The Boresight

Some Thoughts and Discussion

2011-07-16T10:33:00.000-07:00

“You are an excellent researcher -- this is very impressive." (12/2009)
- Andrew J. Bacevich
Author, Boston University Professor of International Relations and History (BS, United States Military Academy; MA, PhD, Princeton University) American Diplomatic History, U.S. Foreign Policy, Security Studies.

"We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. " - Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961.

"Great truths are contained in small absurdities." - Bill Moyers

This material is and has been a living work in progress (a working paper) since 2008 at least. The subject can be fatiguing (as it’s just me), and intense concentration is required to filter through immense volumes of material: half-truths and chest-thumping - to try and identify some facts. I have not cited all reference material to protect my research - but it will be cited in the future. Some of the most relevant reference material has been provided in the right scrolling window.

What the reader will experience on this blog is called Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. This includes adherence to the principles of Cogency and Non-Contradiction.

We also need to remind the reader to be cognizant of the Formal Fallacy in Reason called “Abusive ad Hominem” - also called 'personal abuse/personal attack' or 'Guilt by Association.' As it attempts to link the validity of a premise to a characteristic or belief of the person advocating the premise. Example: "You can't believe Jack when he says the proposed policy would help the economy, because Jack does not have a job."
This tactic is logically fallacious (is an error in reasoning and therefore a Formal Fallacy) because the insults/negative facts about the opponent's personal character have nothing to do with the logical merits of the opponent's argument(s) or assertion(s).

Focusing on Russian designed aircraft or US aircraft flown in combat by foreign operators, was found to be a much better window into the subject. When first hand (pilot) accounts presented itself – everything became clear and supplanted 90% of the specifications, figures and assertions by most western defense industry sources; proper perspective(s) could be identified – or just as often Western-industry assertions could literally be discarded all together. Invariably industry assertions of one, contradict industry assertions by another.

Caution must be used to avoid what might be best described as - a level of systemic bias - by the West - even when Russian aircraft are physically flight tested. Let me explain. When American test pilots finally flew a MiG-15 after the defection of its pilot on 21-Sept 1953, they described the aircraft as having “dangerous” handling characteristics in a high-speed dive. The Russians were bemused by this assertion as Russian aviators had been instructed to gain the advantage over opponents in the MiG by climbing. The F-86 Sabre was faster in a dive than the MiG, but the MiG-15 was better in a climb and could fly much higher than the Sabre.

Nevertheless some still insist the American F-86 Sabre was superior because of its radar gunsight, which the MiG lacked. However this was to prove inconsequential in keeping the MiG-15 from relegating the American B-29 Superfortress bomber obsolete. Even when accompanied by F-86 fighter escorts; MiGs inflicted such appalling losses on Superfortress formations that daylight B-29 strategic bombing over the Korean peninsula had to be halted; the MiG removing American air supremacy. Indeed Russian WWII veterans flying the MiG-15 over Korea accounted for a better than 1:1 kill ratio against American WWII veterans flying their F-86 Sabres.

Some observers will maintain that the MiG-15 could not have come into being without leveraging Rolls-Royce jet engine technology from the United Kingdom. Let us remember that years earlier, the vaunted American P-51 Mustang did not become the aircraft - it became - without its redesign - leveraging the British Rolls-Royce V12 Merlin engine.

[Above] MiG-15 gun camera images from the Korean War are generally of poor quality, however here is what are clearly American B-29s heavy bombers in the gunsights of the these MiG-15s.

[Above] North American F-86s, and [below] Lockheed F-80s. Note that the F-80 have not (or can not) jettison their wing tanks.

The 10-to-1 kill ratio over the MiG-15 claimed by American sources (and the F-86 community) the past 30 to 40 odd years after the war, has since shifted to 7-to-1, and more recently possibly as low as 2-to-1. This would be consistent with B-29 daylight operations being forcibly halted. We would also remind the reader the only plausible explanation remaining for lopsided kill ratios when dealing with an aircraft (a MiG-15) that could out-climb, (out-turn), and had a higher ceiling than the F-86 Sabre is: air-combat proficiency. The bulk of these claims are against North Korean and Chinese pilots. The North Koreans and Chinese have/had no (no) history of air-combat proficiency – whatsoever; a proficiency issue that may persist even today.

[Below] Aircraft evolution during the Cold War was rapid. Clockwise from the top are SAC: Convair B-36, Boeing B-52 and the Convair B-58 intercontinental strategic bombers.

During and after the Vietnam War, immense criticism was voiced that too many targets were deemed ‘off limits’ by U.S. civilian leadership, and that the war could not be prosecuted properly. This augment ignores the fact of thousands of Soviet advisers in theater at the time. Had American planners hit “all available targets” potentially large numbers of these advisers could have been killed. The Cold War could have descended into a larger war - of unimaginable dimensions.

In the early 1970’s the Soviets began unloading a highly secret and special cargo in Egypt. The cargo was four Mig-25 Foxbats. Egyptian personal were kept well at a distance. Soviet Foxbats in Egyptian markings began reconnaissance flights over the Sinai Peninsula and the Mediterranean in late 1971 thru early 1972. MiG-25 reconnaissance flights over Israel were also conducted. Foxbat operational missions were flown with impunity, reaching speeds and altitudes as high as Mach-3.2 and up to 76,000 ft.

[Above] Israeli F-4Es Phantoms in low over the Sinai in an attempt to avoid the Egyptian SAM umbrella during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Note the Phantom signature exhaust soot when not in reheat/afterburner.

Later during the 1973 Yom Kippur war (and beyond) the Israeli Air Force was to become highly sensitive to air-to-air combat losses, and invariably reported these as due to AAA, SAM or simply as "an operational loss" again despite substantial evidence of Arab MiGs (MiG-21) fighters making a good account for themselves, against Israeli F-4 Phantom and Mirage. Indeed, of the over 100 aircraft lost by the IDF/AF during 1973 – a larger (larger) percentage were due to air-to-air combat, than will likely ever be acknowledged by IDF/AF. This issue, with near certainty - persists to the present day.

[Above] The ferocity of the air battles during 1973 October War is all too evident. This MiG-21 gun camera captures the end of an Israeli Mirage “Nasher 9031’ caught in a climb when hit by MiG cannon fire on 20-Oct. Its pilot ejected from the conflagration. The Israeli IDF/AF reported “Nasher 9031 lost to AAA ground fire." (this is typical) ...why?

During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1882, the British Rapier Missile System was credited with fourteen (14) Argentine aircraft destroyed and an additional six (6) aircraft “probable.” This translates to less than twenty (20) Rapier fired at Argentine aircraft. Only after an investigation was the claim adjusted to one (1) Argentine downed by Rapier. With so many (British) shooting at a few Argentine warplanes, if it was hit – each shooter would claim.

The iconic American spy plane, the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird spectacular flight performance - was matched only by an equally spectacular high rate of fuel consumption. A typical ten (10) hour mission for a single SR-71 could see no less than fourteen (14) in-flight refueling tankers aloft and on station, to support the Blackbirds Mach 3+ acceleration runs.

[Above] Called “Habu” by her pilots, the SR-71 flew missions out of the UK over the Barents/Baltic Seas from 1982 to 1989. The Soviet 787th IAP (787th Fighter Aviation Regiment) was assigned MiG-25PD/PDS Foxbats to fly Blackbird intercepts during this period. When Detachment-4 (SR-71) operations ended in 1989, the Foxbat interceptors were withdrawn and the 787th reassigned MiG-23 and MiG-29.

The mighty McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle family is generally credited by most Western observers with over 100 aerial victories, without a single (a single) combat loss to enemy aircraft. A large portion of this (100+) figure is IDF/AF in origin – and must be understood as such:

1981 - According to Russian sources: an Israeli F-15A of the 133 Sqn was downed by a MiG-25P (or PD) of the T.4-Squadron over Lebanon.
1982 - According to Russian sources: (a claim confirmed by Israeli sources) an Israeli F-15D was damaged in an engagement with Syrian MiG-21bis flown by SyAAF Capt Kharah. A second F-15A appears to have been downed in the same engagement.
1983 - According to Russian sources: two (2) F-15As were downed by MiG-23MLs newly delivered to Syria.
1991 Gulf War - An F-15C was either lost or damaged under mysterious circumstances involving ‘contact with the enemy’ near the Saudi border, possibly involving Iraqi MiG-25 or MiG-29 (or F1?)

1991 Gulf War - F-15E Strike Eagle crews appear to have had some harrowing encounters with the Iraqi MiG-29 (and MiG-23?) with numerous missiles fired, but with inconclusive results. How these events unfolded precisely - remains illusive.

The best researched estimates (using non-American sources: as American/IDF-AF sources can be unreliable) conclude that over 130 Iraqi aircraft were downed (with an additional 23 probable) by Iranian F-14 Tomcats during the Iran-Iraq war; with over forty (40) of these using the AIM-54 Phoenix missile. This means the twenty (20) year air-combat record of the F-15 'Eagle' was exceeded in eight (8) years by the F-14 'Tomcat.' Iranian Tomcats literally faced thousands of Iraqi air strikes. Indeed, Iranian F-14 crews fought in more areal engagements than both the USAF and US-Navy combined during Vietnam!

The American Patriot Missile System was widely reported (and shown) intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles over Israel in the 1991 Gulf War. Indeed then US President George H.W Bush exalted the Patriot for this "achievement." An investigation after the war concluded that Patriot hit one (1) or - none - of the Iraqi Scud warheads. This includes a Scud that hit the barracks of a US Army detachment in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on the night of 25-Feb, 1991. Seventeen (17) years after the war, Raytheon (builder of Patriot) literature continued to assert that Patriot missiles had destroyed Iraqi Scuds. It would appear that no less than forty-two (42) Patriot rounds were fired at Iraqi Scuds during the war - for 1 hit.

We all understand that information/disinformation control during wartime can be vital, but fraudulent industry assertions 17 years after the fact - illuminate a vastly different problem.

If we assume (for a moment) that all manner of smart-munitions have an accuracy rate of ninety percent (90%). We will further assume they are used on legitimate-hostile-targets, in high population concentrations, like the large urban area of Baghdad, Iraq. Assuming an accuracy rate of ninety percent (90%) if one drops ten (10) weapons – then one (1) weapon will miss (will not hit its indented target), if one drops a hundred (100) weapons then ten (10) weapons miss, if one drops one thousand (1000) weapons then one hundred (100) weapons miss. How many total munitions (smart or otherwise) were used during 2003 Shock-and-Awe bombing campaign on Baghdad -and in overall totality?

The Boeing Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) Airborne Laser (ABL) system is a Boeing 747-400F equipped with infrared sensors and laser-rangefinder to detect and target hostile ballistic missiles. ABL is to then employ its primary weapon, a high-energy directed-beam (laser) in 747s nose-turret to heat and weaken/destroy the hostile missile. However if ABLs primary weapon – the actual beam - is able to be aimed and directed at ‘beam source’ by a turret of polished/mirrored surfaces - then by definition – it can be (re)directed “scattered” at the target end - by a similar polished/mirrored (rotating) cylindered surface fitted to the missile booster? So in effect - at range - an ABL-countermeasure or ABL-target-hardening.

Care must be used by the public in assessing true capability of Russian verses American (Western) aircraft types using the bulk of Western “published” information. The combat radius of the F-16 verses the MiG-29, look nearly identical; however Western figures are misleading. Most Western F-16 figures are with (with) external drop tanks while for MiG-29 they are without (without) external drop tanks. These types of “information techniques” are just another alarming illustration of the ‘marketing’ of our military to the public, the world, and institutions – and make authentic comparisons from most Western sources; a maze of hyperbole and half-truths. Consider yourself warned…

A blog is not really the ideal format, as blogs are ‘time-stamp’ driven content - so please check back for updates. All material is interconnected and observations, arguments or conclusions are a synthesis of the mostly [but not limited to] the reference material cited under 'Favorite Books.' The implications of my material in totality (for me as an American citizen) becomes almost painful - to contemplate.

Combat Persistence: is a Four Letter Word

The Fighter Mafia whom was largely responsible for the superlative A-10 and F-16, insist that fighters must be small. Indeed they have proposed a new fighter for the USAF that is 30% smaller than the F-16. We agree - but with critical caveats:

Larger, more robust sensor-package and weapons (radar/IRST/longer range missiles), needs a bigger airplane to carry it.
Ultimately, combat persistence needs a bigger airplane.

By the early 1970s, Conformal Fuel Tanks "FAST packs" were developed for the American F-15 Eagle in an attempt to address F-15 high fuel usage. These tanks would become standard for F-15E.

Western observers point out the Sukhoi Flanker immense fuel load will dramatically effect its maneuver performance; that only with a ~ 60% load is the Flanker an effective dogfighter. We’ve been perplexed by this "hair-splitting" as modern fast jets - no matter the nation of origin - inhale vast volumes of fuel in afterburner/reheat. We simply assumed Western observers understood - that it is a near certainty given vast Russian airspace - Flanker will (due to afterburner application combined with the drag of a full weapons load) arrive in the combat-zone with effective “dogfight” fuel weight(s). What then to say of F-15E CTFs?

Strange…

There is no rule that dictates Flanker must always be fueled to its maximum.

Indeed the F-15C in 1991 had the opposite problem; after contact with the enemy, American aircrews nearly flamed-out over Iraqi airspace because air-combat had overextended the aircrafts fuel endurance capability – forcing Eagle pilots to holler on their radios for any Coalition air-tanker to enter enemy airspace to meet the fuel stricken American fighters.

China’s J10 Fighter – Up Close and Slow Motion Train Wreck

How Sino-Russian relations will be effected by Beijing’s theft of billions of Rubles (RUB) of Russian intellectual State property (PRC: J-11b, J-15, and WS-10 programs) – is unknown. The PCR may now be attempting replicate the Russian Su-34.

Swirls of Controversy: Cope India and Red flag 2008

In some respects unilateral US air power may have hit a crossroads against a smart adversary whose air force has shown historical air-combat proficiency. Though one must never underestimate, with respect to operators of Flanker series like Su-30MKK, MK2, MK3, J-11, J-11b and J-15 a case-by-case assessment of these operators historical combat performance - is relevant. Have they demonstrated historical combat proficiency of say an RAF or an Israeli Air Force, or even an Imperial Iranian Air force? Since WWII the United States always fights her wars overseas, over hostile airspace. Always.

The F-22 cost is ~$330-350 million a copy, due the number of aircraft (187) delivered to the US tax-payer at a ~$62 Billion total cost.

Procuring additional F-22s for the USAF will not resolve anything of this. One can purchase between three (3) and seven (7) Advanced Flanker for the cost of a single (1) F-22. To put it another way: if four (4) F-22 Raptors must fly against twelve (12) to twenty-eight (28) IAF flown Advanced Flankers - none (none) of the F-22s survive. The USAF Raptor is simply literally far (far) too expensive for a real world.

The Future of Air Combat?

"Great truths are contained in small absurdities." - Bill Moyers

The sobering realities of the degree and magnitude of air-to-air missile round failures under actual combat conditions - is literally - a revelation.

To pilot these immensely powerful machines - to then hurtle themselves at one another – because your nation orders you to – no matter the training or equipment - is as spectacular - as it is terrifying.

Really - this is at the core of it all.

In the end - it is a human story.

The $62 Billion dollar question

The historical revisionists forgot - then attempt to redefine the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War as “Full Spectrum Dominance” (with its expeditious and quick conclusion.) The real lessons were:

1) A very broad international coalition was employed.
2) Because of ‘1’ - this insured concise and specific military goals of:

• Ejection of Sadam from Kuwait.
• Attrition of Iraqi forces down to safe levels.

3) Proper battle space preparation; No coalition F1 fighter jets were allowed to operate due to IFF issues - had they done so.

4) Nearly ideal Air Tasking Order(s) and Rule(s) of Engagement.

Not "Air Dominance."

* All operations by Kuwaiti and Qatari Mirage F1s were closely guarded and escorted by the French (or tightly coordinated by USAF F-16s from 401 FW) - and they occurred only over Kuwait, where there were no Iraqi F1 Mirages, and thus far away from any kind of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) trouble.

[Above] Lockheed’s previous jet fighter, the F-104 Starfighter - was not only highly unique, but was to become highly controversial. Designed as an interceptor, its operational combat record was to fall well below expectations. Indeed looking back, most would give the nod to the MiG-21, as being better than both its contemporaries: the Dassault Mirage III and the F-104.

US Navy ace Lt. Randy Cunningham and backseater (RIO) Lt. Willie Driscoll defeated North Vietnamese ace 'Colonel Tomb' in the now legendary vertical rolling scissors energy engagement of 10 May 1972 over Vietnam by the Navy flyer unexpectedly chopping his throttles to idle and using his F-4J Phantoms speed-brakes to force 'Colonel Tombs' MIG-17 to over shoot (fly out in front) of the Phantom who then moments later downed the MiG with an AIM-9.

[Above] In this depiction of 10-May 1972, one can easily envision the tremendous impact of 1) helmet-sighting and 2) an aircrafts ability to yaw (‘rudder’) its nose (to use its gun) at very low airspeed at all manner of attitudes. Both the MiG and the Phantom repeatedly exhausted their energy to a mere 150 knots or down into stall speeds - particularity during the top pitch-over portions of the fight. Indeed energy recovery could be more vital than traditional energy-management ‘kinematics.’ Cunningham was consistently out-zooming (drifting out ahead of) the MiG in the vertical, each time the MiG would fire a burst of cannon at the Phantom. Cunningham (simply) had to employ speed brakes (and go to idle) - to avoid "running out of luck" in front of the MiG.

An additional aerodynamic device ‘a speed-brake’ on production F-22 - was deleted - from the YF-22.

We have been unable to determine as of yet if the MiG-25 Foxbat possessed a speed-brake either. This would seem consistent with aircraft designed for high speeds and altitudes?

Raptor must now use her existing control surfaces for rapid deceleration - surfaces that could already be taxed to the maximum during an engagement.

F-22 proponents will sight that she has a superior turn rate (degrees/second) to anything else flying. However the human body DOES have a sustaining g limit of ~ 12-g. Remember, g- loads are universal functions of Newton's laws of motion. F-22 proponents will say that Raptor pilots can use short-duration higher g ‘jerks’ to fly ‘an aerial box’. In all likelihood, Raptor MUST simply slow down to address Newton. Together with helmet-sighting, excellent energy recovery and pilots of equal skill, there is simply no time to fly 'aerial boxes' - advantage Flanker.

Some may argue "well what about Mig-29 with its IRST unit?" I’ve deliberately not focused on the MiG-29 Fulcrum for several reasons:

Its IRST is a smaller less capable unit than Flanker.
MiG-29 is a short range point defense fighter with a small nose and so small radar, and is therefore heavily dependent on friendly ground control intercept (GCI) operator proficiency.
Sooty (dry thrust) exhaust, a tactical disadvantage that can be seen at great distance.
A healthy debate on the exact nature of avionics/offensive/defensive-systems fitted and (again) the degree of historical operator proficiency. The MiG-29 was heavily exported.
To date it has not fared well against better equipped and trained western types in BVR and night combat.
Between 1998 to 2000 Ethiopian Su-27s (foreign or volunteer flown) reportedly downed five (5) Eritrean MiG-29s and damaged a sixth.

Most if not all Eritrean MiG-29s downed by Ethiopian Su-27s, were reportedly in close-quarters turning dogfights, where the MiG is supposed to hold the advantage over the larger, heavier Sukhoi. All air-to-air kills (but one) were scored with R-73s IR dogfight missiles. At least twenty-four (24) R-27s missiles were also fired - with little success.

However might some of this change in the future for Fulcum? See Link (with English narration):

MiG-35 with a new OLS system
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sBoMdRxO0lw

After unification German pilots flying East German MiG-29s against NATO jets in exercises believed the MiG was nearly unbeatable in a dogfight when armed with the Russian R-73 “Archer” short range missiles in conjunction with the MIGs helmet-sighting system. These results led to helmet-mounted sighting becoming standard equipment on most modern combat aircraft around the world.

As was demonstrated by the Indian Air Force MiG-21IBis (I-Bis) against USAF F-15Cs over South Asia, proper training, tactics and effective upgrades can swing an advantage in favor of the “less advanced” aircraft.

Can Raptor approach hostile airspace undetected? This is debatable. During SR-71 Blackbird operations over the Barents/Baltic Seas in the mid-late 1980s, Americans flew along and at times, slightly into Soviet airspace. Russian MiG-25PD/PDS Foxbat and MiG-31 Foxhound units along the Barents/Baltic reportedly always knew a Blackbird was inbound, well over an hour in advance - by intercepting the radio chatter coordinating Blackbird operations and her in-flight refueling tankers and other supporting assests. These MiG interceptions had to be perfectly executed by their Russian air and ground crews to get the MiGs to altitude and in weapons range of an SR-71 - at speed. The MiGs resisted turning on their engagement radars as American RC-135 'Rivet Joint' aircraft supporting the SR-71 flights, were positioned to collect sensitive Russian radar information. The MiGs would use their IRST, which was more than adequate to locate/target a high, fast and very hot SR-71. The Foxbat would either fly alongside the Blackbird for a short period (PD/PDS had improved R-15BD-300 engines), or roll out behind the American spy plane for a simulated stern attack at just under 2 miles. Orders to fire on Blackbird were never given.

[Above] The MiG-25 'Foxbat' interceptor was designed specifically to intercept and shoot down the high flying American XB-70 'Valkyrie' Mach-3 bomber. The Foxbat was a surprise to American intelligence. Cancellation of the 'Valkyrie' program in the early 1960s should have killed the Soviet Mach-3 interceptor 'MiG-25' project…but it didn’t. Soviet reasons at the time included: 1) XB-70 program might be reinstated (again). 2) Foxbat could be used against American Mach-2 B-58 Hustler bomber. 3) Lockheed was proceeding with its Mach-3 A-12/YF-12/SR-71 program. Pictured is the Foxbat ’E’ with a thermal tracker (IRST) under the nose. Foxbat IRST performance at sustained speeds above Mach-2 is unknown; however on the 1st night of the 1991 Gulf War, an Iraqi Foxbat downed a US-Navy FA-18 possibly using only its IRST and R-40TD (infrared) missiles [shown]. In 1977 the Foxbat set an official absolute altitude record of 123,523.62 ft (37,650 m) - which still stands.

The downing of Francis Gary Powers Lockheed U2 over the Soviet Union in 1960 (flying from Pakistan to Norway), forced a reassessment of the American Strategic Air Command (SAC) high altitude doctrine. It would be decided that a LOW altitude penetration doctrine was the answer. This change would eventually produce another Soviet response. Particularly with the development of the American B1 bomber, Russian authorities would issue a new requirement for an aircraft that could also counter low flying threats, with long range, AND be free of GCI limitations. One result was the MiG-31 (Микоян МиГ-31) Foxhound. The Mig-31 [above/ below] is the first aircraft in the world, to take what is effectively a ground-based SAM (phased array radar) system, and design it for airborne usage in an armed fighter. This large (heavy) and powerful radar system on Foxhound is called the 'Zaslon.'

Iran: Satellites and Tomcats

Grumman, Hughes and Northrop design genius in an American funded and Project Persian King facilitated; multi-sensored "Super fighter" that ultimately was to be used to full and chilling effect - in the hands of a foreign operator.

In late 1986, the Pentagon’s Joint Intelligence Group, the CIA, Grumman engineers, the US-Navy and the FTD (Foreign Technologies Division) conducted an evaluation of 132 F-14 parts, along with nine (9) cases containing numerous Tomcat parts – the goal being to determine if Iran was capable of manufacturing F-14 parts; or was paying someone to do so; and if so - who? The results of the meeting were unanimous, and concluded that Iran was in fact manufacturing replacement parts for its F-14A-fleet.

According to the US-Navy, the F-14D was to stay in service beyond 2008, but was abruptly retired from fleet service in 2006 by then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, reportedly due to a “reduction of global aerial threats." When the US-Navy asked for a replacement AIM-54 capability - it was denied.

This same “reduction of global aerial threats” however did not stop the DoD billing the US taxpayer $62-Billion dollars for 187 (Texas based Lockheed) F-22 Raptor “air dominance” aircraft.

The newly formed Department of Homeland Security in 2005 conducted “Operation Fools Gold” to assess if Iran (or others) were attempting to acquire military components presumably listed on the US-commodity-control-list, namely parts for Iranian F-14 Tomcat, F-4 Phantom, and the F-5 (T-38) (among other items). Details remain murky, however parts for all three (3) aircraft were reportedly intercepted – presumably bound for Iran. Only the F-14 was singled out for highly unusual special attention by then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who ordered that F-14s be shredded and Tomcat manufacturing dies destroyed. Why not bone-yarded F-4 and F-5?

Phased Array Radar and Flying Insects?

Had Israel used weapon-location radars in conjunction with Tactical High Energy Lasers (or Directed Beam Weapons), to hit amateur rockets from Gaza - the outcome of the UN report on IDF behavior towards mass civilians in Gaza - may have been very different.

See links:

19-June 2007 Israel Aerospace Industries EL/M-2084

August 30, 2000 Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) delivered to Israel by the end of February

Amateur rockets from Gaza had no “hardening-countermeasures” against Israeli/U.S. Tactical High Energy Lasers

Surely we (all) hold the IDF to higher standards? Alas, the IDF and her government are now facing U.N. warcrimes. What can be said - should be said - must be said - about Directed-Beam-Weapons?

Since the time of this original writing, in April 2011 Israel has suddenly demonstrated ‘operational capability’ against live Gaza rocket-fire with its kinetic “Iron Dome” anti-rocket system matted to IAI/ELTA (weapon-locating class) phased-array radar. We have been strong advocates of this approach since 2008 as an alternative to the IDFs inexcusable 3-week air-land-sea bombardment of (high population density) Gaza in 2008. We trust that Israel will fund this program appropriately.

Development of the Lockheed F-22 Raptor

The worlds first fielded supersonic afterburning engined stealth fighter with internal weapons bays, and tells her pilots to fly around threat-bubbles.

The Raptors primary weapon the AIM-120 missile (medium-range class) necessitates the need for a high speed/altitude launch profile to give the weapon the most possible range and power.

A Painful Road for Sukhoi Su-27 (Сухой Су-27) Series

A remarkable story of an aircraft dragged into existence to counter the "Super Fighters" from America - to become one of the most stunning achievements in aviation - and arguably the most significant combat aircraft since - the Spitfire.

Indeed a proposal was floated in US-Navy circles by retired USN Admiral (Rear Admiral Paul Gilchrist) that the US-Navy acquire Su-33 airframes, and equip them with US avionics and engines.

In late 2009 the Russian Air Force ordered 48 Su-35S to be delivered ~ 2015, with a probable 48 additional Su-35S aircraft after that.

Some care was used to produce this "Soviet F-14 photo.” Note the 'red-star' on the starboard wing.

Persistent Western assertions that Russian aviation designers are incapable of producing superior aircraft (over Western designs) - is all too evident. Here is an original [bottom] and the doctored photograph [top] that claim to prove “Soviet flight tests” of the Iranian F-14A-GR after the 1979 Iranian revolution; that the F-14 Tomcat must (must) have been compromised in order to allow a Flanker design.

This type of fraud is often accepted by far too many in Western defense circles - as fact. The black-white doctored F-14 image appears here: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html

There is no evidence to support that Iranian F-14/AWG-9/AIM-54s were handed to the Soviets after the 1979 Iranian revolution. Are these same Western (and Chinese) observers now correctly assessing (or overstating rather) Flanker operator - China?

What is the purpose of this type of habitual fraud? What else is being (or has been) masqueraded as - fact?

Russia has had a policy of standardizing as much possible, cockpit layouts across a variety of her combat aircraft. This is done to ease pilot familiarization between types. When a new Russian design appears, fitted with “older style” cockpits, the confusion about this policy has often led to misinterpretation(s) and inaccurate assumption(s) by the West about the state of Russian aerospace.

Who would have thought that it would be the engineers and designers at the Sukhoi Design Bureau and TsAGI (the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) that would usher in the swansong for American air power and ultimately address the concerns of President Eisenhower? Perhaps after the 2003 invasion of Iraq - its not a moment too soon.

USN F/A-18 Super Hornet to get IRST

Maybe that F-14D wasn’t so silly after all? How high do we need to be, to use our new centerline drop tank?

Airborne Infrared and Supersonic Stealth

Basically written as response to this seemingly excellent website out of Australia regarding F-22 and the Flanker; the influential Airpower Australia site:

http://www.ausairpower.net/raptor.html

Multi-sensor attack is a combat proven method – using both the radio and infrared parts of the EM spectrum. American F-15C pilots employed exactly this technique in 1991 by alternate firing of AIM-7s and AIM-9s at the same target.

According to Tom Clancy (Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing - Clancy Tom; Penguin Group, 1995) the F-22 Raptor is an 'F-15 Eagle’ weapons platform, in a stealthy supercruising airframe. The only problem with Clancy's description is that the F-15 Eagle was simply no match for the F-14 and its Phoenix missile. No match.

Under the Shah in the 1970s, the Iranians were originally offered the F-15 Eagle as well, but Iran recognized early that the F-15 was completely outclassed by the the technologies that came together in the Tomcat. It is revealing.

Grumman's F-14D was only American multi-sensored fighter that could have challenged (threatened) Texas based Lockheeds F-22 Raptor program, particularly during DACT, (Dissimilar Air Combat Training) exercises. The detect/track range of the GE Aerospace Electronic Systems Infra-Red Search and Track sensor (IRST) and TCS system fitted to F-14D, may have been in excess of (180km) 110 miles. Even todays modernized fleet of F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 Super Hornet were simply no match for modernized F-14D. F-22 during DACT, would have likely fared - no better.

Regarding the rather bizarre circumstances of the retirement of the Grumman F-14D Tomcat under then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and a possible connection to enable "a window for acquisition" of the F-22 Raptor, may seem a bit far fetched?

...but not after reading the names signed onto this letter

[These two links below have been a moving target for several years. Sometimes they go dead only to then return months later. If they go dead again please contact me in the comments section – thanks!]

(B): Letter to President Clinton of 26-Jan,1998:

http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm

(C): PNACs 'Rebuilding America's Defenses' / Sept 2000:

http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf

Threats to Air Supremacy

An excellent presentation produced by the United States Air Force Association. It includes animation of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) radio-spectrum deception technologies. Presentation is definitely worth a look. English narration.

Supersonic Radio Spectrum Airfoils

Some very expensive funny-shaped-airplanes that may have difficulty seeing other funny-shapes-airplanes?

For the Stealth fighter – radar mechanics become a paradox? The stealth fighters air-intercept radar must operate behind a radio-defeating barrier (a stealth nose cone). So either the nose of the aircraft has little or no stealth (so radar mechanic are unimpeded), or its radar will need immense power to - burn through - its own stealth. Stealth proponents might argue that radar return energy is “received” elsewhere (by other sensors in/under the skin of the aircraft). Whatever the case, we’re inclined to conclude that air-intercept/target-detect performance of a highly stealthy fighter - is likely poor – especially for detecting low flying targets.

New information from Aviation Week and Space Technology reported the AN/APG-81 radar being developed for the F-35 JSF was able to detect and then "jam" or "spoof" an airborne F-22 Raptor and her AN/APG-77 radar. Both aircraft are built by Lockheed. Both the JSF and F-22 radar sets are built by Northrop-Grumman.

Fire and Forgotten

Some might ague that the ‘mid-course update’ is not needed for modern BVR fire-and-forget AIM-120-class missiles. This would be an inauthentic augment. The target could change its “predicted” flight after attacker weapon release (“predicted” defined as: target information given to the missile just before release and the weapon is now - flying - to that coordinate.) If this occurs, a revised (new) ‘track-file’ must be (re)calculated and sent via a ‘mid-course update’ data-pulse-transmission - to the weapon in flight.

Two converging radio-spectrum technologies using Doppler mechanics, appear to be on a collision course: 1) the radio-spectrum beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile fight/radar gun sighting, verses 2) Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) deception technologies. No known scheme for active radio (radar) targeting using the mechanics of Doppler-shift will be immune. This may include sampling (by a hostile) of friendly radio and radar transmissions and then feeding these same friendly signals into the hostiles’ primary-weapon targeting-system – to then attack the friendly - with own friendly radio signal-type(s).

DRFM is going to be big trouble.

The sobering realities of the degree/magnitude of air-to-air missile round failures under actual combat conditions - is literally - a revelation.

Total fight-time (propellant burn time) for a functional AIM-9L 'Sidewinder' is reportedly ~ 4-to-5 seconds.

[10-Aug 1999] Chilling HUD image from Indian MiG-21 about to shoot down a Dassault Atlantique of the Pakistani Navy. The MiG’s IR-missile round can clearly be seen heading for the port turboprop engine of the Atlantique.

Russia, Georgia and the Hermes 450

Illustrates the inherent vulnerabilities of drones to fixed

Analysis and criticism continues regarding the entire Russia-Georgia conflict. It is worth noting that it is a universal truth that if hostilities are unavoidable: “the only good war - is a short war.” To achieve a ‘short war’ one must commit overwhelming force. To that end, Russia did indeed use enough (overwhelming) force that the conflict was brought to a speedy conclusion - whatever the resulting view(s), assessment(s), or recrimination(s).

This material also provides a video of public comments on the then Russia/Georgia situation by former American Secretaries of State. Some of the remarks are pointed. In our view, expansion of NATO need not be an issue, as Russia did work with Slovakia to upgrade Slovakian MiG-29 to NATO standards. The issues we see, raised by the former Secretaries comments are:

Do former Soviet states have legitimate mature governments that understand the greater strategic context of their actions?
American Neoconservatives did stipulate that a missile-defense [SAM] system in Eastern Europe is to be used as: “…a base for American power projection...” So what then to make of the comment that Russia is to be sat down and explained what Russia can and “cannot think?”
Patriot [SAM] deployment is indeed "showing our true hand" of the Washington Foreign Policy Establishment, and that the true goal is to encircle Russia. Patriots have nothing to do with an Iranian threat. If current/future Patriot is effective against current/future Iranian missiles, why then the need for both a land based Missile-Defense SAM network and Patriot SAMs? The only answer in our view - for two systems is - encirclement of Russia.

Was Russia to join NATO, would there not have been enormous pressure placed by NATO for Russia to commit combat forces to Afghanistan? This entire notion seems almost ludicrous.

Operational analysis of the war is still illusive. Suffice it to say the Georgia and Russia did operate many of the same types of aircraft and hardware, (Su-25, Hind-24, tanks, etc). The problems associated with IFF (identification friend-foe) would have been substantial - a point that must not be lost or dismissed by Western or Russian defense analysts. Let’s hope cooler heads in Georgia and Russia prevail in the future.

Sukhoi Makes Her Move?

Russia’s roll out her new “5th Generation” fighter, admittedly with some very non-stealthy features; and possibly also to the dismay of some in Western defense-industry circles?

To those in the West that insists that “5th Generation” aircraft like T-50 are a 20-30 year “leap” in capability over 4++ generation aircraft, one obvious impact of T-50 in the next 2-3 years might be as a piloted-operated threat model - to hone – Russian detection/counter-air capability on existing/modernizing Russian 4++ generation fighter fleets (plus some SAM systems) against “5th Generation class” threats. Therefore, T-50 acts as a quasi-Cooperative Threat Reduction program?

Some in the west would say “not so” because of T-50s ‘less-than-stealthy’ features. Then, would not these same Western observers be forced to concede that T-50 is effectively - defensive in nature?

The other possibility is that T-50s stealth is “good enough” to give an opposing stealth fighters air-intercept radar (like an F-22) - problems - for the reasons described here?

========================================

“Then I notice four more MIGs coming in on us at our four-o’clock. I started a break into them, then I had to stop it momentarily and a flight of Thuds flashed through that particular piece of sky. After they cleared, I continued the break, making a screaming 270 degree rolling turn down after the bulk of the MIGs, which were below us, though there were many more spotted up high. In the middle of this break I glanced back over my shoulder to check my wingman. What I saw was his aircraft, a mass of flames from the canopy back, starting to nose up. As I watched, the pitch up increased and, as his airplane ran out of airspeed, the canopies came off and the seats came out. I saw the chutes blossom and knew at least they had gotten out. All of this occurred in fractions of a second. About that time another MIG, possibly the one that had shot down my wingman began shooting at me. The cannon balls were whizzing by my canopy.” 20-May 1967, USAF Colonel Robin Olds, F-4C.

...to witness Argentine aircraft flying through a hail of bullets and gunfire, to streak in over and between, Royal Navy ships in San Carlos water; returning with deep creases running the lengths of their drop tanks from flying so low, they'd actually hit the masts of British warships...

[Above] A surreal photo of an Argentine Dagger attacking Royal Navy warships during the Falklands war of 1982. Indeed on 8-June 1982, HMS Plymouth was hit by no less than five (5) 500lb bombs (none of which exploded), however 30mm cannon-fire from Argentine attack jets exploded one of Plymouths depth-charges, causing severe damage to the ship.

[Above] Note video disruption due to British radar. At playback point 3:22 - something is hitting the water directly aft of the first Argentine attack jet. It is unclear if this is defensive expendables from the Skyhawk or British naval gunfire falling short. The speed and ferocity of the attack - is almost beyond belief.

....to witness a friendly F-105 being hit by a North Vietnamese SAM and as the aircraft burns and begins to fall, on the common radio channel the rest of the flight must listen to an unearthly shriek from the stricken aircrafts radio gear as it begins to melt - the pilots fate unknown...

...Airmen so frightened after retuning from a mission, their hands shake trying to hold a paper cup of bourbon...

The consequences of war carry a heavy (heavy) price - a price that will always be unforeseen.

Surely there are better ways to solves problems…

[Above] An Israeli F-4 Phantom on fire - falls to earth during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Combat Persistence: is a Four Letter Word

2011-07-15T17:23:00.000-07:00

“As we headed south, we realized how critical our fuel situation was. I thought;” This is stupid, we just splashed two MIGs and now we are going to flame out on the way home!” We coordinated (translation: started screaming) for AWACS to send tankers north, and they did. We were still a little worried about enemy contacts. There were two F-1's that Kluso’s flight had seen but not shot at, and there were two MIG-29s that we had chased north. AWACS is telling us that they were coming south again, so here we were up there, low on fuel and with everyone else in our world south of us. ‘Fish’ and ‘Pat O’ are now running north to support our withdrawal. We finally started slow climb to 24,000 feet to improve our fuel flow.

I know that we have shot MIGs, but still that friendly EID I had gotten was nagging me, so I was really happy to see all the F-15s that had been in our AOR on the tanker when we got there. Unfortunately, we were all on different frequencies, so we couldn’t get them off the boom. It would really have been ironic if we had flamed out right behind the tanker! I finally plugged with 600 pounds of fuel in my jet…I couldn’t have gotten anywhere. We each got a thousand pounds of gas, then the tanker ran out. We finally hooked up with a Saudi tanker, which we found after another ten minutes, to get enough gas to get home.” USAF F-15C, 19-Jan, 1991

Above is an excerpt from: ...And Kill MiGs, Air to Air Combat From Vietnam to the Gulf War (third edition), Squadron/Signal Publications, Lou Drendel.

The only 150% certainty in aerial warfare? That aircrews will check their fuel situation BEFORE committing to any (any) action.

With the recent political flap regarding the USAF KC-X program, its time to look at this critical air tanker subject in its larger context.

Since the Second World War, no army has gone into conflict without reliance on air power. A required component for those subscribing to the air power projection doctrine is - something called (air) combat-persistence ... Translation? – Fuel.

The massive 8th Air Force daylight raids over WWII Germany were effectively unsustainable without fighter escorts with sufficient combat persistence (being at the right place and time) to engage the Luftwaffe in a ‘war of attrition’ as the Luftwaffe was provoked to respond to the mass American bomber streams.

[Below] A war of attrition is precisely what it was. Note American four-engine heavy bombers even in defensive formation (bomber boxes) and bristling with their defensive guns – simply defenseless - in the absence of long-range fighter cover. Be warned, the footage is as remarkable and sobering, as it is terrifying.

Had the attrition of the Luftwaffe not been undertaken, indeed the D-Day landings themselves would not have been possible as to risk another Dunkirk.

Whether, when, or to what degree - the US 8th Air Force leadership realized the true significance (on the Luftwaffe pilot ranks) of a long range Allied fighter escort to accompany US heavy bombers deep into Germany, has been extensively written about elsewhere. By wars end, the German Luftwaffe was drowning in new German airplanes, but with no one left to fly them.

Combat persistence can literally determine the entire outcome of a conflict. To this end, modern air tanker support also known as in-flight refueling is - essential.

This issue is especially acute for present day, powerful and thirsty 'fast jets.'

The smaller a fighter is - the better. It can be made more nimble and is harder for opponents to spot. This is the main concept behind today’s F-16 Falcon, JAS 39 Gripen, Dassault Rafale, F-35 and some extent the F-18 Hornet and F-22 Raptor (F-22 is smaller than plane it replaces - the F-15).

However all (all) American frontline fighters: the F-15, F-16, and F-18, as with the WWII brethren - without exception - operate in wartime with additional external drop-tanks.

Ideally modern fighter aircraft should be fully fueled, loaded, in the air - and on station - ready to be vectored by AWACS or ground control (GCI).

The quicker an aircraft weapons can be brought to bear on an opponent (assuming his whereabouts are known and is 'declared hostile'), the greater the effect on the overall combat situation. This is undoubtedly the thinking behind the ‘supercruise’ requirement for F-22 Raptor. In essence supercruise means afterburner (reheat) flight performance (higher airspeeds), using a non-afterburner (non-reheat) engine power settings, also known as dry thrust or military power. In effect - less fuel consumption for distance traveled/over time:

Assuming identical engine power setting:

T = Time, Z = Non-Supercruise, Y = Supercruise, X = Distance

then:
T = 0: then Z = X+0 vs Y = X+0
T = 1: then Z = X+1 vs Y = X+2
T = 2: then Z = X+2 vs Y = X+3
T = 3: then Z = X+3 vs Y = X+7

However there could be a heavy price for one of “5th generation” hallmark features – their internal weapons bays. Stealth aircraft must (in effect) exchange internal fuel-load-space for internal weapons-bay-space.

Indeed we now see F-22 operating with 'higher-drag/zero-stealth' external drop tanks.

Why?

Supercruising may recover 5th-generation-fighter combat radius to some degree - however may not extend unrefueled total time aloft?

...think about it.

The Russian Sukhoi Su-27/30/33/35 Flanker-Series resolves the combat persistence problem by sheer size. Enormous quantity of fuel can be carried internally. No external drop tanks or additional airframe changes are needed to give unequaled (read: no western equivalent) loiter ability and fuel reserves on tap - for combat.

One key to air supremacy has always been the ability to engage or disengage an opponent - at will. The problems associated with disengagement and withdrawal from an opponent as large as the Sukhoi - are very great. Fighters with the endurance of Flanker - are very dangerous.

The problem is - if a portion of Flankers survive an engagement, and unless fresh airplanes are coordinated to cover a withdrawal, remaining Sukhoi should - in theory – have the advantage - the combat persistence - to press an attack on opponents whose must disengage and run for home because their fuel situation has become critical.

This Flanker ability: must not be underestimated. Every moment Flankers might be a threat or could continue to press an attack – the fuel situation of “friendlies” will deteriorate - at an alarming rate.

One need only look at the increasing use of longer and longer range UAVs to understand the relevance of the air-tanker and therefore the combat-persistence discussion.

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

A Spade is a Spade for Odyssey Dawn

2011-07-13T15:31:00.000-07:00

Royal Danish Air Force Badge. Arabic writing is incorporated into the falcons head-body that reads:

"Peace for the People of Libya."

(20-Mar, 2011) Operation Odyssey Dawn is now underway as authorized by UN resolution 1973. Over 100 American Tomahawk and other cruse missiles struck Gadhafi regime targets. We now know three American B-2A bombers also hit LARAF targets in conjunction.

(02-Mar, 2011)"Let's just call a spade a spade. A no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses ... and then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being shot down," - U.S Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

We might also simply remind the reader that: the situation within Libya is no longer simply “an internal matter” as the Gadhafi regime attempts to artificially influence events within Libyan borders by introduction of large numbers of regime backed (financed by ?) foreign mercenaries. To those nations that cast an abstaining-vote on UN resolution 1973, we would hope that all would respect this decision, and thank the members for not casting a “no” vote. We continue to urge for an authentic ceasefire.

Since the start of operation Odyssey Dawn-Unified Protector, it is increasingly apparent that Gadhafi is quite mad, and ceasefire unlikely.

Latest updates [information moving quickly / information may change]:

14-Jul: Increasing reports of female foreign nationals (Colombian/Nigerian) brought in as snipers, fighting for the Gaddafi regime.

13-Jul: The regime appears to have launched a counteroffensive south of Tripoli. Scale of the this attack is unknown but the rebels report that the village of Qawalish has been retaken by the enemy.

13-Jul: Three FLAF MiG-21s [below] photographed over Benina airport on 11-July. Two are single-seat MiG-21bis and one is a two-seat MiG-21UM. This would confirm the defection of four MiG-21s (one crashed - or was shot down - near Benina AB, on 17-Mar 2011).

22-Jun: Libyan state television showed what appears to be the wreckage of an MQ-8 ‘Fire Scout’ helicopter drone, built by Northrop/Grumman.

19-Jun: NATO air strike hits Tripoli apartments; 9 dead - 18 injured. As we have repeatedly warned: continued use of (and belief in) 'precision munitions' on high-density populations areas - will (will) eventually kill non-combatants (read: civilians).

13-Jun: [Below] Gadhafi command bunkers in Tripoli under NATO air attack.

10-Jun: New terrifying footage of heavy fighting during NLA advance from Dafniya to Naimah - village just outside Zlintan, were the regime had deployed a fresh battalion sized (500 men) force. NATO jets can clearly be heard overhead at playback point 11:30. We suggest viewer watch and listen to the entire clip. It is frightening:

[Above] AdA Mirage 2000 660 133-JF at Souda Bay 26-May.

RAF Tornado with EPWIII BLU-109

Excellent Hungarian link of NATO armaments over Libya, including JAS 39C ‘Gripen’with IRST.

[Above] Apache helicopters on carrier HMS Ocean.

[Above] IMA AV-8B on Italian carrier "Garibaldi" of Libyan coast.

29-May: New video(s) of rebel fighting with Gadaffi forces returning fire.

[Above] 5 Qatari Mirage 2000-Mk.9s, four French AF Mirage 2000Ns and three Mirage 2000-Mk.5s

AdA Mirage 2000N 343 116-AH w GBU-31

01-Jun: Two AdA Mirage 2000s make an emergency landing at Malta (presumably one aircraft had problems and wingman landed together.)
01-Jun: The Guardian is reporting that SAS veterans are helping NATO identify Gaddafi targets in Misrata.
31-May: For the fourth time in May, two AdA Mirage F.1CRs run out of fuel and had to divert to Malta after a mission over Libya, yesterday. The reason was a fuel transfer failure on one aircraft, the pilot and his wingman declared an emergency and landed in Luqa IAP.
31-May: the RAF began deploying Enhanced Paveway III LGBs - with BLU-109 (?) warheads (causing reports of "bunker-busters") in Libya.
24-May: French and British attack helicopters: according to French sources, Tonnerre has no less but 12 Gazelles on board (at least seven with Viviane night-vision systems), and 3 Tigers, plus specialists for guiding naval artillery from 11e Regiment d'artillerie de marine (RAMA).
13-May Aircraft of unknown origin [below] is shown operating at very low altitudes over (or near) the battlefront in full view of western cameras in daylight. Aircraft is an L-39 (L-59) class light-attack jet. These aircraft are all known to be operated by the LARAF, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt.

12-May [Below] Reconnaissance image of Mitiga AB, released by the Swedish MOD (taken by SwLM JAS-39 Gripens, which now fly up to 50% of daily reconnaissance sorties over Libya), showing ten (10) LARAF MiG-25s. Aircraft are likely inoperable.

08-May: It appears the LARAF is down - but not out. They reportedly attacked fuel
storage tanks at night at Qasr Ahmed with Aermacchi SF.260s light attack/trainers (pictured below) being the most likely culprit. The aircraft could be operating out of (or near) Misurata, hidden in hangers or other structures. More LARAF activity with this aircraft is expected. Also reports (06-May) of an unknown helicopter dropping mines in
Misurata harbor flying in Red Cross markings.

07-May: Rebels in Misurata reported the regime used "small aircraft, typically used for spraying pesticides, to drop bombs on four oil storage tanks in Qasr Ahmed", near the Misurata's port. The bombs started a fire which spread to four other main storage tanks. These storage tanks are Misurata only source of fuel storage. Reportedly the fire is still burning at the local fuel terminal and smoke is rolling over the city.

03-May: "Unofficial" sources within the USAF reportedly now admit that the USAF F-15E that "crashed" near Benghazi in the night from 19 to 20 March this year, did so due to "lead ingestion" into the engine. (read: was hit and downed by ground fire.) It remains unknown what exactly hit "Mud Hen", but the column of the 32AB the F-15E was likely attacking, was known to have been protected by ZSU-23-4s, SA-8s and SA-24s. (this would also explain reports of the US-Marine V-22 rescue-package engaging in some sort of weapons fire during the rescue).

The GBU-31VB3 similar to what was dropped on Gadhafi compound. Carried only by the USAF F-15E?

01-May: Reports that a variety of NATO munitions being dropped are going unexploded.
29-Apr: This morning reportedly "around 12" regime technicals appeared" in the centre of Dehiba

UAE Mirage 2000 out of Sigonella, with port side PGM-500.

28-Apr: NATO is gone back to hit regime G-2 light-attack aircraft at LARAF Academy at Misurata. There has been no aircraft movement at Misurata since 24-March, but reportedly there is now renewed ground fighting at the airfield.

27-Apr: UAEAF F-16E overshot/veered-off the runway after landing at Sigonella and its pilot ejected. Why it was landing at Sigonella is unclear. The UAEAF presently has six F-16s (now five) and six Mirage 2000s assigned to the NATO.

AdA Mirage 2000D at Solenzara 27-April 11

27-Apr: Growing concern that NATO not doing enough to pressure regime forces because of Gadhafi bombardment causing non-combatants casualties in Misurata. The UN will need to watch this carefully.

23-Apr: Gadhafi T-72 being hit by RPG at point blank range. This is the classic example of what can occur when attempting to operate armor and vehicles in urban fighting.

22-Apr: Global news services are reporting American armed MQ-1 'Predator' series drones are now operating over Libya. This should allow a persistent loiter ability over traditional fast-jets, and also verify the true threat status of whatever remaining Gadhafi antiaircraft defenses (if Predators are not brought down). MQ-1s will fall in the presence of a more sophisticated air defense.

21-Apr: [Below] Rebels training with possibly the French "MILAN" anti-tank weapon,

22-Apr: More and more Internet video producing overwhelming evidence of Gadhafi foreign mercenaries conducting hostile armed actions within Libyan borders.

Rebel video of what appear to be regime tanks:

15-Apr: Gadhafi claimed 2 Chinook helicopters were downed over Brega. All Libyan Chinooks operate from Mitiga No.1347 Squadron - and no rebels acquired or fly the Chinook.
Fierce fighting continues west of Ajdabiya as heavy shelling continues against Misrata. Regime officials deny they have used cluster munitions.
09-Apr: (CNN) Reports bodies of three Gadhafi army soldiers killed in Ajdabia today had IDs from Syria, Algeria and Chad.
09-Apr: According AJE reports: NATO warplanes intercepted a rebel MiG-23 fighter and forcing it land. An unnamed NATO official said the jet took off from an airfield near Benghazi and was intercepted within minutes. No aggressive action was displayed by FLAF MiG-23 and the NATO fighters proceeded to escort land back at the Benina airfield. See here.

10-Apr: (CBS-News TV screenshot) FLAF MiG-23ML with 4 fully loaded rocket pods, formerly flown by No.1023 Squadron from Mitiga AB. This apparently confirm reports about two MiG-23s being flown by defectors to Benina, on 16-Mar in which the other was lost, three days later.

09-Apr: A military helicopter with the Libyan rebel flag reportedly seen flying very low around Ajdabiya on Saturday despite a UN-imposed no-fly zone, the AFP new agency said. The military helicopter had the rebel flag painted on its side was seen flying very low near Ajdabiya [AFP].

FLAF (Free Libyan Air Force) Mi-24 gunship, note the unusual warlord of three UB-32-57 pods and one drop tank. The aircraft was lost shortly after these images were taken due to its repeated attacks on regime positions (hence repeated exposure to enemy fire and SA-24s) and to exhaustion of FLAF stockpile of defensive expendables (defensive flares) for the Mi-24 gunship.

09-Apr: (Reuters): NATO said its aircraft have destroyed 25 tanks belonging to Gaddafi’s forces. 11 of those were hit near Ajdabiya and have helped break up an assault on the city. Aircraft hit 6 vehicles transporting pro-Gaddafi soldiers to Ajdabiya, killing at least 15. On the outskirts of Misrata, 14 tanks were destroyed. NATO air strikes have also sought to take out ammunition bunkers and lines of communications and other logistical facilities.

Remarkable Tornado video of a tank hit, note the regime technicals fleeing the scene. There has been controversy that NATO was unaware of rebels using captured regime heavy armor. More likely it is simply IFF issues - which are a constant concern.

08-Apr: Two SwLM Gripens proceed on their first sortie over Libya from NAS Sigonella at 18:42 hrs local time. An turbo-prob Atlantique is in background.

It appears this is the first forward combat-deployment by the Swedish Air Force in over forty (40) years.

08-Apr: IFF issues are ever-present and resulted in two Allied attacks on rebel hardware.
08-Apr: NATO mounted no less but 164 sorties on Wednesday (compared with 150 on Monday), and is likely to mount even more today: the Canadians may have hit some Scuds.
07-Apr: Allied jets reportedly attacked regime tanks and artillery near Bin Jawad, around the midnight, yesterday.
07-Apr: Ada yesterday reported they disabled a SAM-site near Zintan.
06-Apr: Reuters: Jordan has sent fighter jets to assist in enforcing the no-fly zone. They will be offering logistical support and aid flights.
05-Apr: RDAF (Royal Danish Air Force) attack video is released: http://jp.dk/jptv/nyheder/udland/article2391356.ece
05-Apr: (Reuters) A Libyan-owned ship carrying imported petrol has docked at the regime-controlled port of Zawiyah to relieve fuel shortage, a Gadhafi official said. They did not say where the ship had come from, or how the vessel had been able to get through NATO warships patrolling off shore.
04-Apr: American AC-130s, A-10s, as well as KC-135s, E-3s, E-8s and other support aircraft are planned to stay on.
03-Apr: USAF AC-130 (direct fire) multi-engine turboprop aircraft, A-10 Thunderbolts and US Marine AV-8B Harriers will continue to attack Gadhafi units and other sites through Monday (04-Apr) evening.
03-Apr: Eight (8) Swedish JAS 39C ‘Gripen’ fighters arrive in Sicily. This appears to be the first forward combat-deployment by the Swedish Air Force since the mid-1960s.
03-Apr: Allied fighter jets (French or Danish?) reportedly hit Gadhafi position(s) near the vegetable market in Misurata (RDAF reporting target acquisition has been difficult on some missions).
03-Apr: Reuters: Gadhafi forces (mercenaries) have shelled the town of Zintan, southwest of Tripoli
02-Apr: Reportedly a force of approx 1300 Gadhafi mercenaries heading towards Zintan.
02-Apr: Increasing reports of larger numbers of trained rebel army officers and trained soldiers appearing on rebel front lines.
02-Apr: (Reuters) Allied air hit a group of rebels on the eastern outskirts of Brega late on Friday, killing at least 10. The circumstances of how unfolded is not yet clear. Potential IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) issues will remain inherent here - as it is in any armed conflict.
02-April: Increasing reports of Gadhafi forces switching to rebel-looking "technicals" to confuse Allied air power. We would simply remind the reader that: this will cause inherent IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) issues for - all combatants - including (new) IFF issues for Gadhafi regime forces as well. Current rebel weaponry can knock-out a Gadhafi "technical" more easily than a regime tank or APC - so we'll need to watch this carefully. In effect Allied air power pressure is prompting this shift by regime tacticians?
29-Mar: (AP) USN P-C3 knocked out a Gadhafi naval vessel operating near the port of Misrata, and vessel was forced to beach near the port. American A-10C anti-tank aircraft attacked two smaller regime vessels traveling with the larger ship, and report: one destroyed - one abandoned.
29-Mar: Sweden is sending 8x SwLM JAS-39 Gripen fighters plus support aircraft.

BAF F-16s hit Okba Ibn an-Nafi AB and destroy a LARAF Su-22 "Fitter' left out the the open.

QEAF Mirage 2000 at Souda Bay 30-Mar11

AdA Rafales and Mirage 2000D 28-Mar 2011

AdA Rafale B 118-EC 19-Mar 2011

Newest update (events moving quickly and information may change):

01-April: The regime troops apparently by-passed Ras Lanuf and Brega, and brought themselves into a position south and south-east of Agedabia. A major attack is now expected there.
Gadhafi naval vessel operating near the port of Misrata, and vessel was forced to beach near the port. American A-10C anti-tank aircraft attacked two smaller regime vessels traveling with the larger ship, and report: one destroyed - one abandoned. (AP).
29-March: Sweden is sending 8x SwLM JAS-39 Gripen fighters plus support aircraft.
29-March: CAF Hornets destroyed an ammo depot 92km south of Misurata.
26-March: two flights of AdA Rafales and two flights of Mirage 2000D, as well as two mixed flights of Rafale and Super Etendard destroyed at least five G-2 "Galebs" and at least two Mi-35 gunships, all hit on the ground.

Concentration of LARAF G-2As light attack aircraft and two Mi-24, at the central apron of the Air Force Academy AB in Misurata, on 23-Mar11. Some of G-2As have been hit by Coalition air strikes, and are burning. (GeoEye’s IKONOS)

The infamous Super Etendard returns to the world stage for the UN. The aircraft and her "Exocet" missile became a household name during the Falklands-Malvinas conflict.

RAF Tornado, and below using "Brimstone."

Radar site destroyed in residential suburb of Tajura, 32 km (20 miles) east of the Tripoli on 25-Mar11

USAF B-1B w/ "Sharpshooter" pod at starboard.

A few of key points here:

IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) issues will be a constant concern - for all combatants.
Libyan rebels are not using proper "tactical separation" between their vehicles. 50m to 100m would be a good start.
UN planners must remember that all manner of smart-munitions will only have a curtain accuracy rate. Assuming an accuracy rate of ninety percent (90%) if one drops a hundred (100) weapons - then ten (10) weapons do not hit their intended target.
With the use of our most sophisticated primary strategic assets like the B-2: there is one glaring exception in all of this: the F-22 Raptor. With its US $62 Billion program cost – where on earth is F-22 Raptor ?!? Is it waiting to be introduced in-theater after Libyan era air defenses and other threats can be attrited down by our "older less capable" 4th generation assets?
What we are actually seeing right now is: invalidation of the F-22 as a stealth concept – but not the B-2. This is due to vastly different tasks the F-22 versus B-2 are designed to perform. In the F-22 Raptor program Lockheed/USAF has confounded what fighter aircrews require with what stealth requires.
We've so far been very impressed with the speed and application of Allied combat-power. Heavy regime armor, and 155mm self-propelled howitzers outside Benghazi, appear to have been hit first by French and then additional Allied aircrews - in the nick of time.
So far Allied aircraft are also returning from sorties with unspent ordinance - another good sign.
Sweden has authorized eight of her JAS 39 Gripen fighters to support the Libya operation. This appears to be the first forward combat-deployment by the Swedish Air Force since the 1960s - remarkable.

[Above] The French Air Force Rafale. Rafales were apparently responsible [together with F-15E below, and AV-8B] for shattering Gadhafi armored units south of Benghazi, the night/morning of 19/20-Mar.

[Below] This B-2A returns to the continental US after hitting regime hardened aircraft shelters at Ghardabiya Airfield, in conjunction with Navy TLAMs.

[Below] Post strike USAF B2 / Navy TLAM reconnaissance/damage-assessment of Ghardabiya shown during Pentagon briefing 20-Mar, 2011. All targeted shelters appear either damaged or flattened. Expect UN strikes on Mitiga and Sebha AB.

[Below] RAF Tornado GR4 during in-flight refueling carrying the Storm Shadow attack missiles en route to Libyan targets on 19-Mar.

[Below] Regime ‘Palmaria’ 155mm self-propelled howitzers outside Ajdabiyah 16-Mar.

[Below] Unit of ‘Palmaria’ 155mm howitzers shattered by Allied aircraft 20-Mar, south of Benghazi.

According to Reuters, destruction of 32AB south of Benghazi, during the night from 19 to 20 March, as follows:

14 "Tanks" (4-5 Palmaryas, rest T-72s).
20 IFVs and APCs.
2 BM-21s.
"dozens" of pickups/technicals.
Total: around 70 vehicles.

Apparently, the F-15Es and AV-8Bs caught the 32AB while this was in a night camp, following 32’s unsuccessful first attack on Benghazi (where it lost six T-72s, one T-62 and at least three other armored vehicles).[Above] Unit of ‘Palmaria’ howitzers shattered by Allied (French) aircraft/munitions 20-Mar, south of Benghazi.

USMC AV-8B on Kearsarge.

Regime SA-8 "Gecko" class, low-altitude, all-weather, mobile SAM - ablaze - 20-Mar, south of Benghazi.

[Above/Below] Ammunition 'coking off' and exploding from knocked out regime units.

IFF issues may have caused rebel defences to down rebel MiG-23ML'D' over Benghazi on 19-Mar. Note second additional faint diagonal smoke-trail on upper right of image.

Danish F-16s based at the Sigonella (Italy). F-15Es in background (Getty Images).

AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile rounds being loaded to F-16 at Birgi AB, Sicily (Reuters).

RAF Tornado 20-Mar.

TR-1/U2S with data-link package on spine, departs RAF Akrotiri airbase (Cyprus) 20-Mar.

Norwegian F-16s on tarmac of a NATO military base in Souda on the island of Crete 22-Mar.

RAF Typhoon FGR4 22-Mar.

CAF CC-150 w/ CF-18s

French AF E-3F AWACS

AdA Mirage 2000-5F Solenzara 24-Mar

Rafale M on Charles de Gaule 24-Mar.

Qatar Air Force Mirage 2000 Mk5 EDA fighters at Souda Hellenic AFB, on Crete 27-Mar (AP).

Allied Order of Battle [ACIG] as of 02-Apr:

Air Bases in Italy
Aviano AB

40x USAF F-16C/D Block 40 of 31FW (consisting of 555FS and 510FS)
6x A-10C(A?) of 81FS
14x USAF F-15E of 48FW/494FS; (minus LN 91-0304 from 492FS, which crashed on 21-Mar11, crew OK)
15x USAF F-16CJ Block 50/52 of 52FW/480FS
5x USN E/A-18G of VAQ-132
1x USAF C-17A of 62AW

Note: 31FW F-16Cs were armed with AIM-120Cs and AIM-9X when on CAP over Libya; at least a pair was seen taking off from Aviano equipped with AGM-88Cs too. 52FW F-16Cs are most often seen carrying AGM-88Cs.

Decimomannu ("Deci")

4x EdA EF-18M of Ala 12
1x EdA B707-331B(KC) of 471 Escadron
1x EdA CN.235MPA of Ala 48
6x KLu F-16AM of 322/327 Squadrons
1x KLu KDC-10A (T-264) of 334 Squadron relocated to Cagliari Elmas
6x UAEAF F-16E/F
6x UAEAF Mirage 2000-Mk.9DAD
8x SwLM JAS-39 Gripen
1x SwLM C-130
1x ERIEYE (?)

Gioia del Colle
RAF 906 Expeditionary Air Wing

10x RAF Typhoon FGR.Mk.4 of 3, 11, 29 Squadrons
10x RAF Tornado GR.Mk.4 of 2, 9, 15, 31 Squadrons
1x RAF Globemaster C.Mk.1

NAS Signonella

2x USAF RQ-4B of 9W, Det.4
1x USAF AC-130U of 1SOW
1x USAF AC-130U of 4SOS/16SOW in action 25-Mar11)
2x USAF HH-60G
6x RDAF F-16AM of Eskadriller 727 730 (i.e. Fighter Wing Skrydstrup)
1x RDAF C-130J of Eskadriller 721
1x KC-130J USMC

Trapani

1x USAF E-3B of 552AEWCW
1x USAF E-3B of 552AEWCW
3x NATO E-3A (all without their German crews, which have been withdrawn from ops over Libya on 23-Mar11)
8x CAF CF-18A (or CF-188) of 425 Sqn
2x CC-117 of 429 Squadron
4x AMI F-16ADF of 18° Gruppo
8x EF-2000 of 4° Stormo
8x AMI Tornado ECR RET7 & IDS of 155° Gruppo
4x AMI Tornado IDS of 6° Stormo from Ghedi;
1 x KC-130J of 46 Brigata Aerea now operating out of Pisa
1x VC.10T-1/1K of 101 Squadron
2s AMI HH-3F 82°Centro

Air Bases in France
Avord

2x AdA E-3F of EDCA 01.036

Istres

6x AdA C-135FR or GRV 02.091
Capitaine Preziosi AB, Solenzara
8x AdA Rafale B/C of EC 01.007
6x AdA Mirage 2000C Mk.5
6x AdA Mirage 2000D of EC 02.003 / 03.003
2x QEAF C-17A

Air Bases in Greece

Araxos

7x BeAF F-16AM of 10th Wing
1x BeAF F-16BM of 10th Wing

Souda Bay

1x USAF EC-130J 193SOS
1x USAF EC-130H 193SOS
1x USAF RC-135V
1x USAF RC-135W
2x USAF KC-135
5x QEAF Mirage 2000-Mk.5EDA of No.7 Squadron
1x QEAF Mirage 2000-Mk.5DDA of No.7 Squadron
4x AdA Mirage 2000-5F of (unit?)
6x RNoAF F-16AM
1x RNoAF C-130J-30

Air Bases on Cyprus
RAF Akrotiri

RAF 907 Expeditionary Air Wing
1x RAF Nimrod R.Mk.1 of No.5 Squadron
3x RAF E-3D Sentry
2x RAF Sentinel R.Mk.1
1x USAF U-2/TR-1 (80-1079)

Air Bases in the UK
RAF Marham

4x Tornado GR.Mk.4 (flew one raid the last night)

RAF Mildenhall

2x USAF MC-130H in action 25Mar11
1x USAF OC-135 of 55W
1x USAF RC-135B 55W
?x USAF KC-135R/Ts

RAF Brize Norton

5x VC.10T-1/1K of 101 Sqn
2x Tristar T.Mk.4 of 216 Sqn

Air Bases in Spain
NAS Rota

2x USN P-3C UII (at least one now in Souda)
2x USN P-3C AIP (at least one now in Souda)
1x USN EP-3 Aries II of VP-2 (several flights along the southern Libyan borders undertaken the last week)
3x USAF E-3B
1x E-8C of 116ACW (92-3289, in action 25Mar11)
1x E-8C of 116ACW
1x E-8C of 116ACW
1x E-8C of 116ACW
1x E-8C of 552ACW (80-0138, apparently underway to Rota)
1x E-8C of 552ACW (another apparently underway to Rota)
1x E-8C of 552ACW (two of these aircraft are definitely stationed at Rota AB, two possibly elsewhere; 1 arrived 25-Mar11, 1 arrived 26-Mar11)
4x USAF E-3C

Air Bases in Chad
N'Djamena IAP/Camp Kossei

3x AdA Mirage 2000C RDI
3x AdA Mirage 2000D
1x C-135FR
2x AdA C.160 Transall
1x AdA CASA CN.235
4x ALAT Puma
1 or 2x AN Atlantique

Abeché/Camp Croci

no reports about deployments.

(Note: 4x additional Mirage 2000D + 1x C-135FR deployed "sometimes between 14 and 19 March"; apparently not in connection to Op Epervier, since there are already three Mirage 2000-RDYs there, deployed relatively recently; exact status of the former temporary AdA AB in Faya Largeau some 600km north of N'Djamena remains unknown, but this airfield could probably be used for ops over Libya as well)

Air Bases in CONUS
Ellsworth AFB

2x USAF B-1B (one acted as spares)

Bangor ANGB

3x USAF KC-135s

Aircraft Carriers in the Mediterranean

MNFS/PA Charles de Gaule (R91) (operates as part of TF.473, together with destroyer Forbin D620, frigates Jean Bart D615, Dupleix D641, and Aconit F713, tanker Meuse A607, and a Rubis-class SSN)

8x AN Rafale M of 12F
6x AN Super Etendard NG of 17F
4x AN E-2C of 4F
2x AN Dauphin
1x or 2x SA.316B Alouette III
2x AdA Carcal
1x AdA Puma

ITNS Garibaldi (C551)

6x AV-8B of I GrupAer (WOLF; Home base Grottaglie)
?x EH.101
2x AB.212

USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), with 26MEU on board; all units officially assigned to VMM-266 ("reinforced")

6x USMC AV-8B of VMA-542
5x USMC MV-22A
4x USMC CH-53 (23)
4x USMC AH-1W (164587)
3x USMC UH-1N (31)
1x USN MH-60S of HSC-12
1x USN MH-60R of HSC-12

USS Ponce (LPD-15)

2x USN MH-60R/S of 56RQS

HMS Cumberland

2x Lynx Mk.8

HMS Westminster

1x RN Merlin HM.Mk.1

HMCS Charlottetown

1x RCN CH-134 Sea King

SPNS Mendez Nunez

1x SN SH-60B of 10 Escuadrilla

On the Way in/Planned for Deployment

8x SwLM JAS-39 Gripen
1x SwLM C-130
1x ERIEYE (?)

USS Bataan (LHD-5), with 22MEU on board; all units officially assigned to VMM-263 ("reinforced"); scheduled to replace the ESG Kearsarge)

6x USMC AV-8B of VMA-542
10x USMC MV-22A of VMM-263
4x USMC CH-53 (?)
4x USMC AH-1W
3x USMC UH-1N
1x USN MH-60S/R of HSC-28

USS Whidbey Island

2x USN MH-60R/S

USS Mesa Verde

2x USN MH-60R

LARAF loss/claims to date 21-Mar, 2011 - currently count closed - [ACIG]:

17 February, An-26, captured by protesters in Kufra, after bringing 2000 rifles and US18 Million there.
20 February, Mi-8 or Mi-24, reported as shot down during the uprising in el-Beyda.
20 February, Mi-24 "853", destroyed on the ground at Benina AB.
20 February, Mi-24 "854", captured at Benina AB.
20 February, Mi-24, captured at Benina AB.
20 February, Mi-14 "1406", captured at Benina AB.
21 MiG-23BNs, 10 MiG-23MFs, and at least four G-2/J-21s, as well as several helicopters have been captured by the rebels at Benina, al-Abrak and Misurata ABs; most in inoperable condition.
21 February, unk. transport aircraft, claimed as shot down by ground fire while attempting to land at Gamal Abdel Nasser AB, south of Tobruq.
21 February, unk. helicopter, claimed as shot down by demonstrators.
21 February, unk. helicopter, claimed as shot down by demonstrators.
21 February, Mirage F.1ED "502", flown to Malta by defecting pilot.
21 February, Mirage F.1ED "508", flown to Malta by defecting pilot.
23 February, A.109, claimed as shot down by local protesters.
23 February, Su-22UM-3K, crashed after pilot activated ejection of the crew (WSO arrested for resisting defection; pilot evacuated to Egypt).
23 February, Su-22M-3K, crashed after pilot activated ejection (pilot evacuated to Egypt with severe burns and several broken limbs).
23 February, SF.260 "5A-DME", crushed by T-55 MBT during the fighting for Misurata AB.
27 February, Mi-8 or Mi-24, reportedly shot down by Manpads during attack on local radio station; crew of five captured.
2 March, Mirage F.1ED, claimed as shot down during fighting for Mersa el-Brega airport, (possibly only damaged, but this report by the Toronto Star indicates it was indeed shot down, and that the wingman made at least one turn around that area, looking for what was going on).
3 March, unknown fighter jet, claimed shot down during the fighting in Misurata.
3 March, Mirage F.1ED, claimed as shot down during fighting in Mersa el-Brega, (Most likely a re-report of the same plane claimed on 2 March).
4 March, Mi-8MT "2119/Air Ambulance", captured in abandoned condition at Ras Lanoof airfield.
5 March, unk. helicopter, claimed shot down during fighting in Ras Lanoof.
5 March, Mi-8 or Mi-24, shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting in Ras Lanoof.
5 March, Su-24MK "38", shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting west of Ras Lanoof, crew KIA, one was Syrian (claims about the Mirage with serial "538" supposedly shot down on the same day are definitely wrong, and based on pieces of wreckage from the Su-24MK "38").
6 March, Mi-24, claimed shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting in Bin Jawad area, crew KIA, one of pilots was Syrian.
6 March, Su-22, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks in Ras Lanoof area, pilot KIA; variously said to have been Sudanese or Syrian.
6 March, Su-22, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks in Ras Lanoof area, SyrianBenghazi ever since).
7 March, unknown fighter jet, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks near Ras Lanoof.
13 March, MiG-21bis, flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot (Col. Ali Atiyya), this same MiG-21 now flying for FLAF was lost while scrambling from Benina AB, on 17 March fate of the pilot unknown.
14 March, MiG-23ML, flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot. This MiG-23ML was lost after scrambling from Benina AB, on 19 March, during possible air combat with LARAF MiG-23s)
14 March, unknown fighter aircraft, reportedly flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot.
17 March, Su-22M-3K, shot down over Benina AB, pilot ejected safely and captured; said to be Algerian, (if true then without official sanction by Algeria, so true mercenary. Algerian AF has no pilots qualified on Su-22s, and denies having any pilots flying for LARAF).
17 March, unknown fighter aircraft (possible MiG-23), claimed shot down near Solluch, 50km south of Benghazi, fate of pilot unknown.
17 March, unknown fighter aircraft, claimed shot down over Benghazi around 07:30 local, but apparently came down south of the city.
19 March, unknown fighter aircraft, claimed shot down near Agedabia.
19 March, around 13:30hrs, unknown fighter aircraft, claimed shot down near Fawayhat (suburb of Benghazi).

Balance of the LARAF as of 21-Mar, 2011:

Mitiga AB

1012 Squadron with Mirage F.1EDs (probably 4-6 aircraft).
1023 Squadron with 7 MiG-23MLs and 1 MiG-23UB (at most).
1024 Squadron with 4 MiG-23MS', at least 2 MiG-23MFs and 2 MiG-23UBs (i.e. what's left of that unit after its withdrawals from Benina and Misurata).
1039 Squadron with L-39s.
1226 Squadron with An-26s.
1230 Squadron with C-130s.
1314 Squadron with Mi-14s (other sources cite this unit as "1014" Squadron).
1328 Squadron with Mi-8s.
1347 Squadron with CH-47s.
Police Aviation Squadron with 9 A.109s.

Tripoli IAP

1236 or "Green Squadron" with An-26 and An-32 (fire-fighters).
1276 Squadron with Il-76s.

Ghurdabiya AB (hit by B-2s on 20 March)

1021 Squadron with MiG-21s (what's left of that unit after at least two defections).
1022 Squadron with Su-22s.
1032 Squadron with Su-22s.
1121 Squadron with J-21s (probably including remnants of No.1020 Sqn from Misurata).
1124 Squadron with Su-24s (there should be four of these now).
1308 Squadron with Mi-8s.
1335 Squadron with Mi-24s.

Sebha AB (apparently untouched by air strikes)

al-Fattah Squadron with SF.260s.

Latest LARAF operations:

Reported yesterday in the late afternoon, when at least one "helicopter gunship" was reported in attack on Misurata.

Libyan passenger aircraft are still active over southern Libya and neighboring countries. In the last four days, the following flights are known to have occurred there:

Two B737s returned from Mauritania
A Malian Presidential B727 arrived from Mali
G.550 flew from Ounianga Kebir in Chad to somewhere in southern Libya.

************

In turn, the Libyan State TV by now reported the following claims for allied aircraft:

1 "French jet" shot down on the evening of 19 March

2 "French jets" shot down yesterday, 20 March

1 "Qatari jet", shot down yesterday, 20 March

1 "Qatari jet", "joined the victims of the great Libyan people

Summary for the FLAF to date 20-Mar, 2011:

15-Mar: 6 combat sorties flown: two vs. warships; two vs Agedabia; two vs. Ghurdabiya AB. 1 MiG-23BN fighter lost: reported suicide-attack on Bab Azizia barracks in Tripoli; pilot Muhammad Mokhtar Osman KIA.
16-Mar: 3 combat sorties flown; two by Mi-24s and one by Mi-14, no losses.
17-Mar: 1 MiG-21bis crashed after a take-off from Benina AB, due to technical malfunction; pilot apparently KIA (?)
19-Mar: at least two combat sorties flown; 1 MiG-23ML shot down after take-off from Benina AB, around 07:30 local, possible air combat with LARAF MiG-23s; pilot KIA; it is possible that one LARAF fighter was shot down during the same air combat and crashed south of Benghazi, shortly later.

- Information may change -

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Slow Motion Train Wreck

2011-06-20T14:25:00.000-07:00

THEFT \noun \theft\
a: the act of stealing; specifically: the felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it.
b: an unlawful taking (as by embezzlement or burglary) of property.

[Above] J-15 is an unauthorized attempt to replicate the Russian Naval Su-33.

While the Chinese regime proceeds with her J11-b and J-15 programs (pictured) global governments and the global aerospace community at large, is forced to watch one of the most appalling displays of international intellectual State property theft - in memory.

To those who argue this is whole discussion is revolving around 1970s technology...don’t be fooled. These are the same arguments that say: a modern cell phone has 10 or 100 times the compute-power of the computer used in the Apollo lunar module, that landed on the moon. Okay all that proves is: you don’t need very much compute-power - to land on the moon.

The PRCs J-11b program is an unauthorized attempt to replicate the Russian Sukhoi Su-27SK class fighter, after a 200 aircraft kit deal with China unraveled when Russia detected (after about 100 kits were delivered) the Chinese regime attempting to reverse-engineer the Sukhoi thus abrogated the intellectual copyright agreement. This includes Russian Saturn/Lyulka AL-31-class turbofan engines.

[Above] An authentic Russian Sukhoi Su-33 Naval Flanker.

The J-15 program origins are murkier, but involve unauthorized PRC acquisition of Russian technology as well.

In a time of immense and legitimate pressure to reduce defense budgets – the Chinese have caused both hawks and doves to look at one other and ask: “now what?”

We are not talking about copy-cat fashion handbags...this is State theft of multi-billion dollar programs that included loss of life in the Nation of origin - to develop.

The Russian Federation as the right to control and manage (who/what/where/why) her intellectual State property (particularly with regards to strategic weaponry) and not to have hundreds of billions of (RUB) rubles of Su-27 series design/test/development (this includes TsAGI scientific State research) - willfully stolen by some PRC regime.

The development and flight test program of the Su-27 Flanker Series by Russia costs the lives of two Russian test pilots.

Russia aerospace officials have attempted to downplay the significance of J-11b / J-15 on technical grounds due to organic Russian delivered aircraft will be superior in capability. Surely there is some truth to this, as why would the PRC need additional Russian design references (in Su-33) to “build” a J-15 aircraft?

But there is no response possible regarding international ethics or norm issue.

It is interesting that the PRC is proceeding with these J-11b / J-15 programs after J-20 "Stealth" machine appeared?

To put this in (a western) context: This issue would be equivalent to an aircraft deal with the Chinese regime for 200 F-15 Eagle or Typhoon kits – for the PRC to then build 100 and then say “the aircraft does not meet specifications” - halt the rest of the deal - only to have a Chinese F-15 Eagle or Typhoon copies appear, and fielded (in numbers) by China later (while upgraded F-15s and Typhoon's are still being delivered to their nations of origin).

There would be complete and utter outrage in the west.

There may be another concern: Pakistan. With the demise of Bin Laden, serious questions have necessarily emerged as to whether and to what degree - the Pakistani civilian leadership control events inside Pakistan proper. To understand the PRC/Pakistani relationship see below video of the PRC/Pakistani cooperation and financing arrangement on the JF-17 "Thunder" program:

English narration:

Might the PRC/Pakistan be preparing a roadmap for future illegal technology transfer(s) of Russian Su-30-class fighter technologies into South Asia? Look at this chart (below):

After additional review, it appears that the national markings of many of the aircraft pictured on the chart are Pakistani national markings. The aircraft circled in green could be a PRC J-20 class aircraft (?) There also previously unknown type depicted just below the aircraft circled in green.

The authenticity of this chart is unknown. It appears to be a hodge-podge of aircraft operated by India, Pakistan and/or China. However what is off the most interest is: we count no less than seven (7) Flanker-class aircraft.

Willful and illegal attempted-reproduction of Russian Su-30/33-class technologies could spin out-of-control (outside of Russian government control/oversight) into south Asia if the PRC attempts to “disseminate” Russian technical-intellectual property into Pakistan. Might the PRC have already done so?

Those who might dismiss this eventuality are (simply) not using cogent deductive reasoning. If some Chinese regime sees no issue stealing/propagating Russian fighter expertise into China proper - why then would China have an issue not to propagate this knowledge onward? They see no value in Flanker in the first place – so they steal it – and so they can pass it on – correct? If this is not the case, and they perceive (only their own) J-11b/J-15 programs as valued - how does the PRC justify the theft of the Russian original in the first place?

So if you steal it – you must pass the theft onwards – because you don’t value the work/costs involved development - regardless - and regardless of nation of origin (even your own).

If China asserts it would never pass on Flanker (J-11/J-11b/J-15) technologies elsewhere, that China reserves the right to to control and manage (who/what/where/why) J-11/J-11b/J-15 program costs/technologies go, then China must concede that Russia (at a minimum) has that very same right - and therefore has legitimate concern(s) over PRC State theft - by definition.

This is why we must assume Flanker technologies will be propagated by the State engaged in theft.

Therefore the Chinese State is - by definition - incapable of reason. This then is the issue - and has very serious implications for strategic miscalculation(s).

We trust that the Russian government is abreast of the situation and is watching the events and the state actors involved - very carefully. We trust that all parties that do business in/with China understand the implications for strategic intellectual property.

The Russians must insure they have a counter to J-11b/J-15, and result in evermore lethal versions of organic Russian Flanker/weaponry, yet another unfortunate consequence of agreement abrogation.

So take a good long look at the Chinese State - and how it conducts its affairs when it perceives utility in someone else’s skill, on someone else’s dime, and at someone else’s sacrifice.

Appalling.

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Forward Looking Infrared of F-22 Raptor

2011-06-19T13:02:00.000-07:00

(20-July, 2010) Farnborough UK - Remarkable Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) video of the American Lockheed F-22 Raptor Stealth fighter, the most expensive fighter in service in the world today.

Courtesy of FLIR Systems and Flightglobal / http://www.flightglobal/

The implications of advanced infrared sensor technology negating “the element of surprise” the hallmark feature of the F-22 - might be substantial.

Some may argue that this type of thermal imagery is of too short range to be militarily useful. We would remind the reader that the concern is thermal (IR) detection (used in conjunction with other sensors like radar) not specifically thermal imagery. IR detection could operate at much longer ranges, particularly at high (ultra-frigid) altitudes.

The F-22s primary weapon (the AIM-120C) may operate (well) within this IR detection envelope?

That Raptor aircrews must fly into (into) these IR detect-envelopes before F-22s can fire their primary weapon.

We assume USAF officials would be aware that international aviation events might incur all manner of sensitive instrumentation being pointed at aircraft during an aerial display? If this is indeed the case – then international participation by new and expensive American aircraft may well act as a quasi-Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?

Conversely, international foreign sales of F-22 might be a motivator?

From a technology standpoint, there is nothing to stop all manner of sensitive IR (or other EM band) location-targeting sensors from being deployed on dedicated (or integrated into) current/future ISR, AEW or AWACS class platforms.

Your Thoughts?
- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

A Painful Road for Sukhoi Su-27 (Сухой Су-27) Series

2011-06-18T14:04:00.000-07:00

Described as an aerodynamic miracle by some, and a masterpiece by others, the Sukhoi Su-27 (Сухой Су-27) Series (NATO named: Flanker) has evolved into one of the finest achievements in modern aviation - of any nation.

To understand why Flanker is understood and described in these terms - simply watch:

Watch the aircraft roll onto its back - at near zero airspeed [at playback 1:30] Note the superb energy recovery [at payback 2:10] followed by a simply impossible maneuver. What were are dealing with here is an aircraft 1/3 larger than McDonald-Douglas F-15 Eagle while more maneuverable than the Lockheed F-22 Raptor.

[Below] Note maneuvers at playback points: 0:31, 2:13 and 4:39.

The Sukhoi Su-27 is a non-stealth design developed during the last years of the USSR by Sukhoi Design Bureau Chief Designer, Mikhail Simonov (prototype T-10S). At the time the Russians needed to counter both high flying reconnaissance aircraft like SR-71 and the low level F-111, FB-111, Tornado, cruise missiles, and well as the Rockwell B1. It also needed enormous range to cover the vast expanses of Russian airspace and to (together with the MiG-31 Foxhound) replace the Sukhoi Su-15 and Tupolev Tu-28 interceptors.

[Left] F-15-like model (far right) used as a test baseline.

The other requirement was it needed to be significantly superior to the superb new 'super-fighters' being fielded by NATO, including the Grumman F-14 Tomcat, McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle, General Dynamics F-16 and later, the Northrop-McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet.

It must be said that developing an aircraft to counter the US-Navy F-14 Tomcat and its combination of AN/AWG-9 plus AIM-54 'Phoenix' missile system - remained 'not a simple matter.'

Development started in 1970, and first T-10-1 prototype did not fly until 20 May 1977. The test program was very difficult and after a fatal crash on 7 May 1978, Mikhail Simonov was brought in by Sukhoi to design a whole new aircraft.

According to Mikhail, the only parts his new T-10S inherited from T-10 predecessors were landing gear wheels and ejection seat. T-10S-1 made its maiden flight on 20 April 1981. Development problems persisted resulting in a second fatal crash on 23 December 1981.

These problems were not resolved until 1983. However the T-10S series did have some surprises for its designers. A miscorrelation between smaller-scale test models versus the full sized real aircraft, resulted in better performance on the real aircraft. The Su-27s high Angle Of Attack (AOA) and low speed handing was so astonishing that Sukhoi test pilots thought they had faulty readings from their instruments. A two seat version was also developed. Operational VVS units began to receive production Su-27 (Flanker-B) around 1984. About the same time the superlative Su-33 Naval Flanker was also developed.

Without going into lengthily design analysis, the Flanker bares striking similarities in layout to both the American Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the General Dynamics F-16, seemingly a blend of these two concepts. How much the design was influenced by the F-14 is a subject of debate in some defense circles. There is no evidence however, to support - as many suggest - that the Soviets flight tested F-14A-GR Tomcats from Iran after the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

The Flanker is big (roughly 30% larger than the F-15 Eagle) and only makes the Flanker agility even more impressive.

The Flanker not only uses a statically unstable roll axis (pioneered on the American F-16) but also a statically unstable pitch axis, using fly-by-wire flight control systems to compensate. Later variants of Flanker have effectively no AOA limits.

The Su-27 Flanker uses two Saturn/Lyulka AL-31 class turbofans, rated at ~122.8 kN (27,600 lbf) and have tremendous tolerance to severely disturbed air flows. Fitted at the bottom of each engine nacelle near the intakes is a cleaver louver-system that assist engine gas flow - even if the aircraft flys tail-forward. The AL-31FP and AL-37FU variants have thrust vectoring. The Su-27 has also taken several time-to-climb records away from the American F-15 Eagle. The Flanker's range is ~ 3,600-to-4,000 km without external fuel tanks - this un-refueled range has no western equivalent.

New upgraded engines should propel Flanker thru Mach 1 into “supercruise’ at non-afterburner (non-reheat) power settings. This should give Flanker even greater combat persistence - and allow Flanker to remain at the top of the air-combat fighter tree, a tree that includes the American F-22.

The Flanker will always be associated with the Pugachev Cobra Maneuver: a post-stall maneuver named after Sukhoi test pilot Viktor Pugachev, who first performed the maneuver officially in 1989 at the Paris Le Bourget air show. Many described seeing the Cobra for the first time as a religious experience.

After Paris, many in the western defense community began to dismiss Cobra as having no tactical significance. However, the USAF Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, immediately attempted to repeat the maneuver with an F-16 using a modified flight-control system, but these results were at best - mixed.

It’s important to remember that Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) training has always taught that nose-pointing is critical: “the guy that points his nose at the other guy first - wins.” Highly maneuverable aircraft are also better at defeating an opponents missile shot.

The super-maneuverability demonstrated by Sukhoi without (without) thrust vectoring, was concern in the West. The Americans and Europeans respond in the mid-90s with several super-maneuverability test programs that were to incorporate thrust vectoring and nose pointing. Below are two of these: the American NASA ‘MATV’ F-16 with somewhat subtle (but nonetheless pronounced) altitude gain of the MATV F-16 during a 'Cobra' maneuver.

The second was the X-31 [below], collaboration between Rockwell/Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm. After listening to the narration, imagine what would have happened to Western air forces had war broken out against Flankers equipped with helmet-sighting?

Since its initial deployment, the Flanker has gone through a seemingly endless array of improvements and refinements. To date, Professor V.K. Grishin, the chief designer of Zalson S-800 passive phased array radar on MiG-31 has also focused attention on Flanker sets.

An infrared search and track (IRST) system is fitted which also incorporates a laser rangefinder. This system is nearly identical in concept to the F-14 Tomcat, in that it can slave (can point) its radar at what IRST 'sees' or can slave IRST to what the radar 'sees'. The Sukhoi IRST system incorporates a unique twist, in that its IRST controls the cannon, providing greater accuracy than radar sighting can.

The most significant evolution of air-to-air Flanker was designated Su-27M. Externally looking similar to other types, but in reality was an entirely new airframe using advanced systems, including DFRM wingtip pods, and a new rear-chute 'stinger' housing that may incorporate some type of rearward "targeting device."

One of the few western documentary reports author could locate on Flanker [American narration]:

The Flankers superb abilities did not go unnoticed by American military brass. Indeed a proposal was floated in US-Navy circles by retired USN Admiral (Rear Admiral Paul Gilchrist), that the US-Navy acquire the Su-33 and equip them with US avionics and engines.

US-Navy interest in the Su-33 should not be dismissed. The Su-33 folded-width is smaller that the American F/A-18 Hornet and even the A-4 Skyhawk!

Remarkable.

In 1997 the US acquired from Moldova or Ukraine, one or two Su-27S (export variant) aircraft for evaluation and testing, possibly under civilian registration.

Sukhoi Su-31 Sport Aircraft (of Su-26/29/31 Series)

As of 2005, Sukhoi has reportedly made over ten thousand (10,000) changes to the Flanker series, to counter any technologies that could have been compromised as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The Flanker is going to be with us for quite a while. Its airframe has tremendous growth potential. Its large size allows for extreme high power (and high cooling capacity) electronic offensive-defensive systems. New radar(s) have apparently been incorporated-embedded in the leading edges of the (Su-35S?) wings. This should insure DoD/USAF/USN planners plenty of restless nights well into the future.

When American fighter pilots we’ve spoken with, are casually asked about Flanker, the reply has been nearly universal: “That thing is a nightmare.”

With its large nose (radar angular-resolution potential), IRST assist, weapon load-out without carriage restrictions, helmet sighting, low speed maneuvering, new wing wing radars, and its unmatched unrefueled combat range - and in the hands of a skilled pilot the Sukhoi Flanker must be regarded as: beyond-formidable, even in the presence of Stealth.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Libyan Conflict: Fixed-wing Combat Aircraft make an Appearance

2011-03-20T11:50:00.000-07:00

19-Mar, 2011, UN forces strike at Gadhafi air-defences. Events moving so quickly that we'll begin a new posting on no-fly zone enforcement. Suffice it to say tomahawk cruse missile strikes have been conducted. 17-Mar, 2011 - UN Security Council adopts resolution to impose a no-fly zone 10-0 with 5 abstentions

(02-Mar, 2011) LARAF heavy 'fixed-wing' combat aircraft are - in fact - operating. Clip (see link) clearly shows and LARAF Su-24MK Fencer-D dropping bombs. The Su-24 is an F-111/Tornado interdiction/strike class aircraft. Opposition AAA (antiaircraft artillery) can clearly be heard in the clip. BBC video w/sound:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12618367

Dropping single bombs in ‘manual-mode’ is not typically the Su-24s method of attack.

(19-Mar 2011) Dramatic images of an MiG-23ML being hit over Benghazi:
From Polish Television
From Reuters

As rebel aircraft begin to operate, we'll need to watch for IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) issues for all combatants.

LARAF losses to date 19-Mar 2011 [ACIG]:

17 February, An-26, captured by protesters in Kufra.
20 February, Mi-8 or Mi-24, reported as shot down during the uprising in el-Beyda
20 February, Mi-24 "853", destroyed on the ground at Benina AB.
20 February, Mi-24 "854", captured at Benina AB.
20 February, Mi-14 "1406", captured at Benina AB.
21 February, unk. transport aircraft, claimed as shot down by ground fire while attempting to land at Gamal Abdel Nasser AB, south of Tobruq.
21 February, unk. helicopter, claimed as shot down by demonstrators.
23 February, A.109, claimed as shot down by local protesters.
23 February, Su-22UM-3K, crashed after pilot activated ejection of the crew (WSO arrested for resisting defection; pilot evacuated to Egypt).
23 February, Su-22M-3K, crashed after pilot activated ejection (pilot evacuated to Egypt).
23 February, Mirage F.1ED "502", flown to Malta by defecting pilot.
23 February, Mirage F.1ED "508", flown to Malta by defecting pilot.
23 February?, SF.260 "FA-DME", crushed by T-55 MBT during the fighting for Misurata AB.
27 February, Mi-8 or Mi-24, reportedly shot down by Manpads during attack on local radio station; crew of five captured.
2 March, Su-22M-3K, claimed as shot down during fighting in Mersa el-Brega, more likely only damaged.
3 March, unknown fighter jet, claimed shot down during the fighting in Misurata.
3 March, Mirage F.1ED, claimed as shot down during fighting in Mersa el-Brega.
4 March, Mi-8MT "2119/Air Ambulance", captured in abandoned condition at Ras Lanoof airfield.
5 March, unk. helicopter, claimed shot down during fighting in Ras Lanoof.
5 March, Mi-8 or Mi-24, shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting in Ras Lanoof.
5 March, Su-24MK "38", shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting west of Ras Lanoof, crew KIA, one was Syrian.
6 March, Mi-24, claimed shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting in Bin Jawad area, crew KIA, one of pilots was Syrian
6 March, Su-22, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks in Ras Lanoof area, pilot reportedly captured, said to be Sudanese
6 March, Su-22, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks in Ras Lanoof area, pilot reportedly captured, said to be Syrian
7 March, unknown fighter jet, claimed shot down by ZPU-4s during attacks in Ras Lanoof area
16 March, unknown fighter jet, reportedly flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot.
16 March, unknown fighter jet, reportedly flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot.
15 March, MiG-21bis, flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot (Col. Ali Atiyya).
15 March, MiG-21bis, flown to Benina AB by defecting pilot. (Note: one of two MiG-21s was lost while scrambling from Benina AB, on 17 March, fate of pilot unknown).
17 March, Su-22M-3K, shot down over Benina AB, pilot ejected safely and captured; said to be Algerian.
17 March, unknown fighter aircraft, claimed shot down near Solluch, 50km south of Benghazi, fate of pilot unknown.

FLAF 'Free Libyan Air Force' update to date 17-Mar 2011 [ACIG]:

15-Mar: 6 combat sorties flown: two vs. warships; two vs Agedabia; two vs. Ghurdabiya AB. 1 MiG-23BN fighter lost: reported suicide-attack on Bab Azizia barracks in Tripoli.
16-Mar: 3 combat sorties flown; two by Mi-24s and one by Mi-14, no losses.
17-Mar: 1 MiG-21bis crashed after a take-off from Benina AB, pilot apparently KIA.

[Above] Rebel Mi-24 "Hind" gunship underway near Ajdabiya on 16-Mar. (LA Times)

[Above/Below] LARAF Su-22M-3K (NATO: Fitter). Aircraft "311" would be photographed over Ras Lanoof on 10-Mar 2011.

[Below] MiG-23BN Flogger-H Attack-jet. This type may have been involved in attack of regime warships off Agedabia and regime airbase at Syrte on 15-Mar.

[Above] LARAF MiG-23UB two seat trainer [Below] Ex-Syrian AF aircraft designated MiG-23ML'D' (Export) Fighter "6718" of 1023 Squadron.

LARAF reportedly has only two active MiG-23 units left: No.1023 Squadron with some 10-11 MiG-23MS/UB/MLs at Mitiga AB, and No.1050 Squadron with a (probable) similar number MiG-23MFs at Misurata AB.

[Above] LARAF MiG-21UM. [Below] G-2 light attack jet/trainer.

Be advised that political-officers are (were) reportedly attempting some control of LARAF pilots- placed in copilot position during sorties. Also there confirmed reports of foreign or "volunteer" pilots in service for LARAF.

Su-24MK "38", shot down by ZPU-4 during fighting in Ras Lanoof.

[Above]: Su-22M "311" apparently armed with RBK-250 cluster bombs, underway over Ras Lanoof on 10-Mar.

LARAF update (as of 8-Mar 2011):

Mitiga and Ghurdabiya-Syrte are in full ops. Mitiga is the centerpiece and must be very busy right now, housing:

1012 Squadron with Mirage F.1EDs (or what's left of them).
1022 Squadron with Su-22M-3Ks (except they concentrated all remaining Su-22s in Ghurdabiya).
1023 Squadron with MiG-23.
1039 Squadron with L-39s (these appear to be active over Zawiya).
1226 Squadron with An-26.
1230 Squadron with C-130.
1328 Squadron with Mi-8.
1314 Squadron with Mi-14.
1347 Squadron with CH-47C.
Police Aviation Squadron with A.109 (supposedly, "only" nine of these are left), also at Mitiga, plus 1236 Squadron (An-26) and 1276 Squadron (Il-76) at Tripoli IAP.

Ghurdabiya-Syrte:

1032 Squadron with Su-22M-3K.
1121 Squadron with J-21s (flown in from Ma'arten as-Sahra?)
1124 Squadron with Su-24MKs (between 3 and 5 remaining).
1021 Squadron's MiG-21s have been concentrated there too (they are certainly not in Tobruq any more), but maybe too short-ranged for ops in Ras Lanoof area?
020 Squadron lost the majority of its G-2s and J-21s in Misurata (quite a few were found there); the rest might have been evacuated to Ghurdabiya or elsewhere still under the control of the regime.
1308 Squadron with Mi-8.

All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties.

China’s J-20 Enters Stealth Fray

2011-02-19T14:08:00.000-08:00

(05-Jan, 2011) China’s J-20 "fifth generation stealth fighter” finally makes an appearance. The aircraft is black, large, has a one piece canopy, canards, conventional exhaust nozzles and a shiny nose tip similar to the American F-35 (also under development). New images have surfaced of the aircraft in flight. J-20 is appears heavily influenced/dependent on the Russian Mikoyan MiG 1.42 / 1.44 / MFI of the late 1990s. We're inclined to concur with new observations that J-20 is effectively "a mishmash" of older U.S. and Russian designs.

Borrowing ideas from elsewhere to influence the design of particular said aircraft is nothing new, but whether J-20 represents any (generational or otherwise) leap in PLAAF capability - remains an open question.

The American/Pro-American defense lobby is sure to interpret the J-20 as a severe threat to US and regional security, and call to restart the F-22 production line. We are inclined to reject these threat assessments due to the sobering nature of factors detailed (and hyper-linked) further down the body of this writing.

As a separate matter, we've supported offering an export version of F-22 for foreign sale, again for the same reasons outlined.

The best article on J-20 we've seen-to-date, graciously brought to our attention by our readers.

The Chengdu J-20

Raw footage of what is reported to be J-20 first flight [includes launch of J-10 chase aircraft]:

To be honest, we were caught off guard by the appearance of J-20. The PRC appears to be resolute at conducting (real or perceived) force modernization – at all possible speed. We would still caution the reader that design/development of combat aircraft (in particular) remains - not a trivial affair – even for nations with long histories of aviation design, development, and technology breakthrough. China will not be immune from any of an array of: conflicting/uneven program-platform requirements, design, propulsion, and developmental issues – both seen and unforeseen.

Direct or indirect (current) Russian assistance is unclear due to the “J-11b incident” (international intellectual copyright violation-abrogation by the Chinese State of the Russian Su-27 ‘Flanker’ fighter jet) that surely has had an impact on Sino-Russian relations. The PRC is proceeding with both J-11b and J-15 programs.

As of yet, we have not been overly impressed with stealth fighters for the reasons described here. When combined with available historical evidence, stealth fighter (fighter) technology does not stand up to (inductive/deductive) critical analysis, particularly against a modern multi-sensored aerial opponent with DFRM and helmet-sighting (unobstructed fields of view for missile seeker heads ) – for which no stealth fighter in existence today - has been tested/evaluated/pitted against - in any authentic manner.

The emphasis on radio-spectrum-airfoils (stealth) for fighters and for reduced drag - forces:

Internal weapon bays/carriage restrictions.
so reduces space for internal fuel.
which force increased aircraft size/or the use of external tanks.
all bad for "the element of surprise" Stealths hallmark feature.

[Below] Lockheed's F-35 (JSF). [Above] Note vertical tails of J-20.

How sheath fighters using only radar overcome the paradox of defeating the same radio-energy they need to detect targets, and for own communication/coordination/identification-friend-or-foe (and in weather) - has not been addressed in any serious way. In wartime these issues will emerge – too late for the aircrews already strapped in their cockpits.

[Above ] J-20 [Below] The MiG-1.44.

[Above] MiG-1.44 [Below] The J-20.

Global aircraft development trends are nothing new. In the early 1950s most fighter/interceptors were designed to only to use air-to-air missiles. Guns at the time, were seen as totally unneeded. Later this would be recognized as ill-advised miscalculation by the global design community. Guns were (re)fitted (sometimes hastily so) to all later aircraft.

[Below] Lockheed's F-35 JSF. Note similar DSI intake design on J-20 to aircraft like F-35. Note J-20 shiny nose tip.

We would simply say that: other than opposing stealth fighters having trouble detecting each another, (the Russian PAK-FA and the American F-35 seem to be aware of the problem by retaining a thermal IRST station), the only real strategic effect of stealth fighter programs is that vast resources are exhausted on them - rather than elsewhere. Stealth technology is locked in a pitched running battle with sensor technology - a battle the Stealth fighter cannot win.

Some might be underestimating the thirst by the Chinese leadership for international prestige - regardless of any real or perceived aircraft capability?

As some in the Washington defense establishment weighs in on (or just as likely - says nothing of substance?) on the implications of a PRC J-20 class aircraft, the US-Navy is likely viewing the 'forced retirement' of the F-14D Tomcat with new/invigorated concern? Tomcat variant “D” (or further enhanced versions) with her AIM-54 system, would by definition, have dramatically altered the scope of the discussion on whatever threat(s) the Chinese could (hypothetically or otherwise) impose on USN battle groups, now and in the future.

[Below] The authenticity of this chart is unknown. Aircraft circled in green appears to be J-20. Of perhaps greater interest - we count no less than seven (7) examples of the Russian Flanker-series aircraft. In addition, the aircraft depicted just below J-20 is a previous unknown type. Could there soon be (unauthorized by Russia) Flanker-class proliferation by (Chinese) State illegal manufacture (J-11b) into South Asia?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

The Future of Air Combat?

2010-12-14T20:55:00.000-08:00

F-15C firing the AIM-7 Sparrow

"Our plan was to kill these guys at long range and leave. J.B. (number 3) and I locked them up with AIM-7's and we were ready to shoot at about fifteen miles when they maneuvered again and both our radars broke lock. As they came back to the south again, my wingman (Pitts) locked up the leader, and I got a lock on the trailer. But our closure rate was so great, and they were so close, not to mention twenty-thousand feet below us, that we just couldn't get a face shot on them.
As we got into the merge, the lead bandit started a big right hand turn, while the trailer just spit right on through, heading south, and left the fight. Pitts rolled over and split-S down towards the lead bandit. The other guy was going to be out of range before I could do anything about it. So I rolled over and covered Pitts as he went for the Iraqi fighter. J.B. and Willie stayed high to support us. Cherry rolls in behind this guy and starts shooting missiles. He shot an AIM-9, and AIM-7, another AIM-9, and finally another AIM-7. He had a couple of missile failures, (we never figured out why) and the Iraqi was doing a pretty good job of evading. It was a MIG-25 Foxbat and, though he wasn't maneuvering that hard, because they can't turn that hard, he was putting out a lot of chaff and flares. I also shot an AIM-9, but it was Pitts' second AIM-7 that got him. As soon as it hit him the enemy pilot punched out. My sidewinder also guided and hit him, but the guys had already punched out. We watched the MIG fireball through the low haze layer and hit the ground."
19 Jan, 1991, four F-15C USAF vs two MIG-25 Iraq.

The above is an excerpt from: ...And Kill MiGs, Air to Air Combat From Vietnam to the Gulf War (third edition), Squadron/Signal Publications, Lou Drendel.

The 'Big' MiG-25 Foxbat

How any future jet fighter (and its pilot) can mitigate immense closure rates under compressed timeframes is difficult to contemplate. Most initial engagements are nearly always head-on, to avoid the merge. If there's a glitch, attacker-defender will be on-top of each other in moments.

This is the reason helmet-sighting will be so critical.

Under actual combat conditions - modern air-to-air engagements can easily see (regardless of number of aircraft involved) 50% of all (all) missiles fired: fail to hit their targets (on both sides) - for all reasons.

Again from Lou Drendel:

"He turned from east to south to north (270 degrees) and now I was behind him about 9000 feet back and started to launch missiles. I shot and AIM-9, an AIM-7, an AIM-9 and another AIM-7. I can remember thinking after the second AIM-9…”what the #%@! is it going to take to knock this guy down?!!” He was doing a world class job of being defensive. The last AIM-7 went right up his tail pipes…”

“We started shooting shortly after locking them up. Draeger’s first AIM-7 was a ‘motor-no-fire’ (the missile came off the rail but the motor failed to fire) so he quickly launched second AIM-7, which appeared to guide. I fire one AIM-7 at my guy shortly afterwards. At about the same time Till (number four) fired an AIM-7 but his missile went hung (did not come off the rail). Rodriguez (number three) fired an AIM-7 just as Till fired a second time…”

Historical evidence strongly suggests that highest missile kill-probabilities for medium-range missile BVR shots - are at ranges roughly ½ to 1/3 the publicly stated 'Operational Range.' American aircrews typically did not release (fire) their AIM-7 (medium range class missile round) until target distances had closed to roughly 12-15 miles (target closing head on) despite "operational range" published for later versions of the AIM-7 out to thirty (30) miles.

All fire-and-forget class missiles require mid-course update after "fox" from the attacking aircraft radar to engage at range. Yes, one can be fire in an 'instant-on' mode of the rounds own seeker-head, brevity code “Pit bull” but:

The radar of the missile round is much less powerful than that of the launch aircraft.
There is only finite internal battery-power in the weapon for flight control systems, surfaces, and electronics.
Is typically done closer to minimum side of a missiles engagement envelope.

The AIM-54 Phoenix missile used only by the F-14 Tomcat, was also a fire-and-forget class weapon similar to AIM-120 or Vympel R-77.

Iranian F-14 Tomcat with AIM-54s

On 15-May 1981, during the Iran-Iraq war, an Iranian F-14A-GR Tomcat fired an AIM-54 at a MiG-25RB Foxbat - at long range, roughly head-on. The MiG did not react (know) it was under attack until the Tomcats AWG-9 transmitted its 'mid-course update data-burst' to its AIM-54 (while the Phoenix was still in mid-flight before the AIM-54s own terminal homing radar went active.) The Foxbat ECM gear picked up this transmission (this AWG-9 transmission-data-burst was less than 2 seconds) and the MiG pilot executed a powerful maneuver that defeated the AIM-54 shot (only just). The Foxbat and Tomcat were to have a further series of spectacular engagements during the war.

This was over 27 years ago.

Modern or future combat jets most certainly will be equipped with a Threat Warning System that listens for a AIM-120 mid-course update data-burst from say an AN/APG-77.

From here two (2) things could happen:

First, Threat Warning System triggers automatic release of expendables: chaff and flares. Second, defending pilot then initiates a defensive beaming / beam-turn / Doppler turn maneuver to attempt to defeat the AIM-120 shot.

This type of cat-mouse Doppler turn played out over-and-over during Desert Storm in 1991 to break attacking aircraft radar locks. A good radar-set will re-acquire the target and establish a new ‘track-file’, but it’s not a guarantee especially under the compressed time-frames during an intercept.

Argentine Mirage III EA.

Royal Navy BAE Sea Harrier FRS

If F-22 Raptor is to be flown at high altitude, at supecruise speed verses planes like Sukhoi Flanker - a situation similar to what occurred in the early stages of the Falklands conflict could emerge? Argentine Mirages stayed at high altitudes while Royal Navy Harriers remained at medium-low altitudes, (neither-side content to give away his advantage) in what is best described as a series of 'non-engagements'.

The designers of all modern fighters equip them with defensive chaff and flare systems. Even F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lighting II have these defensive suites.

Why?

...because they work.

Novator KS-172

In a future scenario an opponent may need only scare-off AWACS and tanker aircraft with say KS-172/KS-31 class weapons?

[Below] Libyan aircraft footage over the Mediterranean. Footage are of MiG-25P/PD, Su-22M and MiG-23 (Flogger-E) respectively:

To really understand the magnitude of what is occurring, the link below is an extended audio of an engagement with Libya on 4-Jan 1989, over the Gulf of Sidra. During a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) mission of two F-14A Tomcats from VF-32, (Gypsy flight) off the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) determine the intent of a pair of Libyan MIG-23 Floggers. Pay close attention to the pitch of USN aircrew voices as the engagement unfolds and US Navy and Libyan aircraft snake toward each other. Listen carefully to the radio communication chop during high-g maneuvers: "I'm in hard starb...!"

Click on link then scroll down to bottom-right, select ‘MP3’ just under 'Download MP3 File': http://www.ka8vit.com/sd/shootdown.htm

The skill required to operate, employ and coordinate complex aircraft under the compressed time-frames of immense closure rates - cannot be overstated.

Aircrews must train to both exploit a technical superiority and train so not to rely on it. The rest of the world may not cooperate to employ 'a technical advantage' including ones own government, due to Rules of Engagement or Air Tasking Order.

The future of air combat must rely as in the past: on aircrew training, skill at the dogfight, the right equipment, the element of surprise, and yes - even some dead luck - to get home.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Sukhoi Makes Her Move?

2010-10-16T12:38:00.000-07:00

[29-Jan 2010] Sukhoi successful flight test of her new and much anticipated 'T-50/PAK-FA' fighter jet.

New photos and video have become available since the time of this original writing, and a second prototype (T-50-2) has appeared along with a new IRST (OLS) unit:

Excellent new flight and closeup footage of prototype aircraft '51' is now available:

Official Statement from Sukhoi [29-Jan 2010]

[Above] An infra-red search and track (IRST) sensor is clearly visible on the first prototypes as well as [below] a Flanker-like 'louver-system' at the bottom of the engine intake on each engine nacelle. This would seem to indicate 'stealth' as not the – primary design concern? This is consistent with Russian sources that T-50 was not (not) intended to be an all-aspect Stealth design. There appears to be moving/movable surfaces (canards?) where the leading edge meets the fuselage – just above each engine intake.

As more information has become available T-50 may incorporate two additional thin radar panels along (and/or inside) the leading edge of each wing (also seen on advanced Flanker variants). Again, multi-sensor integration (IRST) has been retained. Together with its round conventional exhaust nozzles could classify the T-50 RCS as an aircraft 'defensive in nature.' Our view is T-50 may incorporate just enough stealthily features to give an F-22 detect/targeting problems.

There is growing evidence that the American F-22 exhibits undesirable own-radar targeting performance under some/all/specific operational conditions. We have alluded to this (for some time) as an inherent probability for an overly stealthy air-combat fighter which lacks multi-sensored (wide electromagnetic spectrum) primary targeting.

Careful review of video-footage should give some insight into T-50 construction methods and indeed the statement was made that T-50 IS important as a manufacturing vehicle for Russian aerospace. Interestingly a second smaller sphere is visible behind the cockpit which is reportedly an "IR detector."

[Below] T-50 appears to have some similarities to both models at center and the far left?

Reports are still a matter of conjecture, however T-50 may indeed be based on Flanker. However it appears closer to an F-35 class aircraft with respect to: stealth, construction methods, takeoff weight (less than F-22 ) and projected price per copy?

Some Russian sources say T-50 would first replace the aging short range Mig-29 fleet in Russia.

It is true that external stores create much more drag than storing weapons internally. However internal weapons bays (on small aircraft) use precious space in the airframe, which could be used for fuel?

Carriage restrictions and the demands of Stealthy clean silhouette have been abundantly evident from the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) program.

Has drag reduction of ‘small’ fighters via internal weapons bays been offset by reduced internal fuel capacities? Without supercruise [The use of lower throttle settings for the same given airspeed] does the whole combat-radius discussion unravel?

If T-50 is indeed effectively based on ‘Flanker’ then this issue would be mitigated to some degree.

[Below] During actual operational intercepts, this Raptor and her external drop tanks - are clearly visible.

Even with supersonic cruising, the fuel penalty of internal weapons bays for a small fighter, and so the 'combat-persistence' penalty may be: high?

The T-50, its test program is reportedly to continue for the next five (5) years.

[Below] The Sukhoi Su-47 'Berkut' (Су-47 Беркут - Golden Eagle) prototype first flew in 1997. This impressive machine reportedly never saw production, but was rather a technology demonstrator.

Russian sources also say weaponry development will take some time. This is understandable. If PAK-FA is put into production she will need to engineer herself thru all the issues discussed here?

PAK-FA may have just enough stealth to give an opposing all-aspect stealth fighter (F-22) radar – aerial detect/track problems?

Remember that an all-aspect stealth fighter (an air superiority fighter that defeats radar energy by keeping it from reflecting back to the transmission source) - inherently invites a paradox - attempting to use its own air-intercept radar (as the same radar mechanics apply) - to conduct its mission.

The paradox is created because of the return radar energy from an opponent and the return radar energy from your own air-intercept radar. So either enormous power is needed to overcome ones own stealth - or – the nose of the all aspect fighter using only radar to find targets - has little or no stealth whatsoever – signal must pass freely through the skin and nose cone - and so we’re back to detection by the opponent; F-22 will likely try to engineer around this paradox with a DRFM/signal cancellation scheme. However, it remains an open question for an aircraft claiming to "dominate" global airspace for the next 30 years – and at ~ $350 million per copy.

In general, it is our view that highly stealthy aircraft built in numbers - are by definition - offensive (not defensive) in nature.

I would invite nations that field these systems - to stop and ponder recent history, power and the perceptions of power.

What should be said about the resulting toll of Iraqi civilians starting in 2003 from Shock and Awe ?

Who decides to wield that power? Have our institutions been effective in controlling the use of power?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

USN F/A-18 Super Hornet to get IRST

2010-09-10T20:01:00.000-07:00

The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Block II is scheduled to receive pod mounted Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) systems.

The Lockheed-Martin F-35 also is to incorporate a chin mounted IRST system. The IRST approach can defeat radar-band Stealth in some instances, by seeing engine exhaust and frictional heating of the airframe against background atmosphere.

IRST can also detect missile release by an opponent. It offers passive location/targeting that will not trigger a target (equipped with a less sophisticated) Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) gear.

When used with medium-range IR missiles an IRST system can offer a stealthy air-to-air engagement option.

IRST systems that can produce recordable infrared imagery can be essential in identification-documentation of target(s) and behavior(s) over say - international waters.
Super Hornet IRST systems are expected ~ 2012-13.

In a separate (and related?) development, Aviation Week and Space Technology (3-Aug 2009, pg 18) is reporting:

“After three years of validating various requirements the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet’s certified flights ceiling has lifted to 41,000 ft from 29,000 ft say officials at Navel Air Systems Command.” AWST goes on: ”All Super Hornet’s Lots 22 and beyond, about 340 aircraft were qualified.”

[Above] Note immense IR exhaust plumes even on subsonic commercial aircraft with non-reheat (non-afterburning) high-bypass, high-efficiency turbofan engines.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Supersonic Radio-Spectrum Airfoils

2010-08-10T02:26:00.000-07:00

A combat fighter is tasked, given sufficient combat persistence, to: search, locate, target, interrogate (IFF), coordinate, maneuver and employ weapons - against other aerial objects.

This is a vastly different mission than that of bomber, strike, observation or reconnaissance, which are free to exploit "avoidance" - at all costs.

If a fighter-platform primary targeting/engagement sensor uses the same radio electromagnetic spectrum that - that same - fighter-platform is designed to conceal/defeat - could this not incur inherent aerial object (target) detect issue(s) under some/all/specific operational conditions?

For the stealth fighter - an inherent Paradox?

The mechanics of ones own radar (radio) return signals passing freely (being transmitted, and then being received) back-and-forth through the nose of a radio-spectrum-defeating barrier, (stealth) opposed to an aerodynamic defeating barrier, (a traditional conical nose shape) – is an engineering problem that should not be underestimated.

Indeed this may include: any radio-spectrum signal traffic, including: aircraft communication, data links, aerial weapons guidance, telemetry and battle-networks.

According to publicly available information, the F-117 did not possess or employ radar. The B2 primary weapons are GPS guided munitions, however B2 also incorporates a synthetic-aperture class radar using radar frequencies optimized for ground detail (understandably) rather than long range aerial object interception. This radar is reported to use two very small radar units under the leading edge of each wing. (1)

In effect the B2 is designed to defeat all manner of air-intercept radar frequencies while at the same time, not relying these (same) radar frequencies to conduct its mission. A “stealthy” combat fighter will not have this luxury.

Industry observers or stealth proponents will argue only specific frequencies are allowed to pass freely with/through the stealth aircraft's skin. This compromise could loop-back and open vulnerability-windows from hostile radars?

[Above/Below] The McDonnell Douglas “Bird of Prey” developed in the 1990s. Its hard (for anyone) not be intrigued by the exotic shapes of this technology? It was a subsonic technology demonstrator. Note the desert terrain where the test program was conducted.

Its important to remind the reader that things like aircraft wake turbulence (wake-vortex) detection, wind-sheer detection, and weapon-location-radar technologies, could indicate what lies ahead for the radio spectrum airfoil.

By the USAF Association own assertions, the AIM-120 engagement ranges seem to fall well within the detect range envelope, of modern (and so non-radio spectrum) infrared search and track (IRST) systems?

Air-to-air missile ranges have historically been "extended" by the launch aircraft accelerating into a supersonic "dash" - to give launch weapons more energy at weapon release - in effect - "to push."

Supersonic flight generates aerodynamic airframe heating due to atmospheric friction (like NASA Space Shuttle during reentry). An aircraft must be designed to operate and function under very high temperatures.

The Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird could fly sustained periods at Mach 3.1 while portions of its airframe radiated temperatures of ~ 426°C (800°F) - at altitude. Indeed during Russian MiG-31 intercepts of the American SR-71 over the Barents Sea in the mid-late 1980s, the skin and canopy windscreen of the MiG would reach frictional temperatures of over 760°C (1400°F) !

Both the Lockheed F-117 and Northrop B2, are subsonic platforms with non-afterburning, (non-reheat) engines.

To date there has been no response (built and fielded in any known quantities) similar to F-117, B2 or F-22? Wind of an F-117 Nighthawk program must have been known by international intelligence agencies by say - the end of the Ronald Reagan’s first term?

Fighter aircraft with internal weapons that cannot expose (articulate its missiles) into the airstream, to provide unobstructed fields-of-view for missile seeker heads – may have disadvantages in the modern-future: IRST/DRFM/helmet-sighting, air combat arena?

It is highly probable that were a stealth aircraft be forced to fly through high moisture - say a rain squall, (thus soaking it’s special external stealthy coating) it’s RCS (Radar Cross Section) could leap up to such a degree that the aircraft could (re)appear on an opponents radar set - much like your local news weather-radar discerns precipitation?

Is this classified? Well, when a stealth aircraft is washed does not the surface become glossy? (The water is literally - altering - the ‘reflectivity properties’ of the skin of the aircraft.) All these aircraft: the F-117, B-2 and F-22 were developed-tested in the deserts of the western US - a fact that should not be dismissed.

Ideal operational environment for stealth could be dry or arid atmospheric conditions – at night.

Remember, even if they see you – they still need to hit you.

The use of plasma-stealth technologies have been discussed and possibly tested now for several years. The fundamental science behind the concept is valid. When spacecraft reenter the earth atmosphere, all radio signal communication and telemetry traffic is cut off, while an energy plasma envelopes the spacecraft. The inherent problem here is, by inducing a plasma (or corona discharge) to control opponent radar mechanics; the plasma itself creates its own host of electromagnetic (EM) emissions?

How the naturally occurring corona discharge phenomenon known as St. Elmo's fire/St. Elmo's light common to commercial aircraft - can affect radar mechanics and other sensitive systems in combat aircraft - is unknown.

Whether other nations will actually develop and deploy a F-22 class aircraft - in numbers - time will tell.

(1) Janes-Avionics

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

China’s J10 Fighter – Up Close

2010-08-03T22:30:00.000-07:00

(25-July, 2010) In a possible first - China has allowed a rare (be it controlled) up-close look by Western cameras and press (among others) of its J10 fighter jet. Export sales by the regime are surely a motivator.

The J10 has already been extensively written about in Western defense press. There are several variants since production started in 2002. It is a near certainty the J10 is effectively a Chinese variant of the Israeli “Lavi” fighter of the mid-1980s – itself a variant of the F-16.

Development of a J10-Class aircraft by the PRC may have been pursued to some degree, by the joint US/Taiwanese Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) program of the 1980s?

[Above] The Taiwanese AIDC F-CK-1 'Ching-kuo' IDF.

The notched-mouth engine intake of J10 may be consistent with a PRC attempt to replicate the Russian AL-31 Flanker engine for J10. However, some suggest it may be an updated Spey turbofan; licensed by the British and sold to Xian Aero Engine Corporation in the late 70s early 80s. There remain persistent reports the J10s maintenance requirements are (far) higher than expected.

The bigger problem is willful and habitual intellectual property theft by the Chinese State. The J-11b "Su-30" and newer J-15 "Su-33" Russian Flanker 'copycat' programs were not authorized by any agreement with Russia and should be of concern internationally - even for the West.

Beijing appears uninterested in the honoring of intellectual property in any sort of international context – with anyone. This is a not only a huge disappointment - it is alarming.

The other rising power in Asia – namely India - has not degenerated into this behavior. At the end of the day, Indian (international) ethics will propel India far (far) ahead of the PRC as an authentic regional and global power.

The Chinese regime still retains its firm grip on Tibet, and so the source of fresh water (rivers) that supply billions of people.

The J-11b is an unauthorized attempt to replicate a Russian Su-30.

Upon discovering the existence of the J-11b program, the Russians were reportedly furious. Beijing behavior only insures evermore lethal versions of existing and new Russian aircraft and other "copied" Russian hardware.

This type of Chinese behavior goes back to at least the 1960s. During the Vietnam War, Soviet advisers in North Vietnam were shocked to find that MiG-21s shipped from Russia through China had arrived with their sensitive avionics stripped by the Chinese, and replaced with cheap Chinese copies.

After the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, the tolerance by Russia for this behavior from the PRC, may have shifted? How Russia and China will workout Beijing’s theft of billions of rubles (RUB) in Su-27/Su-30/Su-33 development – effectively Russian intellectual State Property – is unknown. The PCR may also be gunning to copy the Su-34?

A Chinese assertion of acquisition of Russian Su-33 technology from Ukraine is revealing. It is revealing in the sense that Chinese aerospace should have been able to develop and produce a J-11b Naval variant on its own.

See link: http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4070484

Photos of what appear to be J-15 on a carrier deck mock up (on a rooftop). The J-15 program would be an unauthorized attempt to replicate the Russian Su-33.

In our view, it is clear that true PRC aerospace capability is being overstated by many, both in and outside of China.

The PRC has decided they don’t need the Russians any longer – only Russian weapon designs? This should be an ominous warning to any foreign entity currently doing business in or with China?

The Chinese State is not immune from strategic miscalculation. Though outside the scope of this discussion, government birth policy, which then combined with Chinese cultural preference for male children - has produced profound "unforeseen" consequences.

To those who still subscribe that China will surpass all expectations as a rising power, should remember that the marvel that was Classical Chinese Civilization, was effectively swept away by the Maoist – at least for the foreseeable future?

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Swirl of Controversy: Cope India and Red Flag 2008 Exercises

2010-07-11T16:38:00.000-07:00

Starting in 2004 the joint Cope India exercise began over South Asia (after an absence of nearly 40 years) pitting F-15C of the USAF against a mix of older & newer Indian Air Force (IAF): Mirage 2000, MIG-21, MIG-27, SU-30Mk (not MKi) and Jaguar aircraft.

However this is where everyones expectations – ceased?

By every available account: the IAF soundly defeated American F-15Cs over and over and over.

[Above] Note drop-tanks fitted to USAF F-15C and IAF Mirage 2000s.

American officials credited Indian pilots with being:

"very proficient in [their] aircraft and smart on tactics. That combination was tough for us to overcome,"

"The adversaries are better than we thought," Col. Mike Snodgrass added.” And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated."

"The Indians flew a number of different fighters, including the French-made Mirage 2000 and the Russian-made MiG-27 and MiG-29, but the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MiG-21, and the Su-30MK Flanker, also made in Russia."

When questioned on the capabilities of IAF pilots, Col Greg Newbech, USAF Team Leader made the following remarks:

“What we’ve seen in the last two weeks is the IAF can stand toe-to-toe with best AF in the world.”

“I pity the pilot who has to face the IAF and chances the day to underestimate him; because he won’t be going home.”

“The greatest compliment we heard from an IAF pilot – You American pilots are just like us, simply down to earth people.”

When word of the Cope India 2004 results reached Washington DC, it caused an uproar. Some western military observers quickly attempted to dismiss or reframe the results, claiming that USAF did not bring its true ‘go-to-war-gear’ to these exercises.

True, American USAF F-15C’s typically were outnumbered 3-to-1. However most of these explanations have dubious merit:

1.) AIM-120 AMRAAM missile and AESA radars would have made little difference in BVR - as new jamming technologies (like DFRM) degrade or negate most of these (radio EM-spectrum) AIM-120 class capabilities - regardless. In one sense: active-homing (fire-and-forget) BVR class weapons have become increasingly ‘easier’ to elude - using DRFM-class deception techniques. Indeed this might be what effectively occurs during 'Red Flag' 2008, (so keep reading.)

2.) It is unclear which R-27 missile round was employed by the IAF in 2004: IR-homing (R-27T), semi-active radar homing (R-27R) or active radar homing (R-27AE). Had the latest fire-and-forget class been allowed, the IAF would have simply used their R-77 similar to the American AIM-120 round. R-77 also has an IR-homing version - so again - another “wash?”

3.) Russian Flanker was designed to counter and defeat F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18. Its no surprise experienced Indian aircrews might prevail.

4.) Indians only used the Su-30 "MK" not their Su-30 "MKi." Reportedly IAF Flankers simply used their larger radar and longer range weapons to fire on the F-15C before USAF fighters could fire back.

5.) Lastly the American military always fight its wars over hostile airspace: so USAF-to-IAF numbers/odds/environment is 150% applicable.

Best link author could locate on Cope India:
http://www.indiadefence.com/COPE.htm

Subsequent Cope India exercises in 2005, 2006 had little to no information coming out. Judging from the hubris displayed by the USAF in 2008 – the silence from the USAF during the 2005 and 2006 Gwalior exercises – was apparently - deafening...

- Now - jump to the 2008 Nellis AFB ‘Red Flag’ exercises hosted by the USAF -

This time the Indian Air Force bring their new Su-30 MKi.

64th and 65th Aggressor squadrons at Nellis AFB, Nev.

Colonel Terrence Fornof, Director of the Requirements and Testing office (USAF Warfare Center, Nellis AFB), was providing a briefing to a number of retired US generals, [video has in the past appeared, been removed, and reappeared on the Internet]:

Listen to a pod-cast audio regarding the same presentation (even MORE interesting) * note: pod-cast w/Fight editor appears to have been pulled. The thrust of this interview was that Nellis instructors in the F-15 were able to catch the F-22 in a turn:
http://iagblog.podomatic.com/player/web/2008-11-05T15_41_04-08_00

According to the Colonels own hand positions then a properly flown Su-30 can (also) catch an F-22 in a turn. So what - actually - is the USAF trying to say?

The US Colonels remarks caused an international flap in India.

Did some in the USAF have something to prove?

Indian Su-30MKi landing at Nellis AFB, Nev. in 2008

Problem is Colonel Fornof comments produced more questions than answers:

a.) Indian MiG-21IBis (I-Bis) "Bison" are equipped with Russian-made Kopyo radars, not Israeli “F-16” radars.

b.) That Su-30MKIs "lost in 1-v-1" DACT at Mountain Home AFB, there was apparently no such training done at Mountain.

c.) FOD concerns are not unusual for any air force operating halfway around the world. The Flanker has simply immense loiter and combat persistence ability – so take-off (fighter scramble) intervals are not (as) critical - as for American designed aircraft.

d.) MKi use Lyulka AL-31 turbofans, not Tumansky as was stated.

Indian Air Force MiG-21IBis (I-Bis). The paradigm(s) after 1982 Bekaa Valley and 1991 Gulf War - appear to have been misguided?

So what conclusions, if any, can be drawn?

The paradigms established/embraced after Bekaa Valley ‘Turkey Shoot’ in 1982 and the results of the 1991 Gulf War appear to have been misguided by 2004 - due to Indian MiG-21IBis (I-Bis).
There is no substitute for flight hours and training. Proper training allows aircrews (of any air force) to extract the maximum performance out of their aircraft.
A similar post-stall counter-tactic was used by Nellis (F-15) instructors against less-experienced aircrews in both F-22 and Su-30. So by definition: a properly flown Su-30 can (also) catch an F-22 in a turn?
Remarking on F-22 needing ‘more missiles’ - is consistent with F-22 having only two IR missiles, historical air-to-air missiles hit probabilities and Raptors lack of helmet sighting. Su-30 brings helmet-sighting, nearly twice the number of missile rounds and a huge fuel reserves - at much (much) lower costs - to the fight.
His remarks on the inability of USAF instructor aircraft to employ their AIM-120 AMRAAM round - is interesting. Whether it was jamming, snooping, heads-up defensive flying, or other tactical issues, his comments are (duly) noted.
Remarks on the Indian MiG-21 are revealing. During the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) air battles of June 1982, Israeli F-15 and F-16 radars had no trouble seeing (and downing scores of) Mig-21s. So DRFM-class jammers even on a MiG-21 - may have pushed BVR off the table - for any radio-spectrum AIM-120 equipped fighter - even Raptor?
Colonel Fornof was referring to this video (F-22 and Su-30 side-by-side):

Looking at the video, an astute observer noting airspeed, afterburner usage, altitude-loss, energy-recovery and aircraft attitude during/between maneuvers: can see that both F-22 and Flanker are extremely evenly matched regardless of Colonel Fornof statements or hand position(s). Below is the complete Flanker demo. Watch the superb energy recovery [at payback 2:10] followed by a simply impossible maneuver of Su-30 at playback 2:13:

Keep in mind the Flanker is much larger than Raptor, and F-22 lacks the pilot helmet-sighting of the Sukhoi.

Indian News Report of2008 Red Flag:

The Sukhoi is going to be with us for quite awhile, and by any measure, is (and will be) a nightmare for USAF/USN brass, planners and aircrews alike. Flanker has loiter and combat persistence ability - that has no western equivalent.

Train how you fight and fight how you train, train and train.

The question may be who fights over friendly airspace and who fights of hostile airspace?

We count no less than 12 hard points on this MKi: four on each wing, one on each engine nacelle, and two on the aircrafts centerline. Even without external drop tanks, Flanker endurance and combat radius remains unequaled in the world.

Multi-sensor Advanced-Flanker with pilots of equal skill - should be more (more) than a match for F-22.

When or if the Lockheed-Martin F-22 Raptor participates in a future Cope India exercise at Gwalior India, whatever the results, they are certain to be quite the revelation - even if we never officially hear about them.

Conversely, we firmly conclude that procuring additional F-22s for the USAF will not resolve anything of this. One can purchase between three (3) and seven (7) Advanced Flanker for the cost of a single (1) F-22. To put it another way: if four (4) F-22 Raptors fly against twelve (12) to twenty-eight (28) Advanced Flankers - none (none) of the F-22s can survive this engagement. F-22 is simply far (far) too expensive for a real world.

India has placed a fresh order for forty (40) more Sukhois with Russia.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

The $62 Billion dollar question?

2010-02-07T17:15:00.000-08:00

The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor at 2010 Farnborough air show UK (below).

Since the time of this original writing nearly a year ago, the F-22 has over time, begun to do [to varying degrees] the aerial demonstration maneuvers of the Flanker family of airplanes from Russia. Play close attention to afterburner usage, the sequence of the maneuvers and [and this is key] the length of time (flown distance) between each maneuver. F-22 does not [yet?] display capability of the 720-degree “double summersault” or the zero airspeed roll-onto-back maneuvers of Flanker.

Due to the Raptors very high price tag, we might suggest that the USAF or Lockheed Martin publicly ‘max perform’ the aircraft to address any lingering concerns, or to resurrect F-22 production for export?

To put the "super-maneuverability" of the F-22 in context, below is the Russian Sukhoi “Flanker” the global reference-standard of super-maneuverable combat aircraft. Remember this aircraft is 1/3 larger than the F-15 Eagle. Watch the maneuvers that start at playback points: 0:31, 2:13 and 4:38.

With the additional concerned/doubts remaining regarding F-22 lack of helmet-sighting compounded by seeker-head target acquisition complexities due to Raptor open/closed weapons bays doors.

Now underscores :

The immense closure rates of jet combat (attacker vs defender).
Dogfight is almost a certainty. BVR hit probabilities of only up to ~50% (on all sides) per/engagement; regardless of number(s) of total aircraft involved.
The greatly increased criticality of nose-pointing for Raptor (for which Flanker is superior) due to helmet-sighting issue*.
Flanker ability to employ its gun (in dogfight) and IR medium range missiles (BVR) using IRST, without needing its radar.
F-22 need to turn on it nose radar to actually (actually) engage a target at range (??)

(*Raptor may get helmet-sighting in the future for its two AIM-9 class short-range missiles. No true helmet-sighting possible for F-22 belly-bay primary weapons.)

Remember when discussing the air-to-air engagement: an aircraft is moving thru three dimensional space (including over the ground). In order to detect another aerial object (also flying over the ground), say at lower altitude, your radar set must mask-out (reject) all organic returns 'moving' towards it, (including birds, hailstones, dragonflies, and the ground itself) at ~ your airspeed. The idea here is - only (man-made?) objects traveling at ‘other’ than your speed are ‘seen’ by your radar – everything else - is masked out. This is idea behind the defensive 'Doppler-turn'. The target closure rate all of a sudden “blends” into this Doppler masking of ones own radar object-filtration - and so can ‘disappear' off your radar set.

F-22 proponents will sight that one can use supercruise performance to “exploit” immense closure rates. This assertion is likely based on the element of surprise.

All opposing aircraft can benefit from the very same closure rate?

1. F-22 in the radio-spectrum?
2. IRST equipped fighters in the infrared-spectrum?

Keep in mind that all aircraft (F-22/Flanker) will continuously emit IR energy from their leading edge surfaces, exhausts and after weapon release - on their own. Indeed the MiG-31 'Foxhound' could track-attack an SR-71 'Blackbird' (at speed) using only the MiGs IRST channel w/IR long range missiles.

The designers of F-22, F-35 and Flanker require that they have defensive chaff/flare systems.

Why?

Now compare more of the Russian Sukhoi Su-30, 35, 37 (NATO designation: Flanker) Series. Watch the aircraft roll onto its back, at effectively zero airspeed [at playback 1:20] and superb energy recovery [payback 2:10] followed by a simply impossible maneuver:

So the question might be; can F-22 Raptor change flight direction at a faster rate than Flanker can nose point? Based on video - this answer is self evident.

"...1-2-3-4 seconds"

Now add helmet-sighting and unobstructed missile seeker heads with the immense weapon loadout of Flanker-class.

F-22 in the HUD of F-18 during ACM training. Why the “dogfight” is so dangerous even to high tech aircraft.

Additional F-22 concerns:

Primary AIM-120 weapon @ ~ 340 lbs w/medium-class rocket-motor burn-time(s) and so "range".
AGP-77 mid-course update(s) transmission(s), (1-2 second data-burst pulse) detection by defender; Data-pulse required by AIM-120 from AGP-77 for engagements at range.
F-22 contrail generation over ~24000ft of aircraft and primary weapon, and contrail RCS similar to SR-71.
detection by IRST
IFF interrogation transmissions.
Sandblasting [off] of F-22 'stealth coating' with repeated excursions through the Mach.
Software instability: averaging 20 hrs between avionics software problems, up from 11 hrs.
USAF kill-ratio assertions against improper modern ‘integrated-sensor’ threat model.
F22 flyaway Costs.

Can Raptor be effective? - well i suppose it's possible. The leap that the the F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon and the F-18 Hornet had over their contemporaries is still astonishing.

The long range Meteor Missile.

Russians aircraft designers knew they had a big problem after Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) in 1982.

A gap has closed in many respects with the retirement of the F-14/AIM-54 equipped Tomcat?

This is with near certainty the thinking behind the ducted ramjet FMRAAM from Raytheon and MBDA Meteor missiles; which cannot fit internally in the F-22.

Raptor will need to get its aircrews safely and consistently in closer than say F-14. Whether this is possible with newer-IRST equipped opponents like Flanker or Typhoon is the $62 Billion dollar question?

German pilots flying East German MiG-29s against NATO jets in exercises believed the MiG was nearly unbeatable in a dogfight when armed with the Russian R-73 “Archer” short range missiles in conjunction with the MIGs helmet-sighting system. These results led to helmet-mounted sighting becoming standard equipment on most modern combat aircraft around the world.

Listen to Lt Randy Cunningham describe he and back seater Lt. Willie Driscoll engagement of 10-May 1972 to understand the immense impact of:

Proper aircrew training.
Aircraft able to employ large portions of its weapons load with helmet-sighting versus aircraft that can not.
Off axis (yaw) very low speed nose pointing.
Sufficient weapons load.
Sufficient ‘combat persistence’ fuel reserve.
Speed brake(s).
Energy recovery.

[Below] An obscure old video of a young Randy 'Duke' Cunningham describing his (with RIO Lt. Willie 'Irish' Driscoll) mission of Vietnam May 10, 1972. It is remarkable in its portrayal of the speed/lightning pace of events in air combat, with opposing pilots trying to move each others airplane to its aerodynamic limit to get the noses of their aircraft pointed at one another.

The video has been pulled for alleged copyright issues - typical of American content when it might not portray American dominance. I would remind parties that claim copyright infringement that the US taxpayer paid for Cunningham/Driscoll’s airplane, fuel, weapons, aircraft carrier, Top-Gun training, and war. This story is pubic information. Newer video content of the engagement is available (with computerized animation), but lacks the specifics/objectivity/maturity and so not suitable here.

We would strongly suggest reading Cunningham's account first published in 1974:
"…And Kill Migs", Lou Drendel, Squadron Signal Publications (found in the research-material window at right).

There some discrepancies in this video account. Colonel Tomb was flying a MiG-17, not a MiG-21 as depicted in graphics. Also Cunningham was consistently out-zooming (drifting out in front of) the MiG in the vertical, and each time the MiG would fire a burst of cannon at the Phantom. Cunningham (simply) had to employ speed brakes and go to idle - to avoid "running out of luck" in front of the MiG. Both Cunningham and Driscoll were disciples of the then brand new US-Navy ‘Top-Gun’ Fighter Weapons School. Cunningham said the only part of his Top-Gun training that almost got them killed was when he flew directly at the MiG-17 who’s “nose lit up like a Christmas tree”… in training Top-Gun instructor A-4s: “didn’t do that.”

The center spine speed-brake (an additional aerodynamic device) on YF-22 was deleted from the production F-22. USAF Raptors will need to rely on existing control surfaces for rapid deceleration(s). These control surfaces could already be taxed to the maximum - during an engagement.

It should be noted that “departing the aircraft” has historically at times - been a necessity - to survive an engagement. Both U.S. and Russian engineers have since supplanted this capability in exchange for ‘Super maneuverability’ (inherently unstable airfoils needing computerized flight control ‘fly-by-wire’ systems) that may no longer allow traditional departing?

It should also be noted that helmet-sighting may reduce (to some degree) a combat aircraft's computing power requirements – as the pilot can cue weapons as to where/when an aerial target: will/should/may (re)appear.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Iran: Satellites and Tomcats

2010-02-07T17:14:00.003-08:00

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) 3-Feb, 2009 – Iran sent its first domestically made satellite into orbit spreading concerned about that the same technology delivering warheads. How this event will play out on the world’s stage will be the subject of intense debate.

With the retirement of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat from US Navy service, Iran is now the sole operator of this powerful fighter-interceptor. Iran still operates approximately forty (40) F-14A-GR Tomcats, and reports suggest Iran has over one hundred, (100) reverse-engineered AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile rounds to arm them.

The AIM-54 Phoenix missile weighs over 1,000 lb (454 kg) each, and Tomcat can theoretically direct six (6) of these massive Phoenix rounds (launched nearly simultaneously) at six separate aerial targets. After launch the Phoenix climes to ~80,000 feet and accelerates to Mach 4+ then drives down on its target using kinetic energy, activates it own terminal-phase ‘active-radar' seeker to find and then detonate its enormous warhead near the target.

After 30 years, the aircraft seem to be in fine shape.

Due to this climbing, high altitude, acceleration "kinetic" launch profile, with respect to engagement ranges of current U.S. air-to-air missiles, the AIM-54 is today still - without equal.

The resourcefulness of the Iranians to keep their Tomcats airworthy (since the mid-1980s), can no longer be a subject of speculation by the Western defense community.

(Below) the sheer size of the AIM-54 Phoenix missile is apparent.

The Iranians were originally offered the F-15A Eagle as well, but Iran recognized early that the F-15 was simply no match for the F-14s combination of AWG-9 radar and Phoenix missile.

Note that Iranian F-14A-GR Tomcats do not have the chin IR sensor like their USN brethren. Iran did not order the then available AN/ALR-23 IR sensor, electing to wait for the improved Northrop AAX-1 (TCS). However, after the 1979 Iranian revolution all F-14 support was halted by the U.S.

Iranian Tomcats in new blue-gray color schemes.

The Iranians were to get a reprieve in F-14 support during the Iran–Contra scandal in the mid-1980s under the Reagan Administration. Iran was able to acquire all manner of advanced Tomcat, AWG-9 and AIM-54 Phoenix missile part and systems support. The Iranians seized at this opportunity to reverse engineer this windfall of functional components and sub-systems, so that after the early 1990s, Iran reportedly had “resolved permanently” their Tomcat-fleet parts and maintenance issues.

Another remarkable photo showing extended (and functional) glove vanes of F-14A-GR just ahead of wing roots.

Here is rare (four part) 1977 Grumman promotional film during Project Persian King - the delivery and training to Iran of their F-14A-GR Tomcats:

There has been (further) speculation that Russia was assisting Iran in upgrading its F-14 fleet with new radars, engines, missiles and canopies, however these reports appear to be erroneous.

Iranian F-14A-GR with two MIM-23B ‘I-Hawk’ missiles (foreground) during 'Project Sky Hawk' trials.

Considering the fact that during Iran’s purchase of MiG-29 and Su-24, Iran did not allow Russian personal anywhere near their F-5s not to mention their F-14s. Reports that airworthy Iranian Tomcats were handed over to Russia after the 1979 revolution for testing, appear to be erroneous.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq did ship two (2) American AIM-9P Sidewinder missiles rounds off a defecting Iranian F-5 to Russia for analysis - and may be the source of the F-14 rumors. However, during the war some wreckage of one or two Iranian F-14s may have found their way to the Soviets for analysis.

The F-14 was not without its problems. The TF30 engines were prone to compressor stall under curtain conditions. Iran opened private negotiations with Pratt and Whitney in 1976 to address or replace, but after 1979 Iran has had to make due with the TF30 to this day. Also it AWG-9 radar was designed for over-water operation, radar performance was not optimum for ultra-low altitude targets over land. It should also be noted that operating costs for an aircraft are directly proportional to take-off weight.

Note that the port-side nose number appears be covered from view of the camera crew?

But the F-14 remains an impressive machine. During dogfight exercises at low level, the F-14 always beat the F-15 the F-16 and also out flew the MiG-29 (reportedly the reason Iran order so few MiG-29s).

Indeed navel aircraft need excellent low-speed/low-altitude performance to launch-recover from rolling flight desks at sea level.

Best researched estimates conclude over 130 Iraqi aircraft were downed (with an additional 23 probables) by F-14A-GR aircrews during the Iran-Iraq war. Over forty (40) of these using AIM-54A rounds.

Iran has been exceedingly resourceful in keeping their Tomcats flying.

Due to countess upgrades and improvements done in Iran proper, the true capability of the Iranian F-14A-GR fleet is likely to be difficult, (as in the past) to assess with certainty?

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties - photos 'airliners.net'

Phased Array Radar and Flying Insects?

2010-02-07T17:14:00.002-08:00

Weapon Locating Radars using a Phased Array class radar, have been a part of the battlefield landscape for decades. These counter-battery radars are designed to detect and track incoming artillery, mortar, and rocket fire and determine the point of origin for own counter-battery fire missions. They also provide track, observe and analysis of friendly guns and provide correction to friendly battery counter-fire.

These systems are so sensitive that objects with a tiny radar cross section (RCS) including flying insects - must be filtered out of its tracking returns.

[Below] Note targets at left.

This type of filtration would need to involve target movement behavior. Specifically filtering organic movement, (bugs) from non-organic movement (stealth).

If this type of object tracking-filtration was incorporated into say - a modern surface-to-air-missile (SAM) system - then it could be a game changer for all manner of man-made aerial objects, as well as aspects of theatre missile defense?

Just such systems are currently represented best by the mobile S-400 Triumph (Triumf or 'Триумф'), NATO named SA-21 Growler, and the United States Navy's Aegis System.

[Above] Note both large and small weapons tubes which allow a wide-range of engagement options.

The S-400 class systems is a product of the Almaz Central Design Bureau of the Russian Federation. S-400 Triumph (Triumf or 'Триумф') can attack, intercept and destroy airborne targets, including stealth aircraft, cruise missiles at a range of ~ 400 km (240 mi) and as low as (terrain permitting) 20-30ft off the ground. It is also able to intercept targets traveling at speeds of 4.8 kilometers per second like a ballistic missile at an effective range of up to ~3,500 kilometers away. It should be noted that vertical (tube) launched systems can direct missiles in different directions more easily than SAM systems launched from an incline.

Synchronized low-level multi-directional attack is a well known (and effective) tactic, known to many world air forces. The idea here is to overwhelm any defense by closing on the target from all sides. To counter this, inclined launched-SAM systems may need four (4) launches at-the-ready pointed four (4) different directions. This adds compute complexity for the SAM system in selecting correct launcher(s) for correct-target as multiple inbound aircraft close. The compute problem is instantly repeated as (remaining) attackers egress (away) in opposite directions after aircraft weapons release.

Remember – combat aircraft have an inherent advantage against the SAM system if they fly at very low levels at high speed to use terrain masking to avoid SAM system sensors, and/or force the SAM engagement time to mere seconds.

[Below] is the best video the author could locate that shows the dangers of sophisticated–integrated air defense networks to all types of aerial objects. Below is a video produced by the ALMAZ-ANTEY Industrial Concern. They incorporate seventeen manufacturing enterprises, design bureaus and scientific research institutes located in the Russia Federation to develop long, medium and short range air defense systems. Modern Integrated Air Defense Networks [English]:

Suffice it to say that an opponent using a SAM system incorporating this type of phased array class radar, may have little trouble detecting and attacking Stealth technologies? These new systems are also starting to incorporate these pseudo-random, Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) scheme-class for search/track/targeting.

To understand the true nightmare that SAM systems can present aircrews, watch and listen to USAF F-16 from the 614 TFS encounter Iraqi SAMs (possibly Roland?) during 1991 Gulf War. SAM contrails or F-16 defensive expendables are clearly visible appear in the HUD at playback point 1:28:

Note how the aggressive maneuvering (or in a dogfight) can bleed off airspeed, in this case from ~ 500 down to ~ 200 kt. The pilot is fighting to keep his airspeed up while (call sign "Stroke-Three) 'defending' against this nightmarish encounter with SAMs.

Basic "F-16" HUD is provided here to follow the frightening events in the video (above).

Stand-off munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV/Drone Aircraft) are going to be increasing essential.

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Development of the Lockheed F-22 Raptor

2010-02-07T17:14:00.001-08:00

The pinnacle in current fighter aircraft design the Lockheed F-22 Raptor has been described as an F-15 weapon system in a stealthy, super cruising platform. F-22 project officially began in 1981

when the US Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division, (ASD) put out a request for concepts for an Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) to replace the F-15 Eagle.

Privately, the Americans had also become increasingly impressed with the high-altitude, high-speed capabilities of the MiG-25 Foxbat (even after the defection of a MiG-25P and pilot Lt. Viktor Belenko in 1976).

Keys to the desired replacement were the application of low-observables (stealth) technology, the ability to supercruise, maneuverability, and short-takeoff and landing (STOL) capability.

In September 1983, the Air Force was ready to request ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighter) proposals from Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, and Rockwell. Lockheed decided to develop a design based on the F-117 stealth fighter. The resulting design featured a highly flared nose, relatively conventional wing, and canted vertical tails.

Interestingly supersonic cruising “supercruise” was first proposed on the North American XB-70 Valkyrie Mach-3 bomber project of the early 1960s.

Lockheed’s Raptor concept almost certainly has its roots in their YF-12 program of the 1960s. This would be understandable as the SR-71 Blackbird (an YF-12 derivative), survived reportedly over 4000 intercept attempts during its career.

YF-22 pre-prototypes were unable to meet the Air Force requirements for both short takeoff and landing and supercruise simultaneously. Once the Air Force dropped the STOL requirement, the aft portion of the aircraft was redesigned allowing significant reductions in drag and making super cruising possible.

[Left] The F-22s similarity to the Lockheed YF-12 is hard to ignore.

The spectacular flight performance of the YF-12 and indeed the SR-71 was surpassed only by – an equally spectacular rate of fuel consumption. This would have been more acute on the YF-12 interceptor due to needing room for internal weapons bays.

It is interesting to note that the large spine mounted speed-brake of YF-22 was discarded on production F-22 in favor of a more unusual integrated speed-brake control scheme using existing control surfaces.This may again reveal its true nature as an aircraft more akin to YF-12, than the F-15?

At extreme speeds and altitudes a speed-brake may have had little functionality in the thin air. This YF-12 shown with its internally stowed missile round.

Raptor features/Industry talking points:

• First look/first kill in all environments- A combination of improved sensor capability, improved situational awareness, and improved weapons provides first-kill opportunity against the threat.

• The F-22 possesses a sophisticated sensor suite that allows the pilot to track, identify, and shoot the threat before it detects the F-22. Significant effort is being placed on cockpit design and avionics fusion to improve the pilot's situational awareness. Advanced avionic technologies allow the F-22 sensors to gather, integrate, and display essential information in the most useful format to the pilot.

• Reduced observables- Advances in low-observable technologies provide significantly improve survivability and lethality against air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. The F-22's combination of reduced observability and supercruise accentuate the advantage of surprise in a tactical environment.

• Supersonic persistence- The F-22 engines produce more thrust than any current fighter engine, especially in the military (non-afterburner) power. This characteristic allows the F-22 to efficiently cruise at supersonic airspeeds without using afterburner (super cruise). This capability greatly expands the F-22's operating envelope in both speed and range over current fighters which must use afterburner to operate at supersonic speeds.

• Increased maneuverability- The F-22 has been extensively designed, tested, and refined aerodynamically during the Demonstration/Validation (DEM/VAL) process and coupled with high-maneuver capability. The sophisticated F-22 aero design and high thrust-to-weight provides the capability to outmaneuver all current and projected threat aircraft.

• Improved combat radius on internal fuel- To ensure the F-22 provides air superiority for deep-interdiction aircraft, it operates at medium and high altitude at ranges superior to current generation air-superiority aircraft.

• Improved reliability and maintainability- To ensure operational flexibility, the F-22 has better reliability and maintainability than any military fighter in history. Increased F-22 reliability and maintainability pays off in less manpower required to fix the aircraft and consequently less aircraft required to support a deployed squadron. Additionally, reduced maintenance support provides the benefit of reduced life cycle cost and the ability to operate more efficiently from prepared of dispersed operating locations. The F-22 exceeds current fighter sortie surge rates with a reduced support structure.

• Increased lethality and survivability- The above characteristics provide a synergistic effect that ensures F-22 lethality against an advanced air threat. The combination of reduced observability and supercruise drastically shrinks surface-to-air engagement envelopes and minimizes threat capabilities to engage and shoot the F-22.

• Air-to-surface capability- The F-22 has a secondary role to attack surface targets. The aircraft will be capable of carrying 2 x 1,000 pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) internally and will use on-board avionics for navigation and weapons delivery support.

Your thoughts?
- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Threats to Air Supremacy; USAF Association Presentation

2010-02-07T17:13:00.001-08:00

United States Air Force Association presentation on emerging Threats to Air Supremacy:

Additional issues that may, (soon) affect our traditional “Power Projection” doctrine?

1.) The primary weapon for F-15, F-16, F-18, F-22 and F-35 is (will be) the AIM-120 AMRAAM medium range air-to-air missile. This is the weapon depicted being defeated by Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DFRM) jamming/deception technologies in USAF animation.

2.) The increasing adoption of Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) Radar schemes in SAM and airborne combat systems by a future opponent?

3.) The future of traditional air-to-surface anti-radiation class like AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile) if an LPI environment is deployed by an opponent?

4.) Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DFRM) can also be fitted to legacy aircraft to deny BVR radio spectrum engagement by opponents as well as dogfight radar gun-sighting? DFRM could (also) allow current/future platforms to slip thru SAM radio based (radar) engagement systems?

Your thoughts?

- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Fire and Forgotten

2010-02-07T17:13:00.000-08:00

The AIM-120 AMRAAM. Primary weapon for F22, F35, F15, F16 and F18.

First some background.
There are three types of air-to-air missile guidance techniques:
• Semi-Active Homing.
• Active Homing.
• Passive Homing.

Semi-Active Homing Guidance:

Missile relies on an external pointed energy source to 'illuminate' the target. The energy reflected by this target is intercepted by a receiver on the missile. The weapon uses radio energy collected by its radar receiver to determine target trajectory and adjust control surfaces/nozzles to intercept.

The American AIM-7 Sparrow and British SkyFlash use this is homing technique.

Active Homing Guidance:

Active homing works like semi-active homing, except that tracking energy is both transmitted-received by the missile itself. No external source is needed. It is this reason that active homing missiles are called "fire-and-forget".

At longer ranges, called Beyond Visual Range (BVR), these weapons store target information downloaded internally from the launch aircraft - just prior to launch - however can also receive target position updates from launch platform via command-data link (mid course update) data pulse(s) after weapon release. In this BVR mode, the seeker head goes 'active’ (awakens) only for the final terminal phase - close to target. The AIM-54, AIM-120 and Vampel R-77 use this 'fire-and-forget' homing technique. Again most modern active homing air-to-air missiles that operate in the radio (radar) spectrum can delineate a noise-jamming signal (from the target) from their own targeting transmission, and so (can) switch to home-on-jamming, coming off a target.

Passive Homing Guidance:

Passive missiles instead rely on some form of energy that is transmitted or emitted by the target. Weapon only receives signals and cannot transmit. This includes short range heat-seeking Infrared (IR) class like American AIM-9 Sidewinder and Russian Vympel R-27 the medium range Vympel R-77T, and radio homing ‘anti-radiation’ missiles like AGM-88 HARM in the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) role - used against SAM radar systems.

Although anti-radiation typically is used against fixed enemy radar sites, other types of radio transmissions, including communication radios can also be targeted in this manner.

- Now enter DRFM Jamming -

Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) is an electronic method for digitally capturing and retransmitting (reproducing) an RF signal. The DRFM technique ‘snoops’ then digitizes the received signals, stores it in memory, then if needed, replicates and retransmits.

Because it’s a copy of the original signal, the attacking transmitting radar will not be able to distinguish its legitimate original return signal from the DRFM ‘copy’. Neither does DRFM generate and transmit radio 'noise' class jamming, so the ‘home-on-noise-jamming' used by current weapons - is useless.

The real twist with DRFM, is that slight variations in frequency (phase) can be retransmitted (embedded) by the more powerful DRFM jam signal, to create Doppler (velocity) error in the attackers receiver (seeker) head.

The attacking weapon may not (or cannot) resolve these more powerful “false” DRFM signals (in time) - remember - only a fraction of a second of confusion is all that's required - the weapon will fly wide of the target – and so - is defeated.

[Above] Su-27M: note wingtips pods. Pods reportedly can “receive” as well as “transmit.”

These type of DRFM signal reproduction could include snooping/creating/retransmitting distorted phase signals to confuse attacking aircraft main radar sets (including radar gun-sights) as well?

Core issues for DRFM may be:
• Any radio-spectrum transmission can be snooped including: beeps, squawks, data-links and digitized radio communications.
• DRFM would not be effective in the Infrared (IR) EM spectrum.
• DRFM increases need for robust Within Visual Range (WVR) capability.
• DRFM may require offering aircrews more than one type of homing technique for BVR, similar to say Vympel R-77 plus Vympel R-77T usage model?

DFRM is used on new aircraft entering service, as well as being able to be fitted to existing legacy platforms (F-15, F-16, F-18) via pods.

This could be one reason that stealth is effectively absent on Grippen, Typhoon and Rafael?

Ultra-long range air-breathing weapons, with fully passive wide-band EM-spectrum homing (anti-radiation class) seeker-heads might be the few options remaining for BVR?

One hypothetical (but probable?) scheme to attempt a counter to DRFM Doppler-shift deception, might be for attacking active-seekers to send out “dummy” pulses, then use some form of anti-radiation homing to attempt to home in only on defender DRFM retransmission. The attacking weapon will need to do this quickly enough to fool DRFM into robust retransmission(s). DRFM would know the attacking weapon is closing and might counter this technique by going silent and pilot maneuvering with appropriate expendable(s) or in towed decoy form, DRFM simply detaches free as the attacking weapon homes in on it?

At the end of the day - all this will just as likely increase the probability of an infrared (infrared assisted) engagement - at closer quarters. So again, where back to IRST + Radar cuing and helmet-sighting.

LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) radars might give a new lease-on-life to traditional semi-active guidance techniques?

However, if DFRM has indeed turned the radio-spectrum portion of the battlefield upside down, then (even) gun-sights using IRST rather than radar - might soon be essential?

Your thoughts?
- All media found here is for descriptive purposes and is owned by their respective parties -

Russia, Georgia and the Hermes 450

2010-02-07T17:12:00.001-08:00

Remarkable footage of a Georgian UAV being shot down on 22-April 2008 by "a Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum" fighter jet:

What it may have looked like from the aircraft firing the weapon:

However upon closer examination there may be two (2) problems with this account:
1) The “twin tailed fighter” in question does not seem to exhibit the (levels of) engine exhaust soot consistent with that of MiG-29?
2) Clearly the missile appears to come off the aircrafts port wingtip. This does not appear to be consistent with that of any known variant of MiG-29.

MiG-29 Fulcrum: Note the hard-point configuration and position(s) with respect to proximity to wingtips.

A level of systemic Washington bias did appear to - again - be at work, this time regarding some very pointed public remarks made by former American Secretaries of State.

We were relieved at the absence of any reference in Al Gore's national address in Denver 2008 regarding the then current Russia/Georgia situation:

Here’s why:

Ukraine announced that the lease of Russian naval bases on the Crimea (Sevastopol) will not be extended beyond 2017, the Russian Black Fleet is building a new base in Novorossiysk. In July 2007, Russian Navy Commander announced that the new base will be ready in 2012.

Georgia operates the Elbit Systems Hermes 450 - a medium size multi-payload unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or 'drone aircraft'.

It is designed for tactical long-range endurance missions. It has an endurance of over (over) 20 hours, with a primary use for reconnaissance, surveillance and communications relay. The Hermes 450 has a length of 6.1 m, wingspan of 10.5 m and weighs 450 kg, with a payload capability of 150 kg. It has a 52 hp (39 kW) rotary Wankel engine powering a pusher propeller, giving a maximum speed of 95 knots and a maximum altitude of over 5,500 m (18,000 ft).

Hermes 450 Military support missions include:
• Real and non-real time reconnaissance and surveillance
• Artillery fire adjustment
• Communications relay
• Maritime surveillance
• Damage assessment
Published max range for the 450 drone is 200 km. However assuming these overall average mission speeds (below) - then - these approximate ranges would be possible (overall average speeds of 30 thru 50 mph are the most probable):

Flight Speed (mph) x Flight time (20 Hours) = Mission radius (miles) = One way range (miles):

70 x 20 = 700 mi = 1400 mi
60 x 20 = 600 mi = 1200 mi
50 x 20 = 500 mi = 1000 mi
40 x 20 = 400 mi = 800 mi
30 x 20 = 300 mi = 600 mi

It is clear that Georgian 450 drones can easily reach Russian naval bases at Novorossiysk and even Sevastopol in Ukraine?

Remember 'real-time' surveillance (and so published range?) is not limited to "line-of-sight" control-usage. One 450 can simply orbit high over friendly territory 'relayed' to a second 450 which is flying off in - whatever - direction. Hermes 450 can also fly fully autonomous intelligence data collection-capture flight profiles.

Since NATO and U.S. reconnaissance of Russian military activity is possible from Turkey and from satellites - it begs the question: What then would be the purpose(s) of Georgian UAV capability with these types of enormous ranges?

UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) report on the event:
link: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-7F34PW-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf