The Boresight

Operation Epic Fury / The End of US Hegemony in the Middle East

2026-02-28T07:24:00.000-08:00

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27-Mar, 2026: Total loss of 81-0005, E-3G “Sentry” Airborne Early Warning and Control AWACS of the U.S. Air Force’s 552nd Air Control Wing out of Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, following Iranian missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

27- Feb 2026: The United States and Israel launched military airstrikes on Iran during daylight hours on Saturday, targeting Iran's leadership. Initial footage from the region shows the US 5th fleet headquarters in Bahrain on fire.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in these strikes.

We also strongly recommend scanning "X" [Twitter] for updates on development, as events are moving so quickly, and also as all traditional media outlets are effectively useless as information sources due to their heavy censorship.

Since events are still evolving, we recommend reading our "The Last Question First; Attacking Iran" writing in the meantime for background.

In response to the U.S.–Israeli strikes, Iran launched widespread ballistic missile and drone attacks across the Middle East, targeting Israel and bases used by the US in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Cyprus, Turkey, and the UAE. The counterstrikes have included all effectively (all) US installations in the Middle East. This is now a regional conflict.

On 3/2/26, three (3) American F-15E fighter jets were shot down in quick succession under mysterious circumstances over Kuwait. All aircrews ejected safely.

As of March 3, 2026, U.S. military casualties with CENTCOM confirming six (6) American service members killed. These numbers will rise dramatically, however.

USS Abraham Lincoln CVN-72.

Iran's strategy is clear. Push American forces away by keeping US facilities under fire, therefore denying them safe basing to launch and resupply. This will become apparent in the coming days/weeks. This will turn US and Israeli operations into a long-range proposition with low sortie rates.

After 8 days of war, in total, the US and Israel conducted around 4500 strikes across Iran, while Iran retaliated with 3500 vectors, including ~905 MRBMs:

After ~ a week of fighting, two narratives have emerged:

The first is that the US/Israel have established air superiority over parts of Iran. We know this to be true because the US is now switching to JDAM munitions, which means aircraft can fly over their targets.

The second is that most US bases in the region have largely been made unusable by Iranian strikes. This also appears to be true. Iran took out five (5) THAAD radars in the region, with some of the radar arrays costing upwards of $1.1billion dollors; as a result, there is no longer a warning of incoming Iranian fire.

Heavy GPS spoofing by Iran means GPS-guided munitions like Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) will not hit their targets with 5-meter accuracy. We saw the same thing in Ukraine. The primary backup to GPS for JDAM is an Inertial Navigation System (INS), so accuracy will be down no closer than 30 meters. So lots of bombing with no better than 30-meter accuracy. This also explains the laser designation flashes we see on IDF-CENTCOM press release video of attacks on Iranian launchers and other targets.

Constant reports that the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea has been attacked by drones and/or MRBMs. Also, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) withdrew from combat operations in the Red Sea due to "a laundry" fire on the ship. The exact nature of this fire is unclear.

Iran has used cluster munitions to attack Ben Gurion Airport, where US air tankers operate. Why American planners think these and other basing facilities within reach of Iranian weapons are safe enough to conduct combat operations from is beyond belief.

Russia is now actively assisting Iran. The manner of this assistance is not clear - likely targeting intelligence.

US air tankers are orbiting over Jordan. These assets and their basing should be primary targets for Iran/Russia.

Here is one information source.

09-Mar, 2026: After 10 days of fighting, Iran/Russia has been able to suppress US-Israeli airstrike capacity by 65 percent. Source. Further reports are that Trump is looking for an off-ramp and his people have made a 2nd overure for a ceasefire.

12-Mar, 2026: U.S. Central Command confirmed the loss of one KC-135, tail numbers 63-8017 and 62-3556, are not receiver-capable KC-135R(RT) variants.

The second tanker involved in the incident managed to return to base:

12-Mar, 2026: Five (5) U.S. tankers were struck and damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia during an Iranian ballistic missile strike. According to an official, the battle damage to the tankers was not enough to destroy them, and they are being repaired. Whatever the case, these aircraft are out of the fight. No injuries reported. Source.

Iran has Israel and the US on the back foot. Stopping now would only reset everything, and the US-Israel will simply attack again in the future. Iran needs to keep its foot on the gas pedal. Iran/Russia have collapsed the THAAD and Arrow systems, so both US bases in the region and Israel are now free fire "Turkey Shoot" zones for Russia-Iran and Hezbollah.

This war also proved that "missile defense" is simply unfeasible. Intercept rates were far too low for more modern MRBMs, even with enough interceptor rounds on hand. The war has also shown that Western technology cannot deal with the battle-hardened [Ukraine War] Shaed-136 platforms.

Iran had far more missiles and drones than Western estimates. Perhaps tens of thousands.

18-Mar 2026: Iran hits an F-35 using an IR seeker weapon. We/ve written in depth on stealth fighters' high vulnerability to heat-signature detection and attack.

21-Mar 2026: Iran attacks Diego Garcia with long-range ballistic missiles. Inverified.

27-March, 2026: Iran damaged/destroyed multiple USAF KC-135 tankers parked on the apron at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia. This list also includes a Boeing E-3 Sentry and a Lockheed EC-130. Some very high-value hardware indeed.

28-March 2026: Confirmation that an American E-3G Sentry was in fact destroyed at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia by Iranian missile/drone fire.

We expect the Iranians to hit all near-Persian Gulf bases used by US heavy aircraft (tankers/AWACS/Heavy lift transport) to force all of these operations to relocate to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (Azraq), Jordan, and then launch a heavy knock-out blow on Muwaffaq. This would effectively ground all US-Israeli fast jets from attacking Iran.

Another excellent analysis from RUSI.

03-Apr, 2026: American losses continue to mount:

1x F-15E (48th Fighter Wing) — Shot down in southwestern Iran. Pilot rescued; WSO still missing.
2x HH-60G Pave Hawks — Hit during a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission and crash-landed across the border in Iraq. Crew reportedly rescued.
2x A-10C Thunderbolt II — Shot down and crashed into the Persian Gulf. Pilot recovered. Part of the same CSAR package. A second A-10C was also downed on the same day.
1x IDF-AF F-16I may have been downed over Iran.
1x U.S. Army Boeing CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter destroyed after Iranian strikes on Camp Buehring, Kuwait

Other incidents (past 48 hours):

KC-135R Stratotanker — Emergency squawk 7700 around 10:00 UTC near Tel Aviv.
F-16CJ "Wild Weasel" (F-16C Block 50/52, SEAD configuration) — Emergency squawk 7700 over Saudi Arabia near the Iraqi border around 15:00 UTC; later disappeared from FlightRadar.
KC-135R Stratotanker — Emergency squawk 7700 around 19:00 UTC near Tel Aviv.
Pentagon confirmed that 1,500 sailors and their families have been withdrawn from Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain to Norfolk Naval Base in Virginia.

05-Apr, 2026: U.S. Army aircraft losses to rescue the two crew members of a downed F-15E jet over Iran. Confirmed losses (current tally):

1× F-15E Strike Eagle — destroyed
2× HH-60 helicopters — damaged
1x MH-6 Little Bird — destroyed
1× A-10 Thunderbolt II — destroyed
2× C-130 Hercules — destroyed
1–2× MQ-9 Reapers — destroyed

The Last Question First; Attacking Iran

2026-02-22T13:00:00.000-08:00

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"We judge that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Near East would increase the dangers in an already dangerous situation and therefore not be in our interest. Israel has 12 surface-to-surface missiles delivered from France. It has set up a production line and plans by the end of 1970 to have a total force of 24–30, 10 of which are programmed for nuclear warheads." - Henry Kissinger

United States Attacks Venezuela / Petrostate Regime-Change

2026-01-08T12:00:00.000-08:00

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"...to rely increasingly on the projection of American military power around the world to try to maintain this dysfunctional system, or set of arrangements that have evolved over the last 30 or 40 years. We like to call it an all-volunteer force, but the truth is, it's a professional army, and when we think about where we send that army, it's really an imperial army."

- Andrew Bacevich, 2008

EA-18G Growler. These aircraft were instrumental in blinding Vensualian air defense.

03-Jan 2026: The U.S. conducted a large-scale attack on Venezuela similar to the invasion of Panama in 1989. The 2026 attack captured the leader of Venezuela and his wife and flew them out of the country.

We are not going to write about the details of the attack, as that will be covered elsewhere. The United States attacking another third-world country over energy resources is no longer an interesting topic. Venezuela would have zero strategic significance were it not for having the largest oil reserves in the world.

We recommend these topic resources on the matter:

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/wider-implications-us-action-venezuela-rusi-experts-react

Russian Tactical Adaption : Russo-Ukrainian War

2025-11-18T16:49:00.000-08:00

"Along with the successful interception of most high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) [AGM-88] fired by Ukrainian aircraft, the Russian air defence network is now assessed to be achieving a significant number of intercepts against GMLRS munitions" [HIMARS].

- Dr. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds (May 2023) Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies. London.

Editor's note: The loss of a third F-16 was reported on May 16, 2025, this after a second loss on April 12, 2025, all simply underscores what we have already concluded here in this writing. This is after another F-16 was lost to hostile action last year. The May loss pilot ejected, the other two F-16 pilots KIA. Four F-16s have been lost in total.

The same day (19 May 2023), the United States greenlights NATO to send F-16 AM fast-jets to Ukraine, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies in the United Kingdom, issues yet another extraordinary report. This time on Russian Tactical Adaption in the Russo-Ukrainian War.

[Above] Royal Danish Air Force F-16AM. How NATO F-16 aircraft would operate from dispersed locations (read: operating from roadways) while also being overmatched by Russian R-37M - all remains unclear. The F-16 is an exceedingly capable machine - but after reading this latest RUSI report - it is difficult to see a role for the F-16 in Ukraine.

This latest RUSI report contains some frankly astonishing details.

Original link:

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine

Here are some excerpts from the RUSI report:

Stealth Fighters; Affirming the Consequent Fallacy

2025-11-18T16:48:00.001-08:00

17-May 2021: EOL (End Of Life) for the F-22A has surfaced. We published "Affirming the Consequent" in April 2021, almost a month before F-22 retirement came to light.

E-2D with all new AN/APY-9 UHF radars to see and track LO aircraft. Stealth proponents aren't fooling the US Navy.

"All I could do was scream out on the guard frequency (frequency 243.0). “Eagles engaged, King… knock it off, knock it off, knock it off. Friendlies. Knock it off.”

The history of air combat shows that most air combat victories occurred when the pilot shot down never saw his attacker. So it makes sense the USAF would attempt to leverage this 'element of surprise' by investing in stealth fighters. The problem is the USAF never bothered to look at (neglects) the other necessary element required - IFF (Identification Friend or Foe).

In all these unseen aerial victories, the attacker had clearly identified an opponent as an enemy aircraft in WVR (Within Visual Range). But with the advent of longer-range missiles, everything changed. Now, verifying whom precisely you are intending to shoot at with a missile in a BVR (Beyond Visual Range) engagement becomes (and remains) a serious and systemic technological problem.

Airborne Infrared and Supersonic Stealth

2025-11-18T16:48:00.000-08:00

[Above] The mighty SR-71 Blackbird (part of the A-12 program series) detailing its operational skin temperatures when flying at speed and altitude. The aircraft depicted is the two-seat trainer.

JSF Stands For TFX : Lockheed Loses Conrol of its F-35 Program

2025-08-28T16:44:00.001-07:00

27-Aug, 2025: "An Air Force F-35 pilot was on the phone midair with Lockheed Martin engineers for nearly an hour attempting to resolve a landing gear issue before ultimately having to eject from the jet, according to a newly released accident investigation report."

Source

" Investigation Blames Water In Landing Gear Fluid For F-35 Crash"

Source

Lockheed did not equip the F-35 with sensors measuring dissolved water content in the gear hydraulic system, in an aircraft with a major hydraulic system contingency. The sensors are readily available.

This design omission caused the crash.

Lockheed has lost control of its F-35 program.

We predicted long ago that the F-35 operational history would replicate that of Lockheed's previous generation jet fighter, the F-104 Starfighter. Not a stellar record to be sure. Also, F-35 unit costs are almost $176 million per copy (not $70 million as claimed by Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office). The Pentagon has indeed repeated history; JSF does stand for TFX.

This rather blunt assessment surfaced in April 2022.

The Pentagon forgot the first rule of engineering: it's easy to make the new thing work worse than the thing it's supposed to replace.

From a historical perspective, and looking at actual historical combat data (combat data), the F-35 program should be restricted to non-kinetic air-to-air combat tasks. This would lower the buy for the F-35 and Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) also.

Why?

Impressive stealth aircraft exercises can never replicate certain specific things that happen in a real war. See here

United States Attacks Iran

2025-06-21T18:29:00.000-07:00

Northrop B-2A dropping a GBU-57

23 June, 2025: American B-2A bombers and cruise missiles have attacked Iranian facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Post-attack satellite images appear to show the Fordow site, which was hit by several GBU-57 from B-2As, to be intact, with only some damage to the entryways. Six B-2As carried six GBU-57s.

As of June 24, a fragile ceasefire has been declared.

The results of the American bombing are being disputed, with a variety of assessments being advanced.

Israeli operatives in Iran were able to disrupt Iranian air defenses enough to allow IDF fixed-wing fast jets to attack targets in western Iran using standoff heavy weapons. Israeli drones were then able to roam almost freely over Tarahn and western Iran. Thankfully, we never asserted that Iran's air defense would be a decisive factor. Only that their ballistic missile force would be. The Iranian air force sat out the conflict, safe in its underground facilities in places like 'Eagle 44.' Video released to the world of Iranian F-14 and F-5 aircraft being destroyed by IDF drones was almost certainly derelict airframes or decoys, as there were never any secondary explosions. Israel had the same issue that the Americans had in Iraq in 1991, that mobile missile launchers remain difficult to find and destroy.

The power of Iran's mobile ballistic missile force is no longer in dispute, as we predicted. True damage to Israel from Iran's MRBM force remains unclear (as strict censorship remains in place), but it is much worse than Israeli strategists predicted or will ever be acknowledged.

The Boresight focuses on lesser-known stories through exhaustive research. However, this time we cannot dedicate the bandwidth to repeat what others are reporting. If this event produced unreported impacts, we may add it here.

The US bombing of Iran has been a dream of Washington's Iran-Hawks and the Neocons since the 1980s. Rest assured, this attack by the United States will propel the Iranian regime into a mad dash towards nuclear weapons.

Still, the best analysis we can offer presently is here.

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet Fair Use Law -

Asymmetric Attack by Ukraine on Russian Strategic Aviation

2025-06-03T20:30:00.000-07:00

This is an evolving story.

June 02, 2025, Ukraine successfully smuggled over 100 FPV short-range drones in trucks into Russia, where they then attacked Russian strategic aviation at several Russian air bases thousands of kilometers from the front lines. The success of the attack is still being assessed, with reports of over 40 aircraft being destroyed.

BBC reported: "Ukraine says it has completed its biggest long-range attack of the war with Russia on Sunday, after using smuggled drones to launch a series of major strikes on at least 40 Russian warplanes at four military bases.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said 117 drones were used in the so-called "Spider's Web" operation by the SBU security service, striking "34% of [Russia's] strategic cruise missile carriers."

We think the real numbers are much lower, perhaps no more than a dozen. Many aircraft will likely be repaired. How the Russians respond to this remains unclear. The Kremlin may decide to recategorize Ukraine as a strategic threat to the Russian nuclear triad. This would spell very bad news for Ukraine.

Ominous Warning: Russian Air Power in Ukraine

2025-02-15T12:14:00.000-08:00

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As of March 2024, this warning from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defense and Security Studies - has indeed materialized.

Russian Air Force attack aviation has been pounding Ukrainian defenders with a myriad of new heavy high-yield precision glide munitions with devastating effect - that simply obliterate Ukrainian defensive elements. The result of this - is all too predictable. Russian ground forces have now been advancing on nearly all fronts since mid-February 2024.

During this period Ukraine claims to have downed dozens of Russian attack jets and even A-50 AWACS aircraft. However, no clear evidence has materialized to substantiate or corroborate these claims. Perhaps 2 or 3 aircraft have been lost and Russian friendly fire is the likely culprit.

In a related development, we learn back in April 2023 that the Russians have been jamming US-supplied GPS-guided munitions [HIMARS]. Something that should not have come as a surprise.

"The fighter force on the other hand actually been very effective at the moment.""They're being highly, highly effective at inflicting losses on Ukrainian ground attack sorties..." "They are able to threaten and regularly shoot down Ukrainian ground attack sorties from far, far outside the range of any Ukrainian retaliation." - Justin Bronk Ph.D., (Nov 2022) Senior Research Fellow for Airpower and Military Technology at RUSI, London.

The UK-based RUSI warns that the Russian Air Force could become a major factor in Ukraine in a manner not seen before - in the near future. They detail how Russian fighters have remained 'highly effective and lethal' against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war. This revelation was previously unknown and carries sobering implications.

In early November of 2022, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies out of the United Kingdom, issued an extraordinary and ominous report about the current and future influence of Russian Air Power in the Russo-Ukrainian War. The study warns the VKS (Russian Air Force) could become a major factor in the ground war henceforth unseen to date. With the outcome being the same as in Syria. After 2015 the VKS would break the back of anti-Assad forces in Syria with a relentless aerial bombing campaign. The thrust of the report here - please see video:

According to RUSI, Russian MiG-31BM (NATO: 'Foxhound') and Su-35S (NATO: 'Flanker') fighters are regularly downing UkrAF (Ukrainian Air Force) aircraft at ultra-long ranges - even if the Ukrainian aircraft fly in clutter and ultra-low altitudes. The Russian fighters are using an all-new (never before seen) ultra-long-range R-37M (NATO: AA-13 'Axehead') and also a new extended-range version of the R-77-1 (NATO AA-12B 'Adder') air-to-air missiles. R-37M range is almost 400 km (215 nautical miles). The new R-77-1 has a range of ~ 110 km (59 nautical miles) Both these Russian fighters also have powerful radars that can look down and shoot down targets maneuvering at treetop altitudes in clutter - from great distances.

The Su-35S 'Flanker-E' loadout is clearly visible here for air superiority CAP over Ukraine. Two ultra-long range R-37M missiles down the aircraft centerline, two R-77-1 extended-range medium-range missiles on the nacelles, one Kh-31PD anti-radiation missile round on the inboard port wing station, and two R-73L/K dogfight missiles on outer stations. Two Khibiny-U ECM pods are also fitted with an 18-LSM1 on the port, and 518-PSM on the starboard wingtips, respectively.

[Above] Su-35S of the VKS operating against the UkrAF with two R-77-1 extended range AA-12B 'Adder' and two R-74M dogfight missile rounds. Aircraft ID markings have been blurred by censors.

This MiG-31BM Foxhound with 4x R-33 (AA-9 Amos), 2x R-77-1, and 2x R-73L missiles. R-33S range is ~ 160km (86 nautical miles). The MiG-31 also features an upgraded Zaslon-M/AM radar.

Entering service in the early 1980s, SARH (Semi-Active Radar Homing) puts R-33 in the same class as the AIM-7 and Skyflash, be it with far greater range.

The MiG-31 Foxhound has been very effective against Ukrainian aircraft attempting to operate at low altitudes.[Below] MiG-31BM with four R-37M (Axehead) rounds semi-recessed belly stations and two R-77-1 (Adder-B) on inner port and starboard wing stations.

[Above] Nice shot of the R-77-1 (Adder-B)

Here is a backup working link. And here

[Above] Images of MiG-31BM conducting CAP missions in Ukraine. Armed with 2x R-77-1 (NATO: AA-12B 'Adder') and 2x R-37M (NATO: AA-13 'Axehead') air-to-air missile rounds.

SA-11 'Buk' quadruple launcher. Can hit targets over 80,000 ft (over 24,000 m).

The SA-8 'Gecko' can hit targets up to ~ 40,000 (12,000 m). This is a Polish example.

"Russian air power is largely neutralized from a strike perspective. It's a threat in being rather than major threat a day to day. Because Russia still hasn't managed to effectively hunt down and kill enough of Ukraine's mobile medium and short-range SA-11 and SA-8 SAM systems. And so they're limited to very low altitude attacks essentially beyond the front lines which are then at great risk from MANPADs and even anti-aircraft fire."

"The fighter force on the other hand is actually been very effective at the moment. So what they've done is divided Ukraine (the contact areas in Ukraine) into eight different sectors and they have a pair of fighters on combat air patrol (CAP) in each one during daylight hours. The Russian Air Force is flying about 140 to 160 sorties a day."

"They're being highly, highly effective at inflicting losses on Ukrainian ground attack sorties which are attempting loft rocket attacks, the same as the Russian Su-25s, as well as occasionally bombing attacks with Su-24s on Russian positions because the Russian fighters have both the R-77-1 (AA-12B) but also they're using a lot of R-37s now, a very, very long range air to air missile from both MiG-31B and have been integrating it onto their Su-35S. And what it means is that with the very powerful radar on both of those platforms, the 'Irbis-E' (Su-35) and the 'Zaslon' (MiG-31) that can look down and shoot down very effectively from long range against targets flying in clutter at very low altitudes. They are able to threaten and regularly shoot down Ukrainian ground attack sorties from far, far outside the range of any Ukrainian retaliation."

"If the Ukrainians aren't supplied with additional ammunition from their medium-range SAMs, and ultimately replacement systems to start phasing in Western suppliable, re-suppliable equivalents, things like NASAMS then ultimately the VKS, the Russian Air Force could start to become a major factor on the battlefield in a way it just hasn't up to this point in the war."

"The reason it hasn't is because those surface-to-air missile systems continue to pose a prohibitive threat to Russian sorties at medium and high altitudes inside Ukrainian lines. If those SAMs are no longer able to fire, those sorties will come back in again and we could see a lot of heavy firepower coming in from the air on Ukrainian army positions but also on cities, on towns, on infrastructure, near the front lines."

- Justin Bronk (RUSI) November 8, 2022

[Above] OSINT from September 2022 of Su-35S and Su-30SM3 launch and recovery while conducting CAP (combat air patrol) against the UkrAF in Ukraine. All aircraft can be seen with Khibiny-U wing-tip ECM pods, R-73L 'Archer' dogfight missiles, R-77-1 'Adder-B' extended-range medium-range air-to-air missiles, and at least one Kh-31PD 'Krypton' anti-radiation weapon fitted. Kh-31PD's published range is 160 mi (257 km / 139 nautical miles). No R-37M missiles are seen in these images. No auxiliary drop tanks (ubiquitous for Western fighters) are used or needed by the Flanker fighter series - though they can be fitted. Su-35S and Su-30SM scored many victories against UkrAF early in the war. UkrAF fighters were completely outclassed and overmatched by 'N011M Bars' and 'N035 Irbis-E' radars found in the Su-30SM and Su-35S respectively.

[Above] Equipped with the 'N011M Bars' radar the Su-30SM is able to attack and shoot down UkrAF aircraft at long ranges using the R-77-1 extended-range medium-range ARH missile. Editors note: Since our original writing in 2022, the Naval Su-30SM has also been photographed equipped with the R-37M Axehead.

The superlative Su-35S with its 'Irbis-E' radar. This one is loaded with four R-77-1 rounds and two Khibiny-U wing-tip ECM pods.

[Above] Su-35S with R-37M, R-77-1, and Kh-31PD missile round(s) at Belbek AB, Crimea. Footage appeared 01-Nov, 2022.

[Above] Excellent view of VKS Su-35S 'Super Flanker' load out for Combat Air Patrol mission. The appearance, fielding, and heavy employment of R-37M 'Axehead' is a surprise to almost all Western observers/analysts and defense press.

[Above] R-37M during development tests. The published range is 150–398 km (80-214 nautical miles. [Below] R-37M is an unwelcome development for US-NATO AWACS and air-tanker crews.

[Above] ARH (Active Radar Homing) and ultra-long-range puts the new R-37M (AA-13) in the same class as the AIM-54C Phoenix or MBDA-Meteor - but outranges them both by some 190 km (100 nautical miles). Because it is based on the R-33 form factor, this also allows R-37M semi-recessed belly fitment on MiG-31BM Foxhound.

MBDA-Meteor Range ~ 200 km (110 nmi).
[Below] Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix. Range ~ 212 km (114 nmi)

Editors note: in July 2024 the US Navy announced it had fielded an air-launched version of its RIM-174 Standard SM-6 designated 'AIM-174B.' It may have a range similar to R-37M but AIM-174B weighs in at a hefty ~ 1760 lbs (800 kg) versus ~ 1,120 lb (510 kg) for Axehead. The AIM-174B weapon-release speeds are surely lower than the Russian R-37M, as the Russian weapon is based on the R-33 and was designed to be semi-recessed on the MiG-31, whereas the AIM-174B hangs from USN Hornet wing-pylon. The American weapon has never been used in combat, unlike Axehead.

[Above] US-Navy AIM-174B on F-18 Superhornet. We think underwing carriage should limit launch speeds to < Mach 1 thus giving the R-37M and the American weapon similar range performance.

[Below] The mighty US Navy Grumman F-14 Tomcat, from the VF-111 'Sundowners' firing the Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix missile. Both Tomcat and its Phoenix missiles were retired from US service in 2006. In 2022 the Russian Air Force has now adopted this mantle.

The development and fielding of powerful aircraft like the Su-35 and MiG-31 derivatives with R-37M capabilities are (as we predicted in 2014) unwelcome news for US-NATO air-breathing AWACS, ISR platforms, and air-tanker fleets.

[Above] Both of these high-value assets (tankers and AWACS) are the cornerstones of the US-NATO power projection doctrine. Su-35S, Su-30SM, MiG-31BM, R-37M, and R-77-1 combat performance against the UKrAF simply underscore what we at the Boresight have always argued. The RUSI publication simply supports our assessment that these key NATO assets can be put at great risk in the air (and on the ground) and would therefore be unable to affect the battle. MIM-104 batteries will need to be mindful of 'Krypton' anti-radiation weapons. Kh-31PD published ranges are ~ 160 mi / 257 km / 139 nautical miles.

[Above/Below] The Russian equivalent to the AGM-88 HARM. The 'Krypton' Kh-31PD anti-radiation weapon.

Editors Note: Although not addressed in the published RUSI report, according to Justin Bronk (see video below) when the Russian GBAD crews finally get dialed in after the first few weeks and manually opened their Doppler gates (switched their systems out of automatic mode) they could then see and kill the slow-moving Bayraktar drones, and TB2 fleet began taking heavy losses. This effectively ended the Bayraktar TB2 kinetic combat career in Ukraine. Bayraktar TB2 class drones can only be employed against poorly trained GBAD crews. What we are seeing is the obsolescence of an entire class of weapons, like piston-engined heavy bombers during the Korean War.

Indeed we predicted Bayraktar TB2 class UAVs (including MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper) to be quickly deemed 'not combat effective' (read: obsolete) in Ukraine against modern GBAD manned by properly trained crews. This is precisely what has occurred. To date, at least 14 Bayraktars have been verified destroyed. The life expectancy of any UAV in Ukraine is about 7 days. These classes of drones are an easy target - and therefore certainly are not, (not) the future of air power. We are witnessing the obsolescence of an entire class of weapon platforms, like the piston-engine heavy bomber in the Korean War.

MANPADS effectiveness in Ukraine is consistent with the historical performance of these systems. When the targeted aircraft uses expendable countermeasures (read: chaff/flare decoys) they typically defeat MANPADS attack(s). Aircraft are downed either when countermeasures are not employed, or because repeated exposure to man-portable attack has exhausted the target aircraft complement of expendables during the sortie.

The complete report originally published by Dr. Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Dr. Jack Watling

7 November 2022; Title 'The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence'

Other findings detailed by the RUSI report:

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed, and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defense teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.
It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them.
The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes.

Observations not addressed in the report directly:

IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) environment must be classified by definition in Ukraine - as extreme. This includes IFF transponder interrogation, NCTR, and Mk1 eyeball. This is because both belligerents use effectively identical kit. We hypothesize problems likely were extreme and persisted - especially during VKS manned deep strikes at low altitudes. It is highly plausible both belligerents were falling victim to fratricide/friendly fire from both their own fighter combat air patrol, MANPAD, and GBAD. Based on what we saw in Georgia in 2008 perhaps 50 percent of VKS losses in Ukraine at low altitudes may be due to fratricide/friendly fire from Russian fighter CAPs. Only an investigation after the war can support this hypothesis. The report does not attempt to apprise Russian NCTR.
Kyiv claimed they were able to degrade VKS A-50 AWACS performance but this could also be due to Russian own EW. Russian own EW almost surely interfered with Russian own radio comm especially early in the war.
Whatever Western-based GBAD supplied to Kyiv can still be attacked by Russian anti-radiation and/or depleted by drones. Any radar-based system can be attacked by anti-radiation weapons.
The report omits Ukrianeian Bayraktar TB2 ops - which have gone completely extinct since the beginning of the war. The TB2 was simply no match for modern Russian fighters and GBAD manned by properly trained crews. Slow flight speed was the key. Something we predicted would occur. Videos of TB2 ops were slowly fed to OSINT long after their TB2 fleet had been sidelined.
The success of the Russian air superiority fighters in Ukraine means that these aircraft, radar, and missile programs were indeed developed/funded/fielded; in sharp contracts to popular Western assertions that the Russian military has been gutted for decades by the current Russian presidency. The fielding of the systems means there was no cogent basis for these Western recriminations.
"Neither side has been able to find an effective answer to cheap and plentiful quad-copter drones. They linger over both belligerent troops who remain completely oblivious to their presence."
Kyiv GBAD is almost surely using avoiding Russian SEAD the same way the Serbs did against NATO in 1999. GBAD is switched on for short periods and then switched off again.
The report overstates the threat by AGM-88 HARM to Russian GBAD. Russian AD systems are mobile just as Keiv systems are.
Will Russia continue to allow US-NATO ISR assets orbiting in the region to supply Kyiv with intelligence or use EW or other methods to degrade these platforms?

Ilyushin-Beriev A-50U (NATO: Mainstay) at Vorkuta Sovetsky Air Base July 2015. Photo Vladimir Ivanov

Works Cited

“Breaking of the World: New Phase Russo-Ukrainian War: Syria Playbook.” Breaking of the World, https://theboresight.blogspot.com/2022/10/breaking-of-world-new-phase-russo.html. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

Combat Sorties by Su-35S and Su-30SM Fighter Crews. www.youtube.com https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3yUbJtbXnw. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

Carroll, W. (2022). The REAL truth about the Air War over Ukraine [Video]. In YouTube. https://youtu.be/YYDnspMWdaM

R-37 Long-Range Aircraft Missile (RVV-BD) | Missilery.Info. https://en.missilery.info/missile/r37. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

R-77-1 Medium-Range Aviation Missile (RVV-SD Product 170-1) | Missilery.Info. https://en.missilery.info/missile/rvv-cd. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

Short Range Airborne Missile RVV-MD | Missilery.Info. https://en.missilery.info/missile/rvv-md. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

“The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence.” Royal United Services Institutemenuplussearchsearchclockpdfprintfacebooktwitterlinkedinemailprintfacebooktwitteryoutubelinkedinrss, 7 Nov. 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence.

“Vympel R-77.” Weaponsystems.Net, https://weaponsystems.net/system/665-Vympel+R-77. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

“Warning Russian Air Force Could Become ‘major Factor’ in Ukraine War.” Forces Network, https://www.forces.net/technology/aircraft/western-support-needed-combat-russias-new-approach-air-war-ukraine. Accessed 13 Nov. 2022.

Combat sorties of Su-30SM and Su-35S aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces. 2022. rutube.ru, https://rutube.ru/video/639a5a1c0c0981712e38bb769f0ac26f/.

Yulia Kulikova. “Russian Su-35S and Su-3SM crews destroyed Ukrainian aircraft.” Izvestia, 1 Nov. 2022, https://iz.ru/1419024/2022-11-01/rossiiskie-ekipazhi-su-35s-i-su-3sm-unichtozhili-ukrainskii-samolet.

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet Fair Use Law -

New Chinese Aircraft Appear

2025-01-13T17:17:00.000-08:00

Editors note: Unwanted advertising popups are now the default on Google Blogger. The Boresight recommends installing free Adblock Plus into your browser to suppress this annoyance - and view our content in peace

PLAAF Chengdu J-36

Two new Chinese aircraft appeared over the holidays. We lack the bandwidth to research these types, so we will let Millennium 7 HistoryTech occupy this role.

PLAAF H-20 stealth bomber

Millennium 7 HistoryTech analysis of both types:

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet ‘Fair Use’ Law -

Game Changer: New Russian Aysimetric Kenetic ICBM

2025-01-04T08:37:00.000-08:00

Nov-21, 2024: There has been a major development in Ukraine. The Russians have used an all-new weapons system called "Oreshnik" in Ukraine in response to the US-operated ATACMS attack on Russian territory the day before. The new Russian weapon is a mobile ICBM with 36 kinetic MIRV warheads, that hit their targets at Mach 10. Social media video capture shows the weapon to be highly accurate. "Oreshnik" struck the huge Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro. Excellent independent analysis has appeared since the 21st.

Also, no Western anti-ballistic missile technology can handle this type of weapon. In Ukraine, thirty-two (32) Patriot launchers firing in salvos are required to try and hit just one (1) hypersonic Russian Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" missile."By comparison, German Patriot batteries have 16 launchers and Germany has 72 launchers in total." See link.

This gives Russia the conventional capacity to asymmetrically take out large area targets like NATO airbases - without using nuclear weapons. So this is a game-changer.

Some believe Oreshnik is based on the Russian R-30 Bulava.

The Russians have since warned that they will use "Oreshnik" again if provoked. Remember, only American personnel can operate ATACMS and supply targeting information to the system, so the attack on Russia by the US - is being seen by the Kremlin as an act of war.

Initial Western reporting of the Russians using the RS-24 ICBM was false.

[Above] Russian R-30 Bulava.

[Above] Russian RS-24

The US policy change to greenlight ATACMS firings into Russia proper occurred after the current Biden administration lost its re-election bid in November, and before the new administration takes office. Russia knows ATACMS targeting and employment can only be done by American personnel. This decision to attack Russia with US-crewed ATACMS is totally irresponsible and in our view, those in the administration responsible for the decision to attack Russia - should be arrested.

Another angle of the ICBM strike on Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine

We await further developments - however, we have long emphasized that wherever the West and NATO attempt at escalation - the Russians will simply counter and escalate in kind. This is exactly what has occurred. Continued involvement in Ukraine by the US-NATO is (was) always - a pointless exercise.

The Russians now have an asymmetric capability to counter NATO's keystone capability - its air basing - and therefore NATO air power.

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet ‘Fair Use’ Law -

End Game: Syrian War Final Phase: Coup

2024-12-08T10:09:00.003-08:00

For now, the VKS is staying put in Syria.

As of 08-Dec 2024, the Assad government has melted away after an almost bloodless advance by "rebel" forces from Turkish-controlled Syrian territory in the north. Russia did a couple of bombing runs in the beginning but stopped once it saw that the Syrian government forces were not resisting.

So a Coup d'état.

Now the Second Syrian War begins.

From the military perspective, the Russians had a minimal footprint in Syria - with just a handful of aircraft and helicopters - and ran very high sortie rates - which by 2018 broke the back of the US-Qatar-Saudi-Turkey backed Jihadists - despite assurance from most Western observers that Russian aircraft and engines cannot support that tempo. As the Americans have never learned in their wars - military capability doesn't always produce the desired political outcomes. Remember what happened in

Libya

after Western military intervention - the removal of the dictatorship plunges the country into a Jihadist hell hole.

We were no friends of Assad but he was not a transnational terror threat - like the ISIS nightmare the US created by its invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Assad has reappeared in Moscow. The incoming Trump administration will be less sympathetic to antigovernment forces - because of the jihadist threat they represent.

For now, the Russian military bases in Syria will remain.

=============

"We are going to scourge the Third Reich from end to end. We are bombing Germany city by city and ever more terribly in order to make it impossible for her to go on with the war. That is our object; we shall pursue it relentlessly." - 1944, Sir Arthur Harris, Air Marshal, RAF Bomber Command

F-16 arrives in Ukraine : Kursk

2024-11-11T16:00:00.000-08:00

August 10, 2024 - Ukraine is conducting a large-scale operation that has produced a large incursion into Russia.

History instructs that when a Western army (for which the Ukrainian Armed Forces now are) enters Russian territory in any serious way, that entry marks the beginning of the end for that Western army. The more serious the incursion, the more certain its defeat.

The exquisite irony that this is happening at Kursk is even more salient.

[Above] The first images appeared of an ex-NATO F-16 AM in Ukrainian, in early August 2024.

New York Times 04-Aug, 2024:

"President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said on Sunday that his army had received a first batch of F-16 fighter jets. The long-awaited arrival of the Western-supplied jets should bolster the country’s defenses, although Kyiv appears to have received too few of them so far to have an immediate impact on the battlefield.

“F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it,” Mr. Zelensky said in a video posted on social media networks showing him at an air base addressing and meeting Ukrainian pilots. He was standing in front of two F-16s, and two more flew overhead as he spoke. At the very least, the arrival of the jets will bolster Ukrainians’ morale, which has been dampened by months of slow, but steady Russian advances on the battlefield and devastating attacks on the country’s power grid." Source.

Again, the impact of these aircraft remains unclear. Please see our writing on this subject here. With Russian air defense regularly downing AGM-88 HARM missiles fired by Ukrainian fast-jet aviation in the past, we can not see how changing the launch platform from the MiG-29 or Su-27 to the F-16 demonstrably alters these outcomes.

The answer is - it doesn't.

So what will Ukraine do with the F-16?

They can likely hide them from the Russians on the ground with dispersal and by using underground bunkers, but once the F-16 is in the air, that is where they will be in the greatest peril. Ukraine might try to disrupt VKS FAB employment on the frontlines; however, Russia has air superiority there, and Russian air defenses have also proven extremely lethal.

It also remains unclear if the avionics have been altered on these F-16s to facilitate the Soviet/Russian artificial horizon format. It can be dangerous for any pilot unfamiliar with the differences, especially when moving from one format to another, as Ukrainian pilots would have had to do.

Our best guess is that the handful of aircraft will mostly be used in the western parts of Ukraine to intercept drones and to act as PR. They will also become primary targets for the Russians.

If NATO leadership attempts to use F-16 near the front lines, the aircraft will be completely overmatched by Russian integrated ground-based air defense and in the air by MiG-31BM, Su-35S, and Su-30SM employing the R-37M Axhead.

- All media found here is for scholarly and research purposes and protected under U.S. Internet ‘Fair Use’ Law -

Iran Counterattack On American Military Bases

2024-02-02T16:07:00.000-08:00

"All land-based US Expeditionary Forces in Central Command in range of Iran's missile forces are at the mercy of Iranian missile fire. US Expeditionary Forces in Central Command are totally exposed..."

20-Jan 2024: A string of attacks on US bases. US claims of missile interception are unverifiable.

12-Mar, 2022: Reported Ballistic Missile Attack Near U.S. Base in Erbil, Iraq"

Iranian Qiam MRBM

Iranian Fateh-313

07-Jan 2020: At 01:30 hrs local time Iran fired from Iranian territory at least ten Fateh-313 short-range ballistic missiles and perhaps five to six Qiam medium-range ballistic missiles at two US bases in Iraq in retaliation for the US killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani days before.

Israeli-Hamas Conflict 2023

2023-11-05T09:40:00.000-08:00

Newly published F-15Is of 69 Sqn armed with 500-lb Mk-82 GP bombs (Stations LCT-1/-2/-3 & RCT-1/-2/-3) and 2,000-pound class GBU-31 JDAMs (Stations 2 & 8).

[Above] IAF F-16I of 107 Squadron "Knights of the Orange Tail" armed with four 2,000-pound class GBU-31 JDAMs. Also seen armed with a pair of Python 4/5s and a pair of AIM-120s.

Afghanistan War Ends : The Wrong Tool

2023-11-04T10:59:00.000-07:00

Since no one operates in a vacuum, and this includes airpower, we wish to take a moment to reflect on the end of America's longest asymmetric war. The war in Afghanistan. Rather than the usual observations, accusations, and recriminations, we have published a more authentic and sobering historical view.

The Sobering Continues: Russian Invasion of Ukraine

2023-11-04T10:58:00.002-07:00

"This problem is somewhat unsurprising. The Russian mil was built around the concept of active defense, eschewing strategic ground offensives. It lacks the logistics, and manpower, to sustain this kind of fight in the largest country in Europe." - Michael Kofman. Director, Russia Studies at CNA.

Indeed we have never taken the position that modern Russia could defeat NATO in an offensive operation pushing westward. We have always held that Russian could play defense effectively against a NATO (and NATO tactical aviation) push eastward into Russia and Russian air space.

This war is being reported and analyzed (in English) from a Western perspective. So Western assumptions on warfighting are applied to events in this war. This is a mistake. The Russian army today is not the Red Army of the WWII/post-WWII period. Russian doctrine is different and is structured for defense.

"Neither The Will Nor The Ability": Russia attacks Ukraine

2023-11-04T10:58:00.001-07:00

Russian forces in Belarus for a large military exercise called 'Soyuznaya Reshimost' (Allied Resolve) 2022. VKS Tu-22M3 and Su-35S over Belarus airspace.

Editors Note: Fluid situation. Information will change

24-Feb, 2022: D-Day for Ukraine. Russian forces attack the country. We will spawn a new post shortly. A massive attack opened by 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles, 9K720 Iskander ballistic missiles, K-55 cruise missiles, plus VKS aviation. Russian armor formation on the move into Ukraine. Detail forthcoming.

Times Up - Ukraine Implodes

2023-11-04T10:57:00.001-07:00

21-Jan 2022: We have moved this post from 2015 to the top. We have been watching events in Ukraine for quite some time. We will be writing a new post shortly - as it beginning to appear major hostilities in the form of a Russian invasion may be imminent in some weeks.

Why an invasion? To date, Russian annexation and activities in the Donbas have not yielded the political result the Kremlin would prefer in Kyiv. So why would the Kremlin simply repeat those types of actions now? For these reasons, we think invasion is more likely. We hope we are wrong. No one wants war.

For some background here is our writings in 2015:

With a destroyed economy brought on by the combined weight of insufficient internal history of/with democratic institutions, a systemic Kleptocracy, a 2008 Wall Street Crash, and a toxic housing bubble in Ukraine including a run on Ukrainian banks in Oct 2008, and finally, an I.M.F. Neoliberal stipulated austerity program (directed against pensions, social spending, and fuel prices) – the suffering is too much - economic desperation too great – the resulting nationalistic/xenophobic surge too strong. Times up - Ukraine implodes.

Russo-Ukrainian War: Schrödinger's Cat

2023-03-04T09:42:00.008-08:00

"Schrödinger’s paradox tells us that we as spectators, on the outside, do not know if inside the box the cat is alive or dead, therefore, without verification, it is alive and dead at the same time."

Su-35S, Su-30SM, and MiG-31BM from the 790th Fighter Aviation Regiment. All these types have indeed established air superiority over the areas of contact in Ukraine.

Northrop B-21 Raider Rollout

2022-12-07T18:13:00.002-08:00

"Any survey of the free world's defense structure cannot fail to impart a feeling of regret that so much of our effort and resources must be devoted to armaments." Dwight D. Eisenhower. State of the Union, 1959.

[Above] A new image appears on 12 Sept 2023

07-Dec, 2022: The USAF finally unveils its Northrop B-21 Raider bomber to the world. Presumably a modernized and lower-cost version of the Northrop B-2 Spirit bomber.

Breaking of the World: New Phase Russo-Ukrainian War: Syria Playbook

2022-10-19T23:35:00.058-07:00

"He will come to death. An image of the splendor of the kings of men in glory, undimmed before the breaking of the world."

Indeed the rules-based international system now lies in rubble after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Ironically the rules-based system would be undone in part - by its primary underwriter.

The dwindling air force of the UkrAF still operates a handful of aircraft. To date, we have been unable to confirm whether this Su-27P 'Blue 37' is still operational. Along with a handful of MiG-29s, some/most/all of both types have been modified by NATO to carry US-made AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles. The success of this effort against Russian air defenses appears mixed.

Russo-Ukrainian War New Phase and Revelations

2022-08-25T11:45:00.137-07:00

"Well war - wars are competitions. The adversary develops capabilities. Your enemy develops capabilities. And you try to develop your own capabilities to check what he can do to you to be able to, overcome his capabilities." - Andrew J. Bacevich 2008

[Editors note: Developing story. 08-Oct, 2022 General Sergey Surovikin is appointed by Kremlin for forces in Ukraine. He was responsible for the Russian campaign in Syria. This event may spawn a new post. We expect the trajectory of the war to change - yet again]

We were correct about a new phase - however not in its nature. Neither was the US State Department. See here

Although airpower is not the focus of this post - its disjointed nature in Ukraine may have a simple explanation. Russian Aerospace forces may be facing air defense units and ground forces under the direction of a previously unknown and untested new entity called the National Guard of Russia. Please keep reading.

Bipolar World Order Returns: Russian Invasion of Ukraine

2022-03-12T17:49:00.120-08:00

"May we never confuse honest dissent with disloyal subversion." - Dwight D. Eisenhower

"The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." - President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002