Practice Notes / Diary | Select Notings of Talha Abdul Rahman (Advocate on Record, Supreme Court)

Parole, Temporary Bail and Suspension of Sentence Pending Appeal on Ill-Health of Family Member: 16 Orders

2026-10-19T21:49:19.611+05:30

Orders granting parole, temporary bail or temporary/interim suspension of sentence to a convict, pending appeal, on the ground of ill-health of a family member. Each order has been read in full on Indian Kanoon. Summaries are drawn only from the words of each order. None of these orders shows an SCC, AIR or CriLJ citation on Indian Kanoon; the neutral citation is given where available, otherwise the case number.

Supreme Court

1. Ajay Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Supreme Court of India | 15 July 2025 | Criminal Appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 9024 of 2025

The High Court rejected the "short term bail / parole application of the appellant, who is a convict and whose appeal before the High Court is pending", "on the ground that earlier also a short term bail was granted to the appellant in respect of his wife's treatment". By its interim order of 13.06.2025 (para 6), the Supreme Court recorded: "His presence, particularly at the time of operation and immediately thereafter, will help her to recover at the earliest", and held that "the petitioner could be granted parole for a week from 15.06.2025 till 21.06.2025". For the second surgery (para 9): "If any such application is filed before the High Court, the same shall be considered expeditiously".

Note: Daily order. Parole was granted by the interim order of 13.06.2025; for the second surgery the appellant was relegated to the High Court.

Delhi High Court

2. Angel Gupta vs State (NCT of Delhi)

Delhi High Court (DB: Vivek Chaudhary and Manoj Jain, JJ.) | 14 November 2025 | CRL.A. 623/2025; CRL.M.(BAIL) 2246/2025

Application "seeking interim suspension of sentence on the ground of surgery of her ailing mother". Conviction under "Sections 302 and 120-B" IPC; sentence of "rigorous imprisonment for life". Counsel submitted "the Appellant is the only adult female member in the household" and "The Appellant's presence is therefore indispensable". Para 8: "in order to enable the appellant to attend to and take care of her ailing mother during the forthcoming surgery and the ensuing post-operative recovery period, the sentence awarded to the appellant is hereby suspended, from the date of her release, for a period of four weeks".

3. Mukesh Sangwan vs State of NCT Delhi

Delhi High Court (Jyoti Singh, J.) | 28 March 2024 | CRL.A. 660/2022; CRL.M.(BAIL) 522/2024

Application "seeking extension of interim suspension of sentence on the ground that the nasal surgery of the Appellant's wife could not be performed". Conviction under "Sections 328/376 IPC and Section 6" of the POCSO Act. The State said "medical documents are genuine". Held: "interim suspension of sentence of the Appellant is extended for a period of two weeks from 03.04.2024".

Note: This is an extension order. The original grant dated 12.03.2024 has not been read.

4. Manish Kalra vs State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Delhi High Court (Anoop Kumar Mendiratta, J.) | 10 May 2022 | CRL.A. 129/2022; CRL.M.(BAIL) 459/2022

Application "for suspension of sentence on the ground of ill-health of the wife". Conviction under "Section 10 of POCSO Act". Counsel submitted "that since there is none to look after the wife of the appellant, she could not get admitted". Held: "the sentence of the appellant is suspended and he is admitted to interim bail for a period of four weeks from the date of his release".

5. Honey vs State

Delhi High Court (Yogesh Khanna, J.) | 28 May 2020 | CRL.A. 1325/2019; Crl.M.(B) No. 6334/2020

The applicant, "convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 366 IPC", sought "interim suspension of sentence for the surgery of his mother", for whom "surgery of shoulder has been advised". The surgery date "has been verified by the State". He was "admitted on interim bail for two weeks from the date of his release".

Bombay High Court

6. Pratik Vilas Gangan vs State of Maharashtra and Anr.

Bombay High Court (Madhav J. Jamdar, J.) | 17 July 2025 | 2025:BHC-AS:29608 | IA No. 4618 of 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2021

The applicant sought "temporary bail on the ground that the Applicant's mother is required to undergo the MVR Surgery i.e. Mitral Valve Replacement Surgery". The State and the victim opposed, citing conviction under "Section 376" IPC and the POCSO Act. Para 5: "as the Applicant's mother is seriously ill ... and requires urgent surgery, case is made out for grant of temporary bail". Para 6: "the Applicant is granted temporary bail for a period of 30 days".

Madhya Pradesh High Court

7. Bhura vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar, J.) | 5 May 2025 | CRA No. 13097 of 2024

Second application under Section 389(1) CrPC "seeking temporary suspension of sentence on the ground of illness of his wife who is suffering from a Piles and requires medical treatment". Conviction under "Section 394 of IPC and 397 of the IPC". The Court was "inclined to grant temporary suspension of sentence of imprisonment for a period of 15 days to appellant".

8. Munnawar Khan vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (S.A. Dharmadhikari and Pranay Verma, JJ.) | 10 May 2024 | CRA No. 4996 of 2023

Application for "temporary suspension of sentence on the ground of illness of daughter of appellant who is suffering from congenital multiple growth disorder and require multiple corrective surgeries". NDPS conviction; "sentenced to undergo 15 years R.I.". The doctor's report confirmed the condition. Held: "The custodial sentence of the appellant is temporarily suspended and it is directed that the appellant be released on bail for period of three months".

9. Rehmat Ali @ Remcha vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Vijay Kumar Shukla and Alok Awasthi, JJ.) | 5 March 2026 | CRA No. 457 of 2024

Second application under "Section 430 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (equivalent to Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C.)" "on the ground of ailment of his wife Farzana". NDPS conviction; "12 years' RI". As per the doctor, "advise for surgery has been given". Held: "we allow the application for temporary suspension of jail sentence of the appellant from the date of his release till for a period of 01 month only".

10. Ashish vs State of Madhya Pradesh

MP High Court, Indore (Subodh Abhyankar and Pranay Verma, JJ.) | 13 November 2024 | CRA No. 2077 of 2018

Application "on the ground that the appellant's father is terminally ill and requires kidney transplantation", for which "the appellant had also agreed to donate". Conviction under "Section 302 of IPC"; "life imprisonment". Held: "the jail sentence of the appellant Ashish Gupta be temporarily suspended for a period of 30 days from the date of his release".

Rajasthan High Court

11. Mansab vs State of Rajasthan

Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (Manoj Kumar Garg, J.) | 12 February 2025 | 2025:RJ-JD:8626 | SOSA (Appeal) No. 183/2025

Application "on the ground of illness of his father, who is suffering from heart disease and he needs to be operated and there is no one in the family to take care of the appellant's father". The Public Prosecutor "verified the fact about the illness" but opposed. Held: "the sentence awarded to the appellant can be temporarily suspended and he deserves to be enlarged on bail for a period of thirty days".

12. Sitaram vs State of Rajasthan (with Kamal Kumar alias Sonu)

Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (DB: Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Sunil Beniwal, JJ.) | 22 May 2025 | 2025:RJ-JD:24997-DB | SOSA (Appeal) Nos. 933 and 934 of 2025

Sita Ram's "father, namely Ramprasad is afflicted with Cancer and is in the terminal stage". Convictions included "Sections 302/149" IPC. "[L]ooking into the peculiar humanitarian circumstances of the case", the application was allowed "qua applicant-appellant Sita Ram only, who is the son of ailing father Ramprasad and his sentence be temporarily suspended for a period of 30 days". The grandsons' applications were dismissed "as the presence of applicant-appellant Sita Ram would be sufficient to provide necessary care".

Punjab and Haryana High Court

13. Rajbir and Anr. vs State of Haryana

Punjab and Haryana High Court | 2 August 2016 | CRM No. 21389 of 2016 in CRA No. D-281-DB of 2016

Rajbir, "undergoing life imprisonment" under "Section 302 IPC", sought "interim suspension of sentence of imprisonment for a period of two weeks on the ground that the back surgery of his wife namely Rajwanti is to be conducted". The State relied on her four "'jeths'". Held that this "may not be such a circumstance for the surgery to be conducted as expenses would have to be borne which can be done by the applicant-appellant No.1 primarily", and the sentence was suspended "for a period of two weeks from the date of his release so as to enable him to attend his wife during surgery".

Note: Names of the judges are not shown in the Indian Kanoon text.

Gujarat High Court

14. Pravinsinh Bavubha Zala vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (Sonia Gokani and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.) | 24 June 2020 | Crl. Misc. Application (Temporary Bail) No. 3 of 2020 in Criminal Appeal No. 1472 of 2019

The ground was "the knee replacement surgery of wife", during which "the presence of the applicant is sought to be requested by the wife of the applicant". Para 6: "If the same is tested negative, he shall be permitted to attend to the wife who has to undergo the knee replacement surgery." Para 7: "His release shall be for the period of 10 days from the date of his actual release". Earlier order in the same matter: 16 June 2020.

Note: Release was made subject to a negative COVID-19 test.

15. Sallaudin Gulammaudin Kazi vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (S.G. Shah, J.) | 14 August 2013 | Crl. Misc. Application (for Temporary Bail) No. 13058 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 364 of 2013

"The applicant convict prisoner has preferred this application through his wife for temporary bail on the ground of seriousness of his mother". "Mumtazbibi is practically on death-bed". The Court noted "there is no negative history, so far as the conduct and attitude of the applicant in jail is concerned" and ordered release "on temporary bail for a period of 15 days from the date of his actual release".

16. Gautam Manubhai Makwana vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court (V.M. Sahai and A.G. Uraizee, JJ.) | 16 August 2013 | Crl. Misc. Application (for Temporary Bail) No. 13086 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 2008

"The convict seeks temporary bail on the ground of undergoing operation of vasectomy of his wife." Held: "the applicant-convict is ordered to be released on temporary bail for a period of 15 days from the date of actual release".

Note: "vasectomy of his wife" is as written in the order.

Checked but not included

Relief refused: Abdul Khan @ Abdul Jalil vs State (Delhi HC, 21.10.2020); Chandra Shekhar vs State of U.P. (Allahabad HC, 25.01.2010); Firozbhai @ Piriyo Jivanbhai vs State of Gujarat (Gujarat HC, 08.02.2016); M. Rajender alias Raju vs State of Andhra Pradesh (AP HC, 19.12.1997, 1998 CriLJ 3137).
Not on point: Bhawar Singh Kushwah (MP HC, 2018, adjourned only); Vikram and Anr. (MP HC, 2022, regular suspension on merits); Shyam Singh vs Union of India (MP HC, 2024, undertrial, not a convict).

Source: Indian Kanoon. Verify against certified copies before relying on any order.

Parole - temporary release of convicted prisoner - ill health of family member

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1. Sreevidya vs State of Kerala
Kerala High Court | WP(CRL.) No. 884 of 2026 | 18 June 2026 | Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:43764 | Jobin Sebastian, J.

The petition was filed by “the wife of the convict”, who was sentenced to “imprisonment for life” in S.C. No. 747/2022. Her case was that “the convict’s mother, a cancer patient, is presently in a critical condition and on her deathbed”. A medical certificate stated she “is suffering from recurrent carcinoma of the tongue and is critically ill”. The Court found “prima facie grounds to justify the release of the convict on emergency parole”. It allowed the petition “so as to enable the convict to spend some time with his mother, who is on her deathbed”. He was to be released “on interim parole from 10:00 a.m. on 20.06.2026 till 5:00 p.m. on 21.06.2026”, with “adequate police escort”.

2. Asif Hussain @ Jabi @ Jabi Tiger @ Mohammed Asif vs The Chief Superintendent
Karnataka High Court | WP No. 18095 of 2024 | 31 July 2024 | Neutral Citation: NC: 2024:KHC:30153 | Hemant Chandangoudar, J.

The petitioner, “convicted for the offences punishable under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to under imprisonment for seven years”, sought release “on parole on account of the ill-health of his mother”. She was “bedbound since around 2 months” and “requires 24 x 7 assistance for daily activities of living”. The Court noted that parole was sought “primarily on the ground that his mother is on deathbed, necessitating his presence by her side”. It also noted that the request was “substantiated by a medical certificate” and that he “has already served one and a half years of imprisonment”. It held that he “has established a prima facie case for granting of parole” and ordered his release “on parole for a period of fifteen days”.

Sanctioned Leave of Advocate - matter remanded.

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Para5

Criminal process as recovery tool

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Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab — (2023) 5 SCC 360
Principle: where the complainant did not pursue civil remedies or issue notice and used criminal process after delay, the dispute was treated as civil rather than cheating

Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B. — (2022) 7 SCC 124
Principle: fraudulent or dishonest inducement is essential; breach of contract alone is not cheating -
Paras: 31, 32, 38
Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh — (2009) 14 SCC 696
Principle: non-refund of advance money is ordinarily a breach of contract unless dishonest intention existed from inception -
Paras: 8, 10

319 and discharge

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Yashodhan Singh v. State of U.P., (2023) 9 SCC 108 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 890 at page 128

34. In para 13 of Jogendra Yadav [Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 756] , it has been observed that the exercise of power under Section 319CrPC must be placed on a higher pedestal. Needless to say, the accused summoned under Section 319CrPC are entitled to invoke the remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of power under Section 319CrPC but that cannot have the effect of the order being undone by seeking a discharge under Section 227CrPC. Therefore, this Court categorically held that a person, who is summoned under Section 319CrPC cannot avail the remedy of discharge under Section 227CrPC. In that context, this Court, as already noted, discussed the difference between Sections 227 and 319CrPC, as extracted above.

Jogendra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2015) 9 SCC 244 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 756 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 674 at page 250

13. We are not unmindful of the fact that the interpretation placed by us on the scheme of Sections 319 and 227 makes Section 227 unavailable to an accused who has been added under Section 319 CrPC. We are of the view, for the reasons given above, that this must necessarily be so since a view to the contrary would render the exercise undertaken by a court under Section 319 CrPC, for summoning an accused, on the basis of a higher standard of proof totally infructuous and futile if the same court were to subsequently discharge the same accused by exercise of the power under Section 227 CrPC, on the basis of a mere prima facie view. The exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC, must be placed on a higher pedestal. Needless to say the accused summoned under Section 319 CrPC, are entitled to invoke remedy under law against an illegal or improper exercise of the power under Section 319, but cannot have the effect of the order undone by seeking a discharge under Section 227 CrPC. If allowed to, such an action of discharge would not be in accordance with the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code in enacting Section 319 which empowers the Court to summon a person for being tried along with the other accused where it appears from the evidence that he has committed an offence.

Financial Hardship pleaded by employeer

2026-05-12T14:30:37.430+05:30

In Hindustan Tin Works v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 , it has been held that “ If the employer pleads financial incapacity and expects the workmen to sacrifice a part of the back wages due to them, there must be a corresponding reduction by the management in its emoluments and expenses”.

Parole furlough for child’s education

2026-04-30T13:36:42.448+05:30

W.P.(CRL)-1389/2026

Parties: VICKY @ GOBIND vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Judge(s): JUSTICE MANOJ JAIN

Area of Law: Criminal Law

The Delhi High Court, in Vicky @ Gobind v. State (NCT of Delhi), directed the immediate release of the petitioner, a life convict, on his third spell of furlough for two weeks, notwithstanding that a co-accused was already out on parole. The Court held that the competent authority’s refusal to release the petitioner, whose sentence had attained finality, was unsustainable, particularly given the petitioner’s stated purpose of securing his 16-year-old daughter’s admission to Class 11. The decisive ground for this ruling was the interpretation of Note-1 attached to Rule 1224 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, which states that simultaneous furlough to co-convicts is “ordinarily” not permissible, thereby implying no absolute prohibition. The Court emphasized that furlough is an incentive for good conduct and the mere fact of a co-accused being on parole should not impede a convict from availing furlough, especially when it concerns a child’s education. This aligns with the principle that prison rules, while maintaining discipline, should not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the rehabilitative purpose of furlough, particularly in circumstances involving family welfare. The Court implicitly relied on the broader principle that discretionary powers, even in prison administration, must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. The Superintendent, Jail, was directed to release the petitioner within three days in terms of the order dated 18.03.2026.

Summons to accused and appearance through counsel

2026-04-16T20:43:36.245+05:30

Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd., (2001) 7 SCC 401 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1254 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1004 at page 408

17. Thus, in appropriate cases the Magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The Magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.

18. A question could legitimately be asked — what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not cooperate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care of such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the Magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the Magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.

Affirmed in TGN Kumar v. State of Kerala, (2011) 2 SCC 772 at p. 778
Followed in Puneet Dalmia v. CBI, (2020) 12 SCC 695

Bhaskar Industries Ltd. v. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd. — (2001) 7 SCC 401
Principle: In appropriate summons cases the magistrate may allow even the first appearance to be made through counsel and may record the accused's plea when counsel so pleads on his behalf. -
T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram — (1999) 3 SCC 614
Principle: Non-advocates may be permitted to act as "pleader" only with prior permission of the court; court must be satisfied that such person can assist the court. -
Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of W.B. — 1969 SCR 104
Principle: Examination under statutory sections requiring accused’s statement (e.g., S. 342/313 analogues) must ordinarily be of the accused personally; pleader’s examination in his stead is not a substitute except in narrow cases (e.g., juridical persons). -
Bulbul Guha v. Durga Prasad Ghosh — 1993 SCC OnLine Cal 20
Principle: An appearance through a pleader should normally be allowed in summons cases unless personal attendance is necessary in the interests of justice. -
Paras: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Vivek Bajoria v. State — 2008 SCC OnLine Cal 186
Principle: It is settled that magistrates can allow the accused’s first appearance through counsel and can record the plea when counsel pleads on his behalf; magistrates should record reasons if they require personal attendance despite a dispensation. -
Paras: 3
Harbeenarora v. Jatinder Kaur — 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3687
Principle: While granting exemption courts should ensure accused’s identity is not in dispute and may impose conditions (counsel present, no later challenge); discretion to call accused at any stage is reserved. -
Paras: 11
Mithlesh Kumar v. Shyam Lall Paik — 2003 SCC OnLine Cal 609
Principle: Magistrate’s dispensation of personal attendance is lawful and evidence may be recorded in the accused’s absence provided advocate is present; appropriate for public servants posted away. -
Paras: 13
Hafeez Ullah Khan v. Spl. C.J.M. Allahabad — 1998 (80 FLR 610) (All)
Principle: Discretion to direct appearance through counsel should be exercised when summons are issued; avoid dispensing personal attendance where offence is serious. -

sub judice cases and permission of court

2026-04-09T10:54:29.800+05:30

in Union of India v. Raj Grow Impex LLP, (2021) 18 SCC 601, it has been held that-

“94. […] In other words, though we are at one with the High Court that, ordinarily, when the matter is sub judice in the higher forum and that too before the constitutional court, the executive authorities should not attempt to bring about a new state of affairs without taking permission from the court and/or bringing the relevant facts to the notice of the court. However, even in this regard, before pronouncing on the impropriety on the part of an executive authority who had done anything without prior information to the court or without taking court's permission, all the relevant surroundings factors are also required to be examined so as to find as to whether such an action was calculated at interference with the administration of justice or was a bona fide exercise of power in the given circumstances.”

Elaborate reasoning with a footnote

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Interim Bail

2026-03-24T21:52:00.001+05:30

Period spent in pursuing review can be excluded in condonation of delay

2026-02-10T22:53:00.001+05:30

2011 SCC OnLine MP 2412 : ILR 2011 MP 2326 J 2

Constitution, Article 226 — Writ petition — Justifiable excuse for delay in filing — Filing of a review and its pendency would be a justifiable excuse for delay, provided such review is permissible under the relevant service rules — A review application filed without any legal provision can not provide an excuse for delay or laches.

Suvarnalata v. Mohan Anandrao Deshmukh, (2010) 4 SCC 509 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 203 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 437 at page 511

12. As far as the prayer for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition is concerned, we are of the view that sufficient grounds have been made out to condone such delay, particularly because a large portion of the delay was on account of the pendency of the review petition which had been filed against the judgment and order of the High Court dismissing her appeal. The delay in filing the special leave petition is, accordingly, condoned.

Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2008) 8 SCC 445 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC 770 at page 446

4. In our view, the High Court had fallen into error in not holding that the appellant had sufficiently explained why the writ petition could not be moved or why it was moved after 4 years of the decision of the State Government. Since the appellant had filed a representation/review of the decision of the State Government, it was expected by him that an order should be passed on the said representation/review. Therefore, in our view, the delay in moving the writ application against the decision of the State Government was sufficiently explained by the appellant and, therefore, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned orders of the Division Bench as well as of the learned Single Judge.

.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhvaneswari, (2009) 2 SCC 689 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 840 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 535 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 133 at page 691

7. For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in each and every case the court has to examine whether delay in filing the special leave petition stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. In exercise of discretion under Article 136 to decide whether delay should be condoned or not, this Court is not bound by considerations applicable to an appellate court but nonetheless general principles which would weigh with the appellate court in determining sufficient cause can be the guiding factor/guideline. Therefore, it cannot be stated as a proposition per se that the prosecution of review proceedings would not be a sufficient cause at all for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2000 SCC OnLine SC 55

3. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court in the writ petition dated 23-9-1997 and also the order passed in the review application dated 1-2-2000, dismissing the writ petition. There was delay in filing the SLPs because of the pendency of the review application. We therefore, condone the delay in filing of both the SLPs.

Alternative remedy - long pendency

2025-12-18T21:18:00.000+05:30

Case Title	Citation	Legal Provision	Key Ratio / Holding	Relevant Paragraphs
Hemraj Ratnakar Salian v. HDFC Bank Ltd.	[(2021) 20 SCC 395]	Constitution of India, Article 136	Maintainability of SLP: Even though an alternative remedy was available to the appellant, the Supreme Court decided the matter itself considering the long pendency of the appeal (since 2016).	(Para 9)
Durga Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Principal Secy., Govt. of U.P.	[(2004) 13 SCC 665]	Constitution of India, Article 226	When Alternative Remedy Rule Inapplicable: The High Court summarily dismissed a writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy after it had been pending for a long period of thirteen years. Held: Since the HC had entertained the petition and pleadings were complete, it ought to have decided the case on merits rather than relegating parties to a civil suit. Matter remitted to HC for fresh decision.	(Paras 2, 3, 4 and 6)

Alternative remedy not to be used when matter pending for long time

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2025-12-15T10:33:00.001+05:30

Ground not raised in Appeal but raised in rejoinder - not correct way. ground not allowed to be raised

Since the High Court has recorded a finding of fact as to the market value of the lands, based on the evidence, we do not find any good ground or valid reason to take a different view. As regards the contention based on Section 25 of the Act, we may say that this ground having not been urged before the High Court, not raised in the special leave petition, although it is raised subsequently in the rejoinder-affidavit, cannot be permitted to be urged before us for the first time because it requires some verification of facts and records. We may also state here that the respondent claimants are entitled to all the statutory benefits as are available to them on the amount of compensation, as determined by the High Court.

Mandal Revenue Officer v. C.R. Bhagwanth Rao, (2005) 10 SCC 478

retributive theory is not valid

2025-12-12T09:39:00.001+05:30

Sr. No.	Case Law & Citation	Relevant Extracts (The Principle)
1.	Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 (Constitution Bench - 5 Judges)	Para 211: "It is now well settled that the retributive theory has had its day and is no longer valid. Deterrence and reformation are the primary objectives of punishment... The prisoner does not cease to be a human being and he acts like a human being." Para 53: "Brutal man-handling... is not a valid penal programme... Retribution and deterrence are not the sole ends of punishment; reformation and rehabilitation are the primary objectives. The prison system must be therapeutic, not traumatic." Para 244: "Barbaric treatment of a prisoner from the point of view of his rehabilitation and acceptance and retention in the mainstream of social life, becomes counter-productive in the long run."
2.	Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 (Constitution Bench - 5 Judges)	Para 43: "It is thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behaviour has to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation." Para 43: "The infliction of harsh and savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times... We, therefore, consider a therapeutic, rather than an 'in terrorem' outlook, should prevail in our criminal courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely produces laceration of his mind." Para 45: "It makes us blush to jettison Gandhiji and genuflect before Hammurabi, abandon reformatory humanity and become addicted to the 'eye for an eye' barbarity." Para 72(12): "In our view, penal humanitarianism and rehabilitative desideratum warrant liberal paroles... so that the dignity and worth of the human person are not desecrated by making mass jails anthropoid zoos."

Factors for grant of bail and challenge to grant of bail

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Judicial Considerations in Bail Orders

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(a) Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 (Para 4): Emphasises that the gravity of the offence alone cannot be the sole basis for denial of bail; the court must assess the risk of tampering with evidence or fleeing from justice.

(b) State of Maharashtra v. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle, (2009) 11 SCC 541 (Para 7): Reinforces the need to balance individual liberty with societal interest. Courts must be cautious while exercising discretion.

(c) Reasoning to be given in Bail Orders by Courts (Paras 10–13): It is settled law that bail orders must record reasons – vague or mechanical orders fail the constitutional mandate of fairness.

(d) Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 (Para 11): Reiterates that even at the stage of considering bail, courts must be satisfied that there is no prima facie case, and must record reasons for grant or denial.

(e) Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 (Paras 23–24): Criticises cryptic bail orders and insists on a rational application of judicial mind reflecting judicial discipline.

(f) Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439 (Para 35) (Bail): Recognises that economic offences, though not of violence, are grave and affect public trust; bail must be granted cautiously.

Extension of time ~ due to non-renewal

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Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 726

Expert opinion

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Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Ltd., (2009) 9 SCC 709

18. The importance of the provision has been explained in State of H.P. v. Jai Lal [(1999) 7 SCC 280 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1184] . It is held, that, Section 45 of the Evidence Act which makes opinion of experts admissible lays down, that, when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting, or finger impressions are relevant facts. Therefore, in order to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert it has to be shown that he has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience therein or in other words that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject.

19. It is not the province of the expert to act as Judge or Jury. It is stated in Titli v. Alfred Robert Jones [AIR 1934 All 273] that the real function of the expert is to put before the court all the materials, together with reasons which induce him to come to the conclusion, so that the court, although not an expert, may form its own judgment by its own observation of those materials.

20. An expert is not a witness of fact and his evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished which form the basis of his conclusions. (See Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee [(2009) 9 SCC 221 : (2009) 10 Scale 675] , SCC p. 249, para 34.)

21. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : AIR 2000 SC 1691] , it has been laid down that without examining the expert as a witness in court, no reliance can be placed on an opinion alone. In this regard, it has been observed in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram [(1979) 2 SCC 158 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 389 : AIR 1979 SC 14] that "no expert would claim today that he could be absolutely sure that his opinion was correct, expert depends to a great extent upon the materials put before him and the nature of question put to him".

22. In the article "Relevancy of Expert's Opinion" it has been opined that the value of expert opinion rests on the facts on which it is based and his competency for forming a reliable opinion. The evidentiary value of the opinion of an expert depends on the facts upon which it is based and also the validity of the process by which the conclusion is reached. Thus the idea that is proposed in its crux means that the importance of an opinion is decided on the basis of the credibility of the expert and the relevant facts supporting the opinion so that its accuracy can be crosschecked. Therefore, the emphasis has been on the data on the basis of which opinion is formed. The same is clear from the following inference:

"Mere assertion without mentioning the data or basis is not evidence, even if it comes from an expert. Where the experts give no real data in support of their opinion, the evidence even though admissible, may be excluded from consideration as affording no assistance in arriving at the correct value."

23. Though we have adverted to the nature of disease and the relevancy of the expert opinion, we do not think it necessary to go into the merits of the case in view of the course we propose to adopt, and in view of the fact that the Commission is the last fact finding authority in the scheme of the Act.

207 CrPC

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P. Gopalkrishnan v. State of Kerala, (2020) 9 SCC 161 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1532 at page 182

18. Be that as it may, the Magistrate's duty under Section 207 at this stage is in the nature of administrative work, whereby he is required to ensure full compliance of the section. We may usefully advert to the dictum in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] wherein it was held that : (SCC p. 123, para 47)

"47. Since after the filing of the charge-sheet, the court reaches the stage of inquiry and as soon as the court frames the charges, the trial commences, and therefore, the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised at any time after the charge-sheet is filed and before the pronouncement of judgment, except during the stage of Sections 207/208 CrPC, committal, etc. which is only a pre-trial stage, intended to put the process into motion. This stage cannot be said to be a judicial step in the true sense for it only requires an application of mind rather than a judicial application of mind. At this pre-trial stage, the Magistrate is required to perform acts in the nature of administrative work rather than judicial such as ensuring compliance with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC, and committing the matter if it is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court."

Accused has a right to watch witness

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[Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0995/2009MANU/SC/0995/2009 : (2009) 7 SCC 104 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 500] as quoted above, that the right of the accused to watch the prosecution witness is a valuable right, also need not detain us.

Mohammed Faruk vs. Union of India (21.03.2025 - MADHC) : MANU/TN/1086/2025

Appearance through Pleader permitted

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https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/337-sharif-ahmed-v-state-of-uttar-

pradesh-1-may-2024-560715.pdf

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 1074 OF 2017) SHARIF AHMED AND ANOTHER versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(2) – Contents of chargesheet – The need to provide lead details of the offence in the chargesheet is mandatory as it is in accord with paragraph 122 of the police regulations. The investigating officer must make clear and complete entries of all columns in the chargesheet so that the court can clearly understand which crime has been committed by which accused and what the material evidence available. Statements under Section 161 of the Code and related documents have to be enclosed with the list of witnesses. Substantiated reasons and grounds for an offence being made in the chargesheet are a key resource for a Magistrate to evaluate whether there are sufficient grounds for taking cognisance, initiating proceedings, and then issuing notice, framing charges etc. (Para 20, 31 & 31) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(8) – The requirement of "further evidence" or a "supplementary chargesheet" as referred to under Section 173(8) of the Code, is to make additions to a complete chargesheet, and not to make up or reparate for a chargesheet which does not fulfil requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. (Para 13) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 204 – Issue of summons – Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issue of summons and this is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons. Nevertheless, the summons should be issued when it appears to the Magistrate that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Magistrate in terms of Section 204 of the Code is required to exercise his judicial discretion with a degree of caution, even when he is not required to record reasons, on whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding. (Para 17) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 173(2), 190 & 204 – There is an inherent connect between the chargesheet submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code, cognisance which is taken under Section 190 of the Code, issue of process and summoning of the accused under Section 204 of the Code, and thereupon issue of notice under Section 251 of the Code, or the charge in terms of Chapter XVII of the Code. The details set out in the chargesheet have a substantial impact on the efficacy of procedure at the subsequent stages. The chargesheet is integral to the process of taking cognisance, the issue of notice and framing of charge, being the only investigative document and evidence available to the court till that stage. (Para 20) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Object and purpose of police investigation – Includes the need to ensure transparent and free investigation to ascertain the facts, examine whether or not an offence is committed, identify the offender if an offence is committed, and to lay before the court the evidence which has been collected, the truth and correctness of which is thereupon decided by the court. (Para 26) 2 Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Section 406 requires entrustment, which carries the implication that a person handing over any property or on whose behalf the property is handed over, continues to be the owner of the said property. Further, the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A normal transaction of sale or exchange of money/consideration does not amount to entrustment. (Para 36) Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 415 – Cheating – The offence of cheating requires dishonest inducement, delivering of a property as a result of the inducement, and damage or harm to the person so induced. The offence of cheating is established when the dishonest intention exists at the time when the contract or agreement is entered, for the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver any property, to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he had not been deceived. (Para 37) Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 506 – Criminal intimidation – An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The word 'intimidate' means to make timid or fearful, especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word 'threat' refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Mere expression of any words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. (Para 38) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Issue of non-bailable warrant – Held, non-bailable warrants cannot be issued in a routine manner and that the liberty of an individual cannot be curtailed unless necessitated by the larger interest of public and the State. Nonbailable warrants should not be issued, unless the accused is charged with a heinous crime, and is likely to evade the process of law or tamper/destroy evidence. (Para 46) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 205 – Dispense with personal appearance of accused – Section 205 states that the Magistrate, exercising his discretion, may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused while issuing summons, and allow them to appear through their pleader. Held, there is no provision for granting exemption from personal appearance prior to obtaining bail, is not correct, as the power to grant exemption from personal appearance under the Code should not be read in a restrictive manner as applicable only after the accused has been granted bail. (Para 47)

ex parte disposal of criminal appeals

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141. In the case reported in (K. Muruganandam v. State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police)5, while emphasizing the need that a criminal appeal should not be dismissed for non-prosecution, it was held in para-6 as under:

"6. It is well settled that if the accused does not appear through counsel appointed by him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the case only after appointing an Amicus Curiae, but cannot dismiss the appeal merely because of non-representation or default of the advocate for the accused (see Kabira v. State of U.P. [Kabira v. State of U.P., 1981 Supp SCC 76] and Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam [Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam, (2011) 4 SCC 729])."

if not arrested during investigation - no need for arrest later on

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Siddharth v. State of U.P., (2022) 1 SCC 676 while expounding on the issue of accused's cooperation with the investigation and curtailment of personal liberty was pleased to observe that:

9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration of Section 170 CrPC that it does not impose an obligation on the officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the charge-sheet. We have, in fact, come across cases where the accused has cooperated with the investigation throughout and yet on the charge-sheet being filed non-bailable warrants have been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. We are of the view that if the investigating officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word "custody" appearing in Section 170 CrPC does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the investigating officer before the court while filing the charge-sheet.

10. We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it [Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172] . If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. If the investigating officer has no reason to believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the accused.