Kaid al Dhahab, the new AQAP emir for Baydah province. Photo from The Yemen Post.

The US targeted two local leaders of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the central province of Baydah today. The AQAP leaders survived the strike, but five fighters are reported to have been killed.

Today's drone strike, the ninth by the US in Yemen this month, targeted Kaid al Dhahab, AQAP's emir in the province of Baydah, and his brother Nabil, who is also a senior leader in the terror group, according to The Yemen Post.

The remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers targeted Kaid and Nabil as they were traveling in a convoy in Rada'a, a city in Baydah that was under AQAP control earlier this year. The drones killed five AQAP fighters and wounded four more, according to The Associated Press. US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that Kaid was the target of the strike.

Kaid took control of AQAP in Baydah after his brother, Tariq, was killed in February by another brother, Hazam, a senior tribal leader in the town who was concerned that Tariq's affiliation with AQAP would incur the wrath of the Yemeni government. Before he was killed, Tariq had seized control of Baydah, raised al Qaeda's banner, sworn allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, and warned that "the Islamic Caliphate is coming."

Kaid and Nabil were tasked with regrouping AQAP's forces in Baydah after Tariq's death. The two leaders are also the brothers-in-law of slain AQAP leader and ideologue Anwar al Awlaki.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least nine drone strikes in Yemen this month. The last confirmed strike took place on May 19. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

US is known to have carried out 22 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen so far this year; one in January, six in March, and at least six more in April, in addition to the nine already in May.

Since December 2009, the CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 37 air and missile strikes inside Yemen, including today's strike in Baydah province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province.

The Yemeni military has launched an offensive to retake the cities and towns held by AQAP. Heavy fighting has been reported in Zinjibar, Jaar, and Lawdar. Hundreds of AQAP fighters, Yemeni soldiers, and civilians have been reported killed during fighting in recent weeks.

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 32 airstrikes in Yemen. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government, with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in the 22 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed both Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

In one raid, the combined special operations team targeted an unnamed "al Qaeda leader" and called in an airstrike in the Dangam district, according to an International Security Assistance Force press release. The al Qaeda leader "facilitates the movement of weapons, equipment and insurgents," and "procures and transports supplies for insurgents throughout the province," ISAF stated. One "insurgent" was reported killed in the airstrike.

In the other operation, the combined Coalition and Afghan force targeted "a senior al Qaeda leader" and launched another airstrike in the Watahpur district, according to ISAF. The al Qaeda leader "coordinates and directs insurgent attacks against Afghan security forces and Coalition troops throughout eastern Afghanistan." He also "supplies weapons and equipment to insurgents." Two "insurgents" were killed in the strike.

Al Qaeda operatives and leaders often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. In addition, al Qaeda frequently supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army' for more information on al Qaeda's role in Afghanistan.]

Today's announcement of the targeting of the two leaders is the first ISAF press release noting the capture, death, or targeting of an al Qaeda operative since Jan. 30, when an al Qaeda facilitator was captured during a raid in the eastern province of Paktia.

ISAF Joint Command's press desk has previously told The Long War Journal that the lack of reporting on raids against al Qaeda "should not be misinterpreted as lack of operational rigor against those entities."

"ISAF continues to conduct combat operations against the spectrum of insurgent forces through-out Afghanistan year-round," IJC press desk stated on Jan. 30.

Background on al Qaeda's stronghold in Kunar

Kunar is a known haven for al Qaeda and allied terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Six months prior to his death, Osama bin Laden issued instructions to his chief of staff, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, to relocate "hundreds" of commanders and fighters from North Waziristan to Kunar, Nuristan, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces in Afghanistan to avoid targeting by US drone strikes. Bin Laden's letter to Atiyah was dated Oct. 21, 2010. [See LWJ report, Bin Laden advised relocation of some leaders to Afghanistan due to drone strikes in Waziristan.]

It is unclear if bin Laden's instructions were followed, but several al Qaeda leaders and operatives were killed, captured, and targeted in those four provinces after the letter was written. Bin Laden said that "Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher terrain and the many mountains, rivers, and trees and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy."

For years, the rugged, remote Afghan province of Kunar has served as a sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Asmar, Asadabad, Dangam, Marawana, Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Shigal, and Watahpur; or nine of Kunar's 15 districts, according to press releases issued by the International Security Assistance Force that have been compiled by The Long War Journal.

Despite the known presence of al Qaeda camps in Kunar, US troops abandoned several combat outposts in Kunar in late 2009 after major attacks on remote bases. US Army commanders said that the outposts were closed or turned over to Afghan forces as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy to secure population centers. The Taliban have gained control of several districts in Kunar since US forces withdrew from those bases.

But as the US military began drawing down its forces in Kunar in late 2009, it acknowledged that al Qaeda camps were in operation in the province. ISAF noted these camps and bases when it announced the death of an al Qaeda leader during a raid on a base in late 2009, as well as in a press release announcing the deaths of two senior al Qaeda operatives in 2010. On Dec. 1, 2009, ISAF announced that Qari Masiullah, the al Qaeda chief of security for Kunar province, was killed during an operation in Kunar. Masiullah ran a training camp that taught insurgents how to use and emplace IEDs that were used in attacks on Afghan civilians and Afghan and Coalition forces throughout the provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman.

On Oct. 11, 2009, US forces targeted an al Qaeda base in the mountains in Pech. The raid targeted an unnamed al Qaeda commander known to use a mountainside base near the village of Tantil to conduct attacks in the Pech Valley. The al Qaeda leader, who was not named, and his cadre are also known to facilitate the movement of "foreign fighters" from Pakistan into Afghanistan. ISAF uses the term 'foreign fighters' to describe operatives of al Qaeda and allied terror groups from outside Afghanistan.

In September 2010, ISAF identified another al Qaeda camp in Kunar, when US aircraft bombed a compound in the Korengal Valley. Among those killed in the strike were a senior al Qaeda commander and two operatives. Abdallah Umar al Qurayshi, a Saudi, was a senior al Qaeda commander who coordinated the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces and also maintained extensive contacts with al Qaeda facilitators throughout the Middle East. The other two operatives also killed in the strike were Abu Atta al Kuwaiti, an explosives expert; and Sa'ad Mohammad al Shahri, a longtime jihadist and the son of a retired Saudi colonel.

Special operations teams have been hunting top al Qaeda leaders and its network in Kunar and Nuristan for years. In the summer of 2010, ISAF announced it was hunting Qari Zia Rahman, who serves as the Taliban's top regional commander in the northeast and as a senior military leader in al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and Nuristan, as well as across the border in Pakistan's tribal agencies of Bajaur and Mohmand. In 2010, Rahman and his network were the targets of three large conventional operations and multiple special operations raids.

Omar Hammami, the American terrorist who has served as a Shabaab military commander, propagandist, recruiter, and fundraiser, recently released a statement calling for jihadists to declare a global Islamic caliphate.

Hammani's statement was posted on May 25 in four parts [Part 1, 2, 3, and 4] by a jihadist known as "somalimuhajirwarrior," or "foreign Somali warrior," on a YouTube website. The lecture is titled "In Defense of the Khilaafa: The Next Stage."

The release of the lecture took place just one week after Hammami, who is known as Abu Mansour al Amriki, published part 1 of autobiography, in which he recounted his life in the US, his path to jihad, and his time with the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The autobiography refuted the rumors that he was executed early last month by Shabaab for releasing a video in which he claimed his life was in danger. Shortly after the release of the video, Shabaab quickly denied that the group presented any danger to Hammami.

In the lecture released on May 25, Hammami said that the establishment of the global caliphate is critical to prevent the West from dividing and conquering the disparate jihadist movements and defeating them individually. He cited a RAND study from 2006 that said al Qaeda's ideology is its center of gravity and that suggested methods for causing the jihadists a strategic defeat.

The conclusions of the RAND report are "absolutely correct," Hammami said, according to a transcript of his statement provided by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"So to bring the point home, it's obvious to all that after the death of the Prophet ... this monumental collective action of establishing [monotheism] on the earth can only truly be done properly through the vehicle known as the [Caliphate]," he said. "This means that the Muslims worldwide must unite under the leadership of one Muslim leader called the Khalifa [Caliph]. This then is the reality of the ideology of al Qaeda and al Qaeda, the ideology of the global jihadists, and the ideology of every truly sincere Muslim. This is also the ideology that truly scares the pants and socks off the [disbelievers]."

Hammami noted that a key conclusion of the RAND paper is that the West must break local Islamist insurgencies from the global jihad.

"[A] prong of the RAND strategy for defeating al-Qaeda is to break the links between the global and local jihads," he said. "In other words, they want to cause disunity among the Ummah and keep us from establishing the Shariah of the Prophet ... as a unified group under one single leader."

Hammami cautioned that "internationalization brings costs as well as benefits," and compared the problems with the current global jihadist movement to the "international communist movement during the previous century."

"Contradictions inevitably arise between the global vision promulgated by movements' theoreticians and the national agendas that many local cadres naturally pursue. Excluding this friction could be a part of an effective Western counter strategy," Hammami said.

He warned that human nature may interfere with the overarching goals of the global jihadist movement, and local or regional jihadists may view the global jihadists as a "burden" to their cause.

"So what then of a situation in which a certain land of jihad reaches a level of supremacy in its region, where it finds itself no longer in need of the benefits of being part of the global jihad, but rather instead, it begins to see such ties as a burden," Hammami stated. "Although it may keep some of the global rhetoric, it may actually begin to stand in the way of outside operations or the creation of new jihadi fronts? Worse still, what if multiple lands of jihad in different regions reach such a level simultaneously? Shall we simply rely upon human nature and wait for one side to simply yield power to a unified authority and instinctively guide the Muslims to unity?"

Hammami then said that the "mujahideen" must balance the goals of "freeing Islamic lands and administrating them in accordance with Shariah ... while still keeping our eyes squarely on the goal of spreading the jihad globally." He said that current jihadist groups "have begun specializing in only one of these two fields, either focusing entirely on spreading the jihad globally or focusing entirely on establishing Shariah in one particular land."

He observed that the jihad "has become made up of a conglomerate of local jihadi fronts" and that the global jihadists, such as himself, "are left without any political capital in which to steer the jihad."

Hammami stated that the solution to this problem is the creation of a global caliphate, under a new name. He suggested discarding the name "al Qaeda" and the various Islamic States, and appointing a Caliph with a "more global outlook." He advocated that the Caliph should be from the Quraish tribe, the one into which the Prophet Mohammed was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia:

Therefore, in conclusion, I propose to the mujahideen of the world that we unite no longer under our old names which can only encompass a certain region or a certain class of the Ummah. Instead, we should unite under an all-inclusive name that also has a firm basis in the Shariah. This will be a method of not only uniting the mujahideen, but it will also turn the jihad truly into a jihad of the entire Ummah. Of course, this name is not the global insurgency, or al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State of such and such country, or the such and such movement. No! This name is no other than the rightly-guided [Caliphate], it is inclusive of the entire Ummah, and it is the name which has the most evidence from the Quran and Sunnah.

With this new name we will not only find a method of unifying our efforts of expanding the jihad and establishing the Shariah in different lands, but we will also find a solution to the matter of who truly has authority over deciding the direction of the jihad. We will finally have an authority with greater powers than simply giving the order for deciding which particular front or operation has strategic priority. This, of course, requires that we have to have a [Caliph] who not only controls land but also has a global perspective of the jihad. Having land under his control will obviously give him the missing political capital discussed earlier, and his position as [Caliph] will also give him added weight and credibility from Shariah. Similarly, his position will also force him to have a more global outlook, because his authority stretches the globe.

Of course, human nature dictates that we are naturally more inclined to supporting our own tribe or people, and we are more interested in freeing and administrating our homeland. I understand that, and in response to that, I propose that we choose a [Caliphate] that is from the core of the Muslims lands and from the tribe of Quraish.

Hammami then proceeded to address various perceived criticisms of his arguments. He even denied ever being a member of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical political party that calls for the establishment of a global caliphate. He also said that those who claim that his proposal would divide the Muslim world are wrong, because "the Ummah is already divided and a much eviler form of division could be on the horizon if we sit and do nothing."

Finally, he argued that the mujahideen have played into the West's trap because they have failed to promote the caliphate and that accordingly the Muslim world is unfamiliar with the "concept." He attributed the lack of acceptance of the Taliban's Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, to the mujahideen's failure to educate the Muslim world on the importance of a global caliphate.

"The Muslims will always remain unaccustomed to the idea of [Caliphate] for as long as we, and I mean the mujahideen especially, continue to hide the concept from them. The longer we stray away from it, the longer we implicitly agree with the [disbelievers], who assert baselessly that the [Caliphate] is a figment of our imagination," Hammami said. "We have to remember that the state of the Taliban was met with severe criticisms from the Muslims, just like the Islamic State of Iraq was met with sneers."

The Taliban announced the death of Jamil ur Rahman (or Jamil al Rahman bin Sa'adullah) in a statement released on May 23 on the Pashto-language section of Voice of Jihad, and then again on May 25 on the Arabic-language section, according to the SITE Intelligence Group.

"We received with deep sadness the news of the martyrdom of the deputy governor of Nuristan province in the formations of the Islamic Emirate, the well-known knowledgeable and jihadi personality, the venerable sheikh, Jamil al-Rahman, along with his closest friend, the heroic commander Abdul Hakim, at noon today, Wednesday, 23/5/2012, in an American airstrike in the village of Hashmuz in Wanat Waygal district of Nuristan province," the Taliban statement said.

The Taliban said that Jamil's death was "a big loss to all the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate, and the citizens and the whole Muslim world," and then extolled his "martyrdom," and vowed to "retaliate."

"Every mujahid with determination in the Islamic Emirate has pledged to retaliate, Allah willing, for all the martyrs and the oppressed," the statement continued.

The Taliban provided a brief bio of Jamil, noting that he was born "in a religious family" in Hashmuz, the same village where he was killed, and "completed his studies in different religious schools in Pakistan."

"In addition to teaching Shariah sciences, he had a strong and effective role in the previous jihad and he remained a commander for several fronts," the statement said. The Taliban said that Jamil was "assigned by the Command of the Islamic Emirate as the deputy governor of Nuristan province, where he continued his jihadi mission until the last moments of his life...."

The International Security Force announced Jamil's death on May 23, and described him as "a senior insurgent leader in Nuristan province" who "provided leadership and support to insurgent forces throughout Nuristan and Kunar and coordinated insurgent activities across eastern Afghanistan." The governor of Nuristan confirmed the deaths of Jamil ur Rahman and Abdul Hakim, and noted that Jamil was the Taliban's deputy shadow governor [see LWJ report, ISAF kills Taliban's deputy shadow governor for Nuristan].

Jamil served under Dost Mohammed, the longtime shadow governor for Nuristan who is tied to al Qaeda. ISAF killed Jamil just one week after a Taliban liaison to the Peshawar Shura, which commands operations in Nuristan, was captured. The Taliban liaison also served under Dost Mohammed.

Much of Nuristan is either under Taliban control or is contested. The province serves as a safe haven for al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and other regional terror groups.

The unmanned Predators or the more heavily armed Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan in the middle of the night, Geo News reported. Pakistani intelligence officials said that 10 "militants" were killed in the strike, according to Reuters.

No senior al Qaeda, Taliban, or members of allied terrorist groups operating in the area have been reported killed in the strike. Mir Ali is known to host a variety of foreign and domestic Pakistani terror groups.

Today's strike in Mir Ali is the second in two days, and the third strike this month. The US launched the two latest strikes just one day after it failed to convince Pakistan at a NATO summit in Chicago to reopen the supply lines to Afghanistan. Pakistan closed the supply lines following the Mohmand incident in November 2011, in which US troops killed 24 Pakistani troops. The Pakistani soldiers were killed after they opened fire on US troops operating across the border in Kunar province, Afghanistan.

The US has carried out just 15 strikes so far this year. Three took place in South Waziristan, and 12 in North Waziristan. Eight of the strikes in North Waziristan have been executed in or around Miramshah, and two have been in Mir Ali.

The program has been scaled down from its peak in 2010, when the US conducted 117 strikes, according to data collected by The Long War Journal. In 2011, the US carried out just 64 strikes in Pakistan's border regions. With only 13 strikes in the first five months of 2012, the US is on a pace to carry out just 36 strikes in Pakistan this year.

The US has launched more strikes in Yemen (21) against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula than in Pakistan so far this year. The US only launched 10 airstrikes in Yemen in 2011, versus 64 in Pakistan last year.

Mir Ali is a terrorist haven

The Mir Ali area is in the sphere of influence of Abu Kasha al Iraqi, an al Qaeda leader who serves as a key link to the Taliban and supports al Qaeda's external operations network. Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and the Haqqani Network also operate in the Mir Ali area. Moreover, Mir Ali is a known hub for al Qaeda's military and external operations councils.

Since Sept. 8, 2010, several Germans and Britons have been reported killed in Predator strikes in the Mir Ali area. The Europeans were members of the Islamic Jihad Group, an al Qaeda affiliate based in the vicinity of Mir Ali. The IJG members are believed to have been involved in an al Qaeda plot that targeted several major European cities and was modeled after the terror assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. The plot was orchestrated by Ilyas Kashmiri, the al Qaeda leader who was killed in a US drone strike in June 2011.

Mir Ali also hosts at least three suicide training camps for the the Fedayeen-i-Islam, an alliance between the Pakistani Taliban, the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In early 2011, a Fedayeen-i-Islam spokesman claimed that more than 1,000 suicide bombers have trained at three camps. One failed suicide bomber corroborated the Fedayeen spokesman's statement, claiming that more than 350 suicide bombers trained at his camp.

Prior to this year, the US has been pounding targets in the Datta Khel, Miramshah, and Mir Ali areas of North Waziristan in an effort to kill members involved in the European plot. Al Qaeda and allied terror groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and a number of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups host or share camps in the region. These groups are given aid and shelter by Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and the Haqqani Network, a Taliban subgroup run by Siraj and Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Despite the known presence of al Qaeda and other foreign groups in North Waziristan, and requests by the US that action be taken against these groups, the Pakistani military has indicated that it has no plans to take on Hafiz Gul Bahadar or the Haqqani Network. Bahadar and the Haqqanis are considered "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military establishment as they do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan.

The CIA-operated, unmanned Predators or the more heavily operated Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in Tabai outside of Miramshah, a stronghold of the Haqqani Network. Pakistani intelligence officials told AFP that four "militants" were killed. The compound was "suspected of being a militants' hideout," according to Xinhua.

The exact target of the strike has not been disclosed. No senior Taliban or al Qaeda operatives have been reported killed in the strike.

Miramshah serves as the headquarters of the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network, a powerful Taliban subgroup that operates in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and is supported by Pakistan's military and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. The Haqqani Network is one of four major Taliban groups that joined the Shura-e-Murakeba, an alliance brokered by al Qaeda late last year. The Shura-e-Murakeba also includes Hafiz Gul Bahadar's group; Mullah Nazir's group; and the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which is led by Hakeemullah Mehsud and his deputy, Waliur Rehman Mehsud. The members of the Shura-e-Murakeba agreed to cease attacks against Pakistani security forces, refocus efforts against the US, and end kidnappings and other criminal activities in the tribal areas.

Today's strike took place just one day after the completion of a NATO conference on Afghanistan. The US had hoped that the Pakistani government would reopen NATO's supply lines that have run through Pakistan in the past but have been shut down for six months. The Pakistani government has not made a decision on reopening the supply lines. Pakistan's parliament has demanded that the US end the drone strikes in the tribal areas as a condition for the reopening of the NATO supply lines that run through Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Background on US strikes in Pakistan in 2012

Today's strike in Miramshah is the first since May 5, and just the second this month. The May 5 strike targeted a training camp in the Shawal Valley in North Waziristan and reportedly killed 10 "militants." Al Qaeda, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Taliban fighters under the command of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the leader of the Taliban in North Waziristan, are all known to operate in the Shawal Valley, which is near the border with Afghanistan.

The US has carried out just 14 strikes so far this year. Three took place in South Waziristan, and 11 in North Waziristan; eight of those strikes have been executed in or around Miramshah.

The program has been scaled down from its peak in 2010, when the US conducted 117 strikes, according to data collected by The Long War Journal. In 2011, the US carried out just 64 strikes in Pakistan's border regions. With only 13 strikes in the first five months of 2012, the US is on a pace to carry out just 36 strikes in Pakistan this year.

The first strike this year took place on Jan. 11; it was the first by the US in Pakistan in 55 days. The previous strike took place on Nov. 16, 2011. The pause was the longest since the program was ramped up at the end of July 2008 [see LWJ report, US drone strikes in Pakistan on longest pause since 2008, from Dec. 19, 2011].

The program was put on hold from the end of November to the second week in January, following a clash between US forces and Pakistani Frontier Corps troops on the border of the Afghan province of Kunar and the Pakistani tribal area of Mohmand on Nov. 25-26. The US troops struck in Pakistan after taking mortar and machine gun fire on the Afghan side of the border from Pakistani troops. Twenty-four Pakistani Frontier Corps troops were killed.

The clash led to Pakistan's closure of the border crossings in Chaman and Khyber to NATO supply columns destined for Afghanistan; the supply lines remain closed to this day. In the aftermath of the Mohmand incident, Pakistan also threatened to shoot down US drones flying in Pakistani airspace, and ejected US drones and personnel from the Shamsi Airbase in Baluchistan.

US officials told The Long War Journal on Dec. 12, 2011 that the program had been put "on hold" due to tensions over the Mohmand incident, but that the drones would strike again if a high value terrorist target that could not be ignored was spotted.

The Jan. 11 strike killed Aslam Awan, a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's external operations network. Awan was a Pakistani citizen from Abbottabad, the same town where Osama bin Laden was killed by US forces in a cross-border raid in May 2011. Awan is the most senior al Qaeda leader killed in a drone strike since mid-October, when Abu Miqdad al Masri, a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis who also was involved in al Qaeda's external operations, was killed. [For a list of senior terrorist leaders and operatives killed in drone strikes, see LWJ report, Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012.]

The US also killed Badr Mansoor, a senior Taliban and al Qaeda leader, in a Feb. 8 strike in Miramshah's bazaar. Mansoor ran training camps in the area and sent fighters to battle NATO and Afghan forces across the border, and linked up members of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen with al Qaeda to fight in Afghanistan

Additionally, the US killed a German jihadist known as Samir H. in the March 9 airstrike in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of South Waziristan. Samir was a member of the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was also rumored to have been killed in the Jan. 11 strike. He has since appeared on a Taliban propaganda video that celebrated an assault on a jail in Bannu that took place in April

Despite the US airstrikes, al Qaeda operatives claim they are still capable of conducting training and operations in the area. Abu Zubaydah al Lubnani, a Lebanese member of al Qaeda who operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border, has said that while the drones have "delayed some operations or even stopped them," the terror group is still functioning in the region.

"I want here to confirm that Qaedat al-Jihad is still standing in Khorasan, solid and strong, despite what hit it, and it is still producing operations and it doesn't know the path of despair...," Lubnani said in statement that was recently released on jihadist forums and translated by the SITE Intelligence Group.

A document seized during the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden showed that the terror chief was concerned about the drone program and had ordered those leaders and fighters who could leave the kill box in North and South Waziristan to move to the Afghan provinces of Kunar, Nuristan, Zabul, and Ghazni.