The Frugal Scotsman's Depression Gazette

Delay on FDIC Update

2010-03-24T11:08:00.003-04:00

Oh, dear Reader, what can we say? We are going to hold off on updating the FDIC Report until this week's closures are in. Our lack of updates is solely due to time management issues: we have a large project which we're scurrying to finish. When we're done... we'll find some new excuse for our delays!

Commentary on the FDIC Bank Failure Report (12 March 2010)

2010-03-13T09:48:00.007-05:00

New York City was the scene of much action this week, with the closures of LibertyPoint and Park Avenue Banks. It was also a very strange circumstance, as well, because LibertyPointe was closed on a Thursday, which is very much not how the FDIC likes to do business. The why is not exactly clear, since - as far as we can tell - LibertyPointe was actually not all that badly off. The worst bank this week was Old Southern Bank ($315 million in assets, $319 million in deposits. Oops.), and that bank managed to politely sit pretty (and insolvently) until Friday evening.

Additionally, LibertyPointe's recoverability was not all that bad: 87.93 cents on the dollar. That's actually the best recoverable value in our records! So go figure; there must have been something especially exciting going on at LibertyPointe for a mid-week closure, but unfortunately it is invisible to our financial analysis. Whatever was going on, though, we have the strong suspicion that the FDIC knew all about it, and had taken the traditional regulator stance toward fraud: do nothing.

Speaking of fraud, we notice a trend of recent weeks, regarding the recoverable value of the banks which the FDIC closes. Except for the closures on 6 January 2010, all have been sharply over the overall trendline of ~57%. This week alone was 86.78%, one of the best weeks we've seen, if not the best ever. This makes us wonder: is the FDIC targeting their end costs ever more closely? If so, that means the FDIC is not necessarily closing the worst of the banks, but rather the banks they can afford to close. Remember, Dear Reader, the FDIC will not be receiving any quarterly insurance payments for a little under two years now; they have no source of regular income. Whatever is in the coffers is pretty much what they have to work with, barring either A) tapping the Treasury credit line, and B) a special insurance assessment.

However, the first has been vicoferously written off as an "extreme emergency measure" by Chairwoman Sheila Bair (translation: Goldman Sachs needs pin-money), and the second is likely not politically palatable, considering that banks would prefer to hunker down and park their money in Treasury Bills. Even if the FDIC should decide to tap their Treasury credit line, they will still have to pay the interest on the funds thus extended. As many people are discovering in this Depression, it's pretty hard to pay off debt when one does not have any income.

Sure, the FDIC could levy special insurance assessments to pay the interest, but that is a one or two trick pony; if the FDIC should try to levy multiple special assessments, the banking system would likely rebel. Congress would apply pressure to the FDIC, and force it to back down; at the very extreme, Congress would attempt to force out Sheila Bair for someone more light-handed. The banks, after all, are tolerant of the FDIC, so long as it does not interfer excessively in their operations.

Bringing this back to our original comment, a constricted income is likely the driving force behind the targeted closure programme which we posit the FDIC is undertaking. Capital is presently scarse, and it will be two years until new, dependable income will resume; therefore, the FDIC has every impetus to conserve their resources as carefully as possible.

This, Dear Reader, brings us to fraud: if the FDIC is closing, not the worst banks in the United States, but rather those banks they think the can close with minimal outlays of precious capital, they are shirking their fundamental mission. They are not protecting depositors by closing the cheapest banks to close, but rather attempting to instill a false sense of health and solvency in depositors, to protect the truly horrible banks. By supporting the perception of solvency and deposit protection, the FDIC serves to shield insolvent banks (Citibank, anyone?) from sudden, disasterous outflows of capital.

Such a disastre can be seen in the capital flight from Greece, which - as of 23 February - amounted to 8 billion out of the 30 billion under management in private Greek banks (originial article here, subscription needed). 25% loss of a country's private capital base spells D-O-O-M for the banking system.

The FDIC-as-shield-for-banks, let us repeat, is fraud, if it is indeed the case. Innocent depositors are being duped into believing that their banks are in sound financial shape, since 'only a few banks are getting closed,' and 'the recovery is underway!', et cetera. We do not believe there is a recovery, nor do we see one in the future; the next leg down of the ongoing Depression, whenever it arrives, will likely take be a gut-punch to the FDIC. It's then that we expect bank runs to begin, and when the so-called insurance offered by the FDIC will be seen as the farse it really is.

FDIC Bank Failure Report (12 March 2010)

2010-03-13T09:48:00.006-05:00

On 11 March and 12 March 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed four banks: LibertyPointe Bank, New York, NY; Park Avenue Bank, New York, NY; Old Southern Bank, Orlando, FL; and Statewide Bank, Covington, LA. The assets of the closed banks were $1,288,600,000 and insured deposits were $1,232,500,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,020,050,000. The closure data is available here, at the FDIC website.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 79.16% of declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures well above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.68% (up sharply from 57.63%). This means that the failed banks' assets were worth approximately 79.16¢ on the dollar; overall, all closures since December of 2007 were worth approximately 57.68¢ on the dollar.

Cumulative cost to the FDIC to close all 191 banks (since December of 2007) was brought to $61,347,720,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of failed institutions to $562,753,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $385,967,840,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $324,620,130,000 (57.68% of the declared value).

* * *

Stress in a State's banking system can be best seen in how costly that State's cumulative closures were to the FDIC. Below is the list of those States which likely have the most stressed banks, calculated by comparing that State's total FDIC cost of closures to their share of United States population. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Alabama
2. Georgia
3. Nevada
4. California
5. Florida
6. Illinois

* * *

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth, by our estimate, on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value, representing those States which have the most overvalued banking system assets. Only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (40.91%, up from 40.50%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.47%)
5. Nevada (50.22%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Washington (54.17%)
8. Georgia (55.33%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Utah (58.13%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,020,050,000. The value now stands at $33,791,020,000. This is our estimate of how much money the FDIC has remaining from its special assessment of approximately $45 billion (click here to read the FDIC press release about the assessment). Every week since December of 2009, we subtract that week's cost of bank closures to the FDIC from the standing total.

Commentary on the FDIC Bank Failure Report (05 March 2010)

2010-03-10T20:01:00.003-05:00

Apologies on not updating for the last two-plus weeks. We have a large project which we're in the throes of wrapping up, so quite a bit of other things fell off the table, FDIC reports being one of them.

* * *

The last two weeks' closures were relatively unremarkable, except for their small-ish size - none were larger than $1 billion. Even the least recoverable bank, Rainier Community Bank, wasn't all that bad: it was 'only' 48.25 cents on the dollar. Below average, yes, but not a bell-ringer, as the tenth worst failure by recoverable value - Century Bank FSB - was 40.72 cents on the dollar. Rainier's board of directors needed to fritter away another 8 cents per asset dollar to make our prestigious Ten Nastiest Bank Closures.

Oh well, maybe next time.

It is presently fashionable to blame the U.S. for the ongoing Depression, and we are only too happy to join in: the U.S. banking system has, for the past decade, exported rot and decay to the rest of the world, in the form of securities and derivatives, passed off by the credit rating agencies as somehow AAA debt. In 2007 the domestic became so unutterably septic that even the U.S. banks couldn't handle it anymore, and so the system broke down. Left to its own devices, the banking system would have imploded, taken down the U.S. economy and Government, knocked the stuffing out of the world economy, and then that would have been that.

That obviously did not happen, and now that same rot and decay is not only still extant in the world economy, but the U.S. is attempted to restart the exportation of more, so as to stave off domestic economic collapse. Both issues have severe implications for the rest of the world: first, if said securities and derivatives are not expurgated from the economy, they will with age become even more poisonous than they are now; and second, if the U.S. managed to force-feed more toxic assets to the rest of the world, there will be just that much more poison in the system.

What that means for the person on the ground, trying to make his or her way through this Depression, is rather grim. The greatest Keynesian-Fisherian nightmare is mass liquidation; which is to say, everything must go. We posit that the Keynesians presently holding the purse-strings in the central banks of the world are only forestalling the inevitable, and thereby making the future situation worse, in exchange for papering over the present. When the papering-over fails, as we suspect it will, then more of the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater; or, more good assets (e.g. precious metals, tools, bicycles, et cetera) might collapse in value with those assets which have none to begin with (e.g. AAA rated debt, designer clothing, suburbia, et cetera). This facet will make investing one's financial resources very difficult; indeed, down not so much might become the new high return.

Since the ongoing Depression was fomented in the U.S., we suspect that the next big leg down will also come from the U.S. When - not if - this next drop occurs, we suspect that the FDIC will be caught flat-footed and flat broke. That situation might already be in place, and the economy is not crashing fast enough to reveal the tenuous position of the FDIC, but whatever the case, going into the future, having large and vital amounts of cash sitting on deposit at banks will become a riskier proposition. Put another way, a bank account will change from being an asset, to a liability, for the average person.

Some banks will be better off than other. Some might even be perfectly solvent and capable of performing adequately, and be able to defend their depositors' money. Tying back into our earlier comment, it is highly possible that these rare, healthy banks will be destroyed along with the bad banks, either by hapless Government intervention, or panicked bank runs, or both.

FDIC Bank Failure Report (05 March 2010)

2010-03-10T20:01:00.002-05:00

On 26 February and 05 March 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed six banks: Rainier Pacific Bank, Tacoma, WA; Carson River Community Bank, Carson City, NV; Sun American Bank, Boca Raton, FL; Bank of Illinois, Normal, IL; Waterfield Bank, Germantown, MD; and Centennial Bank, Ogden, UT. The assets of the closed banks were $1,887,100,000 and insured deposits were $1,497,490,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $419,710,000. The closure data is available here, at the FDIC website.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 57.11% of declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures well below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.63% (essentially unchanged from 57.64%). This means that the failed banks' assets were worth approximately 57.11¢ on the dollar; overall, all closures since December of 2007 were worth approximately 57.63¢ on the dollar.

Cumulative cost to the FDIC to close all 191 banks (since December of 2007) was brought to $61,735,260,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of failed institutions to $561,465,180,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $384,735,340,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $323,600,080,000 (57.63% of the declared value).

* * *

Stress in a State's banking system can be best seen in how costly that State's cumulative closures were to the FDIC. Below is the list of those States which likely have the most stressed banks, calculated by comparing that State's total FDIC cost of closures to their share of United States population. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Alabama
2. Georgia
3. Nevada
4. California
5. Florida
6. Illinois

* * *

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth, by our estimate, on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value, representing those States which have the most overvalued banking system assets. Only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (40.50%, up from 39.95%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.47%)
5. Nevada (50.22%, up from 49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Washington (54.17%, down from 55.25%)
8. Georgia (55.33%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Utah, replacing Maryland (58.13%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $419,710,000. The value now stands at $34,811,070,000. This is our estimate of how much money the FDIC has remaining from its special assessment of approximately $45 billion (click here to read the FDIC press release about the assessment). Every week since December of 2009, we subtract that week's cost of bank closures to the FDIC from the standing total.

Commentary on the FDIC Bank Failure Report (19/02/10)

2010-02-20T11:00:00.005-05:00

La Jolla Bank was quite a nasty one, with the assets only apparently worth around 53.27 cents on the dollar. Quite a painful affair, as that is after the bondholders and shareholders have already been wiped out financially. Considering that the FDIC had to kick in another $1.9 billion or so to make the failed bank whole is very telling as well: the U.S. banking system is not in pretty shape.

In fact, it's in horrible shape. Over the two-plus years since the beginning of the ongoing Depression, the recoverability of banks is only 57 cents on the dollar. This means that, if the entire banking system were to be immediately liquidated, in some Keynesian nightmare come alive, the market value of all assets would see a 40% haircut or so - and that is a best-case. Of course, such a liquidation is not going to happen all at one, but it is certainly happening piecemeal, as the FDIC steadily dismantles the small-to-medium sized banks in the U.S. Such as the other three banks which the FDIC closed this week, representing only a bit over $586 million all together. We will bet dollars to doughnuts (we'll even make the doughnuts, mind you) that there are quite a few more La Jolla Banks out there, than the FDIC's closure patterns might suggest.

Be that as it may, the stress information given by our analysis of the States' shares of the total cost to the FDIC for bank closures is quite enlightening. Overall, those States which have suffered bank closures are actually not all that badly off, relative to population. The six States listed in the report (Alabama, Georgia, Nevada, California, Florida, Illinois) are really the only States which are even remotely out of line with statistical expectations - i.e. how close their share of the total cost is, to their share of the total U.S. population.

The rest, interestingly enough, are lower - at times, much lower - than the State's population would suggest. Now, that of course could be because some State banking systems are healthier than others, such as North Dakota's. However, that would suggest the United States is not in, overall, terrible shape. We would object very strongly to such an intimation, because all economic indicators we'd care to consult are showing exactly the opposite.

Unemployment has increased year-over-year in all 50 States and the District of Columbia, for example. According to the Federal Reserve, assets of nonfarm nonfinancial corporations have shrunk year-over-year by 7% in the third quarter of 2009; household and nonprofit assets fell by 5.3%; if we pretend that private entrepreneurs are meaningful anymore, nonfarm noncorporate business assets collapsed by 13.8%. Is the picture grim enough, yet, dear Reader? We don't feel we need to continue to make the point: banks are reliant upon the health of the rest of the so-called economy. That economy is taking a face-plant, ergo banks are not in good straits.

Bank closures, to summarise, should not only be accelerating, but they will be getting worse. Since that factor is not apparent in the short-term of our present data set, we suspect that the FDIC has a modus operandi which has nothing to do with safe-guarding the health of the banking system, nor protecting depositors.

Rather, it seems more plausible that the FDIC is carrying on some sort of psychological management of the U.S. public. This assertion arises from our observation that the closures which the FDIC perform appear to be planned around some calculation of weekly assets, and perhaps total estimated cost to the FDIC. We can't necessarily prove this, of course, but it is our opinion on the matter.

The end of such a psychological management, at least from the perspective of both the banking system, and the Federal Government, is to keep the Citizenry from panicking. The last thing which both the Government and banks want right now is a full-scale bank run, as that would be a very difficult thing to have in concert with the 'ongoing recovery' incantations of the press.

* * *

This week's project for us will be to integrate pre-Depression (i.e. before December of 2007) bank closure data into our analysis. Our intention is to see the changes in recoverability over the early 2000's, leading up to the Depression.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

2010-02-20T10:59:00.006-05:00

On 19/02/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed four banks: La Jolla Bank, FSB, La Jolla, CA; George Washington Savings Bank, Orland Park, IL; The La Costa National Bank, La Costa, CA; and Marco Community Bank, Marco Island, FL. The assets of the closed banks were $4,186,300,000 and insured deposits were $3,363,400,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,068,740,000. The closure data is available here, at the FDIC website.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 54.81% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures well below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.64% (down from 57.66%). This means that the failed banks' assets were worth approximately 54.81¢ on the dollar; overall, all closures since December of 2007 were worth approximately 57.64¢ on the dollar.

Cumulative cost to the FDIC to close all 185 banks (since December of 2007) was brought to $60,715,560,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of failed institutions to $559,578,080,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $383,237,850,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $322,522,290,000 (57.66% of the declared value).

* * *

Due to the increasing depth of data we have on hand, we have retired the bank closures to population analysis as a measure of stress. Instead, we will use analysis based on the cost of closures to the FDIC by State, in order to demonstrate which States are likely the most economically stressed in the United States. Only those States which have two or more bank closures are considered. Presently only six States are over our 'stressed' threshold.

1. Alabama
2. Georgia
3. Nevada
4. California
5. Florida
6. Illinois

* * *

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth, by our estimate, on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (39.95%, up from 39.81%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.47%, up from 45.13%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Washington (55.25%)
8. Georgia (55.33%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Maryland (56.90%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,068,740,000. The value now stands at $35,230,780,000. This is our estimate of how much money the FDIC has remaining from its special assessment of approximately $45 billion (click here to read the FDIC press release about the assessment). Every week since December of 2009, we subtract that week's cost of bank closures to the FDIC from the standing total.

Commentary on the FDIC Bank Failure Report (05/02/10)

2010-02-13T19:27:00.004-05:00

Because the basic FDIC Report is getting quite technical, we've decided to separate out our commentary from the body of data. Both will continue to be published, and when something is particularly shocking, we'll make a point of it, both in the commentary, and the Report proper.

* * *

The bank closed last week was both small, and relatively well-invested, considering how attractive a 72% recoverability is, compared to the overall recoverability of 52%. However, this still is terrible news: a bank should not be so malinvested, that its assets take such a spectacular hit. And that is presumably after the stockholders and bondholders have already been wiped out, as well. It is imminently possible that the closure was far worse than what the FDIC's numbers, after our crunching of them, would suggest.

We would posit that a recoverable value around 75% is a very hopeful case, and it would be unwise for an individual with funds in an American bank to expect such a glowing number. If the FDIC should be rendered impotent, perhaps through utter collapse of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Treasury credit line, this means that the best a depositor could hope for, all other things being equal, is the recovery of 75¢ on the dollar. A worst-case scenario, such as IndyMac, would result only in 22¢ on the dollar; average is hovering presently around 56¢ on the dollar.

Needless to say, if it weren't for the FDIC making depositors whole, there would be massive destruction of savings and deployable real capital throughout the United States. This makes the FDIC indespensible for maintaining public faith in the U.S. banking system... faith that, we think, is already too much.

On a technical front, we believe we now have sufficient depth of data to begin comparing assets of closed banks to the population of their State of domicile. This will allow us to retire the comparision of raw number of bank closures to State population. We expect to have this ready for next week's closures, assuming that the FDIC can dig itself out of the snowbanks.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

2010-02-13T19:05:00.005-05:00

Well, what can we say. We forgot to do last week's closure. There were no closures by the FDIC this week, presumably caused by the massive snowstorm which has shut down most of the East Coast. However, we're confident the banking system will limp along just fine without the fine folks at the FDIC.

* * *

On 05/02/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed one bank: 1st American State Bank of Minnesota, Hancock, MN. The assets of the closed bank were $18,200,000 and insured deposits were $16,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $3,100,000. The closure data is available here, at the FDIC website.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was only 72.53% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures strikingly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.66% (unchanged from last report). This means that the failed bank's assets were worth approximately 72.53¢ on the dollar; overall, all closures since December of 2007 were worth approximately 57.66¢ on the dollar.

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $59,646,820,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of all 181 FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $555,391,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $379,874,450,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $320,227,630,000 (57.66% of the declared value).

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no weighting with assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Minnesota (up from #4)
4. Illinois (down from #3)
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Washington

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (39.81%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.13%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Washington (55.25%)
8. Georgia (55.33%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Maryland (56.90%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $3,100,000. The value now stands at $36,299,520,000. This is our estimate of how much money the FDIC has remaining from its special assessment of approximately $45 billion (click on the Meter's link to read the FDIC press release). Every week since December of 2009, we subtract that week's cost of bank closures to the FDIC from the standing total.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

2010-01-30T15:20:00.005-05:00

On 29/01/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed six banks: First National Bank of Georgia, Carrollton, GA; Florida Community Bank, Immokalee, FL; Marshall Bank, N.A., Hallock, MN; Community Bank & Trust, Cornelia, GA; First Regional Bank, Los Angeles, CA; and American Marine Bank, Bainbridge Island, WA. The assets of the closed banks were $5,531,200,000 and insured deposits were $4,896,600,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,875,760,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 54.61% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.66% (down slightly from last report's 57.69%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $59,643,720,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $555,373,580,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $379,858,150,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $320,214,430,000 (57.69% of the declared value).

* * *

Once again the FDIC has pulled out a new trick: this week is was an "equity appreciation instrument," taken as "consideration for the transaction" of Florida Community Bank. We assume this means stock. If we're right, then it is simply another method by which the FDIC is extending store credit to acquiring institutions. What makes the situation seem all the more strange, is that the acquirer of Florida Community was a bank which was formed just last week: Premier American Bank, N.A., which purchased the failed Premier American Bank, with a "cash participant instrument" in the transaction.

Hmm... We have not heard back from the FDIC on our enquiry about the terms of the cash participant instrument, so we cannot conjecture about what exactly is going on. In general, however, we have to seriously question what the hell the FDIC is thinking: it is not only extending credit, but extending it to a newly-formed bank in two different forms within two weeks, potentially involving upwards of $850 million in assets. If the FDIC gave generous credit to Premier American - for example, only 10% downpayment or so - that's a lot of leverage for an institution, whose predecessor showed itself less than reliable.

We will still try to get more information from the FDIC about these instruments thrown about recently. If we do get something useful, we'll try to make better sense of the situation.

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no weighting with assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Oregon
8. Missouri
9. Florida
10. Washington (replacing Arizona)

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (39.81%, up from 39.38%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.13%, up from 45.06%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Washington (55.25%, up from 54.11%)
8. Georgia (55.33%, up from 54.64%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Maryland (56.90%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,875,760,000. The value now stands at $36,302,620,000.

FDIC Bank Failure Report - Extra Late Edition

2010-01-27T12:34:00.002-05:00

On 22/01/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed five banks: Premier American Bank, Miami, FL; Bank of Leeton, Leeton, MO; Charter Bank, Santa Fe, NM; Evergreen Bank, Seattle, WA; and Columbia River Bank, The Dalles, OR. The assets of the closed banks were $3,159,500,000 and insured deposits were $2,637,600,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $546,210,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were only 66.19% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.69% (up slightly from last report's 57.64%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $57,767,960,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $549,842,380,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $374,961,550,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $317,193,590,000 (57.69% of the declared value).

* * *

We noticed with a handful of these latest closures, that the FDIC has "acquire[d] a cash participant instrument," adding that "[t]his instrument serves as additional consideration for the transaction." At present we assume this means the FDIC is providing financing for the acquiring bank; in essence, the Government is giving store credit for the assets of dead banks. How this is a good idea, we really don't know, but we can only assume the regulatory geniuses at the FDIC have a firm grasp on things.

If indeed the FDIC is extending store credit to acquirers, we posit this means the bank catastrophe in the United States has entered a new phase of... well, catastrophe. Not only did the assets of Evergreen and Premier American start rotting when exposed to oxygen, they were so horrible the FDIC had to give financing to get rid of the muck. "Here, take the assets for awhile and give them a try in your books," the regulators must have told the acquirers; "we're so confident you'll love them, you don't even have to give us a down-payment." If those acquiring bank had had any self-respect, they would have run away screaming.

Once again we can't help but to think that the FDIC is setting itself up for a world of hurt. By extending store credit - if indeed that is what the "cash participant instrument" is - the FDIC is betting that a recovery will help strengthen the acquiring institutions sufficiently, that sucking up the full cost of the filth they bought on credit will not, in turn, cause them to croak. Instead, we're quite convinced by this move that a major bank failure is in the works, whether or not the FDIC is aware of it. If bank assets have gotten to the point where they have to be force-fed, then there's a big bank out there loaded to the gunwales with toxic sludge. The questions are: which bank, and when? Alas, dear Reader, we have no answers.

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no weighting with assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota
5. Utah
6. Kansas
7. Oregon (up from #9)
8. Missouri
9. Florida (down from #7)
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (39.38%, up from 38.89%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.06%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio, up from #7 (50.84%)
7. Washington, down from #6 (54.11%, up from 50.62%)
8. Georgia (54.64%)
9. North Carolina (56.70%)
10. Maryland (56.90%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $546,210,000. The value now stands at $38,178,380,000.

Analysis: U.S. Supreme Court Campaign Finance Decision

2010-01-22T14:00:00.003-05:00

Is it not remarkable, dear Reader, that mere days after Republican Scott Brown upsets the U.S. Senate special election (and Obama Administration referendum), that the U.S. Supreme Court made a landmark ruling, rolling back campaign finance and anti-corruption efforts? The case was two-fold, as far as we can tell, in its implications: first, it holds time-based bans upon corporate political advertising and politicking (namely, preventing those interests from advertising too near an election day); second, it frees corporations and other such interests to make direct contributions to political candidates, rather than filtered through special interest groups. The decision was leveraged upon the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, suggesting that restricting corporations from doing the aforementioned activities was impinging upon freedom of speech.

This actually does have coherence, as we understand it: corporations are considered an individual under corporate law, legally on par with an actual living human being, such as yourself. So, in essence, yes, a corporation does have just as much of a right to contribute and politick for its candidate of choice as you; that they have vastly more money to throw around than you is really trivial. At least, it's trivial to the Supreme Court. The full implication of the decision perhaps did not sink into justices' thoughts as cast their votes. Let us explain:

Consider the organisation known as Goldman Sachs, everyone's favourite vampire squid. As a financial institution, Goldman can borrow an effectively unlimited amount of money from the Federal Reserve, and then turn around and invest that money into something which pays a guaranteed return. At present, much of that would seem to be Treasury Bills; in essence, Goldman Sachs permits the Federal Government to borrow from itself, but make it look otherwise, and make a profit at the same time. This cozy little arrangement, along with all the other cozy little arrangements Goldman has, seems to make a lot of people very angry. Now, let's say that a vociferous group of contenders for Congress run on a "let's shut down all the big banks" platform, and experience massive support from across the U.S.

The Lord's work would seem to be in jeopardy, no? At that point, is it not a good investment to borrow, say, $25 billion from the U.S. Treasury, and invest that in supporting the candidates who are on the "let's keep Wall Street bonuses flowing" platform? The 'return' off of that 'investment' is not necessarily quantifiable, but it is indeed qualifiable: Goldman Sachs continues to survive. That, perhaps, is the best investment that Goldman could have made with someone else's money.

We point out there is no longer any reason whatsoever that Goldman cannot do this exact manoeuvre during the 2010 Congressional elections. Nor, indeed, does anything prevent JPMorgan Chase from doing the same thing, or Citigroup, or Wells Fargo, and the rest of the too-big-to-fail crowd. Heck, the Federal Reserve System itself could start running advertising if it wanted to! Call us alarmist? Please feel free. But remember that there is nothing which will prevent this from happening.

If anyone notices how momentous this decision was, we have no doubt there will be efforts of dressing it up as a good thing; consider this hatchet piece from the Atlantic. However, in our opinion the Court has simply handed over near-total political control of the U.S. Government to large corporate interests on a silver platter. That situation is perhaps nothing new per se - consider Goldman Sachs' apparent ownership of the U.S. Treasury - but it is much, much more of the status quo, and additionally set in concrete. Going forward, we fear there will forever be a shrinking ability of small interests (e.g. individuals, small entrepreneurs, et cetera) in getting their message to their supposed representatives in Government. That could change, as an aside, if the apportionment lawsuit in Mississippi is actually successful, but the outcome of that case is far from certain.

What is certain is that the large corporations which will exploit this Supreme Court ruling will do so to the hilt, because the Depression puts their very survival at stake. Without even the most ineffective of legal restraint on their politicking, we would not be the least bit surprised if more and more high-level officials in the Government come from super-huge banks and large corporate interests, like the defence industry and healthcare, et cetera. Put simply, the sovereignty of the United States has been transferred, de jure, from the American Citizenry, to the largest and most powerful corporations. The Government must and will respond accordingly.

What this will mean for American Citizens trying to scrape their way through the Depression is fairly easy to predict. The average American will feel the pain, because he or she will be forcibly squeezed of their wealth, for the benefit of these corporate interests. The U.S. Government will continue to everything it can in order to reinforce the existence of those institutions which ethically should be left to die. The cost of these corporatist heroics will come in the forms of more bailouts, more Government largesse, higher taxes, higher inflation, and more destruction of the non-corporatised economy.

North American Housing Price Report for January

2010-01-22T13:42:00.006-05:00

Our North American Housing Price Index registered a modest 1.67% increase from December, supported by a rise at the bottom of the market. The drop from May - when we started the Index - is now 14.46%, representing a massive fall in the North American housing markets, and likely correlated by a similar drop in the valuation of bank mortgage portfolios. On an annualised basis the Index suggests the market is down 21.69%, a truly stunning loss.

In the United States, IRS requirements have made claiming the house purchase tax credit rather arduous. This will put a damper on the 'no-money-down' schemes that were being used to have the tax credit stand in for a down payment. Apparently government-backed loans are now about 90% of the market in the US and essentially all in Canada (where many borrowers are having the nasty surprise of balloon notes coming due without any means to refinance them).

The cumbersome tax credit, along with the spectre of interest rate hikes in the future - thus influencing the interest rate on mortgages - will likely collude to continue depressing house prices across the continent. Simply put, the North American housing market is now stuck wheezing in the cold, heavy iron-lung of the state. The crash may be very prolonged, with Governments desperately attempted to prop up prices which should be falling.

U.S. Politics: Massachusetts and the Fall of Obama

2010-01-20T10:13:00.005-05:00

The U.S. Senate special election in Massachusetts is over, and it seems that Republican Scott Brown has trounced the Democratic-hopeful Martha Coakley, 52 to 47, with 80% of the votes counted. We wonder where all the 'non-standard' voters went, notably the ones centred around the Libertarian candidate Joseph Kennedy, but we can only assume his supporters were merely lying about supporting him. Undoubtedly, the Libertarians politely and neatly divided their votes between Ms. Coakley and Mr. Brown, in the noble interest of maintaining an entrenched two-party system, but we digress. As the Agence France-Presse states:

[Brown] pulled off a surprise victory late Tuesday, capturing the seat of the late Democratic icon Edward Kennedy in a stinging setback to President Barack Obama exactly a year after he swept into office.

Note the "stinging setback" comment; this is so very much a vast understatement, we can't help but giggle. Most immediately, it suggests the damage control efforts over the Democrats' face-plant in Massachusetts is already underway, because this was not just a set-back, in our opinion, but a major blow to the efforts of the Obama Administration to continue with its agenda - whatever that might be. If Senator-elect Brown makes good his promise to vote against the Obama mandatory healthcare proposal, it will cement the appearance of the Democrats as being not only non-responsible to their power base, but also impotent in the face of a Republican minority.

Senator-elect Brown's vote is vital in the mandatory healthcare, either in passing or rebuffing the legislation, so he will find himself very popular with many people when he arrives in Washington D.C. The Republicans will want him to vote against the mandatory healthcare bill; the Democrats will court him to honour Ted Kennedy's 'legacy' by passing the bill; lots of pretty, well-dressed people representing healthcare interests will give him bags of money, whilst Mr. Brown 'thinks' about his vote. Frankly, we do not envy him; that level of 'popularity' does not sit well on our conscience.

We also wouldn't be surprised if he's just another turncoat, as well, given the following quote:

"I never said I was going to do everything I can to stop health care. I believe everybody should have health care, it's just a question of how we do it."

Using our previous idea of all the people who want to be Senator-elect Brown's 'friend,' this statement can be understood in three different ways. First, a comment to his fellow Republicans, to not reject out of hand a concept - universal health insurance - just because the Democrats want it. Second, an olive leaf to the Democrats, indicating he's willing to listen to and compromise on their agenda and his own. Thirdly, a cue to the healthcare interests, that he can be bought for sufficient campaign contributions, fancy dinners, and expensive trips, et cetera. Which of the three is in process? Hmm, pick one, dear Reader, or perhaps all three; time will tell, when Mr. Brown takes his seat - or, as he put it, "the people's seat."

But Senator-elect Brown is merely the figurehead for a deeper trend ongoing in the Obama Administration: the rising realisation in Obama voters, that they have been unequivocally 'had,' taken for a ride, bamboozled, and so forth. Throughout several articles, describing the upset Republican victory, we see numerous mentions to "tides of anger" amongst voters, "propelling" Mr. Brown to his victory. Hmm, interesting word choices there, we think; especially since "anger" is quickly followed by "economic recovery," "healthcare," "bank bailouts," "automaker bailouts," et cetera. Could it be the American Citizenry is finally waking up to the cold, harsh reality, that Barack Obama the reformer was a fraud? Are they beginning to wipe the crusts of knee-jerk, feel-good, anti-establishment hysteria from their eyes, only to see Barack Obama, defender of the status quo?

The shocking turn-about of a quintessentially Democratic State (i.e. Massachusetts), in voting a Republican to its Senate seat, suggests this is indeed ongoing. Despite the spin-control which we are highly confident will arise, this blow is acute in its severity to the Democratic agenda, and symbolic for the American Citizenry's faith in the Obama Administration. For an example of that spin, consider AFP's comment, "a freshman president's party loses congressional seats anyway in his first midterm elections..." This is a misnomer, because the Massachusetts election was not a midterm; it was a special election, which necessarily turns into a referendum on the Government, and the Administration. This it was, and to us the results are conclusive: the Administration is losing standing.

The loss of faith in the Administration is not helped by the flip-flopping of one President Obama, on whether or not to personally support Ms. Coakley's flailing campaign. As memory serves, the White House insisted he wasn't going to visit Massachusetts, then it was announced he was, then he cancelled, and then finally he made an appearance, 36 hours before the polls opened. This does not make him seem a strong, capable, dedicated leader; the leader which his supports thought they were electing. Instead, they show him how he truly is: vacillating, feckless, and without an understanding of what is needed in a President to run an effective Government. Heretofore, that same Government has been a relatively docile and obedient one, too - if he cannot be effective with a Government tightly controlled by his own party, how will he appear when the Senate has an empowered, and dangerous, Republican filibuster? What about when the Congress goes up for midterm elections later on in the year, and the Democrats either loose their strong lead, or even become the minority party?

This, we think, is at last the first signs of what we predicted, as soon as Mr. Obama was sworn into the Presidency: he is the Herbert Hoover of the 2007 Depression. Both Presidents came into office extremely popular, and quickly suffered a massive economic calamity; Hoover was quickly regarded as being incompetent and ineffective in his treatment of the 1929 Depression, became a lame-duck, and left the Presidency after one term, in total disgrace. So to, we think, shall go the fortunes of Mr. Obama: the tides of popular opinion will turn against him, his party will lose control of the Government, and he will be, at the end of his single term, a disgrace. As this unfolds, we suspect the irony of this photograph will become iconic in the twilight years of the Obama Presidency (source):

FDIC Bank Failure Report - Late Edition

2010-01-19T18:39:00.000-05:00

On 15/01/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: Town Community Bank & Trust, Antioch, IL; St. Stephen State Bank, St. Stephen, MN; and Barnes Banking Company, Kaysville, UT.The assets of the closed banks were $922,100,000 and insured deposits were $877,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $296,300,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was only 63.01% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closure distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.64% (essentially unchanged from last report's 57.63%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $57,221,740,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $546,682,880,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $372,323,950,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $315,102,210,000 (57.64% of the declared value).

* * *

We don't have much to say about these closures, other than to note that the FDIC was forced to create a Deposit Insurance National Bank to facilitate the liquidation of the failed Barnes Banking Company. What this means, of course, is that Barnes was so rank the FDIC could not possibly slather enough perfume on it to cover up the stench. No other institutions found Barnes to be agreeable as a dance partner, as it were, so the FDIC was left with the corpse. We suspect that Barnes' assets will end up in a future Multibank Structured Transaction, like the $1.02 billion of rotting assets recently auctioned off, for 22 cents on the dollar.

We'd love to see the entire U.S. banking system priced as realistically as that MST!

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no weighting with assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Minnesota (up from #5)
5. Utah (up from #6)
6. Kansas (down from #4)
7. Florida
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (38.89%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.06%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Washington (50.62%)
7. Ohio (50.84%)
8. Georgia (54.64%)
9. North Carolina, up from #10 (56.70%)
10. Maryland, new to list (56.90%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $296,300,000. The value now stands at $38,724,590,000.

Pondering Orlov's Five Stages of Collapse

2010-01-14T14:15:00.011-05:00

Dmitry Orlov blogged an interesting piece entitled The Five Stages of Collapse. It's well worth a read if you can tolerate doomer porn. The best part is the five-stage model itself. His notion is that social collapse follows five progressive steps, and that although collapse may be arrested at any one of the stages, each stage leads to the next one - a progressive breakdown, if you will.

Happily for us civilised folks, collapse usually is arrested before it progresses very far. In wealthy, developed countries even if this Depression turns out to be a doozey, and the first of many more to come, odds are it won't take us very far down the path of social disintegration. We would like to justify this optimistic opinion using Mr. Orlov's own model.

Orlov's first stage is Financial Collapse: "Financial institutions become insolvent; savings are wiped out, and access to capital is lost." This is what most of the world (China excepted, perhaps having a reprieve for the moment due to its many bubbles) is experiencing at present.

We agree with Orlov that governmental policy is not favourable to arresting this stage, and what will come next is what he terms Commercial Collapse: "Money is devalued and/or becomes scarce, commodities are hoarded, import and retail chains break down, and widespread shortages of survival necessities become the norm."

If hyperinflation takes hold because unsupportable debts are monetised, then this scenario may very well play itself out as Orlov describes it.

On the other hand, if the USA and other rich economies maintain non-hyperinflating currencies, the combined result of unsupportable debts and misguided government policies will be catastrophic loss of household income. Goods may not become scarce, but the means to purchase them will.

In either case, whatever government may decide to do or not do about the situation, the people themselves can arrest Commercial Collapse by any number of actions to ensure the continuing flow of goods and services. The so-called informal economy of legal goods and services delivered 'under-the-table' already provides one template for a popular, self-organising market. Many civic organisations such as churches, clubs, co-ops and farmer's markets can operate as clearinghouses. Barter banks and scrip systems of 'bona fide' money can spring up where they do not already exist. Thus the solution to arresting Commercial Collapse absent highly-unlikely, successful government intervention, is for people to set themselves up very much in community, and to become a lot more creative than they are used to.

We suspect that enough people can rise to the occasion. Only a tiny vanguard of creative types is needed to successfully establish functional patterns of mostly-local commerce.

It should be noted that under this scenario, Commercial Collapse would be arrested at a level of affluence that is only a fraction of what most inhabitants of the World's developed countries are used to. It won't be an easy adjustment by any means. Two classes of persons are most vulnerable: the poorest members of society who lack work and social skills; and affluent members who derive their livelihoods from access to those institutions which are not likely to survive the Commercial Collapse.

Toxic Mortgages and U.S. Social Security

2010-01-14T09:54:00.006-05:00

We saw an article (first published 18th November 2009) featured on MSN which got us thinking; the title is "How long can Social Security last?" Reading the article, the answer seems to be "not long at all." It's very interesting that this article was apparently dredged up from the archives and floated once again on MSN, unless it's just that popular.

The article perpetuates the myth of an SS trust fund, stating that the fund will go in the red "in a few years," and be empty by 2037. Oh darn, that sounds unfortunate. But what actually caught our attention was when the article talked about how to fill the 'short-coming' in the 'fund.' The list was as follows:

-Benefit cuts
-Tax increases
-Riskier investments

The first two options are obvious: more money coming in, less money going out, just like our wallet and bank account. The irony of cutting benefits is that inflation is constantly decreasing the value of the SS payouts, but that is beside the matter. We want to dissect the third option: investing the 'trust fund' in riskier ventures.

Given the present, heady atmosphere in the United States Government, we can think of a few exciting places wherein the SS Administration can dump the excess cash it has just sitting around at the office. Now, we have to point out here, that the SS 'trust fund' is actually just money which flows in and out of the U.S. Government's General Fund. In spite of all the accounting shenanigans, in reality the SS cheques are drawn from the general operating budget, as simply any other expenditure.

If the SS 'trust fund' is authorised to be 'invested' in riskier ventures, it will allow the U.S. Government to treat those monies as, effectively, another slush fund. Or, to put it another way, the SS 'trust fund' becomes the SS 'bank, automaker, and whatever-else-Congress-feels-necessary bailout fund.' This can, of course, be dressed up as a good thing: banks and automakers are 'turning the corner,' and will make massive profits to investors; mortgage-backed securities will recoup their value, and then some; credit cards will become profitable again; car loans will be great as the economy turns around; et cetera, et cetera. All these would seem, on paper, to help the SS 'trust fund' close its fiscal gap.

"Surely they won't do that!" you exclaim, dear Reader; "the Government wouldn't put the retirement of millions of Americans on the line to bail out banks and other corporate interests?"

Well, what can we say to that? Frankly, the U.S. Government seems to be constantly doing exactly the worst thing possible during this Depression. From bailing out banks and automakers, to planning on raising taxes via health care 'reform' and other such nefarious plots, we can't see any good moves having been made at all! So, if the SS 'trust fund' were to be allowed to invest in riskier sectors of the economy, where would that investment go but to the arenas which the Government has already been furiously bailing out for two years? We'd be overjoyed to hear other likelihoods, but such corruption as we lay out herein seems inevitable to us. That is, of course, contingent on the SS 'trust fund' being loosened in its restraints.

If the SS 'trust fund' is successfully retooled as a slush fund for banks and automakers, we fully expect to see all other Federal 'trust funds' to be similarly revised. Since all such 'funds' are facing budget shortfalls, brought on by whatever cause(s), such changes can be presented as both necessary, and intelligent. Perhaps even shrewd. Those manoeuvres will be, of course, none of the kind, but rather hopelessly wasteful and economically destructive.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

2010-01-10T11:40:00.003-05:00

On 8/01/10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rang in the New Year closing one bank: Horizon Bank of Bellingham, Washington.The assets of the closed bank were $1,300,000,000 and deposits were $1,100,000,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $539,100,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the bank was only 43.15% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closure distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.63% (down slightly from last report's 57.66%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $56,923,690,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $545,760,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $371,446,650,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $314,522,960,000 (57.63% of the declared value).

* * *

It appears Santa Claus has not fixed the US banking system, after all. This week's closed bank was a particularly putrid affair and we consider it a bad omen for the rest of the year.

The Federal Reserve system laid a sulfurous egg this week too, announcing that bank consumer lending is declining at an 8 1/2 percent annual rate as of November. Revolving credit, primarily credit card lending is declining at a whopping annual rate of 18.5 percent! There is clearly no recovery in bank lending. We suspect that is in part due to the sorry state of household finances, but more so due to the utter insolvency of the banking system as a whole. The credit unions and banks out there that are still solvent enough to lend just cannot pick up the slack from the collapse of the system.

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas
5. Minnesota
6. Utah
7. Florida
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (38.89%)
2. Colorado (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53%)
4. California (45.06%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Washington, up from #9 (50.62% down from 56.18%)
7. Ohio (50.84%)
8. Georgia (54.64%)
9. Utah (55.45%)
10. North Carolina (56.70%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $539,100,000. The value now stands at $39,020,890,000.

Some Thoughts on 2010

2010-01-06T12:00:00.007-05:00

So we took off the last bit of 2009, and the first bit of 2010, and after coming back to it, we realise we still have nothing in particular to say. That, however, has never stopped us before, so we look forward to another year of fun and games on the world scene, as the 2007 Depression rolls on. Since 2010 is still figuring out which way is up, we thought we'd offer some ideas as to how the year is going to look.

Previously, we called 2009 the Year of the Whinger; boy, were we ever right (insert back-patting here). The banks whinged, and got money; the health insurance companies whinged, and will probably get money; the auto manufacturers whinged, and got money; the home-builders whinged, and got money. Come to think of it, the only people who whinged and were ignored was the Citizenry, of the various countries which forked over said money, who really didn't want all the aforementioned whingers to get all that money. Oh well, they don't know what's best for them, now do they? Don't they know that they need autos, and health insurance, and banks, and home-builders? Why, what would a modern economy look like without these centrepieces of industry? Perhaps they'll learn better.

At any rate, this year, 2010, is certainly shaping up to be quite the doozie, what with the U.S. Treasury removing - not raising, but eliminating - the cap on how much money can be poured into the haemorrhaging enterprises known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Additionally, justice has been thrust to the side, with a U.S. judge throwing out a murder case against Blackwater agents (i.e. U.S. mercenaries), because the Government prosecutors botched, perhaps purposefully, the case. And the U.S. Transportation Security Administration is hounding a pair of bloggers who published the details of supposedly super-secret security directives. Say that last part ten times as fast.

But what will 2010 be, you ask, dear Reader? Well, we're getting to that. 2009 saw corporate powers across the globe - but perhaps most spectacularly in the United States - with their collective hands out, begging to be kept from going under. At the same time, we see that being the point where those same corporate powers have cemented their control over the Governments which gave them the money, to the detriment of the Citizenry to which a Government is supposedly responsible. This year, we see the fallout of that move start to make itself evident.

Simply put, the moves, for instance, by Goldman Sachs in the U.S., are of such a patently, and odiously, self-serving nature, it doesn't take a genius to figure out the Citizenry has gotten screwed so that Lloyd Blankfein can keep his $43 million a year for doing God's work - oh, we wish we had thought of that one! At the same time, we have a sneaking suspicion that the world markets will take their next big nosedive toward their final destination, which is a 90% drop or so from the peak.

Do you hear what we hear? Yes, the gnashing of teeth: those who got bailouts will grumble they did not get enough bailout; those who will pay for all the bailouts will grumble about how there is already too much slop in the trough. Both sides will be gnashing, and foaming at the mouth; take a look at the latest bailout of GMAC, as an example of what we're talking about. There will be many, many more bailouts, and we would like to be on record as saying this is the year the FDIC will need a direct bailout to keep operating. Ted Butler, we hear, recently stated that 2010 is the year when JP Morgan Chase closes its heart-stoppingly humungous silver and gold short positions; we'd like to put ol' JP on that list of bailouts-waiting-to-happen, too.

Simply put, this will not be a pretty affair, and might indeed result in the civil unrest which James Kunstler and Gerald Celente have been ranting about for about a year already. It could certainly result in the loss of legitimacy of the most bailout-happy Governments, as their respective Citizenry will see continued, extremely unpopular, bailout-age as a sign those Governments are no longer responsible. History has shown that, when Governments no longer seem responsible, they tend to become quite despotic and oppressive, to keep an increasingly restive population under control.

So, we posit two trends: the teeth gnashing on the part of corporate interests, screaming for another series of big bailouts, to ensure their primacy in a depressionary economy; and the teeth gnashing on the part of Citizens, riling against both the previous bailouts, and new bailouts being forced down their throats. Governments will respond to these two, conflicting demands by funnelling vast amounts of money, either directly or indirectly, to their corporate masters; whist simultaneously increasing the bread and circuses for the masses to keep them placated and obedient.

There you have it, then, dear Reader: 2010 is the Year of the Teeth Gnashers. The two different poles of the gnashers - i.e. the Citizenry and the corporate elite - will attempt to pull on Governments to be aligned more strongly with one, against the other. Unfortunately for the Citizenry of the world, they have already lost this fight, probably a long time ago; the corporate interests have the field, as it were. If those interests are smart, which they might or might not be, they will recognise the need to maintain the illusion that Governments are still responsible to the Citizenry, and make token gestures of hollow sacrifice. This, coupled with a sharp uptick in bread and circuses, will likely be enough to keep the Citizenry of the world in check, and docile.

We would like to make it clear, though, that we don't quite see massive civil unrest, a la James Kunstler or Gerald Celente, happening this year. This is not to say the possibility isn't there, of course - the 18th Century French aristocracy assumed the rabble would simply take their lumps, as it were, but those same aristocrats all had their heads chopped off during the Revolution. However, we feel that Governments will be able to maintain the illusion of responsibility to their respective Citizenry through most, if not all, of this year. Next year, 2011, we think all bets are off; we could see that being the year when even major OECD Governments start to loose their aura of faux responsibility.

However, if civil unrest does occur this year, it will likely be in those countries where the Citizenry has a long and noble tradition of taking to the streets. France, Greece, and Italy, for example, are the most likely, in our mind, to see some form of uprising, along with Spain and Portugal. The United Kingdom is a lesser possibility, along with the rest of the core counties of Europa (i.e. Germany, et cetera); Canada, Australia, Russia, and Brasil are not likely to see revolts, as those populations are either relatively docile, or well-policed. The United States, as the most docile and beaten-down country on the planet, will almost certainly not see anything resembling unrest. China, though, is the wild-card, in our mind: it will either have no problems whatsoever, thanks to the famous heavy hand of Communism, or it will completely blow to pieces, taking any mirage of a recovery down with it.

We end with a little tune, sung to Old MacDonald Had a Farm:

Ol' Lloyd Blankfein had a trough,
E - I - E - I - N!
And in that trough he poured some slop,
E - I - E - I - N!
And some slop! slop! here, and an oink! oink! there,
Here some slop, there an oink,
Here some slop, there an oink!
Ol' Lloyd Blankfein had a trough,
E - I - E - I - N!

Ol' Lloyd Blankfein did God's work,
E - I - E - I - N!
...et cetera...

Unhappy US Economic Numbers

2009-12-22T13:25:00.010-05:00

There are a number of disturbing trends that can be discerned, if one has the time, from rummaging through the data coming out of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. One is that out of the $89.4 billion growth in national income from the second quarter of this year to the third, $12.8 billion was growth of "subsidies". That does not refer to "cash for clunkers" and so forth, but money heading from the taxpayer into government enterprises (our guess mostly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - but really, who knows?). How that can be construed as income is bizarre enough, but it's not good news that 1/7 of third quarter growth comes from something so fishy.

But such accounting shenanigans could be dismissed as mere noise compared to some really big numbers - such as the jump in the profits of our corporate masters: $110.4 billion dollars. One might astutely note that this is actually more than the increase in national income, $21 billion more as a matter of fact. Or putting the whole matter another way, all (and then some) of the much touted 'recovery' is growth of corporate profits, and the rest of us will just have to make do with the scraps.

But the really bad news is something hidden (in the sense that it is not presented by itself - but has to be derived from two data sets) and insidious: the approaching excess of consumption of fixed private capital ($1525.5 billion) over fixed private investment ($1,712.6 billion). We say "approaching" because obviously the latter figure is larger than the former, but it has been falling at a rate of 21% over the year ending September 30 (and without a third quarter "recovery") and 4% the year before that.

Between bank lending contracting, the real estate market collapsing, and corporations being inclined to invest their winnings overseas, there isn't much prospect for anything other than continued decline in fixed private investment. We really can't say if the rate is going to accelerate or moderate but even if it continues at, say, a moderated 10%, the cross over would likely come in late 2010.

What this means in plain English is that at some point in the near future, the economy will reach a state where consumption of capital exceeds its formation, and there will be no prospect of any kind of economic growth ever, until growth in private investment materialises. It could be a long wait.

FDIC Bank Failure Report

2009-12-19T20:31:00.005-05:00

On 18/12/09, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed seven banks: Rockbridge Commercial Bank of Atlanta, Georgia; Peoples First Community Bank of Panama City Florida; Citizens State Bank of New Baltimore, Michigan; New South FSB of Irondale, Alabama; Independent Bankers' Bank of Springfield, Illinois; Imperial Capital Bank of La Jolla, California; and First Federal Bank of California in Santa Monica, California. The total assets of the closed bank were $14,448,100,000, and total deposits were $11,157,130,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $1,827,420,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks was only 64.57% of the declared asset value. This makes the recoverability of this week's closures distinctly above the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.66% (up slightly from last report's 57.48%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $56,384,590,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $544,460,780,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $370,346,650,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $313,962,060,000 (57.66% of the declared value).

* * *

This week's closures were definitely not typical, as there were a number of straight out liquidations; three, to be exact. One of those liquidations (Rockbridge) will be complete by Monday! We pity the customers whose outstanding checks will be bouncing next week. We suspect a bit of year-end housekeeping on the part of the FDIC, as they will be kicking back between the 24th and 28th of December. Further closures this year are doubtful due to the upcoming holiday; perhaps Santa Claus has made the banking system all better.

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas
5. Minnesota
6. Utah
7. Florida (up from #8)
8. Missouri
9. Oregon
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (38.89%, up from 36.65%)
2. Colorado, up from #4 (42.80%)
3. Michigan (43.53% up from 42.78%)
4. California, down from #2 (45.06% up from 42.28%)
5. Nevada (49.81%)
6. Ohio (50.84%)
7. Georgia (54.64% up from 54.62%)
8. Utah (55.45%)
9. Washington (56.18%)
10. North Carolina (56.70%)

* * *

The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $1,827,420,000. The value now stands at $39,559,990,000.

FDIC Bank Failure Report - Updated

2009-12-16T18:37:00.010-05:00

This report is current as of 11 December. The report for this weekend's closures will follow.

Well, 158 FDIC press releases later, we've finished updating our information. We'll work on historical data (i.e. before the past two weeks) in the near future.

* * *

On 11/12/09, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closed three banks: SolutionsBank, of Overland Park, KS; Valley Capital Bank, of Mesa AZ; and Republic Federal Bank, of Miami, FL. The total assets of the closed bank were $984,400,000, and total deposits were $815,300,000. The cost to the FDIC is estimated at $257,160,000.

According to our methodology, the recoverable value of the banks were $558,140,000, or only 56.70% of the declared asset value. This makes this week's closures distinctly below the cumulative recoverability since December of 2007, which stands at 57.48% (unchanged from last report's revised recoverability of 57.48%).

Cumulative cost-to-FDIC so far in the Depression was brought to $54,557,170,000. These closures bring the total declared assets of FDIC-failed banks (since December of 2007) to $530,012,680,000, and total FDIC-insured deposits to $359,189,520,000. The recoverable value of all failed banks was only $304,632,350,000 (57.48% of the declared value).

* * *

The changes we made to our analysis (i.e. taking into account premiums/discounts which acquiring banks paid for failed banks' insured deposits) made a distinct difference. A difference of 0.08% - the difference between the revised recoverability (57.48%), and the unrevised (57.56%) - might not seem like much, but applied to the assets of all banks closed so far, the assets loose an additional $424 million in value. Isn't leverage a beautiful thing, dear Reader?

We don't have much to say about these three closures, however; the seem fairly average... which is probably a problem. We still feel in the FDIC is managing its closures to pick and choose its cost. A question occures to us as we write: does the FDIC pick their cost first, and then close the banks which fit within the cost they selected beforehand? Inquiring minds want to know.

* * *

Because of the revisions we made to our data, we are updating the Frugal Scotsman's Ten Nastiest Bank Closures To Date. Here are the Gruesome Tensome:

1. IndyMac (CA) - 22.99%
2. BankUnited FSB (FL) - 28.91%
3. First Bank of Idaho - 37.10%, revised down from 37.39%
4. Community Bank of Nevada - 39.10%
5. Franklin Bank (TX) - up from #10 at 39.94%, revised down from 41.18%
6. Sherman County Bank (NE) - new to list, 40.06%
7. Horizon Bank (MN) - up from #8, 40.39%, revised down from 40.98%
8. First Bank of Beverly Hills (CA) - down from #6, 40.39%
9. Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast (FL) - new to list, 40.60%
10. Century Bank FSB (FL) - down from #5, 40.72%, revised up from 39.42%

* * *

On the basis of the ratio of bank closures to population (i.e. simply the number of failures in each State, with no account of assets or deposits), the ten most afflicted States are listed here. Only those States which have two or more closures are considered.

1. Georgia
2. Nevada
3. Illinois
4. Kansas (up from #6)
5. Minnesota (down from #4)
6. Utah (down from #5)
7. Missouri
8. Florida (up from #9)
9. Oregon (down from #8)
10. Arizona

The recoverable value represents how much of declared assets are worth by our estimate on the open market. The following are the ten States with the lowest recoverable value; only those States which have had two or more closures are considered in this analysis.

1. Florida (36.65%, up from 36.13%)
2. California (42.28, revised down from 42.43%)
3. Michigan, up from #4 (42.78%, revised down from 43.18%)
4. Colorado down from #3 (42.80, revised up from 42.76%)
5. Nevada (49.81, revised down from 50.13%)
6. Ohio (50.84. revised down from 50.91%)
7. Georgia (54.62%, revised down from 54.75%)
8. Utah (55.45%. revised up from 55.39%)
9. Washington, up from #10 (56.18%)
10. North Carolina, new to list (56.70%)

* * *

Due to the revisions, the FDIC did not spend as much money as we thought previously (it's complicated, don't ask). The Frugal Scotsman's FDIC Cash Burn Through O'Meter gets adjusted with a subtraction of $257,160,000, and also revised upward. The value stands at $41,387,410,000.

Housing Price Report for December

2009-12-16T10:06:00.005-05:00

Our North American Housing Price Index registered a 6.46% drop from November, which likely would have been much deeper if we had not seen a sharp uptick on the top of the housing market. The drop from May - when we started the Index - is now 15.86%, representing a massive fall in the North American housing markets, and likely correlated by a similar drop in the valuation of bank mortgage portfolios. On an annualised basis the Index suggests the market is down 27.18%, a truly staggering loss.

That 27.18% drop strongly suggests the stimulus effect of the US Government's tax credit has worn off. Record low rates for conventional mortgages seem to be little help as few applicants qualify for the new, stringent requirements. All in all, we declare that the housing crash appears to have resumed.

Given the huge shadow inventory of foreclosed houses, the impending wave of Alt-A defaults, high unemployment, and falling income across the board, there is essentially no hope the housing market will find 'a bottom' any time in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the 8.9% rise in housing starts reported by Forbes will only add to the pain of existing housing stock, as new - and difficult to move - houses come into the market and further drive down already distressed property.

We expect the bottom, when it comes, will be shockingly low. We boldly predict a real price decline somewhere in the neighbourhood of 90% on average, peak to trough. In some places, such as Las Vegas, we expect a decline of 100% as the whole urban field there becomes indefensible. Attractive urban centres will fare the best, but it will be grim consolation.

Price declines may be obfuscated by inflation, if that should arrive. Given the devastation banking elites would suffer in a true deflation, we suspect the 'powers-that-be' will attempt to engineer a burst of high inflation to save the banks. On the other hand, such efforts may be unsuccessful, as it would be exceedingly difficult to discern the optimum amount of money-printing. As powerful as banking elites are, they may be sacrificed on the altar of the Almighty Dollar.

No Silver Lining

2009-12-15T10:24:00.007-05:00

A perverse meme is circulating in the news media and blogosphere that some good can come out of house price declines, mortgage defaults, and mortgage restructurings.

Charles Hugh Smith discusses Why a 35% Decline in Housing Values Would Be Good for the Nation. Smith, an otherwise competent commentator, does state the obvious: people have been spending too much on housing and to spend less on that will help households and consequently, the economy in other areas. However he neglects to mention the enormous economic catastrophe that will result from having a huge part of the US National balance sheet permanently wiped out. The US financial sector, as healthy economic agents, cannot survive the permanent impairment of mortgage assets that would result. Bank equity - which forms the basis of banks ability to lend, and even just hold deposits, would be wiped out.

As a matter of fact, it is already wiped out de facto - the FDIC and other regulators just keep banks going in the hopes that a recovery in housing prices will make most of the mortgages legitimate investments again. A further decline to lasting low prices will make that charade simply the legitimisation of a zombie banking system a la Japan.

In a Wall Street Journal editorial on 'walking away' masquerading as an article, the author states:

People's increasing willingness to abandon their own piece of America illustrates a paradoxical change wrought by the housing bust: Even as it tarnishes the near-sacred image of home ownership, it might be clearing the way for an economic recovery.

and:

For the 4.8 million U.S. households that data provider LPS Applied Analytics estimates haven't paid their mortgages in at least three months, the added cash flow could amount to about $5 billion a month -- an injection that in the long term could be worth more than the tax breaks in the Obama administration's economic-stimulus package.
"It's a stealth stimulus," says Christopher Thornberg of Beacon Economics, a consulting firm specializing in real estate and the California economy. "The quicker these people shed their debts, the faster the economy is going to heal and move forward again."

Unfortunately, less money flowing out of the pockets of consumers as debtors means less money flowing into the pockets of citizens as creditors (e.g. the proverbial little old ladies who rely on savings income). It is a bogus calculus which could in any way construe the process as 'healing'.

If "shedding debts" means defaulting (as the article seems to imply), then citizens as taxpayers will feel the suck of money coming out of their wallets as Uncle Sam through the FDIC has to make depositors whole. And, as mentioned above, having a walking-dead banking system is not going to help recovery.

On the whole, the intellectual basis of the perspective of this 'article' is entirely flawed. We suspect it is simply another in a long series of efforts by the Ministry of Truth to put a positive spin on the ongoing havoc caused by the Depression.

Not that this flawed intellectual notion doesn't get the support of some heavy guns. Nobel-prize winning Joseph Stiglitz is quoted in Bloomberg as saying a new kind of bankruptcy needs to be created to let mortgage holders write down their mortgage to a market level and keep it! Either Mr. Stiglitz knows better and is dissembling, or he is the one suffering from bankruptcy - intellectual bankruptcy.

There is a serious moral hazard issue here. Dysfunctional economic units must be allowed to suffer the consequences of poor decisions. Stiglitz's proposal is yet another bailout - this time a bailout for credulous, housing-bubble participants on the borrowing side.

We do not approve of bailouts for housing-bubble participants on the lending side, either. But two wrongs do not make a right. The more poor decision-makers are coddled through bailouts, the more society at large is harmed by resources being diverted to the thieving, hapless and stupid; and the less resources are available to be used by the Intelligent who were wise enough not to get involved in the housing bubble, and who are truly the World's only hope of economic progress.

The Curse of Reverse Banking

2009-12-13T22:07:00.007-05:00

Banking is the great octane booster of the engines of economy. It can make many people feel rich. Albert deposits $100 in the First National Bank. Bertrand borrows $100 from the First National Bank and deposits the funds in the Second National Bank. Clyde borrows $100 from the Second National Bank ... and so on ad infinitum. Everyone has $100 in their bank accounts at the same time! There is a lot more spendable funds now than if Albert had just kept his $100 under the mattress. A whole lot more. Whee!

This sort of dementia has been going on for a couple hundred years and has reached a fevered pitch in the last ten or so. How could this go on so long without it all crashing down like the house of cards that it is? That is the marvel of economic growth. As long as the economy, and consequently income, keeps growing in the aggregate, there will be plenty of funds to keep all those plates spinning.

When banking goes into reverse though, it is deadly. Sufficient losses on loans cause banks to become unprofitable. Unprofitable banks have to pull the loss out of their equity and shrink lending, because loans cannot exceed a regulated ratio of bank equity. Roughly $10 of lending has to be cut for every $1 of losses. When lending is cut, borrowers have to pay back loans (if they can) instead of rolling them over. When they can't pay the loans back, the banks have further losses, and must restrict lending even more.

It gets worse. When borrowers have to pay back loans they have to cut other spending. If their income is falling, this causes their spending to fall disproportionately. One person's spending is another's income, so income tends to fall. When income falls, debt becomes harder to pay back, and many borrowers default, causing more loan losses for banks, and more restrictions on lending.

Around and around this destruction goes, and where it stops nobody knows. The entire World's economy is wildly indebted. Households, businesses, and governments have never been so in debt as they are now. What goes up, must come down. The bottom could be shockingly low.