The Geopolitico

Syria's revolution and the prospects for violence

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 24 Nov 2011 07:44:00 +0000

This article originally appeared in the Toronto Star.

Syria after Assad: Averting the deluge

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan demanded Tuesday that Syrian President Bashar Assad “just leave (his) seat.” He urged Assad to recall the case of the “Libyan leader who was killed 32 days ago.” Eight months after the outbreak of the first protests in Syria, Erdogan, however, is just one of many leaders insisting that Assad step down in light of the growing resistance movement as well as a worsening humanitarian situation in the country.

The Arab League in an unprecedented move suspended Syria from the regional organization earlier this month. The United States, Canada and the European Union have all levied new sanctions on Syria as well. While Assad may be circling the wagons, it now seems highly unlikely he will be able to resist internal and international opposition to his rule. Yet Syria’s future does not only depend on whether Assad departs the scene, but also on the manner by which he does so. This will determine whether the post-Assad transition in the country will be more akin to Tunisia — relatively peaceful — or to Iraq — horrifically violent.
There is no question that Assad’s days are numbered. The bare threads of his legitimacy are dwarfed by the deaths of the very people his regime purports to protect. It is estimated that on Tuesday of this week alone, 30 civilians were killed; the overall death toll has climbed well above 3,500, according to UN estimates. Leading opposition thinker Michel Kilo, a Syrian Christian, put it aptly when he said, “Syrians will never return to conditions prior to March 17.”

There has been far too much destruction and despair to simply negotiate a continuation of the existing regime. There are growing numbers of defections to what is loosely termed the Free Syrian Army, leading to more and more brazen attacks on the regime itself. An attack last week on the air force intelligence headquarters in the Harasta neighbourhood of Damascus was particularly dramatic, given the key role that agency plays in the country.

With Assad now seemingly on the clock, the nature of the opposition also appears to be transformed. Protests and demonstrations, while still occurring, are being overshadowed by audacious attacks by opposition fighters. One day last week more than two dozen Syrian soldiers were killed. In another incident several days ago, in Douma, an attack on a checkpoint by the Free Syrian Army is thought to have led to 22 deaths, according to Al Jazeera. This low-level conflict is a sign of what is to come. There are very few options being pursued to remove Assad except through violent overthrow. Most of the diplomatic manoeuvres by Turkey and the Arab League, as well as by the EU, now centre on censure and sanctions rather than mediation and de-escalation.

Syria, however, is not Libya. There is no Benghazi that can act as a base for the Syrian opposition. So far, there have been no high-level defections of senior military officers. And the opposition still appears to be largely fragmented. This means the growing violence could lead to each major population centre in Syria becoming a staging ground for the contestation of power by force. Imagine the destruction in Misurata in Libya replicated in six or seven cities.

What is even more disconcerting is that Syria is a diverse country ethnically and religiously, so there is the distinct possibility that any conflict could be engulfed by sectarian tensions. The internecine nature of Iraq’s conflict could very well be repeated if events spiral out of control. Imagine if an Alawite village were attacked and there was a massacre; there would assuredly be a counterattack on a neighbouring Sunni village. In many cases, villages in Syria are mixed, and this could lead to dire consequences.

This is the difficult situation facing Syria and the international community. Relieving the pressure on Assad would only further his ability to continue to commit widespread abuses. Yet, without leaving other avenues for his departure on the table besides force, the situation could deteriorate very quickly. Therefore, governments in the region in particular but also in the West, must ensure that aggressive mediation is still an option and that the humanitarian situation is prioritized above political preferences.

Assad does indeed need to leave his seat, as Erdogan said, but it should not be in a manner that sacrifices the future of Syria.

How the GCC aims to benefit from the turmoil in Syria

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 23 Nov 2011 09:10:00 +0000

This article was originally published today in The National newspaper. What is important to note is that the article is not meant to objectively endorse the GCC's actions but rather indicate how it is pursuing its regional interests through the crisis in Syria.

GCC positions for a stronger role in tomorrow's Syria

In 2006 when Israel invaded Lebanon, Syria's President Bashar Al Assad pointedly referred to fellow leaders - particularly in the Gulf - as "half men" for what he contended was their lack of support for Arabs under assault by Israel.

Five years later, the tables have turned as Mr Al Assad's own regime continues to assault Syrian civilians on a daily basis and it is the Gulf Cooperation Council that is at the forefront of criticising his failure to stop the killing and destruction.

In the past two weeks, the bloc's condemnation of Mr Al Assad and implied preference for regime change has led to attacks on its embassies by government supporters in Damascus. Yet in the long term, the GCC has the opportunity to truly facilitate a geopolitical shift in its favour in the region as long as it does not overplay its hand.

The president's father, Hafez Al Assad, was a shrewd politician always looking for an edge in the regional power game. The elder Al Assad saw an advantage in supporting Iran during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, turning against the fellow Baathist regime at the helm in neighbouring Iraq. Alongside Libya which also supported Iran, he put Syria at direct odds with the GCC, which was founded in 1981 largely to contest the perceived growing threat emanating from post-revolutionary Iran.

While the 1990s witnessed a slow detente between the GCC and Syria, in particular because of the latter's support for the US-led Gulf War, the geopolitical divisions re-emerged with the ascension of the younger Al Assad in 2000. Throughout the last decade, GCC leaders especially in Saudi Arabia found themselves at odds with the Syrian regime.

In Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, Syria supported factions and policies that undermined the GCC's own position in those countries. Moreover, the continuing and strengthening alliance between Syria and Iran continued to be a cause of tremendous concern across the Gulf.

Despite the divergent interests, in the initial days of the uprising in Syria the GCC (and for that matter, most of the international community) remained relatively silent. While there was no love lost between GCC countries and Syria in recent years, there had been efforts to pursue a cooperative relationship on regional affairs. Before the uprising, that cooperation was most notable in the joint visit by Mr Al Assad and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah to Beirut in June 2010.

Since the March uprising, however, the growing violence and daily death toll pushed GCC nations to take a leadership position within the Arab League to condemn and further isolate Syria. The latest deadline for Damascus to end violence expired on Saturday, and the Arab League has crisis talks on Thursday.
GCC interests in Syria have now been framed in terms of a humanitarian position. This is in part a response to the sectarian dynamic in the country, where protests are largely seen as coming from within the Sunni majority. But more importantly, there is a regional political balance that is emerging.

So far, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been the most vocal critics of Damascus's behaviour, and in turn they have been subjected to the harshest Syrian attacks. Since Syria was suspended from the Arab League earlier this month, relations have got steadily worse. Pro-regime supporters have attacked embassies in Damascus, including the UAE's.

While the attacks and rhetoric aimed at the GCC may be harsh in the short term, if and when the Assad regime falls in Syria, there will probably be long-term rewards for the bloc. In term of the regional political balance, Syria will move farther away from Iran and look towards the GCC for support in terms of policy and governance.

Furthermore, ordinary Syrians and opposition members will be aware of the leadership position taken by the GCC - the significance of the Arab League suspension was the effect on Syrians' support for the regime more than international opinion. If GCC is careful not to abuse its influence, there will be more opportunities, both economic and political, as Syria opens up.

Given the continued violence and grim prospects for the Assad regime, it only makes sense for the GCC to strengthen its position, challenging human rights abuses by the regime and building closer relations with opposition groups in the Syrian National Council and the National Coordinating Committee.

In the coming months, the situation in Syria will probably become increasingly violent. The role of foreign powers will also become all the more complex to balance intervention on behalf of protesters' welfare and political change. Even while supporting change in Syria, GCC countries will have to work to curtail a more deadly civil war, which may mean exerting pressure on allies in the opposition.

It is difficult to see in the long term how Mr Al Assad can possibly outlast these protests. When he finally does depart from the scene, the GCC will have to temper its involvement and not overplay its hand. Syria has always been subject to foreign interference, and Syrians are naturally averse to manipulation from outside. Although today the dire situation confronting Syrian citizens has opened the door for external support, it will not always be welcome, especially if it is unsolicited, in the new politics of the future.

The Miseducation of the Arab World

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 19:37:00 +0000

The Miseducation of the Arab World
Originally published on Huffington Post

"Each year the private and public sectors need to create 85,000 jobs but they are only creating 55,000, which means we have 30,000 new unemployed people entering the labor market every year in Jordan."

This stark reality was conveyed by the outgoing Minister of Education for Jordan, Dr. Tayseer Al Noami, in an exclusive interview this past week, while attending the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) in Qatar. If we were to extrapolate that reality to the rest of the Arab world, and granted there are varying circumstances, this would mean that there are roughly 1.5 million new entrants added to the unemployment rolls every year. It is a daunting challenge in one of the most volatile regions in the world. As the Arab awakening continues, further attention is being paid to the policy challenges facing leaders, old and new, around youth, education, and employment. While the problem is clear thus far the solutions have been few and far between.

The volume edited by Tarik Yousef and Navtej Dhillon, Generation in Waiting, aptly describes the youth bulge in the Middle East, where there are an estimated 100 million people between the ages of 15-29. In Jordan, for example, a shocking 70% of the population is below 30. This is a scenario repeated across the region. These active, aware and agitated populations are the casus belli for the wider insurrection in the Arab world. These are entire generations that feel disenfranchised. In the short-term they are looking for economic opportunity but in the long-term for much deeper systemic changes. Nearly 10 months after the fall of former Tunisian dictator Zein el-Abedine Ben Ali, this situation is well-known to leaders within the region.

At the WISE gathering in Qatar last week, when speaking about the Middle East, the buzz-term was 'education for employment.' This is the idea that education needs to be relevant to the needs of the private sector. This is considered in many ways to be the panacea for the unemployment malaise across the region. When the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Islamic Development Bank released a major report on the region, it was entitled "Education for Employment." That report asserts that youth unemployment costs the Arab world between $40-50 billion annually. It finds that employers feel youth are not ready for the workplace and that vocational education and skills training are essential to combat widespread unemployment. There are a number of NGOs, international institutions, bilateral donors, and public sector entities, all dedicated to contributing to the effort, from Silatech to the World Bank to the EFE Foundation. Almost every regional government has a Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Ministry assigned to this issue as well. Even private sector initiatives such as Microsoft's Partners in Learning are mobilizing. But it is not enough.

Another report released last month (published by the World Economic Forum), stated that 25 million new jobs needed to be created to maintain current unemployment levels in the Arab world. Simply put, existing trends and initiatives in the region are insufficient. Moreover, the presence of a bold regional partnership is missing. Each country and organization is operating in an unrealistic vacuum releasing often stalled and stilted initiatives that eventually are mired in inefficiency, bureaucracy and ineffectiveness. Outside of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), it appears that the funds allocated for combating unemployment and revitalizing education systems are in the hundreds of millions of dollars rather than the tens of billions that will be necessary. Moreover, while 'education for employment' is part of the answer, it cannot be the answer. When asked about what was needed, the outgoing Jordanian Minister of Education responded, "we need a commitment to the continuity of existing policies over the long-term." That in effect sounds like more of the same.

The above may seem like an unfair diagnosis but the reality itself is not a fair one. A regional partnership for change that truly tackles the entire ecosystem of challenges that lead to youth unemployment is essential. It must address not just education for employment but the wider economic enabling environment as well as the quality of the overall education system. It must be funded. It must involve all sectors. Most of all, it will require leadership. And all the while, the Arab youth are still waiting.

Identity Theft and the Modern Middle East

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 19:33:00 +0000

Damascus. Baghdad. Beirut. Cairo. Tripoli. The list can go on of centers of civilizations past in the Middle East. Centuries later, after these civilizations have come and gone, the region that has served as the crossroads of cultures for millennia has been tamed into a narrow circumscription of its own reality. The search for identity and independence has too often meant the theft of the very pluralistic identity that truly reverberates in the countries of the modern Middle East. Shaking off the shackles of autocratic rule is assuredly a step towards building a truly open and just society in the region, particularly in the Arab world. However, what has yet to come is the embrace of the diverse identities - in ethnicity, in religion, and in philosophy - that already characterizes each country. Instead, what dominates is the pretense of a monochromatic mainstream that maligns difference.

Persian. Shiite. Jewish. Christian. Sufi. Atheist. Secularist. These words betray pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism, the dominant currents of the last several decades within the Arab world. There are illusions of potential purity that have no basis in the history of the region. This is true in the Gulf. It is true in the Levant. It is true in the Maghreb. It is true in Egypt. It is true across each country because each one has a unique ethno and/or religious-centric narrative of nationalism (one that requires much deeper introspection and exploration than this post will allow). They belie what are the interwoven origins of the populations within.

Today, for example, Persian influence is denounced. It is deemed treasonous. Ideas from Iran are treated with derision and distance. There is of course, no natural place within the Arab world for such an intellectual invasion. As if for centuries there was one clean divide between what was Persian and what was Arab. If you walk the streets of any capital in the Arab world and search for a pharmacy, you will likely find the name of Ibn Sina somewhere if not in the very name of the store itself. Who was Ibn Sina? He is the father of modern medicine, who published the 14-volume Canon of Medicine. Yet he was not an Arab. He was Persian! Born in Bukhara and buried in what is now modern-day Iran (Hamedan).

Just five years ago, then Senator and now Vice President, Joe Biden, declared that Iraq must be broken apart into three because of the intractable conflict between oppositional identities. Who could contest that the Kurd and Arab were distinct identities? Perhaps the most quintessential leader of the Arab world would contest that: Salah al-Din. He led the Arab armies in recapturing Jerusalem from the Crusaders -- and he was Kurdish.

These are only two (but prominent) examples of how the historical and cultural fabric of the Arab world is a complex one (and more abound from contemporary and more mundane realities). Yet, what is more important than such cases is the fact that most modern societies have a multiplicity of concurrent ethnicities, languages, and religions as well as contesting personal and political philosophies. The imposition from one to another of a uniform identity is bound to end in discord and lead to bloodshed. Efforts to erase difference are a form of social fascism, whereby individuality is discounted. As Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and soon Syria and Yemen, unlock the political stranglehold of dictatorial regimes, societies will have a chance to define themselves democratically. The danger will be when there is an attempt at a tyranny of the majority. This is not simply a philosophical or existential concern. It goes to the very heart of peace and security. Turkey is an instructive model, where the pursuit of 'Turkishness' has never allowed the full legitimate space of rights for non-Turkish citizens of the country. Until today, the Kurdish rebellion - as well as cases of terrorism - remains a symptom of this long unreconciled situation.

The belonging or naturalness of identity does not relate to its prevalence in society. Take the minority Shiite population. Simply because the Shiite population is in the minority in the Arab world does not make it any less organic than the Sunni population in Iran. The Shiites cannot be erased from Saudi Arabia. They cannot be erased from the United Arab Emirates. They cannot be erased from Bahrain. They cannot be erased from Kuwait. Or Qatar. Or Oman. Or the entire GCC. They are there. They have been there. And they are not Persian fifth columns. In fact, it was a Shiite empire, the Fatimids, that founded Cairo or Al-Qahira as well as the centre of Sunni thought today, Al Azhar University. Moreover, when the Fatimids controlled lands from Morocco to Mecca, most of Iran was still Sunni!

It is a strange thought, that apostasy remains a capital crime (at least on paper) in Iran, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Qatar, and Yemen, in a region that gave birth to the three Abrahamic faiths, all of whom when they emerged were persecuted by the majority. The Jews fled Egypt. The Christians fled Jerusalem. The Muslims fled Mecca. Today, to convert to Judaism or Christianity can bring you a death sentence. What does that tell those minorities within their societies of their true worth? Officially in Saudi Arabia the birthplace of Islam, there are no citizens who are Christians and there are no official churches. Why?

The challenge will be in the coming years for leaders and followers alike, to arrive at definitions of their societies that while inspired by their constituent linguistic, ethnic, and religious identities and histories are not dominated by them and especially by only one amongst them and against another. Rather, the ability to find ideologies that forge a common path based on common values that promote public good, will be essential. If that does not happen, the fears of sectarian strife, tyranny of the majority, and political instability will be realized in full force.

What does the Shalit deal mean for Hamas?

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 21:08:00 +0000

This article originally appeared in The National newspaper in the UAE. You can find the original story by clicking here.

Hamas trades Shalit for a new lease on its political standing

When Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas spoke to the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York last month, he demanded the release of about 6,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. At the time he was riding a wave of momentum due to the bid for recognition of a Palestinian state at the world body.

Nearly three weeks later, little progress has been made towards what had been only a symbolic goal. Meanwhile, Hamas – the political rival of Mr Abbas’s Fatah party – has achieved a tremendous coup: the release of more than 1,000 prisoners in exchange for the return of the captured Israel Defense Forces soldier Gilad Shalit. Just when it seemed that Hamas had been losing ground on the Palestinian political scene to Fatah, it has returned to the forefront in a move that could dramatically affect its political fortunes.
It was always unclear how the Arab awakening would affect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Would there be a mass movement of Palestinians advocating change? Against what forces would it be directed? Would it turn violent?

Mass protests in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip exerted pressure for a unity government between the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority and Hamas. That led to what should have been a ground-breaking agreement in Cairo in May. But “reconciliation” has yet to be implemented in anything but name.
As a result, Hamas has continued to be excluded from the internationally recognised leadership of key Palestinian political bodies such as the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Furthermore, with the growing turmoil engulfing Syria, the base of Hamas’s political leader Khaled Meshaal, the party appeared to be pushed even further to the margins.

Meanwhile, in the West Bank there has been increasing praise and support for the economic development plan captained by Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad, a favourite of donors to the Palestinian Authority, and who is viewed derisively Hamas. More recently, the decisive move by Mr Abbas to seek recognition of the state of Palestine at the UN ,with or without Israel’s permission, generated new enthusiasm. Hamas did not have much to offer except for expressions of doubt and hollow claims that its approach would lead to real results on the ground.

When the news was confirmed yesterday that a deal had been reached between Hamas and Israel to exchange Sergeant Shalit for over 1,000 prisoners, it was a dramatic boost for the party’s flagging image. Hamas will receive direct credit for the release of an estimated one-sixth of the Palestinian prison population in Israeli jails. In contrast, Mr Abbas and Fatah, despite all the years of negotiations and security coordination with Israel, cannot point to a comparable achievement.

It is also significant that the deal was mediated by the new government in Cairo. Mr Meshaal made a point of thanking Egypt and Qatar for their role in brokering the deal, demonstrating its focus on developing support beyond Damascus.

The exact list of prisoners who will be released will not be revealed until 48 hours before the initial exchange and it is likely not to include such heavyweights as Hamas militant Abdullah Barghouti, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine leader Ahmed Saadat, or the widely popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti. Yet, there are a significant number of key Hamas militants and activists who will be released, which will bolster the ranks of its current leadership. Moreover, it is expected that many of the Palestinians who are set free will be from other political factions, further enhancing the political goodwill that Hamas will garner with the deal.
It is expected that Palestinians will finally hold presidential and legislative elections in 2012 – although this could of course change. If elections are held, Hamas will now have a very strong narrative to put forward. Not only will it claim that it is governing in the Gaza Strip and has achieved a significant milestone with the prisoner exchange, but it will also be able to demonstrate an improved relationship with Egypt.

Thus, in the year of the Arab awakening, while it seemed initially that Hamas was caught off-guard, it has since adapted to the new conditions in the region and found away to seize the initiative from its rival Fatah.
Certainly developments in the West Bank and Gaza in coming weeks will be very fluid. More importantly, depending on the outcome of the UN vote and subsequent actions on the ground in Palestinian cities, the situation could change dramatically. It is hard, however, to see how other political factions will be able to demonstrate that they are working towards ending the Israeli occupation.

Perhaps – and it remains to be seen – we will see a new guard of Palestinians in Fatah and beyond emerge to consolidate a non-violent, but anti-occupation political movement. Unless this happens, expect Hamas to exert rising influence on the Palestinian political scene for the foreseeable future.

What if Saudi Arabia was Iran?

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 06 Oct 2011 08:20:00 +0000

What if Saudi Arabia was Iran? A simple question and likely a not so simple answer. Read the previous post by following the link:

http://www.thegeopolitico.com/2011/10/west-condemns-iran-for-suppressing.html

"However, in recent weeks a series of incidents have brought again to the forefront how Iran continues to suppress women's rights systematically, only allowing token promises of addressing the situation. In addition, the overall human rights situation remains dire and recent reform-protestants have been categorically dismissed and disbanded. While Russia and China have dithered on the sidelines, the United States and EU have been unequivocal in their condemnation of the state of affairs in Iran...."

Iran rightly singled out by the West

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 05 Oct 2011 11:45:00 +0000

You may have missed it but Iran recently executed a worker from Sudan for the crime of 'sorcery' which while not on the legal statutes, is punished by the more stringent religious rules that still hold primacy in the religiously-guided judiciary. It was a shocking case but one that escaped the attention of the world's media with so much turmoil in the Middle East. However, in recent weeks a series of incidents have brought again to the forefront how Iran continues to suppress women's rights systematically, only allowing token promises of addressing the situation. In addition, the overall human rights situation remains dire and recent reform-protestants have been categorically dismissed and disbanded. While Russia and China have dithered on the sidelines, the United States and EU have been unequivocal in their condemnation of the state of affairs in Iran.

Although the Arab 'spring' has put democracy at the forefront of the agenda in the Middle East, it has not swayed authorities in Iran who have stymied reform attempts to open up the political system. While there are elections for some positions, analysts insist that real power is held in fact by the Supreme Leader; that position has always been beyond a direct vote of the country's citizens. Yet more poignant is that most positions of power are held by a small coterie of individuals; what exacerbates the situation is that there is a growing economic disparity in the country, despite populist attempts by the government to address the needs of the poorer classes. A significant part of the economy in the opaque country is controlled by a small oligarchy of companies and individuals with links to the ruling class, aided in obtaining government contracts often through corruption or nepotism or a combination of both.

Dissent is simply not tolerated and censorship is commonplace. Inspired by the wider movements in the Arab world, some Iranians have taken to the streets. They have been denounced by the regime, that accuses them of serving 'foreign interests' and trying to undermine public order. These protesters -with demonstrations as recent as this week - have insisted they are simply asking for human rights. There are worries that Iran will escalate the violence it will use if there is a widening of this movement, not to mention the untold numbers of political prisoners who continue to languish in prison.

Unlike in nearby Egypt when it was under Mubarak where there were some elements of political liberalism and openness, Iran is characterized by a complete vacuum of political activities. There are no political parties. In fact it refuses to even have a parliament or hold regular elections, opting for an experimental democratic process on the municipal level. While incremental democratic development itself could be appropriate for its context, what is particularly galling is that women have thus far never voted nor stood as candidates in these contests and are not expected to do so for another four years (if then). On women's rights, not only has Iran denied them political enfranchisement, it has also - as is widely known - enforced a strict dress code. If you are fortunate to see a woman in Tehran - the country's capital - which is rare to begin with, she will likely be covered head-to-toe. In fact, she cannot even leave her house without a male guardian; nor is she allowed to legally obtain a driver's license.

Russia and China guided by geopolitical and geoeconomic interests given Iran's strategic position in the region and vast oil resources, have refrained from voicing any real criticism of the country. Fortunately the U.S., Europe and other Western countries have been vociferous in continuing to denounce and condemn Iran's human rights record repeatedly. They continue to insist on the release of political prisoners and the protection of young Iranians when demonstrating for greater rights. Hopefully the world's eyes continue to remain on Iran and ensure that the rights of all in that country are respected.

Israel running out of time for a two-state solution

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 09:39:00 +0000

This article originally appeared in The National newspaper: http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/time-is-running-out-for-israel-to-salvage-a-two-state-solution

Time is running out for Israel to salvage a two-state solution

The National

Taufiq Rahim

Sep 22, 2011

In the fall of 2002, Prof Sari Nusseibeh, now the president of Al Quds University in Jerusalem, argued that Palestinians needed to adjust to practical realities on the ground, and should avoid living in the dream of a greater Palestine. It was a comment that went to the heart of the right of return for Palestinians to modern-day Israel, which continues to be a contentious point.

At that discussion at Princeton University, which I had helped to convene, Dr Nusseibeh was risking controversy particularly because at the time he was serving as the Palestine Liberation Organisation's Commissioner for Jerusalem Affairs. Nine years later, we see that it is the Israeli leadership that refuses to let go of the concept of "Eretz Israel", or Greater Israel.

It is a common refrain of critics that the Palestinians "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity". Today, however, it is Israel that is presented with an opportunity it cannot afford to pass up - and yet it is doing everything it can to avoid a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

For the past 23 years, the PLO has operated under the formula of seeking a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue. Since the initial PLO declaration of 1988 we have had the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, the Taba negotiations, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Road Map and the non-directed Obama process, all in the service of creating two states.

This vision of course is of two countries living side by side with one another. Nevertheless, the Palestinians would have only 22 per cent of the original mandate of British Palestine, essentially consisting of the West Bank and Gaza Strip along with a presence in East Jerusalem.

It has not been an easy proposition for Palestinians and their leadership to accept a prospect predicated on inequality, one that in effect would necessitate the negation of the return of many refugees to their original homes. Yet that is what has been accepted by the mainstream Palestinian leadership, and supported by countless polls in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

What has been the Israeli response? For many years the assertion was that the so-called Six Day War of 1967, during which Israel seized the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, would lead to eventual peace. While the Sinai was in fact part of a land-for-peace deal with Egypt, Israel continues not only to occupy but also to populate and further entrench its presence in the Golan Heights and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In fact there are now nearly 500,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the vast majority of this population growth has come since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

Rather than move closer to a solution, the current Israeli government, led by the Likud Party's Benjamin Netanyahu and influenced by right-wing populist Avigdor Lieberman, the foreign minister, has shown utter contempt for any modicum of reconciliation. This reality was most vividly demonstrated last spring, when Israel announced a plan for the construction of 1,600 new housing units in East Jerusalem during the visit of the US vice president Joseph Biden.

Tomorrow, when the Palestinians led by President Mahmoud Abbas present to the United Nations their proposal for full recognition of Palestine within the 1967 borders, they will in effect be giving one last breath to the two-state solution and to recognition of Israel. In years past Israel may have eschewed any recognition of a Palestinian state, but today that policy has become untenable.

The world around Israel has fundamentally changed. Economically Israel is no longer the superior force in the region. Politically, its influence is waning worldwide, and long-standing regional allies such as Egypt and Turkey are now far from its side.

Demographically, Israel faces the stark choice between peace and apartheid. If Israel in these crucial stages turns its back on recognition of Palestine, it might well be turning its back on the prospect of a two-state solution. A significant portion of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories, and certainly in the diaspora, would be more than willing to pursue a one-state solution - practical or not - as in South Africa.

Yet all signs point to Israel continuing to read from the same old playbook, using the same language and making the same accusations against the Palestinians as in years past. It seems that Israel once again appears to be ready to miss an opportunity. This time, however, it may also be missing its last chance at the two-state solution and the last chance for its own statehood.

Canada plays the wrong hand on Palestine

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 21 Sep 2011 12:50:00 +0000

This article originally appeared in the Toronto Star, which you can find by clicking here: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/1057064--canada-plays-the-wrong-hand-on-palestine

Canada Plays the Wrong Hand on Palestine
Toronto Star

“Canada views this action as very regrettable and we will be opposing it at the United Nations.”

This was Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s response to the Palestinian campaign for international recognition, ahead of his trip to the United Nations General Assembly. It was blunt. It was clear. It was wrong.

For years Canada has played an even-handed role in the Middle East but today it finds itself clearly allied with one side of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yet Harper’s position ahead of the meetings this week not only appears biased but it also undermines the prospects for peace and the interests of both Palestinians and Israelis.

In 1957, former prime minister Lester Pearson was the first and last Canadian recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded for his efforts in resolving the Suez Crisis a year earlier, serving as an honest peacemaker between Egypt, Israel, the United Kingdom and France. That perception of even-handedness toward the region has slowly faded over time, in particular since Harper came to power in 2006. In a speech last year, he went so far as to say that Canada will maintain its pro-Israeli stand “whatever the cost.”

The government has doubled-down on its support, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Israeli Foreign Minister Avidgor Lieberman, a controversial figure at best. This week on his most recent visit, Lieberman labelled Canada “our best, most reliable friend in the world.” There is a lot to question about blind attachment in this impregnable alliance Harper has forged. Is it in Canada’s interest? Does it undermine our reputation globally? Are we unduly ignoring human rights abuses committed by Israel? However, what is most poignant is that Canada’s current position vis-à-vis the Palestinian push for UN recognition may in fact be against fundamental Israeli interests as well.

When Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas puts forth an application for full recognition from the UN on Friday, it will be the culmination of a long struggle for self-determination for a people still without a state. We could debate the history of the conflict ad nauseam and evaluate fruitlessly who is more culpable, but the truth remains that the Palestinians legally and morally have the right to statehood.

The current drive for UN recognition derives from the moderate wing of the political spectrum and is designed to facilitate a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the conflict. The vast majority of countries, including members of the European Union, are likely to vote for the recognition of Palestine as a state; even a recent BBC poll (2011) showed that 46 per cent of Canadians supported voting in favour while only 25 per cent were against. The Canadian position not only will be going against the grain internationally but will also fly against the face of public opinion domestically.

More important, what alternative is Canada supporting? A continuation of the status quo? The empowerment of the more extremist and perhaps violent elements in the Palestinian leadership that only further threaten Israeli security? If formal recognition of a Palestinian state is considered regrettable, then what message does that send Palestinians regarding the entire peace process?

Unfortunately, the Harper government has adopted a belief that being pro-Palestinian equates to being anti-Israeli and vice versa. In fact, this manufactured duality belies a more nuanced reality. By recognizing Palestine, the Harper government would not by any means have to give up its pro-Israeli stance. Canada would still condemn Hamas and other terror organizations. Canada would still support Israel against all existential threats. Canada would still stand against anti-Semitism in all its forms.

Conversely, the message Canada would send is that it supports a peaceful resolution to the conflict based on two states living side-by-side. A two-state solution, however, by its very nature requires recognition of Palestine. By going against this very basic principle at the United Nations, the Harper government is sending a very clear message to both Israelis and Palestinians — it is not just anti-Palestinian; it is anti-peace.

Israel's Legitimacy Flows Through Palestine

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Tue, 20 Sep 2011 21:37:00 +0000

The original version of this post appears on Huffington Post at (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/israels-legitimacy-palestine-statehood_b_971551.html)

------

Israel's Legitimacy Flows Through Palestine

Huffington Post (September 20, 2011)

"It's impossible to impose peace from the outside. It won't happen," bellowed confidently long-time Israeli spokesman Mark Regev in his robust Australian accent. Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon expressed incredulously, "They say they are against violence but then they use political violence." Even the Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu pointedly called on Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to "stop wasting time". Israeli officials have been pseudo-confidently telling whoever will listen that the Palestinian pursuit for recognition at the United Nations is an affront to the peace process. Didn't the Palestinians know that their legitimacy -- and the creation of their state -- flows through Israel? At some point in the last couple of years the mainstream Palestinian political leadership finally emerged out of Plato's cave and answered that rhetorical question: It's Israel's legitimacy that flows in fact through Palestine.

The claim that the Palestinian effort at the UN seeks to discredit the State of Israel is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. In fact it is Israel's future legitimacy that derives from the creation of a Palestinian state. The longer its political leaders procrastinate, the more tenuous its legitimacy as a democratic and viable state becomes.

What is remarkable about the recent campaign by the PLO leadership in pursuing recognition of Palestine at the United Nations, is that it is at its heart about arriving at a peaceful resolution to the conflict and recognizing Israel's right to exist. Explicit in the recognition of Palestine on the basis of previous UN resolutions (242 and 338) is that Israel has a right to exist on 78% of historic Palestine. Moreover, rather than pursue a resolution by way of violence, Abbas and his team have invested in the diplomatic and legal process. Instead of being praised or rewarded the Israelis and many U.S. politicians have invoked the spirit of Chicken Little and declared that the sky is falling. The moment presented in front of the world is one where 'moderates' (according to the West) can genuinely be empowered. Instead the opposite is occurring, as the U.S. Congress threatens to cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority if Abbas continues with his push for recognition.

While the U.S. will likely veto and thwart the Palestinian bid for recognition at the Security Council, this will not do much to end the effort. In fact, this is just the beginning of a last stand by Palestinians for a two-state solution before the latter idea is deemed itself to not have any viability. If the U.S. and Israel oppose even the symbolic recognition of Palestine at the United Nations, what prospects for a real two-state solution are there? There is a dreamy aspect to an Eretz Israel that encompasses Judea and Samaria in some hyper-Jewish state but it is precisely that -- a dream. The longer Israel punts a realistic and explicit commitment to a two-state solution the more it undercuts its own legitimacy. Israel today is surrounded by a changing Middle East, where it is losing its political, economic, and military edge; traditional allies such as Turkey and Egypt are quickly transforming into adversaries. Demographically it cannot continue to lord over the West Bank, Gaza (yes Gaza), and East Jerusalem (yes East Jerusalem) for time immemorial without facing a scenario of apartheid. The latter point is not made by a pro-Palestinian peacenik but rather byIsraeli defense minister Ehud Barak.

What is the alternative presented to the Palestinians by Israeli Foreign Minister Avidgor Lieberman or U.S. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) for that matter? Thus far there is no light offered at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, by rejecting the current Palestinian attempt to enshrine a two-state solution at the United Nations, Israel risks opening the pandora's box of what's next. Who is to say that the Palestinian leadership in the face of a lack of progress won't switch to backing a bi-national democratic state à la South Africa? In the eyes of the world -- which is generally supportive including in U.S. popular opinion of the Palestinian attempt at recognition -- how legitimate would the State of Israel be without a Palestine?

It seems that both Israel and the U.S. have already made up their minds regarding the vote this week. However, this issue will not disappear and will continue to linger. The Palestinian leadership is trying to firmly establish the legitimacy of the two state solution and the existence of Israel. The question remains will Israel undermine its own legitimacy in response?

Palestine belongs in the community of nations

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 15 Sep 2011 17:16:00 +0000

On September 23, 2011, the Palestinians will likely submit their bid to the United Nations Security Council for an application for membership to the international body and acceptance into the community of nations. If accepted they would be the 194th member state -- over 62 years after Israel gained the same recognition. Yet, most likely their bid will be rejected and vetoed by the United States. In fact, some critics of the Palestinian maneuver have labelled the entire demand for statehood as anti-Israel or even worse. There is much to write about this but who is to deny that Palestine belongs in the community of nations? Does it really seem out of place?

List of Member States of the United Nations

1 Argentina ( 24-Oct-45 )
2 Belarus ( 24-Oct-45 )
3 Brazil ( 24-Oct-45 )
4 Chile ( 24-Oct-45 )
5 China ( 24-Oct-45 )
6 Cuba ( 24-Oct-45 )
7 Denmark ( 24-Oct-45 )
8 Dominican Republic ( 24-Oct-45 )
9 Egypt ( 24-Oct-45 )
10 El Salvador ( 24-Oct-45 )
11 France ( 24-Oct-45 )
12 Haiti ( 24-Oct-45 )
13 Iran (Islamic Republic of) ( 24-Oct-45 )
14 Lebanon ( 24-Oct-45 )
15 Luxembourg ( 24-Oct-45 )
16 New Zealand ( 24-Oct-45 )
17 Nicaragua ( 24-Oct-45 )
18 Paraguay ( 24-Oct-45 )
19 Philippines ( 24-Oct-45 )
20 Poland ( 24-Oct-45 )
21 Russian Federation ( 24-Oct-45 )
22 Saudi Arabia ( 24-Oct-45 )
23 Syrian Arab Republic ( 24-Oct-45 )
24 Turkey ( 24-Oct-45 )
25 Ukraine ( 24-Oct-45 )
26 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ( 24-Oct-45 )
27 United States of America ( 24-Oct-45 )
28 Greece ( 25-Oct-45 )
29 India ( 30-Oct-45 )
30 Peru ( 31-Oct-45 )
31 Australia ( 1-Nov-45 )
32 Costa Rica ( 2-Nov-45 )
33 Liberia ( 2-Nov-45 )
34 Colombia ( 5-Nov-45 )
35 Mexico ( 7-Nov-45 )
36 South Africa ( 7-Nov-45 )
37 Canada ( 9-Nov-45 )
38 Ethiopia ( 13-Nov-45 )
39 Panama ( 13-Nov-45 )
40 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ( 14-Nov-45 )
41 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) ( 15-Nov-45 )
42 Guatemala ( 21-Nov-45 )
43 Norway ( 27-Nov-45 )
44 Netherlands ( 10-Dec-45 )
45 Honduras ( 17-Dec-45 )
46 Uruguay ( 18-Dec-45 )
47 Ecuador ( 21-Dec-45 )
48 Iraq ( 21-Dec-45 )
49 Belgium ( 27-Dec-45 )
50 Afghanistan ( 19-Nov-46 )
51 Iceland ( 19-Nov-46 )
52 Sweden ( 19-Nov-46 )
53 Thailand ( 16-Dec-46 )
54 Pakistan ( 30-Sep-47 )
55 Yemen ( 30-Sep-47 )
56 Myanmar ( 19-Apr-48 )
57 Israel ( 11-May-49 )
58 Indonesia ( 28-Sep-50 )
59 Albania ( 14-Dec-55 )
60 Austria ( 14-Dec-55 )
61 Bulgaria ( 14-Dec-55 )
62 Cambodia ( 14-Dec-55 )
63 Finland ( 14-Dec-55 )
64 Hungary ( 14-Dec-55 )
65 Ireland ( 14-Dec-55 )
66 Italy ( 14-Dec-55 )
67 Jordan ( 14-Dec-55 )
68 Lao People's Democratic Republic ( 14-Dec-55 )
69 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ( 14-Dec-55 )
70 Nepal ( 14-Dec-55 )
71 Portugal ( 14-Dec-55 )
72 Romania ( 14-Dec-55 )
73 Spain ( 14-Dec-55 )
74 Sri Lanka ( 14-Dec-55 )
75 Morocco ( 12-Nov-56 )
76 Sudan ( 12-Nov-56 )
77 Tunisia ( 12-Nov-56 )
78 Japan ( 18-Dec-56 )
79 Ghana ( 8-Mar-57 )
80 Malaysia ( 17-Sep-57 )
81 Guinea ( 12-Dec-58 )
82 Benin ( 20-Sep-60 )
83 Burkina Faso ( 20-Sep-60 )
84 Cameroon ( 20-Sep-60 )
85 Central African Republic ( 20-Sep-60 )
86 Chad ( 20-Sep-60 )
87 Congo ( 20-Sep-60 )
88 Democratic Republic of the Congo [note 8] ( 20-Sep-60 )
89 Côte d'Ivoire ( 20-Sep-60 )
90 Cyprus ( 20-Sep-60 )
91 Gabon ( 20-Sep-60 )
92 Madagascar ( 20-Sep-60 )
93 Niger ( 20-Sep-60 )
94 Somalia ( 20-Sep-60 )
95 Togo ( 20-Sep-60 )
96 Mali ( 28-Sep-60 )
97 Senegal ( 28-Sep-60 )
98 Nigeria ( 7-Oct-60 )
99 Sierra Leone ( 27-Sep-61 )
100 Mauritania ( 27-Oct-61 )
101 Mongolia ( 27-Oct-61 )
102 United Republic of Tanzania ( 14-Dec-61 )
103 Burundi ( 18-Sep-62 )
104 Jamaica ( 18-Sep-62 )
105 Rwanda ( 18-Sep-62 )
106 Trinidad and Tobago ( 18-Sep-62 )
107 Algeria ( 8-Oct-62 )
108 Uganda ( 25-Oct-62 )
109 Kuwait ( 14-May-63 )
110 Kenya ( 16-Dec-63 )
111 Malawi ( 1-Dec-64 )
112 Malta ( 1-Dec-64 )
113 Zambia ( 1-Dec-64 )
114 Gambia ( 21-Sep-65 )
115 Maldives ( 21-Sep-65 )
116 Singapore ( 21-Sep-65 )
117 Guyana ( 20-Sep-66 )
118 Botswana ( 17-Oct-66 )
119 Lesotho ( 17-Oct-66 )
120 Barbados ( 9-Dec-66 )
121 Mauritius ( 24-Apr-68 )
122 Swaziland ( 24-Sep-68 )
123 Equatorial Guinea ( 12-Nov-68 )
124 Fiji ( 13-Oct-70 )
125 Bahrain ( 21-Sep-71 )
126 Bhutan ( 21-Sep-71 )
127 Qatar ( 21-Sep-71 )
128 Oman ( 7-Oct-71 )
129 United Arab Emirates ( 9-Dec-71 )
130 Bahamas ( 18-Sep-73 )
131 Germany ( 18-Sep-73 )
132 Bangladesh ( 17-Sep-74 )
133 Grenada ( 17-Sep-74 )
134 Guinea-Bissau ( 17-Sep-74 )
135 Cape Verde ( 16-Sep-75 )
136 Mozambique ( 16-Sep-75 )
137 Sao Tome and Principe ( 16-Sep-75 )
138 Papua New Guinea ( 10-Oct-75 )
139 Comoros ( 12-Nov-75 )
140 Suriname ( 4-Dec-75 )
141 Seychelles ( 21-Sep-76 )
142 Angola ( 1-Dec-76 )
143 Samoa ( 15-Dec-76 )
144 Djibouti ( 20-Sep-77 )
145 Viet Nam ( 20-Sep-77 )
146 Solomon Islands ( 19-Sep-78 )
147 Dominica ( 18-Dec-78 )
148 Saint Lucia ( 18-Sep-79 )
149 Zimbabwe ( 25-Aug-80 )
150 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ( 16-Sep-80 )
151 Vanuatu ( 15-Sep-81 )
152 Belize ( 25-Sep-81 )
153 Antigua and Barbuda ( 11-Nov-81 )
154 Saint Kitts and Nevis ( 23-Sep-83 )
155 Brunei Darussalam ( 21-Sep-84 )
156 Namibia ( 23-Apr-90 )
157 Liechtenstein ( 18-Sep-90 )
158 Estonia ( 17-Sep-91 )
159 Democratic People's Republic of Korea ( 17-Sep-91 )
160 Republic of Korea ( 17-Sep-91 )
161 Latvia ( 17-Sep-91 )
162 Lithuania ( 17-Sep-91 )
163 Marshall Islands ( 17-Sep-91 )
164 Micronesia (Federated States of) ( 17-Sep-91 )
165 Armenia ( 2-Mar-92 )
166 Azerbaijan ( 2-Mar-92 )
167 Kazakhstan ( 2-Mar-92 )
168 Kyrgyzstan ( 2-Mar-92 )
169 Republic of Moldova ( 2-Mar-92 )
170 San Marino ( 2-Mar-92 )
171 Tajikistan ( 2-Mar-92 )
172 Turkmenistan ( 2-Mar-92 )
173 Uzbekistan ( 2-Mar-92 )
174 Bosnia and Herzegovina ( 22-May-92 )
175 Croatia ( 22-May-92 )
176 Slovenia ( 22-May-92 )
177 Georgia ( 31-Jul-92 )
178 Czech Republic ( 19-Jan-93 )
179 Slovakia ( 19-Jan-93 )
180 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ( 8-Apr-93 )
181 Eritrea ( 28-May-93 )
182 Monaco ( 28-May-93 )
183 Andorra ( 28-Jul-93 )
184 Palau ( 15-Dec-94 )
185 Kiribati ( 14-Sep-99 )
186 Nauru ( 14-Sep-99 )
187 Tonga ( 14-Sep-99 )
188 Tuvalu ( 5-Sep-00 )
189 Serbia ( 1-Nov-00 )
190 Switzerland ( 10-Sep-02 )
191 Timor-Leste ( 27-Sep-02 )
192 Montenegro ( 28-Jun-06 )
193 South Sudan ( 14-Jul-11 )
194 Palestine ( 23-Sep-11 )

The Global 150 - Who's more powerful - Governments or Corporations?

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Mon, 12 Sep 2011 15:01:00 +0000

As the world is beset by economic troubles the question is raised over the role of corporations. Yet how significant is their influence? It is very difficult to determine how much influence is wielded by companies versus countries. In fact it is better to think of the influence of governments versus companies. At the end of the day a country has many constituent elements - individuals, companies, civil society, the media. Yet, what is the weight of the primary public sector entity? What does a government have at its disposal?

In that vein, I constructed a table below to contrast the national revenues of the world's leading governments with that of the world's leading corporations into a new global 150 - the G150. The top ten are all countries. The top five corporations are: Walmart, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP and Toyata Motors. Israel at #126 lands between Microsoft and Home Depot, while Apple at #133 is just above Ukraine.

What are the other results:

$27.7 trillion -- Total revenues of the G150.
$11.2 trillion -- Total revenues of the top 10 countries
$11.8 trillion -- Total revenues of all companies in G150
$153 billion -- Average revenue for government outside the top 10
$108 billion -- Average revenue for company on the list

73% -- Percentage of the list that are companies
27% -- Percentage of the list that are countries
38% -- Percentage of the companies on the list that are US-based
12% -- Percentage of the companies on the list that are Germany-based

What is interesting about this is that just like governments the companies have commitments that they must pay that will of course take hold of the revenues. Additionally, while some governments may have surpluses others may not; companies may or may not be profitable. A government such as India has over $1 trillion in GDP but very low national revenue (in India's case just $154 billion). There are many implications to that.

This is a subjective analysis that is meant to be indicative rather than authoritative. This analysis uses publicly available information gathered from Wikipedia, the CIA Factbook and the World Bank, mostly from 2009/2010 but with some national revenue figures coming from 2007 (specific information on the dates is available on request). Adjustment for subsequent years of inflation is not made.

The Day the Earth stood still was ten years ago

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Sun, 11 Sep 2011 15:04:00 +0000

I was in Princeton, New Jersey just coming back for my sophomore year at college. We hadn't yet begun classes and I was planning to go to Walmart later that day to buy some much needed supplies. Just another day in the life of a student. As I slept, I was awaken on that fateful Tuesday by loud knocking on my dorm room door, followed by a classmate entering with frantic panic (yes I left my door unlocked) and jolting me out of my slumber, exhorting, "somebody's bombed the World Trade Center." I quickly ran into the adjacent room and watched with perplexed pause what was unfolding on the television screens. It was around 9:30 a.m. and we still did not know what was truly happening. The two WTC buildings were on fire and soon the Pentagon was just hit. Then all of a sudden news broke that a plane had gone down in Pennsylvania. It was a fast-moving story with many shifting headlines. Were there more attacks to come? Was this a full-scale war? One of the earliest thoughts that went through my head was 'I hope this isn't the work of Muslims.' At the time I was the (acting) Vice President of the Muslim Students Association at Princeton and I feared the consequences. Immediately, it was clear this was a transformative event and things would not be the same after. It was the day the Earth stood still.

Yet, as momentous as those events were, the subsequent apocalyptic jihad versus crusade vision never fully materialized. The decade that followed was indeed tumultuous and characterized by deadly violence, suspension of human rights, and a climate of fear. However, it is clear on the tenth anniversary of that moving moment (or moments), that the 9/11 era has come to a close and is fading in relevance to describe the world around us. The rise of China. The Arab awakening. The new globalized world. That is what we are now faced with.

Certainly, the 9/11 attacks were a historic event and at the time were not just central but essential to almost every policy-making decision being made in the following years. At Princeton one of the most energetic groups during my time was the Princeton Committee Against Terrorism (although there was no Committee for Terrorism). That narrative of 'with us or against us' became pervasive as well. I recall the climate of hostility, that in many ways persists even more today, against things and persons Muslim. Once after writing an article in the Daily Princetonian on Columbus and the history of Native Americans (without any reference to the Middle East) I received the following letter (redacted) from a trustee of a nearby university:

"Judging from your name you are probably muslim from a godforsaken Islamic country. When you are a guest in our country, it is not courteous to defame our heros especially when you don't have true heros of your own. If you can't handle this analysis, I suggest you consider going back to your deprived country and stick your head in your koran for the rest of your life."

Recent reports have shown that Islamophobia is not just extant but on the rise -- and well-funded. The bifurcation of the world by neoconservatives and binladenists alike contributed to a rise in endemic violence and competing mini-crusades and jihads. Attacks in Madrid, London and Bali caused hundreds of casualties. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused thousands. Seemingly every country enacted anti-terror legislation (sometimes with more sinister anti-democratic motives). Mini Al-Qaedas popped up in countries ranging from the Philippines to Nigeria and everything in-between -- many of them persisting until today. In fact the toll of Islamic radicalist attacks within Muslim countries in the last decade dwarfs that of those on America itself. A decade after September 11 we see that these problems (multifaceted and not all of the same nature) have not been solved by any means. The Shabbab movement is influential in Somalia. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are robustly shaping events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nigeria just suffered a deadly attack. Threats against the American homeland still continue. Yet, the overall post-9/11 struggle is declining in relative significance and relevance in the changing world.

This year has seen historic events that have started to shape the post- post-9/11 era. Of course there was the assassination of Osama bin Ladin that parted a symbolic defeat to Al Qaeda. Yet, more influential was the flight of Ben Ali in Tunisia and the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. Al Qaeda's number 2 had advocated the overthrow of Arab regimes by violent means and here was a direct example of success by different tactics; Al Qaeda terrorists were shown to be not-needed and ineffective by comparison. The Arab awakening that has jolted 300 million people is only just beginning but we can already see many examples of why we are in a different time. Just look at Libya where the commander of the National Transitional Council in Tripoli supported by Britain and the U.S. had in fact been 'extraordinarily renditioned' by the CIA and tortured in a Libyan prison at their behest.

More fundamentally it is clear that in most Muslim and Arab societies it is hard to find a plurality that believes their central concern is the United States. Even more poignantly the U.S.-Muslim divide is hardly seen as the defining relationship in the world; even in the Muslim 'world' the defining issue seemingly is across Shiite-Sunni lines rather than Muslim-Christian. The global landscape overall is much more complex and diffuse today as well. The rise of China has assured that. It was in the past decade that BRIC has entered our everyday lexicon. How the world will address the economic malaise besetting the West transposed with rise of the East and South is the dominant question.

Surely there will be localized expressions internalized by a sense of tradition of the 9/11 landscape that still permeate and often dominate. We won't be seeing the end anytime soon of anti-Western slogans in Peshawar. Cartoons may still inflame a populist march in Jakarta. Europe will still have to come to terms with immigrant integration. Anti-Shari'a legislation will be a convenient agenda in the American South. Wars in Afghanistan and elsewhere will take time to wind down. Islamic radicals may still seek to attack symbols of Western influence. Yet the notion of 'us versus them' has not just dissipated from its omnipresence (whether it should have been so or not in the first place is another discussion) but it is now almost stale as if part of a bygone past.

Today we are in a different world - and especially a different Arab and Muslim world. Policymakers are concerned about the 100 million Arab youth (many unemployed) less for becoming radical anti-Western militants but more about their penchant for revolutionary overthrow of their own Arab and Muslim governments. In Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. would be unable to sustain financially another decade of conflict even if it wanted to. In fact 'American' money itself is trumped by the cash flows of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia. Where there is so-called 'radical' violence its targets are far more local (and perhaps the internationalization was only a blip).

The fact that the so-called 9/11 decade has come to a close and the nature of the world has shifted does not mean that we can wear rose-tinted glasses. Conversely the challenges have simply changed and may in fact be even greater and more complex. I'm sure the Fukuyamas and Huntingtons of the world are already prognosticating (inevitably incorrectly) what will happen. Whatever does happen it will happen in the post-post 9/11 world. Ahlan wa sahlan!

Action not rhetoric needed on Syria

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Fri, 19 Aug 2011 12:46:00 +0000

Here is an article I have written outlining possible international action on Syria. While some points may be controversial (as in oil sanctions), I believe that the time has come for such moves given the continuing death and destruction and complete closemindedness expressed by the regime thus far in the process.

Time has come for world action on the Syrian crisis

August 18, 2011 - Toronto Star

“Perhaps in the beginning (2000 and 2001) we moved too fast in opening up the country and people took advantage of that. . . . We are in a dangerous region and have to consider many things. We will make democratic reform but only at our own pace.”

These words were spoken by Syrian President Bashar Assad when I pressed him (as part of a delegation from Harvard) in 2008 on the role of political reform in building an open society. He was then, as he has demonstrated quite violently now, stubborn and resistant to what he saw as change beyond his own pace.

Today, Assad has effectively doubled down on a strategy of death and destruction to intimidate the opposition to his rule that has engulfed Syria. Despite the mounting death toll, the reaction from the international community — including Canada — has been far too little and much too late. While disjointed calls for condemnation have reverberated in Western capitals, there has yet to be a consolidated and, more important, effective initiative to bring about a resolution to the crisis.

It was in mid-March when the situation truly began to unravel in Syria. On March 18, demonstrations in the southern city of Dara’a led to four deaths. Since then, successive cities have seen protestors marching against the regime. The president himself has appeared deaf to the voices of opposition, instead blaming the unrest on “armed gangs” and “terrorists.”

The response of Assad’s government has been both incompetent and brutal and there has been too much blood spilled on the streets of Hama, Latakia, Homs, Deir el-Zour and elsewhere, including Damascus, for the country to return to the old political system. The result has been more than 2,000 deaths, the imprisonment of thousands more and the displacement of countless others. There exists the real prospect of a large-scale massacre in the near future.

The reaction of the international community, while high on bombast, has been anemic in action. Canada has scaled up its basic sanctions against the country but has not downgraded its trade or diplomatic relations, nor has it threatened to pull out of the $1.2 billion Petro-Canada/Suncor Ebla gas project, one of the largest foreign investments in Syria.

In Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared initially that Bashar Assad had “lost legitimacy,” as did Foreign Secretary William Hague in London; President Obama raised the rhetoric on Thursday, demanding that Assad step aside but, while important, this likely will have a limited effect on Damascus. There have also been disparate statements of condemnation from within the Middle East, particularly from Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, but this has not resulted in much beyond headlines. Meanwhile, the United Nations and other international institutions have dithered.

Much more can and should be done, by the international community — including Canada. What is needed first is an international coalition that is ready to use non-military but robust actions to pressure the Syrian regime into ceasing all violence and entering into a process of political transition. The impetus for this has to be a high-level summit of interested states, including countries from Western Europe and North America but also Turkey, members of the Arab League and, in particular, Jordan and other neighbours, and quite possibly Russia or China.

A starting point must be an overall arms embargo on Syria. Just this past week Russian arms exporters were stating that they will continue their shipments to Damascus as usual.

Second, the UN Human Rights Council should immediately dispatch a monitoring body to protect against further harm to the civilian population.

Third, a high-level envoy, perhaps with the stature of Lakhdar Brahimi, could be appointed by the UN secretary-general to at least present a framework for political transition and help mediate a resolution. Up to now there has been no focal point for international energies and initiatives.

Finally, Canada and other like-minded nations should mobilize to draft an opt-in set of sanctions against Syrian oil exports to limit the cash reserves that Assad is using to finance his crackdown.

There are indeed practical steps that can be taken to build momentum toward resolving the crisis in Syria but they will not materialize without leadership from within the international community. Until now and perhaps in fear of the stalemate in Libya, countries have shied away from a more active role.

The situation in Syria, however, does not require military action but it does demand a level of assertiveness and cooperation from the international community, including Canada, to bring about peace and stability.

Taufiq Rahim is a political analyst based in Dubai and blogs regularly on TheGeopolitico.com. He has visited Syria frequently.

Senselessness in the burning streets of Vancouver

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 16 Jun 2011 21:47:00 +0000

"We have a small number of hooligans on the streets of Vancouver causing problems. It's absolutely disgraceful and shameful and by no means represents the city of Vancouver."

- Vancouver Mayor Gregor Robertson speaking to reporters last night

Car burns in front of Canada Post office

June 15 started as a day of hope in the beautiful West Coast city of 2 million, as residents anticipated a Stanley Cup victory, hockey's most prized trophy, which had eluded the Vancouver Canucks - the city's NHL team - in its entire 40-year existence. The sun was shining, the Lions Gate Bridge was gleaming, and downtown was teeming with a festive flock of fans. However, as it became apparent that the Canucks would lose the decisive game 7 to the Boston Bruins, by the closing minutes of the game, the mayhem had already begin. Instead of hosting a parade, the city finds itself cleaning up the remnants of a destructive night of ruinous rioting. 17 years after the 1994 riots and one Olympic games later, people are rightly asking what happened last night and why.

In 1994, the Vancouver Canucks for the second time in their history - the first being in 1982 - reached the Stanley Cup Finals. Again the underdog and facing a New York team (this time the Rangers rather than the Islanders), the Canucks managed to recover from a 3-1 deficit in the best-of-seven series and force a final decisive game. There was a tremendous feeling of anticipation in the city that June but the final game was lost 3-2. The Cup had seemingly fallen from the grasp of the city. Thousands of people had already gathered downtown that night for the game and a series of events led to a standoff between unruly youths and riot police (see video footage here). The Whitelaw report conducted on behalf of the BC Police Commission and Attorney General had found that there was poor police planning and crowd control and that there had been a premeditated action on the part of some individuals to trigger looting and anarchist violence.

This year, however, was supposed to be different. 17 years later, the 1994 riots were viewed as an aberration and black mark on what is a peaceful, tolerant and beautiful city. Two weeks ago, Vancouver Police Constable Lindsey Houghton remarked:

"That was 17 years ago. The positive atmosphere here in the city that's been increasing in the last few years culminated with the Olympics. We've seen nothing but a fun, family-orientated celebration this year."

Police try to recapture the streets

Of course, the 2010 Winter Olympics hosted by the city barely saw any violence, beyond the anti-Olympic protests in the initial days. It was that Olympic spirit, where for two weeks tens of thousands of people - including families and young children - descended on downtown, which brought me back from Dubai to watch the Stanley Cup Finals in my hometown. Sure enough, until last night, there was a positive atmosphere in the air. Yet, the ingredients were all in place for a repeat of 1994 and the senseless destruction that it brought. The principal difference with the Olympics was that it ended with a Gold medal victory for Canada and electrified the city into celebration. There was nothing to celebrate last night but a devastating lost. All the positive energy that had been built up expectedly came crashing down.

First car set alight in the city

So what exactly happened last night? News outlets are reporting that close to 100 arrests have been made and a couple of hundred people were wounded, several with serious injuries. The estimated damage is roughly $1 million, which compares to the 1994 riots. I was fortunate to have attended Game 7 yesterday and thus as I walked through downtown, witnessed much of the scene until 11pm, by which time the police were regaining control of the streets. What I saw was at times total and utter havoc and a very limited if not ineffectual police presence. There were not thousands of people rioting, but several dozen, mostly angry - drunk or high - youths, under the age of 21, causing destruction. There was a mob mentality for sure, but mostly a high school mentality, whereby young people would attempt to 'fight the authorities'. Bottles rained down on the police from afar. Storefronts were destroyed. Cars were set alight. Onlookers cheered the ringleaders on and yes, young women were seen cheering their male friends on in the violence. While there may have been some anarchists and slight premeditation, this was largely the typical expected reaction of a drunk, young and unruly crowd in a commercial space with limited police presence and infused with a sense of emotions and anger (following the loss).

The initial violence unfolded in the closing minutes of the game as people in the crowds around the fan zones setup in downtown Vancouver began hurling beer bottles at the large television screens that were setup. Some scuffles broke out and then very quickly a car was set alight right near the Vancouver Public Library and Canada Post office. As there was a police presence already within the fan zones, the authorities quickly moved in to secure the area as well as facilitate the arrival of the fire rescue team. As I walked back from Roger's Arena (there was an incident there as a fan fell a couple of stories to the ground and was being assisted by paramedics), and into the area by the Library, thousands of young people had already massed, where a car had already been burned and another one vandalized. There were perhaps a dozen police in the area and a fire rescue truck. Several bottles rained from down on the officers from afar and then perhaps as a result - but also seemingly inexplicably - the police all retreated from the area. This was a critical point in the riots. While there were roaming groups already on Robson and some walking along Granville street - the nightclub district in Vancouver - it was this consolidated mass of people which became a roving mob of destruction.

As the police retreated away, some in the crowd turned to the second vandalized car. A group of about ten people cheered by hundreds around them, flipped the green pickup truck. Soon you could smell the gasoline leaking from the tank. Almost instinctively, one of the group then set the car alight. Several minutes later a large explosion could be heard and a dark plume of black smoke wafted upwards from the vehicle. Police then secured their presence on the intersection of W. Georgia and Homer, and equipped with riot gear and officers on horseback began pushing the crowd back in all directions. The result, however, was the displacement of the crowds towards Robson Street (Vancouver's main shopping area). Yet, for each thousand people there were perhaps only ten or so officers, not nearly enough. So it became a game of cat-and-mouse. As the crowd moved, small items were destroyed in its path, such as garbage bins, newspaper stands, bus stops, and the temporary bathrooms that had been setup downtown.

Further up downtown's main artery - W. Georgia Street - at the Seymour intersection, more cars were set alight, and the crowd set its sights on police cruisers that were parked near there. After this point, with further crowds consolidating downtown, by 9:30pm it was apparent that the police did not have control of the streets and there were many simultaneous incidents unfolding (too many to list here). What was apparent was that there were only a few people involved in the destruction. However, there was a wider ring of onlookers - mostly between 15-21 - cheering on anyone who led the violence, whether it was smashing the glass of a store or setting alight a car. Young women were just as complicit in this second realm of activity. Then there were several thousand amused spectators energized by the destruction who did nothing to stop it or lead a more responsible mood on the streets. And finally, there were several thousand people, the vast majority, who were simply trying to get home. By nightfall, most of these people had dissipated, but because of the chaos, there were no clear paths to leave Downtown.

In fact several times, police officers were asked, "Where do I go? How do I leave this area?" and the response was simply, "Go, get out of here." By 9:30pm and 10pm several intersections had been closed off, and tear gas canisters had been fired from several directions (including from the West along Granville); this pushed people further into the downtown core. Additionally, public transit started to be limited by nightfall, and the last bus service to the North Shore for example was at 11pm. This trapped a few more people downtown.


Residents tried to save this car

What was clear was that several dozen people seeking to cause violence and destruction were given a freehand inadvertently and there was chaos and a lack of control on the streets. Some residents got involved by throwing debris at rioters from their apartment buildings to prevent the destruction of cars. The police officers who were there tried their best to disperse the crowds peacefully, using mostly forced movement, tear gas, and percussion bombs. Vancouver hospitals were the busiest they had been in 20 years, and many officers valiantly tried to help the seriously wounded get medical attention. Yet, for whatever reason, that police presence was limited. Some citizens tried to take matters into their own hands and defend private property; in a few instances these people were successful, but in others they were severely beaten. In the confusion, several fights broke out and other people were wounded by flying objects. In one instance nearby where I was, an individual was stabbed (or had some type of gash from an incident). Yet the crowds were almost over-running this spot, so we created a ring around the person (this was on Homer Street). In another instance, a wounded individual was in the middle of Robson (near Seymour); while we tried to create a ring around this person, it was less successful. In other cases, people naively were driving their cars through the thick of the crowds, leading to dangerous standoffs. Several of us helped navigate a few cars to safety, amidst the frenzy, while a few unruly kids kept kicking the cars as they went by.

For sure, there will be an official report reflecting on the failure of security that was the responsibility of the City of Vancouver and judging by most accounts, the police did not adequately prepare for the consequence of a loss in the Stanley Cup Finals. Massing thousands of young people, many of whom were intoxicated or high, in the downtown core was a significant risk without an adequate police presence or an effective plan to divert them from the commercial center. Yet, there is a need for greater reflection in Vancouver - and perhaps in other cities in North America and Europe - when this type of youth-led anarchist violence unfolds. Not only was the destruction despicable but it was also senseless. There was no reason except the indulgence in violence for its own sake. Spending most of my time these days in the Middle East, and seeing the Arab Spring unfold in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, with further protests for human rights in Bahrain, Syria and Libya and elsewhere, I have sympathy for civil disobedience (not necessarily violence or vandalism) in the pursuit of liberty. Yet, contrast that action with the mindless rioting from last night by Vancouver's youth and the indulgence in it by thousands of titillated onlookers.

It was not even sports hooliganism, which is itself a dastardly act. The targets of rage were not Boston-affiliated stores. The injured were not individuals from elsewhere. That would have been bad enough. However, the targets of rage were parts of their own city. The wounded were fellow Vancouverites. The mindless and pointless destruction that ensued yesterday was shameful for the city and its young people. At a time when in other parts of the world people are trying to channel their energy for positive change, there is a lot for us to reflect on here back in Canada - and in Vancouver in particular.

In Syria, Good Enough is no Longer Enough

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 30 Mar 2011 17:02:00 +0000

This article is also published on Huffington Post - click here for the article.

"Good enough is no longer enough."

These were the words delivered just two weeks ago, by the CEO of the Syria Trust for Development, the NGO started by the First Lady of Syria, Asma al-Assad during a panel discussion - "The New Voice: Civil Society and the Arab World" - I had organized in Damascus on March 17. In fact, the overall conference the panel was a part of was held under the 'patronage' of the First Lady but the words of the participants apparently fell on deaf ears. When I asked her about the free exchange of ideas and the obstacles to that in Syria itself, she defensively began a treatise about how change needed to be rooted in what she termed Syrian 'identity.' It was disappointing to see such a lack of responsiveness in the midst of historic change in the region. That encounter was one day before four demonstrators were killed in the southern city of Daraa, which unleashed what has been two weeks of instability in the country. That encounter and the events since demonstrated what is now very clear: the Syrian regime has lost its connection with its people - something definitively apparent after the hour-long speech delivered today by President Bashar al-Assad.

Today, Dr. al-Assad was supposed to give a cathartic announcement of change after two weeks of uncertainty. Here was the Arab world's popular leader, defender of the resistance - young, smart, and in touch. Instead, the delivery was simply off. Al-Assad squandered much of what was left of his political capital with the majority of his people, after a speech that could only be described as a prolific disappointment. Make no mistake about it. On January 14, the day Ben Ali fled Tunisia to Saudi Arabia, President al-Assad was a popular leader in his country. His inaction and the blundering actions of his government since, has led to the current impasse in which Syria finds itself. His country is now on the verge of an uncertain explosion after Friday prayers this week.

When President al-Assad came to power in 2000, he inherited a country with a closed economic and political system, where dissent was suffocated. In the 11 years since, President al-Assad has become well-versed in the language of reform as he has consolidated his power. For many in the country, the President, however, had the deck stacked against him. Internally, he had an entrenched security apparatus led by an old guard that refused to cede power and that solidified its financial status with a hold on neighboring Lebanon. Externally, he had to deal with the immediate disarray in Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon (for which he had some influence of course) as well as the very real threat of regime change from a Bush administration on the march. When President Obama came to power in 2009, President Bashar al-Assad was seen as the people's man in power, fighting against adverse external circumstances. He was defending Syria's integrity and independence and warding of instability. This did not mean that people acquiesced fully to the status quo internally [especially after Obama came to power and the external threat was perceived as less], as the President himself had stalled his initial reform efforts (which he had begin in 2000 and 2001). In fact, when I asked him in 2008 why he had stopped these efforts, he responded: "We need to reform but it is not something we can do quickly. We have to keep in mind our circumstances internally and externally. Perhaps in the beginning I moved too fast." Prior to the wave of regional unrest, there had been growing frustration but not necessarily agitation, with what was now the President's slow-moving political reform agenda.

Economically, the country has opened up dramatically in the last decade. While there has been growth, especially in the cities, with overall GDP growth hovering around 5% in recent years, rural areas have remained under threat of water scarcity and limited economic opportunities. In Daraa, where the current unrest started, poverty has been endemic largely due to the declining water table. This is a situation repeated throughout the country. Of course, going from a state-controlled economy to a relatively open one has given way to many changes, not least of which has been the influx of foreign products, previously unavailable (i.e. as basic as Pepsi and Coke) as well as the mushrooming of trendy cafes around Damascus. President al-Assad and his Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Dardari have also promoted internet access throughout the country. Yet, because of the continuation of the closed political system, with limited devolution of powers to the parliament and the absence of real political parties outside of the Baath Party, corruption has continued to thrive. Moreover, people such as Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of the President, have benefited from building monopolies.

Yet, largely, the Syrian people were of the view that there was a corrosive system with 'their man' at the helm who was trying to steer things in the right direction. Shortly after the fall of the government in Tunis, al-Assad gave a wide ranging interview in the Wall Street Journal. He seemed to indicate that he understood change was needed while emphasizing why his status was different:

As for the internal, it is about doing something that is changing; to change the society, and we have to keep up with this change, as a state and as institutions. You have to upgrade yourself with the upgrading of the society. There must be something to have this balance. This is the most important headline... Why is Syria stable, although we have more difficult conditions? We have growth although we do not have many of the basic needs for the people. Despite all that, the people do not go into an uprising. So it is not only about the needs and not only about the reform. It is about the ideology, the beliefs and the cause that you have.

President al-Assad on January 14 (after the fall of Ben Ali) was not in the same position as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. Yet, somewhere between January 14 and March 30, when he gave his first major speech to the Syrian people in response to the growing discontent, he failed to internalize what should have been the new mantra: "Good enough is no longer enough." He mistakenly believed that his ideology of popular resistance and Arab sovereignty would allay demands for immediate and systemic reform. There was a moment when al-Assad could have been the bold leader of the Arab world and proactively move in the direction of change. The events of the last two weeks with the culmination being his speech today, indicated that his government has chosen to have a standoff with its people. After the Friday demonstrations in Daraa on March 18, which led to four deaths, there was a subsequent storming of a mosque after several days of protests on March 23, when as many as 15 people were killed. Then on Friday, March 25, solidarity protests were held throughout the country, the strongest again being in Daraa, and dozens more perished. The situation in the past couple of days had become even more precarious when clashes broke out in places such as the coastal city of Lattackia, raising the fears of sectarian attacks.

On Tuesday, March 29, with the specter of instability around the corner, in a country of 21 million people and a multitude of religious minorities - Christians, Alawis, Ithnashiri Shiites, Ismailis, Druze, heterodox Sunni groups and so forth - thousands gathered to show solidarity with al-Assad and the government. Yet it was clear, that the deaths in Daraa and the reaction of security forces throughout the country had eroded the support for President al-Assad and hastened the calls for immediate reform. The country had hit a turning point and in the last few days, it felt like the government perhaps understood that, with presidential adviser, Bouthaina Shaaban, reading out last Thursday (March 24) and again echoing them a few days later to Al Jazeera television, a set of decrees announcing reform, including the repeal of the emergency law that has been in place since 1963.

Yet, al-Assad's speech today set a line in the sand. There were no concessions. There was only a scant reference to the emergency law. There were no major reforms announced. Instead, he raised the possibility of conspiracies from outside trying to destabilize the country. He said emphatically "we are not a copy of other Arab countries." He entered the parliamentary chamber where he gave his speech to chants in Arabic of, "We will give our blood and soul for you Bashar." His speech was interrupted by sycophantic soliloquies. And, throughout he often smiled, almost sardonically. It was shocking - and that is an objective editorial statement.

His speech was made two days before Friday prayers and we can now expect that day to be a monumental day in Syria's history. What started two weeks ago as unruly clashes in Daraa and led to solidarity marches throughout the country and an awakening of the calls for reform, will now lead to something much more definitive. In the past two weeks, the people called for an end to monopolies, corruption, and repression, but not for the departure of Bashar al-Assad. The latter is now formally in play and it is entirely due to the unresponsiveness of al-Assad himself.

The situation in Syria and across the Arab world is fast-moving and is undermining predictions, perceived predilections, and prospective prescriptions. Yet, Tunis and Egypt were deceptive in the speed and relative ease of immediate change. Libya has shown how the situation can unfold in a very fragmented, deadly, and drawn out manner. Syria, will similarly be a very difficult situation. Not only is the regime unlikely to reform or for that matter 'depart' with ease but also the protesters are not consolidated nor do they have chants in unison. Furthermore, very quickly, the situation in Syria can escalate to something far more dangerous, such as sectarian clashes. However, this is now the situation for which the country, the region, and the international community must prepare for. Al-Assad sent his message today, loudly and clearly, and now we await the people's response.

The Day After in Saudi Arabia

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 10 Feb 2011 17:50:00 +0000

Today a controversial news site Islam Times pronounced that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had died yesterday in Morocco at the age of 86. Quickly, the Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal responded, "I'd like to assure you about the health of the King. He is in excellent shape." That reassurance did not assuage oil futures, which rose throughout the day. In the midst of what is ongoing in Egypt, the news in Saudi Arabia has taken a backseat. In fact the Egyptian armed forces released a cryptic statement - amid the prospect of President Hosni Mubarak stepping down - that captured headlines, indicating it would support the "legitimate demands of the people."Without verification, major news organizations have not reported on the Saudi story directly - to verify one way or the other - although there were indications that pointed to King Abdullah's passing. In the Middle East, however, you can never be certain of any situation. What today's story did do, was bring back into the limelight an unenviable but inevitable prospect.

There is tremendous uncertainty that faces many regimes with aging octogenarians at the helm. The Economist played the role of Nostradamus last July, with the headline "Thank you and Goodbye: For good or ill, change is coming to Egypt and Saudi Arabia soon." In truth the day after has been a scary proposition hanging over the Middle East and the West as a dark cloud. King Abdullah has been a giant of history, ruling Saudi Arabia in effect since 1996 (first as regent and then as King starting in 2005). In many ways he has been a progressive and his passing could be a devastating blow not only to the country's leadership but also to the society-at-large and the wider Middle East. There was never a credible plan 'B'. The few weeks after King Abdullah will be pivotal. Yet stability will not be in the cards for the next several years regardless, until much more substantive changes occur and a formidable younger leader emerges in the country.

King Abdullah has a tremendous legacy that is often clouded by very real concerns of human rights abuses that have occurred over the last 15 years and the widespread luxury that the ruling family enjoys. However, the King, especially in recent years, has been a force for modernization and even progressivism in the Kingdom. In a blog post I wrote last year, I highlighted this succinctly:

In multiple ways the King is encouraging an entirely new ecosystem for education, from creating a new first-rate education program for gifted and talented students to modernizing and internationalizing the university network (see KAUST, which will also have both men and women in the same classroom). On human rights, Saudi Arabia has been at the forefront of creating a new human rights organization for the Gulf, as well as introducing 'human rights' to its educational curriculum. The Human Rights Commission in Saudi Arabia is also actively soliciting cases. And on women's rights King Abdullah is pressing the country to tackle taboos and cross new frontiers. He has appointed a woman for the first-time to a cabinet-level position (for women's education) for example. Saudi Arabia is also ahead of other Gulf countries in tackling domestic abuse. A recent report by a think-tank in Riyadh showed that 40% of articles during the first two months of the year in print media addressed women's issues.

In a volatile region that has seen in the last decade a continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the upheaval in Iraq, the stalemate with Iran, and the attacks by Al Qaeda (often specifically targeted at Saudi Arabia), the regime under King Abdullah has been able to maintain a sense of stability and order within the country. In May 2003, Riyadh was the site of violent suicide bombings that claimed 35 lives. It was the peak of the Al Qaeda pseudo insurgency which the King managed to effectively stamp out. This does not mean that Saudi has been without other problems, but as President Bashar al-Assad stated in a key interview after the Egyptian crisis to the Wall Street Journal, Arab societies need to keep "changing" and "upgrading" the society and institutions or suffer from the same uprising and desperation seen in Egypt. It is not necessarily about political rights; the leadership needs to provide positive change. As Tom Friedman wrote in his column yesterday, "China deprives its people of political rights, but at least it gives them a rising standard of living." This was the role King Abdullah has played to a degree in Saudi, at least directionally.

Now, Saudi must prepare for what comes next. King Abdullah has been a beloved figure who united many in the country. Yet, until now, no grandson of the founding monarch King Abdul-Aziz, who died in 1953, has assumed the throne. The mantle passed from Sa'ud to Faisal to Khalid to Fahd and finally to Abdullah, all sons of King Abdul-Aziz. That means that since 1953, there has not been a father-son transition in Saudi Arabia. Today, the Crown Prince and King in waiting is Sultan, who himself is 83 years old. He has been reported to be suffering from severe illness intermittently over the past couple of years. King Abdullah created an Allegiance or "Princes" Council to deal with this uncertainty. The 35-member body representing the sons of the founding King Abdel Aziz (if the son was not alive then a representative would serve), would be tasked with electing a crown prince. However, in a paradoxical move, roughly two years ago, King Abdullah appointed Prince Nayef, a perceived conservative, as the so-called crown prince in waiting (the official title being second deputy prime minister). Prince Nayef himself is no spring chicken at 77 years of age. Moreover, reports have indicated that Nayef has not been a fan of the reform agenda espoused by King Abdullah.

Saudi Arabia has the same youth situation that faces Egypt, Tunisia and the rest of the Arab world, which is described most evocatively in the book Generation in Waiting, edited by Tarik Yousef of the Dubai School of Government and Navtej Dhillon. 55% of Saudis are under the age of 25 and there will have been a 13.7% increase in new university graduates between 2009 (when the unemployment rate stood at 10.5% officially) and 2013. This is a key driver for the new movement that is emerging in the Arab world of 2011 (described here). King Abdullah has been vociferously pursuing changes to satisfy the social and economic concerns of young Saudis. Simply put, it is hard to see Prince Sultan or Nayef holding the same confidence of these youth. It is similarly unclear as to who would succeed Prince Nayef (or Sultan for that matter) that would play that role. Much of the rest of the GCC has started to see that second-generation of monarchial leadership emerge in the last two decades (see UAE, Qatar as examples) but it is something that is a pandora's box for Saudi. And make no mistake about it. Many Saudi youth are very globally-aware, technologically plugged-in, exposed to the West, and will want to have input into who their next leader will be; at the very least they will want somebody representative - at a minimum level - in spirit, of their generation's concerns.

Saudi Arabia has a $500 billion dollar GDP and holds approximately a fifth of the world's oil reserves (although a recent Wikileaks cable may contest that). It is also a pivotal country in the Arab and Muslim world. Thus the next few weeks and indeed years will be concerning for Saudis, its neighbors (both near and far) and the world at large. The immediate consequences will likely be a hardening of both external and internal policy as the regime seeks to re-consolidate control and avoid instability. That would mean a halt to extensive forays of foreign diplomacy, such as the Saudi-Syrian initiative. It would mean a downplaying of its leadership role vis-a-vis what is happening in Egypt and elsewhere. Domestically, the old guard and religious leadership, that in some ways was marginalized by King Abdullah, may seek to reassert their influence. Ultimately, the Saudi state is predicated on an alliance between the religious philosophy of Abdel-Wahhab (see Wahhabi) and the political clan of the house of Saud. After King Abdullah, the conservative elements within the royal family may seek to move for more power in an alliance with religious hardliners, in the absence of a modernizing political leader who commands influence. This could lead to a slow-down of the very little political reforms that have been underway.

The likely scenario is a Saudi state at odds with itself and in reflective confusion. Even so-called reformers would not be able to describe a path towards sustainable progress that would be politically feasible. The truth is that in a post-King Abdullah world, Saudi Arabia is pandora's box. There will be uncertainty. There may even be instability. It will likely take more than a couple transitions before a stable leader emerges. Even then, that leader may not have the answers demanded by the country's young population. If anything is clear, it is that change is coming. The question now is, will it be for the better or for the worse?

Don't cry for me Egypt - I'm never going to leave you

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 02 Feb 2011 23:55:00 +0000

Today we are witnessing the unfortunate escalation of the situation in Egypt. Things are changing by the minute but it is an extremely dangerous environment now in Cairo specifically. How the next few days play out will have wide-ranging effect not just on Egypt but on the region more widely. If violence and intimidation are used successfully by Mubarak to extinguish this new form of peaceful opposition it will be exercised accordingly across the region by other regimes, in response to the new wave of unrest that has reached several countries.

Here is my most recent take on what Mubarak is thinking from The Mark, a Canadian online publication.

Mubarak Won't Leave

Step down he may, but don't expect Hosni Mubarak to dismantle the regime he has spent his life building and sees as the ultimate source of Egypt's stability.

Shortly before midnight on Tuesday, embattled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak declared, “The incidents of the past few days require us – all of us – the people and the leadership to choose between chaos and stability. My top priority is to restore the security and stability of the nation in order to pave the way for a peaceful transition.”

Reports estimated that close to two million people gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo to reject the Egyptian president’s pledge not to seek re-election. The crowd responded with a chant of vociferous rejection: “Irhal, irhal,” or, “Leave, leave.” The same scene played out in Alexandria and other cities around the country.

Mubarak had severely failed to satisfy the demands of the people. He had, however, announced his desire for a peaceful transition, borrowing from the terminology put forward by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this week. In some ways, Mubarak gave the protest movement a key concession: that he would not stand for another presidential term in the forthcoming September elections. Yet, at the same time, he not only refused to resign early but also called upon the security apparatus “to shoulder its responsibilities and undertake its duties” in apprehending those fomenting chaos in the streets. It was a stark warning: I will resign, but on my own terms, and I will stabilize the country before I leave.

A sense of disbelief has overtaken many observers, who wonder if Mubarak sees the writing on the wall. How can he not realize that he has to leave? However, from the perspective of Mubarak, resigning immediately was never in the cards. Before ending his speech, he remarked, partly in the third person, “Hosni Mubarak takes pride in the long years he spent serving Egypt and its people. I will die on the soil of Egypt and I will be judged by history for my merits and demerits.”

As the protests started on the so-called of "day of rage" on Jan. 25 and gained momentum last Friday, Mubarak saw the following cascading options in front of him:

1) Disregard the motivations and demands of the protestors, and suppress them using the state security apparatus;

2) Deflect the attention to the cabinet (i.e. prime minister) and policies of the government, and act to change them;

3) Withdraw his presidential candidacy for the September 2011 elections, leaving other successors of the regime to take hold; and

4) Resign immediately and allow the speaker of the parliament to be appointed as president and early elections to be held.

As Mubarak indicated in his speech, he will die on Egyptian soil, and any immediate resignation would jeopardize that pledge . This is a man who has held an autocratic grip on his country for 30 years, surrounding himself with a team of sycophantic advisors. He believes in himself as the indispensible source of stability and security for his country. When former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali snaked out of Tunisia, it was not at his own behest; the country’s military stepped in to force his hand.

Mubarak, as commander-in-chief and a decorated air force figure, will not be so easily set aside. In his view, he has to maintain the stability of the country. When options 1 and 2 did not sufficiently stem the protest movement, he very reluctantly offered not to seek another term. He has not, and will not, offer to democratize the country. If he cannot run – and his son, Gamal, is absent (he has allegedly fled the country) – then he will transfer power, in cosmetic democratic fashion, to another figure in the regime.

While Mubarak has been confident in the military’s general support – or at least neutrality – during this crisis, it is by no means guaranteed. That is why he solidified the government with the appointment of Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force commander, as prime minister, and Omar Suleiman, another military figure, as his first vice-president.

If, in the end, the military does not turn against him directly, and neither does the international community, specifically the United States, then he will simply absorb the blows. Mubarak has survived assassination attempts (including being shot) as well as insurrection by fundamentalist terrorists. He has faced angry protests before, though not at this scale, and a revolt by the country’s judiciary five years ago, without missing a beat. He has absorbed the blows and moved on.

Today, the scale of the opposition has shocked Mubarak. He had to respond with the extraordinary decision to step down. Yet, it has never been, nor will it be, in his playbook to dismantle the regime that he has spent his life building, and that he sees as the ultimate source of stability in the country, and as his raison d’être.

Now, Mubarak has mobilized mechanisms to solidify the regime, even if he steps down in September, as he has declared he will. It has also been said that regime elements are intentionally contributing to the growing sense of disorder in the country in an attempt to underscore the need for stability. Counter-protests in his favor are being held, and groups of thugs are clashing with the anti-regime demonstrators in Tahrir Square in Cairo, but also in other cities.

Make no mistake about it. Mubarak will seek to cement his legacy and a continuation of his regime, with or without him. If the army stays neutral and the international community stays silent, that is exactly what will happen, with many deaths and injuries along the way.

Mubarak and Friends in Denial about the Revolution

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Sat, 29 Jan 2011 21:45:00 +0000

At around 1 a.m. Friday night, the modern-day Pharaoh arose in Egypt from his slumber to belatedly deliver a message to his country, the wider region, and indeed the world in response to what was an unprecedented day of protests. Dressed in a sharp black suit, with his jet-black hair combed back in slick fashion, President Hosni Mubarak proclaimed: "I address you today not only as the President of the Republic but as an Egyptian citizen." As he wavered between the words of stability and democracy, at one point he claimed: "I will always be taking the side of the poor in Egypt." Then at the very tail end of his speech, he announced that he would be dissolving the government and appointing a new Prime Minister on Saturday. And then he left the stage.

Only several minutes passed before hundreds of Egyptians, late into the night, began reemerging on the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and elsewhere in the North African country. Mubarak had failed. In the eyes of most of his countrymen, he may have been an Egyptian citizen, but he was certainly not welcome anymore as the 'President of the Republic.' What became clear Friday, January 28 - and later on Saturday when the appointment of Omar Suleiman as Vice President and Ahmed Shafiq as Prime Minister barely caused a ripple - was that the Egyptian people were not calling for a change of government but wholesale regime change. It also became apparent from the drizzle of cautious statements by Western leaders and the deafening silence from Arab Kings, Sheikhs, Princes, and Rulers, that everyone is still living in Denial (and I ain't just talking about a river in Egypt).

What exactly unfolded in the last several days? What does it mean and what is yet to come? It would be difficult to answer all of these questions, especially because the situation in Egypt and across the region is rapidly changing hour-by-hour and even minute-by-minute. Let's start with the regional context. There are 22 countries in the Arab League representing over 300 million people, of which none are free and open democracies. To be fair Comoros and Mauritania have recently had somewhat electoral transitions of power, but they are on the periphery of the Arab world. Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, have had active political contestation and even elections; each of these, however, are incomplete examples, simply because of their own unique circumstances. Palestine is not yet even a country, mind being a territory split in two and under occupation. Lebanon has perhaps six dictators rather than one, given its sectarian system. Iraq is Iraq and still in a soft-state of conflict.

In 2002, the cover was finally lifted on this absence of freedom and development in the Arab world, where most people had become accustomed to dynasties, autocracies, and dictatorships, in an official UN publication, the Arab Human Development Report. In addition, the advent of regional satellite media led by Al Jazeera primarily, ushered in a new sense of openness, fostering a new wave of critical reflection. It was in the early years of the 2000s when the internet also started to have wider penetration in the Arab world. Then in Turkey, which for the last half century if not more, was an unseen player in the wider Middle East that looked West, had a seismic shift in its politics. The AK Party, which consisted of a Muslim-oriented group of politicians, won an election in 2002 and provided a new paradigm for democratic rule that also embraced the wider region's heritage and religion.

Unfortunately, 2003 saw President Bush's misguided democracy by neo-imperialism approach take root, with a famed speech at the National Endowment for Democracy as well as of course the infamous invasion of Iraq. Democracy, freedom, and elections became euphemisms for invasion, occupation, and chaos. The regimes of the region used this to chill domestic change-makers. At the same time, the American administration was still pushing for reform. That was until two elections. The first was the 2005 parliamentary elections in Egypt, which saw the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement espousing political Islam (with the slogan 'Islam is the Solution'), win 88 of 454 seats through a campaign of independent candidates (as the party was officially banned). The second was the 2006 parliamentary election in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which saw the rise of Hamas to power, defeating the incumbent Fatah movement, and entrenching a hostile entity to the West in the governance of a strategic area.

When President Obama came to power in 2009, the aspirations for democracy in the Arab world were jaded, deferred, and declining. The President also wanted to distance himself and the administration from the focus on democracy in the region, which it saw as tainted by the Iraq war. Thus President Obama, in fact, chose the Egyptian capital Cairo, under the auspices of President Hosni Mubarak, as the place to launch his new partnership with the worldwide Muslim community. There was an acquiescence to the status quo. From the outside, in a region that was a tinderbox that could export tensions globally and where insecurity could jeopardize global energy security, the stability of existing regimes had come back into favor in Western capitals. Within Arab society, there had been a resignation to the status quo since the overturning of the Hamas government in 2007 and the fear of chaos that reigned in Iraq, and it was hard to see any momentum for change. Simply look at the task that would be at hand. Entering 2011, regime structures had been in place for over fifty years in most cases, with a number of individual rulers having been in place for decades. Jordan. Libya. Saudi Arabia. Egypt. Tunisia. Morocco. Syria. Kuwait. Bahrain. Oman. Yemen. The list goes on.

Yet in 2011, the context is changed. In the Arab world, 60% of people are under the age of 25, with around 100 million just between the ages of 15-29. That means that in many societies, like in Egypt, the majority of the population had only known one ruler - and all the corruption, antipathy, and suffocation that could be associated with that. With the right amount of unemployment, which hovers officially around 15% in most Arab countries, but is more likely to be near 20-30%, not to mention underemployment, this was a fire ready to burn. However, the region needed a match. Perhaps it would have been the 2011 Egyptian presidential election. After all, Egypt is an influential player in the Arab world, partially because it is by far the largest country by population; it is also a strong cultural and political leader. Pan-Arabism, a movement that dominated the politics of the 1950s and 1960s, drew its strength from President Gamal Abdelnasser of Egypt. Pan-Islamism, which grew stronger in the late 1970s until today, grew out in many ways from the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in1928.

Egypt, the influential country of 80 million strong, saw parliamentary elections in 2010 where the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) received 81% of the total seats. A constitutional provision in the country meant that no other parties could contest the 2011 presidential election, because they did not reach the 5% threshold of votes in parliamentary elections to qualify to nominate a candidate. Thus, there was this expectation that the next pitched battle for democratic reform in the region would be September 2011 during the Egyptian presidential election; even the former IAEA President and Nobel Laureate, Mohamed el-Baradei, was returning to contest the election, providing a real alternative to the rule of President Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power since October 7, 1981.

Thus entering 2011, the youth cohort in the region was due to peak and unemployment was rising especially compounded by the global crisis. Additionally, Turkey in the wider region had emerged with a strong government - nine years on from the AK Party's rise to power - and could be seen as an example of a moderate democratic force, showing that there was a liberal political alternative to autocratic regimes that could provide stability. And then, instead of waiting until September, Tunisia, the forgotten North African country came alive, because one man, pushed to desperation, physically lit himself on fire to show that he had enough. His name was Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26 year-old street vendor, who had his produce and other items confiscated by a 45 year-old bureaucrat assisted by two thugs from the security apparatus. He petitioned the municipal administration for a reprieve, especially because he had gone $200 into debt to buy the goods he was selling. It was to no avail. In his town of Sidi Bouzid, the spark of the new revolution started.

What happened in Tunisia and how the protests accelerated over the course of several weeks is fodder for a much longer post. Tunisia, had been an autocratic secular dictatorship ruled with an iron fist. President Zine El Abedine Ben Ali had been in power since 1987 and had succeeded Habib Bourguiba who had ruled for 30 years. Ben Ali, in recent years, however, had not had the same economic success of his predecessor. It's hard to ascertain fully what happened in Tunisia, but each day after Bouazizi set himself alight on December 17 and then when he finally succumbed to his injuries on January 4, 2011, the protests and demonstrations grew stronger. While the Arab world had seen its share of coups, bloodless and most often by the military, it had yet to see popular protests amount to much. When the demonstrations showed no signs of abating, and after Bouazizi's death, President Ben Ali tried to be conciliatory telling the Tunisian people he understands them and would respond to their concerns. The protests went on and the Arab satellite channels, especially Al Jazeera broadcast them. Still the Arab world watched, not thinking it would amount to much. Ben Ali came back on television and announced he would not stand again in 2014 for re-election, a key and noticeable concession. Something had changed, the protestors felt it and they did not relent until on January 14, President Ben Ali fled the country, facilitated by Libya, with his wife Leila Trabelsi - who was the subject of much scorn because of her family involvement in using state power to facilitate their businesses - taking $50 million of gold bars with her to Saudi Arabia for exile. It was the end of a 74 year-old's rule.

That day I was at a talk at the American University of Beirut on an unrelated topic. We followed what was going on by reading twitter on our mobile phones. 700 people were in the auditorium and as it became apparent as to what had happened, the convener of the event - a discussion on the Arab-Israeli conflict - took the microphone, and belted in Arabic - "Today Tunisia, tomorrow Libya, and then Egypt, and then Saudi Arabia, and then every capital in the Arab world!" Yet, within a few days, the euphoria had died down. Tunisia was said to be different. It was not in the heart of the Arab world and had been under the radar. It was not a key interest to the West. Egypt is a very different country. It has 80 million people to Tunisia's 10 million. The population is relatively apathetic. From January 14 to January 25, there were a number of protests throughout the Arab world. In Jordan. In Yemen. In Algeria. To a lesser degree, in Oman and Libya and elsewhere. Egypt, however, was still waiting to erupt. What Tunisia did was break the zero-sum culture of impossibility. It showed that it was possible - to change the country, to protest the ruler, to force a regime change from the street.

So while, Egypt took a couple of weeks to fully react to Tunisia, activists and bloggers and others were organizing. Twitter and Facebook and the internet helped facilitate on January 25 a Day of Rage, organized by loose groups of activists. Like in Tunisia, the Egyptian demonstrations were not led by any one group, mind the traditional opposition, the so-called Islamists. On January 25, the Muslim Brotherhood stayed largely on the sidelines. Millions of Egyptians already infected by the spirit of Tunisia now had an avenue to channel this spirit. Friday prayers, as always, provided the perfect avenue for a wider uprising. Strategically diverse locations (i.e. mosques) in every city across the country would be the barracks of this non-violent civil disobedience. Hundreds of thousands of people - at least - would be automatically mobilized. It was clear by Wednesday and then Thursday, that Friday, January 28 would be an explosion. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to placate "both sides" calling for "restraint" while supporting both the government and the people. What was clear, was that Friday would be a battle, a blow would be struck and everyone would wait to see how the Egyptian government would absorb the hit.

In trying to preempt the protests, the government of Egypt had about 80 ISPs go offline at around 12:30am local time. That meant the country was relatively without internet (except for dial-up through foreign numbers). Then they asked Vodafone and other carriers to halt mobile phone access in selected areas. When people awoke on Friday morning, they could not coordinate by mobile phone, or by email, or by Twitter, or by Facebook; all they knew, was that they could go to the mosques for afternoon prayers and see - Friday prayers being the weekly prayer and the first day of the weekend in Egypt. While Tunisia opened the door and lit the flame, was on Friday in Egypt when it turned into a fire. There was no fear. But there was also no coordinated plan. Yet, people confronted the police forces, pushing them back in many cases, and eventually over-taking them. In Suez. In Mansoura. In Alexandria. Across the country and of course in the heart of Cairo. By nightfall, the headquarters of the NDP was on fire. The police and security apparatus was forced to retreat. When the military came on the streets, the soldiers were welcomed with chants of Allah Akbar, a typical slogan of exuberance.

At 1 a.m. President Mubarak finally came to the podium to address the nation. He did not resign. He did not give in to even appointing a government of national unity or holding dialogue with the opposition. He simply restated his old game-plan. The people on the streets of Cairo in fact surged in their numbers on Saturday, into the tens of thousands if not more, finally overtaking the main square - Liberation or Tahrir Square - in the heart of Cairo. All this under the watchful eyes of the military. The Egyptians respect the military and view it as distinct from the security apparatus of the regime that was used to oppress the population over the last three (or even five) decades. Moreover, in Tunisia, while it was the population that raised the stakes and challenged the government, Ben Ali stepped down when it became clear the military would not side with the President against the people, and would not fire upon demonstrators. The Egyptian population is expecting the same. Of course, it is unclear, as to now, which way the military will turn. Even the US is awaiting the events that will unfold over the next week. However, it would be loathe to be seen as supporting Mubarak over the Egyptian people, and that could be a catastrophic failure in public relations in the Arab world. Thus President Obama gave a stern warning to Mubarak last night:

"When President Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people tonight, he pledged a better democracy and greater economic opportunity. I just spoke to him after his speech. And I told him he has a responsibility to give meaning to those words, to take concrete steps and actions that deliver on that promise."

That is where Egypt finds itself now. President Mubarak is no longer trying to placate the people or even the US, but instead trying to curry favor with the military to ensure that they remain on his side. If the military shows an allegiance to the people or an emerging consolidated opposition movement, then that is the end of Mubarak. The police are now largely absent from the streets. Police stations have been torched across the country. Even traffic cops are not to be found in busy Cairo. Security is in the hands of the army, who thus far, have not clashed with protestors, and instead have focused on protecting key facilities like the State TV building, ministerial offices, and the National Museum. President Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman as Vice President, a post that had remained vacant since he came to office (in fact the last Vice President in Egypt was Hosni Mubarak). Suleiman is the Director of Intelligence in the country and a known figure to the Israelis and the Americans, as well as the enforcer-in-chief inside Egypt. Mubarak then appointed in his new government, Ahmed Shafiq as the Prime Minister. Shafiq is a former commander of the Air Force; coincidentally so was Mubarak many years ago. Thus Mubarak has been sending signals to the military and one cannot forget that he himself was a military man. He is hoping that they will not support a transitional government or a national unity-figure like El-Baredei (the Muslim Brotherhood and Ayman Nour are not real options in this role at this point).

Sunday, marks the beginning of the work-week in Egypt and the Arab world. Will the demonstrators be able to keep up the momentum, especially through to the next weekend and possibly another surge after next Friday's prayers? There is hope evident in Mubarak's tactics and Obama's stern but cautious reaction, that the regime will stabilize, the protests will dissipate, the army will consolidate security back within the regime's control, and a deliberate but slow process of reform will continue. If this was 2010, it might have worked. On Saturday, the King of Saudi Arabia called Hosni Mubarak and said the following:

"Egypt is a country of Arabism and Islam. No Arab and Muslim human being can bear that some infiltrators in the name of freedom of expression, have infiltrated into the brotherly people of Egypt to destabilize its security and stability and they have been exploited to spew out their hatred in destruction, intimidation, burning, looting and inciting a malicious sedition."

Yet, the spark of Tunisia cannot be extinguished. The fire that raged on Friday in Egypt has already spread in both symbol and substance. The bogeyman of Islamism of course will not dissipate. The Muslim Brotherhood will remain under suspicion. However, people like El Baradei show that alternatives exist beyond the proverbial monster in the closet. Thus when King Abdullah and the other Arab leaders in the region offer solidarity to Mubarak they are themselves playing with fire. Each country is susceptible to what happened and is happening in Egypt. At the same time, there is no need to romanticize this revolution. It may end up being bloody. There may end up being chaos. There may not be a clear succession or plan for the day after in Egypt or if it spreads, in Algeria, or Jordan, or Yemen, each country in which there are already thousands of demonstrators. In fact, the situation on the streets of Egypt remain dire. There are reports of random looting. Civilians have formed common neighborhood defense committees to protect against vandals and gangs. Moreover, there is the real and distinct possibility that extremists groups may step into the vacuum.

Nevertheless, in 2011, the Arab world's people have woken up. To believe that they will be lulled back to sleep is a fruitless endeavor. It does not mean that every regime will be toppled and that there will be protests in every country until that happens. It does mean, however, that the old social contract between rulers and their subjects has been torn to shreds. Economically, socially, and politically, leaders will have to provide new - substantively changed - direction. Or else. More of the same will not placate this new desire for effective and open governance.

There is a new playbook in town, and Obama, Mubarak, and the rest of the friends in the region better start reading it fast, or they'll get run off the field. That is the new reality.

It's Deja Vu All Over Again in Lebanon

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Sat, 15 Jan 2011 01:16:00 +0000

This week is a momentous time for the Middle East, especially with the recent ouster of President Ben Ali from Tunisia. I will be commenting on these different events and what they mean for the future of the Arab world and beyond. Please find below an initial commentary on the situation in Lebanon published on the Huffington Post.

It's Deja Vu in Lebanon All Over Again

As my Emirates flight from Dubai touched down Thursday evening in Beirut, I had the feeling of returning to a land where deja vu is a fact of daily life. The same names persisting for two decades or three or even more. Gemayal. Hariri. Nasrallah. Jumblatt. Aoun. Geagea. Berri. Recycled speeches and words. One about resistance another about sovereignty. Each accusing the other of cow-towing to foreign powers. As I made my way into the city centre, the taxi driver -- from Ba'albek -- managed to go on a tirade against theyuhud (Jews) and the haramiyin (bastards a.k.a. politicians), within a few minutes of us leaving the airport. Soon I was amongst friends discussing what would happen next.

This past week was quite eventful for Lebanon. Within a span of almost 24 hours, Christian opposition figure Michel Aoun announced the failure of the Saudi-Syrian initiative and the Hezbollah-led opposition group withdrew from the unity government, effectively collapsing it just as Prime Minister Saad Hariri wasmeeting President Obama at the White House. Somewhere out there, Robert Fisk is snickering to himself -Pity the Nation.

Yet, is anyone surprised? The only surprise is that the walkout of the 10 opposition ministers (and one minister allied with President Michael Suleiman) did not happen sooner; that the facade of an elusive compromise persisted for so long. Syria and Saudi Arabia had been working behind the scenes to try to bring about a deal to address the ramifications of a possible indictment of Hezbollah by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the coming days. Yet, just like the Doha Agreement of 2008, even if there was a breakthrough it would likely be a transient one. Why? As always, Lebanon finds itself in the same tug-of-war, the same sects, the same zuama' (leaders), the same 'foreign powers' or as Jumblatt calls them 'dark forces' -- the same ***t.

The more things change, the more they stay the same. If by some miracle, Saad Hariri is reappointed as the Prime Minister (he is the caretaker PM until the crisis is resolved), or if a consensus candidate emerges (such as the likes of Muhammad Safadi or others from the Sunni-strongholds of the North) it will only be to defer the next inevitable crisis by a few months, to simply be precipitated again by the STL releasing its findings, or the next parliamentary elections, or by an errant rocket towards Israel, or someone sneezing etc. Lebanon may be in crisis today, but it is in permanent paralysis. That paralysis experiences a convulsion frequently, but that only masks the underlying condition. Lebanon is still frozen. Frozen since its last census conducted in 1932. Frozen since the unwritten Shari'a that is the National Pact, agreed to in 1943 and carried out religiously ever since. Frozen despite civil conflict on repeated occasions, including a 15-year brutal war from 1975-1990.

Despite being frozen, the leaders will warmly wait for directives and indications from abroad. Walid Jumblatt is on his way to pay homage to his once foresworn enemy -- who he vowed in typical Jumblatt-will-do-the-opposite-soon fashion he would never meet (including once to me) - President Bashar al-Assad. PM Saad Hariri racked up frequent flyer miles on his return DC, stopping in Paris and Istanbul to consult with the leadership. There will be a flurry of activity by political leaders in a rush to the different embassies in Beirut.

Then, Friday night sees a speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah (likely by the time this article is posted) and there will be more to come. It is still March 8 versus March 14. Again. Again Again. Five years on and still the same fight, around nearly the same issues (or at least borne from the same tree). And it won't change. Not yet. Here's why:

-- The United States is still uncomfortable with Hezbollah in a Lebanese government;
-- The United States needs Lebanon to remain in Hariri or Hariri-allied hands prior to any confrontation, military or otherwise, with Iran
-- The United States and Israel view the STL as a way to hold Hezbollah accountable under international law and target the group
-- Iran is dedicated to seeing Hezbollah lead the government in Lebanon to angle for positioning vis-a-vis the West
-- Israel will continue to threaten Lebanon to ensure it remains unstable and because it has unfinished business with Hezbollah
-- Hezbollah does not trust Hariri and his allies in March 14 because they view them as hostile to the resistance and pseudo-collaborators with Israel in 2006
-- The Future Party and others fear that a government with Hezbollah gives the group both the state projection of power in addition to their power as a militia
-- The constant convulsions of crisis provide the political leaders with a purpose and position, rather than have to answer to the daily concerns of citizens
-- The permanent paralysis maintains the grip on power of political leaders and avoidance of political transition that would undermine the system of patronage and nepotism that is now pervasive.

Solve the above and Lebanon will calm down and fade from the newspaper headlines. Until then, pity the nation.

Revolution-tainment - the curious case of social change in the Middle East

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Fri, 14 Jan 2011 08:31:00 +0000

The Arab League consists of 22 countries around the Middle East and North Africa regions. There are 22 governments with vested control over their populations. What diversity in societies and populations within the same bloc. Morocco and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia and Algeria. Lebanon and Egypt. Jordan and Palestine. Ok, scratch the last one. But you get the point. Each country has a uniqueness in its people, heritage, economy, size and more. Even when you look at the regimes in power you find diversity. Kings. Sheikhs. Emirs. Presidents. Sultans. Or in Libya's case, Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution. Over 300 million subjects - almost all without substantive input (mostly) in their governance. So when a corner or pocket of the proverbial Arab world reverberates with revolutionary fervor, the international media tries to ignore it, the local media will pretend like it's not happening, and the regional media will overdose. Tunisia and Algeria in January have ushered us into Revolution-tainment: the Arab world edition 2011; it's likely only going to be the appetizer this year.

When you think of the Arab world you likely might not be thinking of the Afro-Arab states of Mauritania and Comoros. You may think of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. More likely you might also include of Iraq (always a fan favorite). Out of the 22 countries in the Arab League, these five have had an electoral transition of the government. First off the Palestinian Authority is not really a country. It also failed in its transition (from Fatah to Hamas in 2006) as the non-country somehow split into two, with PM Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza and a Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad in the West Bank. However, the Palestinians have an ethic of democracy, which is supported by everyone unless it doesn't suit them (the latter case being the case quite frequently). Take then Lebanon. Most recently in 2009, the March 14 movement and its allies confirmed their hold on government in parliamentary elections. Yet it's not clear how democratic Lebanon is with the same names rotating power amongst themselves, and where the real power is held by the zuama or political leaders, which are their own absolute masters of their domain. How about Iraq? Elections under military occupation cannot yet count (i.e. 2005), but seemingly with the U.S. announcing its exit, Iraq held an open vote, there was a confirmation of Prime Minister Maliki; actually there wasn't, but after a short time of 'negotiations' (short time being 9 months, I guess pregnancy being taken as the benchmark) a government was formed in late December.

Then there is Comoros and Mauritania. Combined population of 4 million. So what about Mauritania? In 2007, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdullahi won the election for the Presidency. In 2008 he was deposed in a military coup. The coup leader just won the recent elections last year. I'd have to say Comoros is really the hope. The small island nation had elections in 2006 and a new President was just elected (results verified yesterday). Lead the way Comoros!

Today, however, leading the way in the news is Tunisia. The sandwiched North African state (between Algeria and Libya, or the so-called Atlanta bloc (ATL - I made that up, but it works), was considered a very secure, autocratic secular state. In fact, the opposition was relatively non-existent in parliament and the media tightly controlled. Somehow, between mid-December and now, a trader in the market selling fruits and vegetables who was prevented by authorities from earning his livelihood, self-immolated sparking a month of demonstrations culminating in President Ben Ali's speech yesterday that he will step down - in 2014. YouTube videos (a must in any real or pseudo-revolution) have been circulating. Facebook is abuzz with black Tunisian flags (instead of the normal red) passing off as profile pics. The only thing missing is Tunisians to be given a color for their demonstrations (green is already taken by Iran, orange by Ukraine, rose by Georgia, velvet by the Czechs, cedar by the Lebanese, tulip by the Kyrgyz and so forth).

Meanwhile, neighboring Algeria, is also having some not-so-silent protests, mainly against unemployment. Is that what the Tunisian demonstrations signal? The start of a wider movement? Across North Africa? Across the Arab world? Is that even the best thing for the region? I called this article Revolution-tainment, because until now, this is what the movement has represented. The pent-up frustration in a suffocating political climate in much of the Arab world means that the movement in Tunisia and elsewhere are welcome reprieves; they provide escapes. Yet, until now, they are often movements without leaders. Causes without ideas. Diffuse not unified. In fact many Arab populations would not want to trade stability for what the revolution-tainers have to offer. Do people want to be what President Bush used to call 'free'? Sure, but freedom is a fickle thing. Are you free when you feel insecure leaving your home? Are you free when you vote, but your government is under the tutelage of a foreign power? Are you free when you can say what you want, but you don't have enough food on the table?

Yet, there is a hope that is held in large swaths of the region, for change. The revolution-tainers in Tunisia are at least doing something, bringing about something new - and people are excited, intrigued. It is not about the change of leaders - that's secondary in most places (well depending on what country). It is about a change in ideas. A change in governance. A change in the relationship between those governing and those governed. Tunisia has started 2011 with some food for thought, but the year will end with more. Perhaps in Egypt. Perhaps in Palestine. Perhaps elsewhere, but assuredly somewhere. Long live...

A Fresh Start for the UAE and Canada

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Thu, 06 Jan 2011 21:58:00 +0000

This article was originally published in The Mark, Canada's leading online political news magazine. The original link can be found here: http://www.themarknews.com/articles/3659-a-fresh-start-for-canada-and-the-uae

If Canada doesn't rebuild its once-strong relationship with the UAE, we will suffer lasting economic and political consequences.

I often note that Vancouver – where I was born and raised – and Dubai – where I live today – are on opposite ends of the globe. Flying between them is a full-day journey that can easily cost several thousand dollars. For the 25,000 Canadians living in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a direct flight to Vancouver from Dubai and additional flights to other Canadian cities would be a welcome prospect. Yet, after six years of negotiations, Transport Canada refused to alter the agreement on landing rights the two countries signed in 1999, which set in motion the chain of events we witnessed in the last few months, culminating in the closure of a key military facility and new visa requirements for Canadians.

Following the deterioration of what previously appeared to be a strong partnership between the two countries, opposition figures have called on Prime Minister Stephen Harper to reassess his approach, with Liberal MP Dan McTeague being quoted in the Globe and Mail as saying it’s “highly embarrassing.” Conversely, the newspaper from Harper’s own backyard, the Calgary Herald, led instead with the headline, “UAE acting like a spoiled child.” The PM himself seemed unperturbed by the situation in his recent year-end interview on CTV. In reality, the Canadian government’s “new” relationship with the UAE is part and parcel of an inert, insular approach towards the Middle East that ignores both regional dynamics and the fundamental nature of emerging economies. Moreover, without heavy lifting – even if from behind the scenes – the relationship will suffer further and have lasting economic and political consequences for Canada.

Historically, Canada has enjoyed a special relationship with the UAE. Iconic companies such as Fairmont and Bombardier have benefitted from the open nature of the economy. There are thousands of Canadians who have jobs in the UAE, many of them employed by government-linked entities; tens of thousands more use Dubai as a commercial hub to do business in the Middle East. In fact, the UAE is Canada’s largest market for exported goods (i.e. merchandise) in the region. This is not to mention annual investment flows from the UAE to Canada, which are thought to amount to close to $15 billion (unofficial estimates).

Beyond economics, Canada’s presence is much deeper. All things Canadian have strong connotations of quality, such as the Canadian Specialist Hospital in Dubai. The Terry Fox Run is held across several emirates of the UAE, with a legacy going back to the early 1990s. Even Nelly Furtado was in fine form singing to a throng of thousands in Abu Dhabi in November. On the geopolitical level, since the war in Afghanistan commenced in 2001, the Canadian Armed Forces were using – rent-free – a forward-logistics base called Camp Mirage just outside Dubai, and cooperating with the UAE in Afghanistan itself.

The issue of landing rights for the UAE-based carriers Emirates and Etihad was part of a long-standing negotiation; each time the UAE presented a new analysis of the economic benefits of new routes, particularly for Canadian consumers, it was summarily rejected. In retrospect, the Harper government took its relationship with the UAE for granted. In an ideal world, issues would be delinked from one other. Yet, when House Leader John Baird claims hyperbolically that tens of thousands of jobs would be in jeopardy with a few more Emirates routes, it brings to the forefront the full nature of the relationship and who exactly is benefitting.

Overall, a good bilateral relationship has a mix of elements, with both sides giving and taking; in this relationship, however, it became clear that Canada would be the only one doing the taking. Was it petty of the UAE to bar Defence Minister Peter McKay from flying through its airspace? Definitely. But that does not relieve the Harper government of responsibility for irresponsible policy-making. The world has changed. Developed economies such as Canada’s are accustomed to visa-less arrivals, cost-free military bases, and open commercial access in emerging markets. The UAE has simply put the policy of reciprocity on the table.

Unfortunately, the wounds from the last few months are still fresh on both sides. It is difficult to see any dramatic changes in the short term. However, it is vital that practical steps be taken to rebuild a strong relationship between the UAE and Canada in the long term. That means having open channels of communication and seriously considering new flight routes. For Canada, it also means developing a more coherent approach to comprehensive relationships with countries in the Middle East and other emerging areas. It is not enough to trade on the currency of the past and adhere to bygone dynamics of international relations – a lesson learned during Canada’s unsuccessful bid for a UN Security Council seat last year.

The UAE-Canada relationship is one worth saving and strengthening, but it will take a sincere and sustained effort, especially from the Conservative government.

Guest Post- Sympathy for the Devil: Salman Taseer, My Governor!

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Wed, 05 Jan 2011 13:38:00 +0000

My good friend Ali Gibran posted the following note on his Facebook regarding the recent assassination of the Governor of Punjab in Pakistan Salman Taseer, who was killed by one of his own guards apparently motivated by religious fervor as Taseer had previously called for a rethinking of Pakistan's blasphemy laws in response to the death sentence given to Pakistani Christian Aasia Bibi.

I have decided to republish the note here as I think it is more than well worth the read.
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Sympathy for the Devil: Salman Taseer, My Governor!
Ali Gibran

I write from a world, which mimics closely a general perception of Dystopia, something straight out of Golding’s Lord of the Flies. I write from a time which essentially is present but is shrouded by prehistoric mindset of a barbaric hunter gatherer society. The news before me is on the fringes of sanity because I live in times of logic and laws but not humanity. Perverse and heinous are the proceedings of the incident and it stands to ridicule the very fabric of our society.

There is nothing divine about killing someone, be it a self proclaimed Prophet, Satan’s spawn or an ordinary mortal of devious religious inclinations. Today, we have the Governor of Punjab Mr. Salman Taseer who was executed by his own guard for the sole reason that he championed the case of a Christian woman alleged to have committed blasphemy. This act earned him a place, a special place in the heart of some Pakistanis, a place where most of us would not like to be. That place is the “hit list” of fundamentalist Muslims. The pious muslim bodyguard of the Governor acted with the help of the divine and successfully executed a fellow muslim.

Mr. Taseer had been around in the political arena for over three decades but the only reason that he had a place in my universe was because of his witty outspoken outbursts of rational and liberal thought in public discourses. Liberalism is something which is an increasingly rare commodity in the present day Pakistan and he was amongst the last of the influential liberals of Pakistan. His public persona was quite interesting especially when it came to enjoying the finer things in life. He owned a newspaper and every week in the Sunday edition of the paper there would be pictures of him and his parties. He was a man of wealth and taste. But it did not come easy to him; he was put in jail many times as a political prisoner. He had the honor of being taken to the basement of the Lahore fort, famous for its tortures of political dissidents. But it was not all sour for him, the sweet in the form of wealth, influence and style were certainly a part of his personality.

Two months ago, during the case of Aasia bibi, he was perhaps the only Government Functionary who vehemently supported a complete pardon for the poor soul. Thus committing a crime for which he was executed today. Aasia Bibi was a Christian accused of blaspheming against the Prophet of Islam which entitled her to capital punishment in Pakistan under the Article 295 section C of Pakistan Penal Code. So far it was customary to only award the punishment to those who were directly alleged for blaspheming but this is the first time that it has been awarded to a person who committed blasphemy against the blasphemy act. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia_Bibi)

The debate about Blasphemy and Free Speech is almost non-existent in Pakistani context. The concept of free speech is probably considered to be something vulgar in a hypocritical state of affairs that we are in. The articles 295-B, 295-C, 298-A, 298-B and 298-C are generally referred to as Blasphemy Laws (the others being 295 and 295-A). Even a quick look at them for any student (not of Law in particular rather just any person who can reason) will introduce them to the tyranny wreaked by such insult to common sense. By the very definition of 295-C, a strong case can be built against all the non-Muslims in Pakistan who do not believe in the veracity of the divine claim of the Holy Prophet thus rendering the laws redundant and out of line with pluralism-friendly interpretations of Islam. But that would happen in a free country where free and fair judiciary is permitted to operate. Here, the very sense of rationality is probably derived from what is considered to be irrational by most scientists of our age. Mr. Salman Taseer had the courage and the audacity to call these laws BLACK LAWS which is something totally unheard of in our political and public discourse. He was brave or more appropriately insane enough to reveal it to the public and the media that these laws are man made and may not be representation of Divine Will as is generally believed. Now he lies in the grave, a true martyr for a just cause. Poor fellow if he was in a country of mildly conscientious beings, in time they would have erected statues to honor him, built schools, colleges and hospitals in his names but in Pakistan his memory will be tarnished and he will be soon forgotten just like so few (sic!) others before him.
(http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html)

At the moment, what is even more distasteful is the lack of outspoken condemnation of the incident by our political and religious figures. Yes, they are condemning the incident, but unfortunately in the same breath all of them add their views about the holiness of Blasphemy Laws and how Mr. Taseer should not have called them black. Then there is something which is absolutely sinister: the short text messages circulating on the cell phones congratulating the nation of good riddance from such Fitna.

It appears that all our leaders are scared for their life for now they are playing a character in Fight Club. Tyler Durden is telling them “We cook your meals, we haul your trash, we connect your calls, we drive your ambulances, we guard you while you sleep. Do not fuck with us” and they are frightened because here instead of Brad Pitt playing the role of Tyler, every other bearded muslim cleric is a potential candidate for role of Mr. Durden. Today our leaders have displayed fear and cowardice for they were unable to denounce the injustice and atrocity with the courage of their conviction instead they chose to beat about the bush but that will be the surviving legacy of Mr. Taseer who had the guts to condemn inhumanity and injustice like a brave man, in the time when it mattered the most.

I like to believe that the inability of our leaders is due to fear but that is an assumption. In case if this assumption is not true and our leaders truly believe that Mr. Taseer should not have expressed his views about the Black Laws, then my dear friends Pakistan is gone case already. And if on top of that this act was divinely ordained, then the fate of this universe is a gone case too … and I denounce such divinity. We are now a generation of degenerates and ideologically crippled and Mr. Taseer was lucky enough to escape just in time.

Farewell Mr. Taseer. You were a brave man!

Interview Transcript with Sheikha Mozah of Qatar

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Fri, 10 Dec 2010 22:40:00 +0000

This past week I had the chance to attend the Doha Debates and World Innovation Summit on Education, and interview Her Highness Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al Missned, the wife of the Amir of Qatar and Chairperson of Qatar Foundation. I wrote an article reflecting on the events in the Huffington Post that can be found by clicking here.

Below is the full transcript of the interview with Her Highness.

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Transcript of Interview with Her Highness Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser al Missned

Wednesday, December 5, 2010

Location: Office of Her Highness at Qatar Foundation, Doha, Qatar

Others Present: Ali Willis, Director of Media, Office of Her Highness

Trancript

(‘HHSM’ represents Sheikha Mozah; ‘TR’ represents the interviewer, Taufiq Rahim)

TR: Congratulations on winning the World Cup bid for 2022. What do you think it means for Qatar and the region?

HHSM: We saw immediately on the faces of millions and millions of Arabs and not just in the Emirates or the Gulf or our direct neighbors, but also in Egypt, Algeria, and Syria, everywhere – Lebanon. It shows that you are correct when you say that it excited the region, and it did, and I hope it will continue for several years.

TR: So do you see the World Cup victory as a victory for the Middle East…

HH: Of course

TR: For the Muslim world as well?

HHSM: Well the Middle East is part of the Muslim world. But I think it is a victory for all parts because we – what happened in Zurich, is the success of a hard-working group of young people that represents all the Middle Eastern youth. And that success is a success of all youth in the Middle East.

TR: With the World Cup victory, it has brought a lot of attention on Qatar – for example the WISE conference, which has been fascinating in bringing together not just regional but global stakeholders. What do you see as Qatar Foundation’s role as a regional and global leader on the education agenda?

HHSM: Well I saw it really a long time before, 15 years ago. What happened 15 years ago - to understand the current vision you have to understand what inspired us to have this vision. It started from three issues or three convictions that I carry myself or that I deal with myself. First of all I believe that we can reach a quality of global education without losing our identities, without losing our nationalities, because so far, 15 years ago, before we start our reforms, what happened before is that we used to import education from abroad. Importing education from abroad in a way resulted from our vision.

Education itself can transcend barriers and borders. Through education - education can also be used as a soft power as a soft force to transform societies. When I say transform societies it means we can tackle issues in political, social, cultural, economic areas. These are the most important things.

TR: It is interesting that you mention transforming societies. Yesterday [Former UN Envoy] Lakdar Brahimi was talking about education, and he was talking about the importance of values and he brought up the example of the Church in Baghdad [that was attacked recently]. Do you incorporate that kind of philosophy, of, not just the hardware of education, but also the values, tolerance, creating a more open-minded youth?

HHSM: Of course. Of course, this is it. One of the lessons that we learned on education, education is very, very, very living and organic. This living organ needs to always be flexible and needs to be filled with new ideas, with creative approaches. Once we have this in mind, we will build up the critical mind, the global mind, the tolerant mind to accept the other, to live with the others. This is why …one of the areas that we are trying to instill [this philosophy] is in the hearts and minds of every individual who lives here in Qatar.

TR: And what about beyond Qatar?

HHSM: We are – to be frank with you – I can’t say that 15 years ago when we started this I was thinking beyond Qatar. No. And I don’t think that there is a vision that can incorporate such scope. We started this, we started focusing on Qatar. What we can achieve for our people, and what we need to build up our society. And to understand that if you want to enhance and develop our sector of the economy, culture, and the politics you need to start with education. If what we are doing here in Qatar Foundation or in Qatar can be emulated or adapted elsewhere we are very welcoming here to share our experience with others.

TR: With the case of Al Jazeera and media, it was something here but it transformed the way people were doing media in the region. The World Cup itself will transform the nature of sports in the region. Do you feel that Qatar can also lead that vision in education? What is that kind of moment or breakthrough in education that could build similar excitement like a World Cup?

HHSM: You know if you go back to history, and see what’s going on, what was going on, what’s still going on in Qatar Foundation, you can see that we have already made many breakthroughs. First of all, by transforming our education system, by creating this independence or semi-independence in the education system - we shifted away, moved from ministries and ministers. The Supreme Council [on Education] is the governance body of the overall education system – a governance body that takes decisions according to consensus of all board members, including members who came from high profiles from different parts of the world. We don’t have local members only but also have international members. This type of mixture gives us a broader view and perspective of our vision when it comes to education. The education system is transformed and in that on the concept of independent autonomy and accountability. This is one breakthrough.

The other breakthrough is bringing for the first time in the whole world Ivy League schools to this part of the world. The Ivy League was brought according to very tenacious studies and analyses of what we need and what we really require as a society and country. So we selected certain faculties to build up our own societies. This idea also requires us to adapt and be oriented toward research [on changing priorities]. We now – for us as well – for us it’s a great thing – we don’t mind - as long as [the change is] something good for the project cycle there.

The third breakthrough for me, I think it’s research. Our philosophy is that research is the core business for any advancement. Research should not be imported from abroad but should be built here through building capacity in our individuals, and open our environment and our institutions. This is what happened. Today we are giving 2.8% of our GDP to research. This is something again that is a breakthrough, as nobody was even thinking of research as a tool or component for advancement in this part of the world.

For me education is the key, education is the answer. In other parts of the world maybe they think it cannot be. For me, it is education. If you look at our population, 66% is the literacy rate in the Arab world. We have 58 million illiterate among adults in our part of the world. So can you imagine what education can achieve once you put it as a main priority for us? Education is the solution.

TR: I went to Harvard – and was also a teaching fellow there - and for sure I’m a fan of the Ivy League. However, a lot of the work in terms of fostering successful students happens before they even reach the institution. These are great institutions [in Qatar Foundation] but do you feel the necessary groundwork is being done to prepare the students in primary and secondary...

HHSM: Of course because this is what our education reforms are about…

TR: Because you know the TIMMS scores [assessment tests for 4^th and 8^th grade students in math and science], they are for Qatar the lowest or second lowest in the world…

HHSM: I’ll tell you what, this is a question we were asking ourselves as a board: should we participate in those tests or not. And I was the one who held the devotion towards this. The others said there are risks because our experience is very, very immature until now as we are just two years of experience into our reforms, and that will reflect significantly on the results and people will miscalculate the results. I said it’s okay - don’t do it for us, at least we’ll have it as a benchmark from when we started. The results that you saw are the results that reflect our starting point, not our ending point. The ending point you will see it in three years time. Not even then, it is a process that will continue. But you will see the results in three years – actually it’s happening today, every year results are better. Each year is better than the year before. So what you saw is a journey to me, very cautiously, because we wanted to see the results. We want to know our path ourselves.

TR: Thank you so much for your time and best of luck.

HHSM: Thank you.

Qatar and Sheikha Mozah's Vision Extends Further Than the World Cup

noreply@blogger.com (Taufiq Rahim) — Fri, 10 Dec 2010 22:17:00 +0000

I recently had the opportunity to sit down in an exclusive interview with Sheikha Mozah, the transcript of which I have posted in another blog post. I wanted to share with you the article that I wrote in the Huffington Post on the interview, reflecting on the vision of Qatar and Sheikha Mozah and the direction of Qatar Foundation: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/taufiq-rahim/qatar-and-sheikha-mozahs-_b_794827.html?ref=fb&src=sp
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Qatar and Sheikha Mozah's Vision Extends Further Than the World Cup

DOHA -- When Qatar was awarded the World Cup for 2022 it was viewed derisively in many Western capitals. Who was this small nation? Where was this country? Why Qatar? Even US President Barack Obama claimed afterwards, "The wrong decision was made." This country of 1.6 million residents and less than a quarter-million citizens had burst onto the world stage in the most spectacular of ways. Its victory, however, was not just its own, as Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, the Amir of Qatar's wife and an influential leader in her own right, explained to me this week, in an exclusive interview:

We saw [the excitement] immediately on the faces of millions and millions of Arabs and not just in the Emirates or the Gulf or our direct neighbors, but also in Egypt, Algeria, and Syria, everywhere -- Lebanon... what happened in Zurich, is the success of a hard-working group of young people that represents all the Middle Eastern youth.

Sheikha Mozah had made a related impassioned plea in her closing speech for Qatar's World Cup bid. Perhaps many in Western capitals were hearing her speak for the first time. Usually, it is her sense of fashion that precedes her anddominates media coverage. Qatar itself is viewed as an obscurity. Yet, that limited perception, especially in North America and Europe, really is suited only for those who've arrived late to the party. Qatar has the world's third largest natural gas reserves, one of the world's largest corporations (Qatar Petroleum), one of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds (Qatar Investment Authority), and last but not least, one of the world's largest foundations (Qatar Foundation), chaired by Sheikha Mozah herself. This is not even to mention the awe-inspiring Museum of Islamic Art that was recently built, or Al Jazeera which has transformed news media in the Arab world and beyond.

At the heart of this integrated vision (QNV 2030), is the push for true social and cultural transformation, and for Qatar to be an example in this regard for the wider region. That effort is led primarily by Sheikha Mozah, one of the world's most influential women according to Forbes Magazine. In Qatar this has meant pushing for a more open society, that is thinking, that is tolerant, that is informed. Sheikha Mozah's Qatar Foundation for example, partnered with Tim Sebastian to found the Doha Debates, which tackles sensitive topics in the Middle East. This past week's fiery discussion, saw renowned Muslim philosopher from Europe, Tariq Ramadan claim to the delight of the local audience, "What we need today in Muslim countries is courage to challenge governments and policies."

The key for the Qataris, however, is education. "Education is the solution," Sheikha Mozah related in our conversation. "Education can also be used as a soft power and as a soft force to transform societies. When I say transform societies it means we can tackle issues in political, social, cultural, economic areas. These are the most important things." In this light, Qatar has played host to the World Innovation Summit on Education for the past two years, to try and push further collaboration and sharing of lessons, akin to a World Economic Forum-style event. It brings together, for example, education leaders from Ghana, Saudi Arabia and the UK, to share a stage on equal footing to learn from one another. At this year's event, Sheikha Mozah announced a new $500,000 International Prize for Education, the first of its kind in the world.

Domestically, Qatar has engaged in a series of reforms and built a number of new institutions of higher learning in a multi-billion dollar location appropriately named, 'Education City'. This was a concerted effort to bring "Ivy League" quality universities to Doha, and empower specific "faculties to build up our own societies." You can see satellite campuses of Cornell Medical, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, Georgetown and beyond seamlessly fitting into the Qatari landscape. Sheikha Mozah also emphasized that "Qatar is giving 2.8% of our GDP to research. This is something again that is a breakthrough, as nobody was even thinking of research as a tool or component for advancement in this part of the world."

Qatar's focus on education and empowerment is impressive in its own right. It's doubly important in the region where as Sheikha Mozah pointed out, "66% is the literacy rate in the Arab world. We have 58 million illiterate among adults in our part of the world." Moreover, Sheikha Mozah's own example as an impassioned social leader is inspirational to millions of women in the region and also for men. Yet, just as with the World Cup bid there are also a number of questions that need to be raised. Firstly, multi-billion dollar infrastructure cannot replace the 'software' needed for an educated, thinking society. When global assessments (TIMSS) were carried out in 2007 for 4th and 8th grade students across the maths and sciences, Qatar ranked at the bottom of the class. Sheikha Mozah insists that she "was the one who held the devotion towards this. The others said there are risks because our experience is very, very immature until now as we are just two years of experience into our reforms, and that will reflect significantly on the results and people will miscalculate the results. I said it's okay -- don't do it for us, at least we'll have it as a benchmark from when we started. The results that you saw are the results that reflect our starting point, not our ending point."

There are also similar questions around the suitability and sustainability of having branch campuses of universities, who are deeply influenced by revenue streams in moving to the Gulf and do not have the same sense of entrenched history that they do in their own countries. After all, world-class universities are as much (if not more) about the culture and identity of the institution, as the bricks and mortar. Qatar across a range of sectors has embarked on an ambitious national development programme, and it remains unclear if the tens of billions of dollars that are being spent and will continue to be spent, will generate the expected results. More importantly, as Lakdar Brahimi, the former UN Special Envoy mentioned during the WISE conference, countries such as Qatar need to do more in assisting the region around them, and improving the conditions in education for example in Afghanistan (Qatar Foundation has established Reach Out to Asia to this end).

It remains to be seen how exactly Qatar's vision will play itself out. Despite Sheikha Mozah's enthusiasm, there is of course reason to be skeptical about whether the results will follow good intentions. At the same time, there is tremendous reason to be optimistic. The institutions of the Qatar Foundation around social change are extensive and now well-rooted. Additionally, Sheikha Mozah has been providing strong leadership on changing attitudes locally, regionally, and even globally towards education. Winning the right to host the World Cup in 2022 truly inspired the Middle East, especially the youth. It was, however, only one step in Qatar's grand vision and certainly not the last.