The Hosers

Player Usage Charts [UPDATE: March 12th]

2013-03-12T09:42:00.001-04:00

Thanks to the work of Robert Vollman (of Hockey Prospectus and Hockey Abstract), we have newly updated player usage charts. The updates are likely to continue through the end of the season and as soon as I get the update from Rob, I will do my best to get it posted here as soon as possible. As a primer, here is the explanation Rob gives of the player usage charts in last year's guide:

Player Usage charts show how players are used and how they performed at even-strength by mapping the percentage of shifts they started in the offensive zone (horizontal axis) against the average quality of their competition, as measured in attempted shots (vertical axis), with sized and coloured bubbles denoting how well the team performed with them on the ice relative to everyone else.

What are Player Usage Charts?

Player Usage Charts, formerly known as OZQoC charts, were first introduced on Arctic Ice Hockey by Rob Vollman in the 2011 off-season to study how players were being used in a simple graphical representation. The idea caught on quickly among both hockey analysts and front offices, sparking a number of improvements throughout the season. These particular player usage charts are all even-strength play only.

What are Offensive Zone Starts (Horizontal Axis)?

Offensive zone starts is the percentage of all non-neutral shifts started in the offensive zone. A common misconception is that it's the percentage of all shifts started in the offensive zone, but it ignores those in the neutral zone and is therefore perhaps poorly named (like most hockey statistics). Think of it more as a representation of whether a player is used primarily for his offensive talents, or defensive.

What is Quality of Competition (Vertical Axis)?

Quality of Competition is the average plus/minus of one's opponents over 60 minutes, except that it is based on attempted-shots (Corsi) instead of goals. In this particular variation we are using Relative Corsi (explained below). Players who face top lines will have high QoC's while those with the easier task of facing mostly depth lines will have negative QoCs.

What is Relative Corsi (The Bubbles)?

Corsi, another poorly named statistic, is simply a player's plus/minus, except that it's measured in attempted shots instead of goals. In this case it's calculated over 60 minutes, and Relative Corsi is calculated relative to how the team did without him. As explained by Corsi bubble innovator Eric Tulsky, a big blue bubble represents someone whose team attempts a lot more shots than their opponents while he's on the ice, and a big red bubble is someone whose team is usually getting outshot badly. In Tom Awad’s variation the bubble is sized according to a player’s ice-time and shaded dark green or dark red based on their Relative Corsi.

Now for the updated player usage charts as of March 9th:

And a closer look at that cluster right in the middle:

More and more teams seem to be catching onto the trend of zone matching. That is, coaches are beginning to load up offensive players on offensive zone starts while leaving the defensive zone minutes to the more defense-adept players. This allows a coach to put his players in a situation to utilize their best talents. This is contrary to the line matching method that was previously utilized by coaches (and still utilized by some) where they were concerned primarily with who the opposition had on the ice rather than where on the ice the faceoff was.
Unfortunately, Lindy Ruff was not one of those coaches that utilized this zone matching method. It's a little early to tell if Ron Rolston employs a similar system. Ruff's methods are evident in this player usage chart as we see pretty much everybody clumped together in the middle of the chart. You will see teams with players stretching as low as 20% and as high as 70% whereas with Buffalo it pretty much only stretches from 40% to 60% for most players.
It's clear that the rookies have been given favorable treatment as all three are receiving a very high percentage of offensive zone starts. Grigorenko hasn't received the greatest treatment in terms of linemates or ice-time but it's good to see that the three are being put in a position to succeed in the minutes they do see.
Porter has handled some pretty difficult minutes since being called up from Rochester. Buffalo has so badly needed an effective 2-way center in their lineup all season. It's clear that Porter is being trusted with those heavy minutes, allowing Ennis and Hodgson to take the more favorable offensive zone starts. The large red bubble will indicate that he has not been very effective but if you look specifically at the last three games, Porter's game has really been coming around on a line with Brian Flynn and Marcus Foligno as that line has been simply dominant of late.
Myers is still receiving fairly favorable minutes; he's getting the 2nd highest offensive zone start percentage of defensemen, yet he is still performing quite poorly in those minutes. I'm not sure I can blame anybody for the handling of Myers. He's been as high as 23-24 minutes per game, playing in all situations, and he's been on the other end of the spectrum where he's been a healthy scratch. At this point, Myers' issues lie solely with him (and more specifically, in his head).
Mike Weber has been handling by far the most difficult minutes. He has certainly had his struggles, and we can see this by his large red bubble, but all in all he has been passable as Buffalo's heaviest lifter on the back end. By heaviest minutes, I simply mean difficulty of minutes, not quantity.
Ehrhoff's blue bubble is massive indicating he has been very effective at even strength. This is something we took a look at last week. It's evident that Ehrhoff hasn't shouldered the most difficult of minutes, but he has played a ton of minutes and he has been incredibly effective in those minutes.
It is strange seeing guys like Regehr, Sekera, Kaleta, and Gerbe who handled such heavy defensive minutes last season really aren't being used in the same role this season. None of these guys are handling particularly difficult competition (in Kaleta's case, quite weak competition) nor are their zone starts skewed heavily to the defensive zone as we saw last season. I thought all four of them were pretty strong in that role last season so I'm surprised things weren't kept the same this season.
Steve Ott is a strange case, he has faced relatively difficult minutes (lowest offensive zone start rate of any forward) and he has certainly passed the eye test, but the team has been absolutely murdered in terms of shot differential with him on the ice. Ott has the lowest CorsiRel on the team and Buffalo has been outshot 31.6 to 19.3 per 60 minutes of even strength ice time with him on the ice.

Once again, huge thanks to Rob for putting these together. I highly recommend following Rob on Twitter at @RobVollmanNHL and you can check out his website here.

You can also follow me on Twitter at @TheHosers_DSJ.

Christian Ehrhoff is Really Good at Hockey

2013-03-08T12:16:00.003-05:00

Christian Ehrhoff has been one of very few constants in the Sabres lineup this season, one of three (by my count - Ehrhoff, Miller, and Vanek) players the team has been able to count on on a consistent basis. However, unlike Vanek's play (and Miller's most of the time) it seems like Ehrhoff's play has gone largely unnoticed. However, it really isn't entirely uncommon for a defenseman playing well, but not piling up points, to go unnoticed. Just how good has Christian Ehrhoff been for the Sabres?

Many people will consider last season a disappointment considering he only posted 32 points in 66 games after totaling 50 in 82 games in the previous season with the Canucks. However, Ehrhoff's even strength production last year was actually higher than in his 50-point season in Vancouver. The difference lies in the fact that in Vancouver he was averaging 3:33 of power play time per game on a power play with the Sedins, Kesler, Edler, etc. compared to 2:58 on the power play last season in Buffalo, often times not even on the top power play unit. I'm pretty sure I could rack up 10-15 points on the power play by putting my stick on the ice with the Sedins out there together. His even strength production in his two seasons with Buffalo has actually been the best of his career. This also doesn't take into consideration the 60.1% offensive zones start rate he saw in his 50-point season in Vancouver compared to the 52.8% he saw last year (53.1% this season). Here are his numbers broken down for each of the last six years.

You can see that Buffalo is heavily outshooting the opposition with Ehrhoff on the ice at even strength. This is evident in both the shots for/shots against differential as well as Ehrhoff's Relative Corsi rating of 30.6, which is tops in the league among all players who have played more than 10 games this season. Ehrhoff generates 5.22 shots per 60 minutes of even strength play; also the best among Sabres defenseman. To be sure, he's never exactly shouldered what would be considered "difficult" minutes if you're considering CorsiRelQOC and offensive zone start rate. However, looking here you will find that he frequently matches up against the other team's top line. Unfortunately, that does not always translate in CorsiRelQOC.

Before moving on, two quick definitions:

Corsi event - Most of you probably know by now, but a Corsi event is any shot fired on net. That encompasses shots the goalie stops, goals, shots that hit the post, miss the net, or get blocked.

Corsi % = Corsi events in Buffalo's favor divided by Total Corsi events

*For instance, in a particular game if Buffalo attempts 12 shots on the opponents net with Christian Ehrhoff on the ice and the opponent attempts 10 shots on Buffalo's net with him on the ice, that results in a Corsi % of 12/(12+10) = 12/22 = 54.5%.

I guess this is where we get to the WOW moment.

I had to double-check this statistic because the disparity is so ridiculous (and frightening, really). In games that Ryan Miller has started this season, the Sabres have a Corsi % of 53.4% with Christian Ehrhoff on the ice (based on nearly 400 minutes worth of data). Without Ehrhoff on the ice, they have a Corsi % of 40.7% (based on over 600 minutes worth of data). That is to say that for every 6 shots the opponents attempt with Ehrhoff on the bench, Buffalo only attempts 4. In games that Jhonas Enroth has started, Buffalo has a Corsi % of 58.9% with Ehrhoff on the ice and 44.4% with him on the bench. To take it one step further, Christian Ehrhoff's most frequent partner this season, Alexander Sulzer, has a Corsi % of 56.7% when he's on the ice with Ehrhoff and just 34.7% when he's on the ice without Ehrhoff. That is both amazing and terrifying at the same time.

Just to really drive the point home, Ehrhoff has spent more than 100 minutes on the ice with 14 different players; all but two of those players have a Corsi % of 50+% when on the ice with Ehrhoff. Not a single one of those players has a Corsi % of 50+% without him. In fact, only one player even has a 45+% Corsi % without Ehrhoff, the rest have a sub-45% Corsi % without Ehrhoff. Here are the numbers broken down individually for every player who has spent more than 100 minutes on the ice with Ehrhoff:

And in my own chart form:

This chart isn't the best so I strongly urge you to go here and look at this chart, it is absurd how much better the team is with him on the ice. I have yet to find another player's chart that rivals his. It terrifies me to think where this team would be right now without Christian Ehrhoff.

This all really begs the obvious question, can Christian Ehrhoff play 60 minutes each night?

$10 million is a really big number; $8 million is also a really big number. That's not an easy number to get past when considering that amount of money is being paid to a guy to play a game. In Christian Ehrhoff's case, his actual paid salary seems to draw a lot of completely unrealistic expectations. Should Christian Ehrhoff's value be judged relative to the $8 million he is being paid this season or the $4 million that he counts against the cap? A follow up question, six years from now will Christian Ehrhoff's value be judged relative to the $1 million he is making per season or the $4 million that he counts against the cap?

Christian Ehrhoff's value to this team is as a $4 million player, that is how much he counts against the team, that is the number that affects the team's ability to build the rest of the roster. That $4 million is exactly $1 million more than the guy that is essentially their 7th defenseman right now, it is less than Robyn Regehr's cap hit, and it is considerably less than Tyler Myers' cap hit. How the deal is structured or how much the player gets paid in any given year is really only a concern of Mr. Pegula's and does not affect the team on the ice. As a $4 million player, Christian Ehrhoff is one of the better values in the entire league.

Follow Derek on Twitter - @TheHosersDSJ

Analyzing the Rookie Class

2013-03-06T14:11:00.000-05:00

Personally, one of the most frustrating parts of this season has been the handling of Mikhail Grigorenko. I will not try to pass my opinion off as fact because I certainly have no expertise in the area. With that said, I am firmly entrenched in the camp that says you remain patient with your prospects, waiting to promote them to the NHL until you think they're ready but once you do promote them, you immediately put them in a position to succeed. Many teams follow this mold (the Red Wings, for example), and it seems to work very well. Don't take that to read that Grigorenko should be getting 16-20 minutes per game with top power play time, but is he really expected to succeed while playing 8-10 minutes per game with almost no power play time and 3rd or 4th line caliber linemates?

You have to strike a balance, there has to be accountability for poor play but at the same time, if there is enough poor play to force the ice-time down to where an 18 year old kid is consistently getting the least amount of minutes on the team, why is he here? If that's the case, he simply is not ready and he should remain in juniors. I understand the argument that having NHL coaches give you 1-on-1 attention is the benefit, and I won't disagree. However, you can't convince me that sitting on the bench for 52 minutes per game or even in the press box is better for him than playing 20 minutes per game in all situations against easier competition. Is the trade-off of giving up quality NHL coaches for quality playing time worth it? Well I guess that's the debate here. File me under the side that says if he's only going to be playing 8-10 minutes per game, the increase of the quality of coaching alone probably is not worth the trade-off in quantity and quality (ie - playing in all situations) of ice-time.

Rant aside, to evaluate how Grigorenko has played I wanted to take a look at some of the more non-traditional statistics to see how he stacks up against the other rookies. Many of the rookies are playing significantly more than Grigorenko, using rate statistics allows us to look at the production in the time they are given rather than the raw counts we normally see. I only took a look at the forwards of this rookie class since it's hard to compare production of forwards to defensemen. First, a look at those counts along with ice-time and on-ice shooting percentage as well as offensive zone start percentage.

The offensive zone start rate is really to provide context here. For instance, you can't look at Alex Killorn's production with his 37.9% offensive zone start rate on the same plane as Mike Zibanejad with his 68.7% offensive zone start rate. The on-ice shooting percentage is to show if there's been any luck involved in the player's production. We're far enough into the season at this point that the kinks and oddities in some of these statistics are starting to iron out. When you see a 16.07% on-ice shooting percentage for Antoine Roussel, that should raise a red flag as that is a highly unsustainable number. On the other side, Charlie Coyle's 3.33% on-ice shooting percentage is not likely to continue either. Generally, the on-ice shooting percentage number will average out in the 7.5-8.5% range. There's a lot of data here but most of it is readily available to any fan conducting a casual search.

Next is all the rate statistics, these are all based on the players production per 60 minutes of even strength ice-time. I included a column for goals plus primary assists per 60 minutes to to give some extra weight to primary assists over secondary if you so choose. I left the on-ice shooting percentage and offensive zone start percentage in for context.

[NOTE: Fen/60 is individual Fenwick events created per 60 minutes. Fenwick is any attempted shot that ends up in the net, a save, or missing the net.]

Given the large quantity of data, I coded each of the values with dark green indicating a very good value and dark red indicating a very poor value. It makes it easier to really see who is performing well and who isn't.

Some of the more underrated Calder candidates we could pull from this data that aren't getting much attention are Tomas Tatar, Brandon Saad, Drew Shore, and Alex Killorn. I'm also tempted to lump Brandan Gallagher in there because his numbers are so impressive, yet he doesn't seem to get mentioned very often in that upper echelon of rookies.
Antoine Roussel's numbers do look very impressive, but it's hard to ignore his massive on-ice shooting percentage. However, he is still generating shots at a very impressive clip so even with some regression in that shooting percentage, his production could still remain respectable.
It's hard to ignore how massively the Minnesota Wild are getting outshot with Mikael Granlund on the ice (34.4 shots against, 18.8 shots for). He has also struggled to generate shots on his own.
The numbers suggest that Nail Yakupov's production may not be quite as impressive as it appears on the surface. None of his rate statistics really stand out, or at least not to the point at which you would expect from the 5th ranked rookie scorer. In fact, he's actually generated the second fewest amount of shots per 60 minutes among the top 25 rookie scorers (the worst in Jordan Schroeder).
Tomas Tatar and Drew Shore both test out very well across the board, but neithers production really jumps off the page, both just a hair under 0.5 PPG pace. Both produce shots at a good rate and both have extremely impressive shot differentials while they're on the ice.
An additional under the radar guy for me is Jakob Silfverberg. Not so much because the production per 60 minutes is there but the ice-time is lacking, like we saw with some other rookies, but because the shot generation is there but his extremely low on-ice shooting percentage is likely holding back his production. Look for him to be a guy to start stacking some points up once that on-ice shooting percentage begins to correct itself.
It's easy to see that even when you take ice-time out of the equation, Mikhail Grigorenko just doesn't stack up well against the other rookies. His point production is poor, he generates the 6th fewest amount of shots per 60 minutes, and the 8th fewest Fenwick events per 60 minutes (shot attempts). Buffalo also gets manhandled in terms of shot attempts with him on the ice, though that isn't exactly something distinctive to just him on the roster.

This is difficult because I almost see the entire top four being interchangeable but here's my top five Calder candidates:

1) Jonathan Huberdeau

2) Cory Conacher

3) Vladimir Tarasenko

4) Brendan Gallagher

5) Drew Shore

I was also interested in seeing the breakdown for just the players that were drafted last year to see how Grigorenko stacked up. The standard statistics:

You can see that Grigorenko lags slightly behind in all of the standard statistics. You can also see he is averaging quite a bit less ice-time, both overall and on the power-play. Each of the three receive fairly favorable zone starts. Now for the statistics per 60 minutes of even strength play:

There doesn't appear to be a whole lot to differentiate Yakupov from Grigorenko. Galchenyuk has an inflated on-ice shooting percentage but despite that, I see a definite gap between Galchenyuk and the other two.

It's clear to see that even despite the limited ice-time he sees, Grigorenko is not performing like some of the better rookies in this class. There really isn't much shame in that though, considering the fact that his numbers look pretty comparable to the 1st overall pick from his draft. It's not often that 18 year-olds excel in the NHL, often the Calder race is dominated by players who spent a year or two after their draft in juniors, this year is no different.

Follow Derek on Twitter - @TheHosersDSJ

Thinking Rationally

2013-03-04T19:43:00.001-05:00

If you're a Sabres fan, watch the above video. View it closely. If you come to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong with Patrick Kaleta's hit, and that Brad Richards was faking, keep reading. If you think this was a disgusting, dirty play with no place in the game, and a five-game suspension (or more) was rightly deserved, you may direct your browser elsewhere, or continue reading for your own enjoyment.

I have written extensively about supplementary discipline and how it may be reformed. Although there are minor changes in the 2013 CBA (which I will write about once I get a full version of the contract), the system remains flawed in allowing a single person to make these decisions under political pressure from the NHL, its appeal process, and many others too numerous to list here. While part of the problem is systemic (the part I have spent most of my time addressing), the other problem lies in fan perception of supplementary discipline, often blinded by a connection to, or even affection for, a single team.

The result is blind defense. Although practically everyone in the Sabres blogosphere agreed that Kaleta's actions were selfish in the short-term and incredibly stupid and dangerous overall, the defenders came out of the woodwork, insisting that Brad Richards was faking an injury to draw a major, or that Kaleta was somehow blameless or only partially to blame for the hit.

Others defend hits like these on the basis that hockey is supposedly a tough guy's sport, and one assumes the risk of such plays when they turn towards the boards. Blaming the victim aside, it shows an utter disregard for not only the rulebook, but more importantly the well-being of the humans that play this game. When games end, these guys walk out of the office just like you or I, with bones, blood, and brains to boot.

It's time for us to abandon any ties we have to teams when hits like this occur. In fact, we should scrutinize members of teams that we root for more seriously, if not for the fact that the team is often punished for such stupidity. Instead, take a step back. Relax. Put a white sweater on both players. Look at the rulebook. Ask yourself if this play is dangerous.

We should also avoid being hyper-reactive on the other end, i.e., when a player on our favored team takes a dirty hit. Go through the same process above.

Consistency is lacking, and still a major issue in the realm of supplementary discipline. It provides much of the fuel for the fire that rages around every suspension and non-suspension. But the fact still remains: if we want to make suspensions a rarity, it's time to start slapping players, especially recidivists like Kaleta, with huge suspensions. Oddly enough, it worked with the league's former worst offender (Matt Cooke). Suspensions should either change behavior or weed problem children out of the game.

Kaleta didn't deserve five games. He deserved ten. It's time for the rest of us to come to our senses and agree.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

In re the Girardi hit - It's a much closer call than the one on Kaleta. Ennis turned ever so slightly at the last moment, but if it's this close, it still deserves an explanation; both suspensions and non-suspensions (should the play be close) should have explanations issued by the league.

No Favors

2013-02-28T18:50:00.000-05:00

We've all heard it said and re-said a thousand times that Buffalo's troubles this season are endless: lack of a number one, two-way center, beating the opposition's forecheck on the breakout, entering the zone cleanly in both 5-on-5 and power play situations, and most of all, coverage in their own end, among other things. But, as I've said before, there is one aspect of the Sabres' gameplay that has not been inadequate: goaltending from the starter. But that won't get it done.

Perhaps one of the biggest problems isn't staring Buffalo directly in the face just yet: the issue of re-signing Ryan Miller. While the issue may seem like it should be addressed further down the road, the fact that the Sabres are sitting in the proverbial basement of the Eastern Conference isn't helping Miller's confidence in sticking with his team for additional time beyond his existing contract.

Admittedly, he isn't the most popular guy in Buffalo, and I'm not just talking about the media. Miller is a common scapegoat amongst, with phrases such as "Mr. Softee" and "the Ryan Miller shutout" being favorite local utterances. The misperception stems from two sources: team failings and the relative success of Sabre goaltenders in recent memory.

Blaming the goaltender for every goal is notoriously convenient; he's the last guy in front of the goal and the only guy whose only job is to keep the puck from entering the net. Naturally, it's always his fault, it appears. Most of us grew up with Dominik Hasek, who became the full-time starter in 1994-95. His success doesn't need to be rehashed. We then got Biron, who was mediocre at worst, and then on to Miller, who has developed into more than a 138th overall pick is expected to develop.

Clearly, Miller isn't going to go on and win six Vezinas in eight years. But what he's capable of is exactly what you're seeing this season (despite the "bad" raw statistics): He's putting his team in a position to win on a much more consistent basis than the vast majority of goaltenders in the league. No one can seriously argue that Miller has been a sore on the team's side; indeed, Miller, Vanek, and Ehrhoff have all been the brightest spots on the roster.

Even the most cursory examination of Miller's play shows that he came to play during this shortened season. At this point, starting the negotiation process should be a priority for the Sabres, but there's a huge monkey wrench in the deal: team performance. Just like it led to criticism on the ice, it's stifling a conversation that should be taking place at this point. With three of Buffalo's biggest names reaching unrestricted free agency (Miller, Vanek, and Pominville), it should be time to divide and conquer.

Everyone knows that he's frustrated, as any post-game interview proves. Fueling his sentiments is the fact that he knows he's playing at a very high level, with no translation in the standings. The team's lack of success has given him plenty of reasons to defer the conversation until next season, or maybe even next offseason should he elect to test the free agent market.

When the rest of the team is in sync, Ryan Miller is capable of playing at a level that can bring a Stanley Cup to Buffalo. Re-signing him is, and should be, a priority within the next year. Should Miller go to free agency with the same doubts about his team's abilities that he currently harbors. The only other question left is, will Vanek and Pominville feel the same way?

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

A Tale of Two Teams

2013-02-15T22:37:00.002-05:00

I wouldn't go so far as to say that Buffalo has Boston's number this season, but the Sabres played a more complete game than expected and dished the Bruins just their second regulation loss this season, which was also their second against Buffalo, who adds another two points to their name after an exciting one at First Niagara. The game was marked by a blistering pace from both teams, and it appears that Tyler Myers wanted to get a little work done in the process; he tallied a goal and notched two assists.

In all, this looked more like a run-of-the mill hockey game rather than an intense matchup between division rivals. There was only one heated exchange during the game, but the only penalties came in the form of five minors. Milan Lucic and Zdeno Chara looked largely pedestrian, and the more offensively potent Boston forwards were almost nonfactors despite putting bigtime shots on net. Their best player was Rich Peverley, who put up Boston's second goal and tallied five shots, as well as another that missed.

And now, some bulleted thoughts:

The third period made all the difference for the Sabres, who held Boston to just three shots on goal. Ryan Miller obviously has an easy job when shots are so limited, and keeping Boston at bay means more puck possession, and more puck possession means more chances, which hopefully means more goals. Everything seemed to click as soon as the puck dropped in the third. Defensemen looked to act instinctively, forwards were creative and finding space, and everyone here suddenly remembered what hockey looked like.
Drew Stafford was perhaps a dark horse to put up a goal tonight given his luck (zero goals on forty shots on goal so far this season). The forty-first found the net, however. Whether this is the start of something good remains to be seen, but Lindy Ruff said in his post-game presser that the Stafford-Ennis-Foligno line was the best line tonight, both offensively and defensively.
Tyler Myers had perhaps his best game since Buffalo started their tailspin; his display of offensive prowess in the third was impressive, especially just prior to the Hodgson goal, on which he had an assist.
Ryan Miller was the best player on the ice in the first two periods, allowing two goals on twenty-nine shots, including a power play goal as a result of major disorientation of Buffalo skaters. Miller is slowly putting to rest any notion that he is having "another" off year. Miller has been absolutely electric over the past four games, stopping 136 of 144 shots. Miller came into the night facing more shots than any other goaltender in the league. A shortened season may work in his favor given Jhonas Enroth's unreliability, but the fact that there's a condensed schedule cuts the other way.
According to a stat sheet handed to me post-game, Steve Ott put up eleven hits, which is the most since the Goose did it in the Winter Classic at the Ralph.
Another crazy stat off of the provided game notes: Buffalo hasn't won a game without getting a point from Vanek or Pominville since March 23 of last year.
Mikhail Grigorenko played only nine shifts and saw 8:08 of ice time, including a minute on the power play. This ought to prompt complaints, but the result was from Lindy not playing him in the third, when the game was on the line and what Ruff was doing was working.
Andrej Sekera is out with a contusion, which is a relief given that it looked pretty serious. The good news is that playing won't make it worse, but playing will make it hurt like the dickens.
~~Buffalo is still slacking in the face off department, but we won't go there I guess.~~
Christian Ehrhoff has instincts. Major instincts. As much as people are ragging on Regier for the Leino contract, the Ehrhoff one is a major, major success. At a $4 million cap hit, there can be zero complaints.
I'm beginning to wonder if John Scott is worth the four minutes of ice time he sees. The cost-benefit analysis is clearly thus: The cost of the deterrent factor he brings versus the increased skill of Cody McCormick or maybe even the addition of a seventh defenseman. Greater flexibility at the blue line is always a plus, and with Ott and Kaleta, the deterrents are there. It's a question worth entertaining.

The Hosers Live at FNC: 2.15.13

2013-02-15T17:25:00.002-05:00

So Valentine's Day's done with, and I'm back high atop FNC to bring you a bit-by-bit live commentary of the happenings on the ice. Tonight's not gonna be an easy one; the Sabres face a formidable Boston squad whose only regulation loss came at the hands of Buffalo in a wild, wild game.

5:25 - Finally settled in, and I'm in a different spot from last year. Apparently those with locker room access are put on the other side of the press box. No idea why, but I'm not in charge, and I see no cognizable difference other than the fact it's further from the snack bar. Just happy to be here.

5:31 - Boston does their work 5-on-5; only four of Boston's 30 goals have come on the man-advantage. I guess if you're all gritty and tough and stuff, you don't need power plays. (Typing with a broken finger, not so cool).

5:43 - I wish there was just one particular weakness I could focus on with Buffalo, but with so many problems extending basically from the defense forward (Miller has been fine, I'm willing to say that), gameplay in general is the focus. If there was one thing I'd select, it would be breaking out/getting out of their own end, which is largely a problem that can be pinned on the forwards.

I'd like to add that I miss timeonice.com's shift charts.

5:50 - I think I like this end of the press box better. I have a couple big Boston media names right next to me, which is pretty cool, and I'm closer to the end Buffalo will be defending in the first and third so it'll be easier to watch them.

6:02 - People are beginning to file in, including one individual in shorts. What he's thinking, I don't know. It's Buffalo in February. I'm starting to peruse line matching on leftwinglock.com, since timeonice.com is defunct. While there's no interactive feature on leftwinglock.com, there are matchup percentages, which provides similar information.

6:10 - In Buffalo's last game against Boston, Ehrhoff/Sulzer spent about 63% of their ice time facing Boston's top two lines. With Sulzer out as a healthy scratch, it looks like someone else has to pick up the slack. Foligno spent about 45% of the time matched up with the Lucic-Seguin-Krejci line, a testament to Lindy's sentiments about his defensive capabilities. And now, for a fun one, John Scott spent 78% of his time matched up with Thornton, and the remaining 22% with Horton-Bergeron-Marchand.

6:23 - Tonight's jersey jerk is someone in a Marlies jersey. Miller makes an appearance on the bench for his pregame routine. He's been tapped as the starter after Buffalo's couple days off. Plenty of folks here early, likely won't be full until after the game gets going.

6:30 - Passing by the scoreboard control room, it looks like it takes a team of 40 to run. Judging by the jumbotron here early, Kiss Cam is going to be a long experience.

6:31 - The Sabres have drawn the backup Khudobin. Buffalo earned two points against Peter Budaj, who started as Montréal's backup, but failed to earn any against Khudobin the last time around. Win some, lose some.

6:57 - Weber is a late scratch; Sulzer replaces him. Given his success with Ehrhoff and the minutes they played the last time these two teams met, this isn't a huge surprise. Buffalo is teeming with defensemen... trade time?

7:01 - Five minutes to puck drop, and the place is about 60% full, and climbing. Kevin Paul Dupont is dancing to the Sabre Dance, and that makes me feel alright. The aura isn't too optimistic in here, but we never really know what we're gonna get.

7:08 - Puck drop. Buffalo with trouble getting out of their own end early. Miller turning away shots. First possession in the Boston end - to no surprise- is by the HPV line. Pominville shoots into Khudobin's chest ang gets an o-zone face off.

7:12 - Buffalo with a couple early chances, nothing forthcoming. The Sabres are going to have to be quick through the neutral zone or catch Boston on a change; the Bruins are plugging up their on blue line.

7:13 - Drew Stafford, on his 41st shot of the season, puts one past Khudobin. Release the monkey.

7:15 - At 5:42, Adam McQuaid goes for high sticking Patrick Kaleta. Buffalo's 6th-best home PP goes to work.

7:18 - Sloppy power play zone entries plague Buffalo once again. Two virtually immediate clears and an offside. Back to full strength.

7:23 - Stafford-Ennis-Foligno is looking good tonight. If Buffalo can get these top two lines going at the same time, things are going to get much easier for the Sabres.

7:26 - Miller appears to be locked in again; he makes a sprawling leg save after Rich Peverley cut his way through to the Buffalo net. The Sabres are still straining to get out of their own end, but it's better than it has been.

7:31 - Buffalo's best offensive five put decent pressure on Khudobin to no avail. The Bruins return the favor with two struck posts.

7:34 - Stafford goes for tripping Marchand, who was poke checked by Miller just as Stafford was taking his skates out from under him. We've got two pretty bad special teams squads out here in this situation, so let's see what happens.

7:39 - Dougie Hamilton nets the tying goal after a mad scramble in front of the Buffalo net. Tough beans. Tied at one.

7:41 - End of the first, teams tied, shots are about even, 10-12, in favor of Boston. The Sabres still are having trouble in their own end, trouble that led to the penalty, which led to the goal. Going to need a plan with either less thinking or a different plan for exiting the puck. Miller has been as good as expected, and is squaring up well.

7:58 - Teams take the ice for the second. Checking on other games on Gamecenter, nothing too exciting. 13-3 edge for Buffalo in hits; I can see Buffalo leading, but by that margin? Enter the old debate about standardizing the hit statistic.

8:03 - Puck takes a hard bounce off of the end boards after a shot from Chara, and Boston nets the rebound. 2-1 Bruins.

8:12 - This has been a fairly normal hockey game, save for some decent goaltending from Miller. No fireworks yet between the division rivals. Buffalo looks better in their own end during the second.

8:19 - Pace is beginning to pick up as passes get longer and shots more frequent. Jochen Hecht almost converts a wrap-around but is stopped by Khudobin. Buffalo looks like they're in standing in cement as the B's dial it up.

8:25 - Takes the referee a little while to notice, but Boston is caught with too many men. Great chance for Buffalo to tie it up.

8:28 - Ott is caught picking Bruins players in the neutral zone, and gets tagged for interference. 4-on-4 for 1:37.

8:32 - Miller continues to stand tall. This game is going to end up riding on goal scoring for Buffalo.

8:35 - The Sabres leave the ice to boos galore. Peverley netted the only goal of the second period, but that's the difference maker. You can blame a bad bounce, but the shot was directed there on purpose, and Buffalo has to know their own rink and be able to defend it. There's work to be done in the third.

8:53 - Puck drop in the third. Khudobin looking like a Hall of Fame contender against this squad. Shots would be nice.

8:57 - Gerbe and Hecht on the rush, 2-on-1, Hecht gets a juicy rebound out of Khudobin, and a trailing Myers nets the rebound. Tied at two.

8:58 - McQuaid goes for holding Marcus Foligno. This power play could not come at a more opportune time.

9:05 - Dave Brisebois isn't too popular tonight. Booed heavily on a very close offsides call. The McQuaid penalty was shown again, and it looks like he could have been nabbed for high sticking as well. Thirteen and a half to play, Buffalo is hanging around with the aid of Ryan Miller.

9:10 - Drew Stafford gets the puck to the net, and it squirts out to the slot, where Ehrhoff slings a wrister past Khudobin. 3-2 Sabres.

9:11 - Sekera is down hard in a Buffalo corner. Not good, leaves the ice with no weight on his right leg. He's likely out for a while.

9:19 - Tyler Myers uses his length to take a winding path deep into the Boston zone, and throws the puck at the net. Hodgson finishes. 4-2 Buffalo.

9:21 - The next few minutes are going to be critical for the Bruins... crunch time for the Buffalo defense.

9:23 - Commercial break at 15:15 of the third. Boston has registered only three shots on goal this period, and boy does that make a difference. There hasn't been much urgency from the visiting team after allowing the fourth goal, but there's still some time to come off of the clock yet.

9:27 - Still no changes for Boston in their gameplay late in the third... The Sabres earn an icing with less than two minutes left.

9:30 - 22.7 left, and the Buffalo Sabres bring their troll game with Neil Diamond's "Sweet Caroline."

9:32 - Buffalo gives Boston their second regulation loss of the season, and their second at the hands of the Sabres. Ryan Miller was absolutely solid in net, and the third period defense was outstanding. Buffalo salutes the crowd after the win, and heads to the locker room. More to come.

Early Season Player Usage Charts

2013-02-05T14:39:00.000-05:00

Back in June, Robert Vollman (of Hockey Prospectus and Hockey Abstract) produced end of the season player usage charts for all 30 teams with thoughts from various bloggers, media members, etc. (Matthew Coller, Aaron Nichols of Die by the Blade, and myself were the contributors for the Sabres). If you haven't seen it, it is well worth the time to look through. In that guide, Vollman first gives a brief summary of what you will see and then describes the benefits of the player usage chart as well as the components of the chart:

Player Usage charts show how players are used and how they performed at even-strength by mapping the percentage of shifts they started in the offensive zone (horizontal axis) against the average quality of their competition, as measured in attempted shots (vertical axis), with sized and coloured bubbles denoting how well the team performed with them on the ice relative to everyone else.

What are Player Usage Charts?

Player Usage Charts, formerly known as OZQoC charts, were first introduced on Arctic Ice Hockey by Rob Vollman in the 2011 off-season to study how players were being used in a simple graphical representation. The idea caught on quickly among both hockey analysts and front offices, sparking a number of improvements throughout the season. These particular player usage charts are all even-strength play only.

What are Offensive Zone Starts (Horizontal Axis)?

Offensive zone starts is the percentage of all non-neutral shifts started in the offensive zone. A common misconception is that it's the percentage of all shifts started in the offensive zone, but it ignores those in the neutral zone and is therefore perhaps poorly named (like most hockey statistics). Think of it more as a representation of whether a player is used primarily for his offensive talents, or defensive.

What is Quality of Competition (Vertical Axis)?

Quality of Competition is the average plus/minus of one's opponents over 60 minutes, except that it is based on attempted-shots (Corsi) instead of goals. In this particular variation we are using Relative Corsi (explained below). Players who face top lines will have high QoC's while those with the easier task of facing mostly depth lines will have negative QoCs.

What is Relative Corsi (The Bubbles)?

Corsi, another poorly named statistic, is simply a player's plus/minus, except that it's measured in attempted shots instead of goals. In this case it's calculated over 60 minutes, and Relative Corsi is calculated relative to how the team did without him. As explained by Corsi bubble innovator Eric Tulsky, a big blue bubble represents someone whose team attempts a lot more shots than their opponents while he's on the ice, and a big white bubble is someone whose team is usually getting outshot badly. In Tom Awad’s variation the bubble is sized according to a player’s ice-time and shaded dark green or dark red based on their Relative Corsi.

Well, Rob is on top of his game even in a shortened season and sent out updated player usage charts for each team. It's worth keeping in mind that small sample size effects are in play here. With only nine games under their belt, there is a lot of statistical noise involved in this data. The easiest way to look at this chart is that the upper-left corner features the most difficult minutes while the lower right hand corner features the easiest minutes. In addition to the player usage portion, blue bubbles indicate players with positive Corsi ratings while red indicates players with negative Corsi ratings. In other words, a large red bubble means the team gets significantly outshot with that player on the ice while a large blue bubble indicates that Buffalo significantly outshoots the opposition with that player on the ice.

The first thing that jumps out is how Grigorenko appears on an island in terms of usage. For as much heat as Lindy Ruff can take for his handling of young players, in terms of difficulty of minutes, he's handling Grigorenko exactly as he should be. He's being fed offensive zone starts more than any other player on the team, putting him in situations where he's set up in the offensive zone to go to work.

Both Ehrhoff and Sulzer have been rocks on the defensive end. Two of very few reliable players on defense as this point in the season. Neither of them are receiving particularly difficult minutes, but both are posting tremendous Corsi numbers. This should not come as a surprise in regards to Ehrhoff; of the 13 players who have played more than 10 minutes with Ehrhoff this season, only Steve Ott has posted a Corsi% of less than 51% when on the ice with Ehrhoff (only three fall below even 57%). When on the ice without Ehrhoff, all 13 of those players are posting Corsi% of 50% or less. That includes guys like Hodgson, Vanek, and Pominville.

Oy vey, Tyler Myers. Myers has received the highest offensive zone start rate of any defenseman (not considering Brennan due to his small two game sample), yet he has failed to capitalize on that and still produced the second worst CorsiRel among defensemen.

How can Nathan Gerbe's gigantic red bubble not jump right out at you? He's facing relatively difficult competition, but also receiving a ton of offensive zone starts and yet he ranks last on the team in terms of CorsiRel.

Buffalo's most frequent top-six forwards this season (Vanek, Pominville, Hodgson, Ennis, Stafford, and Foligno) all turn in positive Relative Corsi ratings despite Foligno being the only guy receiving relatively easy minutes.

In Kaleta's six-game season thus far, he's being utilized in the same manner he has each of the past few seasons. Kaleta has developed into a very reliable defensive player and Ruff leans on him pretty heavily in defensive situations. This is evident in the fact that only Tyler Ennis has started in the defensive zone more frequently than Kaleta among forwards.

For the most part, Lindy Ruff has not been one to feed easy minutes to his best players (as is Alain Vigneault's preferred method of deployment in Vancouver). That is evident here as it's mostly 4th liners with high offensive zone starts (Ellis, Scott, and Gerbe) while some of the team's best forwards (Vanek, Ennis, Pominville, Ott, Stafford) have the lowest offensive zone start rate. Given that McCormick has only played one game, his low offensive zone start rate can likely be chalked up to chance/small sample. This indicates Ruff's preferred method of going strength vs strength whereas somebody like Vigneault prefers to designate difficult minutes to a shutdown line while leaving the prime scoring situations to the Sedins.

Another interesting use of player usage charts is in looking at role shifts. I looked into role shifts over the summer by comparing zone starts and CorsiRelQOC from the 2010-11 season to the data from the 2011-12 season for each individual player. Basically taking the difference between the two seasons gives you an idea of what kind of role shift a player experienced. For instance, Andrej Sekera and Derek Roy both experienced a drop in offensive production last season. As it turns out, the role shifts chart indicates that both were thrust into much more difficult minutes than they'd ever experienced in their career. This provides additional context to help when assessing player performance. That is something I intend on doing again once we have a larger base of data to work off of. This will also be the first of many updates to the player usage charts, so keep checking back for updated charts.

Once again, huge thanks to Rob for putting these together. I highly recommend following Rob on Twitter at @RobVollmanNHL and you can check out his website here.

You can also follow me on Twitter at @TheHosers_DSJ.

Squaring Up

2013-02-01T12:12:00.002-05:00

Last night's hot mess of a game at TD Garden was not exactly what Buffalo was looking for, but the two points ring just as strongly on the leaderboard as if they had been earned by a score of 3-1. Amidst the four goals against for Buffalo was some really, and I mean really, terrible play in Buffalo's own end, with Boston putting up 42 shots on net and firing another twenty-four that were blocked by Sabres players, a figure that is completely unsustainable if Buffalo wants to be in a playoff spot at season's end.

So with four goals against, it's clear that Ryan Miller had an off night, right? Hardly. It should have been painfully obvious to anyone that watched last night's tilt that Miller was spot on. Each of Boston's four goals were the result of heavy forechecking, defensive breakdowns, or both.

On the first, Alexander Sulzer failed to clear the puck up the wall, and instead coughed it up to a nifty forecheck from Rich Peverley and Chris Kelly, the latter lifting Sulzer's stick and Peverley carrying the puck away. The turnover resulted in complete disorientation in the Buffalo end, and a screened shot from Peverley was completely unstoppable by Miller.

Marchand's first, and Boston's second, was simply terrible defending from Myers and Leopold, a trend we've been seeing. Both defensemen were standing in cement, allowing the ~~rat~~ forward to blast by them and go one-on-one with Miller in close quarters. His second came off of sloppy play behind the Buffalo net and just after Miller squared up on Patrice Bergeron. Again, panic and traffic.

Boston's fourth came off of a Myers turnover in the Boston end, and as a result of none of Buffalo's top-line forwards move to cover the point the Bruins sprung an odd-man rush where Jordan Leopold hit the deck and took himself out of the play, giving David Krejci a point-blank one-on-one with Miller. Goal.

Largely lost on the scoresheet are plays like those that appear in the video below. Despite giving up four goals last night (to the extent you can say that he actually gave them up), Ryan Miller again bailed out his defense, and Thomas Vanek was nearly inhuman, and Buffalo eked out two points thanks largely to similar defensive miscues by a better team.

It has been claimed that Miller has been "woefully inconsistent" and that this is not the "Vezina trophy winner from 2010." While the latter may not be necessarily false, Miller has been ready to compete from game one. Miller has had one seriously subpar game (Toronto on January 29th), but the rest of the time, he has been extremely sharp, almost to the point where he is unnoticeable.

The phrases "Mr. Softee" and "the Ryan Miller shutout" are common refrains by those that are just digging for someone to blame, on the premise that Miller often lets in soft goals, particularly towards the end of games that he is working a shutout. Let's throw away the Ryan Miller shutout crap first, because presumably if he's in the position to post a shutout, he's been playing well.

"Mr. Softee" is only marginally more challenging to debunk, but let's start with this premise: every goalie, even elite ones, allow soft goals from time to time. It just happens. It's an occupational reality. What elevates Miller's play well beyond average, and this is something I've said a million times, is that Ryan Miller makes more saves he shouldn't than allows goals that he shouldn't. It's something that he has done the past few years, and although he may have had "off years" (I'm using that term loosely, especially given some serious defensive issues Buffalo forwards have suffered from) in that span, Miller continues to compete at a level that Buffalo should be happy with and accept.

The scapegoat problem is ill-conceived, as has been proven in the past. There are often systemic problems, such as team defense, that can destroy a goaltender's statistics and make it easier to zero in on the last man the puck passes before it enters the net.

Let it be said that there have been times where Miller played below his own standards, something he has readily admitted. The goaltender is perhaps the single most important component of a hockey team, as any Flyers fan can attest. Miller's play puts Buffalo in a position to win on most nights, and it's time the team takes advantage of the fact that they have a first-class goaltender behind them, and they can start by both scoring goals and fixing their league-worst shots against figure.

Ryan Miller is a goaltender Buffalo could win the Cup with. Period. It's time to accept that.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Tonight's the Night, Huh?

2013-01-31T17:30:00.000-05:00

Steve Ott's pesky presence may be more valuable tonight than John Scott's heavyweight one.

For perhaps the first time in his NHL career, all eyes are on John Scott. With the Sabres heading into TD Garden this evening for Ryan Miller's first game at the venue since the infamous Lucic bus accident, everyone is wondering just how many Bruins the enforcer is going to mash into pulp before the end of the game. But before your bloodlust reaches epic proportions, let's just say that the answer, and the right answer to Buffalo's woes, may be exactly zero.

Sure, John Scott is on the roster for the sole purpose of imposing both fear and his fists into opponents, the latter of which everyone is expecting tonight, especially with Shawn Thornton or perhaps Buffalo's archnemesis Lucic himself. But do the Sabres need outward violence to tame the Bruins, who come into tonight at 5-0-1? Probably not. While the extra disincentive to engage in funny business is enhanced with John Scott's presence, his three to four minutes of ice time limit his role to face pounder and grocery stick. To counter Buffalo's added meatiness, Boston is allegedly suiting up AHL doofus Lane MacDermid, who is taking the place of a more skilled Chris Bourque.

The Bruins are widely lauded for their imposing physical play and on-ice antics. Buffalo has some sizable upgrades in terms of physicality, Steve Ott in particular, and that attitude has bled over to other players (even Jochen Hecht). Although Patrick Kaleta is out indefinitely, defenseman Mike Weber is more than capable of causing a ruckus even if his fighting skills are less than honed. Matt Ellis is a symbol of masculinity in some Buffalo circles. Even Nathan Gerbe has the ability to jaw his way under opponents' skin without getting suspended for dirty play like clipping. Marcus Foligno has shown from the get-go this season that he's not there to screw around.

The Sabres get two points tonight for a win. They do not get it for getting physical revenge. With some new faces and a new attitude, Buffalo doesn't need to punch its way through Boston to come out on top. It needs to use its physicality wisely, undermine the Bruin gameplan of consistent corporal punishment, and grind one out the right way. With Boston adding additional "enforcers," Buffalo gains a little bit on the skill end while still being able to stand up for themselves without engaging in antics.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Image - Rick Stewart/Getty Images

Rulebook: Five Absolutely Asinine Rule Change Suggestions

2013-01-19T14:30:00.000-05:00

Two-point goal? Give me a break.

Every offseason, the NHL's Competition Committee (the details of which are up in the air since the ratification of the new CBA) and the powers that be consider rule changes that are meant to enhance the game and improve player safety. Rule 48 (illegal check to the head), as well as the elimination of the two-line pass, were products of necessity that came from two very different backgrounds: the need for a crackdown on some of the most dangerous hits in the game and the desire to speed the pace of NHL hockey, respectively.

Here is a list of five ridiculous rule changes proposed by not only by NHL GMs, but also by various media members.

5. No line changes on an offside

Offside is fundamentally different from an icing. Alright, so it is not completely different, but the reason the icing rule was changed to prevent line changes was because tired teams were intentionally using icing violations as an excuse to get tired players off the ice at the expense of the speed of the game as well as killing pressure being exerted by the other team.

Offsides, on the other hand, is not such an affirmative tactic. Offsides is largely unintentional, and if it is intentional, teams are amply punished by bringing the faceoff into the team's defensive zone. No line changes on an offside would therefore serve as no real deterrent, but instead perhaps make teams more shy around the blue line, inhibiting offense.

4. No-touch icing

Being that I am a huge opponent of touch icing, you may be surprised to see this appearing on the list, but that's because hybrid icing is the perfect compromise. No-touch icing would speed up the pace of the game, but you lose out on the race to the puck that's preserved with hybrid icing. I understand that hybrid icing has its opponents, but it truly does split the difference between the safety of no-touch and the competition of touch icing, with a negligible marginal burden on officials.

3. The ringette line

Of the post-lockout rule changes, the one that had perhaps the greatest effect was the elimination of the two-line pass. (Of course, the crackdown on obstruction had a bigger impact and sped the game up unimaginably, but that was not a rule change but a change in enforcement of existing rules). That rule was removed to undo the damage the neutral zone trap was doing to offense. The ringette line would essentially bring the two-line pass back into play by forcing the breakout team to gain a line placed at the top of the faceoff circles before making a pass to a teammate across the red line.

The idea is to encourage teams to forecheck and to generate more turnovers in the defensive zone, but what it really does is clog up the ice. GMs, in particular, Brian Burke, was (note the past tense in this situation) not a fan of defensemen being able to advance the puck up the wall to waiting forwards, claiming that it was "not exciting." Teams in their defensive zone will simply utilize more players and motion in their breakouts to ensure the line is gained or employ more motion in doing so. But, in the speed era of hockey, why undo what the elimination of the two-line pass did for you? Installing the ringette line is a step in the wrong direction.

2. "Lane violations"

This one is much, much less popular, and there's a reason. It's out of control ridiculous. The idea is this: paint a lane in front of the net, and if an offensive player is in the lane for too long, the play is blown dead and brought out of the zone. What purpose this serves, I do not know, but Paul Hamilton of WGR uttered the atrocity.

Obviously the rule is similar to one in college and NBA basketball, but there could only be one impact of the rule: opening up the lane. Presumably, this means easier sight of the puck for the goaltender, and therefore more saves. Let's go back to the post-2005 lockout changes in rules and rule enforcement: those changes were made to speed up the game and increase scoring. Inhibiting offensive opportunities by restricting certain areas of the ice runs contrary to those goals. In any event, the idea is a drastic change to the existing set of rules, and its adoption would likely never be welcome.

1. Two-point goals

Come on, really? This idea is so radical and fundamentally crazy that it needs to be outright disregarded. Sure, basketball added the three-point shot partway through their history, but basketball also allowed one-point shots on free throws. Allowing two-point goals would only serve to add more video review on deflected shots while providing only a minor incentive to take shots from further out, where they are far less likely to end up in the net.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Image: Jonathan Daniel/Getty Images

Updated 2013 Sabres Snepsts Projections

2013-01-18T09:59:00.001-05:00

I posted these projections back in mid-June but since then the team has underwent some personnel changes and I wanted to re-calculate them for a 48 game season.

These projections will be based on the system developed by Robert Vollman; it is named after old-time stay at home defenseman, Harold Snepsts. The system takes a look at era-adjusted statistics like goals, assists, shots on goal, and GVT of all players since 1967. For any current player, the system finds historical comparables based on position, age, and era-adjusted point totals in both the preceding season and career statistics. The ten closest comparable players are then selected and used to develop projections based on the comparables' production in the following season. The end projections are simply the average production of all the comparable players in the following season, the high-water and low-water marks for the comparables are also noted here to help better gauge expectations.

Before looking at just the Sabres, you can find the entire spreadsheet here. I have summarized the information here but you can find a list of all the comparables for each player by viewing that spreadsheet. Keep in mind, these are projections for a 48 game season.

The columns on the right side are the high and low water marks based on the ten comparables for each player. Due to the fact that these projections are the average of ten players, it tends to minimize the effect of extreme seasons. Thus, you end up with the Sabres projected leading scorer topping out at ~33 points over 48 games. There wasn't enough of a sample size for Foligno and Brennan to develop an accurate projection, hence why they are omitted.

The most curious projection I see here is in the case of Cody Hodgson. As a 22-year old rookie producing at ~0.5 PPG clip, you would think the comparables would project progress for the coming season. Instead, the system projects a fall from 0.49 PPG to 0.45 PPG. That is not a significant drop, but for a player at an age where you would expect progress from one season to the next, it is a bit odd.

Unfortunately, it's not possible to predict team improvement in the offensive end from this model. These projections are based on every player playing every game so it's not as simple as summing their goal projections and comparing it to Buffalo's goal scoring rate from last season. However, it is quite useful and accurate in projecting individual seasons for players.

On the topic of projections, here is a bit from my June 30th post on the center depth. Some important statistical anamolies that Ennis experienced last season, definitely something to keep in mind when you're considering projections or expectations for him this season.

I am one of the biggest Tyler Ennis fans out there and I have been since his draft year, I had him as a top 10 prospect in his draft year when most viewed him as a slight reach at 26 (projected right around 30). However, expectations need to be tempered with this kid. Yes, he looked fantastic at center when he played there this season and there is no reason he shouldn't start the season right back at that position. But do not be fooled by the effects of a small sample size. He played center in junior and was fine but he was also tried as a center in the AHL and it was not successful. Personally, I tend to believe Ennis will be just fine at center but I still need to see more than a ~25 game sample size to be fully convinced that the center position is where his future will be.

Beyond the small sample size issue, there are some concerning statistics that certainly point to a potential regression from Tyler Ennis this season. For instance, Tyler Ennis managed just 1.7 shots on goal per game this past season; this rate is not at all consistent with his point production. 95 forwards registered 50+ points this season, only four of which did so while registering fewer than 1.7 shots per game. If the expectations are for 50+ points (49 in his rookie season, 58 point pace last season), then the shot rate will most definitely need to increase. In addition to the shot rate, the team's 11.65% shooting percentage with Tyler Ennis on the ice indicates he experienced some good luck this season. Over the two seasons prior to this one, 36 players registered on-ice shooting percentages greater than 11%, only one of those 36 repeated it the next season. For those 36 players, the average regression from their 11+% season to the next was 3.3%. So it's fair to expect Tyler Ennis' on-ice shooting percentage to drop from 11.65% to the 8-8.5% range which can make a significant difference over the course of a full season.

Follow Derek on Twitter - @TheHosers_DSJ

GrigoMania: "No Brainer"?

2013-01-16T10:04:00.001-05:00

The biggest question looming over the Buffalo Sabres heading into the first week of the season is whether or not Mikhail Grigorenko will stick with the team. To say there are varying opinions on the issue would be an understatement. GrigoMania has overtaken Buffalo and its no surprise he has garnered so much attention, Grigorenko is the most exciting prospect Buffalo has possessed in nearly a decade (dating back to Thomas Vanek and the 2003 draft). Not only that, but Grigorenko could potentially fill that role of the big go-to center they have been searching for for years.

This post will be broken down into two portions:

1) How often do 18 year-olds crack an NHL roster in the season following their draft?

2) If they do crack the roster, what is a fair expectation of them?

Some media members in Buffalo will have you believe that it's a no-brainer that Buffalo should keep Mikhail Grigorenko in Buffalo for this season. Many push an agenda that reads the Sabres are much too patient with prospects and wait too long to promote them to the NHL (despite heavy evidence against such claims). How many players have done what is supposedly a no-brainer decision for the Sabres? How many players have stuck in the NHL in the season following their draft? Is draft position as much of a determining factor in this as one would think?

In the seven years since the last lockout, 19 forwards have stuck with their NHL squads in the season following their draft (an average of 2.71 per season, over-agers are not included). Of those 19 players, six were 1st overall picks, 12 were top five picks, and all but one were top 10 picks in the draft the summer prior to making their NHL debut. In other words, Grigorenko would be just the second forward in the last eight seasons to make the jump from juniors to the NHL while not being a top 10 pick. Yes, Grigorenko was absolutely projected as a top 10 pick but you can also consider that on average, only one non-top 5 pick has made their NHL roster per season in the season following their draft. At the end of the day, this decision that is being made out to be a "no-brainer" by some is something that is incredibly rare.

It appears that many in Buffalo are of the opinion that if Grigorenko makes the team better, then he should be on the team. It's a very black and white approach. That is analogous to saying that only about three of the best 18 year-old forwards in the world in any given year are better than the 12-14 forwards already on their respective NHL rosters (or only three newly drafted forwards are better than the 400+ forwards league-wide). The fact of the matter is, the marginal gain that could be had by having a player like Grigorenko in the lineup over a player like Matt Ellis or Cody McCormick might not be worth the price you might pay in Grigorenko's long-term development. That's not to say that the Sabres need to follow what every other team does, but there is a long history from which these decisions are based on. The bottom line is that in the development of NHL prospects, there is nothing that is black and white.

Now comes the question, if Grigorenko does make the team what is a realistic expectation in terms of points? There are a few different approaches you can take here. One approach is using Gabe Desjardins' NHL equivalencies, which translates PPG rates from various leagues (major junior, NCAA, SEL, etc.) to NHL PPG rates based on players who have made that jump in the past. Generally, you use the PPG rate from the season prior to the player making the jump to the NHL to make this conversion. Based on these NHL Equivalencies, we can calculate Grigorenko's PPG rate last year (1.44) by Desjardins' QMJHL to NHL equivalency (0.28) and then multiply that by 48 to get a projected 19.36 points for Grigorenko over a 48 game NHL season. Now, if we were to use his PPG rate in the QMJHL this season (1.56), that projects out to an even 21 points over a 48 game season.

I wanted to dig a little deeper and look at some more specific cases. Desjardins' numbers aren't limited to just 18 year olds nor does it look at just high draft picks (often the two will coincide if a player is jumping to the NHL at 18). In order to get a better look, I pulled the numbers for each forward that played in 25+ games in the NHL in the season following their draft. I recorded their NHL numbers in their rookie season as well as their draft position and their numbers in their final season of juniors to find some good comparables and get a better gauge on what we could expect this season. Here is each season fitting that criteria:

*CONV is simply NHL PPG divided by JR PPG to get the equivalent of Desjardins' NHL equivalency (with a more specific scope).

I calculated the totals, average, and the average without Crosby for both their NHL production in their first season as well as their production in their final year of juniors (or college, in the case of Phil Kessel). The reason I included a section without Crosby is that he is a clear outlier here, a generational type talent whose numbers really can't be used as a basis for comparison or projection. You can see that typically 18 year olds experience very modest success (0.54 PPG) with a conversion rate in PPG of 0.352 from juniors to NHL. We will look at how this applies to Grigorenko moving forward.

I wanted to break it down further to take a look at the results of players drafted in various ranges. Driven by the fact that, as high as everybody is on Grigorenko, he was not drafted 1st overall, nor should he have been, nor should his projection be based on the results of guys like Crosby, Kane, Tavares, etc.

You can see here the stark difference between the PPG rates of all players involved vs PPG rates of non-1st overall picks. In the same vein, the difference between top 5 picks vs non-top 5 picks. It's clear that draft position does have an effect on these numbers. Or more aptly, the causation is actually the other way around, but for our purposes we're looking for the best category to project Grigorenko's NHL PPG so we're allowing draft position to determine PPG or conversion rate. Now for the actual point projections for a 48 game season based on these various PPG rates and conversion rates.

*Under projections, NHL PPG is straight forward, based on the averages of the past seasons for each grouping; it's those NHL PPG rates projected out to a 48 game season for each category. The "Last Season" column are point projections based on the conversion rate using Grigorenko's PPG rate with Quebec last season. "This Season" is point projections based on the conversion rate using Grigorenko's PPG rate with Quebec this season.

Keep in mind, the conversion rates used here compare the junior season for these players in the year BEFORE their draft year. So it is really only fair that we use Grigorenko's production from last season rather than this season. With everything considered (more emphasis on non-1st overall picks and Grigorenko's PPG rate last year rather than this year), the numbers point to a projection in the 22-26 point range for Grigorenko over a 48 game season.

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The Referee's Crease: I'm Back

2013-01-15T11:25:00.001-05:00

Well it has been a while since I have posted, and I actually had a long post ready to go in late December but it was lost even though I had saved it many, many times. But thats rather here nor there. The end of the 2012 season was a good one. I easily worked over one-hundred games before the new year and am still on a roll. Officiating took me on several trips, including ones to New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and most recently to Pennsylvania. I made my first appearance as a referee in something other than the two-official system and, as I have worked in every single officiating system there is in hockey, I can say I actually enjoyed sporting the bands for a few games.

While my referee debut was during a 19U Girls matchup in late December, it gave me a chance to get comfortable within the system and sort of work out any kinks I had before being the referee in both the two referee, one linesman and one referee, two linesman system. Last weekend (January 3-6) I was in Marlboro, Massachusetts for the Eastern Junior Hockey League's Winter Showcase, which mostly featured teams from the EJ's southern conferences. Working eight games in three days made it a long one but was most certainly a lot of fun. Driving out with four other guys, one fellow Rochestarian and three from Syracuse we most certainly made some memories to say the least that weekend. I made my Junior hockey referee debut, in an Empire Junior Hockey League matchup that involved the Brewster Bulldogs of the EmpJHL and a preparatory school Bridgton Academy. The start time of this game was the last one of Saturday night at 9:30pm so needless to say both teams did not want to be there so my debut was certainly an easy one to get my feet wet in the Junior ranks.

Just this past weekend I was in Cortland, New York on Friday afternoon for an ECAC-W Women's matchup between SUNY Cortland and Neumann College. While this game was not very exciting* it was an important one to me. I was able to work with one of the best officials in the Rochester area in Chris Woodworth, who has been a mentor to me ever since I started officiating. This was the first time I had the privilege of skating in a game with Woody and it was one that I took very seriously and was anxious to learn on the ice from him. The game ended in a loss for SUNY Cortland 2-1, and it was certainly one that I will always remember.

Last Saturday and Sunday I was slated to work for USA Hockey's Officiating Development Program in both the Metropolitan Junior Hockey League and Atlantic Youth Hockey League. I left earlier than I should have on Saturday morning heading to Scranton, Pennsylvania which was about a four hour trek from Rochester. After a nice long exaggerated bite to eat at a Wilkes-Barre establishment that I do not name, myself and a fellow Rochester official headed to the hotel for a little rest time before heading to the arena for the 3:30pm start. This game was a Metropolitan matchup featuring the hometown Wilkes-Barre Scranton Knights and New York Saints. Both of the teams have been struggling this year and were on the bottom of the leagues standings. I was a linesman for this matchup, it was one that featured a depleted Saints roster that only had a total of eleven skaters and one goaltender, which by rule they were allowed to play however they are most likely going to be slapped with a fine for not having two goaltenders. This was a back and forth matchup that ended with the hometown WBS Knights winning by a score of three to two.

Later Saturday night my crew and I worked a Midget game in the Atlantic Youth Hockey League between the Wilkes-Barre Scranton Knights and Long Island Royals which made me miss the Broncos-Ravens matchup, but the things we sacrifice for hockey! This game was also a very good one in which I was refereeing once again, getting ready for my ODP referee debut the next morning. Something very strange and unfortunate happened during this game which went into overtime. A quick turnover in the neutral zone by WBS gave a huge scoring opportunity on a two on one to Long Island. After an initial shot a juicy rebound was produced and then hammered into the back of the net sealing a 4-3 victory for Long Island I firmly pointed and hammered my whistle thus calling a good goal and ending the game, so I thought. It was then when I looked to my left and saw one of my linesman waving no goal, and that left me thinking what could I have possibly missed.

He then explained to me what had happened which was the most unfortunate and worst possible moment for it to happen, when the Long Island players entered the offensive zone they just so happened to be offsides, it was then when my linesman went to hit his whistle and blow down the play but he had a high-pitched "tweet" because the pea located inside his whistle had frozen up. I never heard the high-pitched whistle due to the parents going wild because of the scoring opportunity and the bench cleared from Long Island thinking they had won the game. I therefore had the wonderful job of informing the Long Island coach who wasn't too fascinated with me the whole game the unfortunate news. He took it... well? The game thank god, ended in a tie and we all got out of there saying, hey we got the right call and that was what mattered.

My fellow Rochester official and I headed back to our very flashy hotel for the evening, a converted train station to hotel in downtown Scranton:

We then ordered some food from a local establishment and then got some shut-eye as I was exhausted and needed some rest for my marathon skate session on Sunday that is the one referee, two linesman system.

Now I wont get into my referee debut much, well because, there wasn't anything too exciting that happened. The New York Saints managed to show up on Sunday with fifteen skaters and two goaltenders which helped them secure a 2-1 victory over the hometown Knights. I was on the road by one o'clock and home by five, after another long officiating road trip weekend.

I am surprisingly enjoying being the referee in the three official systems and am most certainly looking forward to getting more assignments in the future. I am staying local for the rest of this month which includes three junior games, two which are Junior A games in Rochester for the Eastern Junior Hockey League this coming Saturday and Sunday. Oh the things we do for hockey! Stay tuned.

Oh and hey did you hear? The NHL is back? Weird.

*A women's college game at three o'clock on a Friday afternoon during that college's winter break isn't exactly going to be a major crowd or atmosphere.

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AHL CBA: Health and Welfare Benefits

2013-01-11T12:55:00.001-05:00

With the lockout over, the AHL will return to some semblance of pre-labor strife normalcy, at the expense of two-way talent being called back up to play from the AHL to the sport's most elite level. A major "win" for the NHLPA in the CBA negotiations was in the realm of pensions, which ensures that retired players are adequately compensated. But what about when players are still in the league? This post tackles what the AHL CBA refers to as "Health and Welfare Benefits," which ensure that the players maintain their health throughout their tenure with their respective teams.

Article X, along with Appendices G and H, of the relatively short AHL CBA describe how health care is paid for and provided to AHL players, and which players are eligible for benefits

Eligibility

Every player signed to AHL/NHL contract or pro try-out agreement beginning at the start of the regular season or when the contract is signed is eligible to receive benefits under the AHL plan. NHL teams have the option of electing to provide AHL coverage for an AHL player who:

"1) ends the season with an NHL Team on emergency recall status; 2) has played more than 50% of the games of the preceding regular season in the AHL; and 3) is not eligible for NHL Health and Welfare health insurance coverage and benefits."

If a player becomes disabled while under contract, that player does not lose coverage. A Player under an NHL SPC who is listed on AHL roster on the last day of that team's season (reg season or playoffs) but is not receiving NHL health insurance is eligible for AHL coverage. The trust fund that pays for insurance premiums (discussed below) bills the applicable NHL club for a player playing in AHL and signed to an NHL contract or an AHL contract paid for by the NHL club.

Funding

In 1996, a trust fund, the "PHPA/AHL Health & Welfare Benefit Trust Fund" was set up in 1996 to pay the costs of health care. Each team pays a certain amount per player per year into the trust fund in six monthly installments from October 1 to March 1. That amount includes a number of different premiums and fees, but the money does not go directly to paying the health care premiums. Trust fund money is reinvested to generate additional income to mitigate the costs of funding player health care.

The amount paid per player in 2009-10 was $4,232, but it is almost a certainty that the figure has increased, but it is capped this season at $7,025. Any amount over that is paid equally by the individual player and the team.

What happens if a player is released?

A released player may still elect to continue coverage under COBRA, which he must pay himself.

How does coverage work?

Coverage is managed under an AETNA PPO through Meritain Health. A PPO is a group pool that arranges for a group discount with certain providers to get lower rates. The disadvantage is that the player must pay higher rates if he elects to go outside the PPO.

Under the Meritain Health plan, players have a single yearly deductible, which must be met before insurance kicks in. The amount of the deductible depends on whether the player uses providers within the PPO network. After that point, the player and insurer pay a certain percentage of the cost of services, which also depends on whether the provider is within or outside of the PPO network. For example, within the PPO network emergency room visits are 90% covered, leaving 10% to be paid by the player. The same emergency room visit would only be 70% covered under a provider outside the PPO network, and the deductible is much higher.

Once a player reaches a yearly maximum in payments and co-pays (again, depending on whether a PPO network provider is used or not and whether it is a family plan or a single plan), the player is fully covered for services and does not have to pay a single penny more out-of-pocket.

So what's nice about this plan?

Just looking at the types of coverage and the amount players must contribute after meeting their deductible but prior to their yearly maximum out-of-pocket being met, there are some great aspects of the AHL health plan.

Preventative care, regardless of provider, is 100% covered, meaning that apart from co-pay, the player does not need to provide any funding out of pocket for check-ups, immunizations, or even OB/GYN exams for family members. For providers within the PPO network, mental disorders and substance abuse are fully covered, and the deductible is waived, leaving only a meager $10 co-pay for each visit. In the wake of the three deaths an offseason ago and in the shadow of the discussion of CTE and its possible link to depression and substance abuse, it is plain to see the importance of these services.

Aside from health insurance, players and their families receive dental and vision benefits, as well as special coverage under a Maternity Management Program called the "Baby Steps Program," which ensures education on various aspects of pregnancy. Players also receive a $30,000 life insurance and $45,000 career-ending disability insurance policy. The low life insurance policy is reflective of the fact that the risk of death for individuals as young as players is likewise low.

There you have it. If a player breaks a hand, his kid has a sniffle, or his wife delivers the good news, they are amply covered under the AHL's Health and Welfare programs.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

AHL CBA: Development Rule

2012-12-07T13:30:00.000-05:00

On the heels of the news that we probably will not be seeing NHL hockey this season, there has been a lack of a CBA to talk about and everything surrounding the NHL-NHLPA negotiations has seemed to emulsify into a mass of hardheadedness that no one really enjoys navigating at this point. What has been said is all there is to say, really, and we're left with nothing to do but sit and wait for the end to come.

On this site, I've decided to change gears and concentrate on the AHL's CBA. While about six to seven times shorter than its now defunct 2005 NHL counterpart, the AHL CBA contains a number of important provisions that aid both developing players and minor league veterans in their hockey careers, from the development rule to the Health & Welfare Benefit Trust Fund. This post focuses on the AHL's Development Rule, which ensures that a certain number of youthful players are getting minutes at the AHL level and also, alongside the waiver rules, prevents teams from stockpiling experienced players in the minors.

Before we venture forward, I'd just like to disclose one fact: the AHL CBA is not free, so I presume that I cannot disseminate large portions of its text or post it in its entirety here. Instead, I will put up smaller portions (where necessary) along with comment. If you would like to purchase the AHL CBA (as well as the Central Hockey League CBA), you can order a digital copy at the Professional Hockey Players' Association website.

The AHL is, first and foremost, a developmental league. While I love to see Calder Cups come to Rochester, the primary reason players don an AHL jersey is to improve their skills in an effort to make the NHL. Thus, while winning is important for team morale and plays a role in player development, AHL coaches must sometimes make decisions that improve development over winning.

Article IX, Section 1 describes the AHL's development rule. If a team dresses seventeen players (exclusive of goaltenders), it must play at least eleven players who have played no more than 260 games total in the NHL, AHL, or a "European Elite League" at the start of the season. The team must also dress an additional player that has played no more than 320 NHL, AHL, or European Elite League games at the start of the season.

There is one special caveat for young players: If a player participates in a European Elite League game during a season in which he would be eligible to play in the CHL, his games in the European league do not count towards his total. NHL players who have been put on "loan," (i.e., sent down) for a conditioning period are exempted for the first fourteen days of the conditioning period.

If rosters are increased to eighteen or reduced below seventeen, the number is increased or decreased accordingly. Most teams will dress eighteen players, meaning that for all practical purposes, the number of "developing" players is going to be twelve.

While 260 games is a hefty amount (well over three seasons), the fact that two-thirds of an AHL roster must be made up of players with less experience is telling. For all practical purposes, teams really will not have much issue meeting the demands of the rule given the short shelf life of an NHL player and even shorter shelf life of a prospect. Still, the rule, alongside the NHL's waiver rules, keeps the stores of AHL players fresh by prioritizing the AHL as a developmental league.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Legitimacy at Full Strength: Restructuring the National Hockey League’s Supplementary Discipline Process, ver. 1.3

2012-11-07T18:29:00.001-05:00

Today I posted the latest version of my academic article recommending changes to the NHL's supplementary discipline system as it currently exists under the 2005 NHL CBA, entitled "Legitimacy at Full Strength: Restructuring the National Hockey League's Supplementary Discipline Process." A full download can be found on my SSRN page here. The abstract and an embedded copy appear below:

The National Hockey League’s on-ice commissioner discipline system (commonly referred to as supplementary discipline), its own process for levying fines and suspensions for on-ice conduct, has recently come under fire for perceived inequities in the manner in which it has been administered over the 2010-11 and 2011-12 seasons. Although hopes were high for improvement at the start of the 2011-12 season, criticism of NHL suspensions has never been more fervent. This article identifies six components of the NHL’s on-ice commissioner discipline system: identity of decisionmaker, procedure, due process, the use of precedent, the factors involved, and salary forfeiture, and makes specific recommendations based on the goals of adjudicatory systems.

Is it Time to Worry?

2012-10-26T14:39:00.000-04:00

For the most part, we tend to avoid pieces focusing on any one player in particular but...what the heck man? What happened to Luke Adam? Lets get right to what everybody is thinking (and saying), Luke Adam has flat out lost every bit of game he had in him. Luke Adam is Steve Urkel in a crowded bar kind of lost right now. He looks like he doesn't know what to do without the puck (not a huge surprise), and he seems jittery and unsure what to do with it once he actually gets the puck. It's clear his confidence is shot but even more worrisome than that, the effort just isn't there.

I thought about choosing a much more straightforward title like "Why is Luke Adam so terrible at hockey?" or "Take your pick: Luke Adam or Brad Brown". However, I decided we might be better fit taking a step back and trying to figure out exactly what is going on with Adam.

Once considered a top prospect after scoring 49 goals in 56 games in his final season in the QMJHL and then winning Rookie of the Year honors in the AHL and now falling all the way to where he is now? I think it's safe to say that nobody saw this coming. Coincidentally, given that we rarely write on any one player in particular, we have specifically written about Luke Adam previously, here and here [WARNING: That first link is infinitely more optimistic than what you're about to read, proceed with caution].

Last season started out with a bang with 11 points in his first 11 games and 13 in his first 16 games in the NHL. Unfortunately, that high was countered by a low, which included just one point in his final 25 games in Buffalo and a 20 game pointless stretch to end his time in Buffalo. Many used poor usage from Lindy Ruff as a weakly painted facade to cover up the struggles of Luke Adam. But the issue was obvious, Adam was never the driving force of his production early on in the season, he was the benefactor of an incredible start by Vanek and Pominville. Adam essentially became dead weight on that line at a certain point and he was shifted to a different line, still in a scoring role. Ruff kept him in that scoring role as long as he could, waiting for Adam to regain his touch, only after his patience was worn thin did he demote him down the lineup and eventually, down to Rochester.

Following his demotion, Adam was not impressive by any stretch. He appeared to lack effort, and he only produced 13 points in 27 games after putting up 62 points in 57 AHL games the previous season. However, on the bright side, statistically there were still some promising signs. Keep in mind that any legitimate NHL prospect is pretty much used to scoring, almost at will, at the lower levels. Most high-end prospects don't really begin to encounter extended stretches where they struggle to produce offensively until they hit the professional ranks. Adam was a rarity in that he never really encountered that struggle in his first season in the AHL. It was clear that he didn't know how to deal with it once he finally encountered difficulties and his confidence was shattered. Considering that, his production of 13 points in 27 games, while certainly not impressive, is understandable. In addition to that, Adam managed to produce almost exactly 3 shots per game, which is a pretty impressive rate at any level and it's a sign that Adam at least had some kind of impact on the offense. Only one player managed a shot per game rate high than Adam's on the Amerks last season. So despite the disappointing end in Buffalo and the, seemingly, lack of a turnaround once being sent to Rochester, there was still some hope.

Most were overwhelmingly disappointed with Adam's 2011-2012 season and were already writing him off as an NHL prospect. Foolishly, looking at what I just laid out, I thought there was still some hope for some turnaround. Every young player struggles, every young player hits that point where scoring is no longer easy. Many times, what separates the NHLers from guys who never cut it is their ability to handle that adversity and work their way through it. Early returns on Luke Adam do not look promising. Based on the ~10 periods I've seen, he looks to have regressed even further from last season. Lazy on the forecheck, lazy on the backcheck, fumbling with the puck, and content to just go through the motions. The confidence still looks shot, but beyond that, he still doesn't look like he's putting in the effort necessarily to get to that next level. I don't need to tell anybody this, but Luke Adam is not Sidney Crosby, Steven Stamkos, or even Thomas Vanek, he is not offensively talented enough to get by just on talent.

Sure, you can point to the fact that Adam does have three points in six games, for a small sample size the numbers aren't terrible. However, consider that one of his assists was a result of a shot simply being ripped off his ankle and coincidentally bouncing to a wide open player for a goal, and his one goal essentially just bouncing off him and going in. You can attribute that to being in the right spot at the right time, or you can attribute it to dumb luck, your choice. His 10 shots in 6 games is not promising either, he ranks 7th on the team in shots/game. That's not good enough for one of few players who have experienced more than a cup of coffee in the NHL.

I tend to wait longer than most to make judgments on players, I was never too high on Adam early last season as it was evident he was riding the coattails of Vanek and Pominville nor did I get too low on him during his late season woes. However, I think now is the time to worry. Struggles are to be expected from a young player but the most worrisome part, to me, is that after a full offseason to recuperate and reset himself, he has returned and looked even worse than he did last year. To this point, he has shown no ability to deal with the adversity that has been dealt to him. Adam needs to figure things out and he would be wise to do it soon as he is entering that dangerous territory where he is at risk of being type-casted as an "AHLer".

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Just Play Hockey?

2012-10-24T15:27:00.001-04:00

When testing my brand-spanking-new microphone this afternoon, I went off on talk with myself on a common fan approach to the ongoing NHL CBA negotiations which, in essence, is that the terms of the new CBA don't matter; get a deal done and "just play hockey." I decided to put it out as a podcast teaser:

The NHL's Revenue Sharing Offer - Worthy of Applause?

2012-10-18T08:34:00.001-04:00

The NHL's CBA offer, which was publicly released on NHL.com, contains ten paragraphs of bulleted points made on a range of topics from league economics to supplementary discipline. Included was a discussion of how the League planned on honoring contracts in full (the short version: by making future players pay for them) and, for our purposes here, a refreshed version of revenue sharing.

While some pieces of the proposal are straightforward, others are rhetorically bent to subject the reader to a predisposition to think that the provision is fair. The revenue sharing points are the former, constituting hard numbers and simple statements. The league's proposal came in six bullet points, each concise, if not overly specific. Some of the "wiggle room" left by the proposal will be filled with ongoing League consultation with the NHLPA.

SHARE THE WEALTH, DAMMIT!

In this post, I will outline each of the bullet points in the NHL's' proposal and show how they were much more progressive and yielding to the NHLPA's side than I initially thought. The NHLPA has predictably been seeking a more robust revenue sharing system throughout the CBA negotiations, and the NHL actually did a fairly good job moving to the middle on this issue, despite failing to do so in others. In the end, however, the NHL has more work to do to resolve critical economic issues that directly impact players and their rights to revenues.

NHL commits to Revenue Sharing Pool of $200 million for 2012/13 season (based on assumption of $3.303 Billion in actual HRR). Amount will be adjusted upward or downward in proportion to Actual HRR results for 2012/13. Revenue Sharing Pools in future years will be calculated proportionately.

The $200 million commitment is up from $190 million as it currently stands, which demonstrates some (but likely not enough) progress. Any time you're dealing with a dollar figure, it can obviously be tinkered with, and with their offer of $200 million, it would be asinine to conclude that the NHL won't budge on this figure despite threats to the contrary.

Interestingly, although the payroll range remains static, the revenue sharing pool grows proportionately, which allows for as much flexibility as the league should need as revenues change. Refusing to cap or floor revenue sharing amounts means that the league is actually prepared to implement a solution that has a decent chance of working, rather than pigeonholing lower-revenue teams with relatively less money each year.

At least one-half of the total Revenue Sharing Pool (50%) will be raised from the Top 10 Revenue Grossing Clubs in a manner to be determined by the NHL.

Under the 2005 CBA, there were four sources of shared revenues: excess centrally-generated revenues, escrow, playoff funding, and "supplemental funding" (coming from the top-ten revenue-generating clubs). Up to 25% of the amount comes from centrally-generated revenues, another up to 25% comes from escrow, and the remaining amount comes equally from playoff funding and supplemental funding. The NHLPA is looking for greater individual club responsibility for revenue sharing, much like the system Major League Baseball has in place. The NHL's proposal does exactly that. Instead of relying on escrow (which comes from the players) and centrally-generated revenues to fund up to half of the redistributed funds, the NHL states that the top ten clubs are on the hook for at least half of the shared funds.

The result? At the very minimum, an average of $10 million from each of the top-earning clubs goes to teams that qualify for shared revenue. While, as I will discuss, more teams will likely qualify for revenue sharing as a result of the NHL's proposal, the fact remains that the revenue sharing system would be expanded and realigned to include more direct club revenue redistribution.

However, the fact remains that the League is seeking concessions from the players to reduce the load on lower-earning clubs primarily through a reduced players' share rather than escrow. So, although the League wants to include more funds directly from higher-earning clubs, a lot of those extra monies will exist due to a diminished players' share. The League will need to increase their proposed 50/50 split of HRR to restore balance in this respect.

The distribution of the Revenue Sharing Pool will be determined on an annual basis by a Revenue Sharing Committee on which the NHLPA will have representation and input.

Ongoing collaboration is always a good thing. While the current atmosphere is tainted with the spirit of anything but cooperation, the fact remains that the NHL and NHLPA are capable of working with each other on an ongoing basis, if the experience of the term of the 2005 CBA is any indication. The NHL and NHLPA worked together on broadcasting and marketing, arbitration, system arbitration, performance-enhancing substances policy, among others under the previous agreement.

For each of the first two years of the CBA, no Club will receive less in total Revenue Sharing than it received in 2011/12.

This is a nice freebie, given that the amount of redistributed funds is capped at $200 million - if the team your player is on already receives revenues, don't worry, the rug won't be pulled out from under him.

Current "Disqualification" criteria in CBA (for Clubs in Top Half of League revenues and Clubs in large media markets) will be removed.

A huge pain in the side of certain clubs and the NHLPA were automatic disqualifications from receiving revenue sharing, including clubs that were in media markets of more than 2.5 million households (as defined by Nielsen). Removing these harsh barriers and focusing on reduction standards (see below) will accomplish the same result without the overinclusive or underinclusive restrictions that existed under the previous agreement.

Existing performance and "reduction" standards and provisions relating to "non-performers" (i.e., CBA 49.3(d)(i) and 49.3(d)(ii)) will be eliminated and will be adjusted as per the NHL's 7/31 Proposal.

Because we don't know the specifics of the July 31 proposal, commentary on this is limited. Under the 2005 CBA, teams receiving redistributed funds were required to meet certain attendance and revenue thresholds to keep receiving full funding. If they failed to meet those requirements in consecutive years, they were subject to further reductions. Without more information on the specifics of the July offer, I cannot speak for its progressivity, but with with the removal of the hard disqualifications, at least all clubs outside the top ten will be theoretically (if not practically) eligible for revenue sharing.

***

In all, I was pleasantly surprised with the NHL's offer on revenue sharing, particularly when taking into account their underhanded "make-whole" provision and what amounts to a downright refusal to tinker with supplementary discipline. There is still a way to go, particularly with the redistribution commitment amount, but this was something the League did a decent job with in their proposal.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Image via

Making it Public: Looking Deeper into Bettman's Tactic

2012-10-18T08:15:00.000-04:00

Gary Bettman (center) may have suckered the individual players and the NHLPA into a public relations trap

Commissioner Bettman's release of the latest CBA offer coming from the owners was met with some criticism by players, who were wondering why, throughout the process of what have been confidential negotiations, the owners would choose to fully make their proposals public. Logan Couture questioned why they did not make any of the other offers public. The easy answer is found in the public relations side battle fought by each side as they continue to realize that maybe their economic livelihood depends on fans. But, by criticizing Bettman's decision to publish the terms of the offer, the players fell into his trap.

Bettman is a documented genius, let us be clear. There are few of us that even come close to Bettman's level of intelligence, and if any of us would decide to intellectually tangle with him, we'd be turned inside out before we could even utter the words "players' share." And this move was as brilliant as any of the rest of them.

It has been observed that the proposal in itself was a PR move, calling for a 50/50 split (which is seemingly fair to a casual observer who ignores all other issues) and proclaiming to be in the interest of "saving" an 82-game season. But the real genius of the NHL offer's publication comes in forcing the NHLPA's response.

The players have some options, and none of them look great in this ongoing PR war that has seemingly taken a critical role in negotiations. Today seems to be the "make-or-break" day, as some commentators note. With the NHL's offer floating out in the open, will the NHLPA make the same move? If they do, they may appear hypocritical unless they can frame it in a "if they can do it, so can we" sort of way, which in itself seems problematic.

Even if they publicize the deal, they have two more hurdles to clear. After the NHL's 50-50 stunt, the players will need to somehow come back with a deal that looks fair and equitable to a casual observer while coming up from the 50-50 figure, something that won't be enormously easy. Fehr et al. will also feel the pressure to "save" an entire season, unless, again, they can somehow convince the fan base that this is what hockey needs.

In essence, making the offer public was a little more genius than originally thought, which is no surprise coming from a mind like Bettman's.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

AP Photo/The Canadian Press, Chris Young

The Magic Number

2012-10-09T21:25:00.003-04:00

Amidst the shenanigans surrounding the CBA negotiations, from the politics and PR battle to the discussion of potential solutions to what's really at stake, hockey is falling away from us like cliffs shear to the sea as more and more NHL events are being cut away from our enjoyment. First came training camp, then some preseason games, then all preseason games, and now, with the first two weeks of the season cancelled and the NHLPA threatening to challenge the salary cap system, the outlook looks dreary as ever.

While some of us have alternative hockey outlets (I'm lucky to live in Rochester for the time being), they are exactly that: alternative, i.e., not primary. Undoubtedly we'd all prefer to consume the NHL product. So with regular season games hanging in the balance, just how much hockey are we going to see? My hope was 82, my magic number 60.

Read: Either it's a minimum 60-game season, or there shouldn't be a season at all. Any more than twenty-two games cancelled should mean no season. Anything less cheapens the process and fight for the Stanley Cup. While teams are still on an even playing field in terms of playing the game, why should the year-by-year battle for the Stanley Cup vary? While I hate seeing the blemish engraved on the Cup after the 2004-05 non-season, I'd sooner tolerate that than an asterisk above the one for 2012-13 if there's a half season played.

Of course, there are those that have been fighting for a shorter regular season, many on the grounds that the beginning or even middle of the season "does not matter." Of course it matters, just ask anyone from Buffalo. The past two seasons carried with them some pretty pathetic performances in the first half of the season, followed by a surge. The result? A seventh seed and first round loss in the 2011 playoffs as well as missing the playoffs in 2012. In the end, each game counts just as much as the rest.

* * *

Amidst the cancellations, a common thread throughout the blogosphere was one that was reiterated throughout each of the recent professional sports lockouts: the fans are left in the dust without a voice in the collective bargaining process. While I share the anger, sadness, and frustration with equal force as any other hockey fan, the reality is that this is the new reality. And it sucks.

I have made a number of points on this page about what it means to be fully informed and how none of us rise to that level. We can offer theoretical solutions to problems, and lord knows that I and plenty of others have done just that. While some of these fixes sound simple, the fact is that they fit within a larger framework, and their implementation is wrought with practical difficulties. The exact relationship between the payroll range, salary cap, escrow, definition of hockey-related revenue, and the rest of the economic components of the 2005 CBA are all beyond our full understanding because none of us know the numbers. And that's enough to know that simplistic solutions ("WHY NOT A 50-50 SPLIT?!") are not the answer, if only because economic issues are not the only matters of concern.

With that being said, no one should be off the hook, and that goes for both sides. At this point, I'm placing plenty more of the blame on the owners, but with the public relations battle orchestrated largely at the hands of the NHLPA, as well as their counterproductive step of threatening to take the salary cap away, the final blame scorecard has yet to be filled out.

Donald Fehr told the CBC today that a lot of the noneconomic issues have not been negotiated at all, including salary arbitration and contract lengths, meaning more work left to be done. Fehr also emphasized the "speech control," which is essentially censorship backed up by threats of fines and draft pick sanctions, imposed on the club owners during CBA negotiations.

The question then becomes: how united are the owners in reality? Surely the lesser-earning clubs will unite with the players' on a more robust revenue sharing policy, but then again, are they forced to align themselves with the more powerful owners, only to be unable to voice their opinions publicly? And here in Western New York, where does Terry Pegula, the guy who by all accounts is not in it for the money, find himself in terms of the lockout and the central office's strategy?

We don't know. What we do know is that more powerful owners, the ones in Toronto, Boston, New York, Montréal, etc., do not mind the lockout; they're not impacted as greatly as the Phoenixes of the league. But with Pegula's "I'm a fan first" attitude and the fact that Buffalo likely receives revenue sharing, his opinion can be objectively categorized under "unknown."

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

A Critical Eye Toward Statistics

2012-09-21T16:46:00.001-04:00

With so many new metrics coming out in the developing area of hockey analytics, it's important to keep both an open mind to these new statistics, but also a critical mind in evaluating the usefulness of them. This isn't to say any of these numbers are useless, but some are taken to have more significance than they really hold. Sometimes it's important to evaluate some of these numbers to keep them in perspective, and see what they really tell us.

For instance, offensive zone start rate and Corsi quality of competition are two primary "new" metrics that are finding their way into a lot of casual hockey conversations, something you likely wouldn't have seen 12 months ago. These two statistics are what comprise the popular player usage charts which essentially evaluate hard minutes vs easy minutes. People often hold CorsiRelQOC and offensive zone starts on an even plane, assuming that each has equal weight in providing context for a player's production. Is this really the case though? If we were to standardize the values, would an offensive zone start rate of, say, 40% provide an equivalent disadvantage as carrying a CorsiRelQOC of, say, 1.0?

The first step in developing a method to analyze these statistics is coming up with a few statistics that offensive zone start rate and quality of competition have the most direct effect on. There is little doubt that these two metrics have some kind of effect on goals and points, but there are many other variables that play into that kind of analysis, like shooting percentage, making the results a bit cloudy. The statistic that offensive zone start rate and CorsiRelQOC most directly affect is shot differential.

The idea is that if offensive zone start rate produces a true advantage with high offensive zone starts and a true disadvantage with low offensive zone starts, there will be a noticeable disparity in shot differential between somebody with a 40% ozone start rate and somebody with a 60% ozone start rate. Similarly, if CorsiRelQOC is as indicative of a disadvantage (or advantage) as offensive zone start rate, then we should see similar disparities in those comparisons. In order to test these statistics, we're going to test each stat against shots for per 60 minutes, shots against per 60 minutes, and Relative Corsi. These stats have shown to be a few of the most consistently reproducible stats by players; in other words, they are the statistics that players are most in control of with very little luck involved. Thus, it should provide us the clearest picture of the effect offensive zone starts and CorsiRelQOC can have.

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First, a quick lesson in prediction intervals as it will play a small role in the analysis. Prediction intervals are a sort of variation of confidence intervals (if you've heard of those, they're more common). A 95% confidence interval essentially says if you're looking at 60% offensive zone starts, I can produce an interval that we could say with 95% confidence, that interval would contain the mean shots for per 60 minutes (or SA/60 or CorsiRel) at 60% offensive zone starts.

A 95% prediction interval essentially says, if we're looking at 60% offensive zone starts, I can construct an interval that if given any random skater, that interval would contain that player's shots for per 60 minutes (or SA/60 or CorsiRel) 95% of the time. In other words, confidence intervals deal with the means of a Y value, given an X value. Prediction intervals are an estimation of an interval in which future observations (Y values) will fall based on past observations.

We will be using prediction intervals rather than confidence intervals because we're much more interested in answering the question, if a coach starts a player in the offensive zone 60% of the time rather than 40% of the time, how many more shots per 60 minutes can we expect them to generate? The same question could be asked of CorsiRelQOC. We're interested in each statistic's determining power on a player by player basis, hence prediction intervals rather than confidence intervals.

After each grouping of plots, the 90% prediction interval will be listed for CorsiRelQOC (at values of 1.0 and -1.0) and offensive zone starts (at values of 40% and 60%). Those intervals will be fairly large because there is a fair amount of variance in each of these date sets. More importantly, below that I will list the predicted change in going from CorsiRelQOC of 1.0 to -1.0 and from offensive zone start rate of 60% to 40%. This gives us a much clearer view of what is happening in our data and we can see the kind of effect each of CorsiRelQOC and ozone starts has on the three statistics we're testing them against.

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Now onto the numbers, I compiled the offensive zone start rate, CorsiRelQOC, CorsiRel, SF/60, and SA/60 for all players who played more than 40 games last season in the NHL (567 players total). Given a sample of 40+ games for each player, most statistical oddities due to small sample size should be pretty well eliminated. Given a sample of 567 total players, this should give us a pretty good idea of some general trends.

We will start with shots for per 60 minutes, CorsiRelQOC and Ozone% are mapped across the horizontal axis, while shots for per 60 minutes is mapped across the vertical axis. Again, just to reiterate, these cluster plots will allow us to try to find trends to see if a true trend really exists. We would expect there to be a negative relationship between CorsiRelQOC/Ozone% and shots for per 60 minutes.

Note: Numbers on the offensive zone start rate plot are in reverse order. So both charts shot increasingly difficult minutes to the right, easier minutes to the left.

CorsiRelQOC 90% Prediction Interval for 1.0/-1.0: (22.47, 32.12)/(20.45, 30.11)

Offensive Zone Start Rate 90% Prediction Interval for 40%/60%: (20.18, 28.75)/(24.47/33.05)

CorsiRelQOC Predicted Change: -2.02

Offensive Zone Start Rate Predicted Change: +4.29

The difference between the two plots is very clear in this case. We can see a significant drop in shots for as the offensive zone start rate decreases, while the CorsiRelQOC indicates there's actually a slight increase in SF/60 as CorsiRelQOC goes up. The predicted changes in the two plots paints a very clear picture as CorsiRelQOC doesn't seems to have a strong effect at all on shots for per 60 minutes as the competition gets easier, while offensive zone starts appears to have a very strong effect. There are some other factors involved, but these numbers suggest if you took a player average 40% offensive zone starts and pump his ozone start rate up to 60%, you could expect the team to produce 4.29 more shots per 60 minutes with him on the ice.

Keep in mind, we're looking at correlation here, not necessarily causation. The reason SF/60 actually increases as CorsiRelQOC increases is likely because a lot of the best players in the league have high CorsiRelQOC (due to facing top pairings on a nightly basis) but those players are still going to get their shots on goal. Regardless, it's easy to see here that offensive zone start rate appears to have a much stronger correlation to shot rates than CorsiRelQOC. We can tell there is a stronger correlation because, in essence, the offensive zone start rate dots are clustered much closer together and actually appear to have a direction. CorsiRelQOC is a much more spread out plot with no definite direction.

CorsiRelQOC 90% Prediction Interval for 1.0/-1.0: (23.07, 30.71)/(22.46, 30.10)

Offensive Zone Start Rate 90% Prediction Interval for 40%/60%: (23.44, 31.00)/(22.31/29.86)

CorsiRelQOC Predicted Change: -0.61

Offensive Zone Start Rate Predicted Change: -1.14

When looking at these two metrics against shots against per 60 minutes, the picture is not so clear. The effect seems to be minimal. Based on the trend line as well as the predicted changes, we can see that going from difficult minutes to easy minutes does have an effect on SA/60, but it's not as significant as it is in SF/60. These predicted changes of 0.61 and 1.14 actually prove to be statistically insignificant, meaning that these variations could very well simply be caused by chance.

CorsiRelQOC 90% Prediction Interval for 1.0/-1.0: (-12.65, 15.49)/(-17.32, 10.87)

Offensive Zone Start Rate 90% Prediction Interval for 40%/60%: (-18.52, 6.87)/(-7.13, 18.26)

CorsiRelQOC Predicted Change: -4.65

Offensive Zone Start Rate Predicted Change: +11.39

The trend between offensive zone starts and CorsiRel is very easy to see both on the plot, and in the prediction intervals. There is a significant positive correlation between ozone starts and CorsiRel. The picture isn't quite as clear with CorsiRelQOC and CorsiRel. There is a positive correlation there but it's fairly weak. It's difficult to use prediction intervals on this one because there is so much variance. The predicted change gives a rough idea but that should certainly be taken with a grain of salt as well. The clearest indication here is just by looking at the plots.

Lastly, below is a chart mapping offensive zone start percentage vs CorsiRelQOC and a table tracking the correlation coefficient and R^2 value for each comparison we made above. There really is nothing to draw from the plot, it's simply to show that typically the players with the lower offensive zone start rates have the higher CorsiRelQOC (shutdown players) while the players with the higher offensive zone start rates have lower CorsiRelQOC (sheltered offensive players). The chart is basically just to summarize what we found above, assessing positive correlation vs negative correlation and, to simplify, how well the dots fit the line.

To pull all this together, the entire reason for this analysis was to see whether offensive zone start rates or CorsiRelQOC are more of a determining factor in a player's performance. Does a change in CorsiRelQOC affect a player more or less than a change in offensive zone starts? It's pretty clear through the comparisons we made that offensive zone start rate has a much larger effect on a player's production than CorsiRelQOC. Offensive zone starts and CorsiRelQOC should not be held on an even plane when providing context for a player's production. While the effect of offensive zone starts can be quite significant in some areas, the effect of CorsiRelQOC is marginal at best.

Injunction Junction

2012-09-18T13:59:00.000-04:00

Both Darren Rovell of ESPN and Adrian Dater of the Denver Post have commented on the NHL's lucrative television deal with NBC, wondering whether the NHLPA may file an injunction, much like the NFLPA did last year, to prevent the NHL from getting the money owed to them by NBC even if this season is not played. When I asked Rovell on what grounds the NHLPA could make such an argument, he claimed that it could be made on the "exact same legal grounds" as the NFLPA. Not only was that a trigger to me that he did not actually know why the NFLPA won that suit, I was left vexed. In my confusion about what could actual be the basis for such a lawsuit, albeit a successful one, I went on a dig.

Here's the short answer for what I found: The NHLPA lacks the grounds the NFLPA had in their lawsuit. And here's why:

Back in 1992, the NFL was found to have violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, which, for our purposes and for the purposes of simplification, bans collusion between competitors in terms of price fixing and other anticompetitive behaviors. After that lawsuit, a second suit was filed by several players (called the White case after the late great Reggie White) to force NFLers into free agency. Instead of going to a full trial in the White case, the NFL and named players agreed to settle, and they certified a class action, including all NFL players in the class. The settlement agreement, called the White Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (SSA), is a contract that exists independently of the NFL collective bargaining agreement. The SSA was extended, and set to expire most recently at the expiration of the last NFL CBA because of the NFL's decision to opt out of the final two years of those agreements.

During the last CBA and while still bound by the White SSA, the NFL negotiated several television deals with FOX, CBS, ABC/ESPN, DirecTV, and NBC, among others. These contracts were extensive and valuable, to say the least (at the time of the suit, they generated about half of the NFL's revenues). The NFL wanted to renegotiate these deals to prevent the NFLPA from getting leverage; the league wanted to have those revenues no matter what, just like the NHL is set to receive guaranteed payment from NBC. Without that money, the NFLPA could claim that without the players, the NFL would not be getting any dough.

The television injunction case was based on the violation of the SSA, mainly on the grounds that the NFL failed to use their best efforts to maximize revenues for the NFL and the NFLPA. Under contract law, each party to the contract must act in good faith. It was also the NFLPA's position that the NFL fell short of that duty. The NFL countered that the SSA did not have a good faith requirement, and that lockouts were crucial bargaining tools. While the court actually agreed that lockouts were "recognized bargaining tools and that the NFL is entitled to maximize its post-SSA leverage," it also concluded that the good faith requirement existed in the contract.

The court noted that "Under the SSA, the Players rely on the NFL to negotiate these contracts on behalf of both the NFL’s own interests and the interests of the Players. . . . The record shows that the NFL undertook contract renegotiations to advance its own interests and harm the interests of the players" in violation of the good faith and sound business judgment requirements of the SSA:

"[T]he NFL renegotiated the broadcast contracts to benefit its exclusive interest at the expense of, and contrary to, the joint interests of the NFL and the Players. This conduct constitutes 'a design ... to seek an unconscionable advantage' and is inconsistent with good faith." (citation omitted). The court also rejected the NFL's other arguments, mainly that the NFLPA's pain would be felt only after the expiration of the SSA and the NFL's fear of breaching other contracts, saying that the NFL made this contract, and remains bound by its terms.

The court went on to state that the best efforts requirement was also violated for the same reasons; negotiating contracts with the specific intent to place the other party to the SSA, the players, at a disadvantage.

An injunction was issued on those grounds.

WHEW! So what does this mean for the NHLPA? It means they do not have the same legal basis as the NFLPA. There is no contract analogous to the White SSA between the NHLPA and the NHL. And with the court in the case described above stating that lockouts are recognized bargaining tools, there is persuasive yet admittedly not binding authority that a similar challenge solely on antitrust grounds would be rejected by a court should the NHLPA file suit.

Follow Colin on Twitter - @TheHosersCRB

Fault

2012-09-16T17:57:00.000-04:00

And so it begins, once again.

Devoting an entire post to responding to another person's putative analysis is not something that I indulge in often, but in this case I felt the need to rebut some arguments made by The Buffalo News' own Bucky Gleason, one of their NHL columnists. Bucky, along with Jerry Sullivan, are known to sit back and strike fairly infrequently, but with a lot of force behind each piece. In Gleason's latest column, he seeks to take NHL owners to task for locking out the players for at the very, very least, a part of the preseason (something we can only hope for), placing the blame entirely on that contingency.

The main thrust of the column, as well as a few points made therein, are well-taken. NHL owners are financially superior, as Gleason correctly notes, and have the ability to wait and wring the players dry at the negotiating table. Saying that each side is firmly entrenched in their beliefs over who should foot the bill to help out struggling franchises is accurate. Both sides need to meet somewhere in the middle (or readjust how the league pays, as I've argued).

I've taken pieces out of Gleason's article, in full context, mind you, and responded to each one.

The natural approach this morning would be blaming the owners. Blame them for being greedy and careless and selfish. Blame them for shutting down the NHL for the third time since Gary Bettman was named commissioner. Blame them for their irrational and inefficient approach to negotiations.

The first three sentences are all accurate, blaming the owners seems to be an easy way out; they are, after all, the ones flexing their muscles. As Gleason correctly points out, this is not a strike, but rather a lockout. The last sentence, however, is unsupported by any facts or argument, and seems to ignore the fact that the NHLPA has engaged in a few PR stunts (the Alberta and Québec labor board filings and the "show of solidarity" at the NHL offices in New York), thereby frustrating the spirit of negotiation (to the extent it existed). This is not to say the NHL is innocent in this regard.

What I believe Gleason is getting at is the owner's initial offer, which Donald Fehr essentially made a mockery of with the NHLPA's "alternative" offer, which included salary concessions. While the League's initial offer looked inequitable, it was negotiating, pure and simple. The NHL knew it was not fair, and they also knew that it was not going to be accepted. The hard-lined approach is a recognized bargaining tactic, and the fact that it came back to bite them does not make it "irrational and inefficient," and in any event, the PA is not immune from criticism on that front for the aforementioned reasons.

Anyway, NHL owners can lose money for years and still gain on their investment when they sell the franchise. Tom Golisano pulled the Sabres from bankruptcy and walked away with more than $100 million seven years later when he sold the team.

I actually like this paragraph. Some owners are losing money year after year, but still may see black when they sell the team. No season? Fewer expenses, but also fewer revenues. Whether a lockout reduces total loss probably requires a franchise-by-franchise analysis, but generally, this is accurate.

Bettman's latest proposal called for players receiving about 47 percent of revenues, down from 57 percent last season. Players want an actual dollar amount of $1.8 billion, their take from the pot last year, while refusing to accept a 17.5 percent rollback. Their divide isn't over math, as it was seven years ago.

It's a disagreement in principle. Owners want players to help assist troubled franchises. Players believe owners should pay the bill. It's a philosophical difference that's difficult to overcome when both sides are anchored to their positions. In that way, it's like arguments over politics or religion.

Alright, so this is not about money but it is about money? The difference between the two sides is rooted in math and financials, any way you cut it. Revenue sharing, assistance, "paying the bill," that's all a disagreement in principle, but it's also a math problem. There are no solutions until the two sides find them, but to say this is not about math is inaccurate.

Even more inaccurate is saying that the 2004-05 lockout was simply math. If anything, this squishy "principle" concept Gleason cites was more present eight years ago. Think about it. The salary cap and revenue sharing system that existed in the 2005 CBA were brand new, as was salary arbitration. While each of these are going to be tinkered with once a deal is done, they do not need to be developed from scratch. In any event, there's no such thing as a CBA divide being solely over math. That's an overly simplistic perception of the process, and one that ignores the battles fought in 2004-05 and more generally just how extensive these agreements are.

I'm not going to bore you by attempting to break down the [sic] minutia of hockey-related revenue, direct costs, Canadian labor laws and revenue sharing. Unless you're inside the meetings, it's impossible to decipher fact from fiction.

Besides the misspelling of minutiae, there's no way a discussion of the enumerated concepts can even fit in a single column, nor would I expect a columnist to devote time explaining them. That's my job, anyway. The second sentence undermines any argument that backs blaming one side or the other: "Unless you're inside the meetings it's impossible to decipher fact from fiction." It's a point I have made before, and which I'll paraphrase here: We do not have all the financials. We do not know what happens between the clubs in their meetings with the NHL's central office. We do not know where each side's breaking points really are. We do not know each side's conduct at the table. All we do know is what has been shown outwardly, and to be honest, that's not a whole lot.

Everything being pumped out now by both sides of this fiasco is just a series of public relations stunts, and very little actual substance. Owners are banned from talking about anything specifically (unless it supports the NHL), and the players have a united but general presentation as to their desires. That's the name of the game despite the fact that their interests may differ.

Blame the owners. They became careless, as they always do. Some failed to pay players what they were worth, and others overpaid for them after they hit the market. Either way, it produced skyrocketing salaries. Nobody was responsible more than Golisano, the former Sabres owner who refused to pay Chris Drury and Daniel Briere.

Golisano, in an effort to keep payroll down, actually caused a surge in spending because he, or the people working under him, didn't understand the market value of the former co-captains. It contributed to both players, plus Thomas Vanek, getting overpaid. In Briere's case, it led to circumvention of the salary cap through front-loaded contracts.

See, it extended well beyond Buffalo.

Is that entirely Golisano's fault? No. Someone else, somewhere else, eventually would have triggered the similar results. But it also didn't help matters, a fact Golisano and Larry Quinn somehow failed to comprehend at the time.

There's plenty to unpack here. For starters, owners being "careless" for underpaying and overpaying happens all the time, whether it be prior to or after the signing of the last CBA. The same type of error happens with drafts and contracts in every sport. One thing many fail to recognize (including Paul Hamilton in regards to Tyler Ennis's contract) is that contract amounts are based on future performance, not as rewards for past performance. It's the same concept as valuing a business. Errors are made. Players get hurt (see: Tim Connolly), players underperform (see: Leino). To say that these actions were careless neglects the reality that offering a player a contract comes with an inherent risk, and the more you pay, the more you're most likely hedging for a bigger reward in terms of player performance. It's all simple investment economics.

In terms of skyrocketing salaries, they were more or less necessary given the surge in revenues; Gleason's implication that the error inherent in contracting athletes, including underpaying them, resulting in general overpayment is simply vexing. Players were, after all, still guaranteed a healthy chunk of hockey related revenue (57%, at the maximum), and the (generally) free market of player contracts dictated higher payrolls, to the benefit of players. Put simply, skyrocketing salaries were the natural result of skyrocketing revenues, the 2005 CBA, and the market.

The second paragraph is interesting, and I can't for the life of me find any causal relationship between Golisano/Regier not signing Drury and Briere and a surge in spending. While the Thomas Vanek point is more or less accurate (yet leaves out the whole offer sheet thing, kind of an important point, because someone was going to pay that much for him either way). Another source of confusion comes from the point that Buffalo's refusal to pay money resulted in overspending elsewhere, and pins this "error" on Golisano. While Buffalo may have been able to "set the market" somewhat, setting the market is kind of a false concept. Players have value on the free market no matter what, and Buffalo's offer to the unrestricted free agents would have existed alongside New York and Philadelphia's offers regardless. Those teams were willing to pay those amounts notwithstanding anything Buffalo may have decided to do; the ability of the Sabres to temper those offers is questionable given that there are thirty teams in the league that are able to compete for unrestricted free agents.

Gleason then retreats in the last paragraph to sort of admit these points, but then went ahead and levies some blame anyway. The realization that Golisano and the Sabres front office recognized, and comprehended, is that offering that much money was not in their best interest. Whether or not that assessment is accurate is not the issue, the question is actually whether this had a cognizable impact on owner spending. The answer must be no, by the holy triumphant of the terms of the CBA, the free agent market, and the explosive growth in hockey related revenue.

At the same time Bettman was pushing for term limits on contracts, two of his chief confidants, Jacobs and Snider, signed players to six-year deals. Why? Because they were still working under the agreement that expired at midnight Saturday. They did so because they could. And that's what we have today, too.

Blame the owners for the ridiculous contracts, for not showing restraint, for the eventual charade that Bettman and his cronies pass off as negotiations. The two sides have had numerous talks, but really they've exchanged demands. Most have come from owners in the face of players who have been reasonable.

While I agree that owners should practice what they preach in terms of limiting the length of contracts, there's no surprise that some of the more well-off owners, who probably actually do not want contract limits, took advantage of the terms of the 2005 CBA to sign contracts that extended behind the five-year proposed limit. The "ridiculous contracts" and lack of restraint arguments have been debunked above, but I agree with Gleason on the circumvention mentioned above; there has just not been a whole lot of enforcement on that front, with the exception of Ilya Kovalchuk.

Go ahead, blame the owners. The lockout is entirely their fault.

See above. These shenanigans cannot be pegged on one side or the other, plain and simple. And this is not just me being diplomatic. Both sides are stubborn, and both sides have participated in the politics/public relations battle, most recently today. The NHL released a statement on their website, while the NHLPA released a YouTube video (that borders on the pathetic), both designed to win the hearts of fans, who should keep their hearts to themselves.