Successful Strategy
As part of its strategy, the military initially sought to strike Taliban hideouts, training camps, arms caches, tunnels and safe houses.  This was done to destroy their infrastructure and also minimize the degree of fighting taking place in populated, urban areas.  Taking aim at these targets forced the Taliban to fight “outwards” in the mountains and provide more tactical space for army personnel in the Swat Valley itself.

Precision strikes were carried out by the air force while the army launched three brigade-size offensives from three different directions, forcing the Taliban to fight on multiple fronts.  The Special Services Group (commonly referred to as the SSG, Pakistan’s special forces) conducted a large-scale airborne raid on the primary Taliban base in Peochar Valley.

A month into its campaign, Pakistan’s military has wrested control of and secured Mingora, Swat’s largest city.

The military continues to maintain persistent pressure on militants by carrying out raids, laying ambushes, and cordoning off zones for search and destroy operations.  The purpose for all of which is to ensure psychological and tactical ascendancy against the Taliban.

There is also a strong desire on the part of the military to eliminate Taliban leadership in Swat.  Recent rumors that Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Taliban in Swat, was killed by Pakistani gunships were discredited after the Pakistani government increased its bounty on Fazlullah’s head.  Insider Brief sources within the Pakistani military report that US sources originated the rumors but that chatter on Taliban networks also spoke of Fazlullah’s death.  The chatter was likely a means of diverting the military’s focus on hunting the “Radio Mullah.”

From Swat to South Waziristan
Having taken Mingora, the military has set its sights on Charbagh where action is expected soon.  Other pockets of Taliban resistance still remain in several valleys north and west of Mingora.

Beyond Swat lies South Waziristan, which the military believes to be the center of gravity for the Taliban.  Our sources also report that operations can begin in South Waziristan as early as the first week of June.

It’s worth noting that despite official claims that upwards of 3,000 militants have been killed in Swat, our sources state that the number of dead militants is likely somewhere between 500 and 600.  It’s important to be mindful of this as the military seeks to consolidate the gains it has made in Swat and hold territory.  The number of militants in Swat likely ranged in the thousands at its peak, meaning that many militants were merely pushed back into the mountains or dissolved into the general population.

As internally displaced persons (IDPs) and administrative structures return to Swat, it will be important for the military to maintain much of its strength (two divisions) there.  This ultimately means that more troops will have to be called up for the far more difficult operation that lies ahead in South Waziristan.

Sovereignty in Swat
Over 2.4 million people have been displaced by the fighting, creating what the UN describes as the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda.  With fighting winding down in Swat, these IDPs will begin returning home to widespread destruction (many have started returning home to neighboring Buner).  The resulting discontent has the potential to turn Swat into a breeding ground for the Taliban.

Back in November 2007, we contended that, “only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.”

With US financial support, Pakistan must use the opportunity provided by the devastation in Swat to undertake massive rebuilding and modernization efforts there.  Model villages can be developed similar to the ones built after the massive earthquake that struck northern Pakistan in October 2005.  Administrative structures can be built from the ground up keeping in mind that prior discontent in Swat related to government inefficiencies (particularly in the judicial system).

This can prove to be an important first step in bringing Pakistan’s Wild West into the fold.

Analysis
Insider Brief sources report that the three murdered nationalist leaders — including Baloch — had actually had a hand in the kidnapping of John Solecki alongside several government “bigwigs” and Baloch sardars (local tribal chiefs).  Large sums of money totaling several million dollars were handed over to the kidnappers to secure Solecki’s release.  Infighting ensued between the involved parties over the distribution of the release funds resulting in the deaths of Baloch, Munir and Bugti.

This explanation has a strong degree of credibility (kidnapping for money being a time honored tradition in that part of Pakistan) and helps counter an otherwise inconsistent allegation that Pakistani intelligence was behind the kidnapping and subsequent murder.  State intelligence agencies would most certainly have anticipated that the deaths of these leaders would have resulted in the destabilization we’re witnessing in Balochistan, an already volatile province.  They would not have intentionally mutilated the bodies and left them to be found only to play into the hands of local insurgents.

If true, it would appear that localized greed, not intelligence agencies, can be blamed for the deaths of the three leaders.

We expect to see the further erosion of President Zardari’s government and his already tenuous grip on the country in the coming days and weeks. We also expect the “establishment” to actively strengthen competing factions within the PPP for the eventual replacement of Zardari (e.g. Atizaz Ahsan) as a means of returning stability to the country.

Expect some movement in Punjab; especially keep an eye on its governor, Salman Taseer.

Analysis
Viewed in the context of multiplying reports covering US cross-border incursions and strikes in Pakistan’s northwest, the downed UAV was likely a Predator drone. Whether the drone was a UCAV - unmanned combat aerial vehicle - equipped with Hellfire missiles, is unclear. What is increasingly clear from reports, however, is that the drone and its parts were collected by Pakistani security forces largely in tact. Gaining access to the Predator’s technology should prove to be a boon for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s indigenous UAV technology is by no means rudimentary. Its UAV industry has been growing at a rapid pace over the course of the past decade, driven by both government-funded and private sector programs. In fact, the US Border Guard even purchased the Pakistani-made “Border Eagle” UAV in 2004. But while it has been adept at developing short-to-medium range tactical UAVs, Pakistan’s industry has faced a gap in its ability to develop longer range, long endurance UAVs.

To fill this gap, Pakistan sought to purchase the Predator UAV from the US. The US declined to sell the Predator to Pakistan, despite its utility in monitoring Pakistan’s treacherous border with Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan has access to some of the best American-made UAV technology at the cost of a few dozen shell casings.

It’s worth noting that this wouldn’t be the first time that Pakistan has used access to American technology to further its own indigenous defense programs. In August 1998, near the tail end of the Clinton administration, the US launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. At least two of those cruise missiles failed to reach their targets and landed in Pakistani territory - unexploded. Seven years later in August 2005, Pakistan test launched its first cruise missile, the Babur (Hatf-VII). The Babur, a high-speed, low-level terrain following cruise missile, bore a number of similarities to the Tomahawk.

Let’s see what Pakistan is test flying five years from now.

(Editor’s Note: Apologies for my conspicuous absence over the last month or so. I’m afraid my posting will likely be sporadic in the coming months as I’m occupied with multiple projects. In the meanwhile, I’ve got 3 posts in the queue and hope to have them published soon. I’ll be dealing with the Marriott bombing, Pakistan’s armed forces, and relations with the US, keep an eye out.)

We at the Insider Brief have refrained from chiming in on the issue because there has been far too much disinformation and sensationalism out there clouding the actual story and underlying events. As more information has become available to us, we will briefly try to make heads or tails of the situation in Islamabad.

Our sources report that anxiously waiting Pakistan-watchers can likely expect some major news on Monday. The last time our sources told us to expect “major news,” Musharraf shed his uniform; this time may be a little different. We’re hesitant to speculate that Musharraf will resign due to what we’ve been hearing. The level of leaks and “inside news” emerging from Pakistani and American papers alike is unprecedented - and for good reason. Sources further report that a thorough disinformation campaign is being carried out by Pakistani intelligence agencies (”lafafa” journalism anyone?).

We believe that the campaign may be an attempt to focus the attention of Pakistanis and foreign governments towards the prospect of Musharraf’s resignation, away from the idea that he may be planning something altogether different. Based off chatter we’ve picked up on, we believe that any alternate plans being chalked up by Musharraf and the establishment may relate to the repeal of the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) that absolved the likes of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif of their sins, fabricated or otherwise.

Our rationale is based off the fact that Musharraf allowed for the return and political participation of the late Bhutto, and to some degree the Sharifs, with the understanding that they would play by the rules laid out by the establishment. By pursuing Musharraf’s impeachment, they crossed the line in the sand. Now if Musharraf must go, he will pursue mutually assured destruction, bringing the coalition government down with him.

Ultimately, even if Musharraf does go, it’s of little consequence. As president, his constitutional powers are largely ceremonial - for whatever the constitution’s worth.

As the nation celebrates its 61st year of existence, we hope for a brighter future for Pakistan and its people. May each passing year bring us all closer to realizing a more prosperous and progressive Pakistan.

Pakistan Paindabad.

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle - the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

Zardari’s Miscalculation
It’s an open secret that Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, calls the shots in the current government, not Gilani. According to Insider Brief sources, the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry and thereby Interior Minister Rehman Malik, was Zardari’s decision. Sources further state that Zardari miscalculated and did not anticipate the response the decision received. Like a kid with a stick, he prodded too hard only to awaken a nest of (khaki) hornets.

Kayani Intervenes
In our last post, we indicated that Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would have to respond forcefully to the government’s decision so as not to appear weak, but also, to defend his turf; the ISI for all practical purposes, answers to the Chief of Army Staff. Insider Brief sources report that the night of the announcement, Kayani personally intervened and ensured that the decision was reversed.

Aftermath
The government’s initial decision should not be contextualized within the framework of US-Pakistani relations. This was not about “reining” in Pakistani intelligence at the behest of the Americans. This was an attempt by Zardari to halt ISI activity against the PPP government in Punjab and gain full control of what is essentially Pakistan’s most powerful “policy” tool. He overplayed his hand against what he perceived was a discredited and demoralized military. Now, he will likely have to face the consequences of increased hostility from the establishment and a possible intensification of the campaign to unseat his government.

With each passing day, a once golden opportunity to turn things around for Pakistan is slipping from the grasp of the Pakistan People’s Party. There’s still time to take a stand, make some bold policy decisions and reverse the atrophy that is nibbling away at the current government. Pakistan can no longer afford more of the same.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.

The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.

People may question – what about General Ashfaq Kayani and his stance on political non-interference? The answer and second reason likely lies in the decreasing ability of the military establishment’s inability to control low-to-mid-level personnel as has been demonstrated by the numerous security lapses and leaks that have led to numerous terrorist strikes against sensitive targets.

This brings us to the third reason. Many in Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain sympathetic to their former proxies as is Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is well liked by Pakistan’s right and religious fundamentalists. His return would likely mark the end to the Pakistan Army’s push in the country’s northwest.

The How
If Pakistani intelligence is truly attempting to engineer Nawaz Sharif’s return, the question is, how do they intend on doing so? The answer may lie in what Insider Brief sources recently intimated to us. In the on going discussions over Zardari, it was mentioned that the last phone call to Benazir Bhutto minutes before her assassination was made by Zardari himself. He reportedly asked Bhutto why she was sitting in the car and not outside as the “people wanted to see her.”

The story could conceivably be true – there’s no doubt that Pakistani intelligence tapped Bhutto and Zardari’s phones – and Zardari did indeed have a lot to gain from her death. But the far likelier explanation could be that Pakistani intelligence is working to build up a story to incriminate or at the very least, implicate Zardari in the court of public opinion.

The other explanation is that these meetings are just indicative of pressure tactics being used by President Musharraf and the “establishment” as they tussle with Zardari and his civilian government over major issues such as the restoration of deposed judges, tackling terrorism and handling Pakistan’s economic issues.

The Lesson
The major take away is that the government must act with surety and decisiveness. A constellation of forces is aligning against the sitting government as it waits idly by, paralyzed by indecision and infighting. If it doesn’t act, the PPP will have passed up a chance to consolidate fresh democratic foundations for Pakistan and the opportunity to tackle issues from a liberal platform.

These closed-door meetings were just warning shots that time is running out.

Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Earlier tonight, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the continued volatility in Pakistan’s northwest, the assassination attempt on Hamid Karzai, as well as Senator Barack Obama new conciliatory tone towards Pakistan.

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

The replaced brigadiers were removed from their posts prematurely; Zaheer was due to retire in July with Masood due to retire in September. Sources indicate that both men were close associates of the recenty replaced and highly disliked, Major General Nadeem Ejaz, former Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). Made with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s approval, the removal of Nadeem Ejaz’s associates represents a continued decline in influence for President Pervez Musharraf within the military. As DGMI, Ejaz was instrumental in many of Musharraf’s policy decisions and was a close advisor.

What may be of greater interest is the man whom Brig. Tiwana is replacing, Brig. Masood, is said by sources to have had excellent ties with the MQM and PPP. If true, it highlights the continued drive by Gen. Kayani to disentangle the Pakistan Army and its intelligence apparatus from politics after over 60 years of national involvement. After all, cordial relations with political parties should have no bearing on the selection of a regional MI commander.

Intel Validation
At the end of February, we reported that Gen. Kayani was looking to replace the then-DGMI, Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ejaz. We listed several candidates, one of whom was Major General Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s former defense attache to Moscow. On April 4th, The News International reported that Maj. Gen. Asif was appointed DGMI.

Editor’s Note: For those of you wondering — I’m back.

• Maj. Gen. Muhammad Asif - Formerly Pakistan’s Defense Attache in Moscow
• Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal - Presently posted in Bahawalpur
• Maj. Gen. Raheel Sharif - Formerly General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore; presently posted in Lahore

Kayani intends to curtail the powers of the DGMI with the hope that the next general to occupy the position will focus on what his title implies — military intelligence. This should bode well for the progress of the war on terror and settling the unrest in Pakistan’s northwest.

FOOTNOTES:

• President Pervez Musharraf had an op-ed published in the Washington Post on February 22nd. Individuals familiar with the op-ed report that it had initially been submitted to the New York Times for publication but was rejected by paper. The Washington Post was the President’s second choice.
• The News International reported that the former head of the ISI’s political cell, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Ehtesham Zamir, acknowledged his role in rigging the 2002 elections that brought Musharraf’s civilian allies to power. Zamir claims that the orders to rig the election came from Musharraf himself. The timing of the announcement places further pressure on an already beseiged Musharraf who now faces an empowered opposition after last week’s parliamentary elections. Interestingly enough, sources close to Zamir report that he is a very close friend of Aitzaz Ahsan. Coincidence? I think not.

(Editor’s Note: We’ve received numerous requests for an analysis on the post-election scenario; we hope to have one up for Insider Brief readers by the end of this week.)