The Post's coverage of Russia in November was more like a miss than a hit. Only Philip Pan put up some real effort, whereas the Post's editors and op-ed contributors went MIA (as far as Russia was concerned), focusing instead on President Obama's health-care reform and Afghanistan policy. Besides, not too much negative has occurred in Russia in November, and absent any bad news, the Post sees little reason to write about Russia at all.
Pan began on November 6 with reporting on the arrests of two suspects in the murder of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova. When reading the article, one can almost sense Pan's disappointment with the fact that the alleged suspects reportedly belong to a neo-Nazi group. That's understandable: Pan's bosses would much prefer suspects with direct links to the Russian security services.
Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus reported, on November 7, on a trip to Moscow of President Obama's national security adviser Jim Jones. The trip was said to have provided a breakthrough in the START treaty negotiations, allowing both sides to hope that the new agreement will be signed until before the year's end. (On November 10, though, the ever vigilant Robert Kagan and Dan Blumenthal reminded us that "Moscow needs [arms-control agreements] more than Washington does.")
Pan continued on November 12 with a profile of the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the next day, he covered President Medvedev's annual address to the Federal Assembly.
The Post's editorial board was visibly shaken by Medvedev's address, calling it, in a November 14 editorial, "a spectacle of Russia's president speaking the truth about his country." The editorial went on to add: "We couldn't have said it better." That's a telling admission. The Post's editors seems to believe that they have a monopoly on "speaking the truth" about Russia and now, they're troubled with the presence of a competitor.
The editorial didn't neglect to mention that "[Prime Minister] Putin...looked unhappy in his front-row seat as Mr. Medvedev spoke", with the same point having been made by Pan ("Prime Minister Vladimir Putin...sat without smiling in the audience"). A more perfect sign of the "growing rift" within the Putin-Medvedev tandem, anyone?
(I saw a great number of addresses of U.S. presidents to Congress, but don't remember many smiling, happy looking, faces in the audience. U.S. legislators express their emotions differently. For example, by verbally insulting the president.)
Andrew Higgins and Anne Kornblut described, on November 15, a meeting between president Obama and Medvedev on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.
Pan returned to familiar turf by reporting on the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a lawyer representing the Hermitage Capital Management, on November 18, and apparent terrorist attack on the Nevsky Express train, on November 29. Pan concluded his coverage with describing Russia's position, on the eve of the climate-change summit in Copenhagen, on credits for greenhouse-gas emissions.
The Post's editorial board reacted to Magnitsky's death with another editorial, on November 24. It's not clear why it took the Post six days to publish what looked like an abbreviated version of Pan's article. Perhaps, they planned to wait a bit and then lambaste the Kremlin for inattention to the Magnitsky case (Pan, on November 18: "Neither Prime Minister Vladimir Putin nor President Dmitry Medvedev have commented on the case.")? Unfortunately for the Post, President Medvedev has ordered a full investigation into the circumstances of Magnitsky's death. Do I need to say that the editorial failed to mention this fact?
The only November op-ed piece worth speaking of was an article, "Russia's search for an identity", by Moscow Carnegie's Masha Lipman. Her topic was President Medvedev's videoblog entry made on the day of commemoration of political prisoners, in which Medvedev called Stalin's repressions "one of the greatest tragedies in Russian history." (I wonder if this line by Medvedev will be quoted nearly as often as Putin's allegedly calling the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century").
Having made the obligatory cheap shots at Medvedev ("Medvedev's often well-intended rhetoric has not been matched with policy"), Lipman nevertheless called his videoblog address a "speech...in the right direction."
Lipman ought to be very careful when praising, however timidly, the Russian president. She must be aware of what happened to opposition figure Marina Litvinovich. Litvinovich committed a deadly sin of voicing support for Medvedev's modernization initiatives. After which the Russian Uber-Democrat, Garry Kasparov, immediately fired her from the position of Executive Director of his United Civil Front.
Besides, as a Post contributor, Lipman should always remember this in-house rule: "About Russia, either bad or nothing."
This article was first published on November 9 at "Russia: Other Points of View"
A few weeks ago, the good old science of Kremlinology got a delightful gift. At a meeting with members of the Valdai Club, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the audience that in 2012, he and President Dmitri Medvedev will sit together and decide which of the two will run for presidency. The interpretation of Putin’s words by Western pundits and the media was swift and unambiguous, if somewhat expandable. They concluded that Putin is going to return to his old Kremlin office and possibly stay there until 2024.
Before trying to infer what Putin actually meant to say, it’s worth pointing out that forecasting his future has always been a dubious job. For example, a prominent Russia expert predicted, in January 2005, that “Putin will be out of office in the near future.” Yet in the fall of 2007, the same expert opined that Putin will remain in power indefinitely by "possibly following declaration of a national military emergency." Needless to say, neither forecast has come even close to getting materialized.
It turns out that the much better predictor of what Putin will or will not do has been his own words. Whatever one might think about the Russian strongman, lying for the sake of political expediency is not in his character (a feature pointed to by many world leaders, including President George W. Bush). During his presidency, Putin has always maintained that he was not going to change the Constitution in order to run for a third term. At the same time, he repeatedly indicated his desire to endorse, sometime in 2007, a “successor.” This is exactly what happened in reality: in December 2007, Putin threw his weight behind Dmitri Medvedev who was nominated shortly before that by United Russia and other political parties.
In light of these “historic precedents”, it would appear sensible to interpret Putin’s Valdai statement literally: that he hasn’t made up his plans for 2012, much less beyond that, and the decision on which of the two, Putin or Medvedev, will run for Russia’s top office will be made no earlier than 2012 -- based on their shared analysis of political and economic situation in the country. (Putin specifically mentioned that the opinion of the United Russia party will be taken into consideration too. This is important: United Russia is the party that will officially nominate the candidate, be it Putin or Medvedev, and then use its formidable electoral campaign machine to ensure that the candidate wins a landslide victory).
One would have to admit that the West’s obsession with Putin’s persona (like ruminating over his K.G.B. background or deciphering the meaning of his bare-chest vacation pictures) sometimes borders on the irrational. Even though, it’s still hard to comprehend why so much anxiety is being caused by the prospect of Putin returning to the Kremlin again. No one in the West, to be sure, lost a good night’s sleep over the fact that, for example, in neighboring Finland, Urho Kekkonen had been the country’s Prime Minister and President for a whopping 23 years, practically in a row.
It appears that in the minds of many Western observers, Russia’s transition from a failing state in the 90s to a world power with a rapidly growing economy and assertive foreign policy is inseparable from Putin’s self-confident and often aggressive style of governing. That fuels a fear that for as long as Putin remains the country’s ruler, Russia will always be a difficult partner for the West.
At the core of this logic lies a belief that Putin can shape Russia’s future by whim and push the country, single-handedly, in whatever direction he may choose. This logic is false. Putin has been successful as president -- and is still tremendously popular. Why? Because back in 2000, he was able to understand, first and foremost, prevailing public sentiments, demands, and expectations. He was also able to recognize what kind of leadership Russia needed, given its political and socio-economic situation at the time, and then provided exactly this kind of leadership. Saying it differently, it wasn’t Putin who chose which country Russia was to become; it was Russia that accepted the most fitting man to lead it in difficult times.
Putin’s major objective as president has been preventing Russia’s economic and political collapse (which seemed almost inevitable at the end of the 90s, due to the disastrous policies of his predecessor). By the middle of his second presidential term, it became apparent that this goal was achieved. However, it also became clear that the stabilization came at a price of excessive centralization of power within the executive branch of government. Equally troubling, the Russian economy has developed a perilous addiction to the export of commodities to underwrite its fast growth. A sense that Russia needed an adjustment was up in the air.
The intensity with which President Medvedev has spoken recently about “modernization” created the impression that he was the first among the country’s leadership to recognize that Russia needed serious structural economic reforms. This isn’t true: in his address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006, then President Putin spoke at length about restructuring the Russian economy by instilling an “innovation quality” in it. Ever sensitive to blowing political winds, Speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, titled his speech to the 6th Congress of United Russia (November 2005) as “From Stability to Development.”
It appears that a combination of two factors – Putin’s strong intention to step down from the office and his understanding of the need for reforms – led Putin to conclude that Medvedev will be the best fit for the presidency for the next four years. It’s hardly by accident that Putin chose Medvedev with his business experience over the other potential “successor”, Sergei Ivanov, who had a background very similar to Putin’s.
It’s now common to hear, both inside and outside of Russia, that for the first 18 months of his presidency, Medvedev has done “nothing.” It’s worth remembering however that three months into Medvedev’s presidency, Russia had to fight a war with Georgia. A severe economic crisis followed shortly after, and nothing in Medvedev’s previous years in government had prepared him for dealing with either calamity. Not surprisingly, the modernization agenda had to be put on hold.
However, as the first, if only tentative, signs emerged that the Russian economy was coming out of the woods, Medvedev launched an aggressive PR campaign – by publishing an article “Russia, forward!” He next gave a number of public speeches -- to promote his plans of liberal economic reforms. Largely missed by Western observers was the fact that in contrast to Putin, Medvedev has linked the modernization of Russian economy with the need for concomitant political reforms, however timid and “evolutionary.”
Ever attentive to signs of the “split” between Putin and Medvedev, The Wall Street Journal’s Marc Champion interpreted Medvedev’s “Russia, forward!” article as an indication that Medvedev was “deeply critical of the system Mr. Putin has created.” It’s difficult to agree with such a conclusion. As a loyal member of Putin’s team and a top-level Kremlin insider, Medvedev has been intimately involved in the creation of this “system.” (This is as if the former Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, decided to criticize the Bush administration’s foreign policy after having a hand in it herself). Besides, many problems that Medvedev highlighted in his liberal manifesto, such as a natural resources-dependent economy and chronic corruption, were brought into the “system” years before Medvedev (and Putin, for that matter) was even born.
Medvedev obviously is fully aware that he’s up against formidable obstacles. And so far, his approach to promoting himself has been anything but traditional for Russia’s arcane system of political campaigning (or, rather, lack thereof). He described his “Russia, forward!” article as a basis for his upcoming address to the Federal Assembly and then invited the general public to provide feedback to his blog. As the Kommersant newspaper reported on October 14, about 20,000 responses had been posted by that time “by Russian citizens (including anarchists, futurists, economists and political scientists).”
Medvedev also reached out to the business community, not a common practice, to say the least, during Putin’s presidency. He met with members of the Russian Union of Industries and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) and invited them to participate in brainstorming for the economic section of the Federal Assembly address. The RUIE head, TNK-BP’s Mikhail Friedman, was asked by Medvedev to prepare a report analyzing the economic situation in the country.
Domestic critics predictably accused Medvedev in being short “on specifics.” This is true (but one has first to listen to the address itself). However, being “specific” is hardly Medvedev’s main priority. His goal seems to be to create interest to and, perhaps, even excitement about his ambitious goals, a sentiment he can capitalize upon when (if) running for re-election in 2012. Given the legendary apathy of the Russian electorate, this isn’t easy. But it’s doable. After all, Medvedev doesn’t have to prove that he’s “different” from Putin, much less that he’s “better.” All he has to do is to show the Russian voters that he’s fit to run the country for the next six years.
It therefore appears plausible that should Russia’s conditions remain conducive to reforms in 2012, it is Medvedev, not Putin, who’ll run for presidency. However, should the situation in the country deteriorate – as a result of the second wave of the economic crisis, growing violence in the North Caucasus or another military conflict – to the extent that “stability”, not “modernization”, will be again the Kremlin’s major objective, then it’s Putin who’ll become president.
Perhaps, this is what Vladimir Vladimirovich had in mind when he promised to sit down and talk with Dmitri Anatolievich in 2012.
The Post's early October coverage of Russia was a spillover from September. First, Sarah Marcus reported on the reaction, in Georgia, to the release of the Tagliavini Report covering last year's military conflict in South Ossetia. Predictably enough, state media controlled by Saakashvili insisted that the report "confirms that Russia invaded Georgia." Which led Marcus to conclude that:
"The friendly coverage is one reason the much-anticipated report to the European Union published on Wednesday is unlikely to hurt President Mikheil Saakashvili's political standing in Georgia, at least in the short term."
Warming up to cover the presidential election in Ukraine, Philip Pan wrote another piece on the state of Russia-Ukraine relations, focusing this time on growing tensions in Crimea where, according to Pan, only 40 percent of residents consider Ukraine as their motherland (a drop from 74 percent in 2006).
Princeton University's K. Anthony Appiah used the third anniversary of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya to lecture the Russians on the virtues of freedom of speech. At times, Appiah sounded almost like a rapper:
"But democracy is not functioning when citizens are denied basic information with which to judge the actions of their leaders...
But can we hold Russian citizens responsible for what their country does if they do not know what it is really doing?..
The freedom of journalists to report about life in their societies is critical, because without it, citizens lose their freedom, too...
The murder of journalists affects more than just journalists; and the undermining of Russian democracy is a problem for more than just Russia..."
Unfortunately, Appiah didn't provide a tune.
Carrie Johnson reported on Deputy Attorney General David Ogden's visit to Thailand aimed at pressing the local authorities to extradite to the U.S. the Russian arms merchant, Viktor Bout (the "merchant of death").
Mary Beth Sheridan covered, on October 14, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton's visit to Moscow and her unsuccessful attempt to secure Russia's advanced commitment to a set of specific sanctions on Iran -- should international negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program fail. The next day, Sheridan teamed up with Pan to describe Russia's mini-parliamentary crisis (that coincided with Clinton's visit) when three opposition parties stormed out of the Duma in protest to the alleged mass fraud in the recently held local elections. Having apparently realized that the subject was of little interest to Post's readers, Sheridan and Pan switched back to Clinton to cover her meeting with Russia's human rights activists where Clinton spoke passionately about the virtues of liberty.
Clinton's heroic effort to promote democracy in Russia has earned her a friendly pat on the back by the Post's editorial board. An October 17 editorial warmly praised her for "speak[ing] firmly in defense of true democracy." (True democracy? I always thought that the Post was averse to adjectives defining democracy. Or is this aversion confined to "sovereign democracy" only?).
Pan's October 19 article described another heroic effort: that of the Hermitage Capital Management to force the Kremlin to investigate an alleged theft, by Russian officials, of $230 million in the form of fraudulent tax refunds.
The security expert Walter Pincus drew attention, on October 20, to a study calling for decreasing of the operational readiness of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. According to the study that Pincus quoted:
"The high alert levels for U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are more political statements carried over from the Cold War than military necessities for the 21st century..."
On October 26, Pan continued a sad tradition of reporting on assassinations of opposition figures in the North Caucasus, this time on the killing of the prominent Ingushetian businessman and human right activist, Maksharip Aushev. Pan followed up on October 30 by painting a broader picture of growing violence in the restive region.
Needless to say, the Post's editors have immediately jumped into the ring. They called the murder of Maksharip Aushev "state-sponsored" and openly accused the President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, in organizing it. The editorial went even further by suggesting that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin condoned the murders:
"... Mr. Putin could put a stop to the state-sponsored murders if he chose to; he does not. This is not new, of course. Past Kremlin rulers have used murder to shore up their authority."
It's not clear how human rights activists in the North Caucasus could undermine Putin's "authority" as Prime Minister. But, hey, logic isn't something you go shopping for at the Washington Post mall.
Stupidity (at the Post and elsewhere) comes in many shapes and sizes, but the record of the month belongs to Human Rights Watch's Minky Worden, who opined that political killings in the North Caucasus undermine the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi:
"Why worry now about the Sochi Games? This year alone, several Russian rights activists and journalists have been killed within a few hundred miles of Sochi."
I like this "a few hundred miles." Does Worden intimate that a secret weapon with a capacity to kill over the distance of "a few hundred miles" will be used against participants and guests of the Sochi Games?
The rest of Russia op-eds were provided by what I'd call a group of angry white men: Charles Krauthammer, Jackson Diehl, Fred Hiatt, Jim Hoagland, and Robert Kagan. These gentlemen were enthusiastic supporters of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and continued occupation of Iraq -- despite multiple warnings that this will inevitably result in the increased influence of Iran. Having witnessed exactly that to happen and having no decency to admit their mistakes, these angry white men are now desperately looking for a bogeyman to blame for all of the U.S. problems in the Middle East.
And here is -- ta-da! -- the hobgoblin du jour: Russia.
Krauthammer is angry at the fact that "[i]n return for selling out Poland and the Czech Republic by unilaterally abrogating a missile-defense security arrangement", the Obama administration got nothing from Russia on Iran (which Krauthammer calls "the most serious security issue in the world." H'm. OK). And he's angry with Hillary Clinton for her being too "accommodating" to Moscow.
Diehl is angry because he suddenly realized that "[n]one of the steps the West is considering to stop the Iranian nuclear program is likely to work" and that "Russia and China [have] an excuse to veto new sanctions" against Iran.
Hiatt is angry at Russians because "they don't see things exactly as Americans" and because they stubbornly prefer following their own national interests instead of those of the U.S.
Hoagland is angry with "transaction-oriented Putin" because despite what Hoagland calls Russia's "political irrelevance", Russia's cooperation is still necessary "on Afghanistan, Iran and the broader Middle East." (Hoagland always finds a reason to be angry with Putin. One could say that his anger often borders on infatuation with VVP).
And Kagan is very angry with President Obama because Obama doesn't want to play hardball "with the mullahs." And Kagan is very angry with Russia too. What is the connection? Good question. But then, since when do the Post's authors have to explain their reasons for being angry with Russia?
This article first appeared in Russian and English on the website of the Strategic Culture Foundation (Фонд Стратегической Культуры), Moscow, Russia.
It may seem inconceivable that in such a beacon of democracy as the United States of America, there are “czars.” And not just one or two, but a few dozen. The explanation, however, is quite benign: American political jargon defines “czar” as a special envoy or adviser to the President asked by him to guide a high-priority initiative. Appointed by the president and reporting only to him, “czars” operate largely outside of congressional oversight. Hence the nickname.
According to various calculations, President Obama employs between 34 to 40 czars. In the area of foreign affairs, the most visible are Richard Holbrooke, special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and George Mitchell, the president’s representative in the Middle East.
There is no czar on Russia. However, if one carefully follows whom Obama charges with the most delicate conversations with Moscow, it appears that the czar on Russia does exist, and this role is played by none other than venerable Henry Kissinger, former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations.
What is attracting the young Democratic president to a Republican veteran almost twice his age? The answer is that 86-year-old Kissinger still commands unparalleled respect in the U.S. foreign policy community. More importantly, in the past few years, Kissinger has on several occasions visited Russia and developed close personal relations with Russia’s former President and currently Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin. It is therefore hardly surprising that lacking any serious foreign policy experience, yet pragmatic and ideologically flexible, Obama asked Kissinger for help.
Last December, when Obama was just forming his foreign policy team, he sent Kissinger to Moscow to meet with Putin and President Medvedev. The topic of the discussion was naturally kept confidential, but some foreign diplomats in Russia “leaked” that Kissinger brought to Moscow Obama’s offer to resume U.S.-Russia nuclear weapons control negotiations abandoned by the Bush administration.
In March of this year, Kissinger came to Moscow again, this time accompanied by a group of high-ranked retirees from previous administrations. The White House was quick to assure that Kissinger and his companions traveled to Russia as private citizens. However, the very timing of the visit – less than two weeks before the first Medvedev-Obama summit in London – makes it certain that Kissinger’s talks with the Russian leadership were strictly business.
The fact that Obama trusted Kissinger with the initial (and therefore the most important and difficult) stages of negotiations with Moscow – along with Obama’s complete lack of any experience of his own in dealing with the Kremlin – allows to speculate that Obama’s first foreign initiatives towards Russia were largely driven by Kissinger.
Indeed, Kissinger’s “fingerprints” can be seen all over the founding building blocks of Obama’s Russia policy.
First, since 2007, Kissinger has been actively promoting the concept of “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” According to this concept, all countries possessing nuclear weapons should adopt the strategic goal of their eventual total elimination. For Kissinger, this means that nuclear weapons control negotiations should form a basis for the U.S.-Russia cooperation.
It is exactly the approach adopted by the Obama administration: to almost exclusively focus on the renewal of the START-I treaty that expires in December.
Such an approach carries significant political risk for Obama, as many in Washington (both Republicans and Democrats) believe that any new nuclear arms treaty, including START, disproportionally benefits Russia and thus represents a “concession” to Moscow. Obama’s critics insist that the Iranian nuclear program must instead become the top topic in any conversation with Moscow. It seems plausible that in addressing this criticism, Obama will seek Kissinger’s “cover”, for Kissinger is firmly convinced that the road to a productive U.S.-Russia cooperation – on any issue -- runs through successful arms control negotiations.
Second, Kissinger has always been a principled disciple of Realpolitik that stresses tough pragmatism and the primacy of U.S. national security interests over ideological considerations. Kissinger strongly believes that even when disagreeing with Moscow on some critical issues, Washington should always be looking for cooperation wherever possible. What Washington should not be doing, however, is lecturing Moscow on Russia’s domestic politics, much less on whom the White House prefers to see sitting in the Kremlin.
It is widely believed that Democratic presidents tend to meddle in Russia’s internal affairs more often than their Republican counterparts. For that reason, last fall, some Russian analysts expressed concern that the newly-elected president Obama may launch a new crusade in defense of “democracy and human rights” in Russia.
So far, this has not happened. The Russian political institutions and human rights “violations” have not become the subjects of Obama’s conversations with Medvedev. Nor did members of the Obama administration adopt a habit of commenting on Russia’s internal developments. This seems to stem from Obama himself, and in so doing, Obama is obviously following the advice of his mentor.
It would appear that Obama’s policy toward Russia may also be influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser in the Carter administration. Being, like Kissinger, not a young man (he is 81), Brzezinski enthusiastically supported Obama’s bid for presidency, claiming that he provides “a new definition of America's role in the world.''
Brzezinski is considered the Democratic “response” to Kissinger. So, in a sense, Obama had no other choice than to make Brzezinski his foreign policy adviser too. Otherwise, Obama would have been accused in a lack of “party patriotism.”
The current role of Brzezinski in defining the foreign policy of the Obama administration is not very clear. Brzezinski is rumored to advise Obama on a broad range of issues including Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some new elements of the U.S. Middle East policy, such as urging Israel to halt expansion of the illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, are believed to have been introduced by Brzezinski.
Polish-born Brzezinski never concealed his intense anti-Russian views. At the same time, there has yet been no obvious indication that his sentiments vis-à-vis Russia have in any way influenced Obama’s Russia policy, at least publicly. A long-standing opponent of the Bush administration’s plans to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Brzezinski hailed Obama’s decision to scrap the deployment. He, however, strongly criticized the president for the manner in which this decision was delivered to the Polish and Czech governments (indicating that he wasn’t consulted on the matter).
It’s conceivable that Brzezinski’s influence on defining policy towards Russia may increase in the future. Analysts in both countries have long argued that a success in the U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations – and the atmosphere of mutual trust this success will help to create – will allow both countries to get down to the issues where differences are still huge. One such issue is the controversy over NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia. Brzezinski’s position on this issue is well-known: the acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance will irreversibly remove these two countries from the Russian sphere of influence. Everyone, of course, remembers Brzezinski’s famous line: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire.”
And yet, careful analysis of Brzezinski’s latest publications implies that his approach to U.S-Russia relations has become more nuanced. For example, in a recent article in the “Foreign Affairs” magazine, Brzezinski argued that while NATO membership for Ukraine and NATO must remain the strategic goal for the alliance, this process should not be rushed. Instead, it should be conditioned by establishing more close ties between NATO and Russia (using the format of the NATO-Russia Council).
Furthermore, Brzezinski envisions that the future cooperation between Russia and NATO may be strengthened by establishing formal contacts between NATO and two regional organizations with a strong Russian presence: Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
As it stands, both Kissinger and Brzezinski don’t seem to have any plans to become shadows of the U.S. foreign policy past. Quite to the contrary, they intend to build bridges to its future.
On September 13, with no single Russia-related article published in the Washington Post, I thought that the subtitle of this piece will eventually read: What the Washington Post did not write about Russia in September 2009.
It's not that nothing of significance has happened in Russia in the first half of the month. Just three days before, on September 10, the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev published an article, "Russia, forward!", outlining his ambitious agenda for the country's modernization. However, the Post's editors found no reason to even mention Medvedev's publication (following apparently the in-house rule: "About Russia, either bad or nothing").
Then, on September 14, Philip Pan came up with an article accusing Russia in meddling in the presidential election campaign in Ukraine and even in "laying the groundwork for a ... serious confrontation with Ukraine." Short on arguments and laced with gratuitous anti-Russian swings, the article was so different from Pan's usually thoughtful and fact-based stuff that one couldn't help but question whether Pan actually wrote it.
In the first Russia-related op-ed of the month, on September 15, Anne Applebaum lamented the decision by GQ magazine to pull back, from its Russian edition, the article "Vladimir Putin's Dark Rise to Power", by Scott Anderson. The article recycled, for the umpteenth time, insinuations that Russian security services were behind a series of bomb explosions in Moscow in 2000. The ever-perceptive Applebaum immediately concluded that the Russian government is now capable of exerting a de facto control not only over Russian, but also over American, media outlets.
(Let's play out Applebaum's logic a bit. Someone submits an article to the Post insinuating, for the umpteenth time, that the Bush administration was fully aware in advance of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 -- and the Internet was full of such nonsense in the days preceding the 8th anniversary of 9/11. Naturally, the Post rejects this piece, first, because this is bullshit and, second, because this is old bullshit. Bingo: the U.S. government is exerting a de facto control over the Post.)
The Wikipedia defines the Valdai International Discussion Club as "an international framework for the leading experts from around the world to debate on Russia and its role in the world...The club unites leading foreign experts and journalists who analyze Russia’s politics, economy and culture." That said, will someone please explain me what Jim Hoagland does in the Valdai Club? His article, "Two Faces of Russia", that reports on his this year's Valdai experience, is anything but the analysis of "Russia’s politics, economy and culture."
Hoagland begins his description of a meeting of the Valdai Club participants with Vladimir Putin by quoting the Russian prime-minister: "You all look well fed, well dressed." Everyone in the room -- and the rest of the world too -- took this line for what it was: a trade-mark Putin acerbic joke. But not Hoagland, who immediately sensed "a spy's gambit", an attempt to "compromise or co-opt [read: recruit for Russian intelligence services] 45 foreign academics, think-tank experts and journalists."
Needless to say, Hoagland was the only one in the room who did not fall victim to Putin's charm and was still capable of clearly seeing "the vengeful, hostile-to-change and sensitive-to-slight part of the Russian personality" represented by Putin. In successfully resisting the recruiting advances of the Russian prime-minister, Hoagland joins none other than the former president Bush, whom, according to Hoagland, Putin tried to recruit too, but "failed, and will never forget or forgive." Kudos to both George W. and Jim!
What else did we learn from Hoagland's "analysis"? Not much. That Putin is "the former KGB colonel" (he was actually lieutenant-colonel) and that "he preserves the option of taking back the top job in three years." That Medvedev is "an attorney" and "may be developing ideas of his own about ... 2012." That's about it.
Next year, the organizers of the Valdai Club should consider replacing Hoagland with someone who'd bring analysis of "Russia’s politics, economy and culture" to a level at least slightly higher than that displayed by popular Russophobic websites.
The decision by the Obama administration to scrap the deployment of elements of missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic -- first reported by Michael Shear, Ann Scott Tyson and Debbi Wilgoren on September 17 -- has brought Russia back to the forefront of the Post's attention. Following-up on the subject the next day, Shear and Scott Tyson pointed out that the decision could potentially facilitate greater U.S.-Russia cooperation on Iran and provide a fertile ground for the ongoing START treaty negotiations.
The news also had a positive impact on Philip Pan, who returned to his usual fact-based reporting style. On September 18, Pan reported that the U.S.' decision was met with cautious approval in Moscow, but the reaction was more complicated in Poland and the Czech Republic. Teaming up with Wilgoren, Pan next wrote about the new NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen's, call for improved relations between the alliance and Russia, including the possibility of linking their respective missile defense systems. Mary Beth Sheridan and Pan repeated the assertion that President Obama's decision was expected to smooth talks on renegotiating START, but warned that there could be resistance in the U.S. Senate against attempts to link START and U.S. missile defense.
Finally, Walter Pincus reported on a little-noticed meeting with reporters and the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates during which Gates admitted that Moscow was right about complaining: "that the radar that was going into the Czech Republic looked deep into Russia and actually could monitor the launches of their ICBMs as well." Pincus reminded us that:
"Up to that time, it was generally believed that the radar would be directed only at Iran. No government official had publicly acknowledged that the radar, which had a 360-degree capability, would be able to see as far as the Caucasus Mountains inside Russia."
(Meaning that the Russians always had a point criticizing the location of the radar).
The Post's editorial board was quick to react to the new development. An editorial, on September 18, did not directly question the validity of the Obama administration's novel missile defense approach, but the Post editors took issue with the fact that:
"By replacing a planned radar system in the Czech Republic with another in the Caucasus and by ending a commitment to place 10 long-range missile interceptors in Poland, President Obama satisfies the unjustified demands of Russia's leaders, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. Moscow implausibly claimed to feel threatened by those systems; in reality, Russia objects to any significant U.S. deployment in NATO countries that once belonged to the Soviet bloc."
The editorial was obviously meant to provide a list of talking points upon which the Post's regulars could elaborate. And the usual suspects haven't disappointed.
David Kramer (the tireless fighter against the "grand bargain" concept) accused the administration in "capitulation to Russian pressure", "placating Russia", and "[w]orse, rewarding bad Russian behavior." Unfortunately, usually attentive to details Kramer didn't elaborate which bad Russian behavior he had in mind in this particular context.
German Marshall Fund's Ronald Asmus while acknowledging that "[t]he defense architecture the administration proposes may make more strategic sense", is very unhappy that Obama's decision "has created a crisis of confidence in Washington's relations with Central and Eastern Europe." According to Asmus, some leaders of the Central and East European countries "are no longer certain NATO is capable of coming to their rescue if there were a crisis involving Russia." (I love this euphemistic "a crisis involving Russia").
Anna Applebaum was so kind as to let us peek into her bedroom: by informing us that at the time when Obama tried to reach the Polish prime-minister by phone (the latter refused to take the call), Applebaum's husband, Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski, "was asleep."
Finally, Jim Hoagland treated us to yet another piece of his "analysis." This time, based on his conversations with unnamed Russian military "analysts" (a "tart-tongued Russian defense analyst" and "an authoritative Russian military man") , Hoagland accused president Medvedev in cheating on his commitments to nuclear arms control:
"The Russians happily pocketed the prestige of being back on equal footing with the United States in nuclear affairs. But they seem to place a low priority on the actual results that will come out of the talks."
On September 30, Pan reported (and followed-up the next day with an extended version of the same) on the release of the much-anticipated Tagliavini Report covering the last year's military conflict in South Ossetia.
Last August, it took the Post only a few hours to react to Russia's confronting Georgia's brazen attack on sleeping Tskhinvali -- by calling to stop Russia from preventing the massacre, by the Georgian troops, of innocent civilians. This time around, the Post's editorial board took its time -- a full three days -- to deliver its "verdict" on the Tagliavini Report. Given that a 1,000-page document gave every involved party something to hang on, it's hardly surprising that the Post called the report "to be particularly disappointing to Mr. Putin and his apologists" -- invoking the memory of the Post editors' soul mate, the legendary Bolshevik Vladimir Lenin, who once mused that by picking up appropriate quotes from the Bible, one can compose a convincing anti-religious rant.
Moving from the "analysis" business to a prediction one, the editorial concludes that "another war [in Georgia] will soon follow." As I wrote before, this is something that the Post has been craving for the whole month of August.
This article first appeared in Russian and English on the website of the Strategic Culture Foundation (Фонд Стратегической Культуры), Moscow, Russia.
The Vice-President of the United States, Joe Biden, is famous for his gaffes. From time to time, Biden says things that would make people scratch their heads incredulously: “What did good ol' Joe have in mind?” For example, in one of his interviews last year, Biden decided to compliment the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. According to Biden, at the outset of the Great Depression of 1929, Roosevelt “got on the television” and honestly told to the American people what was going on in the country. The problem with this Biden’s narrative was that in 1929, Roosevelt wasn’t yet elected president, and TV wasn’t invented either.
Having become Vice-President (and having confused, on Inauguration Day, the name of the Supreme Court judge who administered his oath), Biden didn’t stop “gaffing”, forcing the White House to regularly intervene.
So when at the conclusion of his July trip to Ukraine and Georgia, Biden gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal, the eyebrows of many analysts and pundits went up again. And for a good reason indeed. Only three weeks before, Biden’s boss, President Barack Obama, told in Moscow that the United States was interested in a “strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia.” Yet speaking with the Wall Street Journal, Biden asserted that the U.S. national interest will be better served with Russia weakened by the economic crisis (and allegedly more compliant because of that).
The White House intervened again and dispatched Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to repair the damage. Speakingat a talk show, Clinton essentially disavowed Biden. However, calling Russia in passing a “great power”, Clinton reminded the audience that it was Biden who first, in the Obama administration, called for a “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations.
Only time will tell what Biden’s newspaper escapade really was: one of his usual gaffes or a manifestation of something potentially more troubling. For example, that inadvertently or not, Biden spelled out not a “facade”, but the real Obama administration’s attitude towards Russia. As Russians would say: “What Obama has in mind, Biden has on the tip of his tongue” ("Что у Обамы на уме, то у Байдена на языке").
One thing is clear in any case: if Biden’s shot against the official line might have been surprising to some, then the very fact of his steady anti-Russian sentiments could have not. Everyone in Washington knows of Biden’s long (and going way back to the times of the Cold War) record of Senate resolutions accusing Russia in every imaginable sin and calling for a tough stance against Moscow. Many of those resolutions were co-authored by Biden with his Senate buddy, John McCain, last year’s Republican presidential candidate (and himself a veteran of the Cold War in good standing). In August 2008, Biden and McCain led voices in the Senate that, despite all the facts on the ground, blamed Russia for the tragic events in South Ossetia.
Earlier, back in 2002, outraged by Russian restrictions on the import of U.S. poultry, Biden demandedto punish Russia with trade sanctions. Biden’s outrage had a simple explanation: the state of Delaware which Biden represents in the U.S. Senate is a major poultry producer, and Russia’s actions threatened Delaware farmers with losses.
A natural question arises: to which extent can Biden’s anti-Russian views influence the Obama administration’s policy toward Russia? Could Biden’s negative “aura” become a permanent fixture in the Washington-Moscow dialogue?
This concern seems to carry additional weight given the fact that Biden is widely considered a foreign policy expert; in fact, he has repeatedly served as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When Obama announced, last year, his choice of Biden as his running mate, many concluded that a novice in international affairs, as he was, Obama would use Biden as his major adviser on the topic.
Besides, memories of the previous power “tandem” of President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney are still fresh. Immense influence exerted by Cheney on the Bush administration’s foreign policy, especially during the first term, doesn’t seem to have precedents in the history of the American presidency. Many would agree that it was Cheney who was primarily responsible for bringing U.S.-Russian relations to their lowest point since the Cold War.
And yet, careful analysis of the job distribution in Obama’s White House leads to the conclusion that Biden’s influence on the U.S. policy toward Russia will be limited, if not minimal. Here is why.
Cheney was able to hijack the foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration, first, because of Bush’s striking incompetence, and second, due to the weakness of Bush’s both Secretaries of State, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. In this respect, two things are absolutely clear: Obama isn’t Bush (to say the very least), and Hillary Clinton won’t tolerate anyone, including Biden, stepping on her turf.
In addition, Obama’s appreciation of Biden’s foreign policy credentials notwithstanding, the president is also acutely aware of the fact that Biden has spent almost 40 years in the Senate and knows like no one else the Washington political kitchen. All signals coming out of the White House indicate that Obama is going to use Biden as his right-hand man in the major political battles, be it Iraq, Afghanistan or, say, health-care reform. Granted, Biden’s opinion on every policy decision, including U.S.-Russia relations, will be taken into account, but for as long as these relations don’t enter a state of crisis (and let’s hope this won’t happen), Biden’s participation will be minimal at best. It’s telling that the vice-president wasn’t included in the bilateral presidential commission established by presidents Obama and Medvedev to facilitate the U.S.-Russia dialogue.
Who then will be defining U.S. policy toward Russia? Hillary Clinton is an obvious choice given the nature of her job. As such, she will also be co-coordinating (along with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov) the bilateral presidential committee. Then, there is National Security Adviser, James Jones, whose trademark low-key profile makes it difficult, at this point, to understand his role in defining U.S. foreign policy course. Not to be discounted is U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, who advised Obama on international issues when he ran for president. Having sent Rice to the U.N., Obama has unexpectedly elevated her status into a Cabinet position, making Rice report both to him and Clinton simultaneously.
It is getting increasingly clear that the only thing that Obama won’t let happen is that someone in his administration becomes the dominant player in the foreign policy arena. Like Henry Kissinger was in the Nixon administration or Zbigniew Brzezinsky in Carter’s. No, the only person in charge of all major foreign policy decisions will be Obama and no one else.
Obviously, Obama will still need advisers. Interestingly, it appears that both Kissinger and Brzezinsky belong to a circle of Obama’s informal foreign affairs advisers on a broad range of topics, including U.S.-Russia relations. It may turn out the opinions of both on perspectives of the U.S.-Russia dialogue would carry more weight than the ones of the members of the Obama “official” foreign policy team.
But what then do Kissinger and Brzezinsky think about Russia? Well, this is already a different story.
Please meet Michael Hockney, a Canadian photographer and the Artistic Director of the Project "Colours of Russia." Take a look at these pictures and enjoy the peculiar mixture of simplicity and sophistication created by the hand of an experienced professional:
(I'm certainly biased because the slide-show is full of pictures of my beloved St. Petersburg. Curiously, there are many images of weddings. Fits my own impression of St. Petersburg this summer: a lot of weddings and young moms with strollers.)
The "Colours of Russia" project (recently covered by Itar-Tass) is part of a broader campaign to fight country stereotypes created by the media. Russia -- obviously not spoiled by the abundance of objective coverage -- has been selected for the first release from The Colour Group. The ultimate goal of the project, as I understand it, is to cover as many cities and countries in the world as Michael and his partner William Zlatanov are able to travel to.
I want to thank The Colour Group for yet another opportunity to see the Russia I know and love and I wish Michael and William many happy shots.
Or, borrowing the Russian line of the month:
The Colour Group, forward!
Remember Salvador Dali's "Premonition of Civil War"?
It would seem that the Post's authors have spent the whole summer in a state of premonition of a new Russian-Georgian war. Persuaded by a bunch of professional Cassandras that another attack of "increasingly aggressive" Russia on "democratic, pro-Western" Georgia was imminent, they apparently filled their laptops with war stories and were just waiting for the first signs/sounds of military activities to release them.
Here we have Philip Pan's August 2 article, "Tensions flare up in Russia, Georgia. Moscow says South Ossetia was attacked." Sounds like a promising beginning of a series of battlefield reports, doesn't it? (True, Pan took time to write, on August 6, about two Russian submarines spotted off the East Coast of the United States. But giving his interpretation of this event as a "more assertive Russian military posture", one cannot accuse him in taking his eye off the ball.)
But the war never materialized, and the the Post's journalists had to adjust to the uneventful reality. Dispatched to the presumed war zone, Sarah Marcus switched gears and filed a report about the daily struggle of thousands of refugees who fled last year's hostilities to settle in refugee camps in Georgia. Picking up the war theme again, Pan described the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's August 12 trip to Abkhazia.
The editorial coverage of the first two August weeks hasn't been impressive, either. Predictably enough, Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was allowed, on August 6, to repeat the very same lies about the causes of the Five Day War he has been telling to the rest of the world since August 2008. However, hardly coincidentally, in an op-ed published the next day, Howard Berman, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cold-showered the Georgian president by criticizing the country's democratic developments under Saakashvili. The headline of the article, "Georgia's unmet promise", nicely summarizes what Berman had to say on the subject.
The Russophobic prima donna, Anne Applebaum, made her solo appearance on August 11 with an opus titled "A good month for bad news." One doesn't have to be an oracle to figure out what Applebaum considers good "bad news." But having been deprived too of a possibility to express her outrage at another Russian "invasion" of Georgia, Applebaum had to settle for less: on blasting the Obama administration for its lack of a Plan B in its relations with the Kremlin. "What if Russia invades again?", rhetorically asked Applebaum. Well, I can answer this question: the diva will be busy for another season.
The month of August hasn't been gentle to Applebaum in any way. Later in the month, reporting on the commemoration in Gdansk, Poland, of the beginning of World War II, she couldn't wait to castigate Russia for its unwillingness to acknowledge the wrongs of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But the article in Gazeta Wyborczapublished by Putin on the eve of his trip to Poland -- presenting a balanced and respectful to Polish sensitivities point of view -- has sucked the air out of Applebaum's piece, reducing it to yet another round of babbling about "Russia's aggression toward its neighbors."
Philip Pan regained his footage by covering increased violence in the North Caucasus region, including the slaughter of the head of a children's charity in Chechnya, Zarema Sadulayeva, and a suicide attack on a police station in Nazran, Ingushetia, resulting in more than 20 deaths. (Moscow Carnegie's Masha Lipman attempted to boost Pan's reports with her explanation of the roots of the violence in the region -- with "the Russian government" and Ramzan Kadyrov being named as usual suspects -- but after reading Pan's energetic and colorful stories, Lipman's habitually bland narrative felt like drinking Miller Lite after Baltika №6 (Porter)). Showing his remarkable ability to multitask -- and to do solid homework -- Pan wrote an insightful article on Russia's legal system and touched upon the bizarre story of the Arctic Sea freighter.
A member of the supporting crew, the matryoshka expert, Sarah Schafer, wrote about Russia's growing tuberculosis problem.
Finally, Tim Johnston reported on the rejection, by a court in Thailand, to extradite to the United States the Russian arms dealer, Viktor Bout, whom the U.S. authorities suspect in illegal arms trafficking.
Curiously, this court decision was the topic that inspired the only (!) Post's Russia-related editorial of the month. Predictably, the Post's editors didn't like the court decision, for it nullified the results of a brilliant sting operation by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents. Moreover, the Post's editors expected "...Mr. Bout telling American authorities what he may know of the Kremlin's possible ties to illegal arms trafficking." The Post's editors apparently reasoned that by having Mr. Bout in the U.S. and applying to him "enhanced interrogation techniques", obtaining evidence of the Kremlin's criminal activities would be a slam dunk.
The Council on Foreign Relations' Stephen Sestanovich contributed the only piece of serious analysis. In an op-ed published on August 6, Sestanovich criticized the Obama administration's handling of its relations with Russia. He accused the president in placing too much emphasis on nuclear arms negotiations with Moscow, arguing that "the strategic nuclear balance [is in] the heart of Russia's claim to be a great power." (One can often hear this argument that Russia clings to its nuclear arsenal only in order to feel itself a great power. I would challenge everyone, including Sestanovich, to come up with a statement made by a Russian leader saying something to that effect. In the recently published President Medvedev's "liberal manifesto", the Russian president invokes Russia's greatness on a number of occasions, but never in connection with nuclear weapons).
Sestanovich argues that instead of getting closer with Russia, the U.S. would do better providing support, including military training and equipment, to Russia's neighbors in order "to increase their independence from Moscow." It will be certainly up to Sestanovich to explain which U.S. national interest will be served by further militarization of the post-Soviet space.
As for Sestanovich's implicit suggestion to isolate or even deter Russia instead of engaging it, we'll surely see a lot of those on the Post's pages in the weeks and months to come.
A couple of events over the past few weeks have renewed my interest in the role American Vice Presidents play in defining government's policies.
First, I've learned that 8 years ago, the CIA was told not to inform Congress about a clandestine counter-terrorism program the agency had created in the wake of 9/11. I see absolutely no crime in keeping the Hill in the dark: the very moment it gets involved, any CIA program ceases being clandestine. The only sexy part of the whole story was that the order to stay mum came not from then-President George W. Bush, but from then-Vice President Dick Cheney.
There is no point in repeating stories about the enormous influence exerted by Cheney in the years of Bush's presidency, especially in the areas of national security, foreign policy, and energy (remember the Energy Task Force controversy?); they're still fresh in everyone's memory. Besides, only a total amnesiac wouldn't remember pictures depicting relations between Cheney and Bush as the ones between a puppetmaster and a puppet, respectively. And yet, I don't remember that visiting heads of foreign states requested a special meeting with the Vice President. It was always assumed that it was the President who was making decisions. A Decider, so to speak.
Then, I read about an interview the current Vice President, Joe Biden, gave to The Wall Street Journal. While Biden's boss, President Obama, claimed, on a recent trip to Moscow, that the U.S. wants a "strong, peaceful and prosperous Russia", Biden implied instead that U.S. national interests will be better served with Russia weakened by the ongoing economic crisis.
Biden's point of view carries certain merits. Besides, one can easily imagine that Biden has articulated -- inadvertently or not -- a true White House position vis-a-vis Russia. (As Russians would say: "Что у Обамы на уме, то у Байдена на языке"). The question though is whom, Obama or Biden, is the Kremlin supposed to listen to? Or, saying it differently, who is the boss in the Obama-Biden "tandem" as far as the U.S. policy toward Russia is concerned?
And then, there is Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton who couldn't simply sit on the sidelines in the middle of this happening. Commenting on Biden's interview, Clinton swung the pendulum back by calling Russia a "great power." (I think the Kremlin should demand that the White House take great care of Clinton so that another injury won't prevent her from attending the next Obama-Medvedev summit).
And then, there is the U.S. Senate, populated with a hundred supersized egos, each of which believing in their ability to shape international agreements the president is negotiating. A nonbinding "sense of the Senate" resolution has been approved demanding that any follow-on START treaty be stripped of limitations on ballistic missile defense, a provision that will certainly shrink Obama's maneuvering room in his dealing with the Russians.
The power of Congress to derail presidents' ability to "deliver" on their promises isn't to be underestimated. Both presidents Clinton and Bush Jr. promised to graduate Russia from the anachronistic Jackson-Vanik amendment. In both cases, Congress said no. President Obama has promised the same to President Medvedev, and so far, there has been no indication that this time around, the outcome will be any different.
With the official Washington's Russia policy lacking common denominator, it seems only fitting -- in some ironic way -- that so much attention in the U.S. is being paid to the question of who is in charge in Russia. Is it President Dmitry Medvedev -- as written in the country's Constitution -- or his powerful Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, unquestionably the most celebrated contemporary Russian (and, as we have recently learned, the world's fifth sexiest politician)?
Here we read Peter Reddaway's article on this hot subject published in the usually no-nonsense National Interest. Supplied with a tasteful headline ("Two-Part Czar") and high-quality pictures of Medvedev and Putin, the article begins with calling the Medvedev-Putin tandem (Reddaway actually has another, more sophisticated, term for it: "the system of dual-executive leadership") "unnatural" and warning that, due to "the awkward tandem-leadership arrangement", "[t]he Russian leadership is becoming unstable..."
(I have to say that, for some reason, Reddaway's calling the Medvedev-Putin duo "unnatural" bothers me. It sounds almost as if Reddaway considers only a "one-part czar" arrangement -- being it with a Tsar or a General Secretary -- as natural for Russia. Hopefully not, for I believe that Reddaway -- just like the rest of us -- wants Russia to be a democracy.)
Reddaway proceeds with painting a scary picture of Russia going to the brink of a disaster:
"If, as seems plausible, the recession and the clumsy tandem structure should make the Putin-Medvedev leadership increasingly erratic, the implications would be many—a deteriorating economic policy...regional governors asserting more autonomy, the spread of popular discontent..."
And more:
"...the two men could, before too long, lose the public trust that they now enjoy, which is a crucial linchpin holding a fragile state and society together."
Tellingly, Reddaway didn't back his dire predictions with facts, and today, four months after the publication of his piece, we still see little evidence of the perils of "the clumsy tandem structure." The Russian economy hasn't collapsed; in fact, it even shows some signs of a timid recovery. Popular discontent has never materialized as a serious threat to the regime, and both Medvedev and Putin still enjoy high approval ratings. Unless, of course, you take seriously the following Reddaway's assertion:
"With the Putin-Medvedev duo distracted by the recession and their complex relations with each other, [the] regions have increased their autonomy with impunity. For example...Tatarstan practiced regional protectionism by favoring local companies over outsiders."
(The "Buy Tatar Act", so to speak. What a blow to the stability of the regime!).
With the same unburdened-by-facts attitude, Reddaway settles on the question of the leadership in the Medvedev-Putin "complex relations." Referring to largely unnamed "observers" and "critics", he concludes that Putin behaves as "the real czar" whereas Medvedev remains "essentially subservient to his longtime boss."
Reddaway's "academic" piece could be easily dismissed as a modern-day burp of ye olde Kremlinology. Unfortunately, the time-honored art of reading Russia tea leaves happens to be practiced right up in the White House. Or, at least, so we're told by the Washington World Security Institute's Nikolai Zlobin. In a late July article in Vedomosti, Zlobin described intense White House deliberations, on the eve of President Obama's visit to Moscow, on how Obama was to split his time between Medvedev and Putin. According to Zlobin, the very schedule of Obama's talks with both Russian leaders was supposed to send a message: whom the Obama administration considers "the real head of state."
(I find this absurd. Anyone even remotely familiar with the diplomatic protocol knows that a visiting party has only a limited influence with regards to whom -- and for how long -- they'll be communicating with on a receiving team. Demands "We'll talk to Putin (Medvedev) only!" would have gone nowhere.)
A fateful decision had been made, continues Zlobin, for Obama "to bet on Medvedev", that is, to "discuss all principal questions with Medvedev only." And why? Here comes the explanation:
"Obama's aides' way of thinking was that such an approach...would both forward the rule of law in Russia and help Medvedev become a truly independent...president, and strengthen his prestige internationally. That would do good to to the Russian democracy..."
Now, let me get this straight. Since becoming president in May 2008, Medvedev has attended one G20 and two G8 summits, made 35 foreign trips, signed numerous treaties, agreements and protocols, and met with dozens of foreign leaders (6 of them in the month of August alone, including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel-- their third meeting this year). But it wasn't until Medvedev hosted President Obama in the Kremlin -- sticking to the schedule so brilliantly designed by "Obama's aides" -- that the whole world began treating Medvedev as "a truly independent president." Ingenious!
The problem isn't that by trying to take care of the international prestige of the Russian president, "Obama's aides" betray a bit of megalomania. The problem is that they give Obama bad advice by dragging the president into ridiculous discussions or putting into his mouth comments about Putin's body parts. The problem is that a senior Obama Russia adviser still confuses his previous job, which was to promote "democracy" and "the rule of law" in Russia , with his current job, which is to promote America's national interests.
True, the Medvedev-Putin "system of dual-executive leadership" is a long-due challenge to Russia's highly centralized and monopolistic power structure. State bureaucrats and special interests, who used to have only one place, the presidential administration, to demonstrate their loyalty or apply their lobbying to, are now forced to make difficult choices every single day.
However, when it comes to Russia's security interests, the crucial decisions are not made by Medvedev. And not by Putin. These decisions are being made by a consensus of Russian political elites. That's why Medvedev will surely "deliver" on whatever START treaty he is to sign with Obama.
I wish I could be so sure about our president.
This article first appeared on Vladimir Frolov's Russia Profile Weekly Expert Panel (August 21, 2009):
In a July 26 interview with the NTV, President Dmitri Medvedev outlined what looked like a contour of Russia’s new diplomatic approach vis-à-vis its neighbors, including CIS countries. A quote is warranted here:
“…under difficult circumstances, we must be able to give a response. Sometimes, a tough one; sometimes, very tough. But only when the interests of our citizens are threatened. In all other circumstances, we should be predictable, strong and comfortable partners to our neighbors.”
Medvedev spoke specifically about Ukraine too:
“…much depends on these relations [between Russia and Ukraine] because our countries are very close, our people are, as they say, brothers, and our economies are tightly intertwined. Certainly, we expect that in the future, these relations will be better than now. Much better.”
It’s hard to deny that the spirit of Medvedev’s August 11 letter to the president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, didn’t match what he said to NTV’s Kirill Pozdnyakov. Besides, it isn’t immediately clear what has happened between July 26 and August 11 that precipitated such a “tough” shot across the border. What interests of Russian citizens have been threatened over this period of time? (I’ll return to the timing of the letter later).
To me, the most troubling part of the letter is Medvedev’s lightly-veiled threat not to deal with Yushchenko until his term in office expires.
Ukraine seems to be joining a list of countries whose leaders Russia doesn’t want to have any relations with. The first country to enter the list has been Georgia, as Medvedev repeatedly insisted that Moscow will have no dialogue with the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili is a war criminal and doesn’t deserve any better. Yet, Moscow makes no serious attempts to engage any other part of Georgia’s political class. What is Moscow hoping for? That Saakashvili will be soon gone? Hardly: all the signs indicate that Misha will be around until 2013. And what if the next Georgian president will be Irakli Alasania, whom Moscow doesn’t like, either? Will any meaningful relations between Russia and Georgia be postponed until 2018?
True, Yushchenko has almost zero chances to get re-elected. However, in politics, miracles do happen (and actually happen more often than in “real” life). Besides, it’s not beyond our imagination that the next Ukrainian president will come from the Yushchenko camp and will continue his anti-Russian policies. Then what? Wait until 2015?
Although Russia’s troubled relations with Ukraine and Georgia can be viewed as an exception, it’s no secret that not much love flourishes between Russia and the rest of its neighbors. Will Moscow stop talking to each of them – one after another – should the leadership of these countries pursue what the Kremlin would interpret as anti-Russian policies? From here, one could see a short path to Russia sitting in a “diplomatic vacuum”, i.e. surrounded by countries it doesn’t want to deal with until more Russia-friendly regimes are established there. Hopefully, this is not how President Medvedev sees the future of the country’s policy in the “near abroad.”
Other than that, I don’t think that Medvedev’s letter will have any long-term effect. Certainly, not on the outcome of the presidential election in Ukraine. The election is still months away, and in the heat of the inevitably nasty campaign, the letter will be safely forgotten (on the assumption, of course, that Medvedev will restrict himself to only one letter to Yushchenko). Besides, any election in Ukraine, especially presidential, is, first and foremost, about money. Big money. Relations with Russia, however important, will be considered by any presidential candidate as a secondary matter – to be dealt with after it’s decided who’s in charge of state revenues.
Which brings us back to the question: why has this letter been aired in the first place and why did it happen on August 11?
The explanation that the letter was a “warning” to the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yulia Timoshenko, and the Head of the Party of Regions, Victor Yanukovich -- both are leading presidential candidates -- doesn’t strike me as particularly credible. Timoshenko will be in Moscow in a few weeks, and both Medvedev and Putinwill have all the time in the world to deliver their “warnings” in person – without creating yet another PR blunder. And I take it for granted that the Kremlin has channels of communication with Yanukovich too.
The explanation that I favor is different. Medvedev has used the letter to announce that he’s delaying sending to Kiev Russia’s new Ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, whose appointment the president made official two days later, on August 13. The position of Russia’s Ambassador to Ukraine is considered to be of special importance to Gazprom(some call this post, only half-jokingly, “Ambassador of Gazprom”, and the previous Ambassador, the former Chairman of Gazprom, Victor Chernomyrdin, fitted this description perfectly). One can speculate that Zurabov wasn’t a person Gazprom wanted to see in Kiev and that Gazprom used its closeness to Medvedev -- the former Gazprom Chairman himself -- to effectively block Zurabov’s appointment, at least temporarily.
The notion that Medvedev would use a “foreign policy” letter to intervene into domestic corporate turf wars might appear cynical. But not to those who always remember the famous quote: “All politics is local.”