The Low-Down

AI Tool For Wounded Troops With No Nearby Medic Being Built By Ukraine, US

2026-09-07T12:55:15.933-04:00

If there is no medic around, take a photo of the wound with the app and get AI-provided advice on how to treat it. JL

Kelsey Baker reports in Business Insider:

For years, troops relied on handwritten cards and bulky manuals for battlefield medical guidance. Now, Ukrainian and US developers are building and testing AI tools to help when there isn't a medic nearby and evacuation isn't an option. "As the tactical environment limits the ability to move, then we have to provide care wherever we are." The app uses Google's Gemini platform to guide a user through a trauma response. A soldier can photograph an injury, answer follow-up questions, and immediately receive relevant tactical combat casualty care protocol.
For years, troops relied on handwritten cards and bulky manuals for battlefield medical guidance. Now, Ukrainian and US developers are building and testing AI tools to help when there isn't a medic nearby and evacuation isn't an option.
Battlefields increasingly shaped by drones have pushed troops into small, dispersed teams that may be far from medical care when someone is wounded.
"As the tactical environment limits the ability to move, then we have to provide care wherever we are," said retired military trauma surgeon Travis Polk, who leads the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Military Medicine Research. His team has developed a tool to address what he called a "tactical mismatch," where wounded troops may be far from the medical care they desperately need.

Another tool, the Tactical Aid Assistant app known as ALICE, was developed by Ukrainian trauma surgeon Roman Kuziv, the commander of the eastern Medical Forces and Sustainment Group, and is now being tested by medics at facilities near the front.
Kuziv told Business Insider the app uses Google's Gemini platform to guide a user through a trauma response. A soldier can photograph an injury, answer follow-up questions, and immediately receive relevant tactical combat casualty care protocol.

"Many times under the stress and under the environment of the war, they make the mistakes about how to treat themselves or how to treat their friends," Kuziv said.
Troops train to provide prolonged casualty care during a training event in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Airman 1st Class Maria Gonzalez Garduno/US Air Force
One potential use for an app like this is helping users reassess tourniquets, the tight bands used to stop severe bleeding. Amid the chaos of combat, it can be hard for troops to remember when a tourniquet was applied and track how long it has been on.
Deciding whether a tourniquet can safely be removed requires more than knowing when it was applied, though, said Stacy Shackelford, an emergency medicine and surgery professor and former director of the military's Joint Trauma System. Making that call requires judgment about the wound and patient condition that is difficult to teach in basic first-aid training, let alone through an app.

Still, additional knowledge where there might previously have been none has certain advantages, she said. "Even if you focused on just taking off tourniquets in Ukraine, that would make a huge impact on their system," Shackelford said.
ALICE has separate modes for medics and non-medics, Kuziv said, and has voice prompts to help distressed users follow the appropriate protocol even under intense strain.
The US tool being developed at the University of Pittsburgh is tackling the same problem, but with a key difference. It is designed to work entirely offline.

Why Russia's Bombing of Kyiv Is Not Breaking Ukraine

2026-09-07T12:09:58.970-04:00

Among the most enduring images of WWII are photos of Londoners enduring the Blitz on subway platforms. Post-war analyses reveal that bombing of civilians in the UK, Germany and Japan tended to harden attitudes, not weaken them. The same occurred in US bombing of Vietnam.

As Russia's failures on the battlefield are compounded by rising casualties and declining advances, the Kremlin's targeting of civilians is also having an effect the reverse of that intended. In part, because of innate human stubbornness and resentment of bullying, but also because Russia does not have the resources to effectively bomb into submission a country the size of Ukraine. JL

Bogdan Maftei reports in The Erudite Elders:

Russia is elevating attacks on civilians into the central strategy of the war. The intent is to drag the eyes of the world onto these strikes and divert them from its failure in over four years of fighting. Ukraine is now taking more ground than Russia as the Kremlin's forces absorb the highest casualty rates of the war for a shrinking return. And, Ukraine is hitting Russia's economy at scale. Moscow cannot win this war in the conventional sense. Russia wants the world to read its fury as strength. The honest reading is the reverse. Bombing civilians failed in Britain, Germany and Japan in WWII, and in Vietnam. In a country the size of Ukraine, on an average day, more people are killed in road accidents than by Russian bombs. When a power resorting to a military strategy that has never once succeeded, at the very moment its every other effort is breaking down, you are looking at a country lashing out to grab whatever it can before the window closes.

Moscow’s approach has shifted and it is not a small thing. For most of this war the story was the front line, the slow churn of trenches and treelines in the east and south, the meter-by-meter arithmetic of attrition. That story has not disappeared, but it has been crowded out by a different one. The war has moved into the night sky over Ukraine’s cities, and above all over Kyiv. Russia is hammering civilian targets with a regularity and a scale that sets this phase apart from everything that came before it.
None of this is new in kind. Russia has been striking Ukrainian civilian targets since more or less the first day of the invasion, so a burning apartment block in Kyiv is not, by itself, a fresh development. What is new is the scale and the consistency, and the sheer volume of resources Moscow is now willing to pour into these strikes. We have not seen this before. Russia appears to be elevating attacks on civilians from a side activity into the central strategy of the entire war, and the last couple of weeks have made that unmistakable.
Take the night of May 24, which currently stands as the single largest attack of the war measured by the civilian infrastructure actually damaged. On that night alone Russia sent hundreds of drones along with missiles, and the estimated cost of that one strike, a single night’s work, runs to around 400 million dollars. That is a staggering figure for any military, and a particularly telling one for a country that is supposed to be husbanding its resources for a long war. You do not spend like that to achieve a military objective on the battlefield. You spend like that to send a message. And it was not a one-off. The nights leading up to May 24 were near record-breakers in their own right, with Russia launching hundreds of drones and missiles at a time, on some nights more than a thousand.
Moscow has also tried to choreograph the fear around these strikes. In the run-up, Russian officials reached out to foreign ambassadors and envoys stationed in Ukraine and told them, in so many words, to get out of the city because something enormous was coming. It was theater dressed up as a warning, an attempt to manufacture a spectacle the world’s media could not ignore. To their credit, most of those diplomats declined to take the bait and stayed put, which meant Russia was largely unable to follow through on the implied threat. But the intent was obvious: drag the eyes of the world onto these strikes and extract from them something Moscow has failed to extract from three years of fighting. As I write this, with nightfall approaching in Ukraine, President Zelensky has again warned that a massive Russian attack is expected tonight. The pattern is hardening.
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To understand why Russia is leaning so heavily into this, look at what has happened on the ground, because the two are connected. The front has turned against Moscow. Russia has not been able to take significant territory from Ukraine lately, and I do not mean it has merely slowed down. Even the grinding, glacial progress that observers had grudgingly come to expect, advances that were never fast enough to matter strategically, has largely dried up. Several things have driven this. Ukraine has pushed forward with its drone technology and now fields capabilities it did not have a year ago. It also exploited a window of breathing room when Russian access to Starlink was cut off, using that relief from pressure to expand its own offensive operations. The result is that Ukraine is now conducting limited counter-offensives and, in places, taking back more ground than Russia is managing to seize. Russian forces, meanwhile, are absorbing some of the highest casualty rates of the entire war for that shrinking return.
At the same time, Ukraine has started reaching Russian logistics in a way it could not before, hitting supply lines at a scale and intensity that is new. Those strikes are steadily cutting the occupied territories off from resupply, Crimea included. Put all of this together and the picture for Russia is bleak. There is a real possibility that Moscow simply cannot win this war in the conventional sense it set out to win it, by defeating the Ukrainian army in the field and dictating terms. And so Russia has reached for something else: an attempt to win the war through air power alone.
It is worth pausing on how significant that pivot is. Russia’s established way of war, the strategy of human-wave assaults and grinding attrition, is brutal and wasteful, but it is not stupid, and it is not unprecedented. Going into the Ukraine war it was, for Russia, a proven method with history on its side. The clearest example is the Second World War, when the Soviet Union ultimately destroyed the German invader, at a staggering human cost, by throwing so many bodies at the problem that it eventually overwhelmed the enemy. That approach has worked for Russia before. What Moscow is now doing is stepping away from a strategy with a track record of success and substituting one that has, historically, never worked. That is not a sign of confidence. It is the move of a power that has run out of good options.
The logic behind the air campaign is not hard to reconstruct, and Russia is not being especially subtle about it. Having discovered that it cannot defeat the Ukrainian military on the battlefield, Moscow is trying to defeat the average Ukrainian civilian at home instead. The theory is that if you apply enough pressure, enough fear and grief and disruption to ordinary life, a democratic society will eventually exhaust itself and pressure its own government into accepting a peace deal on terms Russia finds acceptable. You do not have to guess at this. It lines up neatly with everything Russia has done on the information front throughout the war, the propaganda aimed both at Ukrainians and at the foreign publics whose governments are arming Ukraine. It lines up with the carefully seeded narrative around each round of so-called peace talks, the steady drumbeat insisting the war is unwinnable for Ukraine so that Kyiv might as well hand Moscow what it wants.
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Above all, it lines up with the targets Russia is choosing. Its long-range strikes are overwhelmingly not aimed at military objectives. They are aimed at civilian ones: schools, apartment buildings, cultural landmarks, the things a society grieves to lose, the things that seize the emotional attention of ordinary people and plant the question, why are we still doing this. Notice the contrast with what Ukraine is doing to Russia. Ukraine is going after factories, war production, the assets that generate Russian military power, the way you fight an enemy you intend to beat. Russia, at least at anything like the same scale, is not. It is hunting for headlines and heartbreak.
And this is where the strategy falls apart, because it is not really a strategy at all. It is a country lashing out in desperation. There was perhaps a time, before we had the historical record we now possess, when you could have argued this approach might work. We no longer have that excuse. We have accumulated more than enough evidence from previous wars to say, with some confidence, that what Russia is attempting will not deliver what Moscow wants.
The Second World War is again the sharpest illustration, because both sides tried exactly this. The shared assumption was that if you firebombed the enemy’s cities into rubble, the surviving civilians would be so broken that they would withdraw their support for the war and the whole thing would collapse from within. This was, in particular, Germany’s bet against the United Kingdom. Berlin viewed Britain as a country that had entered the war by choice and could just as easily step back from it, safe behind the moat of the English Channel, since Hitler had already concluded that invading the British Isles was effectively impossible. Break the will of the British public, the thinking went, and Germany could carry on uncontested. The reality ran in precisely the opposite direction. The bombing destroyed tens of thousands of buildings, left millions homeless, and killed tens of thousands of civilians, a scale of devastation far beyond anything Ukraine is suffering today. And still the British did not fold. Neither, when the bombing was turned on them, did the Germans or the Japanese.
If populations endured all of that without surrendering, it is fanciful to imagine that Ukrainians will buckle under pressure that is, by comparison, considerably lighter. None of this is meant to wave away Ukrainian suffering, least of all for the individuals who have lost someone, and at this stage most Ukrainians probably have lost someone they knew. But there is a difference between personal grief, however profound, and the kind of civilizational shock that would actually push an entire nation to capitulate.
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Consider it this way. In a country the size of Ukraine, on an average day, and certainly year over year, more people are killed in road accidents than by Russian bombs. That is not an argument for shrugging off the bombs. Every one of those deaths, whether from a missile or a car crash, is a tragedy, and every casualty Russia inflicts is unnecessary by definition. But notice that a country the size of Ukraine does not respond to its road toll by banning cars. By the same logic, a country that has already been fighting Russia for years is not going to throw in the towel and accept Moscow’s demands over what amounts, in the cold scale of national survival, to a manageable level of pain.
The historical examples do not stop at the Second World War. You can run the same exercise through Korea and Vietnam, where populations were subjected to overwhelming air power, pulverized by any conventional measure, and did not capitulate. If anything they were galvanized by the destruction around them, more determined to keep fighting precisely because the enemy was willing to inflict such senseless ruin. Why, from their point of view, would you ever surrender to that. The psychological effect Russia is reaching for has a strong historical tendency to produce its exact opposite.
And in Ukraine’s case the polling bears that out. Yes, you can find surveys showing that something like 69 or 70 percent of Ukrainians want the war to stop and would like to negotiate an end to it with Russia, and Moscow happily waves those numbers around as proof that the pressure is working. But the same polling tells a different story underneath. Around 75 percent of Ukrainians, while wanting a negotiated peace, regard Russia’s terms as completely unacceptable. Drill down further and roughly 90 percent say they cannot accept any peace that leaves Russia holding the territory it has seized since 2022. The bombing has not made Ukrainians want to surrender. It has made them want the war to be over, which is what any sane person whose neighborhood is being blown apart would want. Britons wanted the Blitz to end too. Wanting the war over is not the same as wanting to lose it, and beneath the exhaustion you can see in Ukrainians a hardening resolve to defeat the people doing this to them.
There is a further problem for Moscow, which is that the strikes are not even especially effective. The hits that get through and dominate the news are real, but they are always a small fraction of the force Russia launches on any given night. To land a handful of damaging, headline-generating blows, Moscow has to commit enormous quantities of drones and missiles simply to swamp Ukrainian air defenses for a few hours. That is an expensive way to buy a photograph of a burning building.
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Ukraine’s side of this equation, by contrast, improves a little every day. Its air defenses keep getting better, with new tactics and new tools coming online. Much has been made publicly of Ukraine running short of Patriot interceptors, but the less advertised reality is that Ukraine has not run out, and there is a reason for that. Patriots are needed only for particular targets, chiefly ballistic missiles, and for the most part Ukraine has managed to stop those weapons from ever leaving the ground, by striking deep inside Russia at the factories that build them. It is therefore rare for Russia to generate the kind of munitions that could exploit the genuine gaps Ukraine still has in its air defense. Ukraine, in other words, has been using a highly effective and steadily improving offense as a form of defense. And it is now working on fielding its own homegrown alternative to the Patriot.
The takeaway is this. As grim as the past stretch has been for Ukraine, and it has not come anywhere close to pushing the country toward capitulation or even serious thoughts of it, the trajectory points toward things getting better for Kyiv over time, not worse. You may not see that in the immediate moment, because right now Russia is lashing out with these huge, expensive barrages. But that is precisely what Russia does when it is desperate and casting about for some way to wrench the momentum back in its favor.
So here is the framing that matters. Russia wants Ukraine, and the wider world watching alongside it, to read all this fury as strength and resolve. The honest reading is the reverse. When you see a power resorting to a military strategy that has never once succeeded, at the very moment its every other line of effort is breaking down across the board, you are not looking at confidence. You are looking at a country lashing out to grab whatever it can before the window closes. Ukraine has fought this long and this hard, and in my view it has every reason to keep fighting and to keep its nerve, denying Russia the victory it is trying to win by, quite literally, killing Ukrainian children. Looked at squarely, there is no reason for Ukraine to stop. And that is exactly why information, and the framing of information, matters so much. Read the headlines without context and Russia’s air campaign looks like an ascendant power tightening the screws. Read them with a little history and common sense, and you see something close to the opposite: the loud, costly thrashing of a strategy that is already, almost certainly, doomed.

Official Ukrainian Drone-Assault Units Are Beating Russian Units On Battlefield

2026-09-07T11:26:38.206-04:00

This is no longer an experiment or localized unit adaptation. Ukraine's official drone assault units combine aerial recon and strike drones with ground drones and infantry to create a new type of offensive unit that is proving its effectiveness in the hottest sectors of the front like Lyman, Kharkiv and Kupiansk.

The units employing this doctrine and the tactics devolving from it are specialized; they plan and train to use this new combined arms approach, making the drone use even more effective as well as making the infantry involved more specialized in ways that traditional units have been. JL

Decimus reports in Daily Kos:

Ukraine has officially integrated aerial drones, ground robots, and infantry into unified “drone-assault units”. This combines the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of unmanned systems with the tactical judgment and skills of human soldiers, producing combined human-machine assaults where drones conduct reconnaissance, suppression, and direct strikes, allowing infantry to secure and hold captured ground with reduced casualties. The tactic involves aerial recon drones identifying targets and safe routes, followed by UGVs pinning down defenders with machine-gun suppressive fire, and FPV drones delivering precision munitions. Infantry then moves in to consolidate gains. “A UGV armed with a machine gun is more intimidating than an infantryman. Soldiers understand how to fight another human. A machine advancing toward your position while pouring fire onto it creates both a physical and psychological effect.”
Ukraine has officially integrated aerial drones, ground robots, and infantry into unified “drone-assault units”. Adopted by the Ministry of Defense in April 2026, the doctrine is designed to minimize human casualties while maintaining offensive momentum. This strategy combines the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of unmanned systems with the tactical judgment and consolidation skills of human soldiers(see caption photo):

Ukraine Unveils Drone-Assault Units, Integrating Robots and Infantry on the Battlefield
https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraine-unveils-drone-assault-units-integrating-robots-and-infantry-on-the-battlefield-17951

The underlying rationale for this form of war fighting basically shifts the emphasis from traditional massed armor maneuvers to combined human-machine assaults where unmanned systems conduct reconnaissance, suppression, and direct strikes, allowing infantry to secure and hold captured ground with reduced casualties. The standard tactic involves aerial reconnaissance identifying targets and safe routes, followed by Unmanned Ground Vehicles(UGVs) pinning down defenders with machine-gun suppressive fire, and FPV drones delivering precision munitions. Infantry then moves in to consolidate gains.
And it is working. Even though the current offensive operations in Lyman and Kharkiv oblasts are being conducted under a thick blanket of Op Sec, there’s enough information coming out regarding success in pushing back the Russians to give credence to the efficacy of this new doctrine. The still ongoing success of Ukraine in dislodging Russian units and liberating over 745 Sq Km of territory in the Oleksandrivka front(Southwestern Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts) was in part enabled by this new strategy for which the Russians have not as yet been able to effectively counter.
Since late May 2026, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps(“Azov”) has reportedly been conducting a secret drone-led counteroffensive north of Lyman, advancing through the villages of Nove and Katerynivka in the Lyman-Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector, and possibly on the cusp of cutting off the Russian salient … aided by this new strategy. Analysts estimate Ukrainian forces have recaptured approximately 200 Sq Km of territory while forcing Russian units to abandon positions west of the Zherebets River. Ukrainian forces have successfully dismantled the Russian bridgehead west of the Zherebets, forcing Russian troops to retreat or face encirclement. Quite a set back for the Russians as they had spent a significant amount of time, effort and resources to force a crossing of the river in their attempt to create a northern pincer [in tandem with their southern push at Kostiantinyvka] towards the “Fortress Belt” cities:

Russia tried to surround Lyman. Now its own salient is getting squeezed.
Lyman blocks the northern route to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Ukrainian counterattacks are protecting the city.
https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/12/lyman-holds
More here:

Drone-Led Ukrainian Offensive Retakes Ground in Critical Eastern Front Sector

Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps is leading a methodical counteroffensive north and east of Lyman, making significant gains, cutting Russian supply routes and threatening to encircle hundreds of Russian troops in a growing salient, amid heavy drone strikes.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/83539
A similar scenario is unfolding further north in Kharkiv oblast where the 2nd Army Corps(‘Khartia’) holds the ground. Here too, the machine-man combination is yielding fruitful results:

Ukraine’s Uncrewed Air and Ground Systems Teaming Marks a Watershed Moment

“This uncrewed combined-arms approach allowed the Charter Brigade[2nd Army Corps] to successfully dislodge Russian forces from their positions without risking Ukrainian soldiers’ lives. Ukrainian soldiers were still required, however, to secure and hold the captured territory, highlighting the enduring need to pair unmanned assaults with ground forces to fully exploit the shock of the unmanned attack. The brigade’s success stemmed from extensive rehearsals, ensuring drone operators responsible for multiple platforms could coordinate movement and fires and that modified systems were able to traverse the difficult terrain. While two unmanned systems were lost due to inability to navigate the muddy terrain, no systems were lost due to Russian fire, indicating successful suppression of Russian air defenses.
https://oe.t2com.army.mil/product/ukraines-uncrewed-air-and-ground-systems-teaming-marks-a-watershed-moment/
And in Kupiansk, where Ukraine is successfully pushing the Russians out of the area north of the city as well as eastward across the Oskil river:
Ukraine Obliterates 114 Russian Shelters, Exposing Troops to Drone Strikes Near Kupiansk
Ukrainian forces have recently made gains in the Kharkiv region. According to the Institute for the Study of War on August 26, geolocated footage showed Ukrainian troops advancing southwest of Dvorichna, north of Kupiansk, amid continued counterattacks in the area.
https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-obliterates-114-russian-shelters-exposing-troops-to-drone-strikes-near-kupiansk-22089
The Ukrainian soldiers on the frontlines attest to how effective this strategy is:
Ukraine’s Drone War Comes Down to Earth
Ukrainian robots have already gained the upper hand in the skies and the sea; now they’re set to take over on land.

“A UGV armed with a machine gun is probably more intimidating than an infantryman in many situations,” said Obi, a soldier from Ukraine’s 3 Special Operations Regiment.
“Soldiers understand how to fight another human,” Obi added. “A machine advancing toward your position while pouring fire onto it creates both a physical and psychological effect.”
https://cepa.org/article/ukraines-drone-war-comes-down-to-earth/
ADAPTIVE INDOMITABLE UKRAINE is changing the face of modern warfare … in which the first thing to move forward on the battlefield is not a soldier, but a robot. Drone teams track and strike the enemy day and night, weakening their positions and/or forcing them out into the open … before Ukrainian infantry moves in and mops up. In this mode of fighting, robots handle the high-risk initial breach and attrition, human infantry is reserved for holding ground, clearing urban areas, and making critical decisions, thereby making the infantry an elite specialized force rather than the primary breaching force. And saving lives.

Drone-Infantry Combined Arms Assaults Have Driven Russians From Lyman

2026-09-07T10:46:06.688-04:00

Ukraine's 3rd Corps, using an emerging offensive doctrine based on the coordinated use of infantry preceded by aerial and ground drones, has driven Russian forces from the Lyman area, securing that sector and disrupting the Kremlin's attempts to assault Ukraine's Fortress Belt.

The Ukrainians have overcome the Russians manpower advantage by surveilling Russian positions with drones and then focusing increasingly lethal drone attacks on Russian troops. So far, the Russians have not yet found a counter to these tactics. JL

Stefan Korshak reports in the Kyiv Post:

The Ukrainian battle successes to the north of the fortress city of Lyman have been the result of months of small-scale infantry assaults densely covered by strike and observation drones to rout Russian defenders from positions, pushing back Kremlin forces up to 15 kilometers (9 miles). It paints a consistent picture of successful offensive operations accompanied by heavy Russian casualties due to drone strikes. The Ukrainian advance to the east of the city cutting supply roads had formed “pockets of tactically enclosed Russian units. It is now too late” for Russia to salvage the situation, because Ukrainian advances have bitten too deeply into formerly Russian-controlled territory for Russian forces to take them back without prohibitive losses.
A low-profile, patient counteroffensive led by a crack Ukrainian combat corps has pushed back Kremlin forces up to 15 kilometers (9 miles) in an eastern sector of the fighting front and potentially cutting off hundreds of Russian troops from supply and support.
The Ukrainian ground gains and battle successes to the north of the fortress city Lyman have been step-by-step and incremental, the result of months of small-scale infantry assaults densely covered by strike and observation drones to route Russian defenders from positions, field reports and analysts say.
The 3rd Army Corps, a major Ukrainian army formation with roots in a single, untrained volunteer civilian infantry battalion raised in Kyiv to help defend the capital in February 2022, is reportedly at the center of the offensive.

Ukraine’s army has kept a tight lid on ongoing operations in the Lyman sector for months, practically banning media visits to front lines and only reporting the fact of heavy fighting, while confirming neither terrain gains nor losses. The sector – located between the Siverskyi Donets River, a major waterway, and the Zherebets River, a local barrier waterway – is covered with thick woods or swamp, intermixed with rolling hills, farmland and agricultural villages
News and information feeds of formations assigned to the 3rd Corps and reviewed by Kyiv Post painted a consistent picture of successful offensive operations accompanied by heavy Russian casualties due to drone strikes, but as per Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (AFU) OPSEC rules, the information was presented without identifying geographical locations. Civilian rescue information networks monitored by Kyiv Post confirm continuing but limited Ukrainian losses in the sector.

In comments to Ukrainian media in July and August, Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky, the 3rd Corps commander, acknowledged his troops were carrying out limited counterattacks to expand Ukrainian control of territory north and east of Lyman, and that the operations were generally successful. Biletsky is a proponent of drone-led tactics with unmanned aircraft preceding, covering and providing fire support to small infantry units advancing in light armored vehicles to Russian positions to disembark and carefully mop up resistance on foot.

Multiple sources outside Ukraine are pointing to hard AFU ground gains in rough, wooded and swampy terrain northeast of Lyman, near the village Drobysheve, that had carved a 5 km x 10 km (3 x 6 mile) salient into Russian defenses and cut a key Russian supply road, potentially threatening Russian army units in the area with isolation. Kyiv Post researchers confirmed the presence of at least four Ukrainian combat brigades in action in the sector but did not publish identities for security reasons. All reports said the pocket now nearly encircled by the Ukrainians contained Russian troops, with estimates ranging from a few dozen to several hundred.
The Ukrainian drone unit Phoenix, a veteran air strike outfit drawn from Ukraine’s border troops forces, on Sept. 1 published imagery it said was from operations in air space above the Lyman sector. The footage shows first person view (FPV) and bomber drones attacking Russian motorcycles and trucks, individual infantrymen, and fortifications thought to hold Russian troops. Accompanying text states camouflage and shelters did not protect the targets.

Footage published by the unit on Aug. 31 showed strike drones hitting Russian artillery (including a 2A36 Giatsint-B gun, a D-20 howitzer, and a BM-21 Grad MLRS), along with more trucks, motorcycles, transport vans and fighting positions. Ukrainian military media reported the actions depicted were authentic, but Kyiv Post could not confirm each engagement independently.
Graphics in a situation assessment published on Aug. 31 by the US-based Institute for the Study of War showed Ukrainian forces to have reached the outskirts of Zarichne, a large village, which, if captured by Kyiv’s forces, would create a full-on encirclement of potentially hundreds more Russian troops in a 15 km x 45 km “kessel” (or “cauldron,” to use the German military term for encirclement).
For both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian War, ground gains by attacks since 2023 have been orders of magnitude slower and punishingly expensive. Russian forces in 2024 spent almost a year and lost at least one half of an estimated 80,000 men army sent to conquer a similar-sized space of ground between the Ukrainian cities of Adviivka and Pokrovsk. Neither side has reported heavy or even continuing Ukrainian casualties in actions around Lyman.

German OSINT researcher Andy Schneider in an Aug. 25 X comment on the Lyman battles said that contrary to Russian claims the city Lyman is fully under Ukrainian control, and that the Ukrainian advance to the east of the city cutting supply roads had formed “pockets of tactically enclosed units.”
Schneider wrote: “This is a systematic failure of the Russian defensive lines. The AFU has seized the initiative and can thus, as desired, launch a comprehensive strategic offensive from local successes. We will see if this happens.”
The widely read pro-Moscow milblogger Rybar (Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former Russian army officer and high-profile propagandist) in an Aug. 23 situation estimate passed on to his more than 1.5 million followers imagery that effectively matched Western reports of Ukrainian progress around Lyman but downplayed the importance of the success, saying: “Ukrainian formations are undertaking counterattacks in the area of Korovii Yar. Judging by objective control footage, the AFU managed to restore part of the positions on the approaches to the C051020 highway.”
French military analyst Clément Molin in an Aug. 30 confirmation of Ukrainian progress around Lyman city praised the AFU for maintaining tight OPSEC around the operation and that in his view “it is now too late” for Russia to salvage the situation, because Ukrainian advances have bitten too deeply into formerly Russian-controlled territory for Russian forces to take them back without prohibitive losses. Fighting was continuing over a 200 km-squared (124 square mile) battle area, he said, but already the Kremlin has suffered “a significant blow.”

The Ukrainian success will undermine Russian chances of carrying out its latest attack plans: an offensive to the south that Moscow hopes will capture the fortress cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk they have been trying to control for more than 12 years.
The Russian Defense Ministry, for its part, has insisted its forces under the command of 25th Combined Arms Army have made continual ground gains over August, and acknowledged no successful Ukrainian counterattacks. In May, the Russian Defense Ministry announced, falsely, that its troops had captured Lyman entirely. Subsequent statements by that agency have tacitly acknowledged Ukrainian forces actually still control the town by reporting continued Russian attacks against Ukrainian defenses there.
A key plank of the Russian state narrative about its invasion of Ukraine is that Russian progress is slow but relentless and that Moscow’s current main war aims – the total conquest of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions – will inevitably be reached.

According to Ukraine’s government, its forces had brought net Russian ground gains to a total halt in May 2026 and that since then Ukrainian forces have, each month, liberated more Ukrainian territory than Russia has taken.

More Investors Are Hunting For AI-Proof Assets Like Pro Sports To Reduce Risk

2026-09-07T10:03:17.492-04:00

Pro wrestling as a serious hard asset investment alternative to AI? If you have to ask, you clearly don't get it.

For those who haven't been paying attention, the price of sports franchises around the world have been skyrocketing. And much of the money is coming from tech wealth like that of Jeff Bezos, Vinod Khosla and others who are looking to diversify risk. That diversification works in two ways. First, these 'experiential assets' cannot be replaced by new AI and second, it takes some capital out of the chase for already questionable AI returns, investing it out of tech. That young people may find AI-generated imagery more exciting than the real thing is, itself, a risk, but there will presumably be just as much greater-fool-theory and FOMO money seeking these opportunities as those gorging on AI. JL

Kate Clark reports in the Wall Street Journal:

Investors are looking for opportunities insulated from the AI boom, including businesses built around human experiences that ChatGPT can’t replace. Jeff Bezos is participating in a deal to buy stake in the Liverpool Football Club in the U.K., alongside Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin. Others are acquiring the LA Lakers, the San Francisco Giants, the Minnesota Timberwolves and a group led by venture capitalist and OpenAI backer Vinod Khosla is acquiring the Seattle Seahawks. These legendary teams are scarce assets with durable fan bases, predictable media-rights revenue and can provide investors with significant tax advantages. The hunt for AI-proof businesses has extended beyond sports and entertainment to hard assets like manufacturing and power. “We’re looking for where technology personalizes the experience and optimizes the experience but doesn’t replace the experience. While it’s a counter bet against AI, it’s part of the rise of AI.”

Venture capital is usually associated with moonshot technology bets. Lately, though, some venture investors have found new, more analog pursuits: sports teams, iconic real estate and even children’s toys.
Investors are looking for opportunities insulated from the AI boom, including businesses built around human experiences that ChatGPT can’t replace.
Josh Kushner, founder of investment firm Thrive Capital, is among the investors who have recently acquired stakes in some of America’s leading sports franchises, including the San Francisco Giants and a $12.5 billion deal that made the Los Angeles Lakers the most valuable sports team ever.
Jeff Bezos is part of a consortium of investors participating in a deal to buy a minority stake in the Liverpool Football Club in the U.K., alongside Facebook co-founder Eduardo Saverin, valuing the team at more than $7 billion. Marc Stad, the founder of Dragoneer Investment Group, is acquiring a controlling stake in the Minnesota Timberwolves and a group led by venture capitalist and OpenAI backer Vinod Khosla is acquiring the Seattle Seahawks.
These legendary teams are scarce assets with durable fan bases and predictable media-rights revenue and can provide wealthy investors with significant tax advantages.
NBA Commissioner Adam Silver with Thrive Capital founder Joshua Kushner and Disney CEO Bob Iger at the U.S. Open in 2025. Kushner and Iger have agreed to buy a controlling interest in the L.A. Lakers. Javier Rojas/PI/ZUMA Press
Some venture firms are betting that sports teams are less vulnerable to the quick pace of AI development that has threatened to upend parts of the software, legal and financial industries.
“People want to watch actual real humans play sports,” said Sudeep Ramnani, founder of 885 Capital, an investor in Professional Fighters League, a mixed martial arts league. “It makes sense in the context of how the world is changing.”
Some investors expect the new wealth generated by the AI boom to fuel greater spending on live experiences, luxury travel, real estate and physical products.
Increasingly, investors are placing bets on niche, startup sports leagues like the Professional Fighters League, which was founded to challenge the UFC and recently merged with social-media influencer Jake Paul’s combat-sports company Most Valuable Promotions.
Social-media influencer Jake Paul, in brown, at a mixed martial arts press conference in March. Melina Pizano/Getty Images
Investing in new sports leagues requires much less capital but comes with greater risks, some investors say. There is no guarantee they will build a real fan base, and there are concerns that shortening attention spans will make it harder to attract and retain audiences. AI-generated content is also increasingly competing for consumers’ time.
Harley Miller, founder of Left Lane Capital, is an early investor in Real American Freestyle, a family-friendly wrestling league co-founded by Hulk Hogan in 2025. Miller said the business has shown real momentum, with a growing fan base willing to travel to attend tournaments.
“These are hard assets, and they are difficult to replicate,” Miller said. “It’s not speculative stuff that is going to get mousetrapped by a new large language model release in a year.”

Left Lane is also an investor in the Pro Padel League, the Snow League—a professional winter-sports league founded by Shaun White—and League One Volleyball.
“These are not vanity trophy assets for us,” said Miller, whose firm’s other bets include consumer brands like Blank Street Coffee and 7th Street Burger. “We are looking to make venture-style returns,” typically a multiple of the original investment.
The hunt for AI-proof businesses has extended beyond sports and entertainment to hard assets like manufacturing and power.
Barry Diller’s People Inc. is in negotiations to take over MGM Resorts in a deal that values the casino giant at over $12 billion.
“While everyone was running into all sorts of ‘AI opportunities,’ I wanted to run the other way,” Diller said in an earlier interview with The Wall Street Journal.
Venture capitalists invested in StickerBox. Stickerbox
Beth Ferreira, a partner at the investment firm run by tennis star Serena Williams, which raised $111 million for its debut fund in 2022, calls investments spanning physical products, travel and wellness the “experience economy.” She has focused her efforts there with a thesis that people are spending more of their lives behind screens, making the moments they spend in the physical world more valuable.
“We’re really looking for founders who are building where technology personalizes the experience and optimizes the experience but doesn’t replace the experience,” Ferreira said.
Serena Ventures has met with potential investment targets from travel startups to a curling league. One place it has deployed capital is StickerBox, an AI-enabled children’s toy company. Kids can ask StickerBox to create an image, which the toy generates using AI and then prints as a physical sticker.
That bet has already paid off. StickerBox was acquired by Spin Master, the toy company that makes Paw Patrol play sets, in August. The sale valued StickerBox at between $35 million and $50 million.
“While it’s a counter bet against AI, it’s part of the rise of AI,” Ferreira said.

Kremlin's Summer Offensive Lost Momentum Without Breaking Ukraine's Defense

2026-09-06T11:45:47.795-04:00

The implication is that Russia's summer offensive was stymied by Ukraine's surprising counterattacking tactics but also by the weight of its own leadership and logistical failures, which continue to undermine the Kremlin's repeatedly delayed deadlines. JL

Mezha Media reports:

The Russian army’s summer offensive campaign in 2026 failed to deliver the strategic breakthrough the Kremlin expected. After a sharp increase in the intensity of fighting at the beginning of summer, the pace of advance began to slow, while the area of captured territory has barely grown for the second consecutive month. Heavy losses did not provide the Russian army with proportional progress deeper into Ukraine’s defenses. This may indicate the gradual depletion of its offensive potential. "The summer offensive did not gain operational momentum, and there was no breakthrough of Ukraine’s defenses."
The battlefield has entered a dangerous pause: Russia is paying heavily for limited gains, while the next season could reshape pressure on Ukraine’s fortified Donbas belt.
The Russian army’s summer offensive campaign in 2026 failed to deliver the strategic breakthrough the Kremlin had expected. After a sharp increase in the intensity of fighting at the beginning of summer, the pace of advance began to slow, while the area of captured territory has barely grown for the second consecutive month.
According to BBC.
Ukraine’s General Staff recorded the highest number of combat engagements in early July – up to 270–290 per day. By early September, that figure had fallen to approximately 220 battles a day. The hottest areas remained around Kostiantynivka and Dobropillia in Donetsk region.
Russia’s Offensive Is Losing Momentum
According to open-source analysts from the DeepState project and the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces captured between 235 and 270 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory over the summer. That is nearly four times less than during the same period in 2025.
Other indicators of the summer campaign point to the high cost of Russia’s offensive:
according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russia has captured nearly 990 square kilometers since the beginning of 2026;
Ukraine has liberated approximately 820 square kilometers;
irrecoverable Russian army losses in July and August amounted to approximately 40,000–43,000 troops per month.
Heavy losses did not provide the Russian army with proportional progress deeper into Ukraine’s defenses. This may indicate the gradual depletion of its offensive potential. At the same time, Russia continues to hold the initiative in most areas of the front, primarily in Donetsk region.
The aggressor’s summer offensive did not gain operational momentum, and there was no breakthrough of Ukraine’s defenses.
– Viktor Kevlyuk
Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, called the current situation the most favorable for Ukraine since 2023. At the same time, he warned that Russia had not abandoned its offensive plans and that months of heavy fighting could still lie ahead.
Dobropillia and the Defense of Donbas’s Fortified Belt
After the loss of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian units concentrated significant forces on defending Dobropillia – the last major city in the western part of Donbas. Russian troops approached its outskirts from the south and east.
Ukrainian soldiers confirm that several Russian assault groups infiltrated the area around Hannivka. At the same time, reports that they have established positions there remain unconfirmed.
Another objective of the Russian command is to cut the Dobropillia–Kramatorsk highway. If successful, this could complicate the supply of Ukrainian forces defending the line of fortified cities consisting of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka.
Ukraine denies the Kremlin’s claims that it has fully captured Kostiantynivka, as well as claims that Russian troops are approaching Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. According to a source in the military command, dozens of Ukrainian positions still remain in Kostiantynivka. Fighting continues in the central and northern parts of the city.
At the same time, Russia is attempting to stretch Ukraine’s defenses by creating what is known as a buffer zone in the border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Russian units have failed to advance deep into Ukraine, but Ukrainian forces have also been unable to drive them out of some of the positions they have occupied.
Infiltration by Russian Groups and Strikes on the Rear
One of the defining features of the summer was the attempt by small Russian groups to infiltrate villages near the front line. According to open-source analysts, such operations do not always enable Russia to hold the territory it captures, but they force Ukraine to deploy assault units to clear settlements.
Russian claims that individual cities, including Sviatohirsk, had been captured did not correspond to the situation on the battlefield. Thus, the infiltrations were often aimed not so much at immediately expanding the zone of control as at placing additional pressure on Ukrainian reserves.
Over the summer, Ukraine intensified strikes against Russian logistics in the south, in occupied Crimea, and in the Black and Azov seas. Ukrainian drones attacked transport facilities, ships, energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, and oil refineries deep in Russia’s rear.
In response, Russia focused on attacking Ukrainian infrastructure. Throughout the summer, it actively used ballistic missiles to strike Kyiv and Odesa. In late August, Russian forces began launching jet-powered drones at the capital and its suburbs almost daily. Targets included logistics hubs, postal terminals, and warehouses.
What Autumn Could Bring to the Front
Statements by the leadership of Ukraine and Russia indicate that in autumn 2026, the sides are preparing not for a reduction in the intensity of hostilities but for further escalation. Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared his intention to “close the skies over Russia.” This likely refers to the expanded use of long-range attack drones.
For its part, the Russian leadership announced preparations for new attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Amid a shortage of air-defense missiles, the main weapons used in the strikes may remain Iskander-M ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones.
Worsening weather in autumn may reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian reconnaissance and attack drones. This will create additional opportunities for Russian forces to conduct offensive operations, particularly in the areas of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Dobropillia.
At the same time, the Russian army’s record losses over the summer may limit its ability to maintain the current pace of its offensive. To quickly replenish its ranks, the Kremlin might need a new mobilization, but Vladimir Putin continues to call it a measure of last resort.
Autumn will therefore be a test for both sides: the decisive factor will be who can maintain the intensity of hostilities longer without allowing people, equipment, and ammunition to become critically depleted.

By End of 2026, Russian Troop Advantage Will Be Offset By Ukraine Ground Drones

2026-09-06T11:27:28.680-04:00

Ukraine's commanders see increasing evidence that Russia's manpower advantage will be offset by Ukraine's ground drones and that this transformation may happen as soon as the end of this year.

The Kremlin's strategy - which may soon include a far broader conscription of Russian citizens - has been predicated on its larger population. But severe losses in Ukraine coupled with other demographic challenges have given Ukraine the opportunity to offset that disparity by using technological innovation to counter the Kremlin's plans. And those new technologies are coming online sooner than expected. JL

Raj K reports in Medium:

Brigadier General Andriy Biletski, commander of Ukraine's 3rd Corps, now believes that by the end of 2026, unmanned infantry will account for approximately 30% of total ground forces, and possibly up to 80% in the long-term. This change is completely different from Russia’s strategy. Russia tried to overcome the threat of drones with a large number of human soldiers. They believed that with so many soldiers, Ukraine would quickly become exhausted. But the war dragged on. Russia lost thousands of soldiers and wasted resources, but gained no major advantage. 167 Ukrainian units have fully included these UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles) in their systems.
The Ukraine war has now entered its fifth year, and in the middle of this long conflict, a new kind of “quiet revolution” is taking shape.
Earlier, when drone warfare came, it changed the face of fighting from the sky — surveillance, attacks, and precise targeting became much easier than before. But now one more step forward has been taken.
Now, there is talk of robots that run on the ground, which are called Unmanned Ground Vehicles or UGVs in technical language. These are machines that can go directly into the field and work without any humans.
They are often thought of as mini-tanks, remotely controlled robots, or other types of robotic vehicles that operate in hazardous environments (for example, mine removal, supply delivery, reconnaissance, etc.); some may also be used for offensive operations.
Brigadier General Andriy Biletski believes that by the end of 2026, unmanned infantry will account for approximately 30% of total ground forces, and possibly up to 80% in the long-term.
This change is completely different from Russia’s strategy. Russia tried to overcome the threat of drones with a large number of human soldiers.
They believed that with so many soldiers, Ukraine would quickly become exhausted. But the war dragged on. Russia lost thousands of soldiers and wasted resources, but gained no major advantage.
What was earlier just an experiment or limited use of ground robotics has now become a real and large-scale power.
In 2026, Ukraine’s ground robotics has made unprecedented progress. In March 2026 alone, 9,000 missions were completed, while in November 2025, this number was less than 2,900. In the first three months of 2026, a total of 24,500 missions took place.
Now, 167 Ukrainian units have fully included these UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles) in their systems.
Earlier this number was only 67. This means that this technology is no longer limited to some special units but has spread to a large part of the army.
In areas like Pokrovsk, 90 percent of “last mile” supply — that is, the final stage of delivery — is being done by ground robots. This means machines are now delivering ammunition, food, and essential supplies, and they are also evacuating injured soldiers.

Leopard Tanks Converted To Anti-Drone Killers, Paid For By Frozen Russian Funds

2026-09-06T11:09:32.941-04:00

Kyiv is converting some of its increasingly vulnerable Leopard tanks into devastating anti-aircraft killers by switching out the old conventional cannon turrets for new Skyranger revolving guns that fire 1,000 tungsten pellets a minute, hitting Russian drones before they can strike.

And to make the conversion even sweeter, it is being paid for by an unnamed European country which is using frozen Russian assets to pay for it. JL

David Axe reports in Trench Art:

Kyiv is diverting some Leopard 1A5 tanks to conversion programs that are reinforcing Ukraine's air defense while also re-equipping the ground forces with a new generation of tank. The first conversion, overseen by Rheinmetall, plucks the old turrets with their 105-millimeter cannons off some Leopard 1A5s and drops in a new turret with a faster-firing 35-millimeter anti-aircraft gun. Effectively a next-generation Gepard, the resulting Skyranger 35 is a mobile, armored drone-killer that can post up between Russian drone launch sites and Ukrainian cities in order to down incoming Geran drones before they can strike. Its revolver cannon fires 1,000 rounds a minute out to 4 km, using airburst ammunition that scatters tungsten pellets in the path of an incoming drone. An unnamed EU country is paying for the systems out of proceeds from frozen Russian assets
Ukraine has lost a quarter of its German-designed Leopard 1A5 tanks. But it could get many more of the nimble, 40-ton tanks. And some could have brand-new turrets that make them lighter, faster, farther-shooting, and more survivable.
The hulls are 1980s West German. The refurbishment is done in Germany, the air defense turrets are built in Rome, the tank turrets are designed in Belgium, and one of the two programs is paid for out of frozen Russian assets. Ukraine's newest armored vehicles are being assembled from the leftovers of a war Europe spent forty years preparing for and never fought.
In 2023, a German-Danish-Dutch consortium pledged 170 Leopard 1A5s to Ukraine. The 1980s-vintage tanks have come from German, Danish, and Belgian surplus stocks.
Refurbished in Germany by tank-maker Rheinmetall and fitted with add-on anti-drone armor in Ukraine, the first 135 or so Leopard 1A5s now equip at least five units: the 44th Mechanized Brigade, 5th Heavy Mechanized Brigade, the 425th Assault Regiment, the 142nd Mechanized Brigade, and the 13th National Guard Brigade.
Losses have been heavy. The Russians have struck no fewer than 37 of the four-person tanks, destroying at least 30 of them. The 44th Mechanized Brigade, which is fighting a defensive action south of the cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, has been hit the hardest. The brigade has written off around half of its original allotment of 31 or so Leopard 1A5s.

Another 35 Leopard 1A5s from the 2023 pledge should eventually reach Ukrainian units, potentially making good those losses.
But Kyiv is diverting some of those initial 170 Leopard 1A5s to a pair of conversion programs that are reinforcing Ukraine's air defense while also re-equipping the ground forces with a new generation of tank.
The first conversion program, overseen by Rheinmetall, plucks the old turrets with their 105-millimeter cannons off some Leopard 1A5s and drops in a new turret with a faster-firing 35-millimeter anti-aircraft gun. Effectively a next-generation Gepard, the resulting Skyranger 35 is a mobile, armored drone-killer that can post up between Russian drone launch sites and Ukrainian cities in order to down incoming Geran drones before they can strike.
Its revolver cannon fires 1,000 rounds a minute out to 4 km, using airburst ammunition that scatters tungsten pellets in the path of an incoming drone. An unnamed EU country is paying for the systems out of proceeds from frozen Russian assets, and Rheinmetall builds them at its subsidiary in Rome. Germany's own army has ordered 19 and is discussing hundreds more; Ukraine's arrived first.
The first imagery of a Skyranger 35 in Ukrainian service circulated online this week, with the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment.

Old tank, new turret
The second conversion program won't produce combat-ready vehicles for another year or so. This program will swap out the turrets on 31 Leopard 1A5s. The new turret, produced by John Cockerill Defense in Belgium, is unmanned: the commander and gunner move down into the hull alongside the driver, and an autoloader replaces the human loader. That drops the crew from four to three and takes everyone out of the part of the tank most likely to be hit.
The new turret is welded from ballistic aluminum instead of steel, shaving three tons off the tank's 40 and freeing weight for reactive armor, anti-drone netting, or electronic warfare kit.
As a bonus, the 105-millimeter gun in the multi-million-dollar Cockerill 3105 turret also elevates far higher than the gun in the existing turret—42 degrees, against roughly 20 on the original. That confers greater range when a tank functions as artillery, firing its cannon at targets over the horizon: Cockerill says no other Western main battle tank can shoot indirectly the way this one does, and Ukrainian trials reached 10 km from a covered position.
Kyiv has ordered 30 of the turrets and holds one more it bought for testing last year. Some time in 2027, that is a battalion of new medium tanks: a cutting-edge turret on a chassis built when Leonid Brezhnev was alive.
Ukrainian soldier standing on the Leopard 1A5 tank. Photo: Army Inform
To provide hulls for the 31 Cockerill-converted Leopard 1A5s while also sustaining the Skyranger 35 program, Ukraine must make a choice. Combined, the two programs need potentially 50 or more tank chassis, but just 35 Leopard 1A5s from the initial 170-tank pledge are still in the queue for delivery to Ukraine.

Ukraine's ground forces are already short on tanks; taking Leopard 1A5s from the five brigades and regiments that operate the type could deprive those units of desperately needed firepower. Fortunately for Ukraine, there are still hundreds of old Leopard 1A5s in warehouses in Europe and farther abroad—and Rheinmetall is pulling the Skyranger hulls from storage rather than from Ukraine's active fleet.

French historian Stevius made a count and concluded "the stocks in Europe are far from exhausted." As recently as 2022, German firm Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft held 99 Leopard 1A5s. Rheinmetall held 88 of the tanks in 2022 and, in 2023, bought 50 more from OIP Land Systems in Belgium. That's 237 tanks: 67 more than the Europeans pledged to the Ukrainians in 2023.
Some of those 67 excess Leopard 1A5 hulls are unusable owing to rust and other wear and tear. Even so, there should be enough Leopard 1A5s left in Europe to feed the Skyranger and Cockerill conversion efforts. And once those run out, there are still some ex-Italian and ex-Greek Leopard 1A5s that Ukraine could acquire.
And if it can secure the financing, Ukraine could convert those additional tanks—or even some of its existing ones—into faster, farther-firing Leopard 1A5s with Cockerill C3105 turrets. Cockerill has already proposed doing the whole active fleet, around 100 tanks.

As Ukraine Attacks, Russian Claims "Do Not Reflect Reality, Pure Propaganda'

2026-09-06T10:56:44.129-04:00

As another, probably vain, attempt at negotiations unfolds, there has been no ceasefire on the front line in Ukraine. And in what appears to be a bid to claim successes in sectors where loss of territory has been accompanied by growing casualties, the Kremlin's pronouncements are being revealed as 'pure propaganda' which does not reflect reality.

In Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, in particular, Ukrainian counterattacks have pushed the Russians back. JL

Clement Molin reports in Futura Doctrina:

In the Kharkiv region, Russian claims do not correspond to the reality and are pure propaganda. Near Vovchansk, the Ukrainians still have many positions further north, to contain Russian infiltrations. Russian soldiers cross the border, walk in the forest, then try to cross the river and reach as deep as possible behind the lines. There is no threat of encirclement of Ukrainian forces further north, as long as infiltrations are contained. Further south, the Ukrainians are conducting counter-attacks in and around Dvorichna
In the Kharkiv region, Russian 🇷🇺 mappers claim they encircled thousands of Ukrainian 🇺🇦 soldiers north of Veliky Burluk. This does not correspond to the reality and is pure propaganda. We can depict 4 directions where offensive operations are ongoing in Kharkiv oblast : 🔸The westernmost is a cross border operation in and around Kozacha Lopan, with Russian forces showing their flags all over the town recently. This is part of Russian plan to create a "buffer zone" with bordering regions. 🔸The main offensive action is ongoing near Vovchansk, with long infiltrations that often reach very deep, thanks to the lack of engineering structures (the first real defensive line is much farther south). Some mappers show Bilyi Kolodiaz as contested, which is not the case. In fact, the Ukrainians still have many positions further north, to contain Russian infiltrations. Russian soldiers cross the border, walk in the forest, then try to cross the river and reach as deep as possible behind the lines. 🔸A secondary operation is ongoing further east, with cross-border crossings from small infantry teams, that managed to push 10 to 15km, supported by an intense airstrike campaign. For now, there is no threat of encirclement of Ukrainian forces further north, as long as infiltrations are contained. 🔹Further south, we talked about it already, the Ukrainians are conducting counter-attacks in and around Dvorichna, while Russian forces continue to infiltrate into Kupiansk.

Ukrainian Advances In Multiple Sectors Confirmed As Russians' Attacks Stall

2026-09-05T11:15:52.943-04:00

Ukrainian advances in multiple important sectors increasingly suggest that Russian troop strength challenges are turning into operational liabilities for the Kremlin.

That so many Ukrainian successes are happening simultaneously reveals that the Russians no possess the reserves to redeploy sufficient units to meet Ukrainian attacks. JL

Liliana Oleniak reports in RBC-Ukraine:

Over the past few days, Ukrainian Forces have advanced in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Furthermore, they have thwarted several Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian forces have recently advanced east of Sloviansk, north of Kharkiv, made advances west of Kotliarivka, towards Novopavlivka in Dnipropetrovsk oblast and routed Russian troops in the Kupiansk sector.
Over the past few days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have advanced in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Furthermore, they have thwarted several Russian offensive operations, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Kharkiv region
Ukrainian forces have recently advanced or continued to hold positions in the north of the Kharkiv region. According to information from one of the Ukrainian units operating in the area, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks near Odradne, located east of Kharkiv. This may indicate that the town remains under Ukrainian control, despite Russian claims that it has been captured.
Ukrainian forces also continue to strike Russian military targets in the occupied part of the region.

Meanwhile, Russian troops continued offensive operations in the Kupiansk sector. However, according to the ISW's assessment, there is no confirmation of their advance.
In the Borova sector on September 3 and 4, the Russian military also conducted limited offensive operations but were unsuccessful. Ukrainian forces carried out successful counterattacks. According to Russian military bloggers, the area between Ridkodub and Nove, southeast of Borova, remains contested territory where fighting continues.
Donetsk region
Ukrainian forces have recently advanced east of Sloviansk. This is taking place amid attempts by the Russian army to establish control over tactical high ground in the area, which could create more favorable conditions for a further offensive on Sloviansk.
Geolocated video footage released on September 3 indicates a possible advance by Ukrainian forces. The footage shows Russian forces attacking Ukrainian positions in the northwestern part of Rai-Oleksandrivka, located east of Sloviansk.
Meanwhile, on September 4, a Russian military blogger claimed that Nykonorivka, southeast of Sloviansk, had allegedly been captured. There is no confirmation of this information.
On the Kostiantynivka-Druzhkivka front, Russian troops continued their offensive on September 3 and 4 but were unable to advance. Ukrainian forces are holding positions that hinder the Russian army's attempts to advance toward Kostiantynivka and into the city itself.
Russian troops also continued their offensive on the Pokrovsk sector, but achieved no confirmed successes on September 3 and 4.
Dnipropetrovsk region
Ukrainian troops recently made advances toward Novopavlivka. According to geolocated imagery published on September 3, the Ukrainian Defense Forces advanced west of Kotliarivka, located slightly east of Novopavlivka.
Zaporizhzhia region
On September 3 and 4, Russian troops continued offensive operations in the Huliaipole sector, as well as in the western part of Zaporizhzhia region. At the same time, no confirmed instances of Russian forces advancing in these areas have been recorded. Recently, Khartiia fighters routed the Russian troops near Kupiansk.

Why Putin's "Friends" Are Now Confronting Him About the Ukraine War

2026-09-05T11:00:44.081-04:00

Russia's economic friends, like India, Kazakhstan, Armenia and others are delivering subtle but unmistakable warnings to the Kremlin that his war in Ukraine is increasingly viewed globally as going badly for Russia, unwinnable and a threat to the economy of even those countries maintaining positive relations with it.

Much of this is due to the war's impact on oil prices and other economic indicators. But it is also an appeal from those who value Russia as an offset to US power and who fear that Russia's impending failure and potential ensuing chaos is bad for stability. JL

Thomas Grove and Tripti Lahiri report in the Wall Street Journal:

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's momentary admonishment of Putin's Ukraine war marked a subtle shift in the tone that some of Moscow’s partners have struck with the Russian leader in recent months as the toll from the war, now in its fifth year, grows for Russia and its backers. A a month earlier, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, a Russian ally, confronted Putin with a similarly blunt message, saying he was hearing from many countries who were questioning why Russia was still waging the war. The chiding comes as the war’s pain is increasingly being felt inside and outside Russia. The Kremlin’s advances ib Ukraine have largely stalled with its forces taking heavy casualties. Ukraine has been steadily raising the cost for Moscow. “Concern is on the rise that escalation is spilling over to affect other countries and their economies,”

At a heavily scripted summit in Central Asia recently, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared to break from the choreography momentarily to chastise President Vladimir Putin of Russia, a country that has been a close partner of New Delhi since the Soviet era.
It was time “to move on from an endless war to an end of war,” he told an expressionless Putin, seated next to him in an ornate reception room at the summit in Kyrgyzstan.
It wasn’t the first time Modi had criticized the war, but the remark was notably direct and forceful. The admonishment marked a subtle shift in the tone that some of Moscow’s partners have struck with the Russian leader in recent months as the toll from the war, now in its fifth year, grows for Russia and its backers.
A little more than a month earlier, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, a Russian ally, confronted Putin with a similarly blunt message at a meeting in Siberia. Tokayev said he was hearing from many countries who were questioning why Russia was still waging the war. “The nature of the conflict isn’t entirely clear for many, including us,” he told Putin.
The chiding comes as the war’s pain is increasingly being felt inside and outside Russia. The Kremlin’s advances in eastern Ukraine have largely stalled despite its forces taking heavy casualties. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been steadily raising the cost for Moscow, with nearly daily barrages that have struck some of its largest refineries and the warehouses of the country’s biggest online retailer. When Central Intelligence Agency chief John Ratcliffe paid a visit to Moscow last month, one of his messages for the Russian leader was: it is time to come back to the negotiating table.
Russia’s partners have also suffered from the war’s fallout. India has been under pressure from the West to end its oil purchases from Moscow. A Russian missile attack on a cargo ship in the Black Sea killed four Indian crew members in July. Violence in those waters has also led to disruptions for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which Kazakhstan relies on to export its oil.
Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev with Putin. Petr Kovalev/Kremlin/EPA/Shutterstock
“Concern might be on the rise that escalation is spilling over to affect other countries and their economies,” said Hanna Notte, Eurasia director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Moscow has tried to cultivate deeper ties with New Delhi, which has long been a loyal recipient of Russian oil and arms. India’s reliance on Russian crude, however, triggered the ire of Washington. President Trump took aim at India over the sales last year, with measures that pushed tariffs on India to as high as 50%.
Modi’s recent comments also sent a signal to India’s Western partners that he is sensitive to their concerns, even as the country prepares to host a summit of the Brics nations, a grouping that includes Russia, China and Brazil, and has been seen as a challenge to the Western-led order.
India wants its “Western partners to know that even though India may be buying more oil from Russia or may be buying more weapons from Russia, at the end of the day we are not in favor of that war they are carrying out,” said Sreeram Chaulia, professor and dean at the Jindal School of International Affairs in Sonipat, India.
Criticism from former Soviet satellite states highlights Moscow’s waning influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. U.S. companies have invested heavily in countries such as Kazakhstan and Armenia, giving them an alternative to Russian patronage.
Tokayev’s decision to speak out in July came as drone strikes disrupted the CPC and discouraged shipowners from loading at the pipeline’s terminal in Novorossiysk, on Russia’s Black Sea coast. U.S. oil companies that are members of the pipeline consortium, a group that includes arms of Chevron and ExxonMobil, might have reached out to Kazakhstan to express their dissatisfaction with the delays, said Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
“For Tokayev the main reason was pressure from the West,” he said.
A satellite image of an oil tanker damaged following a Ukrainian attack in Novorossiysk, Russia. Vantor/Reuters
Chevron didn’t respond to a request for comment. ExxonMobil said it hadn’t requested Tokayev confront Putin over the war.
Armenia’s public pushback against Putin has taken place against a broader decoupling between Russia and the former Soviet state, which had been under Moscow’s rule off and on for more than 100 years. Armenia has expressed frustration with Moscow for failing to use its peacekeepers to prevent bloodshed during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory.
Last year, Trump hosted the leaders of both Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House to clinch a peace deal, which comes with new U.S. investment in Armenia, including a data center.

“There is a perception that Russians have their hands full in Ukraine, which gives these countries the confidence that they can get away with more in criticizing Moscow,” said Notte.

CIA Director's Visit "To Warn" Moscow Viewed By Putin As Sign Of Weakness

2026-09-05T10:43:17.909-04:00

The ostensible purpose of CIA Director John Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow was to warn the Kremlin that, in the eyes of the US and NATO, Russia's position is deteriorating and that the time to negotiate is now.

But in a subsequent assessment, confirming the Trump administration's repeated misreading of the Kremlin, Putin is reported to have viewed the trip as a sign of western weakness, causing him to redouble his attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets. This would appear to support the view of those who believe that Putin only respects strength. JL

Catherine Belton and colleagues report in the Washington Post:

In the 10 days since CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a rare, unexpected visit to Moscow, Russian forces have ramped up their missile and jet-powered-drone campaign targeting civilian infrastructure. “I have no doubt that the enemy will crumble,” Putin told Russian journalists. His remarks confirmed assessments that Ratcliffe’s visit not only failed to persuade the Russian leader to stop the war, but hardened his resolve to sidestep a ceasefire and continue to push Ukraine to concede to Moscow. Ratcliffe warned counterparts in Russian intelligence that escalating the war would backfire. He argued Russia’s position was weak and would deteriorate further. But after the meetings, Ratcliffe felt that he “had not moved the needle.” Russia viewed the visit as “an attempt to try to convince Putin to stop, but Putin read it as weakness.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin, aiming to exploit Ukraine’s badly weakened air defenses, is intensifying a bombing campaign that he believes will force Kyiv to capitulate on some of his key territorial demands, perhaps by this winter, members of the Russian elite and analysts said.

In the 10 days since CIA Director John Ratcliffe made a rare, unexpected visit to Moscow, Russian forces have ramped up their missile and jet-powered-drone campaign, targeting civilian infrastructure including energy and water supplies, supermarkets and food warehouses.

On Friday, with U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner expected to visit Moscow and Kyiv in the coming days try to restart stalled peace talks, a Russian drone struck the central headquarters of Ukraine’s Security Service. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called the strike “a major escalation.”
While the Russian economy deteriorates and public discontent grows, Putin this week expressed confidence in the war’s progress.
“I have no doubt that the enemy will crumble,” he told Russian journalists. His remarks appeared to confirm assessments that Ratcliffe’s visit not only failed to persuade the Russian leader to stop the war, but may have hardened his resolve to sidestep a ceasefire and continue to push Ukraine to concede territory to Moscow.
In Moscow, Ratcliffe warned counterparts in Russian intelligence that escalating the war would backfire, The Washington Post has reported. He urged a return to talks, arguing Russia’s position was weak and would deteriorate further, according to three people familiar with his discussions.
But after the meetings, Ratcliffe felt that he had delivered the intended message “but not moved the needle,” a fourth person familiar with the matter said. Russia viewed the visit as “an attempt to try to convince Putin to stop, but Putin read it as weakness,” this person said.

The CIA has declined to comment on Ratcliffe’s trip.
Putin’s response to the visit seemed to come in the relentless, day-and-night airstrikes on Ukraine, and in his remarks at a regional security conference in Kyrgyzstan, where he met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and pledged support for Tehran in its war with the United States.
CIA Director John L. Ratcliffe, seen in March, visited Moscow last month. (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)
Russia’s escalating strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities since Ratcliffe’s visit “could be some kind of signal to Washington that Russia is continuing the offensive operation and there is no need to change its position and become more flexible,” said a Russian academic who is close to senior Russian diplomats and spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive security issues.
There had been speculation that Ratcliffe’s visit was also intended to dissuade Russia from helping Iran.

But the purpose of the visit was “primarily about Ukraine and trying to get the Russians to see that if their negotiating objective is to get the Ukrainians to give up Donbas, then it’s just not going to happen,” said a Western official familiar with the discussion.
The message was: “It’s really not in your interests to keep doing this,” the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomacy.
Russia’s military advances in Ukraine have all but stalled, and its budget has become increasingly strained with the deficit snowballing to $74.4 billion by the end of July, or 2.8 percent of its GDP, well beyond the government’s original forecast of 1.6 percent for this year.
Financial anxiety has mounted, prompting Russians to pull billions from the country’s banking system, and bad debts are climbing after a government-directed corporate lending boom to ramp up military output. Several senior members of the Russian elite have warned publicly against prolonging the war.
Russian Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov, a powerful member of Putin’s inner circle, met with Ratcliffe. (Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images)
Ratcliffe delivered his view when he met last week with the head of Russia’s Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov, a powerful member of Putin’s inner circle — who has previously proved effective in coordinating prisoner exchanges between the U.S. and Russia, two of the people familiar with the discussions said.
“This is really the first time that there has been a serious attempt to have this kind of contact in a more formalized way,” one of the people familiar with the discussions said. “If you are trying to get to the inner circle, Bortnikov is probably one of the most important people.”

Bortnikov is seen as representing a more direct line to Putin, given his KGB background and respect for intelligence, another of the people said.
But Ratcliffe’s assessment was far removed from Putin’s view of the situation, according to members of the Russian elite and analysts.

And if the CIA director hoped his message would result in a meeting with Putin, he was bound to be disappointed, Russian analysts said.
Signaling that Russia is losing the war and that it’s better to end the war now “was not interesting for Putin to discuss,” said Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Putin “is certain he is winning the war, and however much time it will take he believes that at some point Ukraine will break, and Russia won’t need to fight.”
Despite declaring on Thursday that he saw a chance of reaching a negotiated peace deal, Putin has no interest in any proposal for a ceasefire based on the current frontline, the Russian academic said.
“It seems to me taking control over all of Donbas is the minimum preliminary condition for all future talks,” the Russian academic said. “This task has been voiced many times by the president and other officials. It will be very difficult to step back from this.”

“The Russian leadership considers they have enough instruments to dominate escalation,” the academic added. “Each strike by Ukraine can be answered by a strike which brings more damage than the one brought to Russia.”
On Thursday, Putin acknowledged that the government had not been prepared for Ukraine’s strikes on Russia’s energy infrastructure, which have led to a sharp drop in fuel output and triggered the worst fuel crisis since the Soviet collapse.
“We made a mistake,” he said, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok as he conceded Russians should be prepared for prolonged gasoline shortages.
But Putin has insisted that further escalation by Ukraine — including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s threats this week to close Russia’s skies to civil aviation by sending swarms of drones — is bound to fail, saying that Kyiv has only opened “a Pandora’s box” by targeting Russian civilian infrastructure.
Putin, speaking in Kyrgyzstan, accused Zelensky of “terrorism,” adding: “One does not negotiate with terrorists.”
The progress of Russian forces toward the administrative borders of Donbas, the strategically critical fortress belt region in east Ukraine, has been halting for months. But a recent spike in oil prices, driven by renewed fighting between Iran and the United States, has boosted Putin.

It has allowed Russian leadership to think it can still outlast Ukraine, even though the chief economist of one of Russia’s biggest state banks has warned publicly that Russia cannot win a war of attrition against Ukraine while Kyiv is supported by the West, one Moscow business executive said.
“There is an opinion inside the Kremlin that a few more months of war is not a problem for Russia and the Russian economy, but for Ukraine it’s a huge problem,” the business executive said, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of angering the government.
“Putin hopes time is still on his side — because despite the problems with fuel and the growth of dissatisfaction with the war, Russia’s population is not as ready to protest as Ukraine’s,” the business executive said.
“The Russian leadership has the view that if they bomb energy infrastructure and water supplies in the regions around Kyiv it will lead to the maximum dissatisfaction of the population and the government will be forced to end the war,” he added. The bombing campaign “is the only possibility for Russia to do something — because destroying the Ukrainian army with the resources that it currently has is extremely difficult.”

As Russia takes advantage of depleted stocks of Patriot and air defense systems, there are growing fears in Kyiv of food shortages as winter nears. “We could be heading toward a complete humanitarian disaster,” said one Ukrainian official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.
Kyiv is facing financial constraints of its own. The government is urgently seeking an additional $27 billion in financing from the European Union as it seeks to plug a shortfall in its defense budget.
Putin could also be banking on changing political winds in the West. In regional elections in Germany this weekend, the far-right Alternative for Germany party, which is sympathetic to Russia, is set to do well. France’s far-right leader, Marine Le Pen, is surging in polls ahead of a presidential election next year.
“The West is becoming weaker and changing politically internally,” Stanovaya said. “Putin really does consider that circumstances are changing in his favor.”
But prolonging the conflict is still fraught for Putin, creating a risk that fuel shortages will worsen, consumer prices will rise and public protests could break out.
“Whether Putin understands this is not clear,” the Moscow business executive said. “The FSB chief who met with Ratcliffe probably does. But he is not going to go to Putin and persuade him to agree a peace deal on the current frontline.”

Financial, Operational Disappointments More Likely To Slow AI Than Politics

2026-09-05T10:11:23.924-04:00

The growing public opposition to AI generally and to the data centers that power them have understandably garnered most of the attention around technology now.

But it is the financial and operational questions which remain unanswered that are most likely to slow AI's growth in the near term. The poll results on the left from a survey of CIO (Chief Information Officer) magazine reveal how 'aspirational' - to put it politely - those hoped-for outcomes remain after four years. The strain on tech companies' financials, the bond market melt-down and the 'murky' return on investment from historically extraordinary infrastructure and AI implementation investments all point to the growing demand for a pause until the uncertainty which business abhors becomes a more well-defined path to profitability. JL

Asa Fitch reports in the Wall Street Journal:

There is some chance that political forces could slow AI’s development. Anti-AI sentiment is becoming increasingly serious, and moratoria on data-center development in the U.S. are growing. Even so, the prospect of political action that actually holds back the development of AI seems distant at best. The more likely scenario is that the natural forces of the boom slow it. AI is putting major strains on the U.S. power grid and raising electricity prices. AI spending is encountering more resistance. Some big tech companies that have fueled the boom are free-cash-flow negative because of their AI outlays. Prices of corporate bonds linked to AI are falling as tech companies raise more debt to grow their infrastructure. And returns on AI spending are still murky nearly four years into the boom. Development will have to slow if it becomes clearer that companies can’t make back what they are spending.
Concerns about AI’s social impact have been growing since the boom began. As real as those are, physical and financial limits are more likely to slow AI’s march.
Warnings against job losses and other social ills have intensified lately. Anthropic in June suggested AI labs consider slowing down development efforts over social-impact concerns. Old-guard tech billionaire Bill Gates wrote in a long essay last week that AI was moving faster than society could adjust to job displacement and other problems it creates.
“I believe we need time to prepare for the period of social, political, and economic upheaval we are about to enter,” he wrote, proposing a tax on robots and AI tokens.
Yet the leading AI labs and Big Tech AI spenders have big incentives keep pushing forward.
Sure, they are concerned enough about cybersecurity threats posed by some of their most advanced models to slow down and adjust. But Anthropic and OpenAI are racing toward IPOs. They are gambling billions of dollars of investors’ money on the notion that AI isn’t only socially transformative, but is a viable, profitable business. Big-tech companies like Alphabet and Meta Platforms also have too much staked on AI to step back.
There is some chance that political forces could slow AI’s development. Anti-AI sentiment is becoming increasingly serious, and moratoria on data-center development in the U.S. are growing.
At the Federal level, a bill introduced in Congress in July would give the government the power to shut down rogue AI models. Other bills have proposed studying AI’s impact on jobs.
Even so, the prospect of political action that actually holds back the development of leading AI models seems distant at best. President Trump this week took to social media to blast people who resist data centers, placing his administration firmly on the pro-development side. That is significant given the largest data-center project in the world is set to be built on Federal land.
China acts as another deterrent for any AI slowdown. China wouldn’t take its foot off the gas if the U.S. held its companies back. As long as AI continues to be a crux of geopolitical competition, giving Chinese companies time to catch up in the AI race isn’t a palatable option for the U.S.
Circumstances, of course, could change in ways that raise the urgency of a forced slowdown. If AI-linked job losses start to sweep through the global workforce, for example, there may be more to be gained politically from a pause.
The more likely scenario is that the natural forces of the boom slow it down anyway. AI is already putting major strains on the U.S. power grid and is raising electricity prices, which is one reason why pauses on data-center projects have legs politically.
AI spending is also encountering more resistance. Some of the big tech companies that have fueled the boom are free-cash-flow negative because of their AI outlays. Prices of corporate bonds linked to AI are falling as tech companies gear up to raise more debt to grow their computing infrastructure.
And returns on AI spending are still murky nearly four years into the boom. It may take time, but development will have to slow if it becomes clearer that companies can’t make back what they are spending.
The social impact of AI is real. For AI developers and investors, though, dollars and cents are what ultimately will matter.

"Piles of Dead Russians" Line Approaches To Ukraine's Dobropillia Defenses

2026-09-05T09:44:00.330-04:00

It has become a commonplace of this war that the Russian military is not a learning organization. While some may disregard this as a bit of irrelevant contemporary consultant-speak, the tangible reality has become evident (again...) at Pokrovsk, where hundreds of Russian bodies litter the ground in front of extensive Ukrainian defenses replete with razor wire, tank traps, ditches and lines designed to funnel the unwary into kill zones.

And where did the Ukrainians learn this concept? Why, from the Russians' own "Surovikin Lines," named for the Russian general who in 2023 created the defensive obstacles that stopped Ukraine's southern offensive in its tracks. So not only do the Russians refuse to learn from the Ukrainians, they refuse to learn from their own successes. This is not, in any field of human endeavor, a recipe for achieving desired results. JL

RFU News reports:

In the Pokrovsk sector, recent footage by Ukraine's Rubizh brigade shows a small stretch of land filled with killed Russian soldiers. The Russians are failing here on Pokrovsk's flanks because dead Russian soldiers are piled up against lines of concrete blocks and razorwire. Extensive defenses counter both Russian armored and infiltration assaults, delaying enemy movement to allow Ukrainian defenders the time to eliminate threats. In trying to cut open a path through the razor wire, the Russians created a narrow corridor that Ukrainians were able to concentrate their fire onto; creating the kill zone that resulted in disastrous losses for the Russians. This means the Russians have failed to find a way into the Ukrainian fortress town of Dobropillia, and are losing hundreds of men in narrow chokepoints in trying to outflank it.

Today, the biggest news comes from the Pokrovsk direction.
Recently released footage by the Ukrainian Rubizh brigade shows a small stretch of land filled to the brim with killed Russian soldiers. The brigade states that Russian forces have tried to infiltrate the area in small groups but are consistently failing to make any progress. The unit reports that in this small area alone, they have killed over one-hundred enemy Russian soldiers.
For the past six months in this sector, Russians have been repeatedly trying to penetrate deeper into Ukrainian lines and again break through the Ukrainian defense line. Doing so would move them closer to surrounding Dobropillia from the east, the last major Ukrainian stronghold in Western Donetsk. After failing to break into Dobropillia from the south directly, Russians see outflanking as their only viable option left, outside of overcommitting all of their reserves and leaving nothing left to take advantage of the breakthrough.
However, in the video shared by the Rubizh brigade, we can see exactly why the Russians are failing here on the flanks. The footage shows that the killed Russian soldiers are piled up against lines upon lines of concrete blocks and razorwire defenses. Interestingly enough, we can see in the footage that in trying to cut open a path through the razor wire, Russian soldiers themselves created a narrow corridor that Ukrainians were able to concentrate their fire onto; inadvertently creating the exact kill zone that resulted in the disastrous losses for the Russians.
Namely, Ukrainians have constructed an extensive defensive line made up of engineering obstacles placed in depth. In some places, the line reaches as deep as six layers of barbed and razor wire, dragon’s teeth, and anti-tank ditches. All of these defenses are able to counter both Russian armored and infiltration assaults, meant to slow down and delay enemy movement to allow Ukrainian defenders the time to eliminate all of the threats. These areas where Russian movement is slowed down and concentrated to one spot are then exploited to the maximum effect and turned into killing fields. Footage shared by the Russian side last month already shows around one-hundred Ukrainian drones waiting in ambush along only a small stretch of road. These drones lay in ambush along viable and known Russian infiltration routes in standby mode to save battery, coming into action and striking the enemy soldiers once they come into view.
With the Azov Corps commander taking full responsibility for this sector, these Ukrainian tactics are being implemented with increasing frequency. Notably, Ukrainian forces report that when these tactics are applied correctly, they allow them to eliminate sixty Russian soldiers for every Ukrainian soldier lost in combat. These devastating losses in exchange for minimal territorial gains are gradually wearing out Russian reserves and combat capabilities, undermining Russian offensive posture and momentum as well as their defense. The undermining of Russian defensive posture through exhausting their manpower reserves is extremely important if we remember that currently the Skala assault regiment has been transferred to this sector, has been placed under Azov command, and is currently spearheading operations to unblock critical defensive positions in front of Dobropillia. Ensuring that Ukrainian defenses do not budge against Russian assaults ensures that Ukrainians have a secure staging ground to launch their counterattacks from, increasing the chances that Ukrainians will be able to turn the tide in the Pokrovsk direction as well.
Overall, Russians have failed to find a way into the Ukrainian fortress town of Dobropillia, and are losing hundreds of men in narrow chokepoints in trying to outflank it. Ukraine’s modernized engineering obstacles designed to counter exactly Russia’s most important tactics of mechanized assaults and infiltrations are proving extremely effective at holding the enemy at bay. As Russians are unlikely to admit that they are unable to advance, even more Russian reserves will be sacrificed in the Ukrainian kill zones north of Pokrovsk. As these losses accumulate to a breaking point, Ukrainians will be able to take advantage and retake the initiative in this sector as well, continuing a trend being seen in more and more places along the Ukrainian front lines.

Ukraine Sea Drones Hit Putin-Favorite Sochi Resort For 1st Time

2026-09-04T08:53:43.216-04:00

Ukraine hit the exclusive Black Sea resort of Sochi with sea drones for the first time, striking and damaging a Russian ship in the harbor.

Since Tsarist times Sochi has been a favored vacation spot for Russian elites and current President Putin is a regular visitor. That the Ukrainians launched the attack in broad daylight rather than at night as they usually do for sea drone attacks was clearly intended for it to be seen and to send a message to the Russian oligarchy that nowhere they may want to travel in their country is now safe from Ukrainian attack. JL

Howard Altman reports in The War Zone:

Ukraine carried out one of its farthest uncrewed surface vessel (USV) attacks from Ukrainian shores, striking the Nefrit, a multipurpose offshore vessel, in the Russian Black Sea resort city of Sochi. The seaside getaway is located about 350 miles on a direct line from the nearest Ukrainian-held territory, but the trip is a lot longer if originating from Ukrainian-held shores. This marks the first known USV attack on this city that Russian President Vladimir Putin often visits. That the attack occurring during broad daylight is also interesting, as Ukraine has often taken advantage of the cover of darkness for USV strike operations on port facilities. There was no immediate response from the Kremlin.
Ukraine carried out one of its farthest uncrewed surface vessel (USV) attacks from Ukrainian shores, striking the Nefrit, a multipurpose offshore vessel, in the Russian Black Sea resort city of Sochi. The seaside getaway is located about 350 miles on a direct line from the nearest Ukrainian-held territory, but the trip is a lot longer if originating from Ukrainian-held shores.
This marks the first known USV attack on this city that Russian President Vladimir Putin often visits. As we have reported in the past, it has been attacked several times by Ukrainian aerial drones.

The Russian Black Sea port of Sochi came under attack on Thursday. (Google Earth)
The Ukrainian Navy said it carried out the attack as part of the country’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure. The Nefrit supported that infrastructure, the Ukrainian Navy claimed.
“The multipurpose support vessel, flying the Russian flag, was hit by an unmanned naval vessel of the Ukrainian Navy,” the service said on Telegram. “A powerful explosion and smoke were observed in the area of the vessel.”
“The NEFRIT is part of Russia’s maritime and energy infrastructure, providing support for oil and gas operations, servicing offshore facilities, transporting cargo and personnel, and carrying out underwater technical work,” the Ukrainian Navy explained. “Its activities directly supported the enemy’s war economy and financed the criminal aggression against Ukraine.”
“The damage to the NEFRIT is a blow to the enemy’s logistics, special capabilities, and military-economic infrastructure,” the Ukrainian Navy added. “The Ukrainian Navy continues to deprive the enemy of resources and capabilities for waging war, and once again demonstrates that even Russian territory is not a safe haven.”
While the Ukrainian Navy claimed the Nefrit was damaged, the extent of that is hard to determine from imagery emerging on social media.

Some video, shot from inside the city, shows a large explosion at the port.

A still picture shows smoke wafting from the Nefrit; however, the quality of the image makes it hard to determine the vessel’s condition.

Starting at about 6 a.m. local time, Sochi Mayor Andrey Proshunin declared an emergency.

“ATTENTION! THREAT OF A USV ATTACK IN SOCHI,” he warned on Telegram. “All forces and resources are working to defend the city. Take shelter in a safe place, remain calm.”

About a half hour later, Proshunin issued an all-clear notice, but did not provide any details about what happened.

There was no immediate response from the Kremlin.
Ukraine has carried out long-distance USV attacks on Russian Black Sea targets in the past, including one in 2023 on the Ropucha class vessel Olenegorsky Gornyak, located in Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. A major Russian port on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, it sits roughly 420 miles from Ukrainian-held shores. Sochi is about 110 miles southeast of Novorossiysk, meaning the USVs in today’s attack would have had to travel an even longer distance if launched from Ukrainian-held shores. However, the launch point of the Sochi USV strike is not publicly known and there is always the possibility that a mothership could have been used.
The attack occurring during broad daylight is also interesting, as Ukraine has often taken advantage of the cover of darkness for USV strike operations on port facilities.

The strike on the Nefrit is the latest in Ukraine’s long-running drone boat campaign in the Black Sea. This onslaught has already kept Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) at bay, forcing it to retreat from Crimea to Novorossiysk. Ukrainian USVs have also damaged enemy military facilities in occupied Crimea and the Kerch Bridge.

Moscow Airports Cancel Flights 2nd Night After Ukraine Drone Attack Warning

2026-09-04T08:28:52.621-04:00

The point here is to further impress upon the Russian people, especially the elites who value their ability to travel, that Putin's war is now threatening their lives, to say nothing of their way of life.

Ukraine is making it clear that it can and will follow through on its threats. JL

Chris York reports in the Kyiv Independent:

Flights in and out of Moscow's Vnukovo and Sheremetyevo airports were restricted for the second night in a row on Sept. 2, after Ukraine warned of a new campaign to "close" Russian skies. "Temporary restrictions on the arrival and departure of aircraft have been introduced," Russia's Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) said. President Zelensky on Sept. 1 warned airlines, insurers, and foreign governments that Russian airspace "will be de facto closed" because of Ukrainian drones. Live tracking of arrivals at Sheremetyevo Airport showed almost every flight scheduled for the afternoon of Sept. 3 either delayed or canceled. A similar situation was reported at Vnukovo Airport.
Flights in and out of Moscow's Vnukovo and Sheremetyevo airports were restricted for the second night in a row on Sept. 2, after Ukraine warned of a new campaign to "close" Russian skies.
"Temporary restrictions on the arrival and departure of aircraft have been introduced," Russia's Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) said.
President Volodymyr Zelensky on Sept. 1 warned airlines, insurers, and foreign governments that Russian airspace "will be de facto closed" because of Ukrainian drones.
Zelensky gave few details about what the new campaign would entail, other than making clear it would involve lots of drones.

"There will simply be drones in Russia's skies on a scale that has to be taken into account," he said, as he warned "every airline that uses Russian airspace" against flying over the country.
Most Western airlines stopped flying to Russia after the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. One exception is Turkey's Pegasus Airlines, which on Sept. 2 announced that "flights to Russia scheduled overnight from 1 to 2 September were canceled due to technical and operational reasons."
It added that flights from "Sept. 2 onwards are operating as scheduled."
But FlightRadar24 live tracking of arrivals at Sheremetyevo Airport showed almost every flight scheduled for the afternoon of Sept. 3 either delayed or canceled. A similar situation was reported at Vnukovo Airport.

FlightRadar24 also reported that overnight on Sept. 2, 21 flights were canceled and 235 delayed at Sheremetyevo, while 22 flights were canceled and 94 delayed at Vnukovo.
Zelensky's announcement comes at a time when, in the absence of meaningful changes on the front lines, both Ukraine and Russia are looking for other ways to increase pressure on each other.
For Russia, this has meant a drastic escalation in drone and missile strikes, particularly on Kyiv.
For Ukraine, lacking the long-range missile firepower of Russia, it means becoming more creative with long-range drones.

Forcing the closure of Russian airspace using drones is not a new idea, and Ukraine has been employing the tactic for nearly a year and a half.
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) began Operation Carpet in the spring of last year, with the aim of disrupting Russian airport operations by deliberately flying drones over them, people familiar with the matter, who did not want to be named for security reasons

Four Sectors, One Signal: Russian Vulnerability Along the Front

2026-09-04T08:19:43.347-04:00

A series of recent Ukrainian successes in four distinct sectors - Donetsk, Zaporizhhia, Sumy and Kharkiv - signal that the combination of these tactical operations could combine and add up to a strategic advantage for Kyiv's forces.

That this is happening not just in one sector but in what are arguably the four most heavily contested areas of the entire front suggest that Russia does not have the current mass to defend its extended deployment, let alone advance in any significant way in even one of them. JL

Giorgio Provinciali reports:

Ukrainian forces are achieving a series of tactical successes that could significantly alter the geometry of the front. Recent Ukrainian advances between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia — iand in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions mark the beginning of an operation distorting the front along the pivots where the Russians seemed to be aiming their summer offensive. At this stage Ukraine has no need to pursue a breakthrough: it simply needs to build depth, move drones and artillery closer to Russian supply lines, and make every enemy rotation slower, more visible, and more costly. Every Russian salient transformed from an offensive springboard into a logistical problem deprives Moscow of a choice and gives Kyiv one back. The war will be decided when one side loses freedom of maneuver, the adversary’s logistics are constrained, when salient points become traps, and when offensives no longer create panic but create opportunity.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are achieving a series of tactical and operational successes that, if consolidated, could significantly alter the geometry of the front. Recent Ukrainian advances between Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia — in Mala Tokmachka, Bilohiria, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka — and then in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions mark the beginning of a complex operational phase that is distorting the front precisely along the pivots where the Russians seemed to be aiming to base their summer offensive maneuvers.

Let’s be clear: we are not yet facing a Ukrainian strategic breakthrough. Talking today about a “march on Tokmak” or “broken Russian salients in Donbas” would be premature; however, ignoring their importance would be equally wrong.
On the southern front, the value of the Ukrainian successes at Mala Tokmachka and Bilohiria is measured not only by the square kilometers retaken but also by the direction in which they are moving: Orikhiv, Robotyne, Verbove, Tokmak. Anyone who has observed this war closely, or read the reports we have compiled for years, including those from those places, knows that Tokmak is no ordinary name: it is one of the Russian logistical and defensive fulcrums of occupied Zaporizhzhia, the hub protecting access to Melitopol’ and thus the deepest point of the Russian corridor to Crimea. It is the reality against which the largest Ukrainian counteroffensive operation of 2023 was shattered. It is the waking nightmare we lived through between the end of that year and the beginning of the next, when the young men you see in our videos died alongside us defending Ukraine. “Токмак це Україна” (Tokmak is Ukraine) — the inscription that stood out for four years on the flagpole at the entrance to Orikhiv, before a Russian drone destroyed it and other flags, including ours.
Held for over 1,500 days under heavy artillery, drones, guided glide bombs, and constant mechanized assaults, Mala Tokmachka — which translates as “little Tokmak” — has become a vivid demonstration of Russia’s inability to turn mass action into decisive action.

On the easternmost hinge, Bilohiria completes the picture: it now forces Moscow to defend not only the frontal axis at Orikhiv but also the lateral connection to Huliaipole.
For months, the Kremlin has built its narrative on relentless pressure, marked by small advances, destroyed villages, and flags filmed among the rubble. Today, that propaganda is silent: an offensive system that cannot close Mala Tokmachka continues to consume men and resources for a few pulverized blocks and sees the threat of interdiction toward Tokmak reopening.
It is not advancing. It is paying extremely high interest rates on an operational debt it can no longer repay. Unlike 2023, at this stage Ukraine has no need to pursue a spectacular breakthrough: it simply needs to rebuild depth, improve observation, move drones and artillery closer to Russian supply lines, and make every enemy rotation slower, more visible, and more costly.

Even more interesting is what is happening on the Lyman salient. Large as they are, Ridkodub and Katerynivka are not important for their size but because they flank a Russian bridgehead that has been trying for months to turn Zherebets into an offensive platform against the northern sector of the Ukrainian Donbas: a salient built by the Russians, leaving tens of thousands of men there. If Ukrainian forces manage to compress enemy positions between Ridkodub, Nove, Katerynivka, and the river crossings, the pressure Moscow intended to exert on Lyman ceases to be a linear problem and becomes a logistical one: who supplies, from where, through which forest strips, under what electronic coverage, and at what risk of being detected by drones before even reaching the position.
In those areas, we documented rapid mechanized assaults, protected vehicles such as the Cobra II and BTR-4E, infantry landing under cover of electronic warfare, jamming or delaying Russian FPVs, and the enemy’s use of fiber-optic drones that are immune to jamming but less readily deployable en masse.
This is where we spent endless nights during relentless bombing. The entrance to this basement collapsed as soon as we entered. We left much later, digging through the rubble in a direction different from the entrance. There was a little mouse that occasionally came to visit us between the mattresses: we named her Larissa :) — copyrighted photo Giorgio Provinciali
It’s the war we’ve been describing for months: a front no longer linear but volumetric, with rear areas that blur into risk gradients dominated by sensors, radio nodes, jamming, and kill zones. Small assault units and the ability to rapidly consolidate a strip of ground have been our home for 1,557 days.
The strategic significance is clear. Lyman is one of the northern gateways to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the Ukrainian defensive backbone in the Donbas. If Moscow loses momentum on this flank or is forced to shift reserves to prevent its bridgehead from collapsing, pressure on the Ukrainian fortress belt will diminish, and with it any possibility of an outflanking from the northeast.
Every Russian salient transformed from an offensive springboard into a logistical problem deprives Moscow of a choice and gives Kyiv one back.

The same pattern is unfolding further north, in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. The Russians’ stated goal was to create a buffer zone for infiltration, observation, drone launches, psychological pressure, and political constraint, transforming the international border into a second permanent line of contact and forcing Ukraine to immobilize reserves that would be needed elsewhere.
The liberation of a growing number of villages in Kharkiv, the Ukrainian pressure toward the border in the Velykyi Burluk direction, and the loss of Russian momentum in Sumy should be interpreted precisely as such: they are the negation of an operational plan, because a buffer zone — or «sanitary zone», as Vladimir Putin chose to call it — only works if it becomes stable.

Four sectors sending a single signal: the Russian front is crumbling.
We are not facing the end of the war or a general counteroffensive. Russia retains mass, depth, artillery, bombs, missiles, and a brutal capacity to consume men. But the war is decided when one side loses freedom of maneuver, when the adversary’s logistics are constrained, when salient points become traps, and when offensives no longer create panic but instead create operational debt.
For months, Moscow has tried to convince the world that Ukraine could only resist. The camp explains that Kyiv is once again choosing where to strike. Not yet enough to break the Russian front, but enough to prevent it from remaining unchanged.

Ukraine Advances At Kupiansk As Trapped Russians Forced To Get Water By Drone

2026-09-04T08:02:46.511-04:00

Ukrainian forces are having success continuing their strategy of identifying weaker segments of the Russian front line and then opportunistically striking them. This has been particularly true in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, as well as around Lyman.

On the Kupiansk sector, Ukrainian troops have pushed the Russians back four square kilometers, adding to the Kremlin's string of losses in that area. As much as the Russians want Kupiansk and continue trying to take it, they have not been able to muster the mass to do so and the Ukrainians have made them pay for trying. JL

Olena Mukhina reports in the Euromaidan Press and RBC-Ukraine reports:

Ukraine's National Guard says its assault units have cleared four square kilometers of ground near Kupiansk. The Khartiia corps have pushed Russian forces out of territory between the settlements of Dvorichna and Zapadne, working with the 35th Marine Brigade. Russian forces in the area had been effectively paralyzed by a fuel shortage, with even water being delivered exclusively by drones. Ukraine's Defense Forces continue to make gains in several sectors of the front line. Independent observers have reported Ukrainian advances on multiple fronts in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions.
Ukraine's National Guard says its assault units have cleared four square kilometers of ground near Kupiansk. According to the military, fighters of the 23rd R.U.G. Assault Regiment of the Khartiia corps have pushed Russian forces out of territory between the settlements of Dvorichna and Zapadne, working with the 35th Separate Marine Brigade on one stretch.
Russia wants Kupiansk as a logistics node and a springboard for pushing deeper into Kharkiv Oblast. Just outside the city sits the Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi station, a key rail hub whose capture would let Russian forces move supplies and equipment far more easily.
“Overall, another 4 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory have been liberated. As long as the enemy remains on our land, the work continues,” the National Guard said.

A city fought over from both banks

The clearing north of the city is only one part of a contested picture. Kupiansk straddles the Oskil River: Ukraine holds the left, eastern bank, while Russian forces have pushed onto the right, western bank closer to Ukraine's rear.
On 2 September, Viktor Tregubov, head of communications for Ukraine's Joint Forces Group, said Russian troops had infiltrated part of northern Kupiansk on that right bank.
"On the right bank, the Russians are trying to hold the northern parts of the city, where they've already infiltrated some of their fighters," he told Suspilne, adding that Ukrainian forces are making trouble for them there.
The infiltrators are trying to reach the city through the village of Holubivka, he said.

On the left bank, Russian units are trying to reach the railway station.

"The Russians are pushing very hard toward it. They want to narrow our bridgehead," Tregubov reported.
No confirmed Russian advance
Back in July, Trehubov mentioned the Russian forces’ logistical problems in this direction, according to ArmyInform.
He explained that logistics for Russian forces in the area had been effectively paralyzed by a fuel shortage, with even water being delivered exclusively by drones.
Ukraine's Defense Forces continue to make gains in several sectors of the front line. In particular, analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have reported Ukrainian advances on multiple fronts in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions.

There Are Many Investors With Shares In Both Anthropic, OpenAI. They'll Cash In

2026-09-04T07:47:48.873-04:00

It used to be in tech investing, that you picked one company in a competitive market and bet on (invested in it). Not with AI. Analysis reveals that many investors have put their money on both. This is both because it is expected that both will do well - and, frankly - because the AI firms need so much money that a small group of VCs and others is insufficient to provide that much capital.

And as Anthropic and OpenAI maneuver to lan their IPOs, those 'both and' investors are positioned to cash in. The only downside is that even as AI becomes an ever narrower but ever more powerful driver of the economy, the additional concentration of investment means that those firms and individuals are not just going to get immeasurably wealthier if it all works out, but that they will be irretrievably exposed if it doesn't. JL

Erin Griffith reports in the New York Times:

As Anthropic and OpenAI prepare to go public, the question around Silicon Valley is which investors will win big. The answer, it turns out, is just about everyone. Anthropic has raised more than $130 billion from 300 investors, according, including venture capital firms, hedge funds, big tech companies and Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds. OpenAI has raised more than $180 billion from 230 investors. As Anthropic and OpenAI grew, their need for capital outpaced backing from venture firms. Menlo Ventures created a “special purpose vehicle” that rounded up many small investors into one $750 million entity. Thrive Capital created a similar vehicle to invest in OpenAI. Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Nvidia also took stakes in both Anthropic and OpenAI. Other investment firms obtained shares of Anthropic and OpenAI when the A.I. companies bought smaller firms with stock. Some of these giants are now the biggest shareholders of the start-ups.

As the artificial intelligence companies Anthropic and OpenAI prepare to go public, the question around Silicon Valley is which investors will win big.
The answer, it turns out, is just about everyone.
At least 95 investors have put money into both Anthropic and OpenAI, according to a tally on PitchBook, which tracks private investment. Sequoia Capital, a marquee venture capital firm, invested in both start-ups. So did Founders Fund, Coatue Management and Altimeter Capital Management.
That’s highly unusual. In the past, venture capital firms that invest in young start-ups typically backed just one company in a fast-growing new technology category. Putting money into direct competitors was considered a conflict of interest.
But the A.I. boom has changed nearly everything around Silicon Valley, and the way that investors nurture start-ups is no exception. Top firms on Sand Hill Road — the famous stretch in Menlo Park, Calif., that remains the nexus of venture capital firms — have shifted their norms and adapted their strategies so that they do not miss out on investing in the A.I. companies that could be the next $2 trillion winner. Few large investment funds want to say, “We missed both” OpenAI and Anthropic, said Karan Mehandru, an investor at Madrona Venture Group.
Just how much of Silicon Valley is tied up in the success or failure of Anthropic and OpenAI is evident from the amount of money that the two privately held companies have accumulated.
Anthropic has raised more than $130 billion from roughly 300 investors, according to PitchBook, including venture capital firms, hedge funds, big tech companies and Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds. OpenAI has raised more than $180 billion from roughly 230 investors, such as big tech companies and Joshua Kushner’s investment firm, Thrive Capital.
In contrast, Facebook (before it became Meta) raised just $2.4 billion ahead of going public in 2012 and Uber raised roughly $20 billion before reaching the stock market in 2019. Not all of the investors named as Anthropic and OpenAI shareholders by PitchBook got their shares through traditional venture funding rounds; the list includes some who bought indirectly via private share sales on the “secondary market,” which is when investors obtain stock from existing shareholders like employees or early investor.

SpaceX’s successful $1.7 trillion initial public offering in June has further fueled investor excitement for Anthropic and OpenAI. Anthropic is heading toward a public offering this year that could value it at $2 trillion and become the biggest listing ever. OpenAI may go public next year, and its offering is also expected to be enormous. For investors, that means “all the numbers are bigger, including the entry price and the exit price,” said Sohail Prasad, chief executive of Destiny100, a firm that bought shares of OpenAI and Anthropic on the secondary market.

Anthropic and OpenAI declined to comment. (The New York Times has sued OpenAI and Microsoft, claiming copyright infringement of news content related to A.I. systems. The two companies have denied those claims.) For years, venture capital investors followed similar rules. Their idea was to take a big stake in a young company and help it with advice. The investor would take a seat on the start-up’s board.

When Facebook went public, the venture firm Accel Partners owned 11.4 percent of the company’s stock. Jim Breyer, a partner at the firm, sat on Facebook’s board alongside Marc Andreessen and Peter Thiel, two other venture capital investors.

And when Uber went public, the venture firm Benchmark Capital Partners owned 11 percent of the company. One of Benchmark’s investors, Matt Cohler, sat on the board.

But Anthropic, which was founded five years ago, looks very different. That’s partly because venture firms initially dismissed the company as a science project. More than 20 firms rejected the start-up’s pitch, Anjney Midha, an Anthropic investor, said on a recent podcast. Instead, people in effective altruism circles, the philanthropic movement that prioritizes data and analysis for social causes, first invested in Anthropic.

Spark Capital, a Silicon Valley venture capital firm, eventually led a round of funding in Anthropic in 2023. Yasmin Razavi, a Spark Capital investor, joined Anthropic’s board. Around that time, Dario Amodei, Anthropic’s chief executive, and Neerav Kingsland, an Anthropic executive, visited the home of Guy Oseary, a Hollywood talent manager who invests in tech through his firm, Sound Ventures. Mr. Oseary was impressed by Anthropic’s pitch, said a person familiar with the matter who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the discussions were private. But Sound Ventures had already invested in OpenAI.

So the firm got permission from Sam Altman, OpenAI’s chief executive, and Dr. Amodei to invest in both companies, the person familiar with the matter said. That made Sound Ventures one of the first firms to put money into both competitors.Soon after, Mr. Oseary raised a new fund dedicated to A.I. “We believed this would be the most important technology of our lifetime,” he said in a statement.

As Anthropic and OpenAI grew, their need for capital outpaced backing from many venture firms, which were not set up to write checks that big. Menlo Ventures, a Silicon Valley firm known for backing Uber, engineered a workaround. To further invest in Anthropic, the firm in 2024 created a “special purpose vehicle,” a fund that rounded up many small investors into one $750 million entity controlled by Menlo. Thrive Capital created a similar vehicle to invest in OpenAI in 2024.

Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Nvidia also took stakes in both Anthropic and OpenAI and have signed large contracts to provide cloud computing services or chips to them. Some of these giants are now the biggest shareholders of the start-ups.

Lightspeed Venture Partners and Iconiq Capital, two large investment firms in Silicon Valley, later led funding rounds in Anthropic. Menlo, Lightspeed and Iconiq now own 1 percent to 2 percent of Anthropic, said three people familiar with the investments. The financial backing ranks them among the A.I. start-up’s largest outside investors. (Menlo and Lightspeed do not own stakes in OpenAI; Iconiq has a small stake in it.)

Venture capital firms usually aim to own more than 1 percent or 2 percent of a start-up, but the potential for Anthropic to go public at a $2 trillion value means the investors will still see an enormous windfall. Ms. Razavi of Spark Capital is the only investor with a seat on Anthropic’s board.

After Anthropic’s coding and business automation tools took off last year, investing in the company became “consensus,” a term that venture investors use to denote a success that’s obvious to the whole industry. Investors worldwide fought to get shares, despite the lack of detailed information about the company’s performance or board seats. Sequoia Capital had previously declined to invest in Anthropic, partly because it had backed Elon Musk’s xAI, a competitor, and was also a significant investor in OpenAI, a person familiar with the firm said. But this year, Sequoia Capital contributed to two financing rounds for Anthropic, including as a co-leader of one in May that valued the company at $900 billion. Other investment firms obtained shares of Anthropic and OpenAI when the A.I. companies bought smaller firms with stock. Anthropic has acquired at least four companies and OpenAI roughly a dozen, according to PitchBook.

Madrona got shares in OpenAI last year after the San Francisco company bought Statsig, a provider of A.I. software, for $1.1 billion. Madrona owned a piece of Statsig, which meant its shares converted into shares of OpenAI.

Statsig was doing well, Mr. Mehandru said, but his firm was happy to trade that stock for shares in OpenAI. “If it had been stock from someone else,” he said, “maybe the answer would have been different.”

In February, Madrona also obtained shares in Anthropic when the A.I. start-up acquired Vercept, a company that makes agents that can remotely operate computers. Madrona had been an investor in Vercept.

Jamming-Proof Fiber Optic Drones Deployed By Ukraine In Deceptively Lethal Ways

2026-09-03T14:09:49.971-04:00

Fiber optic drones are increasingly being used like land mines. They lie in wait for troops or vehicles to come near and are then activated to explode.

It is one of the ways that creativity and innovation are being applied to increase lethal effectiveness. JL

Sinead Baker reports in Business Insider:

Ukrainian operators are increasingly using fiber-optic drones in atypical ways — such as deception and ambush — to "create tons of chaos," relying on their resistance to electronic warfare and close-range video feeds to scout Russian positions, study bunkers and dugouts, and create unusual openings for attacks. Some operators have their drones play dead or purposefully lie in wait on the battlefield, exploding at just the right time to kill approaching soldiers. "The drones hide on roads and at intersections. They're often placed on forest trails, waiting for a target. When they spot a vehicle, they take off and strike quickly, leaving little time to react."

Ukraine is using fiber-optic drones in increasingly deceptive ways, relying on their resistance to electronic warfare and close-range video feeds to scout Russian positions, study bunkers and dugouts, and create unusual openings for attacks, a soldier said.
These jamming-resistant drones have been on the battlefield for over two years, and they have become an important tool for both sides, allowing troops to surveil and attack without their drones being brought down by electronic warfare.
Dmytro "Liber" Zhluktenko, a former drone operator who is now an analyst in Ukraine's 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment "RAID," told Business Insider that Ukrainian operators are increasingly using fiber-optic drones in atypical ways — such as deception and ambush — to "create tons of chaos."

He said that some operators have their drones play dead or purposefully lie in wait on the battlefield, exploding at just the right time to kill an approaching soldier or expose a protected enemy position rather than simply flying directly into a target and detonating on impact.
He said fiber-optic drones are also helpful for studying Russian bunkers and dugouts because they can capture high-quality video of "all of the entrances, because you get the perfect footage, you could literally figure out what type of cover that they have on their entry to their dugout, and what you should do to open it."

Close-range reconnaissance is one of the drone's best uses, Zhluktenko said. Before hitting Russian dugouts and bunkers, drone operators can gather "very good intel" and "very precise intelligence at very, very close range."
While they can be used to chase and attack, he said, there are limitations that make them less than ideal for those missions. These drones, which are connected to the operator by a thin data cable, are slower than the untethered FPV drones, and the fiber-optic cables can "break quite easily when you just give it a full throttle."
For fiber-optic drones, pilot commands and video feeds are transmitted through a physical cable instead of over radio frequency connections, which can be jammed by electronic warfare. The cable is delicate and can snap if caught on trees or obstacles. Some soldiers carry scissors to cut through any cables they come across.

Fiber-optic drones are relatively new to the battlefield but have changed tactics. Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images
A US veteran who has fought for Ukraine told Business Insider on the condition of anonymity that there are "very simple ways to bring them down," including by cutting their wires.
"In the wintertime," he said, "the cold will break them half the time." Still, these systems are considered necessary given the prolific electronic warfare threat.
Zhluktenko said the cable was becoming more expensive, which has limited how often the drones are used. He said Ukraine was finding other ways to try to get the same stable connection, including by using masses of signal repeaters to keep radio connections online, but fiber-optic drones remain in play.

The deception and ambush tactics Zhluktenko described are part of a growing trend on both sides of this war.
A British medic working in Ukraine who spoke to Business Insider on the condition of anonymity said that Russia places drones in positions for ambushes.
Russian drones, she said, will "actually sit within the grass or the verges, and a group of soldiers will either go past or drive past, and these things will literally activate and just almost jump out of nowhere and hit. "

"We have this image of drones flying, making a great noise and making a great presence, but that is not the case," she said. "They can be quiet, insidious, and the one minute you'll be, shall I say, walking along a tree line, the next thing, you hear the noise, and then we see an explosion, and it's just so incredibly rapid. And because they're so fast, it's often way beyond your reflexes to actually react."
Another US veteran who fought in Ukraine told Business Insider that Russian soldiers will use "land mine tactics," where they put the drone next to a road and leave it there, waiting for a vehicle or another target to approach.
Ukrainians have called attention to these tactics as well. Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, then serving as a drone warfare advisor to Ukraine's defense ministry, said last year that Russia was using fiber-optic drones for "ambush" tactics, including lying in wait for targets along roadways.

"This is one of the tactics involving fiber-optic drones," he said. "It's effective and causes us a lot of problems." Russia is also using solar-powered drones that can lie dormant for this tactic.
"The drones hide on roads and at intersections," Beskrestnov said. "They're often placed on forest trails, waiting for a target. When they spot a vehicle, they take off and strike quickly, leaving little time to react."

Russia Suffers 2nd Month of 40,000+ Casualties, 'Fails To Collapse Ukrainian Lines'

2026-09-03T11:35:55.457-04:00

For the second month in a row, Ukrainian forces have inflicted more

than 40,000 casualties - killed and severely wounded - on Russian troops in Ukraine.

This means that not only is Russia unable to replace its battlefield losses with replacements of the same amount by several thousand, but the Ukrainians are getting closer to their stated goal of 50,000 Russian casualties per month, which their analysis suggests is unsustainable for the Kremlin's conduct of the war. JL

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

Russia's Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains. Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses

Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive has failed to achieve operational maneuver or rapidly collapse Ukrainian lines. Russian gains remain slow and limited. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces consolidated positions in or seized about 90.35 square kilometers of territory in Ukraine in August 2026, averaging 2.91 square kilometers seized per day. Including Russian infiltrations, Russian forces advanced or infiltrated into about 123.53 square kilometers — an average pace of 3.98 square kilometers per day. Russian forces’ main territorial gains in August 2026 have been in the Fortress Belt area, Donetsk Oblast. Even there, Russian forces managed to achieve only marginal tactical gains and have thus far failed to complete the seizure of Kostyantynivka. Russian forces maintain a presence (either through advances or infiltrations) in 72.23 percent of Kostyantynivka and have failed to completely seize the settlement, even after months of increased infiltrations and urban fighting.[1] Russian advances in August 2026 remain a fraction of Russia’s gains during the same period in 2025, even when including infiltrations. Russian forces seized 505.55 square kilometers in August 2025, for example, highlighting how Russian forces’ rate of advance continues to slow. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations across the theater in August 2026, notably in the Lyman and Oleksandrivka directions, and ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces liberated at least 129.81 square kilometers in August 2026.[2] This figure is very likely conservative, as ISW’s methodology underestimates the extent of likely Ukrainian gains in the ongoing counteroffensive in the Lyman direction, and additional collection will likely reveal the full extent of Ukrainian gains in the Lyman direction in Fall 2026. ISW will continue to update its assessment as more evidence becomes available.

Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties in August 2026 — the second month in a row that Russian forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in a single month.[3] Russian forces suffered an average of 340 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated and 465 casualties per square kilometer seized in August 2026. Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current footpace offensive tempo at their current loss rate without some form of mobilization

Russian General Who Ordered Ukraine Children's Hospital Bombing Shot in Russia

2026-09-03T11:13:05.977-04:00

The Air Force squadrons of long range bombers under the general's command have been firing cruise missiles at civilian Ukrainian targets since the start of the invasion.

Their arguably most heinous crime was hitting a children's hospital in Kyiv in 2024. It took two years, but the Ukrainians have neither forgotten nor forgiven. JL

Sonia Kozatskyi reports in Militarnyi:

Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich, commander of the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division of the Long-Range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, was seriously wounded in Russia. The assailant rode up to a private home on a motorcycle while wearing a helmet and shot the high-ranking Russian military officer. One bullet struck the officer in the torso and another in the face. Varpakhovich was hospitalized in critical condition. Aircraft aircraft commanded by the general have been firing cruise missiles at Ukraine since the start of the invasion. In particular, they attacked the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv with a Kh-101 missile in the summer of 2024.
Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich, commander of the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division of the Long-Range Aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, was seriously wounded in Russia.
The Russian Telegram channel Mash reported the attack on the military officer.
The attack took place around 7 a.m. on September 3 in the village of Probuzhdenie near Engels in the Saratov region.
It is currently reported that the assailant rode up to a private home on a motorcycle while wearing a helmet and shot the high-ranking Russian military officer.
According to the Dossier of the Spy Telegram channel, one bullet struck the officer in the torso and another in the face. Varpakhovich was hospitalized in critical condition.
The major general’s driver was also wounded but managed to escape and hide; he later returned and called an ambulance.
At the hospital, the bullets were removed from the wounded Varpakhovich, and he is being prepared for transport by plane to Moscow. The assailant has not yet been apprehended.
The aircraft commanded by the wounded major general have been firing cruise missiles at Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion. In particular, they attacked the Okhmatdyt specialized children’s hospital in Kyiv with a Kh-101 missile in the summer of 2024.

In late August, the SSU and the Prosecutor General’s Office formally notified Varpakhovich, among others, in absentia that he was suspected of this crime.
The 22nd Division includes the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment in Engels, which is equipped with Tu-160s, and the 184th Heavy Bomber Regiment, which operates Tu-95MS aircraft.

The village of Shaykovka is home to the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, which operates Tu-22M3 aircraft.
The 22nd Aviation Division also includes the 40th Mixed Aviation Regiment in the village of Vysokiy, which operates An-26 aircraft and Mi-26 and Mi-8/17 helicopters.

Ukraine's Lyman Cauldron Shows "Systematic Russian Defensive Failure"

2026-09-03T11:01:19.959-04:00

Ukraine's local counterattacks around Lyman have succeeded beyond expectation and have become a strategic, not just tactical, success.

The counterattacks have become a counteroffensive which risks trapping several thousand Russians in a cauldron encirclement and has disrupted Kremlin plans to take Ukraine's Fortress Belt. Ukraine's 3rd Corps, which is leading the assault, is also demonstrating a drone, light armor and infantry combined arms approach which could be the key to renewed offensive success in Ukraine's drone dominated battlefields. JL

Stefan Korshak reports in the Kyiv Post:

The Ukrainian ground gains and battle successes north of Lyman have been the result of months of small-scale infantry assaults covered drones to rout Russian defenders from positions. Ukraine's 3rd Corps, leading the attack, is a proponent of drone-led tactics preceding, covering and providing fire support to small infantry units advancing in light armored vehicles to Russian positions to disembark and mop up resistance on foot. Non-Ukrainian sources point to hard AFU ground gains in rough, wooded and swampy terrain northeast of Lyman. Ukrainian advances have bitten too deeply into formerly Russian-controlled territory for Russian forces to take them back without prohibitive losses. "This is a systematic failure of the Russian defense. The AFU has seized the initiative and can thus launch a comprehensive strategic offensive from local successes."

A low-profile, patient counteroffensive led by a crack Ukrainian combat corps has pushed back Kremlin forces up to 15 kilometers (9 miles) in an eastern sector of the fighting front and potentially cutting off hundreds of Russian troops from supply and support.
The Ukrainian ground gains and battle successes to the north of the fortress city Lyman have been step-by-step and incremental, the result of months of small-scale infantry assaults densely covered by strike and observation drones to route Russian defenders from positions, field reports and analysts say.
The 3rd Army Corps, a major Ukrainian army formation with roots in a single, untrained volunteer civilian infantry battalion raised in Kyiv to help defend the capital in February 2022, is reportedly at the center of the offensive.

Ukraine’s army has kept a tight lid on ongoing operations in the Lyman sector for months, practically banning media visits to front lines and only reporting the fact of heavy fighting, while confirming neither terrain gains nor losses. The sector – located between the Siverskyi Donets River, a major waterway, and the Zherebets River, a local barrier waterway – is covered with thick woods or swamp, intermixed with rolling hills, farmland and agricultural villages
News and information feeds of formations assigned to the 3rd Corps and reviewed by Kyiv Post painted a consistent picture of successful offensive operations accompanied by heavy Russian casualties due to drone strikes, but as per Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (AFU) OPSEC rules, the information was presented without identifying geographical locations. Civilian rescue information networks monitored by Kyiv Post confirm continuing but limited Ukrainian losses in the sector.

In comments to Ukrainian media in July and August, Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky, the 3rd Corps commander, acknowledged his troops were carrying out limited counterattacks to expand Ukrainian control of territory north and east of Lyman, and that the operations were generally successful. Biletsky is a proponent of drone-led tactics with unmanned aircraft preceding, covering and providing fire support to small infantry units advancing in light armored vehicles to Russian positions to disembark and carefully mop up resistance on foot.

Multiple sources outside Ukraine are pointing to hard AFU ground gains in rough, wooded and swampy terrain northeast of Lyman, near the village Drobysheve, that had carved a 5 km x 10 km (3 x 6 mile) salient into Russian defenses and cut a key Russian supply road, potentially threatening Russian army units in the area with isolation. Kyiv Post researchers confirmed the presence of at least four Ukrainian combat brigades in action in the sector but did not publish identities for security reasons. All reports said the pocket now nearly encircled by the Ukrainians contained Russian troops, with estimates ranging from a few dozen to several hundred.
The Ukrainian drone unit Phoenix, a veteran air strike outfit drawn from Ukraine’s border troops forces, on Sept. 1 published imagery it said was from operations in air space above the Lyman sector. The footage shows first person view (FPV) and bomber drones attacking Russian motorcycles and trucks, individual infantrymen, and fortifications thought to hold Russian troops. Accompanying text states camouflage and shelters did not protect the targets.

Footage published by the unit on Aug. 31 showed strike drones hitting Russian artillery (including a 2A36 Giatsint-B gun, a D-20 howitzer, and a BM-21 Grad MLRS), along with more trucks, motorcycles, transport vans and fighting positions. Ukrainian military media reported the actions depicted were authentic, but Kyiv Post could not confirm each engagement independently.

Graphics in a situation assessment published on Aug. 31 by the US-based Institute for the Study of War showed Ukrainian forces to have reached the outskirts of Zarichne, a large village, which, if captured by Kyiv’s forces, would create a full-on encirclement of potentially hundreds more Russian troops in a 15 km x 45 km “kessel” (or “cauldron,” to use the German military term for encirclement).
For both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian War, ground gains by attacks since 2023 have been orders of magnitude slower and punishingly expensive. Russian forces in 2024 spent almost a year and lost at least one half of an estimated 80,000 men army sent to conquer a similar-sized space of ground between the Ukrainian cities of Adviivka and Pokrovsk. Neither side has reported heavy or even continuing Ukrainian casualties in actions around Lyman.

German OSINT researcher Andy Schneider in an Aug. 25 X comment on the Lyman battles said that contrary to Russian claims the city Lyman is fully under Ukrainian control, and that the Ukrainian advance to the east of the city cutting supply roads had formed “pockets of tactically enclosed units.”
Schneider wrote: “This is a systematic failure of the Russian defensive lines. The AFU has seized the initiative and can thus, as desired, launch a comprehensive strategic offensive from local successes. We will see if this happens.”
The widely read pro-Moscow milblogger Rybar (Mikhail Zvinchuk, a former Russian army officer and high-profile propagandist) in an Aug. 23 situation estimate passed on to his more than 1.5 million followers imagery that effectively matched Western reports of Ukrainian progress around Lyman but downplayed the importance of the success, saying: “Ukrainian formations are undertaking counterattacks in the area of Korovii Yar. Judging by objective control footage, the AFU managed to restore part of the positions on the approaches to the C051020 highway.”
French military analyst Clément Molin in an Aug. 30 confirmation of Ukrainian progress around Lyman city praised the AFU for maintaining tight OPSEC around the operation and that in his view “it is now too late” for Russia to salvage the situation, because Ukrainian advances have bitten too deeply into formerly Russian-controlled territory for Russian forces to take them back without prohibitive losses. Fighting was continuing over a 200 km-squared (124 square mile) battle area, he said, but already the Kremlin has suffered “a significant blow.”

The Ukrainian success will undermine Russian chances of carrying out its latest attack plans: an offensive to the south that Moscow hopes will capture the fortress cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk they have been trying to control for more than 12 years.
The Russian Defense Ministry, for its part, has insisted its forces under the command of 25th Combined Arms Army have made continual ground gains over August, and acknowledged no successful Ukrainian counterattacks. In May, the Russian Defense Ministry announced, falsely, that its troops had captured Lyman entirely. Subsequent statements by that agency have tacitly acknowledged Ukrainian forces actually still control the town by reporting continued Russian attacks against Ukrainian defenses there.
A key plank of the Russian state narrative about its invasion of Ukraine is that Russian progress is slow but relentless and that Moscow’s current main war aims – the total conquest of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions – will inevitably be reached.

According to Ukraine’s government, its forces had brought net Russian ground gains to a total halt in May 2026 and that since then Ukrainian forces have, each month, liberated more Ukrainian territory than Russia has taken.

Russia Faces 'Geopolitically Strategic Asymmetry' As Ukraine, Europe Strengthen Ties

2026-09-03T10:25:54.593-04:00

'Geopolitically strategic asymmetry' is a polite way of saying Russia is increasingly screwed. And the Kremlin has no one to blame but itself. By invading, then failing over almost five years of brutal warfare to subdue its smaller target and then compounding that failure by committing horrific war crimes on the ground and from the air - as well as subjecting itself to aerial drone and missile retribution - the Russians have not only become a global pariah, but have exposed their own vulnerabilities while Ukraine's support grows.

Putin's two closest allies, Iran and North Korea, are bankrupt and the former is, itself, under attack. China faces economic challenges of its own so is using Russia's even greater weakness to demand bigger discounts on what oil and other resources Russia can still manage to deliver. Ukraine, meanwhile is getting stronger both on the battlefield and economically, while its European partners, as well as those from the rest of the civilized world, instead of querulously backing down as Putin expected, have increased their Ukrainian support. Europe, it should be added, is doing quite well economically, especially when compared to Russia's erstwhile 'allies.' Outraged that it is now suffering while Europe refuses to back down, the Kremlin is amping up its attacks on NATO countries, but at this stage, those are more likely to backfire into even more support than not. JL

Yaroslav Trofimov reports in the Wall Street Journal:

Russia faces a fundamental asymmetry as it seeks to beat Ukraine into submission. Kyiv can rely on a secure hinterland beyond its borders—Europe—for economic resilience and military logistics. Ukraine’s military uses hubs in countries like Poland, Germany and Romania, while Ukrainian defense companies have established production lines across Europe. The Kremlin, whose industries are under attack by Ukrainian missiles and drones, has no such backup. None of Russia's allies are openly supporting its war. Hits to Russia’s economy translate more directly into damage to it’s ability to keep the war going. Russia, has to pay for its war at a time when its economy is weak. Moscow’s closest allies, Iran and North Korea, are broke. China faces economic headwinds. Many in Russia are calling for escalation against Europe but that could massively backfire. Ukraine’s Western supporters, and Ukraine itself, have ways of inflicting more pain on Russia if the conflict escalates.

Russia faces a fundamental asymmetry as it seeks to beat Ukraine into submission with intensifying airstrikes on shopping malls, power stations, ports and other infrastructure. Kyiv can rely on a secure hinterland beyond its borders—its European neighbors—for economic resilience and for military logistics.
The Kremlin, whose refineries, ports and defense industries are also under attack by Ukrainian missiles and drones, has no such backup. Hits to Russia’s militarized economy translate more directly into damage to the country’s ability to keep the war going.
This lopsided geopolitical setup offsets, to a significant degree, Russia’s advantage in firepower. It has also become the key reason driving what Western officials say is a widening Russian campaign of sabotage, hacking and other hybrid operations aimed at intimidating European leaders and voters.
Warning Russia against taking hostilities to North Atlantic Treaty Organization members in Europe was a key message delivered by Central Intelligence Agency director John Ratcliffe on his recent trip to Moscow, according to people familiar with the matter.
Russian officials have long described their war as one against the “collective West,” and not just Ukraine. Russian threats have become increasingly strident this summer, including warnings of military strikes against the Baltic states and even the U.K.
Ukraine’s economy and military effort were funded by $105 billion in new European assistance approved this year, money that came on top of vast amounts of aid and arms received from the U.S. and other NATO members since the 2022 full-scale invasion. European officials are already talking about another package of comparable size, perhaps to be funded with frozen Russian assets.
Russia, however, has to pay for its own war at a time when its economy is under pressure from Ukrainian strikes and Western sanctions. Two of Moscow’s closest allies, Iran and North Korea, are broke. China is taking advantage of Russia’s predicament to negotiate lower oil and gas prices, and is facing its own economic headwinds.

Russian leaders believe that they need to reverse this imbalance, fast, said Sergey Lagodinsky, a German member of the European Parliament and a Russian native. “They see that Ukraine can survive and can continue to fight because it has access to outside resources and outside solidarity, and that is what they want to cut or damage,” he said.
Much of Russia, up to the middle of Siberia, is now within range of Ukrainian drones, and Ukrainian attacks on energy installations and logistics warehouses occur nightly—as do Russian strikes on Ukraine. In one illustration of the disparity in consequences, Russia is struggling with a full-blown fuel crisis because Ukrainian drones have disabled more than one-third of the nation’s refining capacity. By contrast, gas stations are functioning normally in Ukraine because of fuel imports from Europe—even though Ukraine’s own refineries were heavily bombed as far back as 2022.
Ukraine’s military uses logistics hubs in countries like Poland, Germany and Romania, while Ukrainian defense companies have established production lines across Europe, including a plant making ballistic-missile fuel that is under construction in Denmark.
With the exception of Belarus and North Korea, none of Russia’s neighbors, including its formal defense allies in Central Asia, are openly helping its war effort. Even Belarus is careful these days not to provoke more sanctions from the West or a military response from Ukraine.

Seen from the Kremlin, the situation is intolerable: NATO countries are inflicting strategic blows on Russia’s economy and military capacity, including its space program, ballistic-missile industry and strategic bomber fleet, with Ukrainian hands—and without paying much of a price.
“There is an asymmetry in terms of the ability to inflict pain and extract costs by Russia from the West for its support of Ukraine,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Ukraine, he said, has eagerly taken “the war to enemy territory—and it gets a lot of training, advice and material support for these operations behind enemy lines.”
Russia, meanwhile, is constrained by the fact that Moscow doesn’t have a Ukraine of its own, an ally that could strike NATO and absorb the retaliatory blows, Gabuev said. Iran and Yemen’s Houthis are the closest approximations—but they have their own priorities focused on the Middle East that are only partially aligned with Moscow’s, and they possess little capacity to affect European calculations.
This has left Moscow with hybrid warfare—a loose term that includes a recent drone incident involving a Ukrainian cargo plane at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle airport, cyberattacks that disrupted Polish rail services and a series of explosions that struck European defense plants—as a key lever to reshape European attitudes.

“What we see is that, even as the Russians are facing very substantial resistance from Ukraine, they are stepping up hybrid acts in Europe—and their risk appetite is going up,” warned a senior NATO official.
Bomb-disposal specialists deployed a robot after an explosive-laden drone was discovered recently at Germany's Leipzig/Halle airport. Axel Schmidt/Reuters
The notion that Russia must hit military and logistics targets in European nations to win the war is gaining currency in Moscow, said Hanna Notte, Eurasia director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and author of a recent book on Russia’s foreign and security policy, “We Shall Outlast Them.”
“There are hawks on the Russian side who have been saying for a long time that Russia is fighting with one hand behind its back. These voices are becoming louder and will become louder,” she said. “The key question is: How far will Russia go? How much will they step up the game to deal with this problem?”
Moscow’s next step on the escalation ladder could be a limited one-off attack—possibly using captured Ukrainian drones, but also missiles—on one or two logistics targets involved in assisting Ukraine on European territory, some officials warn. Semiofficial commentators on Russian TV have been clamoring for just that for months.

“I am increasingly worried that we may see one single strike somewhere, as messaging to see what the populations will be doing, at the time when European societies are growing very tired of the war,” said Daniel Szeligowski, head of the Eastern Europe program at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. “In that situation, I would be much more worried about the social response. To what extent are our populations prepared for this psychologically, I do not know.”
Such a gamble, of course, could also massively backfire, increasing European determination against Russia just at the time when parties favorable to Moscow are gaining ground ahead of elections in France, Germany and Italy.
In Germany’s case, the intensification of Russia’s hybrid warfare has already shown itself to be counterproductive, said Norbert Röttgen, a prominent lawmaker from the governing CDU party. “It is becoming increasingly clear to Germans that Russia is also a threat to them, and thus strengthening German political resolve,” he said. “Admittedly, a third of the population is against strong support for Ukraine. However, the other two thirds are reinforced in their support.”
Ukraine’s Western supporters, and Ukraine itself, have ways of inflicting more pain on Russia if the conflict escalates. The U.S. could dramatically increase Ukraine’s ability to target Russian ballistic missile batteries by allowing the use of the Starlink satellite network to guide drones over Russian territory. Kyiv, meanwhile, has so far refrained from targeting Russian airports—even though Ukraine’s own civil aviation has been grounded since 2022.

“Ukraine has already started to strike in a way that ordinary Russians can see that the war is real, it is in their homes and not something on television,” said Hanna Shelest, security studies director at the Ukrainian Prism think tank in Kyiv. “Yet, Ukraine is still showing a fair bit of restraint. The question is, ‘how much longer for?”’
Despite the mounting problems of the Russian economy—industrial production flatlined in the first half of 2026, with zero growth despite huge spending on new weapons—few Western officials expect that Vladimir Putin will seek peace because of the pain inflicted by Ukrainian attacks.
“One way or another, the Russians will expand the war because in their grand strategy, Ukraine is an obstacle and not the prize. Their goal is greater influence over Europe and beyond. NATO has failed in deterring Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the question arising now is whether NATO can really deter Russian aggression against NATO,” argued Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, chairman of the Center for Defense Reforms in Kyiv and a former military and intelligence official.
By stepping up the destruction of Ukrainian cities, Moscow is signaling to the rest of Europe that any defiance is so painful that it would be preferable to accommodate the Kremlin’s will, Danylyuk added: “A fortress that resists must be razed as a warning to others—this is an old principle, from the Assyrians and from the Mongols, and one that Russia follows today. The message is that if NATO cannot protect you and if you don’t want to be destroyed like Ukraine, then your only source of security guarantees is Russia.” rko Mihkelson, the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Estonian parliament, said he agreed that Moscow’s strategic goal remains unchanged: conquest of Ukraine and the destruction of European collective security. Yet, he added, there has been no change of Russian military posture along borders from Finland to the Baltic states to Poland—and no indication of preparations for an invasion.
“The picture behind our borders is that all their focus is on Ukraine,” he said. “I don’t think that militarily they are right now both ready and willing to do something here.”
But some worry that could change. Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, in a recent essay published by the Economist, warned that Russia’s hybrid attacks on European nations represent a “razvedka boyem”—reconnaissance by combat that tests reactions and precedes a larger offensive.

To deter that offensive, he added, Europe must convince Russia “that we are willing to sacrifice more than money to stand up for ourselves.”

Spetznaz Block Suggests Putin Prefers Lyman Pocket Death Fight To Retreat

2026-09-02T09:56:20.141-04:00

Units of Russia's 144th Motor Rifle Division trapped in the Lyman salient are in growing danger of being encircled by Ukrainian forces. There is one bridge which would allow either reinforcements in or escape out. But the Kremlin evidently sees there is no point in sending any more of its depleted army into the pocket - and a Spetsnaz blocking company is not letting anyone out.

This suggests that Putin prefers to have the trapped soldiers continue fighting to the death, rather than suffer the humiliation of a major retreat. Ukraine appears happy to oblige. JL

Shankar Narayan reports in Medium:

Ukraine is now methodically eating away at the Lyman salient, which Putin’s forces took more than a year to build. A number of Russian units are caught in the Ukrainian sweep. A significant share belongs to the 144th Motor Rifle Division. The Terny crossing is the only vehicle exit across the Zherebets River. There is one usable bridge, and the 29th Spetsnaz Company is positioned at its eastern exit. Ukraine could have destroyed the bridge but has not. That suggests Ukraine wants to preserve it. Why is Russian spetsnaz company guarding the exit when no reinforcements are crossing the bridge in the other direction? The depleted regiments inside remain where they are. Stalin would understand this immediately. There has been no reinforcement of this pocket. If Russian commanders have refused to reinforce this sector even as Ukrainian forces move deeper into it, Moscow has given up on holding the salient. It looks as though Putin has abandoned the 144th Motor Rifle Division.

The precise size of the Ukrainian-held territory was always fluid, but it remained around the 700-square-kilometre mark for a very long time. Do you also remember the breathtaking American media coverage when Ukraine began withdrawing from Kursk? Donald Trump — Putin’s phone-a-friend — milked that withdrawal for everything it was worth. He told the world that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers were trapped, that he would ask his friend to show them mercy, and that perhaps Putin would allow them to live if only Trump personally intervened.
Putin has repaid that friendship by destroying plenty of American-owned facilities in Ukraine.
Whatever.
Ukraine is now methodically eating away at the Lyman salient, which Putin’s ground forces took more than a year to build. This was the northern arm of the pincer Russia was constructing to compress Ukrainian positions around the three fortress-belt cities.
The Lyman salient covers close to 300 square kilometres, and, as of writing, the following Russian formations appear to be caught in the Ukrainian sweep: the 1428th Motor Rifle Regiment, 1st Motor Rifle Regiment, 488th Motor Rifle Regiment, 254th Motor Rifle Regiment, 29th Spetsnaz Company, 856th Artillery Regiment, 148th Reconnaissance Battalion, 59th Tank Regiment, 283rd Motor Rifle Regiment, 1220th Motor Rifle Regiment, 237th Tank Regiment and 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment.
A significant share of this force consists of subunits belonging to the 144th Motor Rifle Division.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
For the Russian force inside the Shandryholove–Zelena Dolyna pocket, the Terny crossing appears to be the only direct, mapped vehicle exit across the Zherebets River. There is one usable bridge, and the 29th Spetsnaz Company is positioned at its eastern exit. Ukraine could have destroyed the bridge but has not. That strongly suggests Ukraine wants to preserve an avenue through which the Russians can abandon the pocket rather than forcing them to fight to the last man.
But then we arrive at the obvious question: why is an elite Russian spetsnaz company guarding the exit when no reinforcements are crossing the bridge in the other direction? What exactly is it protecting the bridge from? Nothing is coming in. The depleted regiments inside remain where they are. Yet one of the more reliable formations available to the Russian command is sitting on the safe bank, precisely where every soldier attempting to leave the pocket would emerge.
Stalin would understand the arrangement immediately.
It increasingly looks as though Putin has abandoned much of the 144th Motor Rifle Division to the gods beneath the ground. Perhaps his phone-a-friend should now call Zelenskyy, ask for mercy for the Russian troops and bring back those magnificent Kursk diplomacy skills. Trump posed as humanitarian when Putin stood to benefit from the spectacle. Here is his opportunity to prove that his concern extends to the soldiers of his friend.
We have been watching this pocket closely over the past several days, and so far there has been no visible movement of reinforcements into it. Ukraine could have destroyed the bridge and then slammed the pocket shut from both directions. It has not done that either. Ukrainian forces may still be following their slow-corrosion model, using limited counterattacks to steadily remove Russian positions. Or they may have chosen a deliberate clearance operation that leaves the Russians an opportunity to withdraw.
We do not yet know which approach they are taking.
But one conclusion is becoming harder to avoid. If Russian commanders have refused to reinforce this sector even as Ukrainian forces move deeper into it — particularly when the formations inside have only one proper exit — the odds are rising that Moscow has already given up on holding the salient. It may simply expect the 144th Motor Rifle Division and the other units inside to keep fighting for as long as they can. But this increasingly looks like a dead end.
We will be following this pocket closely. It covers nearly 300 square kilometres, although a significant part of that territory has already returned to Ukrainian control. Its importance, however, is not merely its size.
The collapse of this salient would dismantle Russia’s northern approach for closing the gap to the fortress belt — an approach Putin’s ground forces took more than a year to construct. That would be a major battlefield setback for Russia and a material loss of leverage if and when negotiations finally begin.