The Low-Down

Chief Russian Bank Economist Fired For Warning Of 'Economic Defeat' By West

2026-08-18T10:38:14.775-04:00

Not what the dictator wanted to hear. Especially in a public forum. But the experienced economist said what he believed, which is that Russia is falling behind economically and technologically, not just to the US, China and Europe but -get this -to Ukraine. He went on to say that Russia cannot win a war of attrition in the long run.

Comrade Klepach would be well advised to stay away from windows in tall buildings for the foreseeable future. JL

Olena Goncharova reports in the Kyiv Independent:

Andrei Klepach, the chief economist at Russian state development corporation VEB.RF, was fired on Aug. 16, a day after Russian media widely circulated his warnings that Russia was losing its economic and technological competition with the West. Speaking at an event organized by the Moscow Exchange’s Nikitsky Club, Klepach said Russia would be unable to sustain competition with the West in a prolonged confrontation and predicted that the country would eventually face a social crisis. "We are falling behind. We are losing both the technological and economic competition in the world. And, we are losing it not only to China and the US — in some respects, we are losing it to Ukraine whose economy has been partly destroyed. But despite everything, the Ukrainian economy is surviving. We will not win this competition in a war of attrition,"
Andrei Klepach, the chief economist at Russian state development corporation VEB.RF, was reportedly fired on Aug. 16, a day after Russian media widely circulated his warnings that Russia was losing its economic and technological competition with the West.
Russian independent media outlet The Bell reported Klepach’s dismissal on Aug. 16, citing two people familiar with the matter. The report came two days after The Moscow Times published excerpts from Klepach’s May remarks, which were subsequently picked up by other Russian media.
The Kyiv Independent can't immedately verify the claims.
Speaking at an event organized by the Moscow Exchange’s Nikitsky Club, Klepach reportedly said Russia would be unable to sustain competition with the West in a prolonged confrontation and predicted that the country would eventually face a social crisis.

According to one of The Bell’s sources, VEB.RF head Igor Shuvalov dismissed Klepach following an order "from above." A second source confirmed that the firing was connected to Klepach’s May remarks. The Bell said it had requested comment from VEB.RF.
Klepach had served as VEB.RF’s chief economist for 12 years. Before joining the state development corporation, he spent a decade at Russia’s Economic Development Ministry. He joined the ministry in 2004 as head of its macroeconomic forecasting department and served as deputy economic development minister from 2008 to 2014 under Elvira Nabiullina, Andrei Belousov, and Alexei Ulyukayev.
"We are falling behind. We are losing both the technological and economic competition in the world. And, as I have already said, we are losing it not only to China and the United States — in some respects, we are losing it to Ukraine," Klepach said.
"Ukraine’s economy has, of course, been partly destroyed, and there is a demographic catastrophe. But again, despite everything, the Ukrainian economy is surviving. Of course, it receives enormous financial assistance. (…) With that support, their military spending and their own expenditures amount to almost 50% of our budget," he was quoted as saying.

"We will not win this competition in a war of attrition," Klepach continued. "We have this illusion that everything there will collapse. It has not collapsed, and it will not. Our costs are growing."
"I believe Russia will not fall apart, but I am almost certain that we will arrive at a social crisis," he concluded. "Economically, we will not collapse, but we will continue to fall further behind, with all the consequences that entails."

What Happens When Putin's New Mobilization Fails?

2026-08-18T10:19:38.787-04:00

Putin's ground war has stalled and shows no signs of correcting the inefficiencies and incompetences of the past four-plus years. There are rumors he is beginning to implement a quiet 'soft' mobilization so as not to spark further popular resentment, but given Ukraine's success to date in thwarting increased Russian and North Korean troop deployments with drones, mines and counterattacks, there is little reason to believe the corrupt Russian system is capable of - or interested in - change to correct that.

The question then is, what will Putin do when his latest mobilization fails? China has reportedly nixed the nuclear option so further sabotage and provocation to keep Europe off balance look like the most probable tactics. But if the US midterm elections this fall return the Congress and Senate to Democratic control, his options will be further limited by their support for Ukraine. Either way, the war's evident failure means he has to continue it or risk being overthrown and eliminated himself. JL

Mick Ryan reports in Futura Doctrina:

Putin is rapidly running out of options for achieving even his minimalist goals for Ukraine, which would be the capture of all of the Donbas. But even that appears increasingly unlikely for the Russian ground forces. Putin will hope that the injection of a few hundred thousand extra troops might get him over the line, but even that is a doubtful proposition given the increases in effectiveness we have seen the Ukrainians demonstrate in 2026. He could double down, do more mobilization and step up the use of chemical weapons or even i`ndicate his willingness to employ nuclear weapons. However, his nuclear sabre rattling in the past has not shifted Ukrainian determination to hold on to their territory. And NATO has now moved beyond being deterred by these kinds of threats.
Putin is rapidly running out of options for achieving even his minimalist goals for Ukraine, which would be the capture of all of the Donbas. But even that appears increasingly unlikely for the Russian ground forces. Putin will hope that the injection of a few hundred thousand extra troops might get him over the line, but even that is a doubtful proposition given the increases in effectiveness we have seen the Ukrainians demonstrate in 2026.
Thus, if Putin’s additional troops don’t help him capture the Donbas in the coming year, what other options does he have?
First, he could immediately declare a ceasefire and hope that the Trump administration gives him credit for being a first mover in making peace and supporting his territorial claims in negotiations with Ukraine. It is possible, but it does not achieve any of Putin’s long-held claims on Ukraine and it is unlikely he will ever give up on these. It would also create problems for Putin at home – he will have all but nothing to show for (by that time) over 1.5 million casualties. Good luck creating a narrative of victory around that in Russia or elsewhere.
Second, he could double down, do more mobilization and step up the use of chemical weapons or even indicate his willingness to employ nuclear weapons. However, his nuclear sabre rattling in the past has not shifted Ukrainian determination to hold on to their territory. And NATO has now moved beyond being deterred by these kinds of threats by Putin. However, if serious intelligence came to light that Putin had given orders for potential nuclear strikes in Ukraine, this could change the stance of America and NATO. But it might also see China intervene to prevent the use of Russian nuclear weapons as it has apparently done in the past. Putin would not want that. So, this too is an unlikely pathway for Putin if his mobilization fails to secure the military objectives he wants to achieve.
Finally, Putin could choose a strategy of “hold in Ukraine, strike elsewhere” to deliver something that approximates a victory – and to test further the NATO alliance. While I am not calling this probable, it may be the most likely option for Putin in the event of a mobilization failure. It is likely he could secure a military victory in a short, sharp campaign against a Baltic nation while causing a crisis in NATO. With that he could potentially justify to the Russian people his disastrous strategy of the past five years. Importantly, would nations such as Spain or America come to the aid of “a small nation in eastern Europe and risk nuclear war” is a key question. Putin may see much to gain from such a split within NATO.
Mobilisation has not even commenced yet, so this is just speculation. But it is worth pondering just how the mobilisation effort might contribute to Russia’s war effort - and how might the situation be exploited if this mobilisation fails to change Russia’s fortunes.

Russia's 2026 Offensive Has Stalled By Ukraine "Across Multiple Fronts"

2026-08-18T09:54:26.042-04:00

Ukrainian forces have reportedly stalled attempted Russian advances across multiple fronts as the summer begins to wind down.

There has been an uptick in Russian claims of successes, which have almost always been disproved, usually within hours. The independent assessments concur that Russia's infiltration tactic of sending small groups of two or three men has not added up to anything approaching a sustainable ability to take and hold territory. JL

The Kyiv Post reports:

Russian forces continued offensive operations across several sectors of the front on Aug. 15 and 16 but failed to make advances across multiple fronts. Russian claims of advances remain disputed as the Kremlin continued to claim battlefield gains that were not independently confirmed. Russia continues to apply pressure across a wide section of the front, but the attacks have yet to translate into a confirmed breakthrough.

Russian forces continued offensive operations across several sectors of the front on Aug. 15 and 16 but failed to make confirmed advances.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian troops attacked in the northern Sumy region, northern Kharkiv region, the Kupyansk, Borova, Slovyansk, Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Hulyaipole and western Zaporizhzhia sectors. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson sector on Aug. 16.
Despite the broad pressure, ISW did not confirm a Russian breakthrough on any of these axes.

Small infiltration groups probe Ukrainian positions
One notable development was the continued use of small Russian infantry groups to penetrate Ukrainian defensive positions.
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Sumy sector said Russian troops are using groups of just one to three soldiers to move between Ukrainian positions.

He said the groups exploit grass more than 2 meters (6.6 feet) high, which makes them difficult to detect, while Russian forces continue aerial reconnaissance, counterbattery fire, remote mining and drone strikes.
The Ukrainian officer also said Russian forces showed no signs of weapons shortages and were using drone attacks and remote mining to complicate Ukrainian logistics.
Similar infiltration tactics were reported farther south. ISW said Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators from western Kostyantynivka, while Russian troops continued attempting to establish positions in contested areas.

Russian claims of advances remain disputed
Russia also continued to claim battlefield gains that were not independently confirmed.
The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces had seized Kudiivka north of Kharkiv, portraying the settlement as a potential “gateway” toward Kharkiv city. However, a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces said Russian troops were fighting inside the settlement but had not established strongholds there.
A similar discrepancy emerged around Vilcha, northeast of Kharkiv. Russian authorities claimed to have captured the settlement in December 2025, but a Russian source described it as a contested “gray zone” on Aug. 16. The source said Russian troops were entering the area without reliable information about minefields, leaving them exposed to Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes.

ISW also reported on Russian claims of gains in the Oleksandrivka sector. Russian milbloggers claimed Moscow’s forces had retaken several settlements previously liberated by Ukraine, but ISW assessed that Ukrainian forces had liberated at least 626 square kilometers (241.7 square miles) of tactically significant territory in the area between January and August 2026.
Russia intensifies strikes ahead of future offensives
Although Russian ground advances remained limited, Moscow continued to intensify its use of glide bombs and drones against Ukrainian positions and logistics.
Russian forces repeatedly struck Slovyansk and other parts of the so-called Fortress Belt with FAB glide bombs, first-person-view (FPV) drones and Molniya-2 strike drones. ISW reported that Russia is conducting a battlefield air interdiction campaign designed to degrade Ukrainian ground lines of communication and prepare the area for future attacks on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.

Russian forces also used glide bombs against Dobropillya, including strikes reportedly targeting Ukrainian drone positions and temporary deployment sites.
At the same time, Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian logistics and military infrastructure. Ukrainian troops hit Russian ammunition and equipment warehouses in the occupied Donetsk region and struck a railway bridge in the occupied Zaporizhzhia region that Russian forces use for logistics.
Ukraine also targeted a Russian Bastion-M coastal missile system in occupied Crimea, which Russia uses to launch Onyx and Zircon missiles against Ukraine.
Overall, ISW’s assessment shows that Russia continues to apply pressure across a wide section of the front, but the attacks have yet to translate into a confirmed breakthrough.

Nvidia Commits $105 Billion To Back OpenAI Ohio Data Center

2026-08-18T09:15:01.585-04:00

As Nvidia announced its $105 billion in financial support for one of the world's largest data centers in the latest of its circular deals lending money to customers who buy its products, the company's CEO, Jensen Huang, made a noteworthy statement intended to explain the investment.

He said that AI companies are "growing faster than their balance sheets and long term credit profiles can support." That used to be a market signal that a company should rein in its borrowing. In the AI economy, that is apparently a signal for the world's largest supplier of AI chips and wealthiest corporation to lend them the money to keep going. How this ends well for the companies, their employees, lenders, investors and the public is not explained, presumably because no one really knows. JL

Kalley Huang reports in the New York Times:

Nvidia agreed to spend as much as $105 billion to back one of the world’s largest data centers, which is being built in Ohio and will be leased to OpenAI. Nvidia’s financing for the data center, that could cost as much as $500 billion, is part of the complex dealmaking behind the A.I. boom. Using unusual arrangements with chipmakers, cloud computing providers and governments, OpenAI and Anthropic are gaining access to computing power that they could not afford themselves. Many of these deals are circular, with an A.I. start-up receiving billions of dollars from technology giants before spending those billions on the same companies to pay for chips, cloud computing and other services. Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s CEO, said that A.I. labs “are growing faster than their balance sheets and long-term credit profiles can support.”
Nvidia said on Monday that it had agreed to spend as much as $105 billion to back one of the world’s largest data centers, which is being built in Ohio and will be leased to OpenAI.
The sum is one of the largest from Nvidia toward supporting A.I. labs that are seeking more computing power. Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, said in a blog post that the company would use the money to guarantee “lease and power payments” at the site. He added that A.I. labs “are growing faster than their balance sheets and long-term credit profiles can support.”
Nvidia’s financing for the data center in Pike County, Ohio, a project that could cost as much as $500 billion, is part of the complex dealmaking behind the A.I. boom. Using unusual arrangements with chipmakers, cloud computing providers and governments, start-ups like OpenAI and Anthropic are gaining access to computing power that they could not afford by themselves.
Many of these deals are circular, with an A.I. start-up receiving billions of dollars from technology giants before spending those billions on the same companies to pay for chips, cloud computing and other services. Nvidia previously invested $30 billion in OpenAI, and the data center in Ohio will use only Nvidia’s chips. Mr. Huang said in the blog post that Nvidia’s financing for the Ohio data center was not circular because “OpenAI will pay the lease.”
In turn, OpenAI said in a blog post that it would lease the Ohio site “only as completed capacity becomes available,” meaning it may not pay anything until the data center starts coming online in 2028. OpenAI agreed to a 20-year lease for the site, which will provide it eight gigawatts of computing capacity, or enough electricity to power about six million households in the United States.
Nvidia’s financing will support 4.25 of those gigawatts, though the company could extend its arrangement to the remaining gigawatts.
Nvidia and OpenAI had previously discussed the chipmaker’s providing $250 billion in financial backing for the Ohio data center.
Nvidia also said on Monday that it had agreed to invest $1.5 billion in SB Energy, a subsidiary of the Japanese conglomerate SoftBank that will build, own and operate the data center in Ohio. Nvidia has taken other steps to finance the A.I. boom. Last week, the company and six giant asset managers, private equity firms and banks announced an effort to raise $500 billion in financing for Nvidia’s customers to pay for chips, data centers and computing power.
(The New York Times sued OpenAI and Microsoft in 2023, claiming copyright infringement of news content related to A.I. systems. The two companies have denied those claims.)

In Combat, Exoskeletons Made Artillerymen Faster, Less Fatigued

2026-08-17T10:46:16.127-04:00

Ukrainian artillerymen have to carry 30 shells a day which weigh 50 kilograms - 100 pounds. Artillery brigades using exoskeletons found they reduced leg muscle load by 30%, making the troops faster and less prone to fatigue at operational tempo for longer periods of time.

This, in turn, contributed to increased rates of fire and more accurate. Smart use of technology enhances performance and results for Ukraine again. JL

Wes O'Donnell reports:

At current tempo, Ukraine’s 147th Brigade artillery crews carry 30 shells per day: at 1,200 kilograms per soldier, per day. That’s a small car’s worth of explosives, manually humped to a howitzer by one man. Ukraine has deployed exoskeletons to try to fix that. It is a leg exoskeleton with hinged joints along the thighs and knees, weighing 2 kilograms. It buckles at the waist and legs, wraps behind the user’s back, and has two hip actuators. It has 10 intelligent operating modes, over a temperature range of minus10 to 60 degrees Celsius, reaches an assisted movement speed up to 20 km/h, and supports assisted walking for up to 17.5 kms. The AI mode adapts in real time to the load on the soldier’s legs and spine. “According to combat test results, troops become less fatigued, work faster, and maintain combat effectiveness longer.” An exoskeleton reducing leg muscle load 30% and cuts fatigue contributes to rate of fire, accuracy, and the ability to sustain operations at tempo.
I have this theory about my Army service; totally unscientific and based only on my experience: The constant physical stress I subjected my body to, for a solid decade (about 20 years old to 30 years old), put me in the best shape of my life through my 30s.
Running, rappelling, hiking with rucks, quick bursts of speed when it was time to shoot and move, swimming, and of course, the normal daily time dedicated to physical training (PT)… as if we needed it.
But when I hit 40, the butcher’s bill came due. Now my life is constant pain, and it feels like I can pull a back muscle simply by reaching for a Dr. Pepper.
And, by the way, I was in the “light” infantry! Imagine what those artillery guys go through… I watched artillery crews do things to their bodies that no physical therapist would ever sign off on.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
Me before my body started a guerilla campaign against me. Author’s collection.
Loading 155mm rounds all day is exactly as brutal as it sounds, each shell weighing roughly 50 kilograms, crews running 15 to 30 of them per shift, day after day, in conditions that make the CrossFit gym crowd look like they’re doing a mild warm-up.
It’s actually surprising to me that it’s 2026 and (what was) the most technologically advanced military on the planet still goes to war in cloth uniforms with no mechanical assistance.
Well, Ukraine, never one to let a good tech idea rot on the shelf, may claim the mantle as the new “most technologically advanced” military on the planet.
And they deserve it.
At current operational tempo, Ukraine’s 147th Brigade crews are carrying up to 30 shells per day: at approximately 1,200 kilograms of ammunition per soldier, per day.
That’s a small car’s worth of high explosives, manually humped to a howitzer by one man, while someone is trying very hard to kill you.
Now, Ukraine has just deployed exoskeletons to fix that on the Pokrovsk front, in live combat, this week.
Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces became the first unit in the country’s Defense Forces to deploy exoskeletons in real combat conditions, with test samples already in use at logistics and combat positions.
The unit receiving them is the 147th Separate Artillery Brigade, the same outfit running French CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and Ukrainian-made Bohdana-BG towed 155mm systems on one of the most contested sections of the front line.
I can’t embed Facebook video for some reason, but you can watch the Ukrainian exoskeleton at work HERE.
Pokrovsk has been under sustained Russian pressure for months. This isn’t a quiet corner of the war where you’d want to test new equipment. But that’s exactly the point.
The system is a leg exoskeleton designed as rigid arcs with hinged joints along the thighs and knees, built from aluminum alloy, weighing 2 kilograms.
It buckles at the waist and legs, wraps behind the user’s back, and features two hip actuators that serve as hinges.
The whole thing folds into a briefcase.
According to the Ukrainian captions in the video, it has 10 intelligent operating modes, operates over a temperature range of minus 10 to 60 degrees Celsius, reaches an assisted movement speed of up to 20 km/h, and supports assisted walking for up to 17.5 kilometers.
The AI mode adapts in real time to the load on the soldier’s legs and spine.
Colonel Vitalii Serdiuk, the 7th Corps’ deputy commander, said what the numbers already tell you: “According to test results, they become less fatigued, work faster, and maintain combat effectiveness for longer.”
Less fatigued. Faster. Combat-effective for longer.
On a front where Russia is grinding forward at 70 meters a day trying to outlast Ukrainian resolve.
Artillery is the dominant arm of this war. Russia fires somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 rounds per day at Ukrainian positions.
Ukraine fires considerably fewer, the munitions shortage has been real and persistent, but every round matters at a rate that’s hard to overstate. The crews operating CAESAR howitzers and Bohdana systems are working at a pace that would have been considered extraordinary in any previous conflict.
Actually, for crews of the Ukrainian-made Bohdana-BG towed howitzer, shells must be lifted to a greater height without a dedicated loader, which means a human being is manually performing a full-body lift of a 50-kilogram round. Richard Simmons eat your heart out.
But seriously, cumulative physical degradation in artillery crews is a real operational problem that doesn’t show up in debriefs the same way vehicle losses do, but absolutely shows up in sustained combat effectiveness over weeks and months.
Not to mention the long-term wear and tear on these soldiers’ bodies post-war.
An exoskeleton that reduces leg muscle load by 30 percent and cuts fatigue meaningfully is a direct contribution to rate of fire, accuracy, and the unit’s ability to sustain operations at tempo.
“Caesar crews destroy the enemy even on approach, and every minute and every shot matter,” the brigade said.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
147th Separate Artillery Brigade — AFU
The Techno-Assault Concept
The corps frames the introduction of such technologies as part of developing “techno-air assault” capabilities; a concept focused on using state-of-the-art systems in air assault operations.
This is the same corps that trains soldiers to counter Russian FPV drone attacks using virtual reality headsets and a special dummy pump-action shotgun, which is either the most interesting training aid in any military inventory right now, or the most terrifying, depending on your perspective.
Ukraine thinks about war like this:
Where human bodies are the limiting factor, insert technology.
Where human attention is the bottleneck, use AI.
Where human endurance degrades under sustained combat, find a mechanical solution.
Ukraine doesn’t have Russia’s manpower pool. It’s been operating on that constraint since February 2022. The response has been to make each soldier more capable rather than simply adding more soldiers, which is both born of necessity and brilliant doctrine.
Where the US is on this
Since we’re talking about exoskeletons on a battlefield, it’s worth noting where America’s own programs stand, because the contrast is instructive.
The US Army’s SABER is a soft, wearable exosuit strapped to the back and around each leg, designed to reduce spinal strain. Lockheed Martin’s ONYX is a lower-body exoskeleton with knee actuators. Neither system is standard-issue for American forces. Both exist in the research and limited-testing phase after years of development.
DoD — Public domain. Probably still 20 years from fielding…
YEARS of development! The American tech pipeline is infuriating.
Ukraine’s 147th Artillery Brigade is running a 2-kilogram aluminum exoskeleton with AI-adaptive modes and a mobile app in a live combat zone this week.
I’m not saying Ukraine’s system is more advanced than what Lockheed or the Army’s research labs are building. I’m just saying Ukraine’s system is on the Pokrovsk front and the American systems aren’t.
That distinction between fielded and promising is the same one that keeps coming up in every technology comparison between this war and Western procurement timelines.
Ukraine skips the comfortable middle phases and goes straight to live testing under the worst possible conditions.
The cost of the Ukrainian exoskeleton, for context, amounts to several tens of thousands of hryvnias, which at current exchange rates is roughly a few hundred to a few thousand dollars per unit.
So, let me get this straight: Ukraine’s is faster, cheaper, and on the battlefield right now… Got it. Compared to the US where until very recently, the average US infantryman was still using an AR-style assault rifle from before Vietnam.
Since we’re talking about Ukrainian tech…
Ukraine has also received two Phantom MK-1 humanoid robots for battlefield evaluation, one of the first real-world tests of humanoid soldier technology anywhere.
The exoskeleton deployment and the humanoid robot evaluation are happening simultaneously, on the same front, driven by the same logic: the country that runs out of capable soldiers first… loses.
That logic should be familiar to us who have watched how Ukraine has approached every other technology gap in this war.
It couldn’t match Russia’s artillery. So it built drones.
It couldn’t replace its lost armor fast enough. So it developed cheap anti-armor systems and layered drone tactics.
It couldn’t sustain strike campaigns with scarce, permissioned ATACMS rounds. So it built the FP-5 Flamingo.
Every constraint has produced an innovation response, usually faster and cheaper than any Western procurement process would have allowed. The exoskeleton is the same pattern applied to the most fundamental resource in any army: the body of the soldier carrying the ammunition.
Colonel Serdiuk put it in terms any veteran can understand: every minute matters, every shot matters, and a soldier who’s less exhausted shoots better and sustains longer.
The technology doesn’t replace the artilleryman.
It keeps him functional for the entire shift instead of degrading through it.

North Korean Train Carrying Missiles To Russia Blown Up In Siberia

2026-08-17T09:52:25.855-04:00

As Russia becomes more dependent on North Korea for military support, including troops, artillery and now missiles, the rails lines connecting the two countries become a more important target.

Ukrainian forces identified and destroyed a train carrying North Korean missiles to the front. The sabotage occurred close to the North Korean-Russian border and in difficult terrain, making reconstruction of the line more difficult. The missiles, their warheads and accompanying troops were eliminated. JL

RFU News reports:

6,000 kilometers from the front line, explosions destroyed a train transporting KN-Twenty-Three and KN-Twenty-Four ballistic missiles together with railcars loaded with artillery ammunition on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The attack occurred close to North Korea. The detonation destroyed the train, devastated part of the surrounding railway infrastructure, and halted traffic along the affected section. Remotely controlled explosive charges were placed beneath the railway tracks before being detonated as it entered a difficult section of the line. Choosing such terrain aims to maximize destruction while making restoration more complicated. The explosion triggered a chain reaction that detonated the warheads and the accompanying ammunition. The KN missiles carry a warhead weighing five-hundred kilograms. This ranks among the deepest Ukrainian attacks inside Russia.

Ukrainian army sources revealed a reported sabotage operation against a Russian military train carrying North Korean weapons that was targeted around six thousand kilometers from the frontline. According to Ukrainian military sources, simultaneous explosions destroyed a train transporting KN-Twenty-Three and KN-Twenty-Four ballistic missiles together with railcars loaded with artillery ammunition on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The attack occurred geographically much closer to North Korea than to Ukraine itself, and the resulting detonation destroyed the train, devastated part of the surrounding railway infrastructure, and halted traffic along the affected section. Official confirmation from Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate has not yet been released, but once confirmed, this would rank among the deepest Ukrainian operations conducted inside Russian territory.
According to operatives within Ukrainian intelligence circles, the operation was preceded by a lengthy intelligence effort. The reported shipment was allegedly tracked from the vicinity of the North Korean border as it moved westward across Russia. Such an operation would have required establishing the train’s timetable, identifying where it would slow down, and selecting terrain where repairs after an attack would be particularly difficult. Ukrainian operatives have also needed to determine exactly which convoy contained the strategic cargo before committing valuable assets. Local assistance cannot be ruled out, as some remote Russian regions have long complained of economic neglect, potentially making discreet cooperation with outside intelligence services more feasible. Ukrainian agents would have also exploited the well-known corruption among the Russian administration, as such officials with access to railway schedules or cargo manifests could be bribed to reveal when a valuable shipment would pass a specific location.
According to the reports, remotely controlled explosive charges were allegedly placed beneath the railway tracks and near critical points of the train before being detonated as it entered a difficult section of the line. Choosing such terrain aims to maximize destruction while making restoration substantially more complicated.
The effects of the explosion were dramatic, as they triggered a chain reaction that detonated the missile warheads and the accompanying ammunition cargo. The KN missiles carry a warhead weighing roughly five-hundred kilograms, meaning even a single detonation is capable of causing severe destruction.
The exact number of missiles reportedly aboard the train has not been established yet, but the combined explosion reached the equivalent of dozens of tons of TNT, excavated a crater more than fifteen meters deep, and completely incinerated both the locomotive and the convoy. Burning fragments from solid-fuel rocket motors ignited surrounding vegetation and railway infrastructure.
The consequences extend well beyond the destroyed shipment, even though a Ukrainian intelligence source stated that the objective was to ensure none of the missiles intended for attacks on Ukrainian cities survived the operation. However, the Trans-Siberian Railway is Russia’s main east-west rail artery, stretching roughly nine-thousand-three-hundred kilometers from European Russia to the Pacific coast and connecting industrial centers with trade routes toward China, Mongolia, and the Korean Peninsula. It carries tens of millions of tonnes of freight annually, making it one of Russia’s most important logistical networks. Disrupting even one section can create delays of up to several weeks while damaged track, electrical systems, and wreckage are cleared and repaired.
Overall, the reported sabotage represents a direct Ukrainian response to the expanding North Korean military assistance to Russia, which includes missiles, launchers for them, artillery shells, and personnel for both the delivered systems and infantry. Destroying a huge single shipment would deny Russia valuable weapons immediately, while simultaneously damaging the railway itself could delay subsequent deliveries, increasing the logistical cost of relying on long-distance military support from North Korea.

Ukraine Is Steadily Liberating Russian Territory At Notable Scale

2026-08-17T09:37:11.210-04:00

It's generally better to be lucky. But if you are capable of taking advantage of your enemy's misfortune, you can make your own.

In the case of Ukraine's shockingly successful offensive retaking large swaths of Russian-held territory in the country's south, it was a bit of both. The Ukrainians started probing what they correctly perceived were weak Russian defenses in late January. But when the Russians lost their Starlink access, the Ukrainians were ready and began armored assaults which would not have been possible had the Kremlin's forces had adequate electronic communications and defenses. Though the Russians have finally stabilized to some degree, the Ukrainian gains have been large and strategically significant. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack and David Axe reports in Trench Art:

We are now more than halfway through the summer season. This year, the reports are not about Russian advances, but Ukrainian ones. The scale of Ukraine's counteroffensive in southeastern Ukraine is becoming clear. In six months, Ukraine's 78th, 79th, 80th, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 1st and 425th Assault Regiments—tens of thousands of troops—marched through gaps in Russian defenses. In contrast to the usual assault tactics, the Ukrainians attacked in tanks and other armored vehicles, counting on the Russians' connectivity problems to clear a path. Working in Ukraine's favor: better operational planning, a campaign to suppress Russian air defenses, deeper strikes on Russian logistics, Ukrainian drone superiority at the tactical level—and the Starlink cutoff. But the cutoff is the one that arrived all at once, and just as Ukrainian armor was starting to move. The reality was that the Ukrainians had gained ground. A lot of it.
We are now more than halfway through the summer season, and in the past this is often when reports about the successes of Russia’s summer offensive would be heating up in the western press. This was, for instance, when the stories about the imminent fall of Pokrovsk started circulating in 2024 (it actually took the Russians another year to take the city) and last summer at this time the reporting was all about the manpower crisis that Ukraine was facing which was going to lead to even greater Russian advances.
I say that because this year, the reports are not about steady Russian advances, but actually of some Ukrainian ones. Three days ago, the Ukrainian high command gave an update on its offensive actions so far in 2026. Zelensky summarized these in his evening address on August 12.
The offensive operation, which lasted from January through August of this year, was carried out by warriors of the Airborne Assault Forces and other units involved. Its main objective was to disrupt the Russian occupiers’ plans for further advances and push Russian forces beyond the administrative border of the Dnipro region.
Thanks to the active operations of Ukrainian defenders, significant losses were inflicted on the occupation contingent. Russian losses amount to at least 9,550 killed and more than 6,600 wounded. Ukraine’s “exchange fund” was also replenished.
Over the course of the operation, 745 square kilometers of territory were liberated, and 26 villages in the Dnipro, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions were returned to Ukrainian control.
General Drapatyi (on screen—right of the two) briefs President Zelensky.
Note: The Institute for The Study of War claims using a very conservative estimate that Ukraine has liberated between 600-700 square kilometres—which is not that much lower.

The scale of Ukrainian forces' counteroffensive in southeastern Ukraine early this year is finally becoming clear. In six months of maneuver starting on 29 January, a clutch of Ukrainian units, including the 78th, 79th, 80th, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault Brigades and the 1st and 425th Assault Regiments—tens of thousands of troops, in all—marched through gaps in Russian defenses and, according to Ukrainian officials, liberated around 745 square km and 26 settlements. Mostly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but also in neighboring Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts.
That is Kyiv's own accounting, and it is the high end. The Institute for the Study of War, which maps control from geolocated imagery, put the figure at roughly 627 square km across the Oleksandrivka direction and the northern Hulyaipole direction—while noting its own conservative method probably undercounts. Either number describes the largest Ukrainian territorial gain since 2023.
The Ukrainian gains helped to offset Russian gains around the last few free cities in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. Between the start of February and the end of July, Russian regiments captured a net total of just 260 square km of Ukrainian soil, according to a tally by the Black Bird Group. It would've been more than 1,000 square km if those air assault and assault units hadn't been busy clearing the Russians from a wide swathe of the southeast.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive kicked off on 29 January. Three days later, Elon Musk's Starlink bricked Russia's thousands of smuggled and stolen satellite terminals. Practically overnight, the Russians lost their best method for controlling small drones and guiding assault units across the disputed gray zone. Drones couldn't fly. Troops couldn't navigate.
Ukrainian commanders surely knew their communications advantage wouldn't last: the Russians would eventually adapt with new methods of command and control. Seizing the opportunity, Ukrainian paratroopers and assault troops pressed the attack. And in stark contrast to the usual assault tactics for both sides, the Ukrainians attacked in tanks and other armored vehicles, counting on the Russians' connectivity problems to clear a path for heavy forces.
The blackout was not the only thing working in Ukraine's favor. ISW credits the gains to five reinforcing factors: better operational planning, a campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses, deeper strikes on Russian logistics, Ukrainian drone superiority at the tactical level—and the Starlink cutoff. But the cutoff is the one that arrived all at once, and it arrived just as Ukrainian armor was starting to move.

Mechanized assaults
Not all the vehicles got through. The assault troops lost one up-armored M-1 Abrams tank in early February. But by March, other assault forces M-1s were engaging Russian troops at point-blank range with their 120-mm main guns. After clearing a few disputed villages along a 45-km front between Dobropillya and Zelenyi Hai, the Ukrainians focused their maneuver and firepower on Komar, 12 km southeast of Zelenyi Hai.
The Ukrainians "started a slow and quiet offensive, with very few videos and small teams, during April and May," mapper Clément Molin recalled. The strict information security obscured the Ukrainian moves for all but the closest observers, allowing Ukrainian commanders to press their attacks without drawing too much attention—and risking a Russian countercounteroffensive.
By summer, the Ukrainians were within mortar range of Komar. Embarrassed Russian commanders resorted to sending out small teams on virtual suicide missions to plant Russian flags in disputed territory. The flags could create the impression of Russian control on terrain that, in fact, neither side controlled. "Russia is trying to intoxicate us with flag videos, which are meant to hide the real situation to both us and their command," Molin wrote.
The reality was that the Ukrainians had gained ground. A lot of it.

Announcing the results on 12 August, Ukrainian officials also claimed 9,550 Russian troops killed and more than 6,600 wounded—figures no independent body has verified. Former commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, who planned the operation, said it proved the Ukrainian army "is capable not only of steadfastly holding its defences, but also of launching offensives, seizing the initiative, and liberating Ukrainian land."

Apple With Alibaba Has Built AI Only For China

2026-08-17T08:51:49.133-04:00

While the tech media have spent the past year mocking Apple for its perceived failure to develop competitive AI, the company was quietly partnering with China's Alibaba Group to create AI specifically for Chinese users. And, even more impressively, to become the first foreign company to gain Chinese government approval.

Even if, as is sure to happen, the other big US tech companies rush to follow suit, the terms will be harsher - if they ever gain them - and Apple will have further secured its brand prominence and first mover advantage. This is a stunning strategic move which further roils the AI market at an already sensitive time. JL

Cris Tolomia reports in Quartz:

Apple has built its own large language model targeting the China market in collaboration with Alibaba Group. A China-specific model would give Apple greater control over the AI experience in its most competitive overseas market. Such an outcome would also position Apple as the first foreign company Beijing has cleared to deploy its own proprietary AI model in China — a significant milestone for a U.S. firm at a time of deepening trade and diplomatic friction between the two nations over AI. The planned rollout follows a regulatory process that concluded last month, when China's Cyberspace Administration registered Apple's generative AI service, clearing the way for Apple Intelligence to reach Chinese iPhones. Alibaba confirmed that its Qwen model will be integrated into Apple Intelligence across iOS, iPadOS, macOS, and visionOS for users in China. Apple was also working with Baidu to develop Apple Intelligence features for Chinese iPhone users.
Apple $AAPL +0.22% has built its own large language model targeting the China market in collaboration with Alibaba Group, according to Reuters, citing three sources close to the situation. The development signals a shift away from Apple's earlier strategy of depending on outside partners' models to deliver AI capabilities to its China devices.

A China-specific model would give Apple greater control over the AI experience in its most competitive overseas market, according to Reuters. Such an outcome would also position Apple as the first foreign company Beijing has cleared to deploy its own proprietary AI model in China — a significant milestone for a U.S. firm at a time of deepening trade and diplomatic friction between the two nations over artificial intelligence.
Apple Intelligence, the company's suite of AI tools, is expected to launch in China in the coming months following an iOS update, according to the same people. Questions remain about how Apple's proprietary model will fit into the broader picture alongside the Chinese third-party models it is also using, and the precise technical relationship between them has not been disclosed.

The planned rollout follows a regulatory process that concluded last month, when China's Cyberspace Administration registered Apple's generative AI service, clearing the way for Apple Intelligence to reach Chinese iPhones. Alibaba confirmed that its Qwen model will be integrated into Apple Intelligence across iOS, iPadOS, macOS, and visionOS for users in China. Apple was also working with Baidu to develop Apple Intelligence features for Chinese iPhone users.
The previous week, Apple put out a guide in Chinese detailing how eligible Mac users in mainland China could link Qwen with Siri and the Writing Tools feature. The guide has since been taken down by Apple, with no reason given.
The tie-up between Apple and Alibaba became public in February 2025, when Alibaba chairman Joe Tsai took the stage at the World Governments Summit in Dubai and revealed that Apple had selected Alibaba to power its phones in China. "They talked to a number of companies in China. In the end they chose to do business with us," Joe Tsai said at the time. The rollout was subsequently delayed as Apple worked to adapt its features to Chinese regulations.

China remains a critical market for Apple. Analysts and observers had pointed to the lack of AI capabilities on iPhones in China as a drag on sales, with buyers increasingly turning to homegrown device makers whose handsets come with AI features already embedded.
Apple and Alibaba did not respond to requests for comment.

Russian Casualties Predicted To Rise 50% "When Leaves Fall, Winter Sets In"

2026-08-16T07:36:17.138-04:00

Russian casualties have been the worst of the war on a monthly basis this year. But the Ukrainians are predicting those losses will get worse as fall arrives - potentially one and a half times as many - as the trees lose their leaves, the Russians lose their cover and Ukraine's drones become even more efficient at finding and killing. JL

Stanislav Pohorislov reports in Ukraine Pravda:

Russian troop losses at the front will rise once the leaves fall and winter sets in."In winter... there will be one and a half times more of them [Russians killed – ed.] straight away. As soon as the leaves fall, we'll have a bit more room for manoeuvre and the thermal imagers will work better." Russian losses could rise to 35,000-40,000 a month during this period. One of Ukraine's strategic goals is to inflict up to 50,000 casualties on Russian forces each month to make the war unsustainable for Russia.
Kyrylo Veres, Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces' K-2 Brigade and a Hero of Ukraine, has predicted that Russian troop losses at the front will rise once the leaves fall and winter sets in.
Source: Veres in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda
Quote: "In winter... there will be one and a half times more of them [Russians killed – ed.] straight away. As soon as the leaves fall, we'll have a bit more room for manoeuvre and the thermal imagers will work better."
Details: Veres said Russian losses could rise to 35,000-40,000 a month during this period.
Quote: "I think there'll be an improvement. That doesn't mean the improvement will be noticeable within a day. We have a huge enemy, but we need to work towards this. If we'd been killing 40,000-50,000 [Russian troops] a month back in 2022, maybe the idiots would now be running a bit low."
More details: Veres said the Unmanned Systems Forces currently account for 10-15% of total Russian military fatalities.
Quote: "We're holding that level, give or take 10-15%. This is a historic moment."
Background: In January, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov said that one of Ukraine's strategic goals is to inflict up to 50,000 casualties on Russian forces each month to make the war unsustainable for Russia.

In the South, Ukraine Has Rolled Back A Year Of Russian Advances

2026-08-16T07:32:26.885-04:00

The Ukrainians' 'quiet offensive' as it is being called, has pushed the Russians back over 750 kilometers in the south, undoing years' worth of gains, primarily in the southern oblasts.

The implication is that Russia no longer has the troops or equipment to hold what they've taken, let along grab much more, while the Ukrainians are controlling the place and tempo of the fighting. JL

Michael Obelcz reports in Malcontent News:

Russia has struggled to maintain momentum during its summer offensive, despite Ukraine suffering manpower shortages. Almost all of the Russian advances over the last 12 months in Dnipropetrovsk and southwestern Donetsk have been rolled back since Ukraine started its offensive. Kyiv was maintaining tight operational security while local area Russian commanders were attempting to conceal the deteriorating situation through a series of false capture claims. Small groups of Russian troops dressed as civilians tried to advance past the line of contact, to briefly wave flags for drones flying overhead. The Russian groups made one-way trips. Some were captured, others eliminated by drone strikes and close combat. For now, the initiative belongs to Ukraine.
After months of tight operational security, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirmed major advances in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions, including the liberation of 26 settlements. The announcement was made after Russian sources published videos showing Ukrainian forces had crossed the Mokri Yaly River near Komar and advanced to Rybne in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
“From January through August of this year, our warriors of the Airborne Assault Forces and other units carried out an effective offensive operation in the Oleksandrivskyi sector,” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. “Over the course of the operation, 745 square kilometers of territory were liberated. Twenty-six villages in the Dnipro, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions were returned to Ukrainian control.”
The announcement reveals a major improvement in the operational situation compared to the beginning of 2026, when Russian forces were advancing toward Pokrovske [Not to be confused with Pokrovsk in the Donetsk Oblast - Ed.], reaching the Haichur River at Andriivka. They also had a significant presence in Ivanivka and Novopavlivka in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and had infiltrated as far north as the Vovcha River at Orestopil and Novoselivka, and as far west as Iskara [Soviet name of Andriivka-Klevtsove - Ed.].
To support the announced advances, Ukraine released videos showing their forces freely moving in Yalta, Myrne, Voskresenka, Novomykolaivka, Krasnohirske, Rybne, Vyshneve, and Pryvillya. Recent Russian videos revealed Ukrainian soldiers were operating in Zirka, Maliivka, Berezove, and the critical high ground north of Solodke.

In late January, Ukraine started a localized tactical offensive, which accelerated after SpaceX blocked Russian access to Starlink on February 4. By the end of May, Russian forces were pushed back 15 kilometers from Pokrovske and were cleared from Ivanivka and Novopavlivka. Ukraine had also advanced on a wide front through Dnipropetrovsk, almost reaching the Zaporizhzhia Oblast border.
Settlements liberated by Ukrainian forces since January 1, 2026, in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Base map copyright Google Maps, analysis by WBHG News - August 12, 2026.
Our analysts determined that 710.6 sqare kilometers of territory that was under Russian control or contested has been cleared by Ukrainian forces. That includes the liberation of 24 settlements since July 1. This closely aligns with the announcement made by Kyiv.
Settlements liberated by Ukrainian forces since January 1, 2026, in the southwestern part of the Donetsk Oblast. Base map copyright Google Maps, analysis by WBHG News - August 12, 2026.
Last month, Ukrainian forces established a bridgehead over the Mokryi Yaly River at Zirka, and have since advanced to the northern outskirts of occupied Komar. Velyka Novosilka, a critical Russian logistics hub and drone operations base, is now 15 kilometers from the line of contact (LOC), putting it within the so-called “kill zone” for Ukrainian drone operators.
Russia has struggled to maintain momentum during its summer offensive, despite Ukraine suffering manpower shortages. Almost all of the Russian advances over the last 12 months in Dnipropetrovsk and southwestern Donetsk have been rolled back since Ukraine started its offensive.
Until recently, neither Russia nor Ukraine had released a lot of information in this area. Kyiv was maintaining tight operational security while local area Russian commanders were attempting to conceal the deteriorating situation through a series of false capture claims. Small groups of Russian troops dressed as civilians used terrain to advance as far as 15 kilometers past the line of contact (LOC), to briefly wave flags for drones flying overhead. The Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups made one-way trips. Some were captured, while others were eliminated by drone strikes and in close combat.
Ukrainian advances cut off a key Russian supply line
In the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russia’s offensive at Hulaiipole was supported by two supply lines. The first is south of the city from Kamianka, and the second was from the northeast at Velyka Novosilka. In April, Ukrainian forces were within 1,000 meters of the Velyka-Novosilka Road, essentially severing the northern route.
The Ukrainian advance has also reached the outskirts of another critical Russian logistic hub at Uspenivka. Located in a river valley west of the Yanchur River, its capture enabled Russia to start its Huliaipole offensive in the fall of 2025. Recent videos published by Ukrainian drone units show that Uspenivka and the surrounding settlements are now under fire control.
Further south, only one group of Russian forces has been geolocated beyond the railroad grade that passes west of Huliaipole since mid-July. The Ukrainian offensive to the north, combined with other issues, has brought the Russian offensive at Huliaipole to a halt.
What’s next
Russia forces have not been able to stabilize their defensive lines, and with Ukraine establishing a bridgehead over the Mokri Yaly River, Komar can be attacked in two directions. Liberating Komar provides Ukraine with defensible terrain for the winter while expanding the bridgehead.
In April, we assessed that the liberation of Uspenivka and the surrounding settlements was an operational goal for Ukraine, but it would require setting the right conditions.
Current line of contact in the area of occupied Uspenivka, a critical logistics hub captured by Russia in 2025. Base map copyright Google Maps, analysis by WBHG News - August 12, 2026.
Located in a shallow river valley about 100 meters below the surround terrain, advancing into the settlement without taking the high ground from the west and east first would put Ukrainian forces in a kill box.
To set conditions, Ukraine needs to liberate Solodke and the 195-meter-high hill just south of the village. Northeast of Uspenivka, Ukraine needs to advance south of Temyrivka, which is still under Russian control, to the 210-meter heights. Russian forces also control a farm complex south of Novohryhorivka, which is closer to Uspenivka. From the high ground south of Temyrivka, Ukrainian forces could advance west toward Uspenivka or east toward Velyka Novosilka.
Currently, Ukraine holds the 176-meter hill northwest of Solodke, and the village itself is contested. They also hold static defenses about 1,500 meters west of Solodke. To the east, Kyiv claimed that Novohryhorivka is under Ukrainian control, while Russia has offered stiff resistance south of Ternove since April.
With a wave of new Russian videos showing Ukrainian forces have advanced to Rybne, Myrne, Zirka, and Yalta within the last week, Russian area commanders have started to publicly acknowledge the Ukrainian advance.
In the short-term, Russia’s options are somewhat limited. The VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) is conducting about 270 airstrikes per day and recently deprioritized the Huliaipole area. Currently, Moscow is prioritizing the northeastern part of Donetsk and setting conditions for an offensive on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. In order to increase airstrikes along the Mokri Yaly, the VKS will have to reduce airstrikes somewhere else.
Although the Russian offensive at Huliaipole has been halted, the deployed troops have not been drawn down. Our analyst team has noted significant chatter in closed Telegram groups about logistical problems, including fuel, ammunition, and first-person view drone shortages. Russia could redeploy some of the forces on the western outskirts of Huliaipole north, but the terrain is very unfavorable, and it doesn’t solve the supply problems.
For now, the initiative belongs to Ukraine, and Russia has an additional problem. Due to operational security, today’s announcement and videos did not reveal the full extent of Ukraine’s advances.

China and Turkey Covet Russia's Borderlands

2026-08-15T07:50:32.050-04:00

For all their expressions of fraternal support, neither the Chinese nor the Russians trust each other. The Russians realize this relationship is transactional and the Chinese believe that keeping Russia in the war will ultimately weaken them, strengthen the Chinese and provide opportunities for eventual further expansion at Russia's expense.

The Turks, meanwhile, are standing by, waiting to exploit Russia's eventual degradation. This is the reality of living in that neighborhood. JL

Raj K reports in Medium:

Russia is very big and diverse, with different economic, cultural, and political needs in various areas. If central control weakens, some regions might try to build stronger ties with outside powers, tilting towards neighbors like China basic on economic gains. Russia’s eastern and Siberian areas have huge natural resources, very valuable in the world economy. In the case of Turkey, the Caucasus region borders it. During the Chechen war, Turkey openly supported Chechnya’s independence. Taking advantage of a weak Russia, Turkey would still try to bring Chechnya and neighboring areas under its influence.
In the last 100 years, Russia has experienced several total social collapses. The fall of the Russian Empire and the breakup of the Soviet Union are examples that show how fragile Russia’s structure is.
Recently, during his ongoing war against Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has taken several steps that clearly show he is deeply terrified of a complete collapse of Russian society.
Putin recently imposed unprecedented communication restrictions across Russia. These measures are not only bothering ordinary citizens but are also badly affecting the fighting capability of the Russian army.
Due to the communication shutdown within the army, coordination between units has broken down. As a result, for the first time in a long while, Russia is losing territory in many areas.
Putin currently faces two risks: first, dissatisfaction within the army, and second, a power struggle among the influential classes of the government. Both of these are major challenges for Putin.
Regarding the first threat, when a war lasts a long time, losses increase, and resources are strained, which can lead to dissatisfaction between soldiers and military leadership.
The example of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s march toward Moscow in 2023 was cited, which some see as a warning to the power system.
That event showed that differences within the military structure can sometimes take the form of a political challenge.
The second potential threat is believed to be linked to the influential economic and political class, often called “oligarchs.”
In countries like Russia, big industrialists and people with economic power also have significant political influence.
Some analysts believe that if their interests are affected by the war or economic pressure, tension can arise within the government.
Lessons from History
First of all, the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917. After that, a long and bloody civil war took place, at the end of which the Soviet Union was formed.
That is, the result of that collapse was not total disintegration but the emergence of a new and even more centralized state system.
Then in 1991, the Soviet Union broke up. At that time, 15 federal republics became independent countries. This was a historic geopolitical change.
But what is Russia today is not the entire structure of the Soviet Union, but its successor state. Its official name is the Russian Federation, which shows it is a union of various “federal subjects” — including oblasts, krays, republics, etc.
In the 1990s, Chechnya declared independence, and two wars were fought. Those conflicts were a big challenge to Russia’s territorial integrity and were very violent. But the result was that Moscow re-established control over the region.
History shows that Russia has endured crises — 1917, 1991 — but each time it has reorganized in some new form.
Therefore, the word “collapse” should be understood carefully. Sometimes it is total disintegration, sometimes structural reorganization, and sometimes just a rebalancing of power.
Internal Pressures and Rising Risks
Russia is a vast multi-ethnic union with many ethnic republics and regions included. People living there often put their local or ethnic identity first — like Chechen, Tatar, Bashkir, etc. — and Russian identity second.
Due to the war, the state’s focus and resources are mainly on the military front. This has put pressure on internal governance, law and order, and local control.
For instance, a higher salary and opportunities that exist in the military have encouraged many young people to join the military instead of the police or another type of government service; this will reduce the ability of local governments to function at a high level in remote locations.
In the future, it is possible that powerful, influential individuals in certain regions could create private groups to protect themselves and their influence.
If they are larger than what the Russian government can control, then there is a potential for the growth of a regional political base of influence by the groups, which could lead to a call for greater regional autonomy as well as potential calls for eventual separation from Russia.
However, while Putin has taken steps to move toward a centralized form of federalism in his time in office, primarily through reducing the freedoms of the various regions and returning authority to the central government of Moscow.
Even so, if the center weakens for some reason or Putin leaves power, some Russian regions and republics could demand more autonomy or separate identity again.
Russia is very big and diverse, with different economic, cultural, and political needs in various areas.
The Role of External Powers
In that case, some regions might try to build stronger ties with outside powers. Russia’s eastern and Siberian areas have huge natural resources, very valuable in the world economy.
So if central control weakens, some areas could tilt toward neighbors like China based on economic gains.
If we look at the eastern part of Siberia, it once belonged to China and is full of resources. If nuclear weapons appear unsafe there, China could enter using “security” as an excuse. Remember how the US used the excuse of WMDs in Iraq? China could use the exact same tactic.
Meanwhile, the case of Turkey is different. The Caucasus region borders it. During the Chechen war, Turkey openly supported Chechnya’s independence.
Taking advantage of a weak Russia, Turkey would still try to bring Chechnya and neighboring areas under its influence.
This means that, along with Russia’s internal breakup, foreign countries will also become active. If Russia breaks, China in the east and Turkey in the west will take full advantage of this opportunity.
The Nuclear Fear
A major concern about a possible break-up of Russia concerns the nuclear weapons that Russia has the most of worldwide. Russian nuclear weapons are not all located in one area; they are located at various regional military bases.
When people think of Russia being broken up into numerous smaller political areas, it creates a worry about whether an area commander or local military commander would have the authority to release nuclear weapons.
This fear is natural, but in practice, nuclear weapons are not used just because they “exist.” The use of nuclear weapons requires very complex command-and-control systems, launch codes, technical structures, and a military chain of command.
Modern nuclear systems are designed so that it is almost impossible or extremely difficult to use them without a central order.
When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, nuclear weapons and related materials were present in the territories of different new countries, like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
At that time, too, there was a fear that nuclear weapons could go out of control. But eventually, through international agreements and security programs, these weapons were brought back under Russia’s control.
Conclusion
It is often claimed that the Ukraine war will never be able to break Russia. But, if we turn the pages of history, the truth seems different.
The breakup of Russia is nothing new; the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Chechnya war are links in this long process.
Today, the Ukraine war has broken the back of Russia’s police system, hollowed out the economy, and forcibly thrown the youth into the furnace of war. Because of this, heavy anger is growing in the small republics there.
Vladimir Putin understands these weaknesses very well. That is why he is putting a watch on the media, taking away the remaining freedom of the states, and silencing every opposing voice.
But history is witness — whenever the center’s grip loosens, the subordinate states find their own separate way.
If Russia breaks apart once again, the map of the world will change completely. We will see a smaller Russia, a super-powerful China, a more active Turkey, and many new independent countries.
This is not just talk; it is based on the “Russia after Russia” events that have already happened in history. What will happen next, only time will tell.
But one thing is certain — the Ukraine war has changed Russia forever; it will never be the same as before.

Russian Command Post, Drone Base, Artillery Destroyed By Ukraine Jets, Drones

2026-08-15T07:45:03.611-04:00

Ukrainian forces destroyed a variety of Russian targets in the past two days - command posts, drone bases and artillery.

The attacks show that as the Ukrainians increasingly identify and eliminate Russian air defenses on and near the front, the Ukrainians are able to strike weapons and installations of choice on a priority basis as part of their overall strategy while the Russians continue to hit civilian targets due to lack of coordination and capability. JL

Dariia Mykhailenko reports in Untied 24:

Ukraine's Air Force destroyed a Russian command post along with personnel, including drone operators, in an airstrike carried out by a Su-27 fighter jet. The aircraft crew used two guided aerial bombs in the strike. The target was completely destroyed, and the Russian personnel inside were killed. Ukrainian drone operators also destroyed two Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers in the Vovchansk direction. Locating and destroying the systems required coordinated work because the howitzers regularly changed positions, used camouflage and operated at a distance while being protected by other Russian forces.

Ukraine’s Air Force has destroyed a Russian command post along with personnel, including drone operators, in an airstrike carried out by a Su-27 fighter jet, Ukraine’s 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade said on August 13.

According to the brigade, a Ukrainian Air Force pilot struck the Russian command post where military personnel, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operators, were stationed.
The aircraft crew used two guided aerial bombs in the strike, the brigade said.
The target was completely destroyed, and the Russian personnel inside were killed, according to the Ukrainian military.
Ukrainian drone operators also destroyed two Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers in the Vovchansk direction. The operation was carried out by pilots from the Ares artillery reconnaissance battery of the 57th Brigade together with the Bulava unmanned systems battalion of the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, according to the military.

The Ukrainian forces said locating and destroying the systems required coordinated work because the howitzers regularly changed positions, used camouflage and operated at a distance while being protected by other Russian forces.

The brigade said the destruction of the command post disrupted the Russian units’ ability to maintain command and coordinate their operations. The loss of the UAV operators also reduced Russia’s capabilities to conduct reconnaissance and operate drones, it added.
In a separate operation in the Vovchansk direction, Ukrainian drone operators destroyed two Russian 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers, Ukraine’s 57th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade said on August 13.
According to the brigade, the two artillery systems were positioned behind the front line but were detected and subsequently destroyed by Ukrainian drone operators.

Job-Applicants Are Desperately 'AI-Washing" Their Resumes

2026-08-15T07:38:30.517-04:00

This is a new variant on an old and familiar theme. First it was dotcom, then it was cell phones, now AI.

With every generation of technology, those hoping to take advantage - or merely to keep their jobs - adapt by updating their resumes to reflect the latest trend. It is a cynical exercise, but in an economy without much sympathy, staying current is the equivalent of staying employed or of breaking in at all. JL

Te-Ping Chen reports in the Wall Street Journal:

Millions of of job seekers to give their work history an AI makeover. In some cases, they are seeking to add new skills, obtaining certifications to demonstrate their fluency in the technology. In others, they are dressing up their résumés with AI buzzwords in hopes of gaining employer attention. “Everybody’s keyword dumping.” The percentage of LinkedIn users in the U.S. who have added AI-related terms to their profiles rose 70% last year. Users have been retroactively adding AI terms to job titles where it hadn’t previously been mentioned. Compared with historic versions of such job descriptions, there are 30% more references to AI on user profiles today. “A lot of it looks like AI washing.”
Artificial intelligence is suddenly everywhere. Including on résumés.
The technology that is transforming the economy and prompting billions in spending on data centers is also pushing millions of job seekers to give their work history an AI makeover. In some cases, they are seeking to add new skills, obtaining certifications to demonstrate their fluency in the technology. In others, they are dressing up their résumés with AI buzzwords in hopes of gaining employer attention.
“Everybody’s keyword dumping,” said Denise Bitler, an executive career coach in Tampa, Fla. The percentage of LinkedIn users in the U.S. who have added AI-related terms to their profiles rose 70% last year, according to LinkedIn data. With more companies eager to hire workers with related skills, she says, they aren’t alone: “Employers are doing the same thing.”
Among all titles employers are hiring for on the jobs site Indeed in the U.S., 8% mentioned AI in the first quarter of 2026. That is up from 3% in 2022. Many of them are jobs that wouldn’t traditionally have involved many technological skills, such as “AI Autonomous Truck Test Driver” or “Physical Therapist (AI Documentation).”
The impact of AI on the workforce is a critical, and so far, unresolved question. Some economists predict the technology will wipe out jobs, while others say it will make employees more productive and eliminate grunt work. That leaves job seekers trying to find their place in an uncertain market.
Earlier this year, after a year and a half of challenges finding work, self-employed management consultant Grace Gravestock decided to both seek and promote some AI bona fides.
Grace Gravestock Kaylee Green
She has had misgivings about using the technology, but decided it was finally time to embrace it. She began experimenting intensively with AI and added “AI adoption leader” to her LinkedIn profile. She is currently pursuing a certification to demonstrate her AI fluency. Such certifications can take anywhere from hours to months to obtain, ranging in price from free to thousands of dollars in tuition.
“There’s a lot of big change happening now, there’s no way to fight it,” Gravestock said, adding that she empathizes with fears AI will ultimately replace many workers.
A new analysis by Stanford University economists Nick Bloom and Gideon Moore compared current LinkedIn profiles to archived versions of such profiles that existed before 2023. They found that users have been going back to retroactively add AI terms to job titles where the technology hadn’t previously been mentioned. Overall, compared with historic versions of such job descriptions, there are 30% more references to AI on user profiles today.
AI has been around for a while, and in some cases, people might be choosing to correct the record, said Bloom, who also co-authored the study alongside Lisa Simon and Caelan Wilkie-Rogers at workforce analytics company Revelio Labs. Given the prevalence of such changes, though, others are likely exaggerating their experience, he said: “A lot of it looks like AI washing.”
Job seekers are also taking steps to edit terms out of their profiles that might be less enticing to employers today than just a few years ago. For example, Bloom’s study found that references to remote work and diversity, equity and inclusion have dropped in recent years.
“There’s a lot of uncertainty in the labor market,” said Balaji Padmanabhan, who directs the Center for Artificial Intelligence in Business at the University of Maryland. “People recognize what worked yesterday might not work tomorrow.”
Last May, Padmanabhan and his peers launched a free AI-training course, expecting it to reach perhaps 500 people. Instead, to date, some 62,000 have signed up, ranging from laid-off tech workers to former civil servants trying to make a career pivot.

Among them is Elizabeth Meek, who worked for the federal government for two decades, helping oversee biomedical research and track global infectious-disease spread in animal populations. But after President Trump returned to office last year and ordered workers back to their offices, she was forced to commute more than four hours a day to the nation’s capital from her Frederick, Md., home, and felt demoralized. She took early retirement.
Elizabeth Meek
“It was a devastating career moment,” Meek recalled. “I thought, well, what am I gonna do?” Then a colleague sent her a link to the University of Maryland’s training course, and she decided to go for it.
Since then, the 53-year-old has found a new job at West Virginia University that includes using AI to analyze data and vibe-code apps. “It’s changed my life trajectory,” she said.
People touting their AI skills remain a minority: To date, 1.2% of LinkedIn’s 1.5 billion global users have added such skills to their profiles, according to the company. But in some areas, it has become more of a norm. Among product managers, 13% say they have such skills, 10% of researchers do, and 7% of consultants do as well.
“It’s the new buzzword,” said Art Davis, who recently added the term “AI-powered automation” to his LinkedIn profile. An AI system he has been using to help craft résumés and cover letters suggested the move. Davis said he started using AI last year in his work as a systems analyst, but hadn’t previously thought to single it out.
Art Davis Susan Simpson
So far, it hasn’t yielded dividends. Davis, who was laid off from his job this spring, has applied for 100 jobs and has yet to receive an interview. “It’s grim out there,” Davis said.
Given the technology’s newness and rapid evolution, job seekers don’t always know how to show aptitude, said Dina Taylor, who works for the AI hiring platform HireVue and has the title chief evangelist. Still, Taylor said she encourages people to add AI skills to their résumés to demonstrate their potential, even if they are still in the process of developing them.
Even if someone is just using ChatGPT to spin up recipes, it is “perfectly acceptable to say you leverage AI to support your daily projects or find ongoing areas of opportunity to add efficiencies into your life,” Taylor said.
“I believe in the mentality of say ‘yes’ and figure it out later,” she said.

Surviving A Year In the Kill Zone: A Ukrainian Infantryman's Diary

2026-08-14T06:27:52.331-04:00

Unimaginable privation and risk of death by men who continue to serve despite the violence, isolation and death.

It is a testament to their courage and determination. JL

Felix Hoske reports in Reuters:

Both armies now have tiny teams, two or three soldiers, scattered in small dugouts hollowed across the "kill zone" because of the constant drone threat. These groups evade detection and infiltrate gaps in enemy defences. They are stuck for months in their positions because it's so dangerous to rotate troops in and out. Krynitskyi was deployed near Chasiv Yar from April 20, 2025 to March 31, 2026. He filmed video diaries with a cellphone, powered by batteries from downed Russian drones in a cramped redoubt 3 by 4 metres beneath the front lines. Three or four days passed before a re-supply drone could make it through enemy fire. To survive, Krynitskyi picked food and sundries from fallen Russians who would advance on foot in small groups every couple of days. He killed 23 at close range during his deployment.

Serhii Krynitskyi watched the life seep out of the only man who had shared his living hell.
He and his comrade had survived nearly a year together in a foxhole on the front lines. They'd killed Russian soldiers and scavenged for food among the dead. They'd argued and laughed, amidst the horror.
Now, Krynitskyi was alone.
The Ukrainian soldier aimed his phone camera at his companion's lifeless body, wedged inside the dugout. One blood-stained leg was exposed. An artery sliced open by shrapnel from a bomb dropped by a drone. He bled and bled.
"In the morning, you're joking together," the 42-year-old told the camera numbly, his face smudged and worn. "And by the evening, it's the gates of heaven calling."
It was day 326.
The men's isolated position is a consequence of the way drone warfare is revolutionizing the battlefield. The technology has forced both sides to abandon the age-old practice of massing troops, artillery and armoured vehicles in a relatively narrow corridor along the long front line. Such visible targets are easy prey for the cheap unmanned aerial vehicles that both sides have flooded the skies with.

Instead, both armies now have tiny teams, sometimes of just two or three soldiers, scattered in small dugouts hollowed into the ground across a battlefield some 30 km (20 miles) wide, known as the "kill zone" because of the constant drone threat. These groups seek to evade detection and infiltrate gaps in enemy defences, often taking huge risks for minimal territorial gains. They are typically stuck for months in their positions because it's so dangerous to rotate troops in and out. Krynitskyi was deployed near the town of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine from April 20, 2025 to March 31, 2026, he and his brigade said. He filmed a series of video diaries with a cellphone, powered at times by batteries collected from downed Russian drones. He documented, in expletive-laden recordings, the inhumanities and absurdities of life in a cramped redoubt, about 3 by 4 metres, carved beneath the front lines of a grinding war.
Reuters reviewed 22 videos, which were provided by his unit to bring Krynitskyi’s story to a wider audience, and interviewed the soldier after his deployment to piece together this account of his 346-day stint at the front, almost all of it spent in a foxhole, which earned him the country’s highest military award.

He endured terrifying cycles of violence: Every couple of days, Russian soldiers would advance on foot in small groups of typically two or three. They sometimes came as close as 20 metres before the Ukrainians fired at them.
In the morning, you're joking together, and by the evening, it's the gates of heaven calling
He said he'd killed 23 enemies at close range during his deployment. He most clearly recalled one of his first: a soldier injured by a grenade. The Russian had faked surrendering before taking aim at him with a rifle.
"Well, I reacted,” Krynitskyi said. “He stopped aiming at me." In a clip from November 24, more than 200 days into his deployment, Krynitskyi trained his camera on the bodies of two enemy soldiers in the eerie calm after repelling an assault. "Fools," he said. "Crawled up where they don't belong."
Krynitskyi’s unit, the 24th Mechanised Brigade, confirmed that he had reported 23 enemy kills. Reuters couldn’t verify all aspects of the infantryman’s account.
Russia's defence ministry didn't respond to a request for comment about the changing nature of the battlefield and the experiences of soldiers on both sides. rynitskyi was not a military man.
He had worked in farming and construction until an injury left him in a month-long coma. After that, he scratched out a living as a rabbit breeder.

In late 2024, he was rounded up by draft officers in his village of Bilohir'ya in western Ukraine. They put him on a bus, brought him to the city of Rivne and trained him quickly. He was assigned to the 24th Mechanised Brigade and sent to the front in the east, where Russia's invading army, significantly outnumbering Ukraine's, was attacking the so-called "fortress belt" of strategic cities in the Donetsk region.
He and two other privates dug in near Chasiv Yar in April 2025. There, they excavated a foxhole, and Krynitskyi would subsequently spend almost a year living under the ground as enemy forces closed in. The men knew the deeper they dug, the better their chance of survival. Krynitskyi joked he didn't know whether to call the hole a shelter or a grave.
When their refuge was hit by drones, they had to excavate the area anew. One comrade was killed early in the deployment by an attack that left Krynitskyi concussed and temporarily without hearing. Reuters withheld the names of the two dead soldiers at the request of their brigade.
Krynitskyi and his remaining comrade also fought the elements, plugging holes to block frigid drafts and capping lookout shifts at two hours. Any longer was unbearable.

Sometimes, three or four days passed before a re-supply drone could make it through enemy fire. To survive, Krynitskyi picked food and sundries from fallen Russians.
The infantryman, who has two teenage children, started filming the diaries in August 2025, to show people when he got back home what he went through and to remind himself. Reuters verified the date of all the videos using the original file metadata.
In one video, in February this year, he surveyed the cigarettes he'd gathered from dead enemy troops: Camels, Winstons, Chesterfields and others. He obsessed over the packets, “like some nerd collects stamps.”
Krynitskyi, right, endured a punishing trek from his position before rejoining his comrades in Kramatorsk. REUTERS/Alina Smutko
In another video days later, he showcased mud-caked "trophy" rifles he’d seized.
"This is my small arsenal," Krynitskyi said, proudly counting off the 13 firearms, arranged in a row.
DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO SAVE HIS COMRADE
Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbour in 2022 unleashed staggering carnage. While neither side discloses death tolls, the Center for Strategic & International Studies estimates Russian battlefield casualties at 1.4 million, including killed, wounded and missing, and Ukrainian forces have suffered between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties.
Krynitskyi dug his foxhole on one of the deadliest stretches of the kill zone. On March 11, he heard an explosion outside.
He rushed out into the brisk spring air and found his comrade on the ground, hit in the leg by a drone attack. Krynitskyi dragged him back into the hole and frantically tore through his thick cotton trousers to find the wound.
He applied a tourniquet. It was too late to save him.
Upon radioing command, Krynitskyi was ordered to abandon the position as the Russians encroached. That night he crawled out of the dugout for the last time to join a few fellow infantrymen holed up nearby for almost three more weeks. Then came a perilous march to safety 25 km away made more difficult by his weakened state after months underground.
He left behind the body of his friend - a man he had come to know deeply through countless conversations between enemy assaults. In May, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy presented Krynitskyi with the Hero of Ukraine medal for personal bravery.
Ukraine's army is full of men like him, who have endured the unimaginable, said Andriy Derun, a military manager at leading Ukrainian charity Come Back Alive, which provides equipment and other support for the armed forces.
"It can completely destroy a person," said Derun, who frequently speaks with frontline troops.
A man walks past a damaged building in the city of Kramatorsk in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. REUTERS/Anatolii Stepanov
Back in Kramatorsk, the eastern city where he returned after his time at the front, Krynitskyi described the mental toll exacted by the marathon stints on the front: “Many guys have gone out of their mind”. Nearly two months since he left the front line, the scars inside show on the surface. He fights back tears. His hands shake.
During recent visits Krynitskyi made to schools near his home to speak to pupils about his experience, he began to understand better how others may benefit from his sacrifices.
"I realized there, in those schools, that it wasn't in vain that I defended our land and these children – so they could study, see the clear sky.”

July Was Worst Month of Entire War For Ukraine Destroying Russian Vehicles

2026-08-14T06:26:38.151-04:00

Last month, Ukrainian forces destroyed more Russian vehicles than at any other similar time since the Russian invasion four and a half years ago.

This is a reflection of the growing effectiveness of the near, mid level and long range drone campaigns targeting Russian manufacturing and oil production, as well as the vehicles that transport their finished products. Ukrainian attacks also degraded Russian air defenses and armor, as well as again inflicting more casualties than any other month of the war. JL

Olena Mukhina reports in the Euromaidan Press:

Ukraine wrecked more Russian vehicles in July than in any month of the war. Ukraine's Defense Forces destroyed and disabled 13,998 units of automotive equipment, the most for the entire war.Ukraine also struck at the systems that protect Russian forces. Ukrainian troops hit 68 units of Russian air defense systems in July, chipping away at the shield that guards Russian positions and rear areas. Armor losses were also heavy. Ukraine destroyed and disabled 162 tanks, including 28 in a single day on 22 July, along with 204 armored combat vehicles and 2,016 artillery systems. That month was also Russia's deadliest for personnel in 2026, as Ukraine's drones reached deeper and hit more.

Ukraine wrecked more Russian vehicles in July than in any month of the war. Ukraine's Defense Forces destroyed and disabled 13,998 units of automotive equipment, the most for the entire war, Ukraine's Defense Ministry reported on 12 August.
The record fits a month of intensifying attrition against Russian logistics and air defense. In July, the Defense Forces continued methodical work to weaken Russia's air-defense capabilities and logistics, and the vehicle figure, the war's highest, reflects a campaign hitting the trucks that move Russian ammunition, fuel, and troops to the front.
The vehicle losses target Russian logistics
The record vehicle toll strikes at how Russia sustains its offensive. Trucks and transport vehicles are the arteries that carry ammunition, fuel, and supplies to Russian forces, and destroying nearly 14,000 in a month, largely with drones, degrades the logistics that keep the assaults moving.

The figure marks a scale of vehicle destruction not seen before. That the highest monthly total of the war came in July matches the wider picture of that month, which was also Russia's deadliest for personnel in 2026, as Ukraine's drones reached deeper and hit more.
Air defense and armor were hit hard too
Ukraine also struck at the systems that protect Russian forces. Ukrainian troops hit 68 units of Russian air defense systems in July, chipping away at the shield that guards Russian positions and rear areas.
Armor losses were also heavy. Ukraine destroyed and disabled 162 tanks, including 28 in a single day on 22 July, along with 204 armored combat vehicles and 2,016 artillery systems.

The count is Ukraine's own
The figures are Ukraine's tally and cannot be independently verified. The Defense Ministry reports Russian losses without detailing Ukraine's own.
Meanwhile, July was Ukraine’s deadliest month for civilians since 2022 due to Russia's ballistic missile attacks and lack of Patriot interceptors from allies.

Losing To Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Meta Now Touts Open Weight AI

2026-08-14T06:23:45.096-04:00

Tech's BS meter is flashing red. Meta's embrace of open-weight AI, preceded by a wordy manifesto from CEO Zuck about freedom, the threat from China and other rhetoric designed to curry favor with his friends in the Trump Administration, appears to be a desperate attempt to re invigorate the company's position in AI even as it is falling to also-ran status compared to Anthropic, OpenAI, Google as well as the Chinese open weight hitters. It may even be a play for federal funding from once proudly libertarian Silicon Valley.

Whatever the reasoning, industry insiders are suggesting this could signal another whiff, even as the company's metaverse wreckage still smolders. JL

Beatrice Nolan reports in Fortune:

Meta's shift on open-source reflects an attempt to try to regain momentum after recent models have fallen short of those from OpenAI and Anthropic. Meta is looking to reassure investors that it is still competitive with frontier labs. (But) Meta's open weight Muse Glimmer lands in a US market increasingly dominated by closed-sourced AI companies with controlled access to their best models. OpenAI Anthropic, and Google keep their most advanced "frontier" models locked, retaining control of the weights and infrastructure. Meta sought to differentiate itself by embracing open source, launching the open-weight Llama family of models in February 2023. The Llama family helped outside developers to download and modify AI, and gave Meta some influence in AI even as rivals captured more revenue by selling access to their proprietary models. Meta is hoping its commitment to open-source will give it a political argument for user and government support.

Meta launched its newest family of AI models—Muse Glimmer, a group of open-source models designed to run on a laptop—on Monday, alongside a 6,500-word essay from Mark Zuckerberg making the argument for American open-source AI.
In the essay, Zuckerberg argues that powerful AI should not be controlled by a handful of companies, a seeming jab at competitors like OpenAI and Anthropic. Zuckerberg positions Meta's commitment to open-source as critical to challenging Chinese open-source models from DeepSeek and Moonshot which have been getting uncomfortably close to the American frontier. He also urged Washington to support American efforts.

As part of this new commitment, Meta says it plans to open the weights for Muse Spark 1.2—meaning it will publicly release the underlying trained parameters of the model, letting anyone download, inspect, and modify it rather than access it only through Meta's own products or API—its most advanced AI model on the market.
"I do not believe restricting access to foreign open source models is an effective solution. Our goal should be for American open source models to be the best globally. This requires removing the hurdles that make it harder for American open source models to compete," Zuckerberg wrote in the essay, part of a coordinated media blitz by Meta that included a Zuckerberg-penned opinion piece on the same themes in the Wall Street Journal last month and interviews with select media outlets.
The Muse Glimmer release lands in an American market increasingly dominated by closed-sourced AI companies, those that sell controlled access to their best models.

OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google generally keep their most advanced "frontier" models locked behind closed doors, retaining tight control of the weights and infrastructure. Meta initially sought to differentiate itself by embracing open source, launching the open-weight Llama family of models in February 2023. The Llama family, which expanded through several versions, helped make high-performing models available for outside developers to download and modify, and gave Meta influence over the wider AI ecosystem even as rivals captured more revenue by selling access to their proprietary models. Over the past year however, Meta's commitment to open-weight has blurred, as the company mixed open releases with proprietary ones.
Meta has spent heavily on its new Superintelligence Labs, including bringing in former Scale AI CEO Alexander Wang. The company has been trying to position the Muse family as the foundation for a more capable Meta AI assistant across Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and its Ray-Ban Meta AI glasses, while also being competitive with models from Anthropic and OpenAI.

The shift and refocus on open-source may also reflect an attempt by Meta to try to regain momentum after recent models have fallen short of systems from OpenAI and Anthropic. Meta is also looking to reassure investors that it is still competitive with frontier labs.
Meta said it trained its new Glimmer series using distillation, a process in which a smaller model learns from Muse Spark, its larger proprietary system. In his essay, Zuckerberg wrote that American AI developers face disadvantages against Chinese rivals, including in training data, and argued that policy should reduce those barriers.
With the strategy shift, Meta will likely be hoping its commitment to open-source will set it apart from rivals that keep their most capable systems behind closed doors and give it a political argument for user and government support.

Russian Submarine Commander Who Defected From Ukraine Assassinated In Crimea

2026-08-13T11:08:02.344-04:00

Russian Naval Captain Robert Shageev, who had commanded Ukraine's only submarine in 2014 but defected when the Russians seized Crimea that year, was killed by a bomb placed near his home in Sebastopol earlier today.

Ukraine neither forgives nor forgets. JL

The Kyiv Post reports:

Russian Naval Captain Robert Shageev was killed earlier today when an explosive device detonated near a residential area in Russian-occupied Sevastopol. He was a Captain1st rank in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Shageev previously served in the Ukrainian Navy and commanded the Zaporizhzhia – Ukraine’s only submarine at the time. He defected to Russia after Moscow occupied and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Shageev later served in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as deputy commander of its 4th Separate Submarine Brigade. Ukraine charged him with treason and desertion over his decision to join the Russian military. Shageev continued serving Russia during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He had commanded the Stary Oskol, a Russian submarine capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles.
A Russian military officer was killed on Thursday when an explosive device detonated near a residential area in Russian-occupied Sevastopol.
The blast occurred on Stoletovsky Avenue as the officer walked down a staircase with another man, according to Russian Telegram channels Mash and 112, which have links to the country’s security services.
Preliminary reports said the explosive device had been hidden in a trash bin beside a bench. Witnesses said the explosion was so powerful that some initially believed a drone had struck a nearby building.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), confirmed that the victim was a Russian defense ministry serviceman. It said a Russian woman born in 1994 had been detained on suspicion of involvement and alleged that she acted on instructions from Ukrainian intelligence.

Ukrainian authorities have not commented on the explosion or claimed responsibility.
Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels identified the victim as Robert Shageev, a captain 1st rank and officer in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Shageev previously served in the Ukrainian Navy and commanded the Zaporizhzhia – Ukraine’s only submarine at the time. However, he defected to Russia after Moscow occupied and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014.
Shageev later served in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, including as deputy commander of its 4th Separate Submarine Brigade. Ukraine charged him with treason and desertion over his decision to join the Russian military.

Ukrainian investigators have said Shageev continued serving Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He previously commanded the Stary Oskol, a Russian submarine capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles.
Some Ukrainian reports have linked him to Russian submarine-launched missile attacks against Ukraine.
Sevastopol, the main base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in occupied Crimea, has repeatedly been targeted since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Ground Robots Purchases By Ukraine Troops Up 680% Over Last Year

2026-08-13T10:47:17.830-04:00

Ground drones have become so popular with frontline Ukrainian combat units that orders of various types placed with the state platform that loosely resembles Amazon - ranging in capability from logistics support to attack weapons - are up 680% this year over last year.

There are now 280 suppliers making hundreds of variations. JL

Jake Epstein reports in Business Insider:

Ukrainian troops are rushing to a digital weapons marketplace to buy record numbers of ground robots, reflecting the surging popularity of these combat machines on the battlefield. The Ukrainian state innovation platform, said the military has ordered more than 3,000 ground robots from its digital marketplace, including 640 units in July alone. That represents a 680% increase over 2025's monthly average. Ukraine launched the Brave1 Market in April 2025, granting soldiers access to an Amazon-style website to buy military technology, such as drones, robots, and electronic warfare systems. In October 2025, ground drones became eligible for purchase with "ePoints," which Ukrainian troops collect for verified kills of Russian soldiers or military hardware. There are now 280 firms that make hundreds of different ground drones.
Ukrainian troops are rushing to a digital weapons marketplace to buy record numbers of ground robots, reflecting the surging popularity of these combat machines on the battlefield.
Brave1, the Ukrainian state-backed innovation platform, said on Monday that the military has ordered more than 3,000 ground robots from its digital marketplace since it launched last year, including over 640 units in July alone.
That latter figure represents a 680% increase over 2025's monthly average, Brave1 said in a statement.

Yuliia Myrna, product manager for the Brave1 Market digital site, said in remarks shared with Business Insider that ground robots and interceptor drones "are among the fastest-growing categories we are seeing in 2026."
Ukraine launched the Brave1 Market in April 2025, granting soldiers access to an Amazon-style website to buy military technology, such as drones, robots, and electronic warfare systems, from the defense industry, streamlining the procurement process.

In October 2025, uncrewed ground vehicles became eligible for purchase with "ePoints," which Ukrainian troops collect for verified kills of Russian soldiers or military hardware, and the completion of other battlefield tasks.
Brave1 said the military has ordered more than 3,000 ground robots from its online market. Genya SAVILOV/AFP via Getty Images
Various drone types, including first-person-view (FPV) quadcopters, interceptors, and heavy bombers, are among the most popular items on the Brave1 Market by quantity.
While ground robots can cost tens of thousands of dollars — typically making them far more expensive than these other drones — they serve in drastically different roles and have a longer operational lifecycle.

Myrna said Ukraine is "deliberately accelerating" the integration of ground robots into combat operations, particularly for logistics and casualty evacuation.
"Military units now earn ePoints for successfully completing these missions with robotic systems, creating an incentive to replace personnel in high-risk tasks wherever possible," she said.
"This creates a powerful development cycle," Myrna added, explaining that "more battlefield use generates more operational feedback for manufacturers, which leads to faster product improvements and ultimately helps us move people away from missions that can be performed by machines."

Only a few Ukrainian companies produced ground robots at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. Today, there are roughly 280 firms that make hundreds of different products, Andrii Hrytseniuk, Brave1's CEO, told Business Insider.
Ukrainian officials have set out to replace soldiers with robots in dangerous front-line roles. Diego Fedele/Getty Images
The growing popularity of uncrewed ground vehicles on the Brave1 Market reflects Ukraine's broader push to replace soldiers with robots and drones in dangerous missions, particularly front-line supply runs.
Ukrainian officials have said they want robots to handle 100% of battlefield logistics, missions that have become particularly deadly as the "kill zone" — the drone-saturated area that surrounds the front line — continues to expand.

Ukrainian commanders told Business Insider that the robots allow their units to perform critical tasks while keeping troops out of harm's way.
Grek, a UGV company commander with the 21st Unmanned Systems "Kraken" Regiment, who asked to only be identified by his call sign, said that "the stakes of removing humans from dangerous missions are significant."
"Every time a person is exposed to a high-risk environment, there is a possibility of injury, loss of life, or reduced combat effectiveness," he said. "Protecting personnel means preserving experience, training, and leadership that cannot easily be replaced."

As US, NATO Troops Train Against Ukrainians, Kyiv's Teams Never Lose

2026-08-13T10:31:25.769-04:00

For more than a year, US and other NATO forces have been participating in training exercises in which they are pitted against Ukrainian units who apply what they have learned in their war against the Russian invasion of their country. The outcomes have been one-sided: in favor of the Ukrainians.

In one such exercise in Germany, a 10 man Ukrainian drone team wiped out a US armored brigade. In fact, the Ukrainians dispatched the Americans so quickly that the US unit had to recreated as a 'new' unit or the exercises would have ended too early. The British, Swedish and Estonians have had similar experiences against the Ukrainians. The lesson is that NATO now has much to learn from Ukraine about how to fight a modern war. JL

Alastair MacDonald and colleagues report in the Wall Street Journal:

US Army troops faced off against Ukrainian drone operators at a military exercise in Germany earlier this year. It didn’t go well for the Americans. British, Estonian and Swedish exercises have also resulted in easy Ukrainian triumphs. The Ukrainian drone operators eliminated a U.S. armored brigade in one exercise. The US troops sent heavy armored vehicles that threw up dust and were easy for Ukrainian recon drones to spot. Those drones were followed by drones dropping explosives and FPV drones. The Ukrainians were 'destroying' US equipment so quickly that the US units had to be sent back in as new units to keep the exercise going.
U.S. Army troops faced off against Ukrainian drone operators at a military exercise in Germany earlier this year. It didn’t go well for the Americans.
During the exercise, called Combined Resolve, Ukrainian drone units easily spotted and defeated U.S. troops and armored vehicles on rotation from Fort Hood in Texas, according to people familiar with the events.
The exercise, coupled with U.S. casualties in Iran, shows American vulnerabilities to drones—years after the U.S. made uncrewed systems an essential part of warfare. America pioneered using long-range drones in war. The Pentagon has recently spent billions acquiring new drone and counterdrone technology and formed special units to operate it.
Still, in the Middle East this year, the U.S. has struggled to defend against Iran’s long-range drones, which have killed and injured soldiers and destroyed aircraft.
The drubbing in Germany conveyed lessons from Ukraine focused on short-range battlefield drones. The exercise, held in April and May, tested visiting troops’ ability to operate and defend against the proliferation of smaller, front-line drones that have dominated the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
Exercises like Combined Resolve are run precisely so that forces can experience realistic combat conditions. Army leaders in Europe over recent years have taken advantage of having Ukrainian forces on hand to participate and impart their hard-won skills to U.S. and allied troops in practice, on simulated battlefields. The expectation is that failures are educational. British and Swedish exercises have also resulted in easy Ukrainian triumphs.
Eliot Cohen, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, said that recent battlefield experience shows how drones of all kinds are essential to modern war.
“It is vital that the U.S. military master that, and thus far, unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case,” he said.
A Ukrainian servicemember operating a drone near the front-line in eastern Ukraine. Iryna Rybakova/Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanized Brigade/AP
Combined Resolve is a semiannual exercise focused on large-scale ground combat operations, in which rotating U.S. forces use armored divisions supported by ground troops, helicopters, drones and other military assets.
Around 3,500 U.S. personnel, primarily from the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, took part in the exercise. Their task was to attack a position defended by the Army training-ground’s opposition force, or OPFOR, who were reinforced by Ukrainian troops from the 412th Regiment of Unmanned Systems Forces, or Nemesis, people familiar with the matter said.
The rotating troops were equipped with standard electronic-warfare and counterdrone systems, according to an Army official. New Mobile Brigade Combat Teams, equipped with the latest gear and tactics, have fared much better in exercises, the Army official said.
The Ukrainian drone operators eliminated a U.S. armored brigade in the exercise, according to U.S. officials briefed on the exercise and one participant.
The exercising troops sent into battle heavy armored vehicles that threw up dust and were easy for Ukrainian reconnaissance drones to spot, according to the participant. Those drones were followed by drones dropping explosives and first-person-view drones, which smash into targets in combat, this person said.
Live ammunition is rarely used in such exercises. Drones typically hover above a vehicle or move close enough to it for an observer to award them a “kill.”
Ukrainian drones were doing this so quickly with U.S. vehicles that they had to be sent back into the exercises as new units, or “re-spawned,” to keep the exercise going, a U.S. official briefed on the drill said. The U.S. reran the training scenario over the two-week engagement. The rotating forces improved their performance, as they became more adept at dispersing and concealing themselves and using electronic warfare, said the Army official. The Ukrainians also switched sides midway through the exercises and helped them use drone technology offensively, which they did effectively, the official said.
Ukrainian troops have become expert in drone warfare over nearly 4½ years of fighting Russia, with operators and their support troops now skilled at continually repairing and adapting drones. Moscow’s forces have also gained invaluable skills. American drone operators lack experience fixing and arming drones under fire, said the person present at the exercise.
In Ukraine, so many tanks and other armor are destroyed in battle that large parts of the country’s vast front line is almost free of armor.
Some U.S. military officers, though, argue that drones are particularly deadly in this war because it has reached a stalemate with little battlefield movement. In a war of maneuver, the tank and other armor would come back into its own, they say.
Alex Kraus/Bloomberg News
U.S. Army soldiers were able to use counterdrone equipment and operate first-person view drones during the exercise. Alex Kraus/Bloomberg News
But Ukrainian military thinkers such as former chief commander Valeriy Zaluzhniy argue that drone technology has made traditional maneuver warfare unfeasible, for now, explaining the largely static front line in Ukraine’s east. Both Russia and Ukraine are searching for the next breakthroughs in technology and tactics to restore movement to the battlefield.
The exercise showed that the U.S. may struggle to protect that armor as it moves.
This wasn’t the first time the U.S. has come across Ukrainian drone proficiency. In 2023, a U.S. infantry officer helping train Ukrainian troops realized the U.S. needed to learn from them about drone warfare and designed a training program that other Army units later followed, according to a U.S. official.
Despite a sometimes prickly relationship with Kyiv, President Trump’s administration has been reaching out to Ukraine. The U.S. is currently testing Ukrainian drones to buy and has used counterdrone systems tested in that war to help defend its forces in Iran.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in May told senators he has increased the number of U.S. personnel being sent to Ukraine to study drone warfare.
The U.S. Army isn’t the first to be found wanting by Ukrainian drones.
In May of last year, Ukrainian drone operators easily defeated the British, Estonian and other forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including a U.S. contingent, in an exercise in the Baltic region, according to a person familiar with the matter.
This spring, Swedish forces led an exercise with NATO allies in which Ukrainian drone teams outperformed them too, Swedish officials told local media.

Compressing the Kill Chain: Ukraine Gives Satellite Intel To Frontline Troops

2026-08-13T10:13:20.535-04:00

What Ukraine has learned the hardest way possible - through the deaths of its soldiers - is that the more timely and accurate intelligence it can get to frontline troops, the more likely they are to win - and survive.

Which is why, contrary almost all previous military doctrine in any fighting force, they are providing satellite intel directly to combat troops in the kill zone. Their position is that compressing the kill chain is a tactical accelerator. Or, more graphically, he who moves fastest is most likely to live to write the after-action report. JL

Wes O'Donnell reports in Medium:

Ukraine warfighting runs on compression, not Bureaucracy: Compress the kill chain, compress the sensor-to-shooter timeline, and compress the gap between spotting a Russian vehicle and converting it into a smoking grid square. The side that sees first, decides first, and shoots first usually gets to write the after-action report. Ukrainian units identify targets, execute strikes, and immediately re-task satellites for battle damage assessment. This is a process that typically unfolds over hours that became a continuous loop for the Ukrainians. Moving intelligence directly to frontline units reduces reliance on jammable drones. Satellites don’t fly into electronic warfare, run out of battery mid-mission, or require an operator close enough to get targeted. Rapid retasking after a strike is where this begins to look less like imagery support and more like a tactical kill-chain accelerator.

When I was in the 101st Airborne, direct satellite imagery in the field would’ve felt like “god-mode.” Not the heretical kind… The video game kind: flip a switch, see the map, find the enemy, and remove a lot of dangerous guesswork.
When historians look back on the Ukraine War, I think they will examine it the way we look at World War I. The Great War pushed armored warfare, aviation, and submarines from experiment to battlefield necessity. Ukraine is doing something similar with the kill chain, (military jargon for finding a target and destroying it).
It’s taking the time between detection to destruction and crushing it down from weeks or days, to minutes or seconds.
This is most seen with Ukraine’s battlefield AI experiments, Delta app, drones, and uncrewed ground (and sea) vehicles.
But putting live satellite feeds in the hands of frontline soldiers is on another level of shrinking the kill chain.
If you’ve never served in the military, you might be wondering whether the West does this now. The answer is “not really.” (Although I should put a big asterisk on that sentence for Special Forces troops who likely have much better real-time satellite access.)
Also, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention ATAK, the Android Team Awareness Kit used by the US military and represented in the photos I used for this piece. ATAK allows mission planning and some short range comms between units.
Still, here’s how satellite intelligence has worked for most of modern military history.
A national-level asset collects imagery from space, geospatial analysts process it, Army headquarters interprets it, then, the image moves through layers of command.
Eventually, if the machine gods of military technocracy were in a generous mood and nobody had scheduled a three-hour sync to discuss the sync, something useful reached the troops.
Twelve hours later and the enemy is long gone.
That model worked when wars moved at the speed of staff officers.
Ukraine’s war doesn’t.
A 2025 Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin article from US Army intelligence personnel described the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division attempt to use commercial sat imagery during a major exercise. The brigade ran into a time-intensive request process, bureaucratic chains, dissemination barriers, uncertainty over whether requests would be supported, slow processing, and classification problems.
See the problem? It starts with a capital “B.”
We need to learn from Ukraine because their warfighting runs on compression, not Bureaucracy: Compress the kill chain, compress the sensor-to-shooter timeline, and compress the gap between spotting a Russian vehicle and converting it into a smoking grid square.
The side that sees first, decides first, and shoots first usually gets to write the after-action report.
The other side just gets to be in it.
At the GEOINT Symposium last month, Susanne Hake, executive vice president of Vantor (formerly Maxar Intelligence), described what her company actually tested on the Ukrainian front.
Frontline troops used handheld devices to task satellites directly and receive imagery in near real time, bypassing the centralized intelligence workflows that have been choking speed out of the system for decades.
“We have more imagery, more sensors, more phenomenology, more data than ever before,” Hake said. “But the reality is, much of that data still isn’t reaching the people who need it, fast enough.”
Sounds to me like a bureaucracy problem. And Ukraine is forcing it to be solved in the worst possible testing environment: an active war where the penalty for slow intelligence is measured in bodies.
What the Test Actually Did
Here’s the big revelation, and it’s really only a process change.
The Vantor experiment stitched together steps that normally happen in sequence like satellite tasking, imagery delivery, data integration, and analysis, into a single workflow accessible at the tactical level.
Almost sounds too easy. That’s probably why the US gov is lagging behind. Everything needs to be overly complicated for Uncle Sam.
Ukrainian units could identify targets, execute strikes, and immediately re-task satellites for battle damage assessment. This is a process that typically unfolds over hours that became a continuous loop for the Ukrainians.
Rapid retasking after a strike is where this begins to look less like imagery support and more like a tactical kill-chain accelerator.
Let me pause here… “Re-tasking” satellites is HUGE.
Personally, and I’m only speaking from my experience in the field, I would NOT want my squad of grunts and misfits anywhere near a satellite tasking.
They would probably try to fly it into the ISS.
Which is why this capability likely lives at the squad leader level or above (still a misfit, but slightly more mature).
Anyways, in this test, the imagery was also pushed simultaneously to units operating hundreds of kilometers apart.
Distributed teams coordinating targeting decisions off the same near-real-time satellite picture. Holy shit. That’s a fundamentally different way of sharing a battlefield picture, closer to how a network functions than how a chain of command functions.
Vantor is now testing tools designed to compress the full cycle, from satellite tasking to data delivery, to under fifteen minutes. There are still constraints, particularly with large data products like 3D imagery, which have to be scaled down significantly to run over the kind of constrained networks tactical units actually operate on. But the direction of travel is clear.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
Personnel with the 325th Security Forces Squadron train to use the Android Tactical Assault Kit at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Public domain
Why This Changes the Geometry
Think about what direct-to-device satellite imagery means for a frontline unit in practical terms.
A drone team can pull fresh overhead imagery before launching into jammed airspace to confirm whether a Russian battery has displaced since the last image. (Because flying an expensive ISR drone into a position that’s already empty is the military equivalent of driving to a restaurant that closed six months ago.)
A brigade intelligence cell can push imagery to dispersed units without routing everything through a slow central pipeline.
A strike team can request battle damage assessment immediately after a strike instead of waiting half a day for someone else to tell them whether they hit anything.
Drones are Ukraine’s primary reconnaissance tool, and they’re excellent, until they’re jammed, shot down, grounded by weather, or forced into a corridor of Russian air defenses.
Hake made this point explicitly: moving intelligence directly to frontline units reduces reliance on jammable drones. Satellites don’t fly into electronic warfare, run out of battery mid-mission, or require an operator close enough to get targeted.
But I want to be clear, here: This is not a replacement for drones. It’s more like a second sensor layer that exists above the fight.
Also, there are a couple of limitations worth mentioning…
Bandwidth is a bit of a problem. High-resolution imagery is a large file. Multi-spectral data is larger. 3D imagery is enormous.
Frontline units rarely have pristine connectivity, especially under Russian electronic warfare. NGA’s (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) chief information officer Mark Chatelain said: “We can’t carry everything. It has to be prioritized. Being able to operate systems without being connected back to the mothership has been a big problem that NGA has faced for a long time.”
That’s the fed’s version of admitting the WiFi is bad at the front and cell towers aren’t exactly proliferating around the front lines.
NGA is exploring “aggressive” data compression and AI-assisted prioritization to determine what actually gets transmitted when bandwidth is limited.
Which is a reasonable response, methinks.
It’s also an acknowledgment that the technical problem isn’t really collection anymore; it’s the entire chain between collection and the person who needs to act on it.
Classification and access are a different kind of swamp. Security is the quiet nightmare in all of this.
A handheld device that can task satellites and receive fresh imagery is an enormously valuable capture. Let’s face it: frontline soldiers sometimes get killed or captured.
Compromise it and you potentially expose friendly positions, target priorities, strike plans, and methods. Russia would love to get their hands on one.
So, the device needs encryption, remote wipe capability, emissions discipline, and the ability to function when disconnected, all wrapped in hardware that can survive mud, cold, battery scarcity, and combat.
That’s a lot to ask of a device some grunt is going to store in his dirty plate carrier or cargo pocket.
Then there’s the training, something that’s underrated in every conversation about new technology.
A satellite image doesn’t interpret itself (yet). Operators need to understand resolution, shadow, angle, camouflage, decoys, and the difference between a vehicle and a vehicle-shaped pile of branches.
A confident bad read can send a strike to the wrong coordinates.
Still, this has a lot of potential to drastically compress the kill chain and it’s fitting that Ukraine is on the cutting edge here.
What Vantor is describing, and what NGA is trying to solve, is a pipeline problem.
The collection end of that pipeline has never been more capable; commercial satellite imagery is getting better and better.
It’s everything after collection, the latency, the bandwidth constraints, the systems that don’t talk to each other, the workflows still designed around moving data from one place to another before it becomes useful, that’s where the bottleneck lives.
Ukraine is forcing the bottleneck to move because this war punishes slow systems.
Hake said it as clearly as anyone has: “The next breakthrough in GEOINT is really about software, not just sensors.”
She’s right. The satellites are fine. The problem is the last mile between orbit and the guy on the ground who needs to know whether that Russian logistics node is still active before he commits a strike package to it.
Ukraine already came to this conclusion. It bled its way there.
The Delta battlefield app, the FPV drone networks, the Starlink terminals, the commercial satellite accounts, the AI-assisted targeting tools built by volunteers in Kyiv apartments… none of that came from a requirements document.
It came from a country that understood it would either compress the kill chain or lose the war and lose their national identity.
The Vantor test is one data point in a much longer argument Ukraine has been making since February 2022: the future of warfare belongs to whoever closes the gap between sensing and shooting fastest.
Not the country with the most satellites.
Not the country with the best intel weenies.
The country that gets the right picture to the right person at the right moment, and trusts that person to act on it.
NATO has more resources, more technology, and more time than Ukraine ever had. What it doesn’t always have is urgency.
The kill chain is speeding up whether the alliance is ready or not.
Ukraine already paid that tuition. The rest of us got the lesson for free. That’s either an enormous advantage or a wasted one, depending entirely on what we do next.

Amid Media Blackout, Ukraine Liberated 745 KM, 26 Villages On Oleksandrivka Front

2026-08-13T09:57:22.144-04:00

There have been noticeably fewer articles this year about the actions and achievements of Ukrainian forces in specific sectors. This, it turns out, was not for lack of interest, but to preserve operational security so that the Russians could not easily discern Ukraine's plans.

That reporting veil is now being lifted, partially, with the news that on the Oleksandrivka front, Ukrainian forces have liberated 745 square kilometers encompassing 26 villages since the winter. That offensive is ongoing and, although details are sparse, reveals much about Ukraine's success in the ground war. JL

Valentyna Romanenko reports in Ukraine Pravda:

The Oleksandrivka offensive has been under way since 29 January and is continuing. During the offensive, Ukrainian forces regained control of more than 745 sq km of territory and 26 settlements – 12 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 10 in Donetsk Oblast and four in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian troops also searched for and destroyed Russian forces that had infiltrated into rear areas across more than 300 sq km. Ukrainian Air Assault Forces took control of the settlements of Tolstoi, Novokhatske, Hrushivske, Zirka, Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, Myrne, Tsehelne, Pryvillia, Zlahoda, Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, Novohryhorivka, Stepove, Kalynivske, Berezove, Novomykolaivka, Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, Yalta, Rybne, Maliivka, Sichneve, Ternove, Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizke.
Ukraine's Air Assault Forces have provided details of the offensive on the Oleksandrivka front and published a list of settlements liberated since January 2026.
Details: The Air Assault Forces said the offensive operation has been under way since 29 January and is continuing in accordance with the operational plan under unified command.
During the offensive, Ukrainian forces regained control of more than 745 sq km of territory and 26 settlements – 12 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 10 in Donetsk Oblast and four in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian troops also searched for and destroyed Russian forces that had infiltrated into rear areas across more than 300 sq km.

Units of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces took control of the settlements of Tolstoi, Novokhatske, Hrushivske, Zirka, Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, Myrne, Tsehelne, Pryvillia, Zlahoda, Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, Novohryhorivka, Stepove, Kalynivske, Berezove, Novomykolaivka, Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad and Yalta.
Units of Ukraine's Assault Forces took control of the settlements of Rybne, Maliivka, Sichneve, Ternove, Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizke.
It was stressed that the operation's success was made possible by thorough planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, effective staff work and intelligence gathering, continuous collection and analysis of information about Russian forces, high-quality personnel training, effective coordination of fire support and logistics, and close cooperation between all elements of the force.
Air Assault Forces units form the core of the strike group. Together with Assault Forces units and other components of Ukraine's defence forces, they successfully broke through Russian defences, overcame resistance and accomplished their assigned combat missions.
The Air Assault Forces said Ukrainian troops are continuing to build on the success of the offensive and systematically destroy the combat capabilities of the Russian occupying forces.

Kremlin Claims Capture of Non-Existent Ukrainian Village

2026-08-12T11:37:46.952-04:00

If you're the Russian Defense Ministry, the thinking must be that claiming the capture of a non-existent village is arguably better than not claiming capture of a non-existent village. JL

New Voice of Ukraine reports:

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed its forces captured the non-existent village of Shcherbakovka in Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast on August 12. The village was officially abolished in 1997 after depopulation left the settlement completely empty. As of 2026, the community no longer physically or legally exists within Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense, General Staff and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov have also repeatedly asserted control over areas that remain securely under Ukrainian control.
The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed its forces captured the non-existent village of Shcherbakovka in Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast, an announcement that Russian propaganda outlets are now actively disseminating, the Center for Countering Disinformation reported on August 12.
The village was officially abolished in 1997 after depopulation left the settlement completely empty. The Center for Countering Disinformation emphasized that as of 2026, the community no longer physically or legally exists within Ukraine.
“This is yet another typical example of Russian disinformation, which propaganda networks use to manufacture the illusion of a continuous, successful offensive across all fronts,” the Center for Countering Disinformation stated.

The agency recalled that the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff have historically issued false battlefield milestones. Specifically, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov has repeatedly asserted complete control over Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, strategic areas that remain securely under Ukrainian control.

Russia Firing Missiles Faster Than It Can Produce Them Signals Supply Constraint

2026-08-12T11:06:17.626-04:00

Russia is firing a lot of missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine this summer, far more than it has before. Some appear to believe this is a sign of Putin's intransigence and evidence of his ability to continue to fighting. That Ukraine has run short on air defense weapons (as has the rest of the world, including the US) so is less able to hit the missiles which are more powerful than drones, is certainly part of the reason.

But a more informed review of the data suggests this is, in fact, a signal of supply constraint: that the missiles are being fired both because they are all he has left from his once vast and diverse arsenal. And given how little impact they are having on the ground or on Ukrainian morale suggests that the missile attacks are simply continuing the war with what inventory is on hand. The data reveal that Russia is firing them faster than it can produce them, which may also mean that this is a violent strategy to try to force some sort of conclusion before one is forced on Russia. JL

Vikas reports in The Geopolitical Economist:

Over the past month, data have confirmed Russia is spending its missile stockpile faster than it can replenish it. Russia is paying more men, more missiles, and more Zircon hypersonics for less ground than at any comparable point since the full-scale invasion began. In attrition warfare, the side that runs out of something critical first does not necessarily collapse immediately. It degrades. It substitutes. It absorbs. But the degradation is real, the substitutes are inferior, and the absorption has a ceiling. What the July data from Ukraine tells us is that Russia reached a milestone: it began consuming missiles faster than it produces them. Russia is not firing everything at once. It is trading across categories, using more ballistics, fewer drones, and shifting the mix as stockpiles allow. That trade-off is a symptom of constraint, not abundance.

In July 2026, Russia launched a record 376 missiles — exceeding its monthly production capacity- and burned two-thirds of its entire annual Zircon stockpile in 19 days, and paid 1,132 casualties per square kilometre of ground gained.
On the night of August 1–2, 2026, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed strikes on Russia’s Engels-2 strategic bomber base in Saratov Oblast — home to the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 long-range bombers that have been raining missiles on Ukrainian cities for more than four years.
The same night, Ukraine also hit the Saratov oil refinery, a military fuel depot in Kaluga Oblast, and drone launch infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast.
It is easy to look at these strikes as news. Here is why they are something more than news.
Over the past month, data from the Institute for the Study of War and Ukrainian military intelligence have quietly confirmed something the headline coverage has not assembled into a single argument: Russia is spending its missile stockpile faster than it can replenish it. Not slightly faster. Dramatically faster.
In July 2026 alone, Russia fired 376 missiles — a record monthly total since large-scale strikes began, up from 288 in February. That number exceeds Russia’s monthly production capacity. Between July 1 and July 19, Russia used up two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zircon hypersonic missiles — 20 Zircon missiles in 19 days, against a full-year production target of 30.
And what did all of this buy?
Thirty-seven square kilometres of territory. An area roughly the size of a small town. At a cost of 1,132 Russian casualties per square kilometer actually seized.
For Those Who Don’t Know: What a Stockpile War Looks Like
States at war spend from two pools: their current production and their stored reserves. As long as production exceeds consumption, the stockpile grows or holds. When consumption exceeds production, the stockpile drains.
Every war economy treats this as a fundamental discipline. When you spend faster than you produce, you are not just fighting today’s battle. You are mortgaging tomorrow’s capacity.
Russia has been running a stockpile war for most of 2026. What changed in July is that the margin between spending and production became impossible to ignore. The New Voice of Ukraine reported on July 20 that Russian forces had already launched 107 ballistic missiles and 20 Zircon missiles since the start of the month — exceeding Russia’s monthly missile production capacity, per ISW. That was as of July 19.
The full July total came in at 376 missiles across all categories.
Russia produces approximately 60 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 40 S-400 missiles per month, according to Ukrainian military intelligence. The Zircon hypersonic missile programme is even thinner: the planned annual output for 2026 was 30 missiles. Russia used 20 of them in 19 days.
Why Russia Is Switching to Ballistics
Press enter or click to view image in full size
An Iskander-M mobile ballistic missile launcher during Russia’s Vostok 2014 military exercises. Russia produces approximately 60 Iskander-M missiles per month — a rate it exceeded in a single July 2026 salvo campaign. Image: Russian Ministry of Defence, Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
The shift to ballistic missiles is not irrational. It is a tactical response to a specific problem.
Ukraine ran critically low on Patriot interceptor missiles after the United States burned through most of its own stockpile fighting Iran. Militarnyi reported that Russia struck Kyiv with a record number of ballistic missiles in July, and the logic is straightforward: ballistic missiles travel faster and on a more difficult interception trajectory than cruise missiles or Shahed drones. Against a degraded Patriot inventory, they hit more.
This is exactly what ISW identified in its July 19 assessment: Russia appears to be using its stockpiles of ballistic missiles to attack Ukraine because these missiles have a higher success rate — a success rate created specifically by Ukraine’s Patriot shortage.
Russia is winning a tactical exchange. It has noticed that its missiles now penetrate Ukrainian defences more easily, and it is spending its reserve to exploit that window.
The problem is what happens when the window closes — or when the reserve runs out first.
The Numbers That Nobody Is Putting Together
Russia launched 376 missiles — its highest monthly total of the war. That exceeds production.
RBC Ukraine confirmed ISW’s assessment that Moscow’s July missile campaign exceeded its monthly production capacity, and that Russia is increasingly relying on S-400 and Zircon stockpiles to offset shortfalls in ballistic missile production.
Russia lost 42,860 troops in July — the highest monthly toll of 2026, up from 31,700 in January and 26,100 in February. The trend line after February goes in only one direction. Each month costs Russia more men than the one before it.
Russian forces seized 37.85 square kilometres of territory in July — compared to 455.74 square kilometres in July 2025. That is a 92% collapse in the rate of territorial gain, year-on-year, while casualties rose to their highest point of 2026.
ISW calculated the cost at 1,132 Russian casualties for every square kilometer actually seized. Not infiltrated, actually seized.
Russia is paying more men, more missiles, and more Zircon hypersonics for less ground than at any comparable point since the full-scale invasion began.
What Ukraine Is Actually Doing at Engels-2
Against this background, the 2 August strikes are not just tactical. They are strategic logic expressed in drones.
As Euromaidan Press reported, Ukraine struck the Engels airbase, the Saratov oil refinery — which has an annual processing capacity of 7 million metric tons of crude and supplies fuel to Russia’s military-industrial complex — the Lyudinovo fuel depot in Kaluga Oblast, and drone launch infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast. All in one night.
Engels-2 has been hit before. Ukraine has struck it repeatedly since the full-scale invasion began. But the context in August 2026 is different. Russia is spending its ballistic missile stockpile faster than it produces. The bombers at Engels-2 are the delivery vehicles for the cruise missiles — the Kh-101s and Kh-55s — that carry a significant portion of the overall salvo. Strike the base, complicate the sortie rate, and you are not just doing damage. You are attacking Russia’s ability to sustain the pace of its most effective delivery system.
Ukraine’s General Staff said the operation was aimed at reducing Russia’s “military and economic potential to wage war.” That phrasing is more precise than it sounds.
“The operation was carried out overnight on 2 August as part of efforts to reduce Russia’s military and economic potential to wage war against Ukraine. Long-range strikes are intended to disrupt fuel supplies, strategic aviation, drone operations, and logistics supporting Russia’s invasion.”
— Ukraine’s General Staff, official statement, Ukrainska Pravda, August 2, 2026
The Kyiv Post confirmed Ukraine’s strike on the Engels strategic bomber base. United24 Media noted the simultaneous hit on the Saratov oil refinery, tying both strikes together as part of a coordinated deep-strike campaign.
What Happens When the Missiles Run Out
Here is the thing about stockpile wars. They do not end when the last missile is fired. They end when the side burning reserves faster than it replenishes them reaches a decision point: stop using the weapon system at the same rate, accept the loss of effectiveness that comes from doing so, or attempt to produce faster while the strategic situation deteriorates.
All three of those paths carry costs. Reducing missile sortie rates gives Ukraine’s air defences time to reconstitute. Accepting a loss of effectiveness at the current pace of casualties and territorial gain — 1,132 dead per square kilometre — is a trajectory that strains even Russia’s willingness to absorb.
And producing faster requires an industrial mobilisation that Russia has avoided formally declaring.
The Kyiv Independent reported that Russia’s July missile campaign accompanied a sharp reduction in Shahed drone launches — from 5,749 in June to 2,955 in July. Russia is not firing everything at once. It is trading across categories, using more ballistics, fewer drones, and shifting the mix as stockpiles allow.
That trade-off is a symptom of constraint, not abundance.
The western narrative about this war remains focused on territory — how much land Russia takes, how much Ukraine holds. But the war’s logic at this moment is about supply curves, production rates, and the arithmetic of attrition. Russia is consuming its high-value precision strike inventory faster than it builds it. Ukraine is hitting the infrastructure that supports that inventory — the refinery that fuels the bombers, the base where the bombers are armed, the depot that feeds the launchers.
That is a different kind of campaign than the one the headlines describe. And it matters.
Remember one thing: in attrition warfare, the side that runs out of something critical first does not necessarily collapse immediately. It degrades. It substitutes. It absorbs. But the degradation is real, the substitutes are inferior, and the absorption has a ceiling. What the July data from Ukraine tells us is that Russia reached a milestone in July that most analysts expected would take longer: it began consuming missiles faster than it produces them, at a cost-per-kilometre that is simply not sustainable in a war it keeps saying it has already won.

Last Major Russian Black Sea Fleet Base Struck By Ukraine Drones, Missiles

2026-08-12T10:01:40.419-04:00

Novorossiysk was the eastern Black Sea port to which the battered remnants of Russia's Black Sea Fleet retreated after they were chased out of Crimea by Ukrainian attacks.

But that new base proved no safer as, last night, Ukrainian drones and missiles struck ships, docks, repair facilities oil refineries and tanks, sending the umistakable message that no place in Russia is beyond reach. JL

Illia Novikov reports in the AP via the Washington Post:

Ukrainian anti-ship missiles and drones blitzed the major Russian naval base on the Black Sea coast. Russia relocated most of its ships to Novorossiysk after Ukrainian strikes on the base at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula earlier in the war. Hundreds of Ukrainian drones attacked Novorossiysk, Anapa and Gelendzhik and the Temryuk district of the region overnight. The naval base in Novorossiysk is the last major stronghold of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Ukraine’s air and sea drones have limited the movements of Russia’s once-dominant Black Sea navy, in one of the biggest accomplishments of the war.
Ukrainian anti-ship missiles and drones blitzed a major Russian naval base on the Black Sea coast in a “unique” nighttime operation, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Wednesday.

Cutting-edge drones developed by Kyiv since Moscow's full-scale invasion over four years ago have repeatedly targeted Russian ships in the Black Sea, including warships and oil tankers.
Ukraine’s air and sea drones have succeeded in limiting the movements of Russia’s once-dominant Black Sea navy, Kyiv officials say, in one of the country’s biggest accomplishments of the war. The Ukrainian military “carried out a unique operation targeting the naval base in Novorossiysk — the last major stronghold of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea,” Zelenskyy said in a social media post Wednesday. The attack struck air defenses, piers and other port infrastructure, he added.
Russia relocated most of its ships to Novorossiysk after Ukrainian strikes on the base at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula earlier in the war.
Hundreds of Ukrainian drones attacked Novorossiysk, Anapa and Gelendzhik and the Temryuk district of the region overnight, said Krasnodar Gov. Veniamin Kondratyev.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said its air defenses downed more than 500 Ukrainian drones.
In Novorossiysk, an 8-year-old child was killed in the attack, and a person who was injured in the Temryuk region later died in the hospital, Kondratyev said. He added that 12 other people in the region were wounded. Debris from downed drones fell on the grounds of four industrial plants and 21 residential buildings, Kondratyev said.
Novorossiysk also is home to the Grushovaya oil terminal, one of largest international hubs in southern Russia for petroleum products.
In February, the U.S. State Department expressed its displeasure about Ukraine’s attacks on Novorossiysk, saying they affected U.S. oil interests in ⁠Kazakhstan.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium operates a pipeline from the Caspian coast in northwestern Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk. The pipeline handles much of the crude exports from three major Kazakh fields in which major U.S. energy companies, Chevron and ExxonMobil, have stakes.
On the Crimean Peninsula, which was illegally annexed by Moscow in 2014, air defenses downed 115 Ukrainian drones over Sevastopol overnight, said Mikhail Razvozhayev, the city’s Russian-installed head. He added that 10 apartment buildings and 25 private houses were damaged.

26 Russian Casualties For Each Ukrainian, As Kremlin Pushed Back At Huliaipole

2026-08-12T09:41:49.753-04:00

The Huliaipole sector looked vulnerable to Russian advances in December. Ukraine then surged battle-hardened units like the Azov Brigade to stabilize the situation and turn it around.

Now, as in so many other cases along the front, there have been 'zero' Russian offensive operations this month, Ukrainian forces are taking back ground in various areas and the casualty rate is 26 Russians for every Ukrainian. JL

Decimus reports in Daily Kos:

In December, 2025, it looked like the Russians were going to swallow Huliaipole, bypass the Ukrainian fortifications to the West and race the 60 miles from Huliaipole to Zaporizhia city. Fast forward to August 11th, 2026 and Russian forces have been halted on the Huliaipole front, with Ukrainian officers reporting enemy attempts to launch further offensive operations have been reduced to zero this month. Ukraine surged veteran units to stabilize the front, then began counterattacks which have regained territory. The casualty ratio on this section of the front is one Ukrainian soldier to 26 Russians.
Remember when there was a lot of gnashing of teeth, hand waving and unbridled accusatory imprecations hurled at the Ukrainian Army high command for the “disaster at Huliaipole” in Zaporizhia?

The Russians had suddenly managed to cross the Haichur river, flanked and pushed in the under-resourced elements of the 102nd and 106th Ukrainian National Territorial Guard that were holding the defenses at that location. It looked for all the world that the Russians were going to circle behind Ukraine’s prepared defenses and make a bee line across the 60 miles of open Zaporizhian steppe to lay siege to the regional capital of Zaporizhia city, home to some 700,000 people.
The media was abuzz with stories of how Russian forces captured a Ukrainian battalion command post in central Huliaipole on Christmas Day, December 25th 2025, seizing laptops still running, unlocked smartphones, and official seals after the Ukrainian troops retreated under fire. It was feverishly claimed as an “intelligence disaster” and a propaganda bonanza for the Russians.
Less than two months later though, Ukraine completely turned the situation around … which led me to post the following diary:
ADAPTIVE INDOMITABLE UKRAINE Makes Fastest Battlefield Gain in 2.5 Years
While Ukraine was busy holding them off at Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, the Russians loaded up the double-barrel and aimed it at Huliaipole, one of the few sections of the entire battle trace where the Ukrainians were relatively light on fortifications. At some point this past Summer, Russia even pulled some units from Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad to pour into the Huliaipole attack. The news of one thunderstruck Ukrainian Territorial Guard unit retreating in disorder leaving behind still logged in command communication equipment, etc., made for banner head lines:
Russians capture Ukrainian battalion command post in Huliaipole with laptops still running
euromaidanpress.com/…
Ukraine was definitely on its back foot with the Russians pressing hard, having finally forced several crossings on both the Haichur and Huliaipole rivers which the Ukrainians had counted on as defensive strong points. In December 2025, it looked for all the world like the Russians were going to swallow Huliaipole whole, bypass the Ukrainian fortifications to the West and race the rest of the 60 miles from Huliaipole and lay waste to Zaporizhia city, the capital of Zaporizhia oblast and home to an estimated 713,000. The Ukrainians quickly performed several of their now-well-practiced tactical retrogrades(some say “retreat”) from several villages onto their more hardened defensive lines, hunkered down and waited for reinforcements. Live today, fight another day:
Ukraine retreats from five towns in Zaporizhzhia as Russia pounds positions with 400 artillery strikes daily (MAP)
euromaidanpress.com/…
And as always the alarm bells started ringing, hair pulling and gnashing of teeth, and accusations of incompetence flew at the high Ukrainian command. General Syrskyi just kept calm and commanded his troops. First he sent in the redoubtable young commander Denys “Redis” Prokopenko and his 1st Azov Corps … the guys who erased the Russian salient in Dobropiliya(Donetsk Oblast) to the other Dobropiliya near Huliaipole in Zaporizhia to lock down that sector … in order to prevent the Russians from moving northeasterly to threaten the E-50 highway which is one of the major Ukrainian logistical lines between Zaporizhia oblast, Dnipro oblast and Pokrovsk. Check!!. As always, 1st Azov locked it down.
Then more veteran Ukrainian units surged into the Huliaipole area to join the embattled 102nd and 106th Territorial National Guards … Colonel Valentyn Manko and his 225th Separate Assault, Colonel Bohdan Shevchuk and his 141st Mechanized Brigade, Maj. Vladyslav Tyupa and his 48th Assault Battalion as well as other detached units.
Despite heavy Russian attacks and sustained pressure, Ukrainian units have not only managed to stabilize the front but they have now turned the tables on the Russians and are pushing the Russians back in the area. General Syrskyi himself, in a relatively understated announcement indicated that the Ukrainians are carrying out counter-attack operations in the area.
So how did Ukraine achieve this turnaround?:
Ukraine prioritised defence over retaking Huliaipole to improve position in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, commander says
Assault troops say the success of the latest offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast was achieved because Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi agreed not to expend manpower on retaking Huliaipole. Instead, the Armed Forces of Ukraine switched to a defensive posture there to improve their tactical position.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/04/02/8028331
Fast forward to August 11th, 2026 and the Russians, having been pushed back have now been stopped … cold. Russian forces have been halted on the Huliaipole front, with Ukrainian military officers reporting that enemy attempts to launch further offensive operations have been reduced to zero as of August 2026. Although Russia captured significant portions of the city in late December 2025 and early 2026, Ukrainian defenses have stabilized the sector, preventing any further westward advancement toward Zaporizhia city.
The current frontline in and around Huliaipole is characterized by intense but static fighting, with Russian forces effectively “bottled up” after their initial breakthrough. Ukrainian commanders attribute the successful halt of the Russian advance to effective counter-offensives and the stabilization of defensive lines, despite earlier challenges related to personnel shortages and command delays. Not only that but the Ukrainians have now set up an unyielding “meat grinder” in the Huliaipole sector which is chewing up attempted Russian assaults to the tune of 26 lost Russians to 1 Ukrainian:
One Ukrainian soldier to 26 Russian occupiers: Military officer reports losses on Huliaipole front
https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4153271-one-ukrainian-soldier-to-26-russian-occupiers-military-officer-reports-losses-on-huliaipole-front.html
Dmytro “Perun” Filatov, the Ukrainian commander who looks like he just stepped out of the 1890s painting titled “The Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks” and now commands 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after the immortal Dmytro ” Da Vinci” Kotsyubailo describes the current situation as:
“At present, this section of the front is under control. The enemy’s attempts to conduct further offensive operations have been reduced to zero. The enemy does not stop attempting daily assaults, but has had no success. We have built an effective system of countermeasures. We are actively advancing despite the fact that the enemy is trying to attack intensively in this area.
Filatov also said that the casualty ratio on this section of the front is one Ukrainian soldier to 26 Russian occupiers.
“Our ratio has reached 1 (Ukrainian soldier) to 26 (Russian occupiers). In general, during combat operations, the average ratio of losses between attacking and defending units is 1 defender to 3 attackers or 1 defender to 4 attackers. In our case, we are finding methods that result in significantly higher Russian losses.
Filatov is concerned about the coming Russian national mobilization. But he says he and the Ukrainians will find ways to counter it. They will be ready to counter it … asymmetrically. There’s that word again:
“The main challenges we expect from the enemy are increased mobilization after the completion of the electoral process in Russia. It is likely to be carried out covertly in Russia. However, we do not rule out broader mobilization. We will not be able to compensate for this through increased mobilization ourselves, since the enemy has greater manpower resources. Therefore, we are trying to find methods of countering this and conducting the war through asymmetric actions,” he emphasized.