The making of a Scholar

A BOOK REVIEW FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIBERATION FOURTH US EDITION GENE SHARP

2012-02-05T10:57:00.003+01:00

A BOOK REVIEW

FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIBERATION
FOURTH US EDITION
GENE SHARP
THE ALBERT EINSTEIN INSTITUTION
MAY 2010
93pp

BOOK REVIEWER: WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY, NIGERIA

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
POL. 861 (STUDIES IN STRATEGY AND SECURITY)

Lecturer- Dr. Musa Abutudu

September, 2011

INTRODUCTION
The term dictator was originally not negative in meaning. Its present negative connotation started in the days of Julius Caesar of Rome. Even at these earliest times, dictatorships always had to contend with resistance struggles of which much has been violent in nature. While some have been victorious, others have not; even in victorious cases, there were higher likelihood of transition to another dictatorship. The book, “from dictatorship to democracy: A conceptual framework for liberation” by Gene Sharp has tried to x-ray liberation struggle from the two points of either Violence action or Non–violence action. Based on his analysis he prescribed a non-violence action as the better form of liberation struggle.

Sharp dwells extensively on how to embark on a nonviolent struggle. He analyzes different possible means of engaging a dictatorship from violent face-off with the dictator through coups to elections under the dictatorship, foreign intervention or foreign saviours as he termed it to negotiating with the dictators. He highlighted the impracticability of these measures and its inherent limitation. After dealing with these options in liberation struggles, he went ahead to propose a nonviolent struggle option which he carefully provided guidelines for achieving.

Sharp probed the sources of the political power of a dictatorship with an analysis of the “Monkey Master” fable and subsequently the identification of dictatorships weaknesses or Achilles’ heel and how best to attack the dictatorship through these weaknesses. He emphasized the importance of strategic planning and applying political defiance in its workings and as a weapon of nonviolence struggle. He believes that with the application of these nonviolent weapons, the disintegration of a dictatorship with less casualty was certain. Sharp went further to propose strategic plans and groundwork for durable democracy after the collapse of a dictatorship and how to avert the threats of a new dictatorship and coups. On a final note, he advised on constitution drafting, democratic defense policy and meritorious responsibility.

Sharp expressed his very clear purpose of writing this essay. He wants to outline guides on how to destroy a dictatorship and to prevent the rise of a new one for people who face the realities of dictatorial rule. The guide probes the most effective ways dictatorships could be successfully destroyed with the least possible cost in suffering and lives. His desire was born out of the belief that human being should not be subjected to and destroyed by dictatorship. He genuinely believes that these dictatorial regimes could be brought down by struggles waged without mass mutual slaughters, this form of liberation struggle is termed nonviolent struggle.

Sharp has focused this essay on the advantages inherent in nonviolence actions over the commonly applied violence actions and further provides a guide on how to executive a nonviolence action. This essay has undeniable strengths but it is important to carefully think of the practicability of his well laid out plan of action. These plans are very beautiful in essay but it is worthy of note that the implementation is much more complex than the essay has provided. With Sharps envisaged level of planning, there may never again be a nonviolent struggle. As much as this guide looks well thought-out, a successful nonviolence action may have not take so much intense planning and such a step by step manner of execution.

Sharp has shown the merits of nonviolence action over the violence driven ones and proposes nonviolence struggles as the most cost effective and less destructive way to overthrown dictators. However, it may be unrealistic to assume that all dictatorship could be overthrown through nonviolence actions. In reality, a mindless dictator is ready to crush all those who revolt against its regime no matter the number. This is a well thought-out theoretical plan on engaging a dictatorship and disintegrating it to allow for democracy but in practical terms a careful adherence to these plans means that there may never be a revolution. Sincerely, sometimes violence works and may remains the most viable option.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The essay, “from dictatorship to democracy: A conceptual framework for liberation”, was initially published in Bangkok in 1993 by the committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma in association with Khit Pyaing (The New Era Journal). It has since been translated into about thirty-one other languages and has been published in many countries including the United States where it currently has four editions.

The essay has basically focused on how to overthrow a dictatorship. This method of overthrow was categorized into two: the violence and the nonviolence means. This work has no doubt been influenced by literatures on the subject of resistance from the Greeks through the Romans and the Christian philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham who endorsed a limited form of resistance against dictatorships and then the classical authors of Italian Renaissance who believed in the right of resistance against unjust government. These authors equated resistance with violence but later authors like Etienne de la Boetie who appeared promoting the efficacy of nonviolence resistance. He saw that the rule of a tiny minority over society was possible only if the maqjority voluntarily accepted it. He argued that the social consensus theory implied that it could overthrow dictatorship peaceably if the majority withdrew its consent. Though the 17th century theorist like Locke, Sidney and Milton did not follow these thoughts of nonviolent resistance, the 19th century produced two significant theorist of nonviolence resistance, Henry David Thoreau and Count Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy’s thoughts significantly influenced the 20th century preeminent exponents of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi (Caplan, 1994). Gene Sharp has been able to draw from these thinkers on resistance struggle and pitched with the long tradition of thinkers who argue that the source of a dictatorship political power is the consent it receives from the majority of it people and not necessary its intimidating force.

The review of this book therefore will be based on its ability to convince its readers on the effectiveness of nonviolence action over violence action in liberation struggles, the liberation struggles it has influenced since it was published, and the practicability of its guide towards a nonviolence action.

BOOK SUMMARY
Gene Sharp’s essay been driven by his quest for how people could prevent and destroy dictatorships as he believes that human beings should not be dominated and destroyed by such regimes. This desire to destroy dictatorships has been fueled by this reading on freedom and dictatorships, contact with those people who suffered under dictatorial regimes like the Nazi rule and the calm heroism of brave people who under great danger remain defiant to dictatorships. He expresses himself thus:
“Out of these concerns and experiences grew a determined hope that prevention of tyranny might be possible, that successful struggles against dictatorships could be waged without mass mutual slaughter, that dictatorships could be destroyed and new one, prevented from rising out of the ashes.”
Sharp’s point, belief and focus are simple. He has expressed them clearly as
1. Dictatorships can be destroyed and should be destroyed.
2. The disintegration of dictatorship must not and should not be violence driven instead nonviolence means should be employed.
3. Nonviolent action is more effective and less costly especially in terms of human lives lost.
4. Nonviolence action should be carried out by the withdrawal of support for the regime. This he argues is the main source of power of any dictatorship.
He hoped that his analysis will be useful to people who find themselves under dictatorial regime in their struggle to liberate themselves from the shackles of dictatorship.

Sharp proves his point that nonviolent disintegration of dictatorship is possible by given examples of dictatorships hitherto perceived as firmly entrenched and impregnable which have collapsed or stumbled under the concerted defiance of the people. Countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Slovenia, Madagascar, Mali, Bolivia, and the Philippines etc.

In Sharp’s critique of violent actions aimed at destroying a dictatorial regime, he argues that these have mostly failed and have shown no evidence that its level of success will improve. He ascertains that by placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle which the oppressors nearly always have superiority. The dictator nearly always has the superior military hardware. Even in guerilla warfare, there is hardly any benefit for the oppressed as even in rare cases of success; the new regime may be a worse dictatorship.

Sharp considers the three liberation options of coups, elections and foreign saviours. He concludes that military coups leave in place the existing misdistribution of power between the population and the elite in control of the government and its military forces. The new clique of military rulers may even turn out to be more ruthless and more ambitious than the old one after consolidating its position. On the conduct of election under dictatorship, he argues that dictators are not in the business of allowing elections that will remove them from power. Sharp also had his views on foreign intervention as a means of political change. He pointed out the realist opinion that foreign states will tolerate or even positively assist a dictatorship in order to advance their own economic or political interest and will only act against it to gain economic, political, or military control over the country. He adds that the factors that fuel dictatorships are mainly internal; so, foreign pressure can only be useful if it is supporting a powerful internal resistance movement.

Sharp reviews the negotiation option in effecting political change. He argues that negotiation may be very useful when non-fundamental issues are at stake but not to be applied when the issued at stake are fundamental. Issue of human freedom is fundamental so negotiation is not an option. He argues that in a firmly entrenched dictatorship, the negotiators lives are in danger. In a negotiation, both parties give up some objectives and accept some other objectives. He then asked some questions which is fundamental in a negotiation. What objectives of the dictators are pro-democracy forces to accept? Are the democrats to give the dictators a constitutionally-established permanent role in the future government? Where is the democracy in that? Pro-democracy forces must also be aware that negotiation with a dictator may just be a form of legitimization of the regime. When issues are fundamental, negotiation should only occur at the end of a decisive struggle in which the power of the dictator has been effectively destroyed and they seek personal safe passage to an international airport.

Gene Sharp, after analyzing his views on how not to engage a dictator, he proposed an option of how to embark on a freedom struggle which is basically non-violent in nature. He built the analysis/understanding of a nonviolence action on a 14th century Chinese parable by Liu-Ji, the “Monkey Master” Fable and a myth from classical Greece “Achilles’ heel”. The Monkey Master fable was to analyze the source of political power for a dictatorship while Achilles’ heel myth was to prove that even a dictatorship has weaknesses and the struggle must identify the weakness and attack it from that point. The monkey master fable proved that the cooperation and obedience of the people is the source of a dictator’s political power. When there is a withdrawal of popular and institutional co-operation with the aggressors or dictators, the availability of the source of power on which an authority relies diminishes or is totally eroded. This was the case when the monkeys became enlightened and withdrew their support for the monkey master. The master eventually died of starvation. Sharp’s point is that the dictatorship can also die if starved of political power or if the source of supply to political power is cut-off. Using the myth of Achilles’ heel, Sharp elucidated the importance of acknowledging that the dictatorship has weaknesses; so the identification of these weaknesses and subsequent attack from the weakest point and not the strongest point. The warrior Achilles who appeared invulnerable to the enemy’s weapons was fatally attacked through his heel which was identified by the enemies as his weakest point. With the knowledge of such inherent weaknesses, the democratic opposition can seek to aggravate these “Achilles’ heel” deliberately in order to alter the system drastically or to disintegrate it.

From chapter 5 of this essay, Gene Sharp began to analyze the practicability of the nonviolence means of political change; he analyzed the techniques available in the withdrawal of the dictator’s political power and what action will tend to aggravate the identified weaknesses of dictatorship. He specified political defiance as a major weapon in the struggle, he however did not limit political defiance to just strikes and mass demonstrations as was always the case but he specified one hundred and ninety-eight methods. These he classified under three broad categories: protest and persuasion, non cooperation, and intervention

Sharp stressed the importance of nonviolent discipline in the process of what he called political jiu-jitsu. By political jiu-jitsu he means the political rebound of a dictator’s violence against nonviolent actions of activists. It can cause dissention in their ranks as well as foment support for the resisters among the general population, the regime’s usual supporters, and third parties. The maintenance of nonviolence discipline against violent opponents he stressed facilitates the workings of the four mechanisms of change in nonviolence struggle. They are:
1. CONVERSION: when members of the opponent group are emotionally moved by the suffering of repression imposed on courageous nonviolent resisters or is rationally persuaded that the resister’s cause is just, they may come to accept the resister’s aims.
2. ACCOMMODATION: when the issues are not fundamental ones, the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching an agreement, a splitting of differences or compromise.
3. NONVIOLENT COERCION: when a mass noncooperation and defiance has changed social and political situation, especially power relationship, that the dictator’s ability to control governmental processes and the society is in fact taken away.
4. DISINTEGRATION: when the dictatorial system collapse to the extent that they do not even have sufficient power surrender.

In the execution of nonviolence action, Sharp emphasized the need for strategic planning. He hinged the failures of nonviolent struggle on lack or insufficient strategic planning. Bright ideas on toppling dictatorship are good but strategic planning in needed in reality. In planning a strategy however, it should be remembered that against a dictatorship the objective of the grand strategy is not simply to bring down the dictator but to install a democratic system and make the rise of a new dictatorship impossible.

Sharp summarizes that success against an entrenched dictatorship requires that non cooperation and defiance reduce and remove the sources of the regime’s power. Without constant replenishment of the necessary sources of power the dictatorship will weaken and finally disintegrate. Competent strategic planners of political defiance against dictatorship therefore needs; to target the dictator’s most important sources of power. In the advent of the disintegration of a dictatorship, the groundwork for a durable democracy must be put in place by the drafting of a constitution.

EVALUATION
Achievements
This essay has aimed at spurring resistance leaders to consider strategies that may increase their effective power while reducing the relative level of casualties; in other words, the most effective way in which dictatorships could be successfully disintegrated with the least possible cost in sufferings and lives. In doing this, Sharp has highlighted the merits of nonviolent actions over violent ones. In my view this has been a success as the book repetitively reinforced the idea many times over that violence is the strongest point of a dictatorship and any violent challenge will almost likely meet with great loss of lives and failed liberation struggle but an attack on the dictators weakest point through weapons of non violent action will be more effective. As intended by Sharp, I submit that the essay has been really influential and has prompted a lot of those under the yoke of dictatorship to adopt a nonviolence stance. The essay which was originally intended for use by Burmese democrats and various ethnic groups in Burma that wanted independence from the Burma-dominated central government in Rangoon has become potentially relevant in any country with a dictatorial government due to its generic focus. It has since been translated into at least thirty-one other languages. In capturing the influence of “from dictatorship to democracy” Oleh Kyriyenko said in a 2004 interview with Radio Netherlands that
“The Bible of Pora has been the book of Gene Sharp, also used by Otpor… Pora activists have translated it by themselves.... The institution provided funding to print over 12,000 copies of this book for free”. (Kyriyenko, 2004)
The institution refers to the Albert Einstein institution. Writing in the same vein, the Tehran Times, in the aftermath of the Tehran 2009 post election protest, writes that
“According to the indictment, a number of the accused confessed that the plan was following the timetable of the Velvet revolution to the extent that over 100 stages of the 198 steps of Gene Sharp were implemented in the foiled Velvet revolution.”
In comparing the Orange revolution in Ukraine and the recent scenes on the Arab streets, Carol Off remarked that
“Indeed, the remarkable discipline of the young leaders, their tactics and strategies, their slogans and posters are all torn from the same handbook – a guide to nonviolence revolution called – From Dictatorship to Democracy. And they’ve all been inspired by the same guru. An 83-year-old American activist named Gene Sharp”. (Off, 2011)
A Belgrade Student by name Srdjan Popovic in an interview with CBC News said he first heard of the Professor and his “198 methods of non violent action” in late 1999 when a movement in Serbia known as Otpor, managed to oust the bad-man of the Balkans – Slobadan Milosovic. He further explained that he and his young friends went into training a year in advance and spent many weeks honing the skills outlined in Gene Sharp’s handbook before they took to the streets. Ruaridh Arrow analyzed that the handbooks
“help in bringing down Milosovic in Serbia in 2000 propelled it into use across Eastern Europe, South America and the Middle East. When it reached Russia, the intelligence services raised the print-shop and the shops selling it mysteriously burned to the ground. The Iranians became so worried they broadcast an animated propaganda film on state TV – of gene Sharp plotting the overthrows of Iran from the White House”. (Arrow, 2011)
With this huge impact on dictatorial countries around the world, one cannot but accept that the goals of the essay have to a very high degree been achieved.

Criticisms
This essay no doubt has been a great addition to the cause of the liberation struggles against dictatorial regimes around the world but there are some perceived gaps in its analysis. These gaps have been itemized for clarity and further cause of study.
1. To analyze the source of political power for a dictatorship and how to cut-off its supply channels, Professor Sharp employed the use of a Chinese fable, the “Monkey Master”. The fable was not appropriate for this level of analysis. A more analytical review of the fable reveals that the old man in the fable as it were, was not equipped with the coerciveness of the real world dictator. A dictator has the military command with which it could unleash colossal violence even in the face of nonviolence posture of the activists. An example can be found in the 2011 Arab uprising were counties like Libya and Syria to a great extent applied enormous force to suppress the non-violent revolts in their countries. The point being made is simple, in the fable, the Monkeys simply became enlighten and withdrew their support for the old man and that was all needed for their liberation but in a real dictatorial world, the monkeys could be chained and flogged and the leaders of the revolt killed to instill fear in those still alive. A tyrannical government system is not as simple as it has been portrayed with the fable. In a repressive system, there are still those members of the population who benefit and will want the status quo to be maintained, the population will most likely not support a revolt en-mass. For example in Egypt, Libya, etc. there were pro-government protesters. The monkey master fable is too simplistic.

2. Gene Sharp in his analysis has emphasized the importance of strategic planning in the execution of a non-violent action. He provided 198 specific tools which were categorized into three but he was not explicit in the choices of which of these to use at different stages of the struggle. The usage of these tactics needs some form of training but can these training be done effectively under an entrenched dictatorship? Generally speaking, extensive strategic planning may not be realistic in a well policed state as is mostly the case in a dictatorship. Spontaneous actions had driven a lot of revolutionary moves. Yes, they have mostly failed but there is no guaranteed success even in the best planned action. In fact, an extensive planning stage also provides the dictator an ample planning time for a counter action. My argument is thus, while a strategic plan may be useful an extensive one cum training may be counter-productive.

3. Sharp harps on the use of nonviolence action to overthrow a dictator but never considered the use of the same nonviolence measure by a dictatorship to counter a nonviolence action by activists. For example, the police in India during the 1930 Salt Satyagraha blocked protesters by sitting down on their way. The Abacha Regime in Nigeria also organized a one million man match under the auspices of Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha to counter nonviolent pro-democratic forces. The Babangida Regime in Nigeria also built democratic institutions and renamed his position as that of a President. These are dictatorial styles and antics not covered by essay.

4. Sharp has been able to prove the important and undeniable advantages of non violence actions but he did not sufficiently consider conscienceless dictators. It is evident that nonviolence action can work successfully against “civilized” dictatorship more than those regimes completely lacking moral and very prepared to kill as much people as necessary to cement their rule. For example, the case of Libya under Ghaddafi. Clearly more studies have to be done in this area.

5. Sharp’s analysis fell short of a proper guide on how the activists should conduct themselves after the disintegration of the dictatorship. The new found “people power” can become a problem to forming a new government and also the proper running of the society. Some extremist could capitalize on this and ferment enough trouble to keep the society unsettled and ungovernable until they have their way. Even some other elite groups can take advantage of the situation as is the case of Egyptian 2011 revolt.

CONCLUSION
There is hardly any doubt that Gene Sharp is the foremost thinker sympathetic to nonviolent resistance today. His essay “From Dictatorship to Democracy” has been a great influence on a lot of people around the world. The essay has made great attempts at moving nonviolence resistance from just a philosophy toward practical strategy of dictatorship disintegration. The essay to a great extent has proven that the people normally seen as politically powerless can prove to be the source of political power. This is an important insight into the study and practice of nonviolence resistance though some short-comings, the essay is apt, incisive and a success. It is important however to raise a fundamental question in this concluding remarks. That is, is a genuine people-led sociopolitical process is possible; wouldn’t the overthrow of a dictatorship always lead to another group of elite control? In other words, is a successful liberation struggle not simply a transfer of political power from one elite group to another? This calls for further study.

REFEERRES:

Arrow, R (2011) Gene Sharp: Author of the Non violent revolution rulebook
Retrieved on September 4, 2011 from
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east

Caplan, B (1994) The literature of nonviolent resistance and Civilian-Based
Defense Retrieved on September 3, 2011 from
http://www.carolmoore.net/articles/nv-action-article

Kyriyenko, O (2004) Radio Netherland Retrieved on September 7, 2011 from
http://www.rnw.nl/english

Off, C (2011) Middle East uprisings take cue from Gene Sharp’s guide to non-
Violent revolution Retrieved on September 4, 2011 from
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/02

Tehran Times, August 2, 2009 Retrieved on September 3, 2011 from
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_view.asp?code=200033

An Appraisal of Third World Development Strategies

2012-02-05T10:40:00.002+01:00

An Appraisal
of
Third World Development Strategies

BY

Wisdom Iyekekpolo
PG/SSC9503248

A Seminar Paper presented in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

in partial fulfillment of the requirement for POL 866 (International Political Economy)

Lecturer- Dr. O. J. Offiong

October, 2011

ABSTRACT

The governments of the Less Developed Countries of the world have employed various strategies in attempts at developing or growing their economies. The level of success is far less than the efforts put in. the achievements of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s sparked of advocacies for the Commodity Cartel strategy as a means of achieving the much needed economic development. This paper reviews these strategies with a special focus on OPEC and its challenges and successes. A conclusions is also reached about it suitability as a developmental strategy for the Less Developed Countries and recommendations on the suitability of the Newly Industrialized Countries model of Export-Led Industrialization.

INTRODUTION

The strategy for Economic Development remains crucial to the governments of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) of the world and controversial amongst scholars of International Political Economy. Since the end of the Second World War in 1945 the LDCs have experimented with different developmental strategies in a combined attempt at reducing the poverty that has gripped their various countries. Joan Spero has categorized these strategies into three. These includes
1. attempts at excluding themselves from some aspects of the International Economic Order,
2. attempts at creating a New International Economic Order and
3. designing policies beneficial to them in their integration into the prevailing International Economic Order (Spero, 1997:151). Robert Gilpin in his work “The political Economy of International Relation” (1987:290) discussed four different Economic Development strategies advocated by the LDCs. These are the Autonomous or Self-Reliant Development, Economic Regionalism, the formation of Commodity Cartels and the demand for a New International Economic Order.
This essay will attempt a review of the various strategies of economic development tried out in the LDCs and then attempt a critique of the formation of Commodity Cartels as a means of achieving the New International Economic Order envisaged by the LDCs in the 1970s with a review of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In summarizing this essay, conclusions will be reached on the appropriateness of the Cartelization strategy as a means of LDCs Economic Development and then recommendations will be made using the strategy that has worked for the Newly Industrialized Countries of Asia focusing on China.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

This essay has some key concepts that will be very consistent through out its analysis. These concepts need to be defined as used in this paper in order to avoid ambiguity. They are defined below.

Commodity Cartel: the conceptualization of commodity cartel as used in this essay will align with the definition put forward by the dictionary of Business Terms (2007) it puts that a Commodity Cartel is an “organization, usually of producing countries that tries to control the price and quantity supplied of a particular commodity (usually a raw material) Examples are OPEC (petroleum) and the international Coffee organization”.

New International Economic Order (NIEO): This is a set of proposals outlined by the LDCs in the 1970s to help in their economic development. It entailed the repositioning of the world economy to become more beneficial to the LDCs in relation to the DCs. These proposals were set forth at the United Nation Conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) to improve terms of trade, increase development assistance, reduce DCs tariff etc. in their relationship with the LDCs. (www.en.wikipedia.org retrieved 11-Oct-2011).

LDCs ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

In their economic development bid, the LDCs have advocated and adopted various strategies. These strategies will be briefly explained under four categories.

1. Autonomous or Self-Reliant Development: This was based on an attempt by LDCs to exempt themselves from some parts of the present economic system. It is base on a strategy of self reliance. There has been mainly two strategies advocated towards LDCs self reliance. These are the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) and the Domestic Social Transformation.
The Import-substitution Industrialization (ISI) involves an attempt at reducing importation by LDCs through local production of the previously imported products. This local production could be through national or foreign investment, for domestic or/and foreign consumption (www.en.wikipedia.org retrieved 11-Oct-2011). The ISI approach “substitutes externally produced goods and services, especially basic necessities such as energy, food and water with locally produced ones” (Basu 2005). The local producers or industries were protected from international competition by high tariff wall etc. The ISI strategy has been used by Latin American Countries like Brazil where it initially led to rapid industrialization but by the mid-1980s it had become obvious that a strategy of industrialization based on Import-Substitution was inadequate so that some of LDCs that had chosen it especially in Asia began to move towards Export-Led Industrialization strategy e.g. Taiwan and South Korea (Strange, 1985:252).
The alternative route of autonomous development advocated is via a domestic social transformation. It was chosen at different times by LDCs like Cuba, Tanzania and China. Self-styled socialist and communist countries, they wanted to minimize their involvement in what they regarded as hostile imperialist and capitalist world economy and to gain domestic social justice (Rydenfelt, 1985). The social transformation strategy has hardly resulted in any economic development in Cuba since its adoption.
The challenges inhibiting the LDCs from anticipated success adopting the Autonomous strategy includes: the smallness of their national markets, the quality of their manufactured product are below international standard resulting in low acceptability internationally and low foreign exchange etc. Gilpin, appraising the performance and the future of Autonomous strategy to economic development writes in the mid-1980s that,
“It is clear that the strategy of autonomous development advocated by the more extreme of the dependency theorists holds little promise for the less developed economies. If China, with its advantages of a strong state, abundant resources and a relatively large internal market for a LDC, could not be self-reliant, what hope is there for Tanzania?” (Gilpin, 1987:294)

2. Economic Regionalism: As a result of the challenges inherent in the Import-Substitution strategy, attempts were made to adopt a Regional approach to the economic development of the LDCs. Regional monopolies were encouraged in some industrial sectors, the creation of regional division of labour based on specialization and the formulation of guidelines for the relationship management between LDCs and Multi-National Corporation (MNCs).
Economic Regionalism was basically of three forms. Firstly was the formation of regional economic groups to enhance trade amongst the regional countries e.g. Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) etc. The second form was the creation of special trading relations between Developed Countries (DCs) and particular groupings of LDCs e.g. the Lome Conventions between the European Economic Community and certain LDCs, President Reagan’s Caribbean Basin Initiative etc. The third form of regional economic grouping was the forging of trade links amongst the LDCs excluding the DCs. This is sometimes referred to as the South-South trade or cooperation. However a number of factors have hindered the economic development envisaged from Economic Regionalization strategy. These include regional conflicts and economic rivalries, intraregional competition for foreign investment and the ‘nationalistic tendencies’ as countries advanced their own interest at the expense of the Regional economy.

3. The Formation of Commodity Cartel: The Industrially developed countries of the North with their Capital technology and Military power have been primarily dependant on the raw materials from the LDCs of the South. The trade of these primary commodities between the South and the North has been very challenging. In resolving these challenges several agreements had been reached at various times on specific commodity or across board. For example, the 1954 International Sugar Agreement, the International Wheat Agreement and International Tin Agreement both held in 1956, the 1958 UN Conference on Lead and Zinc the International Agreement on Olive oil (Williams, 1981:102-4). The challenges in the Crude oil trade resulted in the formation of an Oil-Exporting Cartel called the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.
“The success of the producers in the 1970s led to a revolution in the thinking of southern raw material producers. Suddenly it seemed that producer cartels could bring the end of dependence. Producer organizations in Copper, Bauxite, Iron ore, Bananas, and Coffee were either formed or took on new life after October 1973. In a variety of United Nations resolutions. The Third World supported the right of Southern exports to form producer associations…” (Spero, 1997:301)
This essay will review this in more details later.

4. The Demand For A New International Economic Order (NIEO): The inherent challenges of Autonomous Development and Economic Regionalization and the subsequent perceived achievements of the oil cartel-OPEC led to the clamour by the LDCs led by the OPEC members for a New International Economic Order. At the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, a Declaration and Action Programme on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order was made. Robert Gilpin captured the most important demands of the LDCs as.
(a) They should be able to control their natural resource or raw material
(b) Increased control over MNCs by LDCs
(c) Increased inflow of foreign aid and reduction in the cost of Western technology
(d) Alleviation of the crapping LDC debts.
(e) Increased influence in the Bretton Wood organization etc (Gilpin, 1987:299).
Further analysis will be captured later on this work.

RATIONALES FOR FORMING A COMMODITY CARTEL: THE CASE OF OPEC

The formation of OPEC was a process of reaction to the Arab countries increasing discontentment with low price of oil. The Iraqi government in 1960 invited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Qatar and Venezuela to an oil producers’ conference in Baghdad to discuss the effect of the Multi-National Corporations unilateral oil price cut. At the conference it was resolved that all necessary measure should be taken to raise oil prices and limit production in a manner that will guarantee oil producing countries a stable and regular income (Williams 1981:81).
Commodity cartel are formed by producing countries are formed to enhance their economic benefit in the international trade of the commodity in question. There may be fluctuations in price and these fluctuations limit economic planning and therefore hinder sustainable economic development/growth. This effect is more evident in countries with mono-culture economies. Again the prices of these primary commodities may be very low in the international market when compared with the finish products from it. The low prices could also be a function of MNCs manipulations. So Commodity Cartels are formed to protect the interest of its members; check fluctuations in prices; check the activities of the MNCs when applicable, coordination and unification of a commodity policy across member countries and to enhance the economic development of the producing countries.
In the case of OPEC, the statute spells these rationale or missions out in Article 2(a) (b) & (c), it writes thus
(a) “The principal aim of the organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of member countries and the determination of the best means for safe guarding their interests, individually and collectively
(b) The organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.
(c) Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries; an efficient economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry” (OPEC Statute 2008)

CARTELIZATION AS A STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATING A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The potentiality of OPEC became evident in 1971 when the call by OPEC for higher posted prices of crude oil led to a mammoth increase in oil payments to producers and a rise in the price of oil to the consumers (Williams, 1981:84). OPEC further issued a policy statement in 1973 seeking higher prices and the resources was to be used as the primary instrument in accelerating their economic development (Williams, 1981:86). “An increase of 70 percent was announced on 16 October. However the real shock to the DCs came on 23 December 1973 when the Shah of Iran announced that the six main oil producing nations in the Gulf intended to more than double the price of exported oil from January 1974, from about $5.10 to $11.65 a barrel” (Williams, 1981:86). Further price increases were done in 1976 and 1978.
The World Development Report (1983) captures that, the World crude oil prices rose from less than $5 to above $30 between 1973 and 1983. Exporting countries with large population like Nigeria and Indonesia, suddenly had the capital resources to finance development at a greatly expanded pace while exporters like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates with relatively low populations not only could afford rags-to-riches luxuries at home, but also accumulated reserves with which they could influence even the great powers. Walters Jones (1985:217) writes that
“Saudi Arabia increased its international currency reserves 5,000 percent between 1970 and 1981 (and Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had increased of 2,400 and 3,500 percent, respectively)…
Meanwhile, the annual trade balances of the principal industrial oil consumers went into deeper deficit. In the United State for example, oil imports alone added $10 billion to the trade deficit of 1979 and $14 billion more in 1980”.
At this point the LDCs sought to capitalize on this new found OPEC influence to negotiate a New International Economic Order to their benefit.
Prior to the early 1970s, attempts at evolving the LDCs as a political force has been largely unsuccessful owing to their differences and unrewarding negotiations for better positioning in the existing international economic order.
“Despite major declarations of solidarity at Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955, and Cairo (Egypt) in 1962, and the first three meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, 1968 and 1972” (Jones 1985:174).
It was only at the Algiers (Algeria) Fourth Summit of the Non-aligned countries that showed great prospect for a concerted effort towards the achievement of the UNCTAD economic agenda. The summit also called for UN 6th Special Session on Development and Cooperation and the framework for the NIEO was outlined. Also, it called for LDCs meeting to decide strategy concerning primary products. Later that year, the oil embargo proved how politically influential OPEC could be. Jones (1985:174) writes that
“with the resulting control of world oil prices by the of OPEC, and more particularly by its Arab members, the Third World was able to force its economic agenda upon the UN in the form of the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly, Which formally launched the NIEO”.
It is evident that the wish to effect a change to an international economic system that was perceived to be more favourable to the DCs by the LDCs was strengthened by the 1973 oil crisis. Philippe Braillard and Mohammed-Reza Djalili (1984:166) argues that the LDCs saw the event of the oil crisis and the resulting economic crisis of the DCs as a
“Proof that a united group of producers had the capacity to impose profound changes on the structure of the world market, by way of the fundamental demand of the Third World. A spectacular readjustment in the terms of trade was thus obtained by the oil producing countries”.
In the same vein, Spero (1997:276) has argued that the most successful effort of Southern countries to alter their dependent relationship with the North was the common action of OPEC in seizing control over the world’s oil markets by acting together in a producer cartel, the southern oil-exporting states were able to increase not only their economic rewards but also their political power”.

REPLICATING OPEC

The 1970s achievement of OPEC has led to the advocacy for more Commodity Cartels as an Economic Development strategy for the LDCs. It now seem as through the formation of cartels has been the missing link in the LDCs development bid. Different commodity cartels were formed to replicate OPEC achievement. Some of these cartels include the International Tin Council (representing Tin exporting countries), International Bauxite Association (representing Bauxite exporting countries), Union of Banana Exporting Countries or Union de Paises Exportadores de Banana (UPEB), Members of the International Committee of Copper Exporting Countries or Conseil Intergouvernmental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre (CIPEC) etc.
Although Commodity Cartels have had varying degrees of success in raising or maintaining prices there does not appear to be any other commodity with influence similar to that of petroleum. Substitutes for almost all other commodities are readily available, and the world demand for many commodities had declined due to dramatic reduction in the resource content of manufactured goods (Gilpins, 1987:298). Though the belief that commodity cartels were the much anticipated opportunity for the LDCs to redress the perceived global inequalities between them and the Developed Countries, it was soon obvious that no other commodity had the characteristics and potentialities of petroleum. Substitute for most other commodities were available. For example plastics were used in place of Bauxite/Aluminum in the automobile and container industries (Holloway, 1988:79-82), substitutes such as aluminium and plastics were used in place of Copper (Iwase, 1980:266-74), Tea in place of Coffee etc. Joan Spero (1997:305) argues that
“perhaps the most devastating blow to the producer association has been dealt by the stagnant-in some cases falling demand for their commodities in 1974 and 1975, as economic activity in the industrialized countries declined, the demand for industrial raw material fell precipitously. Since then there has been a steady decline in the Northern demand for Southern commodities”.
Other uses that challenged the success of emerging commodity cartels included conflicts among the producing countries as they were more in conflict than in cooperation, inability to manage supply as no other commodity had the sought of leadership control Saudi Arabia had in OPEC, and inability to also maintain export and production reduction like OPEC did. These Commodity cartels were generally unable to successfully manage prices or supply, there were price-cutting among fellow cartel members and only few producers agreed to supply control. These issue were evident in the International Bauxite Association (IBA) when Guinea in its eagerness to increase its share of the Bauxite market did not cooperate in price setting effort, in imposing a Bauxite levy, and in nationalization. This was also the case in Union of Banana Exporting Countries when Ecuador, Philippines and Colombia withheld their full support for cartel’s efforts. In the case of Copper and the CIPEC, Chile and Peru opposed export reduction. From these examples, it is also deducible that the failure in replicating OPEC for other commodities was the LDCs inability to give up self-interest for the common good of all LDCs. Charles Lerche and Abdul Aziz Said (1979:245) argues
“that cartels have a limited exporting power because the developed countries can in most instances use other raw materials (or synthetics) as substitutes. The development of production techniques would reduce the consumption of raw materials and the import of raw materials from countries not members of cartels.”
In the case of OPEC, its influence started dwindling as the recession in the developed countries and the over-production of oil in the mid-1980s led to a fall in the price of oil and cut in production. Saudi Arabia’s production dropped from about 9 million barrels per day in 1979 to about 2 million barrels per day in 1985 causing a drop in revenue from $108 billion to $47 billion per annum Like situation existed in all OPEC member countries though with different levels of effect and this was a bitter pill to swallow as it broke the unity that once existed in the cartel (Cammack P, Pool D & Tordoff W, 1988:302).

SUMMARY

Several strategies have been employed in an effort by the Less Developed Countries of the world to eradicate or minimize visible poverty in their countries and enhance their economic development. Of these strategies, the formation of the oil cartel called OPEC has been argued to be the most effective in redressing and renegotiating the trade imbalance and economic inequality between the Developed Countries of the North and the Less Developed Countries of the South. The success of the OPEC in the 1970s has resulted in the advocacy for the formation of more of OPEC-like Cartels for other commodities. In deed, some commodity cartels were formed but as these primary commodities lacked the specific qualities of crude oil and the producing countries lacked the OPEC member level of unity and production control.
The inability of to replicate the success of OPEC in other cartels makes the use of commodity cartel as a means of negotiating for a New International Economic Order inappropriate. Even the strength of OPEC in global influencing in both political and economic matters has declined over the years. This makes the utilization of these cartels as a means of enhancing economic development in the LDCs an inadequate strategy

RECOMMMENDATIONS

This essay has attempted an overview of the economic development strategies employed by the Less Developed Countries of the world in their effort at liberating their countries from the shackles of poverty and economic woes. A detailed analysis of the commodity cartel strategy has been attempted with its successes and challenges. The 1970s OPEC success could not be replicated by other commodities cartels and even the influence of OPEC took a downward slide in the 1980s. Based on the inability of replication the OPEC strength in other commodities and subsequent decline of OPEC strength, this paper is of the view that cartelization as an economic development strategy is not appropriate. Then the question is what strategy will be appropriate for LDCs development?
This paper advocates an Export-Led Industrialization strategy in combination with a purposeful leadership as a panacea to the economic challenges of the Less Developed Countries. This is the strategy employed by the New Industrialized Countries (NICs) of Asia. These countries were once regarded as LDCs but have been able to develop their economies to be as good as and sometimes better than Developed Countries. The experience of these new industrialized economies shows that developing countries could catch up with advanced countries by applying the Export-Led Industrialization (ELI) strategy.
Export-Led Industrialization is a trade and economic policy aiming to speed up the industrialization process of a country by exporting goods for which the nation has a comparative advantage. It involves the opening of domestic markets to foreign competition in exchange for market access in other countries (www.en.wikipedia.org retrieved 18-Oct-2011). LDCs that has transformed their economy through this process includes the Asians Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Other countries include India, Malaysia and China. In recent years, by comparing development experience within the LDCs, some studies shows that the ELI strategy is more successful than other strategies Xue Jinjun (1995:190) writes that
“of 41 nations experiences since the 1960s, nations which practiced an outward-oriented policy had much better performance in economic development than those which followed an inward-oriented policy. The nations that had good performance not only did much better with most indicators of development compared to other nations but also weathered better shocks to the world economy”.
The Chinese economy figures attest to this. China’s share of export in total world exports was 0.92% and ranked 14th in 1989, but has grown to become the worlds largest exporter and its share of world export has jumped to almost 10% in 2009 (The Economist, 2011). This proves that China has grown to an export-led economy. An IMF working paper published in 2009 calculated that if China remained as dependent on export as in recent years and then sustain an annual GDP growth of 8%; its share of world export would rise to about 17% by 2020 (The Economist, 2011).
Export growth played a very important role in the economic development of China. While pre-1978 China had seen annual growth of 6% per annum, post-1978 has witness a growth of more than 9% per annum with less fluctuation. In some recent years its growth had exceeded 13%. Also, the per capita income has nearly quadrupled in the last 15years. This kind of growth is also observed in the economies of the “Asian Tigers” (Hu and Khan, 1997)
Stephen Adei (2007:12) argues that the most important determinant of the rise and fall of nations is the quality of its leadership. This is what makes the difference between the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and those countries still maintaining the statues of less developed. The driving force of economic development in the NICs and economic underdevelopment in the LDCs is the quality of leadership. Adei (2007:11-12) in emphasizing the importance of leadership in national development itemize its role to include:
i. Provision of direction: national mission, vision and goals, in short development agenda
ii. Strategy setting
iii. Empowerment of people and mobilization of resources – human, financial, etc.
iv. Management of the development process
v. Establishment of governance framework and atmosphere for other actors to operate
vi. Development of other leaders, institutions and capacity building.
This essay has reviewed different strategies advocated for the economic development of LDCs and argues that through the strength in forming commodity cartels as a means of negotiation a New International Economic Order, its limitations makes it inadequate for the much desired economic growth of the Third World countries. A much more adequate strategy will be that already proven by the NICs with great measure of achievement. This is the Export-Led Industrialization implemented by a strong and focused leadership.

REFERENCES

Adei Stephen (2007) The Role of Leadership in the Development of the Asian NICs and the Lesson for Africa. At http://www.unpan1.un.org

Basu Arik (2005) Import Substitution and Sustainable Economic Development in Urban & Regional Planning Economic Development at http://www.umich.edu

Braillard P and Djalili M. (1984) The Third World and International Relations. Masson Editeur, Paris

Cammack P, Pool D and Tordoff W (1993) Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction 2nd ed. The Macmillan Press ltd, London

Dictionary of Business Terms (2007) by Barron’s Education Series Inc. Also at http://www.answers.com

Gilpin Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Holloway Steven K. (1988) The Aluminum Multinationals and the Bauxite Cartel. St Martin’s Press, New York cited in Spero J E and Hart J A (1997) The Politics of International Economic Relations 5th ed. St. Martin’s Press Inc, New York

Hu Zuliu and Khan Mohsin S. (1997) Why is China Growing so fast? International Monetary fund. Also at http://www.imf.org

Iwase N. (1980) Recycling and Substituting in Sideri S and John S eds. Mining for Development in the Third World. Pergamon Press, New York cited in Spero J E and Hart J A (1997) The Politics of International Economic Relations 5th ed. St. Martin’s Press Inc, New York

Jinjun Xue (1995) The Export-Led Growth Model and its Application in China in Hitotsubash Journal of Economics, 36(2):189-206. The Hitotsubashi Academy, China. Also at http://www.hdl.handle.net/10086.7761

Jones Walter S. (1985) The Logic of International Relations 5th ed. Little, Brown & Company Limited, Canada

Lerche C. O. and Said A. A. (1979) Concepts of International Politics in Global Perspective 3rd ed. Prentice-Hall Inc, Englewood Cliff

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2008) OPEC Statute. Vienna, Austria. Also at http://opec.org

Rydenfelt Sven (1985) A Pattern for Failure: Socialist Economy in Crises. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego cited in Gilpin Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Spero J E and Hart J A (1997) The Politics of International Economic Relations 5th ed. St. Martin’s Press Inc, New York

Strange Susan (1985) Protectionism and World Politics. International Organization 39:233-59 cited in Gilpin Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

The Economist (2010) China Export Prospects: Fear of the Dragon. The Economist Newspaper Limited. Also at http://www.economist.com/node/15213305

Williams Gwyneth (1981) Third-World-Political Organizations: A Review of Developments. The Macmillan Press ltd, London and Basingstoke

World Bank Development Report (1983) at http://www.go.worldbank.org/ZLYQZWFJZO

INTERNET SOURCES

http://www.en.wikipedia.org

http://www.go.worldbank.org/ZLYQZWFJZO

http://www.economist.com/node/15213305

http://opec.org

http://www.hdl.handle.net/10086.7761

http://www.imf.org

http://www.answers.com

http://www.umich.edu

http://www.unpan1.un.org

THE RECENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN EGYPT AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE MIDDLE-EAST

2011-06-17T16:17:00.001+01:00

BY

WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR POL 807 (THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

COURSE LECTURER: DR. O. J. OFFIONG

JUNE, 2011

ABSTRACT

The Middle East remains a hotspot in world politics. The sensitivity of the region draws from the dominant Arab people, through the Islamic religion, the oil wealth, the creation of the state of Israel, the types of governments, to the level of deprivation and poverty. Egypt being politically central to the region, this paper reviews the current volatile political crisis in the region with a focus on Egypt and on that bases, generalizes for the entire region. This paper focuses on the recent crisis there with an attempt to analyze the origin and likely ending with its implication on the entire region. We have done this analysis using the Conflict theory via the Social Mobilization and Collective Action theory as our guide.

INTRODUCTION
Democracy has become one of the major variable by which the level of development of a society is measured. It is common place to describe nation–states as democratic, non-democratic, democratizing or lacking democratic structures. The region of the world now commonly referred to as the Middle-East can also be measured using the tenet of democracy and the level of availability of democratic structures and conclusions reached as to how democratic the region is.
This work reviews the Middle-East region with a brief look at the history, the nation-states that make it up and their style of government. It goes further to review the role and importance of Egypt as it relates to the Middle-East. With this background information, the paper attempts to use the conflict theory in analyzing the 2011 political crisis in Egypt and how this has and will impact the democratization of Egypt and the Middle-East in general. In the analyses of the democratic implication for the Middle-East, a cursory look will be on the people involvement or participation, understanding why the Middle-Eastern people are revolting against their government, current leadership response and the response of the Western countries particularly the United States of America to the mass up-rising which has been referred to as a revolution by many analysts. Also, we will try to understand what the protests in the different countries deem to have in common, the tactics the demonstration used to display their discontent, and finally what is likely going to be the effect on governance in these countries.

THE MIDDLE-EAST: AN OVERVIEW
The Middle-East is a region that encompasses Western Asia and North Africa. It is often used as a synonym for Near East. The history of the region dates back to ancient times, and throughout its history, the Middle-East has been a major centre of World affairs. When discussing ancient history however, the term Near East is more commonly used (http://www.en.wikipedia.org Retrieved 2011-05-30).
It is worthy of mention that the area or states referred to as Middle-East has undergone different adjustments. Before the First World War, the Middle-East referred to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Turkestan and the Caucasus, while the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire were known as the Near East. The Far East referred to the countries of East Asia (e.g. China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong etc). With the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in 1981, Middle-East came to be applied to the re-emerging countries of the Islamic World (http://www.en.wikipedia.org Retrieved 2011-05-30). In 1957, the United State’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles defined the Middle-East as the area lying between and including Libya on the West and Pakistan in the East Syria and Iraq on the North and the Arabian Peninsula to the South, plus the Sudan and Ethiopia (Davison 1960). In 1958, the State Department explained that the terms “Near East” and Middle-East were interchangeable, and defined the region as including only Egypt, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi, Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar (New York Times, 1938–08–14).
The Wikipedia listed the traditional Middle-Eastern States to include Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Also included are Gaza strip and West Bank which are not fully sovereign. The Wikipedia further listed countries it referred to as the Greater Middle-East, they include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan, Algeria, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Comoros.
Today, Middle-Eastern countries have a variety of governing systems, including traditional monarchies, autocratic republics and semi-authoritarian states that allows for some degree of political pluralism (Katulis, 2009:4). The Central Intelligence Agency, the World fact book (2007) has categorized the various forms of government in the different Middle-Eastern countries thus; Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia and Yemen are under a Republic; Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco are in a Constitutional Monarchy. The Iranians operate a theocratic republic while Oman and Saudi Arabia operates a Monarchical system of government; Iraq and Israel have a Parliamentary Democracy while Kuwait operates a Constitutional Emirate; Turkey has a Republican Parliamentary Democracy and an Emirate system of government is operated in Qatar, The United Arab Emirates offers a Federation with specified powers delegated to the UAE Federal government and other powers reserved to members of the emirate while Syria is governed under a Republic controlled by an authoritarian military-dominated regime. Libya is said to operate a Jamahiriya (a state of the masses) in theory, governed by the populace through local councils; in practice, it is an authoritarian state. Despite the various forms of government, the Middle-East remains largely autocratic and authoritarian. According to Freedom House (2008), a majority of the countries in the region remain “Not Free”.

EGYPT: ITS INFLUENCE AND IMPORTANCE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST
Egypt occupies a strategic position in the Middle-East, with control of the Suez Canal, the main maritime thorough fare for trade between East and West. Throughout its recent history Egypt has been at the political and cultural forefront of Pan-Arabism and the Non-Aligned movement. With the creation of the State of Israel in 1948; Egypt took a lead role in the struggle for Palestinian rights in the land occupied by the new state. Prior to the creation of the state of Israel the influence and importance of Egypt was already evident when she hosted the December 1947 Arab League meeting in Cairo to discuss the threat of a Jewish State in their midst. The States represented were Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Transjordan. In the struggle for the Palestinian rights, Egyptian army invaded Israel from the south on May 15 1948, a day after the birth of Israel. In the same struggle, the Transjordanian army invaded from the east while Syrian and Lebanese armies invaded Israel from the north.
In 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had distinguished himself in the Palestine war, became President by Egypt and was soon the unrivaled champion of Arab nationalism (Stoessinger, 2001:150). His many actions against Israel endeared him to the Arab Middle-East and the Palestinians. Anwar Sadat became the President of Egypt after the death of Nasser in 1970 and continued the onslaught towards Israel when Egypt teamed with Syria to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in what is now referred to as the October War of 1973. After the war, attempts were made at peace negotiation and a Peace treaty was finally signed in Washington DC between Egypt and Israel on the 26th of March, 1979 after the 1978 Camp David Accord and President Anwar El Sadats visit to Israel in 1977. This treaty has resulted in peace between the two countries till date though it has been regarded by some as a cold peace.
This passage has attempted to capture how influential and important Egypt has been since the creation of the Israeli state, Israel has been a leading force in the times of struggles and wars in the Middle-East and has also been the key to the relative peace that has existed for over 30 years by its maintenance of the 1979 peace treaty.

CONCEPTUAL ELUCIDATION
Conflict
Different scholars have put forth different definition at various times in attempts at properly define the concept of conflict. Deutsch puts that conflicts exists whenever incompatible activities occur … one party is interfering, disrupting, obstructing or in some way making another party’s action less effective. Folger, et al. defines Conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals. Conrad defines conflicts as communicative interactions among people who are interdependent and who perceive that their interests are incompatible, inconsistent, in tension. Pruitt and Rubin sees Conflict as perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously. Wall has defined conflict as a process in which two or more parties attempt to frustrate the others goal attainment… Coser in his exposition defines social conflict as a struggle between opponents over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rival (Walker, 2005).

Democratization
Democratization can be understood in three different ways. For one, it is the introduction of democracy in a non-democratic regime. Next, democratization can be understood as the deepening of the democratic qualities of given democracies. Finally, democratization involves the question of the survival of democracy (Welzel, 2008:74-75).

Revolution
The Wikipedia elucidates that revolution is from a Latin word “revolutio” meaning ‘a turn around’ so a revolution is a fundamental change in power or organizational structures that take place in a relatively short period of time. Aristotle (1972:190) describes two types of political revolution.
1. Complete change from one constitution to another
2. Modification of an existing constitution
Jack Goldstone (2001) defines revolutions as an effort to transform the political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non institutionalized action that undermine authorities.
Generally, a revolution can be seen as the radical transformation of a society through a mass movement or a popular struggle, resulting in the reorganization of the class structure, class relations and the basic institutions affecting the daily lives of the people. It is geared towards putting an end to poverty, hunger and misery.

CONFLICT THEORY AND MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS. THE 2011 EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CRISIS IN FOCUS
Conflict theories are perspectives in social sciences which emphasizes the social, political or materials inequality of a social group, which critique the broad socio-political system. Conflict theories draw attention to power differentials, such as class conflict and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies (http://www.en.wikipedia.org).
Karl Marx is one of the classical founding fathers of social sciences commonly associated with the conflict theory. Based on a dialectical materialist account of history, Marxism posited that capitalism, like previous socioeconomic systems, would inevitably produce internal tensions leading to its own destruction (Baird and Walter, 2008). Marx posits that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history class struggle… either in a revolutionary re-construction of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (Marx and Engels, 1998).
More recent scholars in conflict theories include Lewis Coser, Randall Colins, Ralf Dahrendorf, C. Wright Mills, Gene Sharp, Alan Sears, Max Gluckman etc.
It is worthy of mention at this point that conflict theory does not refers to a unified school of thought, and should not be confused as such. No single general theory of conflict exists that is acceptable to social scientists in their respective disciplines, or to authorities in other field from which social scientists borrow insights (Dougherty and Pflatzgraff 1990:187).
The term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human being (whether tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio economic political or other) is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals (Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff 1990:187).
Conflicts seem to have the ability to occur anywhere and anytime but it could be of different shade and sizes, some are violent which others are not, some last relatively long while others are for a short while. Scholars over the years have attempted to answer the fundamental question of why conflict occurs or in other words what is the cause of conflict? Scholars have been diverse in their views on this fundamental question. These diversity has been categorized by Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff (1990) into the Microcosmic and Macrocosmic theories of conflict, where the Microcosmic theories include conflict theories that centers on humans as the basic cause of conflict these theories includes example like Biological and Psychological theories, instinct theories of Aggression, Frustration-Aggression theory and other psychological theories. The macrocosmic theories views institutions as the origin of conflict. The Macrocosmic theories examine conflict at the level of groups, collectivities, social institutions, social classes, large political movements, religious or ethnic entities, nation-states, coalitions, and cultural systems. Theories at this level encompasses those of sociologist, anthropologists etc.
Kenneth Waltz in his work, man, the state and war has identified three level of analysis or set of explanations for the occurrence of conflict. The first analysis rest upon the assumption that the causes of conflict; is to be found in the nature and behaviour of man. The second explanation operates on the assumption that conflict depends on the type of national government or the character of a national society. One implication of this perspective is that while human nature may be changeable, social and political institutions are. The third level of analysis finds the cause of conflict to lie not in men or states but in the nature of the nation-state system itself. It holds that the ultimate cause of conflict or warfare inheres in the very condition of the international system which Waltz and many others have identified as one of the international anarchy (Lieber 1972:100-104).
A. Oberschall, 2010 in his work “Conflict theory” has done a three level categorization of conflict. The first level which he referred to as the Human nature; sees the human nature as the roots of inter-group violence and warfare. He cites psychologist like Robert Hinde (1997) who postulates that “certain behavioural propensities, including the capacity for aggression, are common to virtually all humans. In Oberschall second level of categorization, he looked at conflict from what he referred to as the ‘New wars’ he analysed insurgencies, ethnic cleansing, civil wars, genocide, ethnic riot etc. He argues that unlike war between States, these “new wars” are undertaken by organized armed group against their governments or other groups with guerrilla tactics, bombings, hostage taking, and population expulsion. In his third categorization, he reviews Social Movements and Collective Action for explaining regimes, how the dynamics of confrontation escalates to civil strife, what outcomes results and whether violence is necessary for change (Oberschall, 2010:177). The theory consists of five components; issues, framing, mobilization, confrontation and outcomes. Analysis in this work will employ the use of conflict theory via social movement and collective action theory.

ASSUMPTIONS OF CONFLICT THEORY
Dr. Scott Plunkett and Professor Scott Williams provide some basic assumptions of conflict theory. They include:
1. If you have interaction, you have conflict
• No human society or group exists which does not possess conflicts of interest
• Conflict is necessary for growth and social change
2. Conflict and change are normal, inevitable and ubiquitous (i.e., everywhere) in family relationships and society
3. Conflict is endemic
• Goal is to manage conflict so it does not escalate to damaging levels to reduce the group to totally separate individuals.
• The problem with allowing conflict to increase to damaging levels is the couple or group will inevitably split apart and individuals will become separate.
• Oftentimes this is what occurs in a divorce with chronic unresolved anger and conflict.
4. There is a scarcity of resources
A. With surplus of resources, humans pursuing self-interest would not pursue conflict.
B. Our conflict arises because there is not enough resources for all to have what they want.
C. If everyone could get what they want, there would never be conflict.

5. Human societies consist of varying degrees of inherently unequal elements
• Therefore hierarchies emerges since power is not distributed equally
• Individuals and groups usually try to maximize their own positions within the hierarchies instead of completely changing the society. (www.csun.edu)
6. Revolution: Change occurs as a result of conflict between competing interests rather than through adaptation. It is often abrupt and revolutionary rather than evolutionary.
7. War: Even war is a unifier of the societies involved, as well as war may set an end to whole societies.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: EGYPTIAN 2011 POLITICAL CRISIS IN FOCUS
Oberschall 2010 argues that a theory of conflict has coalesced in the past 30 years in social movement and collective action research. He provides some basic assumptions of the theory.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY:
1. Social movement begins with small group networks, crowds, leaders, activists and ascends to ethnic groups, social movement organizations and regimes.
2. Social movement views contentious politics as necessary for social changes and reforms.
3. It views the states as a social control apparatus.
4. It has sophisticated theory of mobilization and confrontation for challenger, consisting of social infrastructure, repertoires, campaigns diffusion, framing, polarization and escalation (Oberschell, 2010:190).
In the study of social movement and collective action theory, five levels or stages of development is highlighted. These include the issues, framing, mobilization confrontation and outcome stages. These five components are going to be used in the analysis of the 2011 political crisis that erupted in Egypt after that of Tunisia and a consequent overflow to other Middle-Eastern States.
1. 1. Issues: In this analysis, issues are assumed as the beginning of social movement, collective action and conflict. There are existing issues, these issues may be new or long in existence in that particular society. In a regime or government, organized groups with low cost privileged access to political institutions are members of the polity, but less privileged groups and diffuse public are excluded (Tilly 2003; Tarrow 1998). Contemporary social scientists and policy makers generally look upon the high conflict potential of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a function of widespread frustration traceable to economic deprivation (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:323). Ted Robert Gurr argues that the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is deprivation; define as actors’ perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environments apparent value capabilities (Gurr, 1970:36).
There are some clear issues that had ignited the conflict in Egypt. It has been observed by experts that there has been wide spread discontent among the urban Egyptian masses and host of socio-economic factors that bred the political instability. Jeremy M. Sharp (2011:6) has pointed out four (4) issues that apparently kick started the Egyptian crisis. Firstly, was the recent sectarian violence, then an apparently rigged parliamentary election, a third issue was the uncertainty surrounding the Presidents succession and lastly the success of the Tunisia “Jasmine Revolution” All these combined were some of the immediate issues that necessitated the crisis. Remote issue included the Hosni Mubaraks government stance on Arab-Israeli relation and the issue of Egypt–Israeli 1979 Peace Treaty. Also, the significantly declining well being of all income groups since 2005, with only the richest 20% of the population trending positively since 2009 (Gallup, February 2, 2011).
2. Framing: As dissatisfaction and discontent mount, adversaries frame the issue within rival belief system, shared folk knowledge, and ideologies –inequality, human rights, democratic norms etc. The organizing frames transform individual discontent into shared public grievances and call for relief through public actions. The adversaries organize around identity symbols expressed in slogans, songs, dress and hair styles, uniforms, flags, colours and other visible markers for identity and commitment (Oberschall, 2010:177). The Egyptian issues were framed around ideology. The masses wanted democratic norms entrenched in their government and on this democratization request, they hinged their identity symbols which they expressed as slogans like ‘Down Mubarak’ and the lifting of their shoes as a mark of disrespect for the government. Young Egyptian professionals like Wael Ghonim, a google executive were useful in the framing of the Egyptian issues.
3. Mobilization: Oberschall 2010 explains that competitive mobilization erupts with leaders and activists formulating an agenda for change with modes for resistance by the opposition. The Egyptian mobilization was carried out using social media networks like Twitter and Facebook. These were also used in the organization process. The protest started on January 25th with an unprecedented number of protesters. The protesters agenda for change was the sacking of the government along with President Mubarak but the leadership by Mubarak had another agenda for change. In the early morning of January 29, President Mubarak made what some described as a desperate attempt to cling to power in a televised speech to the nation in which he defiantly insisted that he would remain as president to protect the nation. During the speech, President Mubarak announced that he was dissolving the government and later that day, he appointed National Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman as his Vice President, the first time anyone has held that office under Mubarak. He also appointed Civil Aviation Minister Ahmed Shafiq as Prime Minister. This agenda for change failed to clam the public anger (Sharp, 2011:7).
Mancur Olson Jnr (1965), has observed that because social movements advocate on behalf of large group (masses) and their goals are collective goals (legislation, reform, regime change), they are vulnerable to free rider i.e. those who expect the benefits but do not contribute to the cost of attaining the goals. Political figures like Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei; former head of the IAEA and leader of Egypt’s National Association for Change, Mohammad Baltagi; Head of Muslim Brotherhood bloc of law makers from 2005 to 2010 etc. Who were not initially in the protest had joined later as leaders of the opposition in an anticipation of benefiting from the process.
In the Egyptian political tension, without planning, huge crowds gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo from January 25th 2011 and chanted slogans and the display the soles of their shoes lifted with their hands and demanded leadership change; this process triggered similar confrontation of provincial cities and towns. Young activists bonded together by social media network like Facebook and Twitter emerged as pace-setters and leaders and some bore the highest cost of participation. Oberschall 2010 has pointed out that in collective action mobilization, small groups of activists bonding in close knit social milieus emerge as pace-setters and leaders and bear the highest cost of participation in long campaigns and inspire a larger group of part-time activists (called “transitory teams”) for short and low cost events (weekend demonstration), and an even larger sympathetic public (called a “conscience constituency”) who contribute funding but are not exposed to any physical danger or risk of arrest.
4. Confrontation: This is characterized by the tactics of strategic actions the adversaries use for reaching a favourable outcome. A pivotal variable of confrontation is violence because it is likely to change the issues, players, strategies, and other parameters of conflict. The confrontation of the Egyptian struggle in the centre of Cairo on Wednesday, February 2, 2011 was on live global television. Supporters of President Mubarak went on the offensive against opposition protestors in Tahrir (Liberation) square, and the army, while not deliberately hurting anti-government demonstrators did little to help them. In fact, the army had earlier called on protestors to leave the streets in an appeal for calm; a move some observes believe was really intended to deflate protestors’ momentum (Sharp, 2011: 11). Oberschall argue that faced with disruption, the authorities are under pressure to restore orderly routines in daily life. The authorities’ response becomes a new issue: If the authorities ban marches, it is a free speech, freedom of assembly issue for the banned group; if the authorities intervene coercively, they risk being accused of police brutality, protests to free those “unjustly” arrested and for punishing the police who “repressed” peaceful demonstrators become a new confrontation campaign (Oberschall, 2010: 189). The Egyptian police had been accused of Police brutality prior to this unrest so the use of police to intervene in this protest was avoided and the government decided to withdraw the police from the streets of Egypt and in what appeared to be an orchestrated show of force, a huge crowd of pro-Mubarak strongmen, some riding on horses and camel, stormed, Tahrir Square on Wednesday, Februrary 2, and attacked anti-government protesters with metal rods, stones, and sticks. A storm of stones rained down on both sides of battle. Eyewitness account from Egyptians and international journalists suggested that the attacker were made up of active supporters of the embattled President and its group known in Egyptian Arabic as “Baltagiya” or gangs. Some reports suggest that plainclothes police officers were among them (Sharp 2011:11). There are conflicting reports on the number of dead as a result of the confrontation but certainly lots of deaths were reported. The measures employed by the government to stem the protest became a new issue for continued confrontation, for example, the curfew, attacks by gangs in support by Mubarak, killings etc all resulted in the escalation of the protest for a regime change. Doug McAdam (1983) has observed that a variety of tactics, both conventional politics and unconventional protest, are engaged in confrontation as the challenges and their adversaries test each others strengths and weakness and the public responds.
5. Outcomes: At this level of analysis, the impact of collective action is measured or identified. Measures of success distinguish ‘acceptance’ (also called ‘recognition’) of the challengers from advantages gained (also ‘goal achievement’) (Gamson 1990, Oberschall 1973: 342-343). Acceptance is measured by the social movements elected or appointed officials in government, while advantages are clearly observed at the short run as in changes in issues that resulted in collective action or a change in regime/government. At the long-run though, measurement of advantages becomes relatively difficult. There was a form of recognition in the Egyptian collective action when the opposition figures were called for negotiation by the then ruling government and the advantages on the short run is very obvious which includes the overthrow of government, constitutional reform, higher level of political participation etc., but the long run advantages may include a better society and government performance in the economy. This is not as obvious as the short-run achievements.
The analysis of conflict via the social movement approach has assisted us in the understanding of the dynamics of the Egyptian 2011 political crisis from the stage of Issue to that of Output as it stands today. While these categories may not be as distinct or mutually exclusive as presented, they all exist and help shape a social change. It is suggested via the conflict theory that the division between social classes is ultimately a power struggle, a competitive force in which one group seeks domination and control over the weaker group. The ironic component of this thought process is that even within the weaker group, there may still exist a power struggle. The gap is not required to be as wide as it is not necessarily an issue between capitalism and working class. Also, if conflict is a natural segment of humanity, then topics on conflict resolution or peace integration are obsolete and void of meaning. With that consideration, conflict theory is only applicable in situations of war, famine and political strive. Not in situations of peace and social equality (www.ehow.com). Despite these limitations, the conflict theory has provided basis for analysis of conflicts and its dynamics in various society.

THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS AND MIDDLE-EAST DEMOCRATIZATION
The Middle-East may have a variety of governing systems but one thing is sure of these governments and earlier analysis has shown that they are more autocratic than democratic. Most of the governments are not directly elected or are not popular choice of the people but have held sway for decades. The economic statistical data of the region does not show improvement in the well being of the people even in the midst of so much crude oil and its returns in the international market. The gap between the ‘have’ and the ‘have not’ has expanded over time and the well-being plummets despite GDP gains (Gallup, February 2, 2011). There appears to be gross abuse of government office and corruptions on high places. This situation and other had driven the Tunisian then the Egyptian to the streets in a protest for better condition of living. Haven analyzed the important influence Egypt has in the region it is almost definite that anything that affects Egypt or any situation in Cairo will have a ripple effect on other countries in the regions. The rise of the Egyptian youth against their dictatorial government of three decades sent signals in the entire Middle-East that the masses could cry out in the face of deprivation, corruption and oppression. The Egyptian continued protest in the face of death and a consequent ouster of the Mubarak regime showed to the oppressed masses of the entire Middle-East that persistence on social change has advantages and a repressive regime could be removed via a collective civil action.
This paper view some issues present in the Egyptian revolt and its society to see how common it is to other countries in the region and on that basis tries to predict the outcome of political situation in the Middle-East.
PEOPLE PARTICIPATION
In the wake of the Tunisian/Egyptian uprisings other countries of the region immediately followed suit. Countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Algeria etc. commenced protest for better standard of living, constitutional reforms, government change etc. In no distant time, mass protest swept through the region a situation that has been viewed as revolutionary and a drive towards democratization of a predominantly Arab society. Democracy is about people participation in the process of governance and this has been absent in the region. The Egyptian uprising showed to the Middle-East that it was possible for the people to decide on whom not to rule them. When a people become aware of their power to decide on who governs them and then begins to utilize it, then the democratization process has started. The rise to political dominance of the Egyptian people has prompted a reawakening of the masses of like countries and they are now more than ever before willing to take their rightful place in the governmental process and therefore causing a democratic revolution. This democratization process is grounded in the Arab public own aspirations for democracy and human right. It is likely that the outcome of the revolt in Egypt will be the same expectation of the people of the other countries. In the advent of a full fledged democracy in Egypt, the other revolting countries will accept nothing less.

INTERNAL ECONOMIC/POLITICAL CONDITION
This subsection tries to review the level of unemployment, the years the oppressive government has spent in power and the root of unrest in Egypt, and analyses if similar situation exist in the other Middle-Eastern countries.
We will rely on statistical figures as provided by Cable News Network web page in our analysis. The Mubarak led regime stayed in power for about 30 years, Gadaffi of Libya has held Sway for about 42 years, Tunisians Zine EL-Abidine Ben Ali was in power for about 24 years and King Abdullah II of Jordan has been Chief of State since 1999. President Bashar al–Assad of Syria has been president since 2000 while Bahrain’s Royal family has been in change since the 18th century though King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has been monarch since 1999 and Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalfa has been there since 1971. President Saleh of Yemen has been in power since 1978 in North Yemen and upon Merger with South Yemen in 1990 he continued as president. Some other Middle-East countries have been under a family for centuries.
A look at the issues resulting in the revolt shows a great deal of similarities. Just like in Egypt others have also clamoured against their sit-tight government police brutality, corruption of the government and abuse of power, rising prices, discrimination, human right abuse, political freedom and civil liberty, high unemployment etc. The unemployment rates in these countries shows, Egypt – 9.7% (2010 est.), Libya – 30% (2004 est.), Tunisia – 14% (2010 est.), Jordan – 13.4% (2010 est.), Syria – 8.3% (2010 est.), Yemen – 35% (2003 est.) and Bahrain – 15% (2005 est.).
Another issue worth mentioning is the fact that youths are spearheading these revolts in the different countries. On these analyses we conclude that other Middle-East countries are most likely wishing for a change of government like Egypt and will wish for nothing less as their domestic economic and political issues are similar.

THE WEST AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE-EAST
In his second inaugural address in 2005, President George W. Bush proposed the United States foster democracy on a global level beginning with this Middle-East. In his speech he stated …it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. President Bush also reflected the way democracy has to emerge in any nation, from within and rooted deep in the soul of its people, “freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities and when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own…. Our goal is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way (Timmos, 2011). It seems that in Egypt and several other Middle-East countries, people have finally spoken. The same vein as his predecessor, President Obama has continued to call for democratic reforms in the Middle-East. This he has done through the offer and promise of aids and grants, even debt relief for democratizing Middle-East countries. He recently highlighted Egypt and Tunisia saying “First it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy. That effort begins in Egypt and Tunisia where the stakes are high-as Tunisia was at the vanguard of this democratic wave, and Egypt is both a longstanding partner and the Arab world’s largest nation… And we’re going to start with Tunisia and Egypt. Firstly, we’ve asked the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to present a plan at next week’s G8 summit for what needs to be done to stabilize and modernize the economies of Tunisia and Egypt… Second… we will relieve a democratic Egypt of up to $1 billion in debt and work with our Egyptian partners to invest these resources to foster growth and entrepreneurship. We will help Egypt regain access to markets by guaranteeing $1 billion in borrowing that is needed to finance infrastructure and job creation… Third, we’re working with congress to create Enterprise Funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt…” President Obama’s speech shows US policy towards the Middle-East and the Democratization of its governments (www.hizb-america.org). Some scholars have argued that the US is not committed to democratic reforms in the Middle-East as they favour any government that will favour peace and stability in the region –whether autocratic or democratic- as long as the government maintains stability that is important to the US interest in the region. This interest includes the recognition and maintenance of the state of Israel and the unhindered access to oil etc. Despite these arguments, the speeches from Bush and Obama have clearly highlighted the United States interest in the democratization of the Middle-East. The clear incentives from the US for a democratizing Middle-East country are capable of encouraging democratic reforms.

CONCLUSION
Egypt’s historic position in the heart of the Arab world means that what happens in Egypt does not stop in Egypt. Regardless of the form the new government eventually takes, it will have a powerful resonance/reverberation across the region (Bell, 2011). Change in other Middle-East countries may not be a replica of that of Egypt. For some, changes might occur methodically as the autocratic governments are to relinquish power systematically, allowing for a gradual transition to democratic rule. Other countries may fall into Civil war or a slow, burning series of violent outbreaks designed to wear down the government into submission (Timmons, 2011), but it is certain that a change has come to the Middle-East and it is the start of the Middle-East democratization. A fundamental question posed by the current Middle-East revolution is if this revolution will come to an end quickly with the establishment of new governments –hopefully democratic one- or will a much more radical, long-lasting revolution process develop? Will this revolution possibly be taken over by Islamic extremist (as happened in Iran more than 30 years ago), with unpredictable consequences fro the region and the world?
The answer to these fundamental questions not withstanding, it is the view of this paper that a democratizing Egypt will cause democratic reforms in the entire Middle-East region because of the historic antecedence, similarities in domestic conditions and Egypt’s political influence in the region.

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EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

2011-06-17T16:13:00.000+01:00

BY

WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO
COLLINS ODIGIE
OSAHON USIOBAIFO
JOAN IDUMWONYI
GEORGE OKUNGBOWA

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR POL 801 (RESEARCH METHODOLOGY)

COURSE LECTURER: DR. O. J. OFFIONG

APRIL, 2011

INTRODUCTION
There are a lot of classifications of research put forward by different scholars over the years. A cursory look at these classifications reveals that a common trend runs through all of them. For example, Cauvery, el al. (2005), categorized research broadly into four types to include: Exploratory study, Descriptive study, Diagnostic study and Experimental study. Experimental research, widely considered to be the best way of determining cause and effect in scientific research are often touted as the most rigorous of all research design.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to tackle the following:
i. To examine the concept and characteristics of Experimental research;
ii. More importantly, to examine the rationale, types and limitations of Experimental research.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
A lot of definitions abound on Experimental research by different scholars. But, one good way to approach a definition of the concept is to break it down into its component parts i.e. “Experimental” and “Research”.
According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, the word experimental or experiment refers to a scientific test that is carried out in order to study what happens and to gain new knowledge. In this regard, Cauvery, et al (2005:52), conceptualized experiment as “the blue-print of the procedures that enable the researcher to test hypotheses and reaching valid conclusion about relationship between independent and dependent variable”. Agbonifoh and Yomere (1999:213), on the other hand asserts that, “an experiment is a research design in which the researcher manipulates or varies an independent variable in a controlled setting in order to observe or measure the impact of the variation or manipulation on another variable”. The foregoing definition therefore suggest that experiments are indeed the only means for ascertaining whether there is a cause and effect relationship between two variables. In other words, experiments are widely considered to be the best way of determining cause and effect in scientific research (Burnham, et al, 2004:46).
On the other hand, the term research derived from a prefix “Re” meaning to repeat, and a Suffix “Search” meaning Seeking. This is why research often times means to search again, to find out more or to take another closer look. Succinctly put, the Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary views research as “a careful or diligent search, studious inquiry or examination, investigation or experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of theories or laws in the light of new facts”.
Drawing from the above expose, Experimental research can therefore be defined as a kind of study or investigation which is designed or structured in such a way as to enable us observe and measure the impact of one variable on another (Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999:13). A good example of experimental design or research in history could be found in the series of experiments conducted by Elton Mayo and his associates at the General Electric Plant in the United States between 1927 and 1933. At the end of the Hawthorne experiment, it was discovered that contrary to the popular belief that money is the only and most important incentive that motivate workers to work, there are other factors such as recognition and affiliation that determines workers behaviour to work.
At this juncture, it is therefore pertinent to mention the crucial features or characteristics used to describe the nature of experimental research.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
In considering the nature of experimental research, there are crucial distinguishing features that are paramount to all researchers when conducting their experiments. These features are as follows:
1. CONTROL- In control, an attempt is made to hold all other variable except the dependent variable constant. All possible threats to internal validity are eliminated, reduced or isolated.
2. MANIPULATION- This is a process whereby the researcher varies the level of the independent variable or varies the administration of a treatment on the experimental subject in order to enable him observe the impact of the variation. (Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999:216).
3. COMPARISON- Here, the thrust of experimental research involves ascertaining whether a significant change has occurred in the dependent variable of interest as a result of some manipulation. Evaluating a change involves determining the amount of change that has occurred (Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999:219).
Aside from the aforementioned fundamental features of experimental research, others include:
4. RANDOMIZATION: This involves Random selection and Random assignment. On the one hand, Random Selection means that every member of a population has an equal chance of being selected to be a member of the sample. Random Assignment, on the other hand implies that every individual which participate in the experiment has an equal chance of being assigned to either the experimental or control groups (Fraenkel and Wallen 2006:5).
5. ARTIFICIALITY: Experiments does not deal with the phenomenon as they occur in the ordinary course of nature. In nature, events are complex they take place under too many conditions and one does not know which of them is relevant. A scientist problem is to isolate the irrelevant conditions himself. This involves producing a phenomenon artificially (Cauvery, et. al. 2005:66)
6. PROBABILISTIC EQUIVALENCE: This means that we know the odds that the groups won’t be equal. When we deal with human being it is impossible to ever say that any two individuals or groups are equal or equivalent (Trochim, 2006:22).
7. TESTABILITY- The result of experiments on the assertion made can be tested and the same conclusions will be reached using the same methods under the same condition. Thus, the conclusion reached can be replicated (Osemwota, et al, 1996:33). Simply put, the hypothesis on cause-effect relationship is tested and confirmed.
8. OBSERVATION: By observation we mean, an intentional or explicit examination of a situation or event in order to ascertain facts or particulars about it. Here, the effect of the manipulation of the Independent variable on the Dependent variable is observed (Leedey, 1997: 232).
Given the above, the question that now arises is what is underlying rationale for conducting experimental research?

THE RATIONALE FOR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
The focus of this section is to discuss the purposes of experimental research with a view to re-examining each of them critically within the context of social science research. Undoubtedly, the objectives of researches in the physical and natural sciences are very clear compared to the social sciences where the human beings could place certain limitations on their research. Despite these
limitations, there are some basic needs that experimental research meets in the social science. Among them are:
Firstly, experimental research essentially helps the researcher to test hypothesis about cause-effect relationship under a “pure” or uncontaminated conditions. For example, in a set of assumption or proposition that, the female gender generally does not do well in Mathematics or in the Science subjects compared with the male. The social scientist can handle the task by conducting an experiment to confirm the validity of the above proposition or assertion.
Secondly, experimental research is a conscious systematic process aimed at providing answer to a definite question. This is perhaps, the major reason for any research investigation. We must be reminded that no researcher embarked on a research for its sake, but for the desire to know more about whatever phenomenon he is interested in; or for the purpose of answering a contentious question. For instance, the Hawthorne experiment conducted by Elton Mayo and his associates earlier mentioned in this paper could be used to explain the logic behind the rationale.
Thirdly, experimental research helps in the generation of theories for explaining, describing and predicting other phenomena. In addition, it helps to isolate the extraneous variable(s) that may influence experiment through the control and manipulation of the experimental research process.

STEPS OF THE EXPERIMENTATION METHOD
The steps of the experimental methods are essentially those of the scientific method. For the sake of clarification, they may be outlined as follows:
1. Selecting and Defining the Problem-The problems amenable to experimentation generally should be converted into hypothesis. The hypothesis can be verified or refuted by the experimental data.
2. Review the Related Literature- This serves two purposes: (1) to set the theoretical base for research and (2) to set the current research into perspective to show “the state of art”.
3. Drawing up the Experimental Design- This section should place primary emphasis on the question of control, randomization, and replication and should include a clarification of such basic aspects of the design as the place and duration of the experiment.
4. Defining the Population- A clear definition of the population to which the experiment applies is necessary to ascertain to whom and whom the conclusion applies.
5. Conducting the Study- It is important to adhere to plans as they relate to factors such as control, randomization and replication.
6. Assessing the Outcome- Assessment of outcome must be done with a careful consideration of the criterion.
7. Analyzing and Interpreting the Result- The researcher is concerned with the operation of the factors under investigation. He must be especially sensitive to the possibility that the results of his study arose through the operation of uncontrolled factors.
8. Drawing up the Conclusions- The conclusions of the study must be based on the findings of the study.
9. Reporting the Result- The study must be reported in sufficient detail so that the reader can make an intelligent judgment as to its validity (Osuala, 2005).

TYPE OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
The researcher can design his experiments to suit the unique situation of his/her study. Fortunately, this is perfectly in order. However, an Experimental researcher can be evaluated on the basis of the extent to which it possesses or lacks the key features of experiments, that is, the extent to which it possesses or lacks the key features of experiment. (Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999:219). On the basis of these key features, an experiment can be categorized as either being a True experiment, Quasi-experiment or Weak experiment. We can broadly classify into a simple threefold classification by asking some key questions. Firstly, does the design use Random assignment to group? If random assignment is used, we call the design Randomized experiment or True experiment. If random assignment is not used, then we have to ask a second question. Does the design use either multiple groups of measurement? If the answer is yes we would label it a Quasi-experimental design, if no, we would call it a non-experimental or Weak-experimental design. The classification is especially used with respect to internal validity (Trochim, 2006:78)
For the purpose of this paper we shall look at these three broad types of design and the different design under each.

1. WEAK EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS:
The following designs are considered weak since they do not have built-in control for threat to internal validity. By internal validity, we mean the extent to which observed differences on the dependent variable result directly from manipulation of the independent variable. Among the factors that act as threat to internal validity of experimental study includes: history, maturation, testing,
instrumentation, statistical regression, differential selection of subjects, morality, etc.
a) The One-Short case study: A single group is exposed to a treatment and its effects are assessed. For example, a study of the effect of the introduction of new text book on the interest of students in the course.

(Fig. 1)
X-------------------------------------------------------O
New text book Attitude scale to measure
Interest Dependent variable)

In this example, an Attitude scale questionnaire to measure interest of the students is administered after the introduction of the new text book. There is no random assignment to groups and it does not use multiple groups of measurement. This experiment is weak in internal validity and therefore a weak experiment.
b) The One-Group-Pretest-Posttest Design: Single group is measured both before and after a treatment exposure (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2006:8). Using the same example in (a) above, there is a little modification which is the introduction of pretest, a measurement of the interest of the student before the treatment, then the introduction of the New textbook.

(Fig. 2)
O--------------------------------X----------------------------O
Pretest Treatment Posttest
Attitude Scale to New Textbook Attitude Scale to Measure interest measure interest
(Dependent variable) (Dependent variable)

Though this is an improvement of the One-Short case study, but randomization and multiple group measurement is still absent which make it weak in internal validity and therefore a weak experiment.

2. TRUE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS:
The essential ingredient of a true experiment is the random assignment of subject to treatment groups. There is also the multiple group measurement and comparison. These are powerful tools for controlling threats to internal validity (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2006:12). The following designs are considered strong and true experimental designs based on the strength of their internal validity.

a) The Randomized Posttest-Only Control Group Design: There are two groups randomly selected and assigned but the treatment is applied to one while the other group does not receive any treatment. The obvious logic of this design is that the difference between the two observations can be attributed to the impact of the independent variable. In other words, the difference is due to the treatment. This is founded on the probabilistic equivalence assumption. For example, let us experiment to ascertain whether the rumour of impending or imminent scarcity of a Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) has an impact on its demand by retailers.
We have used Indomie Noodle as the FMCG for our experiment. We used the Indomie Noodle Model Shop on Benin-Auchi road. A population of 20 randomly selected retailers of Indomie Noodles was taken and subsequently assigned randomly into 2 groups of 10 each. We observed the retailers’ weekly demand over a 2 week period. The first week was observed without interference and we took the individual retailers’ total order for the week after which we applied our treatment in the form of a ‘rumour of an impending scarcity’ of the product. This treatment was applied to the first group of 10 retailers, say ‘Group A’ while the other group, say ‘Group B’ did not get the treatment as they did not hear the rumour of the imminent scarcity. The difference in the measurement or in the retailers’ weekly demand is regarded as the effect of the treatment or rumour of an impending scarcity of the Indomie Noodles product.

(Fig. 3)
R---------------------------------X1--------------------------------O
Random assignment Treatment Posttest
of 10 Noodles retailers ‘Rumour of scarcity’ Total goods ordered
Experimental group (Dependent variation)
20 Noodles
Retailers
Randomly
Selected
R--------------------------------X2----------------------------------O
Random assignment No Treatment Posttest
of 10 Noodles retailers ‘No rumour of scarcity’ Total goods ordered Control group (Dependent variation)

This experiment has a multiple groups of measurement and there is Random assignment into groups. This is a true experiment as the internal validity is strong.

(b). The Randomized Pretest-Posttest Control Group Design: Pretest is included in this design. The introduction of pretest is the major difference between this design and the Randomized posttest only control group design. Using the same example as in (2a) above, the difference is the introduction of the questionnaire prior to the treatment and again after the treatment. This experiment is also a true experiment.

(Fig. 4)
R---------------------------O----------------X1---------------------------O
Random assignment Pretest Treatment Posttest
10 Noodles retls Total gds ordered ‘Rumour of scarcity’ Total gds ordered
Experimental group (Dependent variable) (Dependent variable)

20 Noodles
Retailers
Randomly
Selected

R------------------------O-------------------X2---------------------------O
Random Assignment Pretest No treatment Posttest
10 Noodle retls Total gds ordered ‘No rumour of scarcity’ Total gds ordered Control group (Dependent variable) (Dependent variable)

(c). The Randomized Solomon Four-Group Design: The design involves studying four groups made up of two experimental groups and two control groups. One experimental group undergoes a pretest while the second group does not. Similarly, one control group undergoes a pretest while the other does not. There is a post-test for each of the four groups (Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999:224). It is design to deal with a potential testing threat. This design is meant to check the effect of pretest on posttest which is also a possible testing threat. Within each treatment condition, we have a group that is pre-tested and one that is not. By explicitly including testing as a factor in the design, we are able to assess experimentally whether a testing threat is operating (Trochim, 2006:88)

(Fig. 5)
R---------------------------O----------------X1---------------------------O
Random assignment Pretest Treatment Posttest
10 Noodles retailers Total goods ordered ‘Rumour of scarcity Total goods ordered
Experimental group (Dependent variable) (Dependent variable)

20 Noodles
Retailers
Randomly
Selected

R------------------------O-------------------X2---------------------------O
Random Assignment Pretest No treatment Posttest
10 retailers Total gds ordered ‘No rumour of scarcity’ Total gds ordered Control group (Dependent variable) (Dependent variable)

R---------------------------------X1--------------------------------O
Random assignment Treatment Posttest
of 10 Noodles retailers ‘Rumour of scarcity’ Total goods ordered
Experimental group (Dependent variation)
20 Noodles
Retailers
Randomly
Selected
R--------------------------------X2----------------------------------O
Random assignment No Treatment Posttest
of 10 Noodles retailers ‘No rumour of scarcity’ Total goods ordered
Control group (Dependent variation)

3. QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS:
Quasi-Experimental Designs do not include the use of random assignments but use other techniques to control threats to internal validity (Fraenkel and Wallen 2006:19). An example is the Non-randomized Control Group Pretest-Posttest Design.
Non-randomized Control Group Pretest-Posttest Design: The design is similar to the Randomized Pretest-Posttest Control Group Design only that no random assignment occurs. It is used to investigate a situation in which random selection and assignment are not possible. It is one of the strongest and most widely used quasi-experimental designs (Leedy, 1997:7).

LIMITATIONS OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
Despite the utility of experimental research, the study is not without some shortcomings or limitations. Tonwe (1996) summarized as follows:

I Problem of Random sampling: There are practical difficulties in random sampling, losses of cases and shrinkage in numbers in each group during the period of observation.
II Problem of Application of Probability Test: There are limitations connected with application of probability tests as means of estimating the significance of the results.
III Artificiality: The result of most laboratory research may be artificial in character and may only help in finding out some explanations to given situations. In contrast, social situation are real and pragmatic and have very limited scope for artificial research.

IV Possibility of Wrong Interpretation Due to Artificiality: Since laboratory situations are artificial, the possibility of wrongly interpreting the experimental findings exists, and poses a threat to the internal validity of such investigation (Osemwota, et al, 1996:32-33).

Experimental research in the social sciences generally is pretty difficult as it has to apply human behaviour which is largely unpredictable. Human beings can change their behaviour from time to time depending on the situation and especially when they are aware that they are being studied.

IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
I. The results of Experiments are subjected to testability.
II. The assertion made can be tested and the same conclusion will be reached using the same methods and under the same condition
III. It has scientific character and it is not based on personal limited experiences and observations (Osemwota, et al, 1996:33).

CONCLUSION
Experimental Research is generally regarded as the gold-standard on the world of research. This is basically true considering it utility in the measurement of cause-effect relationship. This paper has attempted to review experimental design and its broad classification down to specific designs and their utility.
It is worthy of mention that the applicability of the experimental research in the social sciences is pretty difficult as the study of human behaviour can hardly be subjected to a kind of laboratory research.

REFERENCE

1) Agbonifoh B.A. and Yomere G.O. (1999) Research Methodology in the Management and Social Sciences Uniben Press University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.

2) Burnham P. et. al. (2004) Research Methods in Politics Palgrave Macmillian.

3) Cauvery R. et. al. (2005) Research Methodology (for students of Social sciences. Chand and company Limited Ram Nagar.

4) Ehiamator Egbe T. and Nnandiani M. (2002) Practical Guide to Research in Education and social sciences NERA Publication Benin City.

5) Fraenkel J. K, and Wallen N.E. (2006) How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education McGraw-Hill Higher Education. Internet WWW page at URL: http://www.highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/dl/.../fraenkel4_ppt_ch13ppt.

6) Leady P. D. (1997). Practical Research Planning and Design (6th ed). Upper Saddler River NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

7) Osewmotas O. et al. (eds) (1996) Research and Statistical Methods in Social Sciences, Humanities and Education. Amfitop Book Company, Lagos.

8) Osuala E. C. (2005) Introduction to Research Methodology. Africana-First Publishers PLC (Africana Academic Books), Anambra.

9) Trochim William M. (2006) The Research Methods Knowledge Base 2nd Edition. Internet WWW page at URL: http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/ (Version current as of October 20, 2006.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN NIGERIA: A CASE OF THE 2010 ELECTORAL ACT

2011-04-28T12:25:00.001+01:00

BY

WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO
HARRISON OLUWASEYI NASIRU
PATIENCE ISOKEN EBUEKU (MRS)

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY, NIGERIA

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR
POL. 806 (PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND DECISION MAKING)

LECTURER: PROF. A.O. IKELEGBE

APRIL, 2011

ABSTRACT

Policy making is an integral part of Government which identifies good governance in any nation. Civil society has been assumed to play an important role in the policy making process in Nigeria. This paper attempts to examine the workings of the civil society’s role as it affects policy making in Nigeria. The paper identifies the nature of civil society, its aims and objectives. How the civil society is trying to positively influence governance by its contributions in the administration of Government through the roles it plays in the policy making process. We have used the system theory in analyzing the role and contribution of civil society in Nigeria using the 2010 Electoral act as a case study. This is going to be basically descriptive in approach.

INTRODUCTION

The development of any nation does not rest wholly on the government alone but on the contributions of every citizen generally and stakeholders in particular. This informed the analytical view of the role of the civil society in general and its contributions to policy making in Nigeria. The need for all hand to be on deck for the progress and development of the state cannot be over-emphasized and here in comes the civil society.
Civil society is a reinforcing mechanism for effective governance in the overall interest of the majority of the people. As democratic governance has been enthroned in Nigeria since May 29, 1999 the civil society has been persistent in it’s agitation for good governance and sustenance.
This study is focused at discussing the subject matter, civil society, its role in general term and in policy making in Nigeria with the 2010 Electoral act in focus. How has the civil society influenced policy formulation in Nigeria? In this democratic dispensation what role has it played to sustain democracy especially in the process of Electoral reform and the 2010 Electoral Act.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society has been defined variously by different scholars but it is important to state that the concept of civil society has evolved over the years. From a historical perspective, the actual meaning of the concept of civil society has changed twice from its original classical form. The Wikipedia elucidates that the first change occurred after the French Revolution, the second during the fall of communism in Europe.
In the classical era, the concept of civil society was seen as synonymous with good society. Generally, civil society was referred to as a political association governing social conflict through the imposition of rules that restrain citizens from harming one another (Edward 2004:6). In the modern era, G.W.F Hegel completely changed the meaning of civil society, giving rite to a modern liberal understanding of it as a form of market society as opposed to institutions of modern nation state. Hegel held that civil society had emerged at the particular period of capitalism and served its interest: Individual rights and private property (Dhanagare 2001:169). Hence, he used the German term “burgerliche Gesellschaft” to denote civil society as “Civilian Society” – a sphere regulated by the civil code (Zaleski 2008). The second change in civil society conceptualization in what is referred to as the post-modern era. The post modern way of understanding civil society was first developed by the political opposition in the former Soviet block East European countries in the 1980s. From then, the term civil society replaced that of political society. However, in the 1990s with the emergence of the nongovernmental organization and the new social movements (NSMs) on a global scale, civil society as a third sector became a key terrain of strategic action to construct an alternative social and world order. Henceforth, postmodern usage of the idea of civil society became divided into two main as political society and as the third sector (www.wikipedia.org). On this basis, the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia puts that civil society is composed of the totality of voluntary social relationships, civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as distinct from the force backed structures of a state (regardless of that states political system) and the commercial institutions of the market. Together, state, market and civil society constitute the entirety of a society and the relations between these components determine the character of a society and its structure. The London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society postulates that civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests purposes and values. In theory, its institutional form is distinct from those of the state and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embrace, a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s organization, faith based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups (www.wikipedia. org).
The civil society is more than just a formation. It is a site, a realm, a theatre and an instrument (Ikelegbe 2003). It possesses the capability to corporate with, engage, antagonize, contend and influence the state on behalf of the citizenry. The civil society is a realm of discourse, of interest articulation and aggregation, of deliberation of common affairs and of exchange between the civil society formation and other forces. It is also a context where citizen organizations relate and interact with the state, to influence moderate and cooperate or to oppose, resist, challenge and struggle against it. It can be regarded as an arena where self organized and autonomous groups engage the stage in hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles for domination, accommodation and opposition (Ikelegbe 2005, Abutudu 1997, Adejumobi 2001; Chazan 1994, Shaw 1994). The civil society in its engagement of the state, attempts to articulate and influence public policies in favour of the popular classes. It is also important in the assessment; measurement and evaluation of the impact of public policies on the masses as it acts as an organized instrument through which the citizenry interacts with the State.

THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC POLICY

Public policy has been defined by various scholars in different ways. Carl Friedrich in Ikelegbe (2006:3) defined public policy as the proposed course of action of the government or one of its divisions. Egonmwan (2000:1) defined public policy as important action of government. Olamiyi (1998:17) defined public policy as the management of human and material resources by policy actors to address a policy problem identified at any point in time while Ikelegbe (2006:3) defined public policy as governmental actions or course of actions, or proposed actions or course of proposed actions that are directed at achieving certain goals. From the foregoing it is evident that public policy in governmental action to remedy perceived societal problems.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The system theory was propounded by David Easton and it describes public policy as an output of the political system. The theory conceives of political activity as essentially involving the environment, the political system and output (Ikelegbe 2006:36). The environment is where demands arises and are placed on the political system. Demands of different kinds emanate in a society and are expressed through various methods upon the political system.
The political system is made up of institutions, processes and government personnel, (Ikelegbe 2006:37) and the political system is the processor of the demands (inputs) from different societal groups into outputs which are the public policy. The authoritative allocations or outputs are the public policies. Public policies are the reaction of the political system to environmental demands and pressure (Ikelegbe 2006:37).
The kind of society determines the type of policy demands. In an autocratic society the policy demand will essentially be that of political reforms or demand for democratization. The nature of the political system whether developed or developing determines its ability to process accurately the demands from the environment.
The outputs which are public policies are continually responded to by the citizenry and this is feedback to the system that brings about new policies or the modification of existing policies (Ikelegbe 2006:37).
All theoretical frameworks have its limitations and the system theory is not an exception. Ikelegbe (2006:37) observes that the theory assumes that policies are environmental input converted by the political system. It fails to recognize that the characteristics of the political system itself may have considerable independent effect on the content of policies. Despite this, the system theory has the advantage of insights into the totality of the policy process and the interactions between the component parts.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN NIGERIA: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The evolution of civil society in Nigeria could be traced back to the colonial era when nationalists resisted and strived to put an end to the colonial domination and subjugation of the country.
The nationalists struggle and opposition to colonial rule was strengthened by the formation of civil society organizations like the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, the Jamiyar Mutanin Arewa etc. These organizations were used as spring boards to express the wishes and aspirations of the citizens. It is worthy of note that some of these organizations later metamorphosed into political parties in attempts to seek power.
Taking a cue from the foregoing, we can ascertain that civil society formations in Nigeria have a very long history of existence, so the present status of Nigerian civil society could be said to be an appendage of historical evolution of a vibrant social structure in the polity in order to guide against the subversion of the will of the people (Omodia and Erunke 2007).
Under the military regimes in Nigeria, there were attempts to stop, reduce or manipulate the activities of the civil society. This is not unexpected as we may attest to the fact that civil society organizations thrive better in free democratic and liberal society. The civil society under the military, struggled to survive and credit could be ascribed to it as a major part of the final ouster of military rule in Nigeria. Organization like NADECO, Civil Liberty Organization, Campaign for Democracy etc were part of the civil society that fought against the subversion of the will of Nigerians and enthronement of democracy.
Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the state has become relatively open to criticism and allows inputs from the public space. By implication, therefore, the various interests are largely articulated in the scheme of the nation’s policy making processes for an enhanced socio-economic and political development in Nigeria (Omodia and Erunke 2007). There has been proliferation and strengthening of civil society organizations (CSOs) influence public policies in different spheres of the social political life of Nigerians. These civil society organizations cut across the academia, activist groups, charities, clubs, community organizations, cooperatives, churches, cultural groups, environmental groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), professional associations, trade unions, women’s groups etc. Some of the prominent civil society organizations are the Save Nigeria Group, OPC, Ijaw Youth Movement, Campaign for Democracy (CD); Women in Nigeria (WIN), Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), Constitutional Rights Projects (CRP), United Action for Democracy (UAD); National Democratic Coalition (NADECO); Joint Action Committee of Nigeria (JACON); Democratic Alternatives (DA); National Association of Seadogs (NAS); etc.

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)

Civil society organizations are very important to the policy makers or the state as they are better placed to know population needs in terms of development and good governance. In recent years, CSOs have become more prominent, more visible and more diverse all over the world. One of the factors influencing the growth of CSOs has been the increased challenge to imbalances of power between state and its structures on the one hand and civil society on the other. This has being driven by many forces such as reactions to centralized authority in state structures, dissatisfaction with state performance on public services and dissatisfaction with policy positions taken by the state in international arenas. CSO networks have been formed within and across countries to promote a wider support to public interests on global policy issues such as human rights environment, debt recovery development and health etc (www.who.int). The CSOs have the responsibility to influencing public policy processes including counter balancing of commercial interest and consensus building on societal priorities. The CSO also provide a legal authority for public participation and the enhancement of civic education and expanding opportunities for greater involvement in governmental programs. Attahiru Jaga enumerated roles of civil societies in Nigeria when he listed three roles thus:
• The promotion and defense of the constitution and rule of law
• The enhancement of the integrity and efficacy of the democratic institutions and processes as well as
• The development of a viable democratic political culture in the polity.
In other words, civil society can positively contribute to sustainability of democracy by legitimizing and entrenching institutions, processes and the culture of democracy, as well as by contesting, de-legitimizing and opposing authoritarian, undemocratic and uncivil practices and dispositions (Jega 2007:247).

THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE FORMULATION OF THE 2010 NIGERIAN ELECTORAL ACT

There had been an overwhelming consensus among Nigerians that the electoral system was in dire need of reform. Since the return to civil rule in 1999, all the elections conducted and even the 2007 election that brought the President Yar’Adua government to power had been flawed by both local and international observers. Different reasons for this electoral aberration have been put forward from the people to the government and even the international community but that is not the focus of this paper.
On August 28, 2007, late President Musa Yar’Adua fulfilling promises made during his inauguration speech which was a consequence of the continuous clamour of the civil society to reform Nigeria’s electoral system, appointed a 22-member Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) headed by Hon. Justice Muhammadu Lawal Uwais, former Chief Justice of Nigeria. The Committee was composed of prominent individuals from both public and private sector. The committee’s mandate was to examine the entire electoral process with a view of ensuring that we raise the quality and a standard of our general elections and thereby deepen our democracy. During its proceedings, the committee received 1,466 memoranda from both Nigerian and the international community and held Public hearings in 12 states and Abuja, the Nigerian capital during which 907 presentations were made (www.electoralreformnetwork.org). The submission of memoranda, public hearings and presentations marked a concrete step towards the 2010 Electoral Act and the contributions of the civil society in the amendment and re-amendment of the act. The committee was as it were expected to interact with the citizens and seek their wishes concerning the electoral system. It was practically impossible to hear the views of every Nigerian. So the most practicable was to engage the civil society organizations as their views are perceived to be the views of the mass population.
The systems theory as earlier discussed conceives of political activity as essentially involving the environment, the political system and output. The environment consists of the objective conditions and forces that generate demand and support input. Demand, are the articulated needs, problems and aspirations which are brought to bear upon the political system (Ikelegbe 2006:36-37). The civil society being populated by social-political groups that relate with the State in the interest of the masses is a part of the environment. It is the civil society which is a component of the environment that articulates the needs, problems and aspiration of the environment and therefore places the demand on the political system or state for onward processing and subsequent output in the form of public policies.
The scenario painted above was the case in the formulation of the 2010 Electoral Act in Nigeria. There was the problem of bad leadership that was traceable to the manipulated electoral system. The environment or the mass population had clamoured for the amendment of the Electoral Act as a panacea to the electoral fraud being perpetuated by the political class. This wishes and aspirations were channeled through the civil society to the political system. The civil society organizations influence on the policy process occurs at every stage. They are active in the initiation, generation and formulation of public policies and in the determination of their content and direction (Ikelegbe 2006:116). The civil society groups were active in the initiation of the Electoral Reform. This role was performed through criticisms of the electoral system and the Independent National Electoral Commission that facilitated the elections that returned civilian governments to power. These criticisms were put forward through the mass media, public debates, seminars etc.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS ROLE IN ELECTORAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ARTICULATION

Civil society in Nigeria has been critical of the manner in which the electoral process has been managed; in particular, in respect of the voters register, voter education, and election observation. The large numbers, expertise, and geographical reach of civil society organizations give them great potentials to play a strong role in the electoral process, and in conflict prevention and resolution.
The main issues raised by civil society representatives regarding electoral administration include: INEC’s lack of independence and impartiality, limited civil society access to INEC, inaccuracy of the voters register, lack of transparency and credibility in the determination of results, and late granting or refusal of domestic observers accreditation. Civil groups were also critical of political parties’ lack of ideological differentiation, lack of intra-party democracy, the use of thugs and intimidation, and abuse of state resources by incumbent powers at both federal and state levels. The pervasiveness of corruption was also identified as a fundamental obstacle in the electoral process (www.nigeria.usembassy.gov).

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS ROLE IN POLICY AGENDA PROCESS: THE ELECTORAL REFORM PROCESS

The persisting clamour/demand for electoral reform started yielding results when the late President Yar’adua in his inauguration speech acknowledged the flaws in the electoral process that brought him to power and promised a reform of the process. This promise culminated in the set-up of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) in 2008. The ERCs attempt at generating a policy document had to return them to the civil society through whom the people’s aspirations are articulated. The ERC requested for memoranda and presentations at public hearings from mainly the Civil Society Organizations. The role of the civil society became evident again as they articulated the desires of the environment in an effort to influence and place demand on the political system.
The ERC commenced its work with a public Call for Memoranda followed by release of a schedule for public hearings that held in 12 venues across the country. In recognition of the importance of the work of the ERC, civil society groups met at a number of strategy meetings to map out a plan for effective engagement of the ERC. One of such meetings held in September 2007, where it was agreed that the key civil society coalitions focused on constitutional and electoral reforms should seek a unified platform for engaging the work of the ERC. In response to this, the Civil Society Coordinating Committee on Electoral Reforms (CSCC) was set up with the following groups as member:
• Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)
• Alliance For Credible Elections (ACE)
• Electoral Reform Network (ERN)
• Transition Monitoring Group (TMG)
• National Coalition On Affirmative Action (NCAA)
• Gender And Constitutional Reform Network (GECORN)
• Citizens Forum For Constitutional Reform (CFCR)
The Alliance for Credible Elections (ACE) was nominated as the secretariat of the CSCC.
Following the establishment of the CSCC, the secretariats of the member coalitions met to develop a joint plan of action. The following activities were implemented on the platform of the CSCC:
• Commissioning of experts to develop position papers on thematic areas covered in the ERC’s terms of reference
• 2 expert meetings
• Zonal Civil society consultations on the position papers
• Consultations with special interest groups (women, political parties, religious groups, organized private sector) on electoral reforms
• Judicial colloquium on electoral reforms
• Civil society participation at the public hearings organized by the ERC
• National civil society validation meeting
The CSCC came up with a civil society charter. Though the positions contained in this charter were initially drafted by commissioned experts, the positions were widely deliberated upon by a cross section of stakeholders across the country at the various consultations facilitated by the CSCC (CSCC, 2008).
The CSCC made useful recommendations to the ERC on
-the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & State Independent Electoral Commission (SIECs)
1. Model of INEC & SIECs
2. Composition of INEC & SIECs
3. Appointment into INEC
3.1. INEC Commissioners
3.2. Chairperson of INEC
3.3. Executive Secretary and Resident Secretary of INEC
4. Finance and Administration of the Commission
5. Tenure of office
5.1. Chairperson of the Commission
5.2. National Commissioners
-the conduct of elections
1. Voter registration
2. Voting system
3. Declaration of election results
4. Voter education
5. Ad-hoc staff for electoral duties etc.
Recommendations were also made on civil society, media and media regulatory agencies, women, persons living with disabilities, youth, international community, political parties, security agencies, electoral justice system, prosecution of Electoral Offences, election Petitions, and other legislations that have bearing on the electoral process (CSCC, 2008).
The Nigerian Labour Congress made presentation at the public hearing on electoral reforms on Thursday, 26 June, 2008, at the ECOWAS secretariat, Abuja were it clearly stated positions in line with the CSCC (www.nlcng.org). These memoranda and presentations were made to the ERC whom in this case is a governmental actor acting on behalf of the executive in the policy process. This was designed to influence the governmental actors to incorporate these demands and choices into the Electoral Act which is the policy action in this case.

THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE NIGERIA ELECTORAL POLICY CHOICE

The ERC submitted its final report to the President on December 12, 2008. The report concluded that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the State Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) lacked the necessary independence to perform their duties (www.electoralreformnetwork.org). The ERC made critical recommendations in its report and in response to this report; the government released a white paper on March 11, 2009 indicating its readiness to implement some, not all of the recommendations. On April 30, 2009, the President submitted 7 bills in this regard to the National Assembly (Owodiong-Idemeko 2009). There was great delay in the passage of the bill which prompted further role by the civil society organization. The Electoral Reform Network, a network of over 100 civil society organization dedicated to the reform of Nigeria’s electoral system on 15th September 2009 organized a Civil Society-Legislative consultative Forum at the National Assembly Complex Abuja. The consultative forum attracted members of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Reform, Civil Society Organizations and members of the media (www.electoralreformnetwork.org). The consultative forum had as its purpose the creation of an avenue for dialogue on the review of the 1999 constitution and the electoral process in Nigeria. This was just one of the many efforts of the civil society to influence the passage of the electoral act. There was also the Strategy meeting for Civil Society Organizations on Constitutional and Electoral Reforms organized by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). The theme of the strategy meeting held at the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja on Thursday September 10, 2009 was Constitutional and Electoral Reform Process in Nigeria – Towards Effective Citizen’s participation. It was attended by representatives of various Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), political pressure groups, the Conference of Nigeria Political Parties, the academia and the media. The meeting took place against the background of calls on CSOs and other political pressure groups in the country to re-think their strategy towards ensuring that both the executive and legislative arms of government implement much-needed electoral and constitutional reforms agenda especially in the wake of popular clamour for the adoption of the main recommendations of the Justice Uwais led Electoral Reform Panel (OSIWA, 2009). The Electoral Act was finally passed in 2010 after some amendments by the National Assembly and assented to by the President. This is now a policy which is the output of the demand placed on the political system by the environment represented by the civil society.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE ELECTORAL ACT

The policy document does not end the role of the civil society as they are also involved in the development of a viable democratic political culture in the polity (Jega 2007:247). The CSOs continue in the education of the populace on the democratic process, electoral procedures and the importance of political participation. This was elaborated by Ikelegbe (2006:117) when he elucidates that groups influence the implementation of policies too. They enhance implementation of policy programmes through their support, cooperation and participation. In this case, they are participating actively to ensure that the electoral process is properly implemented.
Domestic Civil Society Organisations were engaged in a positive dialogue with INEC, playing an important role in promoting the rule of law, the adherence to election regulations, and encouraging an overall orderly electoral process. CSO’s dialogue platforms brought to public attention among other issues, logistical and operational challenges during the registration and voting processes, voters’ lists shortcomings, instances of electoral malpractices, the need for enhanced civic education on voting procedures, concerns about the security of the ballot and voters, and called for the establishment of INEC Election Day hotlines (EU, 2011:37).
The European Union Election Observation Mission to Nigeria Final Report on the 2011 General Election captured explicitly the different roles of the CSOs in the implementation of the electoral act and in the 2011 electoral process in Nigeria. Worth mentioning is the Election Situation Room, a joint platform of 28 CSO’s actively engaged in cooperation with the electoral authorities. Its main concerns were the performance of the law enforcement agencies and political parties, and the role of the judiciary in the electoral process. The Election Situation Room identified security hotspots ahead of the polls and widely called on political parties to condemn and refrain from violence. The 2011 Project Swift Count, a partnership of four well-established CSO’s observed the general election in all 774 LGA’s and provided stakeholders with real-time information on the conduct of the polls. Swift Count also conducted parallel vote counting for the Presidential election, presenting their findings in a timely and professional manner. The National Elections incident Centre (NEIC) managed an internet based map on incidents with popular participation. The Independent Republic Institute (IRI) in partnership with INEC and political stakeholders, contributing to the signing of the Code of Conduct for political parties, while the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in collaboration with the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) produced information on the voters mandate protection. Also the CLEEN Foundation published guidelines for the conduct of Police Officers on Electoral Duty. The CSO “Enough is enough” established a platform to track information on social media that allowed to monitor the conduct of elections and violence, and to interact constructively with INEC and security agencies. A number of State-based and regional CSO’s were also noted to observe the electoral process throughout the country. The electoral commission received technical assistance from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in the areas of voters’ registration, voter and civic education, training of staff, election dispute resolution systems, and in the capacity building of judges and lawyers to administer and facilitate the election dispute resolution (European Union, 2011:37-38). The contribution of the civil society organization is evident in the positive comments made on the 2011 elections by both local and international observers.

CONCLUSION

The civil society which is made up various groups, the professional groups, religious groups, market guilds, road transport workers union, development associations, environmental protection organizations and even secret cults seek to influence public policy with specific proposals to suit not only or necessarily their interest but that of the masses. The articulation of the peoples interest is carried out by the civil society organizations through submission of specific proposals for legislation or working through legislative or executive officials to ensure the enactment of policy proposals favourable to the entire society (Egonmwan 2000:119).
This paper has reviewed how the civil society has been able to influence the policy making process of the state in the enactment of the 2010 Electoral Act in Nigeria. In its review which has been basically descriptive in approach, it applied the system theory as a basis of analysis. We have observed and analyzed that the demand or support from the environment to the political process is mainly articulated by the civil society organizations. These articulated issues determine, guide and influence the state or government or better still, governmental policy actors’ policy agenda and subsequent policy choice and even the implementation. The output of the political process is the public policy which is meant to impact directly on the people. The impact or non-impact of these public policies will generate feedback which is again fed back to the political system either as demand or support as articulated by the civil society on behalf of the environment for a continued process.

REFERENCES

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Ikelegbe, Augustine O (2003). Civil society and alternative approaches to conflict management in Nigeria in T.A. Imobighe ed. Civil society and ethnic conflict management in Nigeria: Spectrum Books, Ibadan 36-77 cited in A.O. Ikelegbe Engendering Civil Society: oil, women groups and resource conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in Journal of Modern African Studies 43, 2, 241-70: Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom.

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INTERNET SOURCES

CDC holds voters education on new Electoral Act http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/03/cdc-holds-voters-education-on-new-electoral-act/ Retrieved 11-04-2011

http://www.electoralreformnetwork.org/ Retrieved 11-04-2011

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm. Retrieved 11-04-2011

Civil Society http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/civil_society Retrieved 11-04-2011

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

2011-04-05T02:21:00.002+01:00

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

PRESENTED BY

WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO

BEING A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY, NIGERIA

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE COURSE REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

COURSE LECTURER
DR. M.I.M. ABUTUDU

APRIL, 2011

ABSTRACT

The history of humans has been that of interaction. This interaction has grown from intra-state to inter-state. Interaction can be studied and the determinant of state actions described. This paper focuses on the interaction between Israel and Egypt. It reviews the history of this interaction, the present Political instability in Egypt, the response of Israel to this Egyptian Political instability and an attempt is made at analyzing Israel’s stand and the determinant of this position using the realist approach to Foreign Policy Analysis.

INTRODUCTION

For almost half of its existence as a State, of all its neighbours, Israel has enjoyed its most cordial relations with Egypt, particularly under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Egypt occupies a strategic position in the Middle East, with control of the Suez Canal, the main maritime thoroughfare for trade between East and West. Throughout its recent history Egypt has been at the Political and Cultural forefront of pan-Arabism. With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Egypt took a lead role in the struggle for Palestinian rights in the land occupied by the new state. From 1948 to 1973 Egypt was a key participant in the wars that broke out between Israel and its neighbours (www.memonitor.org.uk 2011:1).

In 1967, Israel instigated a war by destroying the entire Egyptian Airforce on the ground in a “pre-emptive” strike. With war between Israel and Egypt-Jordan-Syria broke out, Israel occupied Sinai and the Gaza strip (as well as the West Bank and Syrian Golan Heights). Gaza had been administered by Egypt since 1948. The Israel defense forces took control of the whole Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal (Six Day War) www.memonitor.org.uk 2011:2).

In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an operation to claim back the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights but the UN passed resolution 339 calling for cease fire. The Egyptian government agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the Israelis and on the 26th of March 1979 the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in Washington, DC following the 1978 Camp David Accords and the Egyptian Presidents visit to Israel in 1977. The peace treaty was signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin and witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter (www.wikipedia.org Camp David Accords-Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs). The main features of the 1979 Peace Treaty are as follows:
1. Mutual recognition of each country which made Egypt officially the first Arab country to recognize Israel.
2. Complete withdrawal of Israel troops from the Sinai Peninsula and the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israel war.
3. Egypt agreed to leave Sinai Peninsula demilitarized.
4. Free passage of Israel ships through the Suez Canal and recognition of the strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Agaba and the Taba-Rafah straits as international water ways.
5. The US was also to begin economic and military aid to Egypt and political backing for its governments (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/egypt.htm).

According to the Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East, “The normalization of relations (between Israel and Egypt) went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchange in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt’s National Assembly the same month and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular Airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel
with crude oil” (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PeaceProcess/GuidetothePeaceProcess/CampDavidAccords).

From the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978 until 2000, the United States has subsidized Egypt’s Armed forces with over $38 billion worth of aid. Egypt receives about $2 billion annually (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/egypt.htm).

REALISM THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The realism approach is a normative approach to the study of international relations. Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger are famous realists.
The fundamental basis of political realism is the concept of “interest defined in terms of power” it assumes that, in the formulation of foreign policy, what matters is the interest of the nation. The idea of interest is of the essence in politics and it is forever there through time and place (Ejiofor, 1981). Sultan Khan argues that realism seeks to preserve political autonomy and territorial integrity of nation states. Once basic interests are secured, national interest may take different forms. Some states may have an interest in securing more resources or land; other states may wish to expand their own political or economic systems into other areas. Generally speaking, national interest must be defined in terms of power (www.homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/Competing%20World%20Views-Lamborn.htm).
C. Alden argues that Foreign Policy Analysis starting point is the state and its interactions with other states, be this through direct bilateral relations or through multilateral institutions such as the United Nation. In keeping with the realist paradigm, Foreign Policy Analysis understands the state to be a unitary actor in order to assess a state’s foreign policy. In this context, a key concept in Foreign Policy Analysis is that of the ‘national interest’ (Alden, 2006). Hans J. Morgenthau in his analysis of realism put forth six principles:
1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. He posits that to give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline. In order words we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain circumstances and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must solve his problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he act in a rational manner). Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can analysis what their objectives might have been (Morgenthau, 2006:4).
2. Morgenthau posited that statesman “think and act in terms of interest defined as power and that historical evidence proves this assumption (Morgenthau, 2006). This concept, central to Morgenthau’s realism, gives continuity and unity to the seemingly diverse foreign policies of the widely separated nation-states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). In Morgenthau’s views the concept of national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interests. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous adjustment of conflicting interest by diplomatic action (Morgenthau, 1952). This assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman –past, present or future– has taken or will take on the political scene (Morgenthau, 2006:5).
3. Realism assumes that it’s key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all (Morgenthau, 2006:10). However, in a world in which sovereign nations via for power, the foreign policies of all nations must consider survival the minimum goal of foreign policy. All nations are compelled to protect “their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations”. Thus, national interest is identified with national survival. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990).
4. Realism maintain that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Morgenthau argues that morality in the pursuit of national interest differs from that of individual relationship. Realism, then considers prudence –the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions- to be the supreme virtue of politics (Morgenthau, 2006:12).
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe (Morgenthau, 2006:12), when foreign policy analysis is done under the framework of national interest which is defined in terms of power, we are able to objectively explain different state actions and then pursue policies that respect the interests of other states while protecting our national interest (Morgenthau, 2006).
6. On the sixth principle, Morgenthau emphasizes the autonomy of the political sphere he argues that intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth, the lawyer of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist of the conformity of action with moral principles. He maintains that political actions should be judged by political criteria (Morgenthau 2006:13).

LIMITATIONS OF REALISM

Different theoretical approaches to the study of international relations have received criticism and Realism is no exception.

The concept of National interest as defined by realist has been criticized. They argue that National interest as a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and un-illuminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of the national interest (Cook and Moos, 1953:28). Moreover, it is difficult to give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. Statesmen are constrained or given freedom by many forces in interpreting the national interest. They are often the captives of their predecessors’ policies. They interpret national interest as a result of their cultural training, values and the data made available to them as decision-makers (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:124).

Realism has also been criticized for placing too much emphasis on Power as the principal behaviour. They argue that the concept of power has not been clearly conceptualized. The measurement of power or the unit for the measurement of power has not been provided by realist writings; moreover, power must be related to the objective for which it is to be used. The amount and type of power vary with national goals. In addition, realists have been criticized for allegedly having placed too much emphasis on power, to the relative exclusion of other important variables (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:126).

These criticisms not withstanding, realism has been the most important attempt at the study of power as a key variable in political behaviour. In Robert O. Keohane’s words “Realism provides a good starting point for the analysis of cooperation and discord “(Keohane, 1984:245). On this basis, I shall attempt to analyse Israel’s foreign policy in its relation to Egypt and her current political instability, Israel’s specific position as it affects Egypt, what is at stake and what Israel stands to gain or loss given specific scenario.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS

In Egypt, discontent with life in the autocratic, police state has simmered under the surface for years. There has also been growing discontent over economic woes, poverty, unemployment, corruption and police abuses. Even with the long-standing Egyptian discontent, it appears the Tunisian experience was enough to push many young Egyptians into the street for the first time. Social media tools, such as Twitter and Facebook were used extensively to rally support for the protesters as instructions were sent out to people on why, when and where to gather via them.

On 25th January, 2011, demonstrators were gathered peacefully in central Cairo demanding an end to Mubarak’s nearly 30 years regime and the economic woes that has accompanied it. As the crowds filled Cairo’s Tahrir Square –waving Egyptian and Tunisian flags and adopting the same protest chants that have rung out in the streets of Tunis, the police blasted the crowds with water cannons and set upon them with batons and tear gas in an attempt to clear the demonstrators shouting “Down with Mubarak”. So the protest turned violent.

There were further demonstration in the preceding days in major cities likes Cairo, Alexandria and Suez. This resulted in lots of death estimated by the Human Right Watch as not less than 300 people with about 2,000 injured
(http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2011/01/29/f-fag-egypt-uprising.html).

Series of attempts were made by the Mubarak regime to stop the unrest but all to know avail. President Mubarak assured that he will not contest for another term of office, he sacked the Cabinet and appointed a new one and he also appointed a Vice President (Vanguard: Jan. 29, Feb. 1 & 2, 2011). He made appeals to the demonstrators through public broadcast on the public television but none of theses could pacify the demonstrators. He finally relinquished power to the Supreme Military Council 18 days after the demonstration started.

ISRAEL’S NATIONAL INTEREST AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Israel faces acute security predicaments spawned by the rapid changing political dynamics in the Middle East. Israel’s security predicaments would not have been all that acute had the political upheaval currently underway in the Arab world of the Greater Middle East had been localized to one or two of her Arab neighbours. Israel’s security environment becomes threatening and a matter of strategic concern as the political upheaval in the Arab world is today spreading far and wide like a ‘tsunami’. The situation becomes more startling for Israel as the mainstay of Israel’s security, its 32 year old Peace Treaty with Egypt authored and under written by the United State, today is shrouded in uncertainty with the overthrow of the pro-Israel regime of President Hosni Mubarak (www.eurasiareview.com).

Through out the 18 days protest in Egypt, the Israeli government remained relatively silent on the crisis except for Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu’s Press event with visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Natanyahu said the demonstration Paralyzing Cairo and other major Egyptian cities weren’t instigated by the Muslim Brotherhood movement but that as one of the few organized opposition groups in the Arab country, the movement could “take advantage” of the situation to enhance its power. He further said he was monitoring events with “vigilance and worry” and feared radical Islamists could take advantage of any leadership vacuum (Williams, 2011).

The fear of the Brotherhood taking over the Egyptian government is not far fetched, given the statement credited to the current Brotherhood supreme leader, Mohamed Badi in 2010 “(We will) continue to raise the banner of jihad against the Jews, (our) first and foremost enemies….. Resistance is the only solution against the Zion-American arrogance and tyranny, and all we need is for the Arab and Muslim people to stand behind it and support it …… We say to our brothers the Mujahideen in Gaza; be patient, persist in (your Jihad), and know that Allah is with you”. (www.daphneanson.blogspot.com/2011/02/muslim-brotherhoods-Jihad-against-Jews.html). The Muslim Brotherhood movement is a deeply conservative Islamic movement, which wants to move Egypt from secularism to the rule of the Quran but was banned by the Egyptian government. Following the anti-government protests in Egypt the movement was re-energized. In an interview with NHK TV, Rashad Al-Bayoumi -the Deputy leader of the movement in Egypt said that there was a need to dissolve the peace treaty with Israel (http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/2668051/posts). The well organized group, though banned in Egypt has gained popularity in part for its opposition to President Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade rule. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood members –posing as independents- won 20 percent of seats in Egypt’s parliament (www.theisraelproject.org).

The issue of National Interest is of the greatest essence to the Israeli nation-state. This national interest includes her national security, territorial integrity, political autonomy and power. Adopting the realist model, a statesman is assumed to be rational in approaching the circumstance that threatens to ouster the pro-Israel government in Egypt. The foreign policy of Israel must consider national survival as its minimum goal, so therefore, Israel must seek to protect and sustain an Egyptian government that has maintained a peace treaty with her for three decade. There is also the likelihood that an ouster of the Mubarak government would bring in an Islamic fundamentalist government in the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood; it is only rational to support an arrangement that will maintain the status-quo.

Kevin Rosner, Senior fellow at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security in Washington DC told the Daily News that “it is the vast cache of unknowns that underscores the greatest Israeli concern”. The main problems for Israel is the fact that the region still sees Israel as an aggressive state, while most of these societies vying for change at home have actually not changed. The inability of observers to predict the future political make-up of the region’s regimes is a real concern to Israel (www.hurriyetdailynews.com). Israel is usually a country where politicians have an opinion on any topic, and vociferously so. But on the political crisis in Egypt, Israel’s leadership has been unusually silent. “We are closely monitoring the events, but we do not interfere in the internal affairs of a neighbouring state”, was the comment from the Israeli Foreign Ministry (www.spiegel.de). This position is very unlike that of the United States, presently the greatest Israeli ally who finally went on air to support change as advocated by the Egyptian protesters. The Israeli position was a clear support for the Mubarak regime not necessarily for the interest of Mubarak or Egypt but for the national interest of Israel in maintaining her power and her territory. This Israeli stand may be viewed as amoral being that it is ignoring the cries and aspirations of the Egyptian protesters for a more participatory, concerned and democratic government but realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of a state in abstraction but that morality must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions has guided the Israeli position.

In power struggles, nations follow policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. In Morgenthau’s view, domestic and international politics can be reduced to one of three basic types: (1) to keep power, (2) to increase power, or (3) to demonstrate power. Although the purpose of a status quo policy is to preserve the existing distribution of power, the nation adopting such a policy does not necessarily act to prevent all international change; instead, status quo nations seek to thwart changes that may produce fundamental shifts in the international distribution of power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:97). Israel has sought to maintain the status quo in its silence and adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach.

True to the resilience of the Egyptian people, the government of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and the Military is now in power and they are expected to guide the country to the type of constitutional and democratic changes the people had fought and died for. The pro-Israeli government led by Mubarak for about 3 decades has been overthrown against the hope of majority of the Israeli officials. Now the Israelis have to anticipated the worse and hope for the best.

The worse situation as anticipated by the Israelis is the enthronement of the Muslim Brotherhood via a democratic process. If the Brotherhood seizes power, experts and scholars have expressed different opinion at what will be their likely relationship with Israel. Some are of view that it will lead to an Iranian-style theocratic regime which would be a nightmare for Washington and Israel. That will mean a destruction of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and a teaming up of Egypt with other Arab nation against Israel. Bilal Hassen, a renowned Palestinian writer and political analyst writes that some experts who are of the view of a review of the peace treaty would want Egypt to handle this particular case in line with it own interest. The agreement signed with Israel stipulates that its articles may be reconsidered after every 15 years, and this date has passed twice without any form of view. There are numerous articles that could be reviewed. For example, the full sovereignty of the Sinai Peninsula should be transferred to Egypt, from a stage of (theoretical) acknowledgement, as it is currently, to a complete, tangible transfer. Egypt has a right to exist freely in Sinai, with regard to security, the army, the mobility of the people, construction work, and the cities and factories there. Some also believe that the Muslim Brotherhood will evaluate the Israel-Egypt relationship on the basis of Israel’s policy towards Arabs and the Palestinians in particular. Such a policy is characterized by aggression, a perpetual preparation for a state of war, and rejection of any serious moves towards political settlement (www.aawsat.com). On the other side of the argument are those that believe that the Muslim Brotherhood movement is less extreme than the hard-line clerics who rule Iran. Michael Singh, visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that first and foremost, there is no figure in the Muslim Brotherhood who is equivalent to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite cleric who led the toppling of the Iranian government (Sterling, 2011). There is an assumption that the Brotherhood will adhere to the Peace Agreement signed with Israel, due to the fact that it is an international convention, and because the decision to shift from a state of peace to a state of war is not an easy one. Furthermore, America’s economic and military weight in Egypt promotes the necessity to maintain existing relations with Israel. Dr Lieberman is of the view that the days of challenging Israel to rebuild pan-Arab credentials are over…. In the peace treaty, Egypt got back the Sinai. So there will be no incentive to fight Israel. He argues that a full break with Israel would not help Egypt that is the second largest recipient of U.S aid -after the Jewish state- Cairo picks up $1.3 billion annually in U.S military assistance and $815 million in economic aid. Lorenzo Piras argues that if there is war between Egypt and Israel, Egypt is likely to lose the war based partly on the following reasons.
1. Arab allies may not be easy as there is hardly any Arab unity as it was 3 decades ago.
2. Israel has defeated Egypt for 4 times. This is very important for the fighting spirit of soldiers.
3. The training level of the Tsahal military specialists in Israel is mush higher than in Egypt (www.profi-forex.us).

Israel has remained relatively silent even in all these debates. The pursuit of her national interest is the driver of this present silence. Israel watched helplessly as the pro-Israel government led by Mubarak was being overthrown and now Israel has continued to watch hoping that the next democratic election would not bring an anti-Israel government in Egypt. Even if this happens, Israel will always act in the protection of her national interest which holds territorial integrity, political autonomy/power, and national survival as basic.

CONCLUSION

In a world where sovereign nations vie for power, the foreign policies of all nations must consider survival the minimum goal of foreign policy. All nations are compelled to protect “their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations! Thus national interest is identified with national survival (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990).

This paper has reviewed the Egypt-Israel relationship especially under the present political instability in Egypt; attempts have also been made to analyze possible scenarios and likely effect on the relationship. It is the view of this paper that the relative silent posture taken by Israel so far is in the protection of the Israeli national interest which has been analyzed to involve among others its national survival.

The continued existence and recognition of Israel as a sovereign state is an issue of basic interest to her and any type of government in Egypt that respects this territorial integrity will maintain a cordial relationship with Israel but on the contrary, a rusty relationship will exist and Israel will go ahead to protect her national interest even through military means.

REFERENCES
Akinboye Solomon O; Nigeria’s foreign policy in Anifowose R. and Enemu F. C. (ed.), Elements of Politics, Malthouse Press 1999.
Akinboye Solomon O and Ottoh Ferdinand O; A Systematic Approach to International Relations: Concept Publications, Lagos 2005
Alden C; Foreign policy analysis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2006
Cook, Thomas I. and Moos Malcolm; The American Idea of International Interest, American Political Science Review XLVII March 1953
Dougherty James E. and Pfaltzgraff Robert L. Jr.; Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 1990
Ejiofor, L. U; Africa in World Politics, Onitsha: African Educational Publishers (Nig.) Ltd., 1981
Keohane Robert O; After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 1984
Morgenthau, Hans J.; Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of United States, American Political Science Review, LXVI, December 1952
Morgenthau, Hans J.; Politics among Nations: The Struggle for power and peace revised by Thompson K. W. and Clinton D. W: McGraw Hill Higher Education, New York 2006
Stoessinger, John G.;Why Nations Go to War: Palgrave Macmilian, London 2001.
Vanguard, Saturday, January 29, 2011
Vanguard, Tuesday, February 1, 2011
Vanguard, Wednesday, February 2, 2011

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FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF CONSOLIDATION

2011-03-19T10:26:00.000+01:00

BY

Wisdom Iyekekpolo,
Gloria Okonye,
Helen Okonye,
Stanley Nwadiaru

A Seminar Paper presented in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

Lecturer- Dr. D. A. Tonwe

March, 2011

ABSTRACT

Nigeria is a federal Republic made up of thirty six States. The History of Nigeria federalism dates back to the pre-independence constitution of 1954 called the Lytlleton Constitution. However, with the advent of the 1979 and 1999 constitution, there has been a profound change in the practice of federalism in the country which has called into question whether Nigeria is indeed a federation. This question has been further accentuated by recent damming report of the National intelligence council of the United States Government which forecasted that by the year 2020, Nigeria might cease to exist as a nation-state. The level of government that should take responsibility for such issues as federal character, power sharing, revenue allocation, maintenance of public order, fiscal federalism, judiciary are the major centripetal and centrifugal forces that have threatened the consolidation of the Nigeria federation. The current situation where the federal government is a towering overlord over the component states on issues enumerated above, and much to the disenchantment of the states, requires a thorough re-examination and possible redress. The bottom line is that attitude and excesses of political power elites lie central to the crises and contradiction of Nigeria federalism. In spite of this, it is maintained that, there is still hope for consolidation of the Nigeria federalism.

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a country of extraordinary diversity (Human Right Watch, 2005:5) and as such, one of extraordinary complexities. These complexities are a reflection of the avalanche of ethno-cultural and religious groups co-habiting the territory and the intricacies of interaction among them. While no one is certain about the extent of its religious diversity, Nigeria’s linguistic composition is estimated to be over 250. This situation is quite unique much as it creates unique problems which often tend to defy known and existing strategies. Indeed Nigeria’s adventure into pluralism of ethnic and religious diversities owes its origin to the colonial conquest, which permeated the entire continent of Africa beginning from the early 19th century.
The colonialist in their intra European struggle for the soul of Africa ended up creating entities with diversity of languages and cultures and the attendant problems which later bedeviled post colonial Africa. In the case of Nigeria, the foundation of this unfortunate malady was formally laid in 1914 when Frederick Lugard amalgamated the two separate territories of North and South. Even long after the amalgamation, the two territories were separately administered thereby creating disparities in their level of socio-political and economic development. In other words, it could be reasoned from this background that Nigeria as at 1914 had been implanted with enough seeds of discord that would mar its future political stability and consolidation.
Perhaps cognizance of the existence of several latent threats to the future political stability of the emergent nation-state, both the British colonialists and even Nigeria Nationalist were desirous of a system of government that would neutralize the potential threats and accommodate the divergent interest of the various ethno-cultural groups. This desire eventually found expression in the federal system of government. This suggests that the adoption of federalism in Nigeria as a diversity management technique was neither the exclusive desire of the British colonialists nor the nationalist’s leaders alone. Indeed, it was a mutual but tacit agreement of the parties (Muhammed, 2007).
In describing the popularity of the federal idea in the post 1945 period, (Walts, 2002) aptly captured the compromises that greeted the adoption of the federal system in many countries. In this, Nigeria is not an exception. According to (Walts, 2000:5) …The creators of the new states approaching independence found themselves faced with simultaneous conflicting demands for territorial integration and balkanization. They had to reconcile the need, on the one hand, for relatively large economic and political units…with the desire, on the other hand, to retain authority of the smaller political units with traditional allegiances representing racial, linguistic, ethnic and religious communities. In such situations, where the forces for integration and separation were at odds with each other political leaders of nationalist independence movements and colonial administrators alike found in the ‘federal solution’ a popular formula, providing a common ground for centralism and provincialism.
Going by the above discussions therefore, it could be reasoned that Nigeria’s adoption of the federal system was not as a strategy to manage problems of pre -independence period but more importantly as an enduring strategy that could help detonate a major source of threat to the future political consolidation and stability of an independent Nigeria. Given this background and against the fact that operation of the system per se started far back in 1954, what is the continue relevance of the federal idea in Nigeria? This is against the background of hiccups experience so far with the system and its attendant implications for political stability. Further to the above question: what are the sources of the present worry over adaptability of the system of Nigeria’s situation and what are the future hopes for a politically stable Nigeria through the practice of Federalism?

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM AND ITS KEY FEATURES

It has been difficult for scholars over the years to reach a consensus as regards the definition of federalism. This problem is inherent in the fact that it is difficult to establish a proper linkage between theory and practice of federalism on the one hand and the issue of different scholars viewing federalism from different perspective, on the other hand. However the concept of federalism has attracted the attention of various scholars, hence the need to look at different definitions of scholars on federalism.
K.C. Wheare, the father of federalism as regards the legal or constitutional perspective of federalism, defined federalism as a constitutional arrangement which divides law making powers and functions of the state between two levels of government which are coordinate in status (Wheare, 1963:33). By this definition however, K.C. Wheare emphasizes the need for each level of government to have adequate resources to perform its functions without appealing to the other level of government. He went further to argue that if the component government in a federation discovers that the services given to them are two expensive for them to perform and call on the federal government for assistance, they are no longer coordinate to the federal government, but subordinate to it and when this happens, federalism cease to exist. Though this definition has been described as too legalistic and rigid, it has remained the classical definition of federalism.
In the same vein, Nwabueze stated that: Federalism is an arrangement whereby powers of government within a country are shared between a national (nationwide) government and a number of regionalized (i.e. territorially localized) governments in such a way that each exists as a government separately and independently from the others, operating directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs and with an authority in some matters exclusive of all others (Nwabueze, 1983:1).
Federalism also has been seen as the approach to governance that seeks to combine unity or shared rule with diversity or self rule (Kincaid, 1995). R.L. Watts defines federalism as a political system characterized by two sub-systems, one of central government and the other of state governments, in which the component government are coordinate in the sense that neither is politically subordinate to the other but interact with each other at many points both cooperatively and competitively. The main idea here is that although it is desirable that each level of government should be relatively autonomous in its sphere of competence, there is also the need for intergovernmental cooperation as well as the inevitability of competition (Ola, 1995).
C.J. Fredrich sees federalism somewhat differently (from the way K.C. Wheare see it) when he defined federalism thus: Federalism is a process by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working- out solutions, adopting joint policies and making joint decision on joint problems and conversely also the process by which a unitary political community become differentiated into a federally organized whole, i.e. as a process of federalism (Friedrich 1963). To him, institutional cooperation is an integral part of federalism as it involves a working arrangement to achieve an objective at a particular time. Hamilton sees federalism as an association of state to form a new one. Some other writers also regard federalism as a kind of decentralized government, in the sense that the central government alone possesses inherent authority but develops some power on the units as a means of facilitating the administration of the country. In some countries also, federalism is seen as regionalism, ethnicity being the distinctive feature which delineates the units (Awa, 1976).
Federalism is dynamic and should be seen as an instrument for the realization of national values and objectives and since societal values are not static but dynamic, the institutions built to realize them should also be flexible enough to adapt to the changing circumstances (Eleazu, 1977). From the above analysis, it would be safe to say that federalism exist in a situation where there is constitutional division of powers between different levels of government.
Having defined federalism, our next task is to discuss briefly the major features of federalism. One of the features of federalism is Rigid constitution. A Rigid constitution is one which is very difficult to amend or change and before it can be amended or changed, it will involve a specials or complicated process. There is also the existence of a Supreme Court (which is usually at the apex of the judicial system), which acts as an umpire in a federation in the case of any conflict between the centre and the constituent units. The Supreme Court interprets the constitution and makes pronouncement or Judgments on the constitutionality of the actions of government. A federal government has a clear demarcation and de -concentration of power to guarantee each unit or level of government its independent legitimacy in its own sphere and a constitutional guarantee of its own set of institutions, power and responsibilities (Olufemi, 2005). Thus, there is the independence of components within its own sphere of competence. Also worthy of note is the relative equality and viability of the component unit. A unit should not be bigger than the units put together as was the case in Nigeria first republic.

NIGERIA: A FEDERAL OR UNITARY STATE

There is a wide debate among scholars as to whether Nigeria is a federation or not. To many, the practice of federalism in the country deviates from the cardinal principles and attribute of the federal idea hence the quest for “true federalism”. To the protagonists of this concept, true federalism is referred to as a politico-constitutional device for power sharing in plural societies. As a framework for political management, it is suited for dealing with the twin problem of unity and diversity (Tamuno, (1998: 13), Asobie (1998:18), K. C. Wheare, Amwo and Herault (1998:6) (all cited in Onwudiwe & Suberu, eds.) see democracy and power sharing as the requisite for federalism.
To the proponents of the true federalism, federalism must guarantee the freedom, right and socio-economic welfare of people as federalism is inextricably tied up with the goals of democracy, good governance and development (Onwudiwe & Suberu (eds.) 2005:74).
For some others, the Nigeria federalism is termed as quasi federalism, they
tend to blame the military for this. As Osadolor contends “the military has played a key role in the collapse of the federal system through the imposition and strengthening of quasi federalism as a machinery of government that has been politically and economically repressive (Onwudiwe & Suberu (eds) 2005:94).
It will be important at this point to stress that different scholars have designated the Nigeria state at one time in the other as either a quasi federalism or still searching for true federalism. The point should be made clear that Nigeria is a federation. The underlying features of every federation is that it must be constitutionally arranged, power must be shared between the central and the unit and in practice, federalism as a system of governance is pragmatic, dynamic, utilitarian and evolving (Tonwe, 2008:298).
Based on these features, it would be very correct to say emphatically that the Nigeria state is a federation as we cannot use the federal arrangement of other States as a criterion for judging whether the Nigeria state is a federation or not. For no two federations are the same. The Nigeria federation is unique in its own sense. For example, one of the imperatives of federalism is that no unit has the right to secede. The exception to this rule existed in the defunct Soviet Union where the rights of secession of the units were constitutionally guaranteed. Also, the division of power varies from country to country. In some federations, exclusive legislative powers are vested in the central government, while the units exercise residual powers (e.g. United States and Nigeria); it is interesting to note that in Canada it is the other way round just like India where there are four lists different from what we have in Nigeria which has a concurrent list containing subjects on which the federal and State governments can legislate (Ola, 1995).
It is almost impossible to neatly share government powers between the two levels of government. Therefore they are bound to be overlapping which will necessitate cooperation (Ola, 1995). While we can situate the notion of duality of legal sovereignty to most federation, we cannot equate same for Nigeria. Nigeria is the first of its kinds to operate a federal structure where provision is made in the constitution for the local government as the third tier of government (see section 7(i) of the 1999 constitution) in the federation.
The logical conclusion from the foregoing is that in the world, there is no pure or ideal federal model, therefore the notion of “true federalism” or “quasi federalism” does not exist and cannot change the fact that the Nigeria state is a federation.
On a final note, since there is no ideal federalism, we can establish that the Nigeria Federation is characterized by features which are found in other federations and associated with K.C. Wheare’s formulation of federalism. Nigeria has a written and rigid constitution, a supreme court and a bi-cameral legislature. There is constitutional interpretation and judicial review. No unit is large and powerful enough to control the central government alone or dominate the other units put together. Each constituent government operates directly on the people rather than indirectly through the other tier. No unit or state has the right to secede from the federation. It is based on this in mind that we can say that the Nigeria state is a federation.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The outline of the country was delineated by British, the erstwhile colonial master. Prior to their colonization by Britain, the ethnic groups that eventually metamorphosed into what is today known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria were not only independent of one another, but were also at different stages of economic, political, social and cultural development. The process of colonization culminated in the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914. With the introduction of the elective principle by Huge Clifford constitution of 1922, the first political party, the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) was formed in 1923 under the leadership of Herbert Macaulay who is popularly referred to as the father of Nigeria Nationalism. The three seats allocated to Lagos in the legislative council were won by the party in the election held in the year (1923). As at that point in time, the Northern and the Southern parts of the country were ruled as separate entities in spite of the amalgamation of 1914. The North was not represented in the legislative council and the legislation for that part of the country was by imperial proclamation. The policy of divide and rule went beyond the division of Southern part into the Eastern and Western units by Bernard Bourdillion in 1939 and ended with the promulgation of the Arthur Richards constitution which introduced regionalism in 1946. It was in that year that Northern and Southern sections of the country were effectively brought under the same national government.
The point has to be made that the introduction of regionalism in 1946 did not translate to the emergence of federalism. Nigeria was still a unitary state. The Unitary system was still in existence as at the time the Macpherson constitution came into being in 1951.
The adoption of Lyttleton constitution of 1954 marked the beginning of the federal form of government in Nigeria. Since 1954, Nigeria has accepted as an article of faith that the federal system of government is the best form of government for the country. This is obvious from the fact that after independence, attempts at constitution making has been premised on the fact that the issue of federal form of government was not open for debate.

THE POWER ELITE APPROACH

The Power Elite Approach tries to find a common ground between Marxism which holds Class as the basic unit of a state analysis and Liberalism-pluralism which holds the individuals or groups as the basic unit of State power analysis.
The major proponents of the Power Elite approach includes: Yilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite approach rejects the rigid notion of separation between the bourgeoisie and the preliterate as well as the Marxist assumption that economic relations determine political relations. In the other hand, it rejects the pluralist notion of a diffuse structure of power which is distributed among various groups with multiple over-lapping memberships (Takamich 2001).
Mosca explains the basics of the Power Elite approach when he wrote that in all Societies… two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoy the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first (Mosca, 1939). The Power Elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and woman; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make decisions is less important than the fact that they occupy such pivotal positions. Their failure to make decision is itself an act that is often of greater consequence then the decisions they do make (Mills, 1956).
According to C. Wright Mills, the members of the Power elite membership is drawn from three areas (1) the highest political leaders including the President and a handful of key Cabinet members and close advisers; (2) major corporate owners and directors; and (3) high-ranking military officers (Mills 1956), (Dye 2002).
The Elite occupies what Mills terms the top command posts of society. These positions give their holders enormous authority over not just governmental, but financial, educational, social, civic and cultural institution as well. Their power is enhanced by the close collaboration of political, industrial, and military organizations. As a group then, this ruling triumvirate of politicians, corporate executives, and military officers has by virtue of the position they hold, an unprecedented authority to make decisions of national and international consequence (Dye, 2002). The power elite sometimes disagree but they agree more than disagree.
The power elite approach proponents argues that National interest or State policies are determine by the power elites in pursuit of its own interest and these individuals that make up these elite group have such powers by virtue of the top positions they hold in institution like the State, business corporations and military which are all important institutions in modern society (Takamich, 2001). This implies that if the powerful men are taken off the institutional positions they occupy, away from the resources they control, then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebrated for power is not of man, wealth does not center in the person of the wealthy, celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, and to have power requires access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold these valued experiences (Mills, 1956; www.exampleessays.com/viewpaper/81287.html).
In summary, the Power elite Approach to the study of State Power analyzes the Society on the basis of Power elites/Masses and that the Power elites determined policies while the role of the State is just to maintain the elite domination; the Masses are fragmented and impotent in determining the decisions at the top. The approach assumes a considerable degree of in- and out-flows or social mobility between the ruling elite and the ruled, which is called the “circulation of elite” (Mill, 1956; Takamich, 2001). This paper will therefore evaluate how the Power elite in Nigeria among other factors have been the clog on the wheel of federalism and the prospect of its consolidation.

ISSUES IN THE ORIGIN AND CREATION OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION

There are two schools of thoughts that talks about the adoption of a federal system in Nigeria. The first school of thought is made up largely of Marxist. They argue that the federal system of government in Nigeria was imposed on the country by Britain. To the proponents of this school, Nigerians did not contribute to the decision of adopting federalism in the country (Ola, 1995). To this extent Eleazu is of the view that the founding fathers of Nigerian federalism that gathered in Ibadan in 1950 did not have a clear intention of what they wanted to achieve and so they did not address core issues and questions such as:
1. What is the common interest?
2. How best can the common interest be achieved?
3. If we need federalism what do we want to achieve by it?
4. Is a federal structure the best means of achieving what we want?
5. If so, what should be the nature and form of the federal structure? (Nnamdi 2009:106).
Thus, the British colonial masters, convinced that the Nigerian delegates to the Ibadan constitutional conference were not clear in their mind as to what type of political system they wanted, designed what appear to them would work and euphemistically dubbed it a federalism with unity in diversity (Nnamdi, 2009).
The statements of some of our political elites during this period tend to throw more light to the view of the above school of thought. Alhaji Tafawa Balawa seems to have stated the position and concern of Northerners in the midst of the raging controversy and mutual distrust that characterize that era when he said that
Nigeria’s political future may only lie in federalism so far as the rate of regional progress is concerned… The regions of Nigeria as you are aware have reached different stages of development. Some of them seem to have advanced very much more than the others and they are therefore now naturally asking to be given the opportunity to make very rapid political advance. North is afraid of making this rapid and if I may call it artificial advancement at this stage…(Cited in Adiliege, 2003).
The above statement clearly indicates the northern drive towards federalism which was in conflict with the interest of the political elites of the other regions.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo also observes that Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Irish’ or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not (Elaigwu, 1993:28).
Since 1914, the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British creation for the country (Adilieje, 2003:293).
The other school of thought argues that federalism was freely chosen by Nigerians. According to them, the 1950 and 1953/54 constitutional conferences preceded the adoption of a federal system of government in Nigeria and Nigerians participated actively in the deliberations that led to the adoption of the Macpherson constitution in 1951.
The argument that Nigerians participated actively in the deliberations that led to the adoption of federalism in Nigeria is not water tight. Thus a critical analysis of the views of the above schools of thought would take us to the conclusion that in as much as Nigerians participated in the London constitutional conferences of 1950, 1953, 1954 respectively, the British government played a greater role in establishing the Nigerian federation. Unlike the federal systems of United States of America and Switzerland which falls under the category of aggregative or coming together federations (which involves the classical method of federation building in which a federal state is constituted through an agreement or bargain to bring together previously sovereign entities in a new federation), as described by Suberu and Agbaje (1999), the Nigeria federation was established to hold together the diverse ethnic groups and nationalities that had been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a unitary colonial state under British imperialism. John P. Mackintosh stated thus: “The Nigerian federation has always had peculiar features; the most evident being that it was not created by the coming together of separate states but was the result of the subdivision of a country which had in theory been ruled as a single unit” (Mackintosh 1962:223). This peculiar feature of the Nigerian federation (i.e. being a British creation) is a major problem of consolidation in that it lacks the integrative features associated with coming together federation but it is rather associated with the citizens owning their allegiance to their units or regions rather than to the central government.

POLITICS OF ETHNICITY

Ethnicity has been defined by Elaigwu (1994) as ethnic consciousness acted out in relations with others–individuals and groups–to maximize gains in situations of conflicting interests and claims over scarce resources (i.e. values, statuses, and /or goods).
Ethnic consciousness is not detrimental to the process of national integration in nation-state. In fact, it can be argued that it is when competing elites and politicians exploits it for their personal gains that it becomes a problem to the nation. He further argues that ethnicity is ethnic consciousness transformed into a weapon of offence or defense in a competitive process in relations with other groups over desired scarce resources; this could lead to the mobilization of ethnic bedfellows in order to maximize gains at the expense of the other competing group(s) (Elaigwu 1994:147).
Idahosa and Aghahowa arguing in the same vein argues that the members of the ruling class have become ethnic chauvinist in order to achieve economic, political and other advantages that are often competed for by different groups. Rather than work for the unity of the federation, the leaders and aspiring leaders use these elements to keep the people divided (Idahosa and Aghahowa, 1995). We argue that ethnic consciousness is not a problem to the consolidation of federalism in Nigeria but its manipulation by the elites has continued to mar our prospect of consolidating Nigeria Federalism.

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS AND EFFECT ON THE NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

It is instructive at the level to say that the Nigeria’s federal structure has gone through series of ‘pot-holes’ that have affected the consolidation process. Military rule has no doubt affected the structure of the Nigerian federalism (Onwudiwe/Suberu, 2005:55). According to Olusola Sanu (The Guardian, 23 January 2011) ‘Nigeria’s 50 years of nationhood: looking back with Anger’. “The army ended up destroying true federalism. They imposed the one line command structure on the country and the mess they made is what we have inherited. Nigerian became a laboratory for constitutional experimentation. In the end, the parliamentary system with its checks and balances was destroyed and replace with the presidential system which in the hands of military presidents became outright dictatorship”.
In line with its command structure, Nigeria’s federal system has been over-centralized to the extent that it reflects more of a unitary arrangement than a federal one (Elaigwu, 1998:6-7). Out of the fifty-seven (57) years of federal practice, the military his been in power for twenty-nine (29) years (1966-79; 1983-99). The period of military rule allowed the military administrations in the state to exercise most of the powers assigned to the regions under the suspended democratic constitution (Nnamdi, 2009:111). There was a gradual increase in the powers and functions of the centre and a corresponding erosion of powers and functions at the state level. For example, Ayoola notes that: “….the unitary command structure of the army is the definition incompatible with the federal political system. Thus, as long as the army was in power; federalism could only have retained paper significance” (Abia, 2008).
The military is known for the disobedience of the orders and judgments of the court thereby dealing a death blow to the rule of law which is crucial to the survival of any federalism. Executive lawlessness is more prominent under the military than a civilian regime. The creation of states (except the defunct mid-west region) we created by military in contravention of due process. There is also the violation of human right with impunity by the military; there is no freedom of expression and citizens are presumed guilty before they are tried, or detained indefinitely without trial. The right of habeas corpus is totally suspended if not wiped out from existence. In addition, bills which seek to deprive citizens of their civil liberties and property are passed into law which has retroactive or retrospective effects (Idahosa/ Aghahowa, 1995).
These various issues that have hampered the Nigeria’s federal structure can be regarded as a typical example of problems that have affected the process of consolidation over-time. Though it’s possible to say that military intervention or better put as military interference in politics has been one of a mixed-blessing but that doesn’t remove the fact that in theory and practice, federalism cannot be successful with such vice that was introduced as a result of militarization.
STATE CREATION AND ITS MOTIVATIONS

The movement for the creation of more state/regions can be traced back to 1937 when Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe advocated in his book, The Political Blueprint in Nigeria’ (Azikiwe 1965), a federal system with eight constituent states based on geographical configuration. In 1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo also published his book… ‘Path to Nigerian Freedom’ (Awolowo, 1968) in which he proposed a re-division of Nigeria into ten federating units, with ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinity as the bases of division (Ola 1995:192).
Pre-independence of Nigeria, involved a lot of movement agitating for new states: these included a Movement for the creation of Mid-West which was launched in 1951 by Chief Anthony Enahoro and in 1953, the Middle-belt Peoples Party was formed to demand a separate state. In the same year, the Action Group began a campaign for the merger of Ilorin and Kabba provinces with the Western Region. In the East, the C-O-R state movement demands a state comprising Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers provinces. There was a demand for Kanu state too. (Ola, 1995:193).
These communal pressures for new units of state and local governments in the country continued after independence which resulted in the creation of the Midwest Region in 1963 through democratic structure and later, there were further balkanizations by different military dictators from 4 Regions to 12 states, 19 states, 21 states, 30 states and finally 36 states.
In all these state creations, only one was created via democratic process, the others were through military fiat which may not necessarily be according to the yearnings and aspirations of the people who are supposed to determine when, how and where new states should be created. Idahosa and Aghahowa have argued that in a federation, states are created in order to among other things guarantee the autonomy of significant groups but the creation of states by military decrees has resulted in what they consider to be unnecessary proliferation, thereby unwittingly weakening the ability of the federating units to defend their autonomy. It is not in the interest of the federalism to reduce the states to a position of subservience and some of the states created under the military are not economically viable (Ola 1995).
Suberu and Agbaje noted that the pressure that resulted in the creation of these states was directly rooted in the struggles by the elites within those states to access those federal revenues and resources that are disseminated or devolved through the states (Suberu and Agbaje 1999).
The military elites has also explored these agitations to promote the legitimacy of their rule, strengthen the powers and status of the central government as a means of creation a unitary government under the guise of federalism (Nnamdi 2009).

FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE

Nigeria is a country with enormous oil wealth, large population as well as great agricultural potentials. In spite of the enormous wealth and demographic advantage, Nigeria has not been able to establish the relevant socio-political and economic framework for transformation and development. Nigeria politics is still characterized by ethno-regional conflicts, secessionist threats, religious bigotry, coups and counter-coups, corruption and mismanagement (Joseph, 1991; Forrest, 1986; Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985; Ekekwe, 1986). The fear of domination of one ethnic group or section of the country by another and the national question as to who gets what and how the national cake should be shared is central to this problem.
In view of these enormous problems, the federal character principle was established in the 1979 constitution and reaffirmed in all subsequent constitutions of the federal republic of Nigeria. The essence of the federal character principle according to Agbodike (1998), is to ensure social harmony among all Nigerians and to promote the stability and national integration of the nation. He notes that national integration is a process leading to political cohesion and sentiments of loyalty toward a central political authority and institution by individuals belonging to different social groups or political units. It ensures that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.
According to Saro-wiwa (1985:7) the formula will make for a more equal federation is which more people will owe loyalty because they see themselves represented meaningfully therein. To an extent, the formula has achieved this intention.
The federal character principle, while stressing the imperative of ethnic – balancing, invariably enthrones ethnicity and de-emphasizes nationhood. In the process too, it strengthens parochial, particularistic orientations and primodial ethnic attachments of Nigerians. These tendencies form the basis of disaffection among various groups in the country. The formula has not adequately addressed the problems of the different and unequal ethnic groups. Unfortunately, this principle has been used to accelerate the promotion of mediocre and incompetent civil servants into government. The federal character principle has been manipulated by, and channeled to serve the overall interest of the petty bourgeois ruling class. It is the members of their class who formulate and operate the principle. As carried in the Nigerian press, and noted by Agbaje (1989:17) has been mainly an elite preoccupation…under the guise of the federal character principle, the members of the bourgeois class get themselves entrenched in power and exercise control over the machinery of state. They strive to reconcile their class differences through the operation of acceptable formula for allocation, distribution and sharing of national resources and benefits among themselves. And in the course of this elite game, members of this class climb to positions, amass wealth and enrich themselves. Agbodike opined that one of the major problematic features of the federal character principle, as presently operated, is the complexity of the interests and units as represented by the north-south, state, local government, and ethnic and religious group affiliations. For example, the creation of more states and local government and the establishment of federal educational institution in every state to enhance greater representational opportunities lead to the multiplication of governmental and administrative units and facilities which becomes disturbingly expensive to the nation.
Despite the obvious militating against the functionality of the system and controversies surrounding the notion and application of federal character, Agbodike (1998) notes that, there seems to be a general acceptance of the principle as a normative expression of the equal right of all Nigeria to participate in the political, administrative and economic affairs of the country. According to Agbodike, he suggested that to make the federal character principle achieve its objectives in Nigeria that:-
- The original North-South balances should be restore as it was when states where created in 1967. There were twelve of them, six in the North and six in the South. To eliminate mutual suspicion and ill-feeling generated by this situation. Moreover, state creation exercise should be called out with caution. This is to ensure the visibility of the states and their ability to discharge the statutory and other function for the common good of all orderly development of the country.
- Effort should be made through appropriate legislation to remove the indigene syndrome engendered by the federal character principle and the discriminatory policies, laws and regulation which legalize its operation. It is an aberration of nation building and national integration to see fellow Nigerians, some of whom were born and may have lived in a place all their lives, being thrown out of jobs they are discriminated against became they are not indigenes of the area. In this vein Osaghae (1989:453) and Mark (1986) in asking the government to see that every citizen of Nigeria who settles in any part of the country is treated as an indigene of the place and endowed with residency rights as is the case in the United States of America.

REVENUE ALLOCATION AND ITS POLITICIZATION

Revenue allocation refers to the mechanism for sharing the country financial resources among the different tiers of government in the federation, with the overall objective of enhancing economic growth and development, minimizing inter-governmental tensions and promoting national unity (Danjuma 1994) Danjuma argues that the issues of revenue allocation are partly economic but largely a matter of political compromise and an issue central to this compromise is the impact of a given ‘revenue allocation structure’ on the nature of federalism. This is an important and delicate issue, since it is federalism that creates the need for revenue allocation. Some of the questions that relates to this issue includes:
(i) How much independent source of revenue should be given to a tier of government to execute its functional responsibilities? And (ii) how should the federations resources be shared? (Danjuma, 1994).
The survival and the ultimate success of any federal system depends on an acceptable distribution of resources and functions among the tiers of government so that efficiency in the use of scarce resources is encouraged while reducing inequality in the treatment of individuals and among different states (Nnamdi 2009). Mbanefo and Egwaikhide noted that the discordance between fiscal capacity of the various levels of government and their expenditure responsibilities, the non-correspondence problem, the problem of how revenues should be shared among the states and local councils are striking features of the Nigeria federal fiscal system (Cited in Nnamdi 2009:179).
The granting of internal autonomy to the Regions under the Richards constitution of 1946 and the subsequent sharing of responsibilities between the federal and regional government, provided the starting point for the revenue allocation exercise in Nigeria. There were six ad hoc revenue allocation commissions between 1946 and 1966 and in addition the various military governments issued decrees between 1967 and 1975 on the same issue.
Since 1977, there has been the emergence of more comprehensive revenue allocation efforts. All these efforts have not had the desired impact expected by Nigerians. Lupton argues that the need to maintain the strength of the federal government always in a way that limited the scope of revenue allocation to the units and limited field and amount of revenue which could be independently raised by the regions or states characterized the pre-independence fiscal commission (Lupton, 1970). In the same vein, Onwudiwe and Suberu argue that the simultaneous emergence of oil and the military in revenue allocation politics ended the general consensus that characterized the process of construction of the revenue allocation principle. Through decree No. 13 of 19790. The federal government assumed 100 percent tax power over mining, actually the sole power to collect and distribute oil revenue. It expanded the power through Decree No.9 of 1971, which gave it exclusive right to offshore oil revenue (Onwudiwe and Suberu, 2005).
Since 1946, several criteria have been used to allocate revenue among the regions/states but the most controversial has been the Derivation principle. Because of the variability in the types and quantity of material resources in the regional units, inequality in economic development is inevitable. But Awa argued that no unit should be allowed to remain too poor and too backward compared to the average standard of living of the units within the federation. It is argued that the presence of petroleum in any state is fortuitous and the revenue from rent and royalty accruing from its mining should not be monopolized by the state of origin. On the other hands it is maintained that agricultural produce which goes into the export market flows from the skill and perseverance of the people in the state of origin and the export duty accruing from it should be surrendered in full to the state of derivation. But contrary to this, there is also an argument that there is an element of the fortuitous in both the agricultural produce and petroleum as the agricultural produce is partly a function of such places being favoured by nature (Awa, 1976). Indeed, the totality of the relationships among the units must be predicated on patriotic consideration as evidenced by the spirit as essential ingredients to federalism. Each unit must be given the opportunity to develop at its own pace within the overall national framework (Idahosa and Aghahowa in Ola (ed) 1995).
It is our view that the elite have effectively hijacked the reverence allocation process in Nigeria to meet their selfish or myopic interest. On the allocation of revenue between the central government and the units, there has been all effort to ensure that the central controls the bulk, even when these allocations are finally appropriated to individual pockets of the elites controlling the central government. These elites have used their position by virtue of the institution they occupy either military or civilian to amass the wealth of the country to their families and that of their allies.
As regards the allocation among the states, the states with oil resources have argued in favour of higher percentage of allocation via derivation principle and those states without oil have supported the opposite. Our concern is whether these allocation being sought by the different camps are for the actual development of their states or for self enrichment. We argue that the issue of revenue allocation in Nigeria would have not been this pronounced if the elites do not whipped up emotion based on it but for their personal aggrandizement. A proper revenue allocation that will reflect the wishes and aspirations of Nigeria is advised in order to maintain the Nigerian federation, but it is also very important that the allocations are used primarily for the development of the country.

POWER SHARING

This is one of the problems with the Nigeria federalism. This basically ensure that certain elective offices such as that of the president, government, chairman local government council and other key elective political offices are rotated or zoned around several geo-political divisions. Zoning offers opportunity for rotational leadership. This arrangement came into being after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election where M.K.O Abiola, the supposedly winner of the election was denied his electoral victory. The move became necessary to allay the distrust that have been created in the southerners mind, especially the west. To this end, a National constitutional conference was set up in 1994-1995 is look at how this problem of power sharing could be resolved. Rotation of political offices/zoning system was one of the solutions proffered in the draft constitution of 1999 which provide that: the office of the President shall rotate between North and South. The office of the Chairman of council shall rotate within the local government areas… No political party shall be registered under this constitution until it has reflected the provision of this section in its constitution. For this purpose, six geo-political zones were suggested or created; North East, North West, North Central, South East, South West and South South, wherein the office of the Presidency, Vice-president, Senate president, Speaker of House of Representatives and other federal political position shall rotate.
Tekena N. Tamuno has argued among other things that none of the states of the federation is completely homogeneous (i.e. without fierce sub-group differences as often revealed, in some states, during assets-sharing exercises, the definition of local government area or public-sector employment activities). At zonal level, issues like these would be more complex (Tamuno, 1991).

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this paper so far, we have tried to examine the Nigeria federal system and its basic peculiarities and inherent problems. Analysis has revealed that stability or instability of the society is a function of the extent of societal polarization and how they are managed. Federalism by virtue of its inherent value of reconciling opposing tendencies, the federal system hold’s better prospect in helping to stem a major source of political instability. Nigerian federal structure since inception has witnessed several fiscal and structural reformation as new realities emerge. Although this is not without some deficits but like in all political organization, there is no perfect policy.
The Nigerian federal structure may not have succeeded in solving all its political ills; it is nonetheless, what has kept us united together. Moreover, even non federal systems are faced with similar problems bothering on threat to its very existence. Therefore, our inability to have stability in the political system in spite of years of practicing federalism should not be taken as bankruptcy of the system. Equally, there have been attempts at explaining the current tension prevailing in the system through emphasis on structural imbalance, but we are of the view that there is the need to focus on some other cogent factors that drives this instability. As argued in the text, absence of astute political leadership, corruption and the promotion of elite interest, by the state are the major bane of federalism and its prospects of consolidation in Nigeria. It is in the light of this that this paper submits that in spite of structural deficits and some other problems, federalism still hold better prospect for political stability in Nigeria, if the factors that promote instability can be attenuated. On this basis we recommend the following:
- Attention and more efforts should be directed on how to have a national political leadership that would be able to inspire citizens to think and act federal not a leadership that is solely driven by self interest.
- Political education and enlightenment of the citizens and the need to propagate the positive virtues of federalism are essential. This would help erase negative thought and skepticism about the system. Hence, all hands should be on deck to realize the positive intents of the federal architecture.
- Government at all levels needs to promote good governance and the values of transparency and accountability. This is against the background that lack of accountability and prevalence of corrupt practices aggravates poverty and increases frustration among citizens.
- While we should learn from our colonial and military history so as not to repeat its mistakes, we must never see ourselves as victims of history; it is our responsibility to overcome the challenges posed by our history.
In concluding these recommendations, we would not fail to state clearly that nations just don’t happen by historical accident; rather they are built by exemplary men and women with vision and resolve and sustained by institutions that promote good governance and thus socio-economic development (Gambari, 2008).

CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on the Nigerian Federalism, its problems and prospects for consolidation. In our study, we have reviewed the concept of federalism and its features. We have also gone ahead to evaluate the Nigerian federalism vis a vis the definition and features of federalism. We have discussed the origin and features of the Nigeria federalism, it development, its features, problems and prospect for consolidation.
We have approached our study from the stand point of the Power-Elite theory which holds that the society is divided into two classes, the ruling majority and the minority that is ruled. It argues that state policies reflect the wishes of the minority class who are the Power-elites. They are power-elites based on the societal institutions which they head and control. These institutions are divided into three areas which are the highest political offices, directorship of the major corporations and the highest military officers.
In our analysis, we highlighted the key features of federalism which includes a written and rigid constitution, Supreme Court and a constitutional division of power between the center and the units. We analyzed this vis a vis the Nigerian federalism and came to the conclusion that the system of government operational in Nigeria is the federal system of government. The foregoing not withstanding, the Nigerian federalism is bedeviled with a lot of problems that have made consolidation very difficult. These problems discussed includes the origin and creation of the Nigerian federalism, politics of ethnicity, military intervention in politics, state creation and its motivations, the federal character principle, revenue allocation and its politicization and the issue of power sharing in Nigeria.
On the issue of origin and creation of federalism in Nigeria, one thing is sure; there was a form of guide by the British colonial masters on the choice of federalism by our founding fathers as the preferred form of government. The colonial masters as it were controlled the politics, economy and military institutions, so they were the power-elite. This form of government was in their interest. As argued in Nnamdi (2009), Nigeria was more of a ‘hold together federation’. This form of government was introduced to keep the geographical area which was made up of diverse ethnic groups and nationalities that have been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a unitary colonial state under British imperialism. Mackintosh argued in the same light when he stated that the Nigerian federation has always had peculiar features, the most evident being that it was not created by the coming together of separate states but was the result of the subdivision of a country which had in theory been ruled as a single unit (Mackintosh, 1962:223). It is time for us to rise above the circumstances of the creation of Nigerian Federalism and Unite to form a strong and prosperous federation.
The politics of ethnicity has also been another clog on the wheel of consolidating the Nigeria federalism. We argue that ethnic consciousness is not a problem in itself but the manipulation of ethnic consciousness by the power elite in their struggle for the authority to allocate scare resources. The power elite approach assumes a considerable degree of in- and out-flow or social mobility between the ruling elite and the ruled which is called the “circulation of elite (Mills, 1956). In order to migrate to the class of the elite, would-be elite and their godfathers whip-up ethnic sentiments. In other cases, for the elite to retain their elite’s position, they also rely on ethnicity as a launching pad. Our Politicians must rise above politics of ethnicity to politics of ideas.
It is not implausible to aver that one of the greatest problems that have confronted the Nigeria federation is the military interference in politics. Given the nature of the military as a hierarchical and centralized institution, a large dose of military accretion would appear to have been infused into the Nigeria federal system, so much so that any casual observer would wonder and worry about the integrity and survivability of the federal structure in the face of such protracted onslaught (Awolowo-Dosunmu, 1994). In the same vein Elaigwu explains that military rule has no doubt affected the structure of Nigeria federalism. In line with its command structure, Nigeria federal system has been over-centralized to the extent that it reflects more of a Unitary arrangement than a Federal one (Elaigwu, 1998:6–7 adopted from Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005:55). We must learn from the mistake of military in politics and ensure that there is no repetition of this.
All State creations in Nigeria with the exception of the Midwestern region have been a function of the Military elite in political arena. This has also been ably assisted by the struggle by the elites within the states created to have access to the federal allocation that is shared through the state. Put simply state creation in Nigeria has been predominantly a manipulation of the combined effort of the elite in the military and the elites from the states. This creation has been to satisfy the selfish ends of the elites. To the military, it has been a means of weakening the autonomy of the state and a means of legitimizing their elongated stay in politics while for the States elites; it was to create a channel to the “national cake”. There is basically no consensus on the number of states that the country should be divided to or even the basis of state creation, whether territorially defined state or ethnically defined state, but we are of the view that if we retain our present number of States and provide a more accountable and visionary leadership, then agitations for more states will be weakened.
Revenue allocation has been a tool in the hands of the elites especially at the central government to satisfy their un-quenching appetite for money. There has always been the struggle on what percentage goes to where, but it is important to ask for public accountability in the use of this public funds. It is our position that an adequate revenue allocation formula be put in place but at the same time, the political-elite should account for the present percentage they receive and stop using this revenue allocation problem to overheat the polity. We contend that the issue of accountability is primary to that of revenue allocation.
Power sharing has been an endemic issue militating against the consolidation of Nigeria federalism. The region or zone from which the occupant of a particular public office originated from has become more important than the credentials and quality of the leader. The power-elites have emphasized this regional basis of power sharing to ensure their access to power especially at the centre. It is important to note that consolidation will be impossible until we emphasize those qualities that unite us and not those that divide us.
Our point of argument in this paper is the acknowledgement that there are a lot of issues that has and is endangering the consolidation of the Nigerian federalism but the common denomination is power-elite factor. The elites have continually magnified problems inherent in the Nigeria federalism to their own advantage and the disadvantage of the consolidation process.
According to Chinua Achebe, the trouble with Nigeria is the failure of leadership. Leadership is a critical factor in nation-building and it should be understood in two important but related ways. Firstly, there are the personal qualities of integrity, honesty, commitment, and competence of individual leaders at the top. Secondly, there are the collective qualities of common vision, focus, and desire for development of the elites as a whole. Leadership is not everything but it is an extremely important factor (Gambari, 2008). In summary, we submit that consolidating Nigerian federalism is possible with a combine effort of the elites and the masses.

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