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Fractional-reserve banking is a contentious issue within libertarian theory. This is confusing because I do not consider it to be part of libertarian theory at all.

The practice of fractional-reserve banking has been variously defined. A standard and neutral definition is: the practice by which a bank maintains readily available reserves that represent only a portion of its customers’ deposits while lending out or investing the rest. At the same time, the bank stands by its obligation to redeem demand deposits upon request. Fractional-reserve is often viewed as an aspect of centralized banking or government regulation but it is an entirely separable practice that has functioned within free banking systems. Indeed, fractional-reserve was standard in the 18th century Scottish free banking system which economist Lawrence H. White described in his classic work Free Banking in Britain – Theory, Experience and Debate 1800-1845.

The iconic Austrian economist Murray Rothbard offered a different definition. In an article published by The Freeman (September and October 1995), he described his view of how fractional reserve operated even in the absence of a central bank. Rothbard explained, “I set up a Rothbard Bank, and invest $1,000 of cash (whether gold or government paper does not matter here). Then I ‘lend out’ $10,000 to someone, either for consumer spending or to invest in his business. How can I ‘lend out’ far more than I have? Ahh, that’s the magic of the ‘fraction’ in the fractional reserve. I simply open up a checking account of $10,000 which I am happy to lend to Mr. Jones. Why does Jones borrow from me? Well, for one thing, I can charge a lower rate of interest.” Rothbard called this “counterfeiting” because money is created “out of thin air.”

Additionally he viewed fractional-reserve as a fraud perpetrated on the original depositors. Why? If “the American public…in unison, demanded cash. What would happen? The banks would be instantly insolvent, since they could only muster 10 percent of the cash they owe their befuddled customers.”

Rothbard’s depiction encounters some practical objections. For example, he is assuming all deposits could be demanded in unison – that is, he assumes they are demand deposits and not term ones. Moreover, the same sort of logic could be used to discredit insurance companies. If all (or a significant enough number of) insurance holders filed claims in unison, the insurance companies would go bankrupt. And, yet, I am not aware of insurance companies being similarly viewed as fraudulent.

Instead of dwelling on side issues, however, I accept the description of fractional reserve offered by Rothbard and various other Austrians. I will disagree with them on their own terms.

What Is NOT Being Debated

Both libertarian defenders and opponents of fractional-reserve reject a state monopoly of money or banking; most of them reject any state involvement at all. Instead, both sides advocate privately issued currency that enjoys no legal privileges beyond those enjoyed by individuals. They argue for banking and currency by contract, by voluntary acceptance.

The disagreement on fractional-reserve banking is twofold. Is it fraud? Is it economically prudent? Only the first question is a libertarian one.

Libertarianism can be loosely defined as the political and social philosophy based on the right of every person to the peaceful use his own body and property. Stated in a ‘negative’ manner: libertarianism opposes force and fraud; the latter is a form of theft because it is the wrongful assumption of a property title.
Thus, if fractional-reserve banking is fraud, then it falls squarely within the realm of libertarian theory, and it would be outlawed by a free-market system. But if it is not fraud and merely imprudent, then it falls outside of libertarian analysis however interesting or useful an economic issue it may be. In other words, if fractional-reserve banking is voluntary and non-fraudulent, then a libertarian society would not outlaw the practice even if it proved to be a foolish one.

Is Fractional-Reserve Banking Fraud?

Theft is the non-consensual use of another person’s property. The owner relinquishes some or all control of his property in exchange for a described value. If the value is not as described, then no legitimate exchange or contract has occurred. As economist Bryan Caplan stated, “If you offer me a Mitsubishi 5500 projector in exchange for $2000, and hand me a box of straw instead, you are using my $2000 without my consent (which was contingent, of course, on you giving me the projector).”

The issue upon which fraud hinges is “informed consent.” If depositors at a fractional-reserve bank are fully informed of the bank’s policies and practices, then fraud is not possible. With full knowledge of the terms and the risk, the depositors are entrusting their money to the bank in exchange for an interest rate. (By contrast, a 100%-reserve bank that would not have the benefit of using most of the money deposited would presumably charge a storage fee rather than offer interest. Indeed, this is what happens with the 100%-reserve storage called safe deposit boxes.) Otherwise stated, an informed depositor may make a poor choice with whom or where to entrust his money but the free market and libertarianism does not prohibit even stupid choices.

To maintain the accusation of fraud in the presence of informed consent, some Rothbardian economists expand the definition of ‘fraud’ itself. As a counter to Bryan Caplan’s arguments in defense of fractional reserve, for example, Walter Block responded, “But, lying is only sufficient for fraud, not necessary. There are other ways to commit fraud besides an outright lie. For example, it is fraudulent for a bank or anyone else to try to sell you a square circle, even if they do not lie about it. Why? Because there is no such thing as a square circle, and, in order for a contract to be a valid one, not only must both parties agree to it (neither lies to the other), but, also, the contract must be in accordance with LOGIC.”

This is a strange requirement. It means a 3rd party would be able to invalidate a contract in which there is full disclosure and with which the contracting parties are satisfied. As with insurance policies that cannot be paid out if there is a ‘run’, there are quite a few contracts that may well involve what some Austrians see as a breach of ‘logic’. For example, a man might well pay a priest to hear confession and absolve his sins, or a psychic to tell his future. As long as both parties accept the logic of the exchange, it is not the business of an atheistic 3rd party to intervene and invalidate the contract. Just as the free market and libertarianism do not outlaw stupidity, neither do they prohibit a breach of logic. And a 3rd party has no business substituting his logic for that of the contracting parties.

The 19th century individualist anarchist Benjamin Tucker wrestled with much the same issue as the “illogical” contract. Like many contemporaries, Tucker believed that charging interest or rent was “usury” – an unethical or immoral monetary practice. He thought such practices were sustained by the state and would naturally disappear in a free market. When confronted with the possibility of people choosing to pay interest in a free market, Tucker agreed that such contracts would be valid. They would be immoral, unwise, and worthy of scorn but they would be valid because they would be voluntary.

Equally, contracts that seem illogical to a 3rd party are valid nonetheless.

Is Fractional-Reserve Banking Foolish?

The work of the libertarian monetary theorists White and George Selgin long ago convinced me that fractional-reserve banking would thrive in the free market, as it has done in the past.

The free market is well able to manage the problems perceived by fractional reserve opponents. Banks would rest increasingly upon their reputations as good managers; those with impeccable records of redemption would probably offer the lowest available interest on deposits. Defaulting banks would not be bailed out except in a free-market manner – e.g. by an insurance policy or buy-out. Perhaps insurance would be an optional purchase for individual depositors as well. Moreover, a bank that diluted the value of its own notes through an ‘inflation’ of supply would be ‘corrected’ with a loss of reputation and customers.

Opponents of fractional reserve would disagree, of course. But the important point here is that the disagreement is no longer libertarian but utilitarian. The question has become “Which is the best banking system: fractional or 100% reserve?” My answer: let the free market decide. Let individuals choose for themselves.

Thomas Jefferson said a revolution every 20 years would be a good thing. Regardless of what one thinks of that, perhaps a little constitutional crisis every now and then would have its benefits.

One such crisis may be brewing now. On election day solid majorities of voters in Colorado and Washington voted to make marijuana a legal product not just for people who are certified as ill, but for everyone. Several states already allow marijuana use for medical purposes. But these two states are blazing trails by recognizing the freedom of all adults to smoke or otherwise consume the plant. (I will refrain from calling it a drug, a term used purely for propagandistic purposes. Moreover, we say we “drink coffee and beer,” not “use caffeine and alcohol.”)

The problem of course is that the federal government forbids the manufacture, sale, and use of marijuana (and many other substances) for any reason. The first question that might occur to a thinking person is: by what authority? After all, the American theory of constitutional republicanism holds that the central government’s powers are limited to those enumerated in the Constitution. (This is not the place to examine that theory.) What power in the Constitution authorizes the central government to forbid marijuana? The question is further bolstered by the fact that when opponents of alcoholic beverages sought prohibition of their manufacture and distribution, they pushed for and won an amendment to the Constitution — implying that without the amendment, Congress had no legal power to regulate or ban alcohol.

Regulation of marijuana began as a tax with the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, signed by Franklin Roosevelt. The first man caught selling marijuana without having paid the tax was sentenced to four years in the federal Leavenworth Penitentiary. Some three decades later the Act was declared unconstitutional because of Fifth Amendment problems, and Congress promptly replaced it with the Controlled Substances Act in 1970. The earlier Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, which began as a record-keeping requirement for physicians who prescribed opiates and cocaine, “quickly became a prohibition statute,” as Thomas Szasz put it in Our Right to Drugs. The Supreme Court seemed unsure of its constitutionality but upheld it anyway because of its revenue-raising objective. (The power to tax is the power.) A few years later, the Court lost all doubts:

There can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription, and use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs…. The right to exercise this power is so manifest in the interest of public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully called in question. [Emphasis added.]

So much for government’s having to justify newly exercised powers. As Szasz summed up,

In 1914, trading in and using drugs was a right. In 1915, limited federal drug controls were a constitutionally questionable tax revenue measure. By 1921, the federal government had gained not only complete control over so-called dangerous drugs, but also a quasi-papal immunity to legal challenge of its authority. Thus has the rejection of one of our most basic constitutional rights become transformed into reverence for one of our most baneful therapeutic-religious dogmas. [Emphasis in original.]

Federal response

Be that as it may, the people of two states now say they can manufacture, sell, and use marijuana no matter what the feds think. What happens now? We already have some idea: 20 states and the District of Columbia permit (or refuse to penalize) medical marijuana in defiance of federal law. Despite early assurances to the contrary, the Obama administration has cracked down on legal state-licensed marijuana dispensaries in California to a far greater degree than the Bush administration did. During the Bush years, federal anti-marijuana policy was challenged by Californians, but the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) sided with the central government, ruling that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause empowers the feds to prohibit marijuana manufacturing and consumption even when a state law permits it for medical purposes. (The Bush administration argued that it could not effectively prohibit commerce in marijuana nationally if people in the states were free to grow and sell it.)

Is the Obama administration likely to stand by and permit the recreational use of pot in Washington and Colorado, when it tries to stop its medical use in California? It hardly seems likely. But does it want to ignite open resistance by cracking down? That puts the feds in a bind.

Asked by NBC News what the future holds, Kevin Sabet, a former Obama administration drug-policy adviser, said, “Once these states actually try to implement these laws, we will see an effort by the feds to shut it down. We can only guess now what exactly that would look like. But the recent U.S. attorney actions against medical marijuana portends an aggressive effort to stop state-sponsored growing and selling at the outset.”

So it looks as though a conflict is in the offing, maybe even a constitutional crisis. With marijuana generally legal in two states, there would seem to be no authority for those state governments to devote resources helping the feds enforce federal law. (The feds don’t typically go after users; that’s left to state authorities.) And what of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause? It says, “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme law of the land….”

That would seem to seal the deal for the feds. But maybe not. What if a law is not “made in pursuance” of the Constitution, at least in the judgment of people in the states? Do they have the authority to ignore the law? Thomas E. Woods Jr. takes up this question in his book Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century. Pointing out that other efforts to reverse the growth of the central government have failed, Woods writes that “more and more Americans … are beginning to wonder if some other strategy should be pursued.” He has a point. The principle of checks and balances among the three branches of the central government has done little to stem its growth. The Supreme Court and Congress almost always defer to the imperial presidency. It’s an exception when the Court puts a limit on Congress. Electoral politics hasn’t had much effect. What’s left?

Nullification

Fortunately, there is another strategy worth trying in the 21st century: in Woods’s words, “the Jeffersonian remedy of state interposition or nullification.”

As Woods notes, nullification proceeds from the premise that an unconstitutional law is not properly regarded as law and therefore the states may ignore it. “Nullification provides a shield between the people of a state and an unconstitutional law from the federal goverment,” he writes. Without nullification, the feds define their own powers, which is intolerable from the standpoint of liberty because a government that defines its own powers is an unlimited government.

Nullification, as already noted, has a high pedigree. “It was Thomas Jefferson, in his draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, who introduced the term ‘nullification’ into American political discourse,” Woods writes. “Jefferson was merely building upon an existing line of political thought dating back to Virginia’s ratifying convention and even into the colonial period. Consequently, an idea that may strike us as radical today was well within the mainstream of Virginian political thought when Jefferson introduced it.”

Nullifying the central government’s destructive and misnamed war on drugs — it’s really a war on people — would be appropriate because in the past Americans used the principle against other laws that violated personal liberty, such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, which among other things suppressed criticism of government officials, and the Fugitive Slave Act, which required the return of runaway slaves to their masters. (Several states passed “personal liberty laws” in response. While that was not formal nullification, it was similar to it. Pro-slavery southerners objected. So much for southern devotion to “States’ Rights.”)

While nullification has not been acknowledged as valid by the feds, we shouldn’t assume it’s a dead letter. Woods notes that resistance in the states can force the feds to back off even if they don’t repeal the offensive law. Such is the case with the REAL ID Act of 2005, which would have standardized the identification process. Woods’s book discusses other modern examples of de facto nullification.

Nullification should not be conflated with the principle of States’ Rights. Nullification is about the real rights of individual persons, not the alleged rights of state governments. History demonstrates that decentralized power tends to pose less of a threat to freedom if for no other reason than that the smaller the jurisdiction, the cheaper it is to vote with one’s feet. What possible objection can there be to letting the people of the states decide when to ignore federal laws that violate their liberty?

And what better place to start than with the feds’ war on people who make, sell, and use disapproved substances? The drug war builds up intrusive police power, enriches black-market gangs, stimulates violence, ruins inner cities, jails millions of nonviolent people, and generally violates Americans’ civil liberties. It is an abomination in a society that regards itself as free.

Keep an eye on Washington and Colorado. They may be the birthplaces of freedom in the 21st century.

This article originally appeared in the February 2013 edition of Future of Freedom.

Note that it appears someone shoved something into his back pocket in the moment before he was grabbed by police at about 0:53 in the above video.  If the charges are “possession” or similar, we’ll know he was framed.

See also:

http://militantlibertarian.org/2013/05/19/adam-kokesh-arrested-was-he-set-up/

(Thanks to John at FUDC.org for that one)

The horrific Boston bombings already have led to irrational calls for more security cameras and more police officers, with some Democrats absurdly using this tragedy as a reason to stop the slight sequester-mandated cuts in federal spending growth.

Never mind that police spending primarily is a local matter. The bigger questions that Americans have rarely asked, especially following the 9/11 attacks: Do we really want the government to hire new armies of police officers? Do we really want to pay the price for this?

Knowing my views on the growing public-pension crisis, most readers probably think the “price” I’m worried about the nation’s multi-trillion-dollar unfunded pension liabilities driven largely by the “3 percent at 50” pension deals that cost taxpayers millions of dollars for each “first responder” who retires at 50 after 30 years of service.

That’s a huge problem – the result in part of Americans’ irrational embrace of the “more police” logic after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. But that’s not the main source of my concern. My real concern involves our safety and civil liberties given that police officers, and other groups of public employees, have become a protected class that does not have to follow the same rules as the average citizen.

A few years ago the Orange County Register reported on California’s special-license plate program that puts the addresses and license information of many public employees and their family members in a special database that shields them from getting tickets when they drive on the toll roads without paying the toll. That’s somewhat infuriating.

But a series from the Sun Sentinel newspaper in Florida found that “professional courtesy” – i.e., the way police allow other police officers to speed, drive drunk, and violate every manner of traffic law provided they are members of the law-enforcement caste – also has dangerous consequences for the general public.

The newspaper series, announced as a winner of a Pulitzer Prize the same week as the Boston bombing, details the tragedies of essentially giving one group free rein to drive in any manner its members choose. In one incident documented by the newspaper, a 21-year-old girl was driving with her 14-year-old step sister and a deputy accelerated from 24 to 87 miles per hour in 24 seconds as he rushed to aid a fellow officer who had pulled over a driver with – get this – a broken tail light. He T-boned the car, injured the driver, and killed the passenger. The 14-year-old girl’s body was found 37 feet from the accident.

The newspaper found police speeding routinely in excess of 120 miles per hour – not on emergency calls, but simply to get to work or for the fun of it. We’ve all seen it on the highways and there are news stories of tragic accidents with police killing citizens throughout the nation. Many times, off-duty officers drive in the same dangerous manner knowing that fellow officers will give them a pass at the sight of a badge.

On the last point: Police unions often point to the dangers of their job. But about half of the police on-the-job fatalities are due to traffic accidents, and a large portion of them are no doubt the result of reckless driving by the officers themselves.Here’s the Sun Sentinel, which reported that 21 Floridians have been killed or maimed by speeding cops since 2004: “Speeding cops are often spared severe punishment in the criminal justice system. Cops found at fault for fatal wrecks caused by speeding have faced consequences ranging from no criminal charges to a maximum of 60 days in jail. Inside many police agencies, speeding isn’t taken seriously until it results in tragedy. Even then, some cops are disciplined but stay on the job – and the road. The dead include seven police officers who crashed at speeds up to 61 mph over the legal limit.”

Recently, the Sacramento County sheriff was pulled over for a speeding ticket and he made a big deal of telling the public the police do get tickets. Maybe on occasion, but the “professional courtesy” problem is real and it applies not just to speeding but to every sort of police misbehavior.

Meanwhile, in California in particular, police unions have exempted police disciplinary records of misbehaving cops from the state’s public records law so the public never learns about the bad actors in police agencies – the ones who routinely abuse the public or who are involved in multiple car accidents due to their own speeding.

Police unions continue to push for special privileges – not just higher benefit levels, expanded disability pay, and other such benefits, but exemptions from every manner of oversight. Given the power of the police unions among union-friendly Democrats and law-and-order-supporting Republicans, there is no powerful civil-liberties lobby to stand up against this endless drive for more “protections” for those who patrol our communities.

The nation’s crime rates are at 40-year lows. Many studies have been done on the link between more police officers and crime rates and there’s little if any connection between the two. We cannot create a society that is entirely safe – especially from attacks on “soft” targets such as marathons and other such public events.

And we should not blindly embrace the call for more police without first reading the Sun Sentinel series about the potential downside.

The Library of Congress sparked a firestorm late last year when it issued new rules that made it effectively illegal to unlock a cell phone to switch to a new wireless carrier. An online petition on the issue attracted more than 100,000 signatures and prompted a White House statement criticizing the new rule. Members of Congress sprang into action, introducing at least three bills to deal with the issue.

But copyright reform groups panned these bills. Not only did they provide only narrow and temporary relief on the cell phone unlocking issue, the groups said, but they completely ignored the underlying problem: a provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that makes it a crime to “circumvent” copy protection even for lawful purposes.

New legislation sponsored by Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Thomas Massie (R-KY), Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and Jared Polis (D-CO) takes a broader approach to the issue. In addition to explicitly legalizing cell phone unlocking, the Unlocking Technology Act of 2013 also modifies the DMCA to make clear that unlocking copy-protected content is only illegal if it’s done in order to “facilitate the infringement of a copyright.” If a circumvention technology is “primarily designed or produced for the purpose of facilitating noninfringing uses,” that would not be a violation of copyright.

For example, Lofgren’s bill would likely make it legal for consumers to rip DVDs for personal use in much the same way they’ve long ripped CDs. It would remove legal impediments to making versions of copyrighted works that are accessible to blind users. And it would ensure that car owners have the freedom to service their vehicles without running afoul of copyright law.

Read more here.

For many, Mexico remains a land of Pedro sleeping away his days leaning against an adobe hut, sombrero pulled low over his face, with a burro drowsing nearby. Apparently this is actually belived. An American woman of immoderate idiocy once asked me by email whether Mexico had paved roads.Such folk seem to have in mind, if mind they have, the Mexico of the age of Pancho Villa. As best I can tell, they have no ideas at all of the rest of Latin America.

For the record, a paved road in Mexico. The Baluarte Bridge, between Sinaloa and Durango. It is used exclusively for burro traffic.

In reality, a much neglected location, things are a tad different. The Mexican economy prospers. Per-capita GDP rises rapidly. Goldman-Sachs predicts that Mexico will be the world’s
seventh economy by 2020. I´ll believe it when I see it, but it´s not called Goldman because it doesn´t know about money. Poverty assuredly exists, but I am aware of no city that has achieved the dysfunction of Detroit, Newark, Camden, Birmingham, and so on. The birth rate is way down. Literacy is up. Shopping malls are indistinguishable from those in America. Old pot-holed roads exist next to new highways.
Mexico, as popularly conceived. Close enough for government work.

But Latin America is not just Mexico. There is an actual civilization south of Texas, a whole unsuspected world, and much of it is not remotely primitive. If you transported Buenos Aires to Italy, say, or to Spain, it would not seem out of place.
Detroit.
Buenos Aires. As the photo makes clear, Latin cities are dismal slums.

Vi and I have spent days walking the streets of Lima and Buenos Aires and found them to be modern, agreeable, and usually very pretty cities, highly civilized in a distinctly European way, and in general delightful. If one regards southern Europe as part of the First World, it is hard to see how Argentina, Chile, and Colombia can be excluded.

Newark

Bogota. An enlightening example of the civilizational incapacity of Latinos.

On the other hand, Bolivia is decidedly backward, often lacking roads of any kind, paved or not. Ecuador, while lovely and pleasant, is not quite midway between Bolivia and Argentina. Venezuela is nasty and dangerous. Latin America is not one place.

I belong to a list-serve of highly bright people, some of whose names you would know, who are serious academics and writers and such. They are intensely concerned with the idea of IQ. They assert that Hispanics have a mean IQ of 89, Mexicans in particular of 87, American blacks of 85, and regard the book IQ and the Wealth of Nations as demonstrating that GDP per capita depends on IQ. The idea is hardly implausible. It is hard to see how a population of low intelligence could build and run a modern city, for example.

A problem with this theory is that its proponents are attributing a result in fact—economic success, level of civilization—dependent on many variables to a single factor, IQ.  It doesn´t work. For example, according to IQ and the Wealth, Italy has a mean IQ of 102, the US of 98, and yet the US has been greatly more profuse in its engendering of both money andextraordinary technology. The advanced countries of Latin America resemble Italy in such things as are visible from their cities. And of course if GDP per capital is a function of IQ, then the IQ of the Chinese must be rising at a hell of a rate. Perhaps their heads will explode.

Brazil, specifically Embraer, designs and builds these babies, and others, used by countless airlines. Building airliners is a characteristic of people of low IQ. The remains of such craft are often associated with Neanderthal burial grounds.
Curious. Checking the CIA Factbook, I find that the rate of literacy in Argentina is 97%, in Mexico, 86%, and in the United States, 99%. Though I don´tknow where the figures come from, or how literacy is defined, the first two seem plausible. However, the US Department of Education says that 14% percent of American adults are illiterate. Let’s see, 14 from 100 is…86.

I don´t vouch for the exactitude of these numbers, but they would seem to indicate that northward things are perhaps not as rosy as we would like our roses to be. And, having spent a lot of time on the ground southward, I note that are a lot more culture, civilization, brains, and talent in those climes than most Americans believe. I hesitate to suggest that we do anything so extreme as to pay attention. It´s because I believe in the sanctity of tradition.

We now live in a world where public servants informing the public about government behavior or wrongdoing must practice the tradecraft of drug dealers and spies. Otherwise, these informants could get caught in the web of administrations that view George Orwell’s 1984 as an operations manual.

With the recent revelation that the Department of Justice under the Obama administration secretly obtained phone records for Associated Press journalists — and previous subpoenas by the Bush administration targeting the Washington Post and New York Times — it is clear that whether Democrat or Republican, we now live in a surveillance dystopia beyond Orwell’s Big Brother vision. Even privately collected data isn’t immune, and some highly sensitive data is particularly vulnerable thanks to the Third Party Doctrine.

So how can one safely leak information to the press?

Well, it’s hard. Even the head of the CIA can’t email his mistress without being identified by the FBI. With a simple subpoena or warrant, the FBI can obtain historical calling information (and with cellphones, location history); email messages (and records revealing the pattern of where and when the target accessed these accounts); internet activity; and much more.

Since even separate, innocuous contacts between a reporter and source may be sufficient for the FBI to establish a relationship in its investigations — and who knows what kind of leak triggers a crackdown — here’s my guide for potential leakers.

Read more at this link.