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  <title>The Public Ballot - All Comments</title>
  <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2009:mephisto/comments</id>
  <generator version="0.8.0" uri="http://mephistoblog.com">Mephisto Drax</generator>
  <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/feed/all_comments.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml"/>
  <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
  <updated>2009-05-17T20:59:01Z</updated>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>My maps</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-10-27:31:605</id>
    <published>2009-05-17T20:59:01Z</published>
    <updated>2009-05-17T20:59:01Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/10/27/technical-updates" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Technical Updates' by My maps</title>
<content type="html">Blog added to my favorites! :-)</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>My maps</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-06-28:7:604</id>
    <published>2009-05-17T20:48:15Z</published>
    <updated>2009-05-17T20:48:15Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/6/28/ohio-secret-ballot-compromised-methodology-exposed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Ohio Secret Ballot Compromised - Methodology Exposed' by My maps</title>
<content type="html">Blog added to my favorites! :-)</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Alexwebmaster</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-06-28:7:492</id>
    <published>2009-03-03T11:18:01Z</published>
    <updated>2009-03-03T11:18:01Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/6/28/ohio-secret-ballot-compromised-methodology-exposed" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Ohio Secret Ballot Compromised - Methodology Exposed' by Alexwebmaster</title>
<content type="html">Hello webmaster 
I would like to share with you a link to your site 
write me here preonrelt@mail.ru</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Mimi Lindsay</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-10-27:31:322</id>
    <published>2008-11-13T03:52:02Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-13T03:52:02Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/10/27/technical-updates" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Technical Updates' by Mimi Lindsay</title>
<content type="html">y4gllkumk58d3nl6</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Brady Mercado</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-07-21:12:321</id>
    <published>2008-11-13T03:48:49Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-13T03:48:49Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/7/21/jennifer-brunner-seemingly-cares-about-the-secret-ballot" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Jennifer Brunner [Seemingly] Cares about the Secret Ballot' by Brady Mercado</title>
<content type="html">o4vif08ayoomlxqc</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Lorna Murray</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-07-18:11:320</id>
    <published>2008-11-13T03:40:40Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-13T03:40:40Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/7/18/there-is-no-more-secret-ballot" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'There is no more Secret Ballot' by Lorna Murray</title>
<content type="html">yyj7ozhva6c6xsmj</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Emma Houston</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-11-07:34:319</id>
    <published>2008-11-13T03:16:21Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-13T03:16:21Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/11/7/we-re-on-npr" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'We're on NPR!' by Emma Houston</title>
<content type="html">c76o7vas4g1kp85f</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Charla Kerr</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-21:20:318</id>
    <published>2008-11-13T02:59:21Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-13T02:59:21Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/21/two-common-misconceptions" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Two common misconceptions' by Charla Kerr</title>
<content type="html">dg1z84n0jqtonrhx</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Melinda Reid</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-11-07:34:317</id>
    <published>2008-11-12T23:20:00Z</published>
    <updated>2008-11-12T23:20:00Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/11/7/we-re-on-npr" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'We're on NPR!' by Melinda Reid</title>
<content type="html">cvqpu50tgkppsrs3</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Yury</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-21:20:24</id>
    <published>2007-08-22T20:31:10Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-22T20:31:10Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/21/two-common-misconceptions" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Two common misconceptions' by Yury</title>
<content type="html">&lt;p&gt;Man, these comments are formatted terribly :(&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's my bad.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Sorry, readers.&lt;/p&gt;</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>zappini</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-21:20:23</id>
    <published>2007-08-22T20:01:19Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-22T20:01:19Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/21/two-common-misconceptions" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Two common misconceptions' by zappini</title>
<content type="html">Thank you for sharing your findings.

I wrote about similar attack late last year:

&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.washblog.com/story/2006/10/9/124420/383&quot;&gt;No Privacy on King County's Touchscreens&lt;/a&gt;

In brief, if your poll site doesn't somehow shuffle (mix) the order of the voters using a touchscreen, you can infer how everyone voted. Without using timestamps.

King County WA currently has a single touchscreen per poll site. So the order of the voters doesn't get shuffled.


Ballot boxes are the physical equivalent of a secure one-way hash. After the ballot goes into the box, there's no way to tie it back to the voter. You achieve end-to-end traceability and the public vote count by ensuring the physical security of the ballots.

At this time, there is no computerized voting system that ensures both the secret ballot and the public vote count. Some academics think it can be done with novel voting systems (e.g. PunchScan). I remain unconvinced.


Cheers, Jason Osgood / Seattle WA</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Creeva</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-20:15:22</id>
    <published>2007-08-22T19:21:35Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-22T19:21:35Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/20/we-re-on-cnet" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'We're on CNET!' by Creeva</title>
<content type="html">I finally got around to doing a write up -  http://www.creeva.com/2007/08/vulnerabilities-in-ohio-voting-system.html</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Al Kolwicz</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-21:20:21</id>
    <published>2007-08-22T13:54:11Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-22T13:54:11Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/21/two-common-misconceptions" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'Two common misconceptions' by Al Kolwicz</title>
<content type="html">The secret ballot issues raised by Moyer and Cropcho won't be solved until the toilet-paper roles used to sequentially record voter activity are eliminated.

As a Colorado poll watcher, I have the right to record the names of people who vote.  By observing the sequence in which they use a specific DRE, I know the sequence of their (supposed) votes recorded on the VVPAT.  Access to the roll means access to their &quot;ballot&quot;.  The canvass board and election officials have legal access to the roll.

NO!, I do not trust the officials.  Not because they are evil, but because the protection of a secret ballot is sacrosanct.  If any pathway to retrieving a specific voters ballot exists, it might be used: (1) by the court, or (2) for political purposes by a partisan official, or (3) to create a &quot;threat of disclosure&quot; needed by vote-buyers and voter-intimidators to suggest that they can know a voter's selections.

Furthermore, HART Intercivic suffers not only the problem described above, but also uniquely identifies every PAPER and VVPAT ballot with a unique, NON-REMOVABLE, serial number and barcode.  Voters can make a record of this serial number on their ballot and use it to later identify their specific ballot.  Consequently, the market for vote-selling is facilitated and the opportunity for voter intimidation is supported.  

The arrogance of vendors who trample on our right to use a secret ballot must be punished by immediately forcing them to meet our requirements for &quot;privately voted anonymous ballots&quot;.    

Al


Al Kolwicz
Colorado Voter Group
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net 
www.AlKolwicz.net  
www.coloradovotergroup.blogspot.com</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Yury</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-20:15:17</id>
    <published>2007-08-20T21:00:12Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-20T21:00:12Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/20/we-re-on-cnet" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'We're on CNET!' by Yury</title>
<content type="html">I'm still a little amazed at how little concern people have over this exploit, even from some of those who acknowledge that it's a problem.

1. Voter turnout is terrible as it is. This, coupled with the maker's of these machines and the state's nonchalance won't help.

2. We &lt;i&gt;do&lt;/i&gt; care how a large contingent of the population voted, and there's good reason why they shouldn't be exposed. Judges, school board members, even doctors and lawyers. Do priests vote? :)

Not to mention husbands and wives, employers and employees. Unions. 

Hey, Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot</content>  </entry>
  <entry xml:base="http://thepublicballot.org/">
    <author>
      <name>Yury</name>
    </author>
    <id>tag:thepublicballot.org,2007-08-20:15:16</id>
    <published>2007-08-20T20:49:55Z</published>
    <updated>2007-08-20T20:49:55Z</updated>
    <category term="Voter Privacy"/>
    <link href="http://thepublicballot.org/2007/8/20/we-re-on-cnet" rel="alternate" type="text/html"/>
    <title>Comment on 'We're on CNET!' by Yury</title>
<content type="html">No longer above the fold ;)</content>  </entry>
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