As I recently told everyone here, I have resigned from JVP and so this blog is discontinued. I had re-directed all of you to the blog I sort of maintain at the Talking Points Memo site.

I’m pleased to let you know that I will be continuing The Third Way at my new blog site, mitchellplitnick.com.

I am not going to import all of the subscriptions again, and I have discontinued the TPM e-mail notifications. I hope you will all visit the new blog by clicking here. On the right hand side, just under the picture of Jerusalem at the top, you will see a link you can follow to subscribe to the blog if you wish. Thanks for reading and keeping up with me.

Thanks to the many of you who have followed this blog, and those who have commented. As I have now resigned from Jewish Voice for Peace, this blog is closing. I will continue to write analysis and welcome comments at my other blog, at Talking Points Memo Cafe, which you can follow at this link.

That such a debate would raise passions to a boiling point on both sides is self-evident. For Israelis, the question goes to the very legitimacy of their state and to the history of the Zionist movement. More, it implies a question of whether it is morally justifiable to seek to destroy Israel by any means necessary.

For Palestinians, the question has two layers: one, acknowledging and recognizing that Zionism succeeded in establishing the Jewish state. The second layer implies a demand that Palestinians acknowledge that their dispossession was justified and legitimate. Most, though far from all, Palestinians can accept the first layer. But search as hard as you might and it is unlikely you’ll find more Palestinians than you can count with your fingers that can accept the second.

Such a vexing question is not asked about other countries. The “right” of the United States to exist was not questioned before, during or after the Americans and their colonial predecessors nearly wiped out the native population. The right of Lebanon, a country sliced out of Greater Syria with an arbitrary pen stroke on a map, or of Jordan, a country split apart from the rest of the British Mandate over Palestine, to exist is not similarly questioned. But Israel’s is. By the same token, those countries do not ask for their “right to exist” to be acknowledged, merely that their sovereignty be recognized and respected. But Israel does ask this.

Countries do not exist by right. They exist by fiat, a recognition of sovereignty, defensive capabilities, and the power, derived either from the populace or the military, to maintain the structure and government of that country. But the debate over Israel’s right to exist persists for two reasons: Israel’s insistence that other countries, particularly the Arabs and especially the Palestinians, acknowledge this right and the constant rhetorical attempts by Israel’s opponents to de-legitimize the state’s existence. Both of these are pointless exercises that serve only to fuel the conflict and make rational discussion that much more difficult.

Israel’s “right to exist” and even to exist as a Jewish state was sanctioned by the United Nations in their partition plan of 1947 and expressed in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. While GA resolutions do not have the weight in international law that Security Council resolutions do, this is still much more international acknowledgment than most countries have. UNGA 181 speaks specifically of a “Jewish state” repeatedly.

More than that, though, Israeli diplomat Abba Eban put it best: “Nobody does Israel any service by proclaiming its ‘right to exist.’ Israel’s right to exist, like that of the United States, Saudi Arabia and 152 other states, is axiomatic and unreserved. Israel’s legitimacy is not suspended in midair awaiting acknowledgement….There is certainly no other state, big or small, young or old, that would consider mere recognition of its ‘right to exist’ a favor, or a negotiable concession.” (New York Times, November 18, 1981).

Eban was right. Israel’s insistence that its right to exist be recognized in fact undermines the very goal that insistence seeks to achieve. This is a different matter from recognizing Israel’s sovereignty, a diplomatic formality that is very important for international relations. That is what Israel needs, not recognition of its “right” to exist. And Israel can best achieve that end by ending its dispute with the Palestinians and finally demarcating clear borders so that Israel is a clearly defined entity in the international arena. Put simply, Israel needs its sovereignty recognized in the same manner as sovereignty is recognized for most of the rest of the world’s states.

The PLO recognized that sovereignty in 1988. Jordan and Egypt recognized that sovereignty with their respective peace treaties with Israel, and other countries in the Arab and larger Muslim world have also recognized it. The Arab League peace proposal offers that recognition from the rest of the Arab states. But by adding in the need for Palestinians in particular to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, Israel goes well beyond a request for recognition and asks Palestinians to agree that their dispossession was justified.

The father of Revisionist Zionism, which spawned the Herut party, the key party of the Likud coalition, Ze’ev Jabotinsky was a man of racist views, yet he saw better than his contemporaries the realities of the Palestinians Arabs’ position. In his signature essay, “The Iron Wall”, he wrote: “…consider all the precedents with which they are acquainted, and see whether there is one solitary instance of any colonisation being carried on with the consent of the native population. There is no such precedent…As long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of getting rid of us, they will refuse to give up this hope in return for either kind words or for bread and butter, because they are not a rabble, but a living people. And when a living people yields in matters of such a vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope of getting rid of us, because they can make no breach in the iron wall.”

The situation today is no different than when Jabotinsky wrote those words in 1923, at least not in this regard. Most Palestinians realize that Zionism has succeeded and a Jewish state established. Most Palestinians realize this is an established and irreversible fact of history. They can accept these facts. But to ask Palestinians to accept that the Zionists and later the Israeli state had the right to take the land they once lived on is an unrealistic demand and one that no people could possibly accept.

By the same token, rhetoric aimed at making the case that Israel has no right to exist must also be eliminated. It is not necessary to engage in “chicken or the egg” debating as to whether that rhetoric spawns Israel’s demand or the Israeli’s repeatedly stated need for this acknowledgment inspires such rhetoric. Both need to stop if sufficiently cool heads are ever to prevail in this conflict. In this, it is not only Israel and the Palestinians, but Israel and the rest of Middle East, including Iran in particular, that is at issue. Israel must accommodate itself to the reality that, while its existence may be accepted at some point, the manner of its birth will always be disapproved of. The Arab states, as well as Iran, must recognize that Israel is a fact and that it has the same entitlement to sovereignty and security as any other country.

In my experience of dealing with peoples of all these groups, the overwhelming majority are willing to accept these conditions. It is only the constant rekindling of the pointless debate over legitimacy and the “right to exist” that radicalizes the discussion. This happens because of the deep-seated insecurities of both Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli political scientist Professor Menachem Klein puts it quite elegantly: “…admitting that Israeli forces committed war crimes in 1948, or that central organs of the government played a role in turning many Palestinians into refugees, meant admitting that Israel had been founded on an injustice. Such an admission, many Israelis feared, would void their country’s moral foundation and legitimacy…When Israel is reassured that its darkest nightmares will not come to pass, the hour will come for Israel to apologize for its role in the refugee problem….

“The PLO had a similar difficulty. Palestinian society as a whole was reluctant to admit to war crimes that its forces committed during its national liberation struggle, and to apologize for the terror that its organizations used and still use against Israelis and foreigners….They also fear that admitting to war crimes and terror will invalidate recognition of their right to self-determination. When the Palestinians are ensured of sovereignty over the territories Israel conquered in 1967, and when they are certain that their confession will not be exploited by Israel to undermine their country, the Palestinians will be able to apologize.” (Klein, A Possible Peace Between Israel And Palestine: An Insider’s Account of the Geneva Initiative, 2007, pp. 59-60)

Klein describes here how both sides need to establish a certain moral purity or, in their respective views, risk undermining the legitimacy of their national claims. But the very attempt is absurd. Notwithstanding the fact that most Israelis and most Palestinians are good and ethical people, people do terrible things in war. Israelis and Palestinians, Israel and Arab countries, and Zionists and Arab nationalists have been at each other’s throats for over a century. It is not humanly possible to fight for any length of time, much less a century, and not commit terrible crimes. No army, guerrilla group, militia or police force can make such a claim anywhere in history. The fact that terrible crimes were committed does not de-legitimize either Israeli sovereignty nor Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

It’s high time the discussion moved past pointless debates such as Israel’s “right to exist.” It’s time to deal with realities, and they are simply these: Israel exists and will continue to exist as a Jewish state for the foreseeable future and Palestinians have a right to self-determination in a viable state of their own, their experience of the past 60 years having entitles them to a good deal of aid and support from not only Israel, but also the Arab world and the larger international community in establishing that state in a sustainable manner. Should Israelis and Palestinians mutually decide (inconceivable as this is) on some other structure, such as one state or a federated system, that is their right and no one else’s to determine. From there, people of good will and conscience, in and out of government, can work within Israel and Palestine to address other needs within each society, such as healing the sectarian rifts among the Palestinians or working to ensure equality for Israel’s non-Jewish citizens.

If those basic facts of life cannot be accepted as axiomatic, then there really is no point in discussing anything else.

Americans for A Safe Israel is bringing its demonstrators to Annapolis. They essentially object to any settlement of the conflict that is not tantamount to a complete surrender on the part of the Palestinians and Arab states. They will be joined by the starkly Orwellian-named Shalom International, a Christian group that opposes any withdrawal by Israel from the Occupied Territories on religious grounds.

While no left-wing groups have, as of yet, announced any intention of physically protesting the conference, messages of protest from various small groups have been circulating. Most of these have been based on the point that the “Bush agenda” is being forwarded at the conference and therefore it should be opposed out of hand. Typically, alternatives are not presented nor, from my experience, even thought about for a moment.

Two liberal Jewish groups, Americans for Peace Now and Ameinu, have also announced that they plan to demonstrate in support of the conference.

In truth, this is much ado about nothing. The agenda for the conference has yet to be set, but the past few months have seen the Americans, Israelis and the Palestinian Authority all working overtime to tamp down expectations of this conference. And with good reason.

Before getting into that point, it needs to be stated that a conference of this type is not a negative development. There simply is no alternative to bringing the US, Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab League and the international community together to discuss the issues. The mere fact of such an event is a step in the right direction, although there can be some very negative fallout from it.

Unfortunately, the lessons of the two Camp David summits (the one that succeeded in 1978 and the one that failed in 2000) have been entirely ignored in this gathering. Even the modest goal of this conference, which is simply to restart negotiations on a final peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, needs to be pursued under certain conditions. One of the key features that distinguished the Carter summit in 1978 from the Clinton version in 2000 was the position of the various leaders attending in terms of their own terms of office.

Jimmy Carter, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat were all secure leaders whose terms in office still had a lot of future to them. Despite passionate and politically significant opposition to their actions, all three leaders had strong bases of support both among the populace and in key political arenas in their respective countries. By contrast, the 2000 attendees were all on shaky ground. Bill Clinton was nearing the end of his presidency and desperately wanted a Mideast peace accord to overshadow what appeared to be his legacy of oral sex and impeachment. Ehud Barak’s coalition was falling apart amid sundry scandals and Hezbollah’s claim of victory and rise in stature in the wake of the withdrawal from Lebanon. And Yasir Arafat’s popularity was at an all-time low after the Oslo process had seen unprecedented settlement expansion and his administration was marked by autocracy, human rights abuses and corruption.

All the Camp David II leaders were desperate to redeem their reputations, but their needs diverged. Clinton needed a stable agreement. Barak needed to find a deal that allowed most of the settlers to stay in place, did not permit any return of refugees nor burdened Israel heavily in their compensation and did not diminish Jewish control over Jerusalem. Arafat desperately needed to show he was capable of standing up to the Americans and Israelis. These were obviously incompatible goals.

A similar situation takes hold now. George Bush’s presidency lies in ruins on the sands of Iraq. Ehud Olmert is facing a stream of scandals and the humiliating setback in Lebanon last summer has already been blamed on him. The upcoming release of the second Winograd report is said to put the blame squarely on Olmert’s shoulders for that war’s failures and he also bears the brunt of the botched withdrawal from Gaza and the constant flow of qassam rockets being fired at Israeli towns from there. The Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas is the most different from his predecessor, but this only worsens the situation. Abbas has presided over a split that might be a death blow to the Palestinian national movement while achieving virtually nothing for residents of the West Bank. Unlike Arafat, he has very little respect among Palestinians and virtually no ability to persuade his people to accept painful compromises.

Both Olmert and Abbas are being confronted not only with strong opposition from their typical political opponents, Likud and Hamas respectively, but are also being opposed by members of their own governing coalitions. Various PA officials, including Fatah members, have not only expressed a lack of confidence in the conference, but some have even said that Abbas must make no concessions at the conference. Meanwhile, Olmert is daily attacked by right-wingers, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, but faces a much more daunting opponent in his own defense minister. Ehud Barak, attempting to position himself for a challenge to regain the Prime Minister’s office for himself, has consistently undermined Olmert and the conference. Barak goes even further, though. There is virtual unanimity that the best outcome of this conference will be the restarting of serious final status negotiations. It is “the day after” that really matters, and Barak is moving to quickly start the diminishment of electricity to Gaza on December 2, a move which will clearly stir the pot and make any follow-up negotiations much harder. Thus, Barak hopes to prove Olmert a failure and set himself up as the only “moderate” alternative to Netanyahu.

All of this speaks to the need to ripen conditions before the conference rather than convene it in haste. The gestures provided by both Olmert (granting some limited amnesty to Fatah fighters, freeing several hundred Palestinian prisoners and announcing a freeze on settlement construction and the dismantling of illegal outposts, although this last has thus far been no more than words and one outpost removal) and Abbas (the increased security presence in Nablus aimed at proving to Israel that the PA can maintain security)have done little to raise confidence on the respective other sides. Syria has received no indication that it’s claims would be given serious attention and is therefore declining its invitation to attend the conference (although it did cancel a parallel opposition conference). There is every reason why virtually everyone, left, right and center, expects nothing from this conference.

It need not be this way. It has always been the case that the nature of the conflict, the imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, buttressed by Israel’s (largely correct, though somewhat decontextualized) view that the Palestinian issue is intertwined with its conflicts with more credible enemies in the larger Middle East as well as domestic constraints on both Israeli and Palestinian leaders limit the maneuvering ability of both parties. Strong leaders have shown themselves capable of pushing past some of these issues, but these have often been in service of obstructing, rather than promoting comprehensive settlements (this was true of both Yasir Arafat and Ariel Sharon, for example). The only thing that can bridge this gap is strong American intervention, using both carrot and stick. This has, in the past produced some significant shifts and motion, such as the Camp David I accord, the Madrid conference and recognition of the PLO. Many of these have been mixed blessings themselves, but none of them could have happened without American intervention. In fact, without strong American use of both carrot and stick, there is little chance any progress will be made, now or ever.

The current administration has proven completely inept on the few occasions it has even deigned to attempt diplomacy, in this or any arena. It is loathe to employ the carrot and its use of the stick is akin to a bull in a china shop. Still, for the next 14 months, this is what we have. And I disagree with those who believe this an insincere effort on Condoleezza Rice’s part; I grant that there is every reason to mistrust her, and that she has no real support from the Bush-Cheney White House, but her actions seem to indicate that she has realized, far too late, what must be done and is trying, within the limits imposed on her by her bosses, to do it.

Until the United States exerts real pressure on Israel to take down all the outposts and completely freeze settlement construction, while simultaneously both enhancing quality of life for Palestinian in all of the Occupied Territories and finding the correct balance of engagement and pressure to help the Abbas-Fayyad government stop the attacks on Israel from Gaza and establish a modicum of security on the chaotic territories, progress will be elusive and fleeting. Conditions must be improved so that both the Israeli and Palestinian publics have both hope for the future and a reason to endorse the sorts of compromises that the masses on both sides currently oppose. It is inconceivable that the Bush Administration could do this, even if it wanted to, which it obviously does not. But some of the building blocks for such a future can be laid at Annapolis and in the year that follows. This should be supported, not opposed, by all who care about either the Israelis or Palestinians, or both. And in the interim, it is crucial that those with a desire for resolution of this conflict and a realistic approach to it come together to create significant political pressure to make it happen.Recent events, such as the Ackerman-Boustany bill in Congress, show that when there is sufficient political pressure applied, even the vaunted and exaggerated “Israel Lobby” embodied in AIPAC will follow the political winds. But only if people more sensible than those in that organization make it happen.

The potential benefits of an agreement between Syria and Israel are enormous for many parties. The United States is one of those parties, although one of the few players who stand to lose from such an agreement are the neoconservatives and hawks in the Bush administration. There are also real obstacles to an agreement, especially in the arenas of domestic politics in Israel and the US. But the chief factor blocking Israel-Syria talks at this time is the Bush Administration’s refusal to allow them. This is not something often talked about, which is not surprising–one can only picture the response of the overwhelming majority of Jews to the news that the US is blocking Israel-Arab peace talks that Israel desires.

Yet for all the difficulties, a deal with Syria is a lot easier to attain for Israel than one with the Palestinians, and it might have just as many, maybe even a few more, benefits for Israel as well as the region as a whole.

The Ground On Which To Build An Israel-Syria Agreement

To understand the potential benefits, we must first understand where we are now. The Middle East as a whole is engulfed in burning conflicts, simmering conflicts and growing potential for conflict. The ongoing bloodshed in Iraq and Sudan, the deepening tensions in Lebanon and growing concerns over increasingly tense situations in Bahrain, other Gulf states, Egypt and even to some extent, Saudi Arabia make this always explosive region all the more so. The fuse that is sitting too close to the flame is Israel and the Palestinian Territories.

Though not always reported, there are multiple, daily incidents of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank as well as ongoing clashes between Fatah and Hamas as well as other Palestinian factions from time to time. Israel’s deepening of the infrastructure of the occupation makes matters worse. The wall continues to be built, Palestinian land continues to be appropriated and Israel continues to discuss its plans to hold onto various chunks of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Promised relief from checkpoints and settlement “outposts” has not materialized, echoing for Palestinians the Oslo years when Israeli promises of peace were accompanied by a massive acceleration in settlement expansion.

Israelis have, in the past seven years suffered through both the worst violence with the Palestinians that they’ve seen since 1948 and the most extensive damage caused by a cross-border nemesis since that same time. Mahmoud Abbas is not even considering any attempt at restoring Palestinian unity and is on the “hot seat” to produce some tangible results before Palestinian misery erupts in violence again. This time, that violence may not be limited to Israel, but could well threaten the surrounding region and intra-Palestinian violence may become more devastating than Israeli attacks.

Iran’s position also greatly magnifies the volatility of the situation. On the one hand, Iran’s influence in the region has grown substantially. Its traditional buffer, Iraq, lies in ruins. It has greatly increased its ties with and support of both Hezbollah and Syria. The rise of the Iraqi Shi’a to an advantageous position in what is left of Iraq has also opened at least the potential for Iranian agitation and inspiration of Shi’a in Iraq as well as those living in oil-rich areas of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Iran’s position, however, is also more unstable than at any time in its recent history. It finds itself in the US’ cross hairs, so despite its enhanced position regionally, it feels less secure. Iran’s attempts over the past ten years to re-ingratiate itself to the United States have consistently failed and been undermined both by neoconservative forces and by its own strategic decision to pursue rapprochement with the US while maintaining, and at times even increasing its bombastic and hostile rhetoric towards Israel.

All of this adds up to a situation where the Middle East is potentially on the precipice of violent conflagration that would be mind-boggling even for this troubled and war-torn region. The status quo must be shifted radically to avoid this. That status quo will not hold, one way or the other; the only question is whether it will be changed through negotiations and diplomacy or by radical conflict.

Syria: The Way Out?

There is a common wisdom that the key to unraveling the quagmire of the Middle East is resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. That’s true, of course, but for all the prodding toward the upcoming Annapolis conference, it doesn’t seem like either Israel or the Palestinians are in position to strike a deal. The Israeli public is more angry and fearful of the Palestinians than ever and the Palestinians are split. Both sides are led by weak leaders whom few believe can either reach the needed agreements or gather the needed support from skeptical publics and parliaments even if they do.

One of the benefits that a deal with Syria may reap could well be easing the difficult conditions under which the Israel-Palestinian dispute is being negotiated. But what is certain is that a deal with Syria will change the playing field. Predicting the future is a dangerous business. Unintended consequences and unexpected events always crop up. But let’s see what could potentially come of a deal between Israel and Syria.

An agreement between Israel and Syria would be based on the full return of the Golan Heights to Syria. In exchange, Syria would fully normalize relations with Israel, and would also agree to assist in disarming Hezbollah, close all offices of Palestinian militant groups and cease support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Syria would need no prodding to remove itself from its association with Iran. The alliance between the secular, Allawi-led Syrian government and the theocratic, Shi’a government in Iran has always been an uncomfortable one for both parties, a marriage born of necessity due to the isolation of both countries. But Syria and Iran have significantly different ideologies, long-term interests and political and diplomatic systems. Syria would be much happier being welcomed, as it would certainly be, back into the Arab fold. It would continue to work to influence events in Lebanon, whether through Hezbollah or through other pro-Syrian groups in that country, but it would no longer need an armed militia at its call to harass Israel and would have no reason not to content itself with political agitation.

Syria does not have absolute command of Hezbollah. They can cut off support, cease serving as a way station for Iranian supplies to Hezbollah and pressure them to disarm and become a political party, but the response to these actions is completely in Hezbollah’s hands. But whether or not it complies with Syrian pressure to disarm, Hezbollah’s supplies from Syria would be cut and its ability to receive aid from Iran would be compromised. While this would not resolve the political issues that grip Lebanon, it would measurably reduce the violent dimension of those squabbles.

With the defeat of Iraq, a Syrian-Israeli peace would mean that the entire Arab world would be in the “pro-Western” camp. While full cooperation in combating terrorism would still hinge upon a resolution of the issue of Palestine, the Arab regimes would be officially on the same page on this issue, both de facto and de jure. While elements in many Arab countries, in some cases powerful elements, would continue to support radical groups, the governments, all of which would be threatened by such groups (indeed, it would almost certainly be the case that al-Qaeda and similar groups would do everything they could to disrupt such an Arab entente), would be united in their opposition.

The issue of Palestine would remain a problem. But without Syrian backing, Hamas and other, similar groups would have a hard time rejecting the Arab League framework. Active Syrian participation in diplomacy might also help the Palestinians heal the rift between Hamas and Fatah, a necessary pre-condition for arriving at a sustainable agreement between themselves and Israel. But the incentives for the Arab League to broker an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, already considerable, would be exponentially boosted.

Iran

The elephant in the room remains Iran. As I pointed out in an earlier piece, Iran is a country that is not understood at all well in the United States. Israel has a somewhat better grasp of Iran, but both Israel and Iran have spent the better part of the past quarter-century hurling bombastic rhetoric at one another. Until relatively recently, indeed, long after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran and Israel would do clandestine business with each other, despite neither liking nor trusting each other. They were competitors even in the days of the Shah, to some extent, but had never come close to direct conflict until the coming of the neocons and the invasion of Iraq. This was yet another neoconservative “contribution” to Israel’s security.

Iran’s tendency has always been geared much more toward defensive actions than offensive ones. Even when they are arming groups like Hezbollah, they do so quietly and without attempting or endeavoring to wield the sort of influence that Syria has had in Lebanon, for example. Their ambitions are pointed at regional leadership, attained through Islamic rule. But Iran has also generally been mistrusted by Arabs, and even today, its alliance with the likes of Syria and Hamas are matters of necessity. Their Shi’a leadership is seen as a threat by most Arab rulers, and a considerable portion of the Arab street sees things similarly.

Iran also desires to end its isolation and engage not only with Europe, but with the United States as well. What has tripped it up in the past was its refusal to recognize Israel. Iran’s alienation from the US has its very deep roots in the hostage crisis of 1980, a crisis which the theocratic leadership did not create, but which they did decide to endorse, for fear that not doing so would undermine their new revolutionary government. Since the resolution of that crisis, Iran has made more than a few attempts to repair its relationship with the US. But it was not until George W. Bush’s presidency that it sent a clear signal that recognition of Israel could be a part of that approach, and by then, with the neocons having so much influence, it was too late.

The failure of the attempts at rapprochement was a factor in the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and things have gone downhill from there. But the point here is that Iran desperately wants to end its international isolation. The hostile rhetoric it has employed against Israel has largely been motivated by their desire to win over the Arabs. This is not to say that Iran has not been active in its opposition to Israel–their support of Hezbollah is sufficient proof of that. But Khomeini himself was always more than willing to do business with Israel as long as it was clandestine and did not jeopardize their efforts at ingratiating Iran to the Arabs. While they have vacillated over the years in whether they were aiming at the hearts of the Arab masses or the Arab leaders, it is not Iran’s intention to see their anti-Zionism, however ideologically genuine it might be, isolate them from, rather than enhance their status with the Arabs.

Thus, there is every possibility that an agreement with Syria would also lead to Iran to help resolve, rather than intensify, the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The Key and the Stumbling Block

The key is the Golan Heights. The biggest stumbling block to a deal between Israel and Syria on full peace and normalization between the two countries is domestic politics, both in the US and Israel.

In the US, the Bush Administration may have fewer neoconservatives in visible positions, but the neocon disdain for diplomatic solutions remains. It is therefore disinclined to trust a process of negotiation with a spoke in the “axis of evil.” Bush has also invested some stock in the Israel-Palestinian track and part of that strategic thrust is to isolate, not talk with Syria.

But the domestic obstacles to a deal with Syria are much more serious in Israel. Despite the fact that a deal with Syria has been close on a number of occasions, giving up the Golan Heights causes a great deal of worry among Israelis.

Even though Israel has held the Golan for forty years, the national memory still holds the image of Syrian mortars being lobbed at Israeli kibbutzim from the high ground of the Golan before the 1967 war. This is a visceral feeling that is not easily overcome by modern military realities that have seriously diminished the threat of holding the high ground outside of a direct battle and the fact that security guarantees preventing such a situation from recurring are easily enforced.

There is also the concern of precedent, one which rose both with the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and from Gaza. In each case, the concern was that setting a precedent of giving up territory would lead to more territorial concessions. In the case of the Golan, this is even more intense because the Golan has long since been annexed to Israel. It is, for all intents and purposes, part of Israel. The former Syrians living there are not under occupation, but are citizens of Israel. If Israel can give up such territory, the fear goes, how can it justify holding on to any of the West Bank?

This feeling is strong. In the 90s, a widespread campaign was waged opposing the return of the Golan in exchange for peace with Syria. I’ve seen the bumper stickers, not infrequently, both in Israel and in the US. They read “Ha’am im Ha’Golan”, the country with the Golan. The campaign was so popular and familiar that it was recycled for Gaza, with stickers that looked identical but had Gush Katif (the major settlement bloc in Gaza) instead of the Golan.

This is not an easy obstacle to overcome, but a strong Israeli campaign, if the government leads it, can pull it off.

Conclusion

The Golan does not get anything like the attention that the West Bank does. For activists, whatever they may think of Israel’s annexation of territory acquired by war, there are no people being held under military occupation without the rule of law and at the whim of the military, dealing with checkpoints, home demolitions and walls in the Golan as they do in the West Bank.

Yet looking today at the situation between Israel and the Palestinians as well as the state of internal Palestinian affairs, it’s hard to see how these conditions will allow a viable and lasting agreement between the two parties. The Syrian side, however, seems like a deal ripe for making, especially since Israel can, in the wake of its attack on Syria last month (which remains shrouded in mystery) claim to have negotiated peace from a position of strength.

Will the dominoes fall in the Gulf, in Lebanon, in Iran as I have described? Who knows? The future and the various reactions and ripples cannot be easily predicted. But it is hard to see the downside of a deal with Syria, from a geostrategic perspective. The issues all come from ideology or from an essential conviction that deals with Arab and Muslim states cannot be trusted under any circumstances. These are recipes for eternal war, and must be rejected by any who wish to see a stable future for Israel, for the Arab states, for Iran and, indeed, for the US.

The latest example is the cancellation of simultaneous concerts in Jericho and Tel Aviv that was to be a part of the “One Million Voices” campaign put on by the organization known as One Voice. The dual concerts were to be free, with participants being asked to add their signatures to the One Voice statement. This would not have been a requirement, but it was an obvious effort to help One Voice reach its goal of one million signatures on their statement (they have a little less than 600,000 at this time).

The One Voice platform is clearly a two-state one, and, while the group professes only to be pushing for negotiations, it’s clear that their stance is based on the sorts of agreements that are on the diplomatic table–the Clinton Parameters (which the group mentions in its own overview of their mission), the Taba talks, the Geneva Accords, etc. It is not surprising that many activist groups would disagree with this platform, as a growing trend in Israeli-Palestinian activism is to embrace a one-state solution, and even many who are not committed to that path bristle at these agreements as being insufficient.

But whether or not groups agree, the rhetoric employed all around on this issue has been terribly divisive. The status quo on an issue like this is always difficult to change, and the fact that various individuals and groups find it much easier to attack others working on a peace program, albeit a different one from what they would desire, only serves to strengthen the occupation and ensure that Palestinians will continue to live in misery, violence and dispossession while Israelis continue to live in perpetual fear.

The twin concerts were attacked rhetorically by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) as promoting “apartheid.” Many of their critiques are understandable–One Voice does generally make no distinction between the occupying power and the occupied people in terms of the plight of each, and it does not promote international law as a guideline, something very important to the Palestinians (for good reason, as it is really the only diplomatic leverage they have). But the stridency of the language, essentially accusing One Voice of being nothing more than a front for Israeli policies and implicitly accusing the many involved with it of treason is uncalled for, unsubstantiated and needlessly divisive.

Sadly, the One Voice leadership responded in kind. They don’t make it clear what the “security threat” was that forced the cancellation of the concerts. Presumably, it was based on some threat they received, which they attributed to the PACBI campaign. Or perhaps it was just a reaction to campaign itself. In any case, they canceled it, thereby simultaneously eliminating what would have been the biggest gathering of people calling for some kind of peace ever in the region and sparing both Israelis and Palestinians from the agony of hearing Bryan Adams. Some good comes out of anything, I suppose.

That could have been the end of it, but instead of taking the high road and letting the cancellation of the events speak for itself, One Voice issued a sharply worded release condemning PACBI and blaming the International Solidarity Movement for the cancellation (ISM’s involvement seems to have been limited to publicizing PACBI’s statement, though I’m sure they would not deny that they agreed with it).

By implication, One Voice painted the threats to the concerts as coming from PACBI and ISM, two organizations whose only connections with violence have been made by ultra-right opponents of peace, such as noted disseminator of misinformation Lee Kaplan, and the occasional foolishness of some of their volunteers. But neither group has ever advocated violence, much less engaged in it, by action or threat.

Indeed, while I have profound disagreements with PACBI on most issues, and they can certainly be legitimately defined as anti-Israel, the fact is that the call on which the coalition was initially based was specifically adopted as an alternative mode of resistance to the violence of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs, et al. That was its raison d’etre when it was constructed, and it remains the guiding principle. Whatever else one might say about the group and the movement it is part of, accusing it of fomenting, encouraging or employing violence is clearly baseless.

So, in the end, there’s no concert and instead we have the same old story. The so-called “moderates” attack the so-called “radicals” as rejectionists and fanatics, while the “radicals” attack the “moderates” as traitors, shills, or double-agents. And the occupation, dispossession, walls, rockets, checkpoints, threats, shootings, insecurity and all the other wonderful features of the conflict roll merrily along.

This is hardly atypical. I’m put in mind of my own position, where hardly a day goes by where I’m not either called a “self-hating Jew” or accused of “seeking Israel’s destruction” from one side, or being accused of being a front for “The Israel Lobby” or a “Zionist shill” form the other.

And people wonder why reasonable, committed and sensitive people don’t want to get involved in this issue?