The Veil of Ignorance

Are you an Asker or a Guesser?

2010-05-12T12:53:00.004+08:00

Ever felt uneasy to say "No"? Maybe you shouldn't:

An Asker won't think it's rude to request two weeks in your spare room, but a Guess culture person will hear it as presumptuous and resent the agony involved in saying no. Your boss, asking for a project to be finished early, may be an overdemanding boor – or just an Asker, who's assuming you might decline. If you're a Guesser, you'll hear it as an expectation. This is a spectrum, not a dichotomy, and it explains cross-cultural awkwardnesses, too: Brits and Americans get discombobulated doing business in Japan, because it's a Guess culture, yet experience Russians as rude, because they're diehard Askers.

Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

2010-05-06T14:02:00.000+08:00

http://baselinescenario.com/2010/05/04/why-do-harvard-kids-head-to-wall-street/

Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

with 100 comments

By James Kwak

That’s the title of a post a couple weeks ago by Ezra Klein, in which he interviewed a friend of his who went to Wall Street after Harvard. Having seen this phenomenon from a couple of different angles, I’d say the interview is right on. This is how Klein summarizes the central theme:

“The impression of the Ivy-to-Wall Street pipeline is that it’s all about the money. You’re saying that it’s actually more that Wall Street has constructed a very intelligent recruiting program that speaks to the anxieties of the students and makes them an offer that there’s almost no reason to refuse.”

When I graduated from college, I had no interest in investment banking or its close cousin, management consulting. But I went to McKinsey for reasons that were only slightly different than those of the typical Ivy League undergrad; after getting a Ph.D. in history, I discovered that I was unlikely to get a good academic job and was pretty much unqualified for anything else, and McKinsey was one of the few places that would hire me into a “good” job with no discernible qualifications (other than academic pedigree). Now that I’m at Yale Law School, where maybe 15% of students (my wild guess) come in wanting to be corporate lawyers but 75% end up at corporate law firms (first job after law school, not counting clerkships), I’m seeing it again.

The typical Harvard undergraduate is someone who: (a) is very good at school; (b) has been very successful by conventional standards for his entire life; (c) has little or no experience of the “real world” outside of school or school-like settings; (d) feels either the ambition or the duty to have a positive impact on the world (not well defined); and (e) is driven more by fear of not being a success than by a concrete desire to do anything in particular. (Yes, I know this is a stereotype; that’s why I said “typical.”) Their (our) decisions are motivated by two main decision rules: (1) close down as few options as possible; and (2) only do things that increase the possibility of future overachievement. Money is far down the list; at this point in their lives, if you asked them, many of these people would probably say that they only need to be middle or upper-middle class, and assume that they will be.

The recruiting processes of Wall Street firms (and consulting firms, and corporate law firms) exploit these (faulty) decision rules perfectly. The primary selling point of Goldman Sachs or McKinsey is that it leaves open the possibility of future greatness. The main pitch is, “Do this for two years, and afterward you can do anything (like be treasury secretary).” The idea is that you will get some kind of generic business training that equips you to do anything (this in a society that assumes the private sector can do no wrong and the public sector can do no right), and that you will get the resume credentials and connections you need to go on and do whatever you want. And to some extent it’s true, because these names look good on your resume, and very few potential future employers will wonder why you decided to go there. (Whether the training is good for much other than being a banker or a consultant is another question.)

The second selling point is that they make it easy. Yes, there is competition for jobs at these firms. But the process is easy. They come to campus and hold receptions with open bars. They tell you when and how to apply. They provide interview coaching. They have nice people who went to your school bond with you over the recruiting period. If you get an offer, they find out what your other options are and have partners call you to explain that those are great options, but Goldman/McKinsey is better, and you can do that other thing later, anyway. For people who don’t know how to get a job in the open economy, and who have ended each phase of their lives by taking the test to do the most prestigious thing possible in the next phase, all of this comes naturally. (Graduate schools, which also have well-defined recruiting processes, are the other big path to take.) The fact that most companies don’t want new college graduates makes it easier to go to one of the few that do.

The third selling point — not the top one, but it’s there — is the money. Or, more accurately, the lifestyle. The glossy brochures never say how much money you can make. But they make it clear that you will be part of the well-dressed, well-fed, jet-setting elite. When people walk into those offices, with fresh flowers and all-glass walls and free food and modern technology everywhere, they get seduced. Last summer one person wrote to my school’s email list about how wonderful his office was, with its view of Central Park. I mentioned this to an old friend who used to work at McKinsey, and he said, “he fell for the office.*

The same factors are also largely true for top law school graduates, although for them the money is understandably more important. Law school costs close to $200,000 for three years, and I believe the average graduate has about $100,000 in debt. So another major inducement is the idea that you will work at a corporate law firm for three or four years, pay off your debt, and then go work for legal aid or the U.S. attorney’s office.

But the other factors are also very important. If you go to a top law school, it is simply easier to get a corporate firm job than any other job. They all come to campus at the beginning of your second year, most people can get a job simply by following the interview process, you work there for one summer, and then you get an offer to come back. Even if you don’t want to work at a firm, it makes rational sense to do it for that summer to get the offer as Plan B.

By contrast, it’s hard to get a public interest job. Most public interest organizations don’t have the money to hire a lot of people, and many don’t want people right out of law school. So the usual route is you have to apply for a competitive fellowship to work at a public interest organization, and then you have to hope they’ll hire you for good after that year. It’s hard. And that’s how Plan B becomes Plan A. And besides, many prominent corporate lawyers have gone on to important positions in Washington, so there is still the possibility of future greatness.

And once you’re in the door, the seduction begins. As Klein’s interviewee says,

“When people leave law school with a lot of debt, they figure they’ll get some good skills and good money at a top-tier firm before going to save the world. But then you have a great apartment, more responsibilities, kids. You start enjoying it. It’s not even all material.
“And I think it’s important to point out, that things happen very quickly. Private equity firms were trying to recruit us in the first year of my two-year training program. There’s this notion of the accidental banker, people who get caught up in that world and get more and more pay and find it harder to justify leaving. But the cultural effect of all of this — and even with regulatory reform, we need to think about that — is that a lot of people decide to sacrifice much more time than they normally would because the money is so good, and then they believe they deserve extremely high pay because they’re giving up so much time. It’s not malicious. But there are a lot of unhappy people who end up in that situation.”

It’s just human nature. Your expenses grow to match your income. As the decades pass and you realize that no, you’re not going to save the world, the money becomes a more and more important part of the justification. And when you have kids, you’re stuck; it’s much easier to deprive yourself of money (and what it buys) than to deprive your children of money.

More importantly, you internalize the rationalizations for the work you are doing. It’s easier to think that underwriting new debt offerings really is saving the world than to think that you are underwriting new debt offerings, because of the money, instead of saving the world. And this goes for many walks of life. It’s easier for college professors to think that, by training the next generation of young minds (or, even more improbably, writing papers on esoteric subjects), they are changing the world than to think that they are teaching and researching instead of changing the world.

Sure, there are self-parodying, economically delusional, psychotherapy-needing, despicable people on Wall Street, like this one. But there are also a lot of people who went there because it was easy and stayed because they decided they couldn’t afford not to and talked themselves into it.

A college student asked me at a book talk what I thought about undergraduates who go work on Wall Street. And individually, I have nothing against them, although I do think they should do their best to keep their expenses down so they will be able to switch careers later. But as a system, it’s a bad thing that a small handful of highly profitable firms are able to invest those profits into skimming off some of the top students at American universities — universities that, even if nominally private, are partially funded by taxpayer money in the form of research grants and federal subsidies for student loans –and absorbing them into the banking-consulting-lawyering Borg.

* By the way, I think that even within the elite there is an inverse correlation between pay and quality of office; the banks make the most money and have the shabbiest offices, although that has been changing recently.

Update: I want to emphasize, if it isn’t clear from the above, that I don’t claim to be any better than people who do go to Wall Street. I worked at McKinsey, which is more or less the moral equivalent thereof (at least from the perspective of a new entrant to the job market), and for basically the same reasons. And I only left McKinsey because I went to an Internet boom-era software company, and I did that because it seemed even more prestigious and exciting (and potentially more lucrative, although that didn’t work out).

Want a Mate? Get an iPhone

2010-04-28T13:14:00.003+08:00

Though Phone 4u subsequently denied doing the survey...

Want a Mate? Get an iPhone
Men wielding Apple's iconic iPhone are more likely to be lucky in love according to a new survey.

Website Phones 4u surveyed 1500 women and found 54 per cent of women would be more likely to date a man if he owns an iPhone, presumably regardless of looks.

Quote of the Day

2010-04-26T16:31:00.001+08:00

"You might start flirting with Nick Clegg, but that way you will end up marrying David Cameron. " ~Mandelson

Quote of the Day

2010-03-29T11:17:00.000+08:00

"One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one's work is terribly important." ~Bertrand Russell

民建聯無恥紀錄集

2010-02-24T23:01:00.000+08:00

民建聯無恥紀錄集

民建聯最無恥！

日本旅遊資源

2010-01-29T18:04:00.003+08:00

兩個超好的訂酒店網站
Jalan
楽天トラベル

以下這個背包客棧有很多有用的資訊，網友們都很幫忙的：
背包客棧

賞櫻的話請看下面網站可知道開花的時間
日本氣象廳
Weathernews
Rurubu櫻前線

看櫻花的好地方：
櫻之名所800
櫻百選

租車網：
Club Tocoo! (推薦﹗)
Toyota rent-a-car
Nippon rent-a-car
Nissan rent-a-car
駅レンタカー

行車時間計算：
NaviTime
MapFan Web
北の道ナビ (北海道專用)

惡搞財政預算案廣告

2010-01-29T00:42:00.002+08:00

港人真是創意無限，政府剛推出財政司司長曾俊華主演的廣告，網友便推出惡搞版，兼改名為回魂夜…財爺睇見唔知有咩感想？

香港收費電視廣告戰 — 有線 vs NOW

2010-01-28T18:19:00.004+08:00

首先，NOW拍了以下這個廣告：

跟着，有線拍了這個回應：

超搞笑

iPad is launched

2010-01-28T17:26:00.007+08:00

千呼萬喚始出來的iPad終於面世，名字不是之前大家估計的iSlate，而且怪怪的。

初步大家對它的評語不是十分正面，認為它不過是一個大一點的iPhone，與Kindle競爭的話又沒有eInk，與netbook競爭的話又沒有Multi-tasking…不過，就看看Steve Jobs今次能否化腐朽為神奇，將之包裝為新一浪的潮物…

香港不需第二個任志剛

2009-05-27T09:41:00.001+08:00

人人都說任志剛很重要，恕我愚笨，我完全不明白他有何重要，也不明白為何不在根本上取消這一個職位，或是職稱保留，工作性質重新劃定。新的專員自然不需千萬元以上的年薪，而香港金融體制之內，再不需要一個如任志剛這樣經人治的政治文化下產生的大白象式人物。

　　如果說任專員要管理整個金融體系非常重要（其實他絕對無這個權力，只是他經常出鏡指點一切予人的錯覺），所以值得這個高薪，但為何重要性與他一樣的財經及金融事務局局長沒有他三分一人工？何解他的上司也沒有高薪？

為陳德霖做評論

　　若說他管錢多所以重要，那麼一個銀行的櫃位員每月經手的金錢隨時過千萬元，為何只可支萬多元的小職員人工？既然經手多少錢不是人工的標準，是什麼令到任志剛可以年支千多萬元的公帑？若說他權重，他的權不會比特首更重，他又憑什麼支比特首更高的人工？

　　他自比投資銀行的行長或總裁嗎？對不起，外基金的投資回報比順嫂更差，經常不能與放在長期定息五六厘更高的收益，自然我們也不希望他將港人的儲備學投資銀行家一樣進行炒賣投機，那有什麼好比較？將外基金大半放到外國的定息債券，小半分散外判給各國際級的投資基金作保守的投資，並時加監察，這碼子的工作，財政司指導半個局長就能勝任有餘，而且可更有效率，回報更佳。

　　若說金融管理專員有負責監督管理銀行業之責，要提防多家小銀行在八十年代到九十年代初倒閉的事重演，任志剛在這十多年似乎做得不錯，也只是當局依法檢查銀行賬目及投資情況比較嚴格的結果，那是任何會計師也做得來的事情，從前的銀行監理專員（政府官員）也有這些法定的權力，只是當局不干預（實是不理）市場管治哲學有誤而已。

　　時至今天，任志剛的離任終成事實，各界的評論又再次顯示就算在一個議題是可以預知的情況下，不論是評論家還是政客也不會想多一些，功課多做一些，評問題評得宏觀一些。由社論到政黨小政客談得最高興的話題是什麼？就只是新專員的任命過程要公開公正、要有透明度、要重人才不要任人唯親啦之類，背後的理念欠缺，想的只是官場的人事八卦。亦可以說，大家只是為陳德霖而做評論，這是多麼無聊？

下任工作節省支出

　　最少大家應想一想新任金融管理專員有什麼責任要肩負，有什麼事情要改革？筆者認為給他一個高薪的兩年合約，由他負責重新規劃金管局及專員的工作，目的是要簡化一切，為政府及納稅人節省以億計的支出。陳德霖能夠這樣做，他就是一個真正的精英，治港的人才，否則，他只是一個延續任志剛式貪婪的自利小人，是另一損眾自肥的特區惡吏。

　　政客為何要捲入政府的人事任免紛爭之中？民主黨利用雷曼事件爭取政治曝光，但對元兇的任志剛則輕輕放過，保持良好關係之餘，在他下台的問題上忽然唱反調，由倒任變成了挺任，這場戲也太難看了吧？也太出賣苦主的利益了吧？政客的不可靠，筆者也沒有批錯你們吧！

　　任志剛的位置，是他利用權勢為自己度身訂做弄出來的結果。這是經十多年累積，但並不表示不可改變。他為自己訂做的三大任務，事實上已經證明全無重要性，而且失敗，這個專員的位置應該取消，金管局亦要簡化。

　　第一的投資與管理外基金任務，前面已經分析過，不必再負責下去，交回財政司負責便可以。第二是監管銀行之責，在雷曼事件之中，我們已經看到是如何失敗，任志剛為保權位，反轉過來要靠銀行家的支持，於是反而包庇他們的利益，銀行家可沒有出糧給專員閣下的，反而雷曼苦主個個是納稅人，任志剛你對得起他們嗎？你能無愧嗎？

聯可靠與專員無關

　　金管局若然減低職能，那負責監管及執法的專員薪金與職能，只能與證監或國際上類似機構看齊。金融專員只餘下第三職能，就是保持香港貨幣的穩定。這正是任志剛此人或繼任人最不值錢的地方。

　　在聯不變的前提之下，任志剛度過了大半生的金融高官生涯。聯本身保證了港的穩定與可靠，這就與專員的能力無關。若然脫，特區之內根本沒有官員有相關的經驗，陳德霖有嗎？這方面的人才只能外求，美國聯儲局中人長期用利息微調貨幣的穩定，其他央行也有這些經驗，獨香港的沒有，但可以支人家十倍的人工。

　　任志剛這類人才要是多幾個，香港必亡於公帑超支之上，這才是香港金融危機所在。

金管局落後各地央行缺法例訂權責

2009-05-26T10:31:00.001+08:00

自從金管局總裁任志剛即將退休的消息傳出後，已有立法會議員要求檢討目前金管局的相關法例，藉以訂明總裁任期、聘用方式等等，但其實，改動還牽涉金管局的權責和獨立性如何透過法例確立。

　　事實上，相對於大多數中央銀行，金管局的相關法例明顯有別，例如沒有訂明權力，以及職責，也沒有規定如何問責。

英國澳洲加國有列明

　　金管局成立於一九九三年四月一日，由外基金管理局與銀行業監理處合併而成，合併僅透過修訂《外基金條例》和《銀行業條例》進行，並未有如其他央行的《中央銀行法》般，另立新的《金融管理局條例》，其獨立性也未有透過法例確立，而是由經歷「五朝」財政司的任志剛，以其在位時間之久和個人作風維持。

　　在貨幣政策方面，《外基金條例》亦僅訂明，金管局的權力和職責由財政司司長授與。

　　相比之下，歷時三百多年演化的英倫銀行，《一九九八年英倫銀行法》除列明其職責，以及其行長的任期外，更要求該行就決定發表書面聲明，而部分會議的紀錄亦須於特定時間內公開，旗下貨幣政策委員會的組成及職責亦有說明。

　　英倫銀行的例子並非獨有，無論是《澳洲儲備銀行法》還是《加拿大銀行法》，除最基本的行長任期，由誰委任等基本規定外，都同樣列明央行的權責。

　　相反，以金管局總裁到立法會報工作為例，雖然任志剛自一九九九年起每年都會到立法會財經事務委員會三次，但做法僅是約定俗成，並無法例或協議訂明。

　　事實上，據國際貨幣基金會（ＩＭＦ）二○○三年的一份報告，便在讚揚金管局的管理具透明度、運作協調得宜。

　　同時，ＩＭＦ質疑金管局運作欠缺明確的法律支持，貨幣政策目標也沒有透過立法或規例確立。

　　報告並指出，金管局總裁的任免理應透過法例中清楚訂明。

專家指做法十分不尋常

　　香港大學法律學院亞洲國際金融法研究院主任Douglas Arner指出，由英倫銀行、美國聯儲局、歐洲央行到中國人民銀行，一般央行都有本身的法例去保障其獨立性和訂明如何問責，各央行之間做法都很相似，但金管局卻沒有，因此香港的做法可說「十分不尋常」，如果香港決定修訂，便應參考其他國家的法例。

　　目前盛傳的下任金管局總裁大熱人選，是曾任行政長官曾蔭權助選團要員、現為行政長官辦公室主任的陳德霖，Arner承認，「不少央行行長過去都是政治人物、財金官員和學者，而且即使是（美國聯儲局主席）貝南奇，也須與總統和財長攜手合作挽救經濟；但他強調，各地都有透過法律，去確保央行的獨立性■

曾蔭權不代表我

2009-05-15T04:16:00.004+08:00

金管局在迷債事件有否失職？

2009-05-11T13:47:00.001+08:00

金管局在迷債事件有否失職？ By 曾廣海、尹靖廷

立法會雷曼迷債調查小組的主要目標是調查事件有否涉及官員在監管上的失職、如何改善現行的監管制度、及如何妥善解決事件。要達到此等目標，首要任務是從法例上，釐清各監管機構在事前和事後的職責，過程是否存在失職。這才能追本溯源，有效探索如何改善現行的監管制度和尋求妥善解決辦法。

保障存款人投資者利益

在銀行經存款業務的監管方面，金管局的職責是確保銀行「以持正和審慎的方式，以及適度的專業能力經營」及「以無損或相當不可能損及存款人或潛在存款人的利益的方式經營」（《銀行業條例》)。

另外，在銀行經營證券業務方面，根據金管局與證監會所簽訂的備忘錄，金管局取代了證監會對銀行的前線監管，以及開立調查檔案這二方面的職責，並在顧及投資者對投資產品的「認知水平和專門知識所達程度後，確保他們獲得適當程度的保障」的責任（《證券及期貨條例》)。在探討金管局對事件是否存在失職時，應以此作為標準。

根據上述的二條法例和相關安排，金管局具有監管銀行不以違規或違法的手法向存戶或投資者銷售證券產品的法定責任。

此外，金管局對銀行在這方面的監管，應較證監會對證券行的監管要求為高、審查應更頻密、處分應更嚴厲，主要原因是銀行較證券行更直接地掌握了存戶可動用財富的資料，更易取得存戶的信任，而且，投資經驗不足及希望穩健、保本的投資者，大多數是將儲蓄存放於銀行，這些人對投資風險的認識一般較證券行客戶為低。

再者，銀行對這些非傳統的銀行業務是於近年才開展，故經驗不足。他們快速膨漲前線員工隊伍，對迷債這類較股票或債券掛鈎複雜得多的產品的風險，認識亦未必足夠。目前所見，迷債的分銷銀行幾乎全是中小型及中資銀行，這些銀行除了本身應負一定責任外，其實它們也是金管局監管力度不足的受害者。他們因受收取較高佣金的吸引，負責人為求增加銀行收入，將經營多年建立的客戶關係，押在這些自己也認識不深的金融工具上，最後不單賠上金錢，亦賠上客戶對銀行的多年信任和銀行本身的聲譽。

為何說金管局的監管力度不足？這可從多方面看出，首先，按任志剛向立法會的作供，金管局並未如上所述，對銀行參與這些新業務於早期便給予較高的重視，只集中力度在他們熟悉的傳统的系統性風險監管，將資源放於監察銀行20萬億計的資產負債表，對幾十億的迷債及信貸掛鈎產品一直只當小事處理，直至2008年才對這些產品的銷售作專題審查。審查了四間已發現大批違規個案，但監管當局仍未採取強力手段，制止違規活動。直至去年8、9月雷曼倒閉前，個別銀行仍誘使不少客戶購進雷曼產品。

「適合性」處理令人失望

另外，金管局對「適合性」的處理亦令人失望。證監會提交的雷曼報告書指出，政府對投資產品銷售的監管架構，是建基於「披露」和「適合性」這「兩大支柱」。證監會發放給銀行的「適合性」要求，包括三項主要方面：
（一）認識你的客戶；如投資知識、投資期、承受風險的能力；
（二）認識你推介的投資產品，如「透徹理解」投資產品的結構、運作方式，其包含的投資項目的性質及風險；
（三）就客戶的情况作合適的配對，並要用淺白易懂的言語向客戶不偏不倚地解釋產品的缺點及風險，對長者及缺乏投資經驗的客戶，應特別審慎。

至於懲處方面，該報告强調違反「適合性」就是違反《操守準則》，可導致被除牌（證券經營牌）、或被公開譴責及罰款。

迷債是一個結構極其複雜的金融產品，涉及一些保險承擔如CDS，貨幣及利率掉期及CDO等衍生工具，而這些迷債是由一個實則是「皮包公司」的公司所發行，亦涉及一些與他相關連的跨國公司的複雜關係，相信沒有相當水平的金融、公司法及合同法的知識，難以明白其中的各項風險，更不用說用準確及易明的語言向客戶解釋，以讓他們明白內裏的風險。

真不明白，金管局為何可以讓銀行賣給非專業投資者達數年之久，而且客戶有數萬之眾，其中包括弱智、弱視及文盲人士，而在雷曼出事前，一直查不到違反「適合性」、以至足以被公開譴責的個案。*
任志剛在立法局雷曼小組作供時承認，《證券及期貨條例》較《銀行業條例》賦予金管局較多權力以執行前線監管工作，例如《證券及期貨條例》第180條對中介人的監管及調查的權力，遠較《銀行業條例》第55條的相應條款為高。

任志剛承認金管局一直未有使用《証券及期貨條例》，而只用《銀行業條例》，實在是把自己的老虎牙剝掉。沒牙老虎便只能在調查時答應銀行一些條件，以換取他們的合作，造成今天的被動局面。據上文列舉的資料及分析，金管局在雷曼事件的監管上是否失職，讀者可自行判斷，更期待金管局在下次立法會作證供時能給予進一步闡釋。

註 *參考任志剛於4月28日立法會雷曼迷債調查小組回答余若薇議員供詞

任志剛奇人奇事

2009-04-28T13:17:00.000+08:00

任志剛的確是一個傳奇得令人羡慕的人物，他非常奇特，權力大得驚人之餘，卻似乎不須對公眾問責，不是似乎，事實上他在憲制上不屬於三司十二局，亦不屬於公務員系統，他人工極高，是美國聯儲局局長的10倍，人家為金融海嘯又道歉又減薪，他面不紅，心不跳，在無任何工作成績，只有雷曼事件的大黑鑊之下，他可以豪支五個月「花紅」，無人可以奈他何，他到立法會解釋雷曼事件，一不高興句句駁回議員的提問，寸步不讓，連長毛也被氣得只能掟咪。

立會政客顯得愚笨不堪

筆者特別翻一翻《基本法》，其實不用翻也可以肯定，金融管理專員並不是公務員，《基本法》除司局長有提及外，廉政專員、審計署署長、警務處處長、入境處處長、海關關長也有特別提及；而金融管理局及金融管理專員，則並無提及，於是任志剛及金管局在香港並無憲制上的地位，其權力雖大，其地位雖然重要，卻是名副其實的無王管。

亦所以，當任志剛知道自己只有區區幾個月任期的事實已是鐵定之時，他並無需要再對任何人假以辭色，立法會的政客以為傳令他到立會接受雷曼小組的調查，可以對他施壓，可以用言詞羞辱其他官員，以求出位抽水的經驗，對任志剛已經完全不管用，他無欲則剛之時，句句頂回，立法會一眾政客馬上無所作為，顯得功課不足及愚笨不堪。

這其實是香港憲制上的漏洞，但立法會的政客就連提出質疑帶引討論的知識也欠缺。

金管局及其專員的權力來自《銀行條例》，成立的時間是在1993年左右，那是《基本法》完稿之後的時間，亦所以連一眾《基本法》委員也從無想過在基本法中為這個管理外匯基金及負責監管全港銀行如斯重要的角色，並無寫下片言隻字，為他的權責作一個界定。

據《銀行條例》，任志剛是由財政司所委任，只對他負責，理論上，在輿論及政治壓力之下，曾俊華或是他的前任梁錦松，或是再前任曾蔭權，皆是任志剛的上司，有權任免任志剛，但他歷任多朝而不倒，連已經過了60歲也毋須退休，提及他的退休，也成為一個敏感話題，為的是甚麼？

位高權重而又毋須問責

因為任志剛出身公務員，資歷遠比曾蔭權久遠，是他自己不爭取財爺之位，而為自己度身設計一個位高權重而毋須問責，更而且連薪金也比特首高幾倍的金管局專員之位，曾蔭權才有機會上位做財爺，上位做政務司司長，再上位做特首，這根本不是英式管治制度文化的產品，而是中國人文化之下的官場怪事，簡而言之，就是人治。

任志剛的權位，只是來自他一生服務的官僚體系，他的才能如何，重要性如何，在雷曼事件已經露底，從前他八面玲瓏，到立法會交代金融事務之時，客氣禮貌，對議員的提問有問必答。今天一旦變臉，則回復英治時期公務員的傲慢，而且高度官僚化，甚麼時間發過甚麼言論，做過甚麼預警，寫過甚麼文件，完全是官僚推卸責任的手法，無人可以奈他何，成為特區政治體制之內的一名古怪人物。

時事評論員wongonyin@yahoo.com

Larry Summers: Stop the AIG Bonuses. Yes You Can.

2009-03-17T11:40:00.000+08:00

Larry Summers: Stop the AIG Bonuses. Yes You Can.

2009香港國際電影節 - 觀賞影片清單

2009-03-02T15:00:00.001+08:00

22/3 (Sun) 19:15, 新宿事件
22/3 (Sun) 21:45, 天水圍的夜與霧
02/4 (Thu) 19:15, 別問愛是誰
04/4 (Sat) 14:00, 捷古華拉
27/4 (Mon) 19:30, 中國

湯家驊將陳克勤叫做李克勤

2009-02-07T18:41:00.000+08:00

Mr. Bloomberg, shame on you!

2009-02-06T16:39:00.004+08:00

Michael Bloomberg, the billionaire Mayor of NY, made the following remarks:

NY Mayor Bloomberg wary of bonus caps February 5, 2009

NEW YORK - Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a billionaire who got his start on Wall Street, sounds like he doesn't agree with President Obama's pay cap for top executives from companies that want bailouts.

Asked Thursday about the cap, Bloomberg would not directly answer. But he said he doesn't think the government should get involved in telling businesses how they should be run.

Bloomberg said he understands there are strings attached when companies accept government money. But he says the city relies on its tax base of wealthy workers and profitable companies.

Bloomberg says those bonuses may seem like a lot of money, but they trickle down into the economy and help everyone.

What Bloomberg said is absurd and outrageous...

1) It is not simply government intervening business operations. The government actually invested billions into these banks. It is protecting taxpayers' money instead. If you invest billions in a company, you would care how they use the money. It is not a question of intervention or not. Of course, I prefer the government doesn't own the banks in the first place, but the fact is it does own the banks now.

2) The argument of trickling down is absurd. If it is true, why just limited to paying those lucky guys who happened to work in banks that are rescued by the government? You should pay everyone in the town, and then spending will trickle down anyway or he believes bankers' spending is easier to trickle down?

Performance of Exchange Fund 2008

2009-01-22T11:29:00.002+08:00

The star fund manager Joseph Yam announced the return of the Exchange
Fund for 2008, -5.6%, the first time that is below the undisclosed
benchmark.

The following table appears on Mingpao:

Citi Government Bond Index +10.0%
Exchange Fund -5.6%
USD Balanced Equity and Bond Fund -26.0%
HSI -48.0%

Such table leads you to think that the Exchange Fund was doing pretty
well last year as it outperformed the balanced fund a lot, but it is
not!

If you look at the balance sheet of the Exchange Fund, 86%
of the assets are deposits or debt securities and less than 15% of the
assets are in equities so comparing the performance of it to balanced
fund is misleading.

Let's assume the benchmark for debt securities and deposits are 8% (I
added some discount to the 10% for the Citi government bond index
already), then the return on equity portion is:

(-5.6% - 86% * 8%) / 14% = -89%

Somehow, he must have bought some highly risky bonds or his equity
investment is completely crap.

Why Nationalization is the Best Alternative

2009-01-20T15:40:00.001+08:00

An article by Felix Salmon on Portfolio.com:

Why Nationalization is the Best Alternative

Yes we can, Mr Geithner

2009-01-20T15:14:00.002+08:00

An article from Luigi Zingales on VoxEU.org:

Yes we can, Mr Geithner

轉貼：重新評估監管水平

2009-01-13T12:12:00.000+08:00

雷曼迷債一事揭露了金管局及證監會兩者的監管水平，其實任總口中所謂的「一業兩管」監管水準如何，細看證監會1月6日發表的新聞稿可見一班：事件中證監會譴責渣打銀行，因為渣打在2001至2003年期間特別優惠一名客戶，所以未能達到《操守準則》的要求。這事件反映什麼？是渣打早在七年多前開始不達標，但七年多後的今天，監管機構才作出譴責！

　　證監會的新聞稿表示，金管局發現渣打讓一名為Stone Castle公司的客戶取得相關互惠基金的即日定價，從而可以轉入或轉出基金，但渣打其他客戶只獲提供翌日的定價，未獲通知或沒有獲得即日定價安排。

　　細看新聞稿，可以發現有幾個重點：第一、Stone Castle獲得特別安排的基金多達二十四隻；第二、證監會的新聞稿披露了幾個重要日期：「這次決定源於香港金融管理局（金管局）對渣打在2001年5月至2003年9月期間分銷互惠基金及相關交易運作的調查。金管局在2008年1月10日將調查結果轉介證監會作進一步行動。」最後值得注意的一點，是「證監會在決定應向渣打採取什麼適當行動及商討和解方案時，已考慮到渣打主動向金管局滙報事件。」　　將以上資料重新拼圖，可得出的要點如下：渣打不達標行為歷時兩年多，是一段不短的時間；涉及的基金數目逾二十隻，數目亦同樣不少；渣打銀行是持續地出現不達操守要求的情況。單憑這幾點，已反映金管局後知後覺！

　　事件是如何曝光呢？是金管局調查時發現？非也，原來是渣打主動投案！走筆至此，陳焱腦海裏升起的問題是：如果渣打沒有自首，金管局何時才會發現事件？還是一直不知不覺？

　　這個問題，我沒有答案，但是尚有另一個問題，這個問題金管局一定有答案。事情在2001至2003年發生，為何金管局在2008年1月，即優惠結束已經長達約四年半之多，才將調查結果轉介證監會？究竟金管局何時才獲渣打通知此事？而金管局獲得渣打通知此事後，用了多少時間做了什麼調查工夫？總的一句：究竟這四年半時間，金管局做了什麼事？

　　事件的結局，是「渣打已與證監會達成協議，向那些曾投資有關基金但未獲渣打給予同等對待的合資格客戶付款。在這項協議中，渣打不同意本身曾經犯錯，並且是渣打自願向客戶付款的。」

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/chanfire3

Is Joseph Yam Irreplaceable?

2008-12-11T17:30:00.005+08:00

One of the most bizarre arguments against replacing Joseph Yam is that: If you fire him, who will be the chief executive of HKMA? The argument then goes on to ask you to name a person that could do the job.

This is a silly argument: because you are unable to quote the name of a potential successor to a person, then that guy must be irreplaceable. I am quite sure out of the 15 politically appointed ministers, a majority of the Hong Kong people wouldn't even have heard of many of their names before they got appointed. Apart from a few lawyers, I am quite sure none of you have heard of Wong Yan Lung before he was appointed as the Secretary of Justice. No one would have possibly quoted his name when asked who can be the next Secretary of Justice, but he turns out to be one of the most popular ministers, out of this highly unpopular cabinet. Could anyone think of a successor to Ambrose Lee, the Secretary of Security? Hardly. Will our public order collapse if he has to leave his post somehow? Not at all.

I do not understand how on one hand, we claim our city as a "financial center" while on the other hand, we think it is impossible to find just ONE person, out of 7 million people, to maintain that automatic currency board system. If the status of Hong Kong as a financial center depends solely on the existence of ONE person, that is truly dangerous and we should try to make it less so. After all, it is not uncommon for public officials to be unable to carry out their duties, for one reason or another, so how can you say someone cannot be replaced?

Extended Reading:

任志剛，請你依法問責﹗

任志剛憑甚麼出花紅？

何俊仁余若薇失憶？任志剛免責？

任志剛，你收檔番歸啦！

How high is the salary of Joseph Yam?

2008-12-09T17:20:00.009+08:00

Salary of Joseph Yam, head of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, de facto central bank of Hong Kong, is always criticized as too high (which is a fact often denied by the HKMA), but how high his salary actually is?

Check it below and you will be astonished:

Salaries of Central Bankers (USD)

Joseph Yam $1,227,000
Chairman of Federal Reserve $191,300
European Central Bank President $444,000
Bank of England Governor $429,000
Bank of Japan Governor $387,000

Sum of salaries for Fed Chairman, ECB Pres, BoE Governor & BoJ Governor = 1,451,300
Salary of Joseph Yam = 1,227,000

Put it into perspective,

GDP of US+Japan+EU = 64% of world GDP
GDP of HK = 0.4% of world GDP

This certainly looks like how officials in corrupted countries are paying themselves. What a shame for Hong Kong, which always prides itself as "Asia's world city"!!

Don't forget Hong Kong is adopting a linked currency system which means there is no independent monetary policy for the city. The importance of this post is certainly much less than his counterparts in the US, Europe and Japan. Judging from his recent performance in the Lehman mini-bond debacle, Mr. Yam also failed to do its role as a bank regulator properly. Surely his performance as a fund manager for the Exchange Fund is less than inspiring, too. I cannot think of better ways to waste taxpayers' money than giving this incompetent guy a salary enough to hire the 4 most important central bankers in the world.

Mr. Yam, shame on you!

Extended Reading:

任志剛，請你依法問責﹗

任志剛憑甚麼出花紅？

何俊仁余若薇失憶？任志剛免責？

The Veil of Ignorance

Are you an Asker or a Guesser?

Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

http://baselinescenario.com/2010/05/04/why-do-harvard-kids-head-to-wall-street/

Why Do Harvard Kids Head to Wall Street?

Want a Mate? Get an iPhone

Quote of the Day

Quote of the Day

民建聯無恥紀錄集

日本旅遊資源

惡搞財政預算案廣告

香港收費電視廣告戰 — 有線 vs NOW

iPad is launched

香港不需第二個任志剛

金管局落後各地央行 缺法例訂權責

曾蔭權不代表我

金管局在迷債事件有否失職？

任志剛奇人奇事

Larry Summers: Stop the AIG Bonuses. Yes You Can.

2009香港國際電影節 - 觀賞影片清單

湯家驊將陳克勤叫做李克勤

Mr. Bloomberg, shame on you!

Performance of Exchange Fund 2008

Why Nationalization is the Best Alternative

Yes we can, Mr Geithner

轉貼：重新評估監管水平

Is Joseph Yam Irreplaceable?

任志剛，你收檔番歸啦！

How high is the salary of Joseph Yam?

任志剛，你收檔番歸啦！

金管局落後各地央行缺法例訂權責