The Wadi el-Hol Translation

The Arabo-Ugaritic Translation of Jamme 863

2011-08-16T12:28:00.000-07:00

Jamme 863 is a little-known "South Arabian" inscription from Yemen. My drawing of Jamme's drawing is displayed above. The drawing and their translation were published in 1955, and the transliteration and translation read as follows:

5	4	3	2	1
b					1. Šarḥum,
’	y	y	ḏ	š	2. he of [the family of] Barlum,
ḏ	ḥ	‘	b	r	3. respects [and]
n	m	ẓ	r	ḥ	4. protects
ḏt	y	m	l	m	5. in obedience to Ḏât-Ḥ[imyâm].
ḥ			m

It is a viable translation epigraphically, but the ḏt that they posit is in fact a logogram for illu (see the previous post on the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions). This makes it very unlikely that the following ḥ is somehow related to Ḏât-Ḥimyâm. The other problem is that the character they posit as a ḏ, which at the time was reasonable, is now in light of the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions more likely to be identified as h.

Hence I propose the reading be flipped and it be treated as a pre-South Arabian inscription paleographically. I also propose that from the first character in their Column 5 to the last character in their Column 4, in which the y is reversed in orientation, be treated as a single sentence. Likewise the next three columns should also be treated as a single sentence. Additionally, the character in their Column 5 they treat as n, I treat as another final form of l. Obviously the column numbers in my reading are reversed.

With those slight revisions I see the following:

1	2	3	4	5
b					1. In the tent, Illu li-
’	y	y	h	š	2. ves and protects.
h	ḥ	‘	b	r	3. May he respect [supplicate?]
l	m	ẓ	r	ḥ	4. [He], Heber, to the Lo-
[Illu]	y	m	l	m	5. rd, the Merciful.
ḥ			m

While seemingly odd, the simplicity of the translation is at least striking. The confluence of Arabian and Northwest Semitic terminology and grammar along with the proto-South Arabian paleography could also answer some questions. Surprisingly, I have not been able to find any later published translations or analysis of this inscription. It is absent from the Corpus of South Arabian Inscriptions (CSAI).

For reference, here is a very good chapter of North Arabian including a chart of letters on page 496.

http://krc.orient.ox.ac.uk/aalc/images/stories/mcam_ancient_north_arabian.pdf

The Actual Translation of the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions

2011-08-03T15:34:00.000-07:00

I realized today that this blog advertises the translation of the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions but does not exactly deliver. I have just finished a forthcoming paper in which the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions make up the first part (alongside Sinai 365 and Sinai 375, the inscription Colless calls Thebes 6, the Grossman Seal, and a better translation of the Timna Inscription; with the Plates also the Lachish Dagger, Sinai 346, Sinai 376, and Sinai 357).

Below is the part of the paper specifically concerning Wadi el-Hol, alongside the first few plates. I may edit it over time to make it more relevant because the section is clipped, but generally the information will not change.

//

The Wadi el-Hôl Translation Hypothesis (1830-1800 BC South Egypt)

In 1999 two presumably alphabetical inscriptions were found on a desert trade road forty or so kilometers northwest of Luxor. They have been dated tentatively to 1850-1700 BC (Darnell et al. 2005: 90). This translation is basically unexceptional, the grammar and lexicon being standard Northwest Semitic with the exception of one Egyptian loanword. There is some consensus between this study and previous identifications (Darnell et al. 2005; Hamilton 2006) over the letters ’, B, Ḫ, P, R, Ṯ, and T. Most previous readings omit a character prior to the P in the Vertical Inscription. Hence the initial incomplete:

Vertical: ?ṮTRH??T?PṮ’L

Horizontal: RB?N?NḤNP?H’??ḪR

Vertical Inscription:

This examination will concentrate on reconciling the characters on which there is not the aforementioned agreement with the paleographic schema presented below (Plates I & II). The first unknown character in the Vertical Inscription (see, Plate III) appears as a three-peaked character in the Horizontal Inscription. In the Vertical Inscription, these peaks are joined to a fourth, and the third peak is bisected (Hamilton 2006, 327). Upon closer examination, the third peak is actually bisected by N, and both three-peaked characters are Ḏ. This makes the first “character” actually three characters (see, Plate Va) – ḎN ?.

Because early Ḏ had specifically three peaks, the fourth then represents an additional character, despite the current academic oddity of suggesting it is an ^c. A line below it corresponds with a line above the following Ṯ, above which is a second, smaller ^c(see Plate Va). This then spells ^cṮTRH, the H possibly specifically being styled after Gardiner C10 – Ma’at. The non-feminized divine name might reflect similarity with either Akkadian Ištar, or with Proto-Semitic “*?aθtar- ‘morning/evening star’” (Huehnergard 2008, 243) [Venus]. The next character is a Q flattened on its left side, followed by S₁,[i] and T. The inscription continues K, P, Ṯ, ending with ’, L.

The text thus begins with a demonstrative, ḎN. This orthography is attested in South Arabian as a singular masculine demonstrative, the similar ḏyn acting as the dual (Nebes and Stein 2008, 154). It may occur alongside ZN in Thamudic D (Macdonald 2008, 199). The name ^cṮTR is followed by an enclitic, the locative case equivalent to Hebrew ā and Ugaritic H (Bubenik 2010, 171), meaning for either Athtar or the goddess. The flattening of the left side of the Q may reflect it being a “bow,” which is the word it begins – QS₁T (Murtonen 1990, 389). A bow is in fact drawn (partly cut off in photographs) to the left of the depicted figure in the Vertical Inscription.

The next word, KPṮ may then be the crooked staff to the right of that depicted figure. In Ugaritic, kpṯ occurs in an epithet to Anat. Juxtaposed with “the high heavens”, some have argued kpṯ means “earth” (Rahmouni 2007, 110). It has also been linked with Akkadian kub/pšu, “headdress” (ibid, 111), and Aïcha Rahmouni notes that it occurs amidst terms of authority (ibid). The root [KBS₃^[ii]] may also mean “Syr … wether; Amor … lamb, young sheep; Akk … =; Arab … ram; chef; ram, pillar, buttress; Mhr … lamb; Soq ram … Syr entry is loan from Arab.” (Murtonen 1990, 227). Arabic further evidences a split sibilant descent through “kubš… ram… kubša… hook, clamp” (ed. Cowan 1994, 950) and “kafisa… to be bandy-legged” (ibid, 976), as in the bow-legs of an animal. Indeed, the shape of the Egyptian ḫpš-scimitar has been described as the “foreleg of an ox” (Hayes 1935: 34), and Gardiner F23 (ḫpš) may also appear this way. Egyptian ḫpš has been connected with Greek κόπις (kopesh) of similar meaning (Gordon 1958: 24). This divine or royal scimitar can now be connected with Anat’s epithet and the usage here. The last word is ’L (Darnell et al. 2005: 85), either meaning god or El.

Horizontal Inscription

The bow and scimitar are divine symbols, but there are no epithets explicitly analogous with bow- or scimitar- of-El or of-a-god. These two inscriptions are the only known examples of this script; they are present on the same boulder; they are only several meters apart.^[iii] These facts at least demand the consideration of the possibility that they represent a singular text. A line beneath the Vertical Inscription changes orientation at the end, maybe indicating the scribe ran out of space and continued writing several meters to the left on another inset surface of the same rock spur. Alternatively, the same scribe or another might have later added the Horizontal Inscription as a response to the Vertical Inscription. But they do appear to be substantively and paleographically related. The first two words of the Horizontal Inscription occur above a logogram (see, Plate Vb).

The Horizontal Inscription (see, Plate IV) clearly begins with the word RB (Hamilton 2006, 325), which could connote ‘many or great,’ or ‘chief or lord’ (Murtonen 1990, 391). If not for the logogram, a temporal authority might be considered. A divine connotation of RB is known in Classical Arabic, and in Ugaritic as the masculine analogy to “rbt ’ṯrt ym … lady ’Athir(a)t of the sea” (Gordon 1965, 75). The next word, DN could connote “mighty” or “judge” in Ugaritic (de Moor and Spronk 1987, 134). The former is more likely, and is also present in Amorite as “/dnn/ be strong; /dunn/ strength” (Murtonen 1990, 151), and in Akkadian as dannū “powerful” and in Amarna Canaanite (Huehnergard 1998: 66). RB DN then means “Powerful Lord” in reference to El of the Vertical Inscription.^[iv]Next, Ḏ is a relative pronoun, i.e. “who,” like Ḏ in Ancient North (Macdonald 2008, 199) and South Arabian (Nebes and Stein 2008, 162), usually D in Ugaritic (Pardee 2008, 16).

The following word NḤ is one of only two suggested cases of Semitic borrowing of Egyptian words in this paper. It may be connected with Egyptian NWḤ, “to get drunk,” which would reinforce a connotation of Hathoric drunkenness (see, Darnell 1995: 54). However, the (at this point likely) context and the grammar clearly demand a causative verb. A W is drawn on the “arm” of the Ḥ (see, Plate Vc), perhaps evidencing the equivalent of a Ugaritic C-stem.^[v] It is equally plausible that W was not included in the orthography due to the abjadic nature of the writing system, and NWḤ can regardless reflect a causative form in Egyptian. The connotation fits with rituals to appease Hathor through “drunken, nocturnal revels… the fiery power of the solar deity, an unquenchable flame to destroy the souls of the damned and a brilliant torch to illumine the paths of the blessed dead in the necropolis” (Darnell 2002: 133).

The following word NPS₂, regardless of Hamilton’s uncertainty over the S₂ (Hamilton 2006, 325), is “soul.” The possessive pronoun H’, “her [soul],” and the locative case both mark this dialect as West Semitic. Two unknown characters remain: W and an archaic Ṣ, then finally Ḫ and R. In Qur’anic Arabic, ṢḪRT connoted rock or boulder (18:63), and (BN) ṢḪR is a Biblical name (Genesis 23:8, 25:9). But W implies either an object or verb. The medial radical might reflect Ġ,^[vi] the alphabetical character perhaps not yet having been devised (Pardee 2008, 6). This could then reflect a cuneiform-based orthography for the root ṢĠR, “(to be) small” (Rendsburg et al. 2008: 535).

Meaning “child,” ṣġr is the name of a Ugaritic god, son of Ba’al and either Anat or a mysterious cow (Day 1992: 185). There are thematic similarities between this story and the return of the oft-bovine Hathor to Abydos, with the “conception, birth, and care of the child god” (Darnell 1995: 48). But the lack of stylization or logograms around ṢḪR, and its inclusion at the end of the inscription on a rougher rock surface may cast doubt on the divinity of its meaning. The W might actually precede a second verb, Ṣ[Ġ]R “small,” in this case specifically connoting to “reduce, squander, deplete” (ed. Black 1999, 335). The scribe likely participated in nearby Hathoric celebrations, and the inscriptions are “ideally located to be integral in processions related to… the welcoming of the returning goddess of the wandering eye of the sun” (Darnell 2002: 133).

The connection of the final verb to the previous verb could parallel Qur’anic Arabic “صَلُّواْ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلِمُواْ تَسْليماً … bless him [the Prophet] and salute him with greetings of peace (or, surrender yourselves completely to his guidance)” (Badawi and Abdel Haleem 2008, 450). The conjunction w connects the object of the initial verb to the final verb, though there is no object explicitly following the second verb. Otherwise, a similar idea is known from Biblical Hebrew, as in Judges 18:5, …wnd^ch ‘…that we may know.’ In this goddess’s context, her soul would be ‘depleted’ of violence through intoxication. The connotation of direct divine participation in pacifying a violent Hathor-like goddess may be reflective of a later version of the Egyptian story (see, Walls 1992, 53).

^VḎN . ^cṮTRH . QS₁T . KPṮ / ’L . ^HRB DN . Ḏ NwḤ . NPS₂H’ . W ṢḪR

^V“These are for Athtar (the goddess), the bow and the scimitar. El (the god)... ^H…[is] the Powerful Lord who intoxicates her soul, that it may be exhausted.”

Hence, the first inscription depicts a warrior-goddess; the second depicts a powerful god who causes the goddess to become drunk thereby exhausting the violence of her soul. The offering of alcohol to the returning goddess Sekhmet (Hathor) was probably not uncommon (Darnell 1997, 47). Additional paleographic features must be discussed. The depiction of a bow may similarly correspond with the depiction of a staff forked in the middle to the right of the Vertical Inscription depiction. The stylization of the Q as a bow might correspond with the depiction of two scimitars to the left of KPṮ (see, Plate Vd). The Egyptian divine-determinative nṯr is drawn in a few places, notably next to the names Athtar and El. Finally, the Horizontal Inscription evidences what might be a simplification of the cuneiform divine determinative. This overtly appears in two related cases (see, Plate Vb) – in Sinai 365 and a ‘South Arabian’ inscription in which it was described as a monogram (Jamme and Albright 1955: 34). Hamilton speculates that this character may be a “subscript y?” (Hamilton 2006, 325).

First, the Horizontal Inscription is so far the only explicit evidence of an anthropomorphic origin for Ḥ. Second, the depiction in the Vertical Inscription is neither an “ankh-sign” (ibid, 328) nor a woman (Altschuler 2002: 39). It does have a vaginal slit at its base, but it is undoubtedly the goddess whose name appears directly below the figure itself. Both inscriptions contain graphemes that stylistically might relate to nearby Egyptian prototypes from regnal years 26-30 of Amenemhat III (Darnell 2002: 195-204). The content may relate to Middle Kingdom holidays (ibid: 129-138) and to a Hathoric myth perhaps originating in the XIII^th Dynasty (Id. 1995: 47). So at the earliest these are likely from 1830-1800 BC.

^[i]The suggested prototype for S₁, Gardiner O29, appears flipped vertically but otherwise basically identical in a late XII^th Dynasty hieroglyphic inscription ([top left character in] Darnell 2002: 95, and ibid: Plate 74).

^[ii]This final sibilant (S₃) in the reconstructed root could be consistent with the Ugaritic Ṯ.

^[iii]Some authors of Darnell et al. (2005) repeatedly stressed to me that the inscriptions were far away. However, Plate II (Darnell et al. 2005: 116) suggests they are at most two or three meters apart.

^[iv]With hesitation, ’L / RB DN seems similar to האל הגדול הגבור – The Great and Powerful God.

^[v]For the importance; see, David Marcus, “Review: A New Ugaritic Grammar.” JAOS 107.3 (1987): 488.

^[vi]Interchange of Semitic ġ and Egyptian ḫ is not unknown either (Leslau 1962: 48).

Partial Works Cited:

Altschuler, Eric L.

“Gloss of One of the Wadi el-Hol Inscriptions,” Ancient Near Eastern Studies 39 (2002): 201-4.

Badawi, Elsaid M. and Muhammad Abdel Haleem.

Arabic-English Dictionary of Qur'anic Usage (Leiden, 2008).

ed. Black, Jeremy A., Andrew George and Nicholas Postgate.

A Concise Dictionary of Akkadian, 2nd (corrected) printing (Wiesbaden, 1999).

Bubenik, Vit.

“Change in Grammatical Categories.” in The Continuum Companion to Historical Linguistics, ed. Silvia Luraghi and Vit Bubenik (New York, 2010), 161-200.

Butin, Romain F.

“The Protosinaitic Inscriptions,” HTR 25:2 (1932): 130-203.

ed. Cowan, J. M.

Arabic-English Dictionary: The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Urbana, IL, 1994).

Darnell, John C.

“Hathor Returns to Medamûd.” SAK 22 (1995): 47-94.

“The Apotropaic Goddess in the Eye.” SAK 24 (1997): 35-48.

“Volume 1: Gebel Tjauti Rock Inscriptions 1-45 and Wadi el-Ḥôl Rock Inscriptions 1-45.” UCIOP 119 (Chicago, 2002).

Darnell, John Coleman et al.

“Two Early Alphabetic Inscriptions from the Wadi el-Ḥôl: New Evidence for the Origin of the Alphabet from the Western Desert of Egypt,” ASOR 59 (2005): 63-124.

Day, Peggy L.

“Anat: Ugarit’s ‘Mistress of Animals.’” JNES 51.3 (1992): 181-190.

de Moor, J. C. and K. Spronk

A Cuneiform Anthology of Religious Texts from Ugarit, (Leiden, 1987).

Gordon, Cyrus H.

Ugaritic Textbook, Revised Reprint 1998, Volume 1 Part 2, Analetica Orientalia 38 (Rome, 1965).

Gordon, D. H.

“Scimitars, Sabres and Falchions.” Man 58 (1958): 22-7.

Hackett, Jo Ann.

“Chapter 3: Phoenician and Punic,” in The Languages of Syria-Palestine And Arabia, ed. Roger D. Woodward (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 82-107.

Hamilton, Gordon.

The Origins of the West Semitic Alphabet in Egyptian Scripts, CBQMS(Washington DC, 2006).

Hayes, William C.

“The Tomb of Nefer-khēwet and His Family.” MMAB 30:11 (1935): 17-36.

Huehnergard, John.

“Review: A Grammar of Amarna Canaanite.” BASOR 310 (1998): 59-77.

“Appendix 1: Afro-Asiatic.” in The Languages of Syria-Palestine And Arabia, ed. Roger D. Woodward (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 225-46.

Jamme, A. and W. F. Albright.

“An Archaic South-Arabian Inscription in Vertical Columns,” BASOR 137 (1955): 32-8.

Leslau, Wolf.

“Semitic and Egyptian Comparisons.” JNES 21.1 (1962): 44-49.

Macdonald, Michael C. A.

“Chapter 6: Ancient North Arabian,” in The Languages of Syria-Palestine And Arabia, ed. Roger D. Woodward (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 179-225. XXX

Murtonen, A.

Hebrew in Its West Semitic Setting: Part One, A Comparative Lexicon, Volume 3, Sections Bb. Root System: Comparative Material and Discussions. Sections C, D and E: Numerals under 100, Pronouns and Particles (Leiden, 1990).

Nebes, Norbert and Peter Stein.

“Chapter 7: Ancient South Arabian,” in The Languages of Syria-Palestine And Arabia, ed. Roger D. Woodward (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 145-78.

Pardee, Dennis.

“Chapter 1: Ugaritic,” in The Languages of Syria-Palestine And Arabia, ed. Roger D. Woodward (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 5-35.

Pitard, Wayne T.

“The Shape of the ʿAyin in the Ugaritic Script,” JNES 51.4 (1992): 261-79.

Rahmouni, Aïcha.

Divine Epithets in the Ugaritic Alphabetic Texts. Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 1, The Near and Middle East. tr. J.N. Ford (Leiden, 2007).

Rendsburg, Gary A., Aaron D. Rubin, and John D. Huehnergard.

“A Proper View of Arabic, Semitic, and More.” JAOS 128.3 (2008): 533-41.

Walls, Neal H.

The Goddess Anat in Ugaritic Myth (Atlanta, 1992).

2010-12-18T05:16:00.000-08:00

I think this might be worth posting because I can find no online critical lens about the subject... which is of course crazy esoteric. This is an email to a friend in response to "Why?" after I claimed I understood the connection between the Judeo-Christian name "Elijah" (for that prophet) and the Arabic-Islamic name Eliaas:

"
Elijahu > Eliyahu is usually taken as Eli+Ya+Hu

"My God is Yahu"

Now... This is obviously a standard possibility; but then why in
Arabic traditions would his name be Eliaas?

Arabic S1 does equate with H with Egyptian F; all as 3rd. sing. masc.
enclitic genitive particles; i.e. El=f (Eg.) El=Shu (Ancient
Arabian/Akkadian "his god"); West Semitic El=hu "His god").

But, what happened, current hypothesis-wise, is that the S1 actually
became H in Arabian, not the other way around.

So... it is impossible for his name to have been Eliyahu and become Eliaas.

For the Wadi paper, I found out about an entirely new kind of
grammatical particle: terminative dative/locative. In Canaanite and
Ugaritic, it was enclitic (a)H and in Akkadian (i/a)$.

So my current thought; and I can find nobody who has even bothered to
refute this; is that his name was actually El+i=a$ "For my god" and
the name was later changed, before Jahu, he was adopted as the
Canaanite/NW Semitic Eli+aH "For my god" (or Eli+aHu with archaic
inflection).

When he as a prophet was adopted into Jahuwism (specifically the
worship of Jahu, not Judaism... i guess they're pretty similar though
but you get my point) his name was grammatically equated with Eli+Yah
"My god is Yahu"

Generally the argument is that Islam just equated the prophets and the
difference in naming schemes is seen as a fault of Islam. I think
that is unlikely...
"

2010-12-18T04:58:00.000-08:00

I've removed my translations.

At present, I am going to start working on a book with a systematic reinterpretation of virtually all of Sinai, Petrie's Theban ostraka, Wadi el-Hol, the Timna Valley inscription; and the connection of all of these to Arabian and Ugaritic corpuses (and... because I am far less interested in this, the Proto-Canaanite script - personal opinion; it's received too much attention).

Until then, Wadi el-Hol says:

V: These are for Athtar, the bow and KPT_-headdress (?). El /
H: Is the powerful lord who brings peace to her soul and The Child.

Timna:

Right Tablet: May the Shasu (or PN) cut the head
Left Tablet: Of the ewe-of-the-new-moon-festival.

If you'd like my thoughts on Petrie's Theban ostraka or on the faults of translating Sinai, please email me. I'll give you a hint, there are two entirely separate fish-graphemes in Sinai. One is 7 hawt - "beast/whale" the other is dg "fish"; they are both not original elements of the alphabet; they were derived by a man named Henni or Hennihotep whose name appears in at least three inscriptions.

It would appear that he was taught the alphabet by the Wadi el-Hol scribe and he derived (secondarily) a number of the graphemes common in Sinai. This will sound ridiculous without the evidence I have for this... so let's hope that's forthcoming.

I'll give one more hint, because it's so frankly amazing. The Theban ostrakon (in Petrie's book it's upside-down at the top of the page) that Colless labels 6, which is unfortunately in his pictures missing the left quarter of the tablet (I am unaware of a freely available and digitized copy of the whole picture; i have a printout of Petrie's 1912 book) says the following:

'D . M$ . D_ [...] cNT . QST . H.PZ. B . $cW . WT_[...] . GT_R . L$QY

Then, the Lord of... girds Anat the archer with his offering. And [she] off[ers] the Gether-drink that he may drink.

This would thus be the most complete Ugaritic literary text (dialectic) discovered outside Ugarit.

Obama, Peace, Law, and Order

2009-10-09T09:32:00.000-07:00

On this, the day of Obama's victory over Nobel's Peace (which I assume is a world populated primarily by dynamite), and the US's bombing of the moon (which I assume is an extension of Nobel's dream), I have decided to address the question on everyone's mind: Why and when was Law & Order moved to a Friday timeslot?

I hope this doesn't spell the end of its consistent ratings and long-time run. Usually this type of intentional sabotage spells the end of a series. But L&O is still fresh. They've got a black and white detective duo (attacking the black and white world), which hasn't been seen since the 10th Season in 1999. Ten years later (21 years after the pilot premiered), I'd argue it's still totally fresh.

Why the US is a Pawn in Iran's Diabolical Game of Checkers

2009-09-25T21:54:00.000-07:00

I have gone through CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Itar-Tass, Rianovosti, Xinhua, and China.org.cn, all in English, to see just what is deliberately emphasized, and what is not emphasized. It is clear to me that US and British media (by way of my initial 6:30 AM Cairo time viewing of Katie Couric, and even CNN and BBC - curiously I didn't check Le Monde) have both made a huge deal out of nothing.

Le Monde's headline, by the way, is: Les Occidentaux menacent l'Iran de "severes" sanctions.

And in typical fashion, Ahmedinejad perenially looks unconcerned. Anyone else see why? Firstly, the plant is not likely to be operational for at least another year. So Ahmedinejad pretty justifiably said that Iran was announcing the plant a year ahead of time. Secondly, Obama, Brown and Sarkozy get up discussing the international community's desire for united action toward inspections and sanctions. So Ahmedinejad pretty justifiably said Iran has no objection to fairly immediate inspections of the facility.

Others have trumped up the issue that only 3,000 centrifuges are planned for the facility and that this is enough for fuel-generation but not power-generation. The plant is supposed to be experimental, but with nothing in it there is no way to be sure of its specific purpose. So for the united 3, it was all sanctions and inspections - which apparently was a consensus.

Medvedev

And yet I see odd signs in Medvedev's reaction (this is from ITAR-TASS):

“Bearing in mind Russia’s commitments of an IAEA member, we will assist such inspections in every possible way,” he said.
“We urge Iran to fully assist the Agency to make this inspection,” Medvedev said.
“The construction of a new uranium enrichment site contradicts repeated demands of the UN Security Council that Iran must stop uranium enrichment research,” he said.
“We are determined to start negotiations on the soonest signing of a long-term comprehensive agreement aimed to settle the Iranian nuclear problem. The situation requires close attention,” he said.
“The Sextet is due to meet with Iranian representatives on October 1. This is an Iranian opportunity to confirm its adherence to the negotiations,” he said.
“We hope that Iran will present convincing evidence to its pursuit of the exclusively peaceful atomic energy goals, especially in the light of the latest information about the construction of a new uranium enrichment site,” he said.

Though Rianovosti is slightly harsher in saying that Medvedev is echoing Obama's statement that Iran is "breaking rules all nations must follow," the end of the article was this statement:

[Ahmedinejad] He said Iran must not "inform Mr. Obama's administration of every facility that we have."

Not as much a picture of a callous president, but rather one who is resistant to American exceptionalism. Not necessarily the worst gesture to any international audience...

Needless to say, Russia has always voiced "concern;" now they've upped it from Magenta to Mauve and said "serious concern." Nevertheless, there is no mention of sanctions. The mention of inspections are quite interesting because of Ahmedinejad's immediate acceptance of these calls. So, why would Russia stress the need for Iran to present evidence at the Summitt, and its stress on IAEA inspections aided by Russia?

Jiaobao

Xinhua says this, in an article title "Obama warns about consequences..." (no tie-in with China):

The two leaders also joined French President Nicolas Sarkozy in a meeting with the press on Friday to make the case against Iran.

Iran has always defended its nuclear program, saying that the peaceful use of nuclear technology is its inalienable rights that can not be negotiated.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed on Friday that a second uranium enrichment plant is completely legal under the U.N. nuclear watchdog's rules.

"What we did was completely legal, according to the law," Ahmadinejad told reporters at a New York hotel press conference.

and

China.org.cn said this in an article entitled "China expects Iran to work with IAEA:"

Asked to comment on the reports, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said China has noticed that Iran has informed the IAEA of the issue, and China is aware of the statements made by leaders of the United States, France and Britain.

China has been paying attention to the development of this issue, said Ma, adding that China expects the IAEA to deal with it on the basis of its function and authority.

China supports the safeguarding of international nuclear non-proliferation regime and maintains that the prevention of nuclear proliferation should be handled peacefully through negotiations.

"We hope the talks between representatives of six major powers and Iran to be held on October 1 can make positive progress," said Ma.

The six countries of China, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Germany have agreed to hold talks on October 1 with Iran on its nuclear program.

So clearly, the Chinese position is even less direct and reserved. Jiaobao is not in any way related, and Xinhua reported that he spoke about growth at the G20 Summit (go figure). It is clear that China was probably also informed by Iran about this issue, not to mention the fact that the news actually broke sometime last week but the vultures picked it up at the Summit.

Conclusion

The US, France, and the UK, having consistently taken a bellicose stance toward Iran on this issue, have once again misrepresented international opinion as united. In reality, the US, UK, and Iran are speaking of severe sanctions and reprecussions, and catching Iran and making it come clean. But if the two states which have consistently been closer to Iran on this issue are not acting all that shocked, and instead expecting and insisting on inspections and cooperation that Iran has basically agreed to, then perhaps Les [trois] Occidentaux vraiment menacent l'Iran!

The irony is that I have no doubt Iran will make a fairly strong case at the UN on October 1. Even the CNN political analyst in their article essentially argued that the timing was strategic, allowing Iran the ability to show that it cooperated with the IAEA a year before another facility becomes nuclear. And frankly, he's right one way or the other. The big deal, historically, with 'nuclearization' has been firsts - they provide a huge challenge to the treaty because they pull the ground out from under the boundry of 0 for states not nuclearized as of an initial deadline (except for at least India and Pakistan). This is, of course, for nuclear weapons.

For civilian nuclear tech, Iran is technically entitled to assistance with safeguards: including and especially assistance from previously nuclearized states like the US, UK, and France. Russia and China (and Pakistan and probably North Korea) have done a better job of living up to their obligations (though those in parentheses should probably be seen as less obligated...). Nevertheless, despite this consensus preached by Les Trois Occidentaux, Russia and China have consistently refused to act or really speak against Iran, with Russia continuing to assist in Iran's nuclear efforts.

Finally, Iran has consistently agreed to unprecedented inspection of its facilities to a level, and on a scale, unsurpassed by any other state. Simply, despite maintaining secrets (come on guys... it is a state), Iran has allowed unprecedented access to information on normally classified material (normally being reflected by Anglo-Saxon and Norman states) but has been consistently rebuffed. In other words, it has held up if even 20 or 30% of its side of the NPT bargain, and the West shows it empty pockets. Whether right or wrong, Obama clearly is unaware that not ALL states are NPT signatories, and thus these are not obligations of ALL states. Additionally, he's starting to sound a lot more like he's from Crawford, Texas and either unaware or unconcerned about the lack of consensus behind his words.

Farouq Hosni

2009-09-22T06:16:00.001-07:00

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2009/09/20099228304238310.html

The first few weeks I was in Cairo, last September probably, I was driving around with a friend of mine and he decided to stop into a stationary store to look for something or other. It was a very random store. It wasn't small, there were two floors, but it was not a particularly notable store either - very likely singularly owned and not franchised.

On the second floor was a book-rack of dictionaries. Among those dictionaries were 2 or 3 Hebrew-Arabic dictionaries. They were quite expensive, about 200 LE, and if I had had the money I would have bought it on the spot.

Also, AUC uses Prof Sela's book on Hamas. My point is that rhetoric, particularly given the questionable policies often pursued by the Israeli and Egyptian states, can often seem to overcome truth. That being said, there does not appear to be a persecution of Israeli authors or books in anything other than rhetoric.

Islamic Prejudice on the East Coast

2009-08-15T17:00:00.000-07:00

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/08/2009815182636153569.html

About a year and a half ago, about 5 months after I was dismissed by the National Defense University (NESA Div.) for being Muslim, I went to Bangkok for a conference. I live in NJ so I was returning with a friend transiting to NC.

We noticed that all of the brown-skinned probably Indians or Pakistanis in front of us, as well as one Nepali that I heard speaking in Abu Dhabi (where we were previously transiting), had their passports taken by a special usher and were moved off the line.

I am a Muslim. I have a beard. I am white. I have a very Ashkenazi Jewish name.

When we got to that usher, I tried to hand him my passport and he rebuffed me, pointing ahead. I looked very confused and eventually he pushed me ahead.

I love New Jersey, in a lot of respects, and have mixed feelings of pity and hatred on the other hand. Nevertheless, despite that it will be populated by a majority of non-white people soon if not already, there is a lot of overt prejudice. I have noticed this particularly at the Newark Airport. Now, strictly speaking it is a very important and in many ways 'great' airport. However, I know, from personal experience, this account above to be true; and it saddens me.

Taiwan

2009-08-11T07:04:00.001-07:00

http://www.stonepages.com/news/archives/003407.html

Interestingly, if this is indicative of the same culture in Taiwan that may have given rise to later Polynesian societies, it would suggest a potentially far earlier origin of those later societies.

A Wonderful Example of Academic Racism from... I guess some sort of Anthropologist

2009-07-30T20:57:00.001-07:00

http://mathildasanthropologyblog.wordpress.com/2008/07/23/racial-differences-in-skull-shape/

Dude.. this is really messed up. After reading some of your other posts I figured you just enjoyed entertaining bizarre otherwise rejected hypotheses. But race is an effectively rationalized division. So... that physical anthropologists merely shows a strong level of self-importance across time periods, not so much strong cross-temporal empirical support for race. I recently had to throw somebody out of my house for staunchly arguing that Negroids are sons of Ham. So... good job on driving forward all these wonderful replies about whether Indians are Caucasoids.

Simply, Mr. George Jones, many Indian languages are considered to be derived from proto-Indo-European, as Persian, and most European languages. There is, however, no direct evidence of Indian racial divisions that do not themselves cut across linguistic divisions. Additionally, the idea that skull size and physical non-phenotypic elements of human physical expression can determine race were largely debunked (for most of us "moderns") following the Second World War (see the movie: Europa Europa for a stunning true account of how dumb and arrogant the Nazis were in this endeavor - whilst admitting a Polish Jew who had been in the Communist Youth - into their elite Hitler Youth school).

Additionally, elements of race are effective social barriers on genetic diversity that result in phenotypic trends, at best. Meaning that our conception of race entails punctuating a basic spectrum of genotypical and phenotypical diversity through rationalization on the basis of physical appearance. That, to me, seems like a pretty good description of academic racism.

Iran Movements

2009-07-17T05:35:00.001-07:00

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/07/200971613365514463.html

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/07/200971793040418381.html

Possible Policy?

2009-07-08T08:55:00.000-07:00

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/954/eg5.htm

BBC's Hitlist

2009-06-25T16:10:00.000-07:00

#1 Gravely ill Jackson in hospital
#2 Singer Michael Jackson 'is dead'

Michael Jackson's death is slightly less popular than his illness by BBC's count.

An Iranian Thomas Payne? - خيابان

2009-06-21T06:25:00.000-07:00

This is an edited version of a newspaper called خيابان, "The Street," translated from Persian by ...someone, I'm not exactly sure - if they see this please contact me.

Original Link - http://irangcc.wordpress.com/2009/06/21/translating-the-street-newspaper-circulating-among-iran-protesters/#comment-107

The Street

Issue 1 – 29 Khordad 1388 (June 19, 2009)

Aiming to negate students’ impact on the current developments:

University dormitories ordered closed

Iran in a bloodbath

Workers of [car maker] Iran Khodro on Strike

Hundreds of thousands protesters march from Tupkhaneh Square to Haft Tir

In the provinces, coup-makers practice violent oppression

“Media and the streets” (page 1, center)

A bloody page in Iran’s modern history seems to be turning in the events we are witnessing. In past days and nights, Tehran and many Iranian cities have not stayed calm as peoples’ burning rage has thrown daily life into flux. The people in the streets are playing a game of cat and mouse with violent thugs, youth are in revolt, and the elderly rack their memories for re-learned lessons of the calamitous events of the 1979 revolution to pass on to the young.

Again, after thirty years, people are leaving the doors of their homes open [as refuge] to the courageous youth, and we hear from many how great people are, and how quickly they can change. As witness to the events of the [recent] days past, we were different people, different slogans. During the campaign until Election Day, the huge crowds of people that [were swept] into the street in the green wave were spirited, the bliss of ignorance reigning over them. Yet since the results were announced, the situation has changed and people have become angry. They have sought the crest of the wave to propel them beyond the ignorance and repression, and hundreds of lies. During recent days and nights, the tide has once again turned.

Like Azar of 1953 [CIA-backed coup of Prime Minister Mossadegh] and Tir of 1999 [regime crackdown of reformist student protests], and – according to many present at the time – even like the protests of the Revolutionary years and of 1963 [clergy-led anti-Shah protests]!!! Yes, we are again seeing the naked face of repression. We see the green wave of reformism in its entire expanse, as it brings us into a shared arena with the existing system.

Killing us and calls for calm have only made the situation more acute. Now we have more questions; more than just issues with vote counting. We want a different voice. We do not want to be sacrificed to corruption and graft again, for the ‘nth’ time our interests ignored. We do not want a slaughter that would set society back thirty years. We do not want a repeat of the fraud of 1979. We may not have any media but the world has gotten smaller, so we no longer see one thing on the streets but read something else in world media. We do not want the next generation to be ignorant about what happened on the streets of Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashhad, Ahvaz, Kermanshah, and the rest of the cities, large and small. We will represent a new voice in this power play: the voice of the people crying out in the streets. The people who have no delusions about colors and who demand change. Khiaban Newspaper

“We rely on the streets” (page 4, bottom)

By Simin Mesgari

Mousavi knows too well how deep the wound is. He also knows that his green bandage is only a superficial treatment for this wound, and not a cure.

Mousavi knows that he cannot be both the cause of pain and its remedy at the same time.

Mousavi knows that not all “this” is for him.

He knows very well, as do we also, that had there been a “better” candidate than Mousavi with a “past of lesser evil” who instead chose yellow for his campaign, the nation would have gone yellow and Mousavi would be relegated to the position of Ahmadinejad…

One can’t know all this and not be scared about the consequences of what has been unleashed. These protests can get out of control.

The ultimate demand of this campaign is far from the presidency of Mousavi, even though its official color remains green.

Velayat-e Faqih or the “Guardianship of the Supreme Jurist” is the red line which Mousavi has acknowledged he will not cross – this red line is now being crossed by those wearing green.

No longer can either political camp [reformist or conservative] control the streets, however much both may try. One with guns and batons, the other through public mourning for the dead at mosques – a traditional powerbase arena for the target practice of Revolutionary Guards and Basiji’s, practicing their aim on the bodies of our brothers and sisters.

The streets are dangerous, not just for us but more for them. That’s why they try to pull us from the streets by inviting us to attend Friday Prayers after we have mourned for our dead brothers and cried over our ruined homes. Ironically, it is Mousavi who is inviting us to attend. To make folly of our protest, they invite us to attend mosques, because they fear “the streets” but they should know that “we rely on the streets.”

Birthday Wishes to Aung San Suu Kyi

2009-06-19T05:04:00.001-07:00

Like many peoples forced into opposition with their governments, Burma's people are plagued with problems overlooked by obstinate, directionless governance. But its state is also beset by the forces of liberty - liberty of thought and mind, and liberty of self-determination. More than anything else, Aung San Suu Kyi forms a cornerstone of a waning group that keep alive the power of nonviolent transformation.

Letter to Letterman

2009-06-17T00:53:00.000-07:00

Dear Mr. Letterman,

I live in Cairo, and I rarely get the chance to catch your show - they play day-old shows at 5 in the morning. I happened to be watching your apology for a joke made about Sarah Palin's daughter (I didn't see the joke itself). I must say, I was very impressed with two elements of the show - a) your monologue about perception and intent, and b) your discussion of Iran's recent Presidential Elections. Iran has a vastly misrepresented political system, particularly in American media. And though the intent may not be directly racist or negative, much of the perception is. Iran is associated with fundamentalist Islam and irrational religious fanatics. The reality could not be further from the truth, however. And like any government, factional politics and divisions thrive. Iran is not a fundamentalist state, and should not represent Islam in any sense other than that its politics are derived from a fundamentally divergent understanding of Shia'i philosophy than had existed prior to the 1960s.

I truly appreciate your inclusion of material on Iran because of the gravity of the elections to Iran's future. But I must urge that if you sincerely wish to do two of the noblest things - tell the truth about a difficult and complex issue, and do so using humor - then I must urge you to inform the public about an important bifurcation in the Iranian political structure. The theocratic element of government, often misrepresented as dominating everything,
relies essentially on revisionist Shia'i theology that the religious class (clergy) should select, in consultation with the people, a Supreme Leader (like a Pope) that issues irreversible edicts in God's name. Though it is difficult to contradict the word of the Faqih (the Supreme Leader) without provoking grave questions of religious loyalty, the electoral system is intended as a means of legitimizing the religious establishment through popular mobilization and participation. Thus this election, if nothing else, has forced all elements in Iranian politics to more seriously consider the role of both the religious and electoral structures in the Iranian Constitution.

I would urge you to inform the public about this dichotomy, so that Ahmedinejad no longer represents some all-powerful force, and also so Americans finally recognize the complexity and
true vestiges of Power in Iran. Regime change and reform are not going to happen externally, so the issue is to what extent the US can buttress reform from within - and this will undoubtedly mean cooperation with an Islamic government in addition to meaning accepting that that government is unlikely to 'go.' Ahmedinejad is a great tool of media distraction, but his power is markedly weaker than previous Presidents like Rafsanjani, Khatami, and former Prime Minister Moussavi. American understanding must increasingly learn to recognize the diverse complexity
that unifies all geopolitics in the same way we see it at home. There is no "us" and "them," only many "us'es" and "thems." And the friction between policy aspirations and policy applications that Americans and others see is inflamed by such simplistic perceptions that have remained basically un-evolved since the time of "Greeks" and "Barbarians." In conclusion, love your show - please give the people some truth on Iran that doesn't fuel the fire of irrationality.

Sincerely,
Michael Sheflin

American Chamber of Commerce violating gender discrimination laws?

2009-06-17T00:26:00.000-07:00

This is an ad for an administrative assistant for the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt. You will notice that males need not apply.

Job Profile
Job Code:	30175
Employer:	American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt
Job Title :	Executive Secretary
Languages :	Fluent in both English & Arabic
Country :	Egypt
Job Category:	Administration, Secretarial Work
Job Type:	Full Time
Description :	1. Screen telephone calls for the Deputy Executive Director & assist caller with information and/ or direct caller to the appropriate department. 2. Maintain Confidentiality of information 3. Review, sort and distribute all incoming & outgoing mail for the Deputy Executive Director & officer 4. Ensure that all matters requiring attention by the Deputy Executive Director are promptly brought to their attention and followed up as appropriate 5. Handel the in /out basket for the Deputy Executive Director. 6. Schedule appointments for the Deputy Executive Director and ensure that all committee meetings (Including any addition/ changes or deletion) are recorded on the appropriate calendars. 7.Handel travel arrangements for the Deputy Executive Director 8.Provide Staff support to assigned committees, Taking& record minutes for the Deputy Executive Director 9. Maintain a master calendar of scheduled activities which concern the Deputy Executive Director, monitor the status of the activities and regularly provide an update for the Deputy Executive Director. 10.Monitor for the work projects of the Deputy Executive Director 11. Follow the office standards for correspondence and quality of work and provide advice on overall office work follow. 12. Be aware of, understand and follow The Chamber Policies & Procedures. 13. Prepare the articles for the CDC newsletter. 14. Perform other tasks requested from the Manager.
Qualifications :	Bachelor’s degree,Bachelor’s degree. Admin./ secretarial experience. Excellent spoken English. good computer skills; basic knowledge of Microsoft Office (, Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook). Excellent interpersonal & communication skills. Excellent memory & organizational ability. Well organized and capable of working with different departments. The ability to communicate clearly & concisely, both orally & in writing
Gender :	Female
Experience :	5-10 Years.
Salary (L.E.):	Negotiable
Comments :	Kindly send your resume with a recent photo.
Job Contact Person :	hr department
Job Contact Email:	hrdepartment@amcham.org.eg
	Job-Contact Information

Everybody See Bamboozled

2009-06-16T21:19:00.001-07:00

Amazing film (2000) by Spike Lee: Damon Wayans, Jada Pinkett, Mos Def. I saw it on Dubai One yesterday and promptly wrote them the following:

Dear Dubai One Info,

I caught Bamboozled (2000, Spike Lee) on Dubai One yesterday. I had never seen it before and was very surprised; it is a complex film with one of the most twisted and convoluted messages I have ever seen regarding American race relations. All in all, it is probably the most intelligent and uplifting film on the subject I have ever seen, perfectly tempered with sobering realism.

But this suggestion, bordering on a very strong complaint, is that I believe the complexity of the message of this film is probably lost on the majority of your audience. I cannot speak to audiences outside Egypt, but in Egypt, not that many Americans consistently watch Dubai One (myself included), and I feel that the comedic elements of this movie may be accentuated in the minds of non-Americans at the expense of the actually very deep message. The intense post-Civil War racist imagery - in particular old cartoons and old comedies - are intended to shock audiences by a currently intensely negative and racist association with such images juxtaposed against the blatant comedy.

The name of Mos Def's group the Mau Maus refers to groups of black people in the late-60s that bilked state and federal social programs out of money earmarked for legitimate purposes. The idea of a minstrel show, and men in black face, also does not have the same disturbing connotation to non-Americans as it does to those familiar with American race relations. A similar case can be made for the use of dolls and (as I have mentioned) the use of comedic entertainment to point out broader truths about the black community and race relations in the States.

I suppose my suggestion is the following. I am grateful to Dubai One for introducing me to this movie, I am indebted in that respect. Nevertheless, I humbly request that you do not repeat this film as I think it probably damages the message Spike Lee originally intended to convey.

Sincerely,
Michael Sheflin

I may have been wrong

2009-06-15T10:03:00.000-07:00

This is going to produce something major. What, we will have to leave to the forces of dialectic progression. Nevertheless, this has quickly ballooned into something beyond the control of Khamenei. I would be very scared, were I he, right now that the rumors of Rafsanjani's attempts at a coup may in fact be true http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/13/iran_what_now.

More importantly, I would be afraid, were I among the upper echelons of the 'ulema, that disposing of Ahmedinejad quickly may be the only way to salvage the system. Of course, reform would probably be another way, but reform is more gradual and less tumultuous. It may in fact be one or the other; at which point the West will learn just how powerful Ahmedinejad is (for those not keeping up, I was implying not very).

IRNA Appears Blocked

2009-06-15T09:59:00.000-07:00

http://irna.ir/en

The English and Persian (irna.ir) versions of the Islamic Republic News Agency are not working.

Reporters Sans Frontières

2009-06-15T02:15:00.000-07:00

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/15/iran.election.media/index.html?iref=topnews

Who cares? Certainly not Iran. But I think sanctions are a good idea, because of how thoroughly Iran has shifted its foreign reserves. So yea, be a bully US; and while you're at it, why not push Palestinians into the Red Sea. I have a feeling you could get it recognized as a preemptive strike.

Netanyahu's War Plan

2009-06-15T00:45:00.000-07:00

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8099948.stm

Needless to say, this happened today. Virtually everyone in high up Palestinian governance rejected the plan as essentially a farce, which it is. The US and France called upon the Palestinians to be tempered in this "important step forward." Man... I'll give you that diplomacy should usually be the language of peace, but it seems in terms of foreign policy that the new administrations in France and the US are just as dumb and willing to be blinded as the previous administrations.

Talk was already cheap, but imagine a bountiful world in which we all get hot air subsidies from the President.

2009-06-14T10:50:00.000-07:00

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8099757.stm

Facade, this is clearly the latest attempt to create peace with Syria; which will likely happen under Netanyahu's administration, because the volition for that agreement is well beyond him. Nevertheless, I strongly feel this is an attempt to shift media attention from Israel to Palestine when Palestinians are (rightfully so) less than satisfied with a demilitarized state - and not only that, but apparently "no army, no control of its air space and no way of smuggling in weapons."

This violation of sovereignty in terms of air space, and "smuggling in weapons" is pretty steep. In the case of the former, it means that Palestine will be limited in terms of civil aviation, and be subject to Israeli monitoring. The latter element means that border control will continue to be run by the Israeli administration (presumably with strong cooperation from Jordan). The perfect storm is coming, and once again the Palestinians are likely to be swept up in the tide - at least for a while.

The brief article stub mentions that Netanyahu said he would be willing to promote this proto-state idea in Beirut, Riyadh, and Damascus. Here, I think is the real point of his policy. He is attempting to misdirect anger at potential normalization with Lebanon, Saudi, and Syria - misdirecting anger through the media to a half-assed attempt at a deal with Palestine. I don't personally see who among anyone would take this deal seriously as it would not be a Palestinian state so much as a Palestinian vassal (I believe bitch is the polite term). Yet subtly, Netanyahu, a hardline asshole, appears willing to reach out to state-oriented enemies like Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi. It was a long time coming, and my fear is Netanyahu intends to use what was essentially an inevitable policy "shift" (we could argue that later) to distract from his lack of will to make a real peace agreeement in Palestine at a time of steep American and international pressure.

The Iranian Presidential Election of 2009

2009-06-14T06:15:00.000-07:00

I have previously written about the polarization between the electoral and institutional frameworks of politics in Iran (http://msheflin.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-look-at-old-problem-polarization-in.html ; http://msheflin.blogspot.com/2008/01/additional-justification-for-my.html). This most recent Presidential Election may represent an increasing gap between the islamiyya elements of the state ('ulema) and the jumuhuriya elements of the state (the electoral process), as it were. It is still too early to tell but unlike some seasoned analysts (http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2009/06/iran-on-fire.php - a very good analysis, by the way), I tend to have a more skeptical view of change in Iran.

Rather than representing a new Revolution (Totten likens current events with the events leading up to the Shah's political demise), I would suggest that the present protests in Iran more closely resemble the protests of June 2003. Protests resulted over the arrest of Hashem Aghajari due to his criticism of some hypocrisies of the Islamic administration in Tehran and the original practices of Islam. Initial crackdowns beget further protests, and though the the government eventually commuted the sentence, the incidents produced strong discourses about the nature of the power of reform in an extremely rigid institutional structure (whose association with religion makes criticism all the more controversial), just as it encouraged the discourse of the nature of the dialogue between the reform movement and the Islamic Republic.

I would suggest that all the available information indicates the Islamic Republic is still widely popular in Iran. This is not to say that policies and structures in Iran are widely popular or seen as legitimate. Nevertheless, the suggestion that this will 'tear apart' some smokescreen around a wall of a corrupt Faqih and Vilayet thereof is probably hyperbole. The idea that this election may further the perception of a divide between the 'ulema and the electoral system in Iran is likely to pan out. There is also likely to be a serious reassessment of the role of reformists in a system that increasingly uses the same traditional (SAVAK-y) methods of crowd and thought suppression as it always has.

It is hard to maintain optimism for reform in the face of cyclical disappointment. Indeed, the opinion polls for this election suggested at the worst (for Moussavi) closer results - but reality may have been different (whether rigged or not). It is yet hard to tell, but if Moussavi was indeed arrested Saturday or today, he then is put into a position somewhat similar to that of Hashem Aghajari. Obviously a key difference is Moussavi's historical presence in Iranian national politics, his prominence and celebrity. Nevertheless, he has become an outspoken leader of moderate, sober, reform from within that looked tangible and may have been an even greater threat to the 'ulema than Khatami - that Sayyid Mohammed Khatami was a cleric should come as no surprise in the context of a perception of harmony between the 'ulema and the electoral legitimation process.

My thought is that both the reform movement (at its hard-core identity), and the appartus-e-Faqih view the situation in similar terms. Both wish to protect their identity within the Iranian social structure, and each professes its interests in the form of policies in competition with those of the "other." Moussavi may have, to the reform movement, represented a plausible compromise moving forward, that could transform this system of interaction into a more cooperative one (this may be one explanation for why Sayyid Khatami stood aside in the most recent elections despite his own obvious celebrity and historical importance). So in my humble opinion, the telling difference between this scenario and the one which emerged in June 2003 lies in the hands of the 'ulema and not the people and not President Ahmedinejad.

Just as reformists wished Aghajari freed and took to protest for it, I think that Iranians want the Supreme Leader to take action against the electoral results - in some manner. Whatever small, even token, action that he does take will dramatically affect the structure of the resulting actions of reformists presently in the streets. This explains why the Faqih's apparatus previously commuted Aghajari's sentence after months of de facto dialogue between protesters and the Apparatus. If Moussavi was arrested, we have a frighteningly similar picture beginning to develop.

I believe that whatever Ahmedinejad will say today should be seen as nothing more than an attempt at media misdirection from the Faqih. Those of us who study Iranian politics fix our gazes more firmly on him. All that being said, it is unclear on what grounds electoral review or invalidation would be pursued. This most current election is not particularly anomalous given the 28 year history of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the chart below shows, the changes that occurred in this election were a dramatic drop in W/S, the loyalty norm, to its lowest point in 28 years.

If we trust the theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al., which I would argue withstands logical scrutiny, but does not withstand empirical or methodological scrutiny, this would suggest a future increase in public rather than private goods, surprisingly. But the loss of private benefits, like many de facto autocracies like Iran, will not occur in key sectors; thus crowding out private goods around the core of the winning coalition (W). Drops in W/S, or a weakening of the loyalty norm in voting blocs from the presidency, theoretically tends the balance of goods from private to public. But in Iran, weakening of the Presidential loyalty norm has tended to be associated with key events like the Revolution, the death of Ayatullah Khomeni, the election of Khatami, and now the reelection of Ahmedinejad.

Since the Presidency was created in 1979, no weakening of the loyalty norm of the Presidency has been sustained beyond the initial drop. Thus between the election of Khatami and Ahmedinejad's reelection there was a sustained increase in W/S; similarly after the Revolution, and the selection of Ali Khamenei. In part this is the natural result of the growth of the youth coming of voting age having had no say in the previous presidential election; the upward trend of S drops slightly because the original voting bloc comprises less of the new future voting bloc each year. But this trend reveals a political reality, that in using voting as a benchmark, we must acknowledge that those who have not voted form a more ambiguous political contingent.

I would suggest even more strongly that each of these periods in each which W/S dropped have ushered in conflict between a hard-core bloc of the regime and others within the coalition but outside the core as well as those outside the coalition. Each of these drops theoretical threaten the central control 'ulema by granting the very same legitimation demanded by the system to those outside the Faqih's hard-core.
Thus the key to understanding the loyalty norm may in fact be institutional friction. For better or worse, the system of the 'ulema and the electoral system rely on each other to function. People like to empower one person and associate (always him) him with Iran; Ahmedinejad, Khamenei, Khomeni was quite popular. But the dualistic association of Iran with an antisemitic president or some backwards irrational state of mullahs is misleading (although the former criticism is no doubt true). Thus the hard-core in the regime, however shrouded their intentions and interests, have a distinct interest in maintaining at least the guise of support (for itself) through elections; the idea is that the state should be guided by Islam but legitimated by the people - an interesting Sunni compromise.

So though voting has always been stressed by all, the expansions of the selectorate have produced potential anomalies in the control of the hard-core. Turnout (S) increased in this election, commensurate to the levels of the 2001-2004 Khatami administration, and the percentage of voters in the winning coalition of Ahmedinejad (W) rose slightly from his previous election to the 3rd lowest point (by a margin of .014%, or just over 540,000 votes, which is about 100,000 more than the number of ballots found invalid). The increase in S accounts for the drop in W/S, but suggests that new participants in the electoral process are the least likely to see the benefits of these new private benefits - probably in the form of military hardware and domestic high-finance services. The constraint of the provision of public goods certainly also mean that public goods like foreign policy will continue to fall under the purvew of the Faqih and his administration; thus taking Ahmedinejad almost completely out of the decision-making process.

Perhaps this is a signal from the 'ulema that it is unwilling to abandon its old tools of political and social distraction just yet, particularly because of the institutional importance and growing popularity of the reform movement after the 1999 and 2003 student protests eminating from Tehran University. Then why, in this most current election, did less than 14,000,000 people vote for Moussavi, when no fewer than 28,000,000 voted for Sayyid Khatami (his first election marked an increase of just under 12.5 million voters - or roughly 20% of the total population of Iran and about 32.5% of the voting population of Iran). That increase is staggering, and though Khatami failed to provide meaningful reform, it is amazing to think that Ahmedinejad pulled in 7 million additional votes from his previous election, with the US Bureau of Economic Analysis suggesting an increase of 4 million people of voting age in Iran from 2005-2009. Thus at least 3 million people, or about 13.4% of Khatami's (peak) coalition had to switch sides so to speak.

But it is too convenient that this "realignment" so conveniently echoes the desires of the 'ulema, to expand participation within "its" system, and this requires a degree of obedience by the people to its clergy. I would argue that such a system is essentially an extreme contradiction of Islamic ideals of political participation, and may amount to a difficult choice for those who bow only to God. Nevertheless, the expansion of the selectorate S, an issue that nobody can control so long as a voting age and no poll taxes exist in Iranian elections. Thus electoral irregularities, violence, intimidation, and obstruction remain the only ways within the system to perpetuate the appearance of a system using might for right. Needless to say, it's a shi'ite situation.

So Moussavi may become a martyr. I think he probably knew it, and the issue is not so much how people think or feel, or even act; but the response of the state to a crisis of legitimacy more pronounced than before, in part because the state encouraged popular participation to maintain its legitimacy. So we have an image of the state of and by the Faqih increasingly in contrast with the people. More importantly, this may reflect the movement of Iran from a system of consultative legitimation through elections to one of competitive state images onset by elections. In other words, if elections are increasingly associated as a meaningless procedure devoid of their logical underpinning, then the state will have a serious crisis of legitimacy. None of this is rocket science, nor is it particularly esoteric. People have seen this, in and outside Iran, since before the Khatami election. Yet those not skeptical continually fail to see that no humanitarian tends the light at the end of the tunnel.

These elections do not mark the end of the Islamic Republic, nor should they, but the following events are likely to structure the dialogue between reform and reaction in Iran. In so doing, Moussavi's dialogue with the Faqih and to a lesser extent Ahmedinejad's rally are likely to be formative transformations in Iranian views of their political system. I think, of this there can be no doubt. But prediction of how such a transformation will occur is something that cannot be gaged until after the Faqih initiates that dialogue with Moussavi, or until Moussavi escalates his criticisms of the election to an extent that prove untenable with the regime's interest in controlling the state's politics. No reasoned analyst should expect regime change, but then again regime change occurs only with time anyway - and often involves a transformation of a continuous regime. Time is a forgotten dimension of IR, and though it's last in our hearts and minds, I would argue it is not least.

All people are fundamentally transformed by and through time. And just as none of us are physically or spiritually who we were yesterday or who we will be tomorrow, the Iranian regime has transformed with time. The experiences of the next week will, in Iran, help clarify the nascent structure of future visions of the Iranian people and the Iranian regime. Both have divergent images of what the state should become, and the next few days or weeks will show us how the regime intends to pacify its people - either through outdated Shahist crowd suppression, through compromise and cooperation of more diverse interests, or a third way not wholely tied to the cooperation/competition dichotomy bandied about by theorists.

Sacre Bleu

2009-06-14T02:01:00.000-07:00

http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/2009/06/iran-on-fire.php

http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1092304.html

Ah give me your sensationalists, all raised in democracy, all looking for a fight, all looking for a thrill. I think we'll find that whatever will happen depends on the incumbent President Elect (for now) Ahmedinejad's address to his nation sometime later today (http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/14/iran.election/index.html).

My guess is this will probably inadvertently lead to reform of some kind, better to think of it as change, if not just to ruin the wind under the wings of Moussavi. Other states really could learn from Mubarak's regime. Say and (God forbid) think what you will about Egypt, this administration is extremely politically adept - a la the salary raises/subsidy cuts and the jockeying with, around, and for Israel. This regime is very realist, and very smart. Iran's administration must tote a much more sensitive line, in part because of its increasingly tenuous position in the international structure; but also because the lines of patronage to its government, banks, and people have long been severed.

2ul ya rabb