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Breather from Politics

2012-01-27T16:16:00.000-05:00

I’ve been watching the endless debates with a certain amount of ambivalence. My passion is not what it was. In my heart of hearts I wonder how much any of this matters. Some of this comes from the tremendous intellectual impact of encountering books like Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable which (among other things) serves as a reminder that – for all of humanity’s impressive achievements – we are tiny specks of nothing blown about by chance. Some of it comes from some personal stuff, that I have only touched on but not really written about. But in the face of this one begins to consider what really matters – and I’m certain it is not the plague of preening pundits posturing on cable news.

In What’s Bred in the Bone, Robertson Davies (one of my favorite novelists) gets it right on politics.

Francis Cornish, the main character, is encountering his estranged wife who has become a Communist. She bawls out the wealthy Cornish for his ambivalence about the masses. Cornish replies:

The best thing about Plato was his good style. He liked inventing systems, but he was too fine an artist to trust his systems fully. Now I’ve come to hate systems. I hate your pet system, and I hate Fascism, and I hate the system that exists. But I suppose their must me some system and I’ll take any system that leaves me alone to got on with my work, and that probably means the least efficient, ramshackle, contradictory system.

Politics and public affairs is what I do. And human nature is such that systems that create the conditions in which people can “get on with what matters to them” are fragile things. Ultimately politics is about protecting, preserving and where possible expanding this space. That is worthy calling and an important one. But there is no salvation in it; it is only a means.

It is worth putting that into perspective every once in a while.

Now back to our regularly scheduled programming.

The AQ Khan Network and its Fourth Customer at Carnegie

2012-01-25T22:53:00.003-05:00

On Monday I had the good fortune to attend The A.Q. Khan Network and its Fourth Customer at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace featuring my friend (and ArmsControlWonk regular) Josh Pollack.

The event (which can be viewed online here) is based on an article initially published here. My own initial thoughts about it can be read here.

The core question is who was the AQ Khan network’s fourth customer. It was well-known that Khan dealt with Iran, North Korea, and Libya. But there was regular talk of an un-named fourth customer, there were also unaccounted for shipments of sensitive equipment. A related question is who was really running the network. At various points Khan attempted to blame the military or the Dubai middlemen for the nuclear smuggling – although at other times he insisted it was entirely his work (as befits the man who claims to be the father of the Pakistani bomb.) Pollack also notes some upcoming research by others which indicates that most of the stuff AQ Khan sold was actually junk.

Pollack argues, persuasively, that the fourth customer is none other than India. India was known to have dabbled in the nuclear black market so its tendrils would have encountered the AQ Khan network. There were certain very specific similarities in centrifuge design that seem beyond coincidence.

The full story will probably never be known. Although technically under house arrest, AQ Khan manages to run a website and write columns. Pakistani authorities are loath to permit international access to Khan or press their national hero to hard. At the same time, many of the key figures in the smuggling network that could shed light on the matter are deceased.

However, the possibility that India was the fourth customer gives Khan far greater incentives to deny that he was the king-pin of the smuggling network as it would destroy his reputation as a Pakistani patriot.

I had to ask how Khan could have gotten away with this for so long. After all, his primary achievement was stealing centrifuge designs while working in Europe. Shouldn’t that have set off some alarms in Rawalpindi. Several people who know Pakistan assured me that Khan’s reputation made it difficult to monitor him and that he was given enormous freedom to operate. The existence of such large blind spots does little to reinforce confidence in the Pakistani state.

The policy implications of India being Khan’s 4th customer are unclear. At events about India and Pakistan there are usually representatives from each side that use the Q&A period to deliver diatribes escoriating the other side. This did not happen here. Neither side has much incentive to draw attention to this story. Even in refuting it, the Indians would only draw attention to the story – which has the potential of undermining their nuclear deal with the US. Pakistan probably does not want to remind the world of its lack of control of its nuclear program.

Unearthing the full story of the AQ Khan network needs to continue. As frightening as al-Qaeda is – the AQ Khan network could be the harbinger of far worse destruction.

Belated Thoughts on MLK Day

2012-01-19T00:45:00.000-05:00

Although MLK day has passed, the resonance of the life and achievements of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. have remained with me. MLK was the perfect counter-point to terrorism. King, facing profound injustice against his community developed tactics and strategies that were moral and effective. They demanded enormous self-discipline, but these methods relied on and appealed to the very humanity of those committing and tolerating the injustice. At every turn, he rejected calls to violence – calls that were understandable. The United States was founded on certain premises:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

King held the United States accountable to its own values and he did so successfully by appealing to the very best in this country.

Politics is the complex art of settling disagreements in a manner that most of the people effected can live with (there are presumably other definitions – but this one works) so that violence is not necessary. Losers in disputes understand that they will have legitimate opportunities in the future under the same process and that the outcome is not so unjust that the system itself needs to be removed.

King’s non-violent resistance pushed the boundaries of the system without turning to violence – pointing out the system’s own inconsistencies and pressing for their rectification within that system.

Terrorism, in contrast, seeks to negate politics arguing that only violence – and not violence within the bounds of jus in bello but the explicit targeting of civilians.

This is not a comment on the cause – many terrorists have legitimate (or at least understandable) causes. The Tamils of Sri Lanka did suffer discrimination at the hands of the Sinhalese majority. But in fostering a bloodbath on that beautiful island, the Tamil Tigers can hardly be said to have brought any justice to the Tamils. They only made things worse for everyone. Ultimately the Tamil Tigers were pursuing maximalist ambitions in order – not merely to achieve justice but to pursue power-mad dreams that would have been unjust to the Sinhalese majority.

The Turkish government did not treat the Turkey’s Kurdish minority justly. But the turn to violence only made things worse. And yes, the same question can be asked as to whether terrorism has served the Palestinians – who do have legitimate grievances with which even this arch-Zionist can sympathize? (But I lacked the energy to delve into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a holiday morning.)

Ultimately, the great challenge of non-violence is that in a sense it is so much harder then terrorism. Terrorism requires a relative few; non-violence requires many. While terrorism requires discipline and skill it feeds off of anger, which Homer aptly said is, …far sweeter than trickling honey, expand[ing] in the breast like smoke…” Anger, once ignited, is extremely difficult to extinguish – even for the movement’s founders.Contrast that with King’s words in his elegant Letter from a Birmingham Jail:

In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action…. W[hen w]e had no alternative except to prepare for direct action, whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and the national community. Mindful of the difficulties involved, we decided to undertake a process of self purification. We began a series of workshops on nonviolence, and we repeatedly asked ourselves: "Are you able to accept blows without retaliating?" "Are you able to endure the ordeal of jail?"

It is the harder path and the narrower one. It may not work in all times and places. Would non-violent resistance have stopped Hitler or Stalin? This seems, at best, unlikely. But there are many, many more cases where it could work and MLK Day and his life as a whole, is a testament to this hopeful possibility.

Politicians: Caricatures under the Microscope

2012-01-15T23:51:00.000-05:00

When discussing politics I am frequently told that George W. Bush is dumb. I readily concede that he was probably our dumbest president ever (or at least tied with Warren Harding). But that doesn’t mean that he is actually stupid.

As we watch a bunch of presidential hopefuls stumble through primaries and caucuses it worth considering the bizarre microscope under which politicians are forced to function.

It is said that the camera adds ten pounds (I think I heard it in an episode of Friends.) The American political process, which has a lot of cameras and lot of other people, also on camera, talking about it presses a person flat against the glass and gives us a strange distorted image of that individual in which perhaps one quality will be grotesquely prominent.

This is not an original thought, I got it from that leading sociologist and observer of the American scene Dave Barry in Dave Barry Hits Below the Beltway. Barry described the two major party candidates for president in 2000:

Al Gore… who had developed this annoying, condescending manner of speech that made him sound, when he spoke to us, as though he were addressing a herd of unusually stupid sheep…. George W. Bush… who often sounded as though he had the brain of a sheep…. Here’s the thing: I have actually spent time in social settings with both Al Gore and George W. Bush. I’m not saying I got to know them well, but I will say that Gore seemed more natural in person and Bush seemed smarter. They were nothing like the two over programmed androids I saw debating each other on TV, both of them desperately trying to get all their memorized sound bites in.

Similarly, a knowledgeable acquaintance, as we were discussing my dissertation, observed that despite being gaffe-prone, Biden seems to have won the President’s confidence. Biden is the perfect example of the strange distorted view we have of politicians. This CNN video is a short compilation of Biden’s greatest hits including misspeaking and falling asleep in public during speeches. But here is the thing, imagine if a camera were following one of us around all the time. Biden’s job involves an enormous amount of talking. Considering how much he has to speak, it is amazing he doesn’t make many, many more times the gaffes he makes. Sort of like being the worst hitter in the major leagues – Biden may be more gaffe prone then most politicians – but very few of us would be capable of doing better. (Falling asleep during boring speeches and meetings seems hardly noteworthy – especially since we see West Point cadets with heavy eyelids as President Obama speaks to them.)

That is not to say that our process is necessarily bad. Sometimes that caricature we see in place of the person reveals a truth.

Anyway, it isn’t clear that the bizarre selection process gives us the best person to president. But if a candidate can’t get through the process – they probably have no business in the White House. Running for president requires personally performing at a very high level, thinking strategically, and organizing nationally – all at the same time. Someone who can do all of that might be able to cut it in the Oval Office.

Wordling My Prospectus

2012-01-14T21:40:00.000-05:00

In my endless quest to generate content here, without actually writing anything, here is a the Wordle for my prospectus. I could just post my prospectus... but no.

Wordle allows you to take words out. So I removed the words "vice" and every form of "president" (including "presidential" and "presidency") since seeing those words show up a lot does not reveal much.

Implications of the Cyber-Strike on Israel

2012-01-09T23:44:00.000-05:00

The U.S. had WikiLeaks, not Israel has xOmar 0 who got hold of thousands of Israeli credit cards and posted them online. According to Israeli sources he is a student in Mexico and perhaps not a great super-hacker.

Although the hacker claims to have sensitive data on over a million Israelis, the banks involved say it is only thousands. Nonetheless the Israeli government is cyber-rattling. The Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon called the incident:

…a breach of sovereignty comparable to a terrorist operation, and must be treated as such. …Israel has active capabilities for striking at those who are trying to harm it, and no agency or hacker will be immune from retaliatory action.

This incident raises a number of questions. I have long speculated about strategic identity theft. Not the strategies of identity theft, but rather using identity theft to interfere with a target’s functioning. In one way, this is very much beginning to occur. As I’ve written before, efforts to infiltrate critical networks to gather intelligence rely on the same combination of technological and social engineering that cyber-criminals use. But there are important differences. Cyber-criminals use low-cost techniques that target the easiest (and often most gullible) targets. Right now the Internet environment supports that approach. The systems by which credit cards are processed leaks. An enormous percentage of the world’s credit cards are already compromised. With easy access to thousands of credit cards, even if most false charges are rejected a tiny number of successful charges will bring a comfortable return. Spam works the same way, if one in ten thousand spam emails are successful, then the answer is to send out a billion spam – which doesn’t really cost much more than sending out a million or a thousand.

Of course cyber-criminals (if they think this through) don’t want to overwhelm Internet commerce, because that is how they make their money. They need to keep the level of crime low enough that financial institutions can absorb the loss. A few thousand lost credit cards here and there can be replaced. It is a cost of doing business.

But what happens if the attacker is not a criminal but instead an adversary that seeks to undermine the target’s ability to function? Credit card theft is among the least sophisticated and complex forms of identity theft. But occasionally, there are stories about people who discover that they are leading second financial lives, owning homes and taking on debt because their identity has been pirated. Could enough financial fraud occur to actually undermine an economy (we have recently seen how sensitive and fragile advanced economies can be)? The scale of this operation, even against a relatively small country, would have to be enormous – but that doesn’t make it impossible. What if, instead, an adversary targeted several hundred key bureaucrats so that critical agencies had difficulty functioning, as their top officials were suddenly all wrestling with personal bankruptcy? Even if these scenarios were not completely effective, they could certainly create a sense of panic.

This panic might be a sufficient end in its own right. One of the most valuable resources a state has is the attention of its leaders. The ability to generate a cyber-crisis might be an excellent way to distract an already busy leadership.

xOmar 0 may have sought to do this, but achieving it was beyond his abilities. But that is no reason to be sanguine. That fact that an individual with limited skills and resources can do this indicates how much more is possible. This incident is a possible harbinger of things to come. In one very specific way, these issues do resemble terrorism in that the targeted states often did not have effective policy options (this was a particular problem for the U.S in the 1980s.) Ayalon’s bluster aside, twenty-first century leaders facing cyber-crises may have the same problem – limited policy options – which means that the crisis becomes a greater and greater distraction. The fact that it has not happened yet is no reason to believe that it cannot.

Aaron Mannes on Israeli Counter-Terror in Journal of International Security Affairs

2012-01-07T23:23:00.000-05:00

The Fall/Winter 2011 issue of The Journal of International Security Affairs includes my review of Daniel Byman’s A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. My review is below, but definitely check out the rest of the issue on how American counter-terror efforts are going, 10 years after 9/11. It includes great reads from Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Matthew Levitt, Avi Jorisch, Barry Rubin, and many more.

Counterterrorism’s Cost
Daniel Byman examines the strengths and weaknesses of Israel’s counter-terror policies and institutions.
By Aaron Mannes

Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (Oxford University Press, 2011), 496pp. $34.95.

One of the many virtues of Daniel Byman's A High Price is that it peels back the curtain on the complex security environment faced by Israeli decisionmakers. In doing so, it highlights where Israel has fared well in its own war on terror—and points out where it needs to do better.

Israel's fight against terrorism began even before the establishment of the state itself, with Arab raids against Jewish communities in Turkish and Mandatory Palestine. After independence, but well before the establishment of the PLO, Egypt and Jordan supported cross-border fedayeen raids. Israeli responses are also familiar, including reprisal raids and targeted killings. Byman discusses Israeli counter-terror innovations in response to the rise of Fatah and international terrorism, how Israel kept its Arab populations and later the West Bank and Gaza relatively peaceful through systematic intelligence operations and rewarding supporters, and how counter-terrorism policy evolved in the wake of Oslo and during the Second Intifada. There are also extensive descriptions of Israel's involvement in Lebanon, and its efforts against Jewish terrorism.

This solid overview, a balanced assessment of Israeli successes and failures, sets the stage for the final quarter of the book, a discussion of lessons learned from Israel’s counter-terror experience that focuses on interrogation, targeted killings, and Israel’s defensive measures, along with a survey of Israel’s national security institutions. In brief, Israel has been tactically successful and even brilliant, but strategically shortsighted. But Byman explains why this situation prevails in terms of institutional arrangements, political realities, and frequently a lack of better options.

Israel's targeted killings policy epitomizes this situation. Tactically, Israel has developed impressive intelligence and strike capabilities, along with careful frameworks for evaluating targets and opportunities. While some mistakes have been made, Israel has gone to great lengths to avoid accidentally killing the wrong person or killing civilians. Unfortunately, in the political arena, when these mistakes occur—as they inevitably do—civilian casualties overshadow these efforts. Nonetheless, the United States has modeled its own legal justifications on those of Israel, and the decreasing lethality of Palestinian terrorist organizations is a testament to the effectiveness of that model.

However, Byman argues, on the political and strategic level targeted killings at times are are counter-productive—particularly when they are unsuccessful. In 1997, for example, Israel orchestrated an elaborate effort to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mishal in Jordan using poison. But the attempt failed, and Israel was forced to supply an antidote, release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners (including Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin) in exchange for its agents, and relations with both Jordan (Israel's closest Arab ally) and Canada (Israeli agents were traveling under Canadian passports), as well as Israel’s reputation writ large, were damaged. Rather than decapitating Hamas, the targeted killing’s failure re-invigorated it. There were strong arguments for attempting this operation, but a more careful view of the potential political consequences would have been warranted.

More broadly, Byman cites critics who argue that Israeli policies don't take Palestinian politics into account. Targeted killings have frequently been seen as undermining fragile truces with the Palestinians. But Byman also notes, correctly, that Palestinian leaders rarely take Israeli politics into account either, and that the depth of the connections between the PA and Hamas raise serious questions about whether there was ever a reliable Palestinian peace partner in the first place.

Byman examines many other Israeli practices in this vein. West Bank checkpoints complicate Palestinian lives, cutting towns off from one another and hampering travel and commerce. They also work; terrorists have far more difficulty infiltrating targets and about 30 percent of Israeli arrests are conducted at checkpoints. The IDF responded to criticism of the checkpoints by constructing better checkpoint facilities, professionalizing checkpoint personnel and standardizing procedures. Still, these barriers turn trips that should take minutes into hours, so it is no surprise that Palestinians resent them. Yet the threat is very real. Ambulances have been used to ferry explosives, so that time-consuming Israeli searches of Palestinian ambulances are not merely Israeli caprice. While the number of ambulances used this way is a tiny percentage of the total, an Israeli soldier has every incentive err on the side of caution.

Similar arguments apply to Israel's defensive barrier on the West Bank, to targeted killings, and to Israel's interrogation and detention policies. There is little question that Israeli tactics work. Terrorism has been reduced. Time and again since the founding of the Jewish state, new terrorist tactics have been countered and neutralized. But, Byman notes, Israel has not effectively embraced the COIN paradigm in which “hearts and minds” are the crucial battlefield. It is an open question whether or not Arab hearts and minds could ever have been won over, but it is fair to say that Israel never really tried. Byman’s discussion of Israel’s institutions provides confirmation of the Israeli preference for “kinetic” rather than “smart” counter-terror policies.

The reasons are practical. The conflicts between the Departments of State and Defense that characterize the U.S. national security process have no equivalent in Israel. Israel’s National Security Council is a mere shell, not an effective coordination mechanism. There are no political institutions to rival the influence or capabilities of the IDF. Thus, when policy options are presented, only the IDF provides comprehensive, well-fleshed-out options. And unsurprisingly, those are frequently military in nature. This is not to say that military options are not essential. However, Israeli policymakers need other options and a broader understanding of the political consequences.

Byman is correct when he states that Israel's political system hampers decision-making and more on this topic would be welcome. Byman focuses on Israel's proportional representation system as being responsible for Israel fragmented politics. This is a widely held belief, but in fact is inaccurate. Many other countries use a form of proportional representation. Where Israel is unique is that the entire country is a single district represented by the entire 120-member Knesset. One of the important consequences is that this creates enormous incentives for political entrepreneurs to leave a major party and establish their own party where they can wield disproportionate influence as coalition-makers. To govern, Israeli prime ministers need to assemble complex coalitions, giving key posts to leaders of other parties. One experienced Israeli foreign policy hand told Byman, “the prime minister must strike a deal with the minister of defense every morning.”

Israel's impossible political system is not completely at fault, however. The situation itself is impossible. Israel's foundation was rooted in the Holocaust. Israelis are motivated by the principle that never again will Jews be slaughtered without fighting back. Only rarely have Israeli politicians have suffered electoral backlash for pressing for retaliation or tough tactics. Still, Byman may overemphasize this argument. Israel's national ethos only reinforces human nature. It is difficult to imagine a country facing a comparable threat and not reacting similarly.

The look at Israeli institutions is not all negative. One area where Israel can offer lessons to the world is in institutional adaptability. No country can anticipate every threat, but Israeli security shifts gears in the face of new threats remarkably quickly. After being humbled by a 1968 hijacking by the PFLP, Israel developed a range of responses including armed sky marshals and improved security that neutralized this danger; Israeli jets haven't been hijacked since.

The Shin Bet is a particular example of this kind of organizational flexibility, first and foremost because it is an elite organization that prides itself on specialization and deep knowledge. Pre-Oslo, when Israel had direct control of the West Bank and Gaza, case officers and interrogators were key players. After the Accords were signed in 1993, as the Shin Bet lost its easy access to Palestinian agents and had to rely more on signals intelligence, analysts went from an auxiliary role to a primary one. Of course, American intelligences agencies are much larger and have to operate on an international rather then regional basis. Nonetheless, Israel’s experiences with organizational reform could be useful to U.S. policymakers. This institutional adaptability shows that if Israel sought to undertake real national security process reform and embrace a broader set of options, it could almost certainly do so and bring the same spirit of innovation to them. As the United States and the rest of the world struggle to counter radical Islam, creative ideas and energy would be welcome.

Byman’s overall conclusion is sobering. Effective counter-terror tactics buy time, and the IDF and Israel’s other security agencies have done an admirable job in buying Israel time. Now Israel and the West must start using this time effectively, to formulate a larger strategy against terrorism. A decade after 9/11, it is counsel worth heeding.

Aaron Mannes, the author of Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations (Rowman & Littlefield-JINSA 2004) and TheTerrorWonk Plus (www.terrorwonk.com), is a researcher at the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics and a PhD student at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.

Possibility of a Bleak Future for Egypt

2012-01-02T20:11:00.000-05:00

Egypt is beginning its third round of elections. Islamists - the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists - heavily dominated the first two rounds. There is little reason to believe that this will change in later rounds.

One spot of good news is that the Islamists have stated that they intend to honor Egypt's international commitments, i.e. the peace treaty with Israel. This is all to the good, since conflict with Israel would be a disaster for Egypt on almost every level. The more likely danger would be that Israel would have to divert to its southern border - which has been relatively quiet for over 30 years. Here again, this wouldn't be good for Israel, but it wouldn't do much good for Egypt either.

But the real dangers are to Egypt itself.

The universe of elections in the Middle East is small, so a statistical proof is probably not appropriate. But I can think of two cases in which reasonably fair elections in Arab countries that did not have a king (that can really matter) took place and brought Islamist parties to power. The two cases were Algeria and the PA. Both ended in civil wars as the displaced powers decided not to share with the elected Islamists. In Algeria the military rejected the election results and plunged the country into a decade of civil war that took tens of thousands of lives, helped spark the growth of al-Qaeda, and has not completely come to an end. In the PA the civil war was much quicker, but bloody nonetheless as Hamas purged Gaza of Fatah – creating an Islamist mini-state along the strategic crossroads of two continents.

One certainly hopes things do not go this way in Egypt - ideally the military and the Islamists will figure out a way to live with one another. But that may not be possible. Egypt’s economy is a nightmare. Even if the immediate situation were stable (and it isn’t) the long-term trends are terrible. The population is growing very fast, the country is running out of water, and Egypt has limited resources or industries for export. Actually, Egypt's great export is tourism where Egypt really does have incomparable resources. Unfortunately political instability hits tourism harder then just about any other industry.

The Islamists will need to figure out how to manage this, but if the military continues holding on to key elements of power the Muslim Brotherhood will become extremely frustrated. It isn’t hard to see this blowing up. The military's ongoing crackdowns show every sign that the military is prepared to defend its place in the national order. Seeing the once all-powerful Mubarak a broken man on trial certainly cannot give confidence to the Egyptian brass. So far the Islamists are trying to show the military that they are not looking for a confrontation, but given that ultimately they will be unable to address Egypt's core problems at some point there is a real possibility of the Islamists and the military coming into conflict. If a frustrated MB continues to cooperate withthe military and not challenge the perks of the top brass, it is easy to imagine more radical forces emerging and pressing for the rejection of the democratic process and calling for violent revolution. A further complicating factor is the question of the military's ability to crackdown. If protests go past a certain point, and the military police are insufficient, the regular army may not respond. This open question only increases the possibility of a deadly miscalculation.

The United States faces an unenviable challenge. Keeping Egypt more or less stable is in our national interest. Supporting a rejection of the democratic process is against American interests and values - but so is seeing Egypt become an Islamist state. Navigating this diplomatic Scylla and Charybdis will involve very difficult choices about identifying the less evil.

it would be a fine thing if Egypt's military rulers were well-schooled in give-and-take politics and could be seen as fostering and cultivating Egyptian democracy and reform. Alas, this is unlikely based on past behavior.

Hindsight

Predicting the Arab Spring was impossible, but foreseeing the possibility that Mubarak’s reign would become untenable was not. This day was going to come, sooner or later.

There is an ugly reality in international affairs that sometimes the US must do business with unpleasant regimes. The old “he’s an SOB, but he’s our SOB” problem. Jeanne Kirkpatrick handled it a touch more eloquently in her landmark essay "Dictatorships and Double-Standards." Kirkpatrick notes that the U.S. had a reasonably good record of working with dictators while pressing them to keep open a space for political opposition. All over the world, when dictators fell there was a civil society to replace them. At the same time, while the U.S. was certainly blamed in many quarters for its support of the dictator, it also had allies among the opposition and relations were not destroyed when a democratic government took over. This trend, which occured on several continents in different circumstances, was quite remarkable and a real achievement for American diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the Middle East was immune. It is difficult to say whether this was due to the region's political culture or a failure of American diplomacy. In my study of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (there was also a parallel Mubarak-Gore Commission) I noted the American belief in aid packages that transform nations (sort of IR social work.) It doesn't always take. Still, efforts in Egypt could have been more extensive. Egypt's economy really only started liberalizing in the past decade (friends who follow this closely credit Gamal Mubarak with real success in this) but it can take time for liberalization to improve the well-being of every sector of society and Egyptians didn't have much time to wait.

Whether or not a secular opposition could have flourished in Egypt is an open question - but Mubarak never gave it much of a chance. Nor was the government held accountable for the consistent stream of conspiracy theory and vitriol emanating from the state controlled press. Finally, reforming Egyptian institutions may have been beyond American capabilities - but at least greater efforts could have been made in the three decades in which Egypt was a leading recipient of US foreign aid.

Too late now. Hopefully - and it really is a slender hope - Egypt can find a way forward and shake the vast weight of history. Hopefully, but past experience does not augur well for the future.

Excellent Article on Fostering anti-Hezbollah Shia-

2011-12-26T13:46:00.001-05:00

A long-time cyber-friend, Phillip Smyth, has a very good article for the Middle East Review of International Affairs, THE “INDEPENDENT SHI’A” OF LEBANON: WHAT WIKILEAKS TELLS US ABOUT AMERICAN EFFORTS TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE TO HIZBALLAH

Smyth, relying on cables made available through Wikileaks, shows the efforts of American diplomats to foster an alternative to Hezbollah among Lebanon's Shia. There are important indicators that Hezbollah, even at the height of its power had certain vulnerabiliities.

A model of Hezbollah's behavior, built at the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics (my day job) highlighted that Hezbollah does not like to go to war in Lebanese election years. One obvious interpretation of this finding is that Hezbollah values its role in the Lebanese political system, even though it has demonstrated that it could take over the country easily. Hezbollah may not be vulnerable militarily. If the Israelis were unwilling to exert the effort needed to destroy Hezbollah, it is unlikely that anyone else will even try. But this sensitivity to Lebanese politics could indicate a political vulnerability. It suggests, among other things, that Lebanon's Shia are not in lock-step support for Hezbollah's militancy. Many Lebanese are proud that their country defeated Israel, but, with Israel removed from Lebanon the expense of further fighting is too great. If the rest of the Arab world wants to continue the conflict they are welcome to do so, but - in the views of the Lebanese - why must Lebanon be at the forefront.

Seeing that perhaps Lebanon was being dragged into a confrontation against its will by Hezbollah and its patrons, I had speculated that perhaps a Shia alternative (and in particular the AMAL party which still has strong support among Lebanese Shia) could reduce Hezbollah's influence and power. With this in mind, I mentioned to Phillip that I'd like to know more about AMAL. Phillip heard my request and went far further, writing his fine article. The first finding in Smyth's article was that American diplomats attempted to do just that. The WikiLeaks (and other leaked cables) showed strenuous efforts by the US Embassy in Beirut to support Shia alternatives. Unfortunately, this did not prove so easy to do. AMAL is seen as decaying, corrupt, and without a generation of leaders after its long-time chief Nabih Berri departs the scene (as he inevitably must.) But State also worked with a number of Shia dissidents, including those allied with Saad Harriri, moderate clerics, traditional Shia leaders - and even radical Shia clerics who had fallen out with Hezbollah. Unfortunately these efforts have not amounted to much. Hezbollah doesn't hesitate to intimidate its opponents, and the Shia opposition was riven with internal feuds and ineffectiveness. But most significantly, Hezbollah could fund a massive social services network that provided grants and charity to a huge percentage of Lebanon's Shia. The resources for this came, in great part, from Iran which was believed to provide Hezbollah with tens of millions of dollars a month. The entire population of Lebanon's Shia is only a few million.

However, therein lies the opportunity. Although seemingly powerful, Hezbollah has undergone a number of reverses. Its behavior in Lebanon has rankled many within that country and Iranian patronage has declined dramatically. Hezbollah's other patron, Syria, is also having some difficulties which could leave Hezbollah isolated. The time was not opportune for an anti-Shia front, but the efforts described in Smyth's article could lay a groundwork for when circumstances change. That could occur sooner than anyone expects. - Posted using BlogPress from my iPhone

KHAN!!! A Tale of Pakistani Perfidy and Persecution

2011-12-24T22:13:00.000-05:00

Politico's Arena has just run short piece I wrote that builds on a friend's article on the activities of the father of Pakistan's A-bomb. The piece follows:

A fascinating recent article by ArmsControlWonk regular (and, full disclosure, good friend) Joshua Pollack sheds a disturbing light on the nuclear smuggling network of Pakistani atomic bomb builder, A.Q. Khan and on the nation that allowed all of this to happen.

The article, The Secret Treachery of A. Q. Khan appears in the most recent issue of Playboy (so maybe don’t read it at work – but definitely read it!)

Khan often articulated high-minded goals for his work, such as re-balancing power away from the dominant super-powers and restoring strength to the Muslim world. But, as Pollack shows (I won’t spoil the ending to this thriller) Khan’s real reasons were tawdry and sad. Tawdry because, based on his clients, Khan was really only in it for the money. Sad, because a great part of Khan’s quest for money was in order to buy respect. Born in pre-partition India, Khan had (like millions of others) a harrowing journey from his birthplace to the new nation of Pakistan. He encountered endless humiliations and then faced further setbacks establishing himself in his new country.

It is an interesting portrait of an individual whose private demons have terrorized the world. But it is also an allegory for the nation-state of Pakistan itself.

Pakistan’s leaders, often employ Islamist rhetoric, while capriciously enriching themselves. Reading Ayesha Siddiqa’s Military Inc. paints a picture of an all-powerful security establishment slowly devouring the nation’s economy. (In fairness, Pakistan’s civilian leaders have hardly been exemplars of rectitude.)

But, like Khan, part of Pakistan’s national ethos is a sense of being slighted by the world – especially in comparison to its powerful neighbor. This damaged pride leads Pakistan to pursue great power status on the world stage at the expense of development at home.

This is perhaps the saddest part of all. Khan is obviously an individual of great industry and intelligence and could perhaps have been successful – if not rich and famous – without resorting to a massive crime that may have world-shattering effects.

Similarly, the nation of Pakistan could have focused its energies on development and education instead of its military. Then Pakistan might be the economic miracle of south Asia. Instead it is slipping further and further into poverty and disorder.

On the international stage, the challenge of Pakistan will not recede anytime soon. As this is being written Pakistan and the United States are involved in a difficult contratemps over what looks like an unfortunate friendly fire accident.

This recent article shows how the story of Pakistan is the story of A. Q. Khan writ large. As policy-makers wrestle with developing an effective Pakistan policy, Pakistan’s own perceptions (even if they are wholly unjustified) of its place in the world are worth considering.

Golden Oldie: North Korea and Terrorism

2011-12-20T23:39:00.000-05:00

The TerrorWonk is not a North Korea expert, so I have not joined the chorus of pundits. That being said, it is now clear that no one really knew that much of anything - so I might as well have mouthed off.

Kim Jong Il was a monster. Yes he was funny/weird (TerrorWonk too laughed at his antics, making fun of his ostrich initiatives which led to a very odd exchange), but like another late international jester, Muammar Qaddhafi, Kim Jon Il's stage was built on bones.

For what it is worth, the more I read and study, the more I find institutions trumping individuals. There are exceptions, but knowing that the newest King Kim/Beloved Leader/what have you is particularly weak and new to the family business it seems unlikely that he will take on the established powers in his regime and pursue real reform. It would be nice to think that the North Koreans will rise up against their rulers, but considering how much they have already suffered without a mass rebellion it is difficult to believe one is in the works. Also, unlike the Arab Spring where, despite massive censorship of domestic media, there is fairly open access to pan-Arab media, North Koreans are profoundly isolated.

South Korea and China are both nervous about the possibilities of a North Korean collapse. South Korea is also well aware of how expensive German re-unification proved to be, and North Korea is far poorer and has been effectively cut off from its neighbor for over fifty years. These countries have an incentive to pay to maintain the status quo. At the same time, that gives the DPRK every incentive to continue its calculated belligerence to ensure that the neighbors keep paying as much as possible.

Meanwhile, the horror show that is North Korea appears likely to continue.

I did write one article on North Korea several years ago, focusing on my main area of interest - terrorism. It is important to provide the coda to this analysis. In October 2008 North Korea was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. However the DPRK is not fully cooperating with US counter-terror measures, thus some sanctions remain in place.

National Review Online
FEBRUARY 15, 2007 6:00 A.M.
The T Word
The lifting of North Korea's designation as a terrorist-sponsoring nation has a lot to do with Japan.

One of the conditions of the agreement with North Korea is that the United States starts the process of removing North Korea from the list of terrorist-sponsoring nations. Although North Korea’s nuclear program is the central issue, removal from the U.S. list of sponsors of terrorism has been a North Korean priority since February 2000. Inclusion on this list restricts U.S. exports to North Korea and requires the U.S. to veto World Bank and IMF aid to North Korea. The primary complainant regarding North Korean terrorism is Japan, which would also be a major donor in the event of a long-term aid package to North Korea. (For an excellent backgrounder on this issue see the CRS report North Korea: Terrorism List Removal.) Consequently, the bilateral North Korean-Japanese negotiations will be much more than a sideshow–they may provide an important window into North Korean strategy.

North Korea has a long history of sponsoring terror and other international provocations. In November 1987 North Korea bombed a (South) Korean Airline Boeing 707 in mid-flight, killing 115 people. In 1983 a bomb detonated in Rangoon, Myanmar, minutes before South Korea’s president was to lay a wreath there. The bomb killed 17 senior South Korean officials and wounded 14 others. There have been innumerable bloody incursions into South Korea by North Korean forces, and many attacks and attempted attacks on both South Koreans traveling abroad and North Korean defectors. Lower-level violence is almost constant. Reportedly, graduating from North Korean Special Forces training requires successfully entering South Korea and committing an act of vandalism. (Since the Special Forces are one of the only segments of North Korean society that eats enough, candidates have great incentive to succeed.)

Despite decades of being on the receiving end of North Korean violence, in June 2000 South Korea pushed the U.S. not to consider this past history and to remove North Korea from the list of terror sponsoring nations.

The rationale for North Korea’s inclusion on the list is North Korea’s kidnapping of over a dozen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. The kidnapped Japanese were used to train North Korean agents (the woman who confessed to bombing the Korean airliner in 1987 claimed that she was trained to pass as Japanese by a kidnapped Japanese woman). In a September 2002 summit between Kim Jong Il and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi North Korea admitted to kidnapping 13 Japanese citizens and claimed that eight had died and allowed the remaining five to return to Japan. While North Korea claims that the issue is closed, the Japanese are not satisfied. Japan has since claimed that the remains of two of the allegedly kidnapped Japanese that were handed over to the Japanese were not those of the kidnap victims.

North Korea has also reportedly provided a haven to members of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), a far-left terrorist group that was aligned with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other leftist radical terrorists and carried out many bloody attacks. In 1972 JRA gunmen attacked Lod airport in Israel, killing 24 (including 16 Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico) and injuring 78. In June 1987 a JRA operative was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike with a car full of explosives. The group has not been active in over a decade and most of its leaders are imprisoned.

The Japanese government and people feel strongly about the abduction issue. Prime Minister Abe established his national reputation taking a strong stance against North Korea on the abduction issue. Consequently Japan has stated that it can only provide indirect support for the current agreement.

North Korea’s first priority will be to maximize any possible aid package, but how the North Koreans handle talks with Japan may indicate if they have other goals as well. Other participants in the negotiations do not share Japan’s focus on the abductions issue. South Korea, threatened not only by North Korean nukes but also by North Korean artillery that could level Seoul, seeks agreeable relations with and stability in North Korea. China, already facing a flood of North Korean refugees, would like to see the North Korean economy strengthened. The South Koreans have already expressed irritation at what they interpret as Japanese intransigence in the face of a breakthrough.

A long-term North Korean ambition is to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. According to former Pentagon official and long-time Korea watcher Chuck Downs writing in the Journal of International Security Affairs North Korea has made substantial progress in achieving this goal. While the U.S. has a unique military relationship with South Korea, Japan is the closest U.S. ally in the region. For both political and moral reasons the U.S. will not pressure Japan to make concessions on the abduction issue. Stonewalling Japan, while making conciliatory gestures to South Korea, could indicate further North Korean efforts to foster splits among the participants in the six party talks. International attention will focus on whether North Korea complies with restrictions on its nuclear program. But the character and results of the discussions of North Korea’s sponsorship of terrorism will be a gauge of whether the North Korean regime is ready to deal or playing for time.

Prospectus Defense Slides

2011-12-14T18:02:00.000-05:00

So as Facebook friends and Twitter followers now know, I have advanced to PhD candidacy. In other words I am ABD! Just for fun, I thought I'd share my slides with the world. They aren't perfect, but the are a pretty good guide to what I am trying to do - that is tell the story of the rise of vice presidential influence and figure out why it happened. Unfortunately, they are bereft of funny pictures.

Prospectus defenseslides

View more presentations from awmannes.

Pakistan's Jihadi Stew Boils Over into Afghanistan

2011-12-07T21:52:00.001-05:00

Yesterday’s bombing of the Shia Ashura in Kabul, that left 58 dead, is yet a new horror to a country that has seen all too many. But if the Taliban’s denial and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s claim of responsibility are true it highlights a new dimension to the complex Af-Pak wars. Can the Taliban be believed – they are Deobandis who do not like the Shia and during their period of rule did massacre them. But in fighting NATO, the Taliban have tried to present themselves as Afghan nationalists and not sought to play up sectarian and ethnic issues within Afghanistan. They have not attacked the Shia yet – so why now? Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is a Pakistani terrorist group with roots in the Jhang area. Is is the armed wing/offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP.) Jang, in Punjab, is a fertile region for sectarian conflict because there is a substantial Shia population which includes the areas dominant feudal landlords. This class conflict was exacerbated after the Iranian revolution when, inspired, the Shia of Jhang began becoming more assertive. SSP was founded as a Sunni counter to the new Shia stridency and received support from the ISI which was worried about growing Iranian influence. Hundreds were killed in sectarian fighting in the 1990s. They also attacked Iranian diplomats and cultural centers After attempting to assassinate then prime minister Nawaz Sharif in the late 1990s Pakistani security turned on them. Dozens of SSP operatives were killed in “encounters” with the police. LeJ has carried out major operations in Pakistan (such as the Marriott Bombing and the cricket attack) but they have not carried out attacks in Afghanistan. However, LeJ was close to the Taliban before 9/11 and one LeJ hero (Riaz Basra who assassinated an Iranian diplomat) fled to another jihadi group’s safehouse in Afghanistan. The environment of jihadi groups in Pakistan is probably best understood as a stew with its many ingredients mixed thoroughly. Members of one group shift to or assist members of others. While groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (one of the most disciplined of the Pakistani terror groups) carefully coordinate with the Taliban, other groups freelance and seek targets of opportunity. So it is not difficult to imagine LeJ moving operative into Afghanistan along the routes followed by the other groups. One big question is whether the ISI was linked. The ISI, which is preparing for the NATO withdrawal, may not want the Taliban to be too strong. A potent Taliban, coming off of a “victory” over NATO might be well positioned to, working with the Pakistani Taliban, make trouble in Pakistan. Alternately, cowing Afghanistan’s Shia might help keep Iran out. It is difficult to say which scenario would be worse: if the bombing is the result of Machiavellian planning by the ISI or if it indicates that a situation spinning out of control. Pakistan has long used the strategy of asymmetric warfare against stronger opponents, keep the fire going but not letting it boil over into open war. But it appears that sooner or later, Pakistan’s jihadi soup will get too hot to handle.

Speculation Alert: Romney's Veepstakes

2011-11-23T21:43:00.000-05:00

As obsessed as I am about the VP's relative increase in influence, the truth is a huge percentage of VP stories are reporters trying to fill space and - if they are lucky - make a story where there wasn't one. Now CNN pitches New Hampshire Senator Kelly Ayotte as a possible - Romney states she is one of 15 possibles.

While Romney is the putative front-runner and there is still plenty of smart money on him, he hasn't actually won anything yet.

Let's hit some overall trends. Ayotte is from Romney's region. Geographic balance isn't an absolute necessity (see Clinton-Gore, two southerners) but New England is not an electoral power-house. Ayotte was elected in 2010 - she is probably a lot more seasoned then Palin, but she is still relatively inexperienced. Although Romney was born into a political family, he hasn't spent any time in DC - so he is still an outsider. Plus he needs someone with rock-solid conservative credentials to shore up party suspicions that he is really a moderate.

So he needs a southern conservative with DC experience. There are any number of possibilities to fit that bill - Jon Kyl and Lamar Alexander leap to mind. (Marco Rubio does not.)

One interesting character who fits it perfectly is actually Newt Gingrich - but something tells me that he isn't terribly interested in the number two slot. Gingrich is a brilliant idea machine, but even if he were interested, would number two be a good fit?

Speaking of which, I answered the Politico Arena question of the day:

Will immigration stance hurt or help Newt Gingrich?

It is likely that Newt's stance on immigration will hurt him with "the base." Fortunately for him his major rival has a number of weaknesses with the base as well. Part of the problem is that this base has calcified into a set of impossibly rigid positions that no candidate can realistically satisfy.

However, this position will serve Newt well if he can make it to the general election as it highlights him as an independent thinker and it reflects a more humane side to a Republican Party that is looking increasingly mean-spirited.

Why Republicans love Coolidge

2011-11-11T16:20:00.000-05:00

An article in Slate explores the Republican fascination with Calvin Coolidge. The author discusses how Reagan's biggest moves seemed to be ripped from Silent Cal's play book. But the veneration of Coolidge reflects something more profound then policy preferences.

Renown Presidential Scholar Richard Neustadt wrote that the President has been transformed from a leader to a clerk. Neustadt wrote in 1959:

A striking feature of our recent past has been the transformation into routine practice of the actions we once treated as exceptional. A President may retain liberty, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "to be as big a man as he can." But nowadays he cannot be as small as he might like....

In instance after instance the exception behavior of our earlier "strong" Presidents has now been set by the statute as a regular requirement. Theodore Roosevelt once assumed the steward's role in the emergency created by the great coal strike of 1902; the Railway Labor Act and the Taft-Hartley Act now make such interventions mandatory upon Presidents. The other Roosevelt once asserted personal responsibility for gauging and for guiding the American economy; the Employment Act binds his successors to that task. Wilson and FDR became chief spokesmen, leading actors, on a world stage at the heights of war; now UN membership, far-flung alliances, prescribe that role continuously in times termed "peace." ...And what has escaped statutory recognition has mostly been accreted into presidential common law, confirmed by custom, no less binding; the fireside chat and the press conference, for example, or the personally presented legislative programs, or personal campaigning in congressional elections.

In form all Presidents are leaders nowadays. In fact this guarantees no more than that they will be clerks. Everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do something about everything. Laws and customs now reflect widespread acceptance of him as the great initiator... A President today is an invaluable clerk. His services are in demand all over Washington....

Critical to this transformation was FDR and the massive expansion of the Federal government in response to the Great Depression and World War II. Coolidge (Republicans would prefer not to mention Hoover) was the last leader President and part of being a leader was the option not to take action. Consider a few choice Coolidge statements:

Four-fifths of all our troubles would disappear, if we would only sit down and keep still.

If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you.

Perhaps one of the most important accomplishments of my administration has been minding my own business.

They criticize me for harping on the obvious; if all the folks in the United States would do the few simple things they know they ought to do, most of our big problems would take care of themselves.

In venerating Coolidge, more than merely approving cutting taxes and other pro-business policies the Republicans are harking back to an era where little was expected of the President, the government's role was not all pervasive, but at the same time when action was needed it was decisive.

Also, while Coolidge was seen as pro-business, this attitude was heavily tempered by a belief in morality:

Industry, thrift and self-control are not sought because they create wealth, but because they create character.

It is only when men begin to worship that they begin to grow.

No person was ever honored for what he received. Honor has been the reward for what he gave.

Prosperity is only an instrument to be used, not a deity to be worshipped.

In Politico's Arena on the Perry Meltdown

2011-11-10T12:48:00.000-05:00

This morning, the Politico Arena question of the day was Can Rick Perry recover?

My answer, in a word: No! The full answer is below:

Perry's campaign was always a long-shot because, quite frankly, Texas has had its turn in the White House. Voters are inclined to give other states a chance.

It is often remarked that the primary system the United States has is no way to pick a president. It is unclear if this system shows who is fit to be president, but it is safe to say that at least it shows us who is not up to the job.

Perry, unable to recite his own talking points, has shown the voters which category he best fits.

Iran's Nuclear Future & Pakistan's Present

2011-11-07T23:10:00.000-05:00

The Iranian nuclear program is again in the news – it appears that the regime has made important technical progress in developing the capability to construct a nuclear weapon.

It is unclear how this will play out. Covert and overt action (like the Stuxnet virus or an Israeli strike) will delay, but not halt progress. At the same time, Iran may find it useful to maintain a state of nuclear ambiguity for some time. This policy will allow Iran to gain many of the benefits of nuclear power, while avoiding the worst of international opprobrium for violating the NPT.

It is useful to look at neighboring Pakistan for a picture of nuclear Iran’s future.

Pakistan faces and is obsessed with India, a far more powerful state that, with its own acquisition of nuclear capability cemented its superiority. Then Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (father of the recently assassinated Benazir Bhutto) declared:

If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice.

It is a prophecy that has come true. Pakistan’s nuclear capability has allowed it to continue a fruitless rivalry with India that has sapped the nation’s resource while abetting corruption and radicalism.

Part of Pakistan’s political culture is that the state was crippled in its very founding by India and its allies. Pakistan has sought the means to right this fundamental injustice. Weaker then India, Pakistan sought asymmetric means to balance India. Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the Afghan jihad was particularly instructive. The generals of Rawalpindi observed how a weaker power (that’s how the US was perceived) waged a low-level war, but kept the fighting within limits so as to prevent the situation from escalating. They perceived that nukes protected the US from more aggressive Soviet responses.

This is the strategy Pakistan has followed against India, low-grade war that, in Pakistani fantasies, will ultimately lead to the dissolution of India. Nukes allow Pakistan to continue a conflict (without nukes India’s ability to carryout devastating conventional retaliation would be a deterrent to Pakistan-backed terror). This gives Pakistan’s brass something to do and justifies their expanding hold on the country’s economy while helping Pakistan’s elites maintain the status quo (to the advantage of the traditional elites of course.) Meanwhile, Pakistan’s education system, infrastructure, and social services are sapped of resources.

On the international front, besides the general carnage caused by Pakistan backed terrorism, they have incubated jihadi groups to advance their aims in Afghanistan and India – but those groups have developed an impact beyond the sub-continent. At the same time, the ongoing tension between nuclear-armed rivals leads to the constant danger that the two sides will accidentally wander into a nuclear war.

This is all food for thought as Iran continues on its course. It is already a world champion supporter of terrorism. Will it feel even freer to do so if protected by a nuclear umbrella? Will nukes be the crutch that allows the corrupt and vicious Iranian regime to cling to power? Finally, will a nuclear Iran inspire other player in the region to follow suit – meaning more nukes and thus a greater chance for accidents?

Presidents and the Art of Mean

2011-11-07T00:03:00.000-05:00

I enjoy Washington Post columnist Dana Milbank, but today's column "A Machiavellian model for Obama is a bit off. Milbank writes:

FARC Leader Killed: Background on Colombia's CT Strategy

2011-11-06T23:41:00.003-05:00

FARC jefe was killed yesterday in a gun-battle with Colombian military commandos. This is by no means the end of the FARC – which, embroiled in the cocaine trade and taking advantage of Colombia’s vast territory and difficult geography continues to have the ability to fight and terrorize. Nonetheless, 15 years ago the FARC appeared to be capable of destabilizing the state. Now, while still dangerous its place in Colombia has been marginalized. The Colombian government has built some impressive military and technical capabilities. Hopefully, as the threat from FARC is reduced, these capabilities can be turned to Colombia’s many other internal challenges so that the country can consolidate its democracy and extend its writ throughout its territory.

The TerrorWonk has written quite a bit about FARC, so here is a short retrospective that will give some insight into the source of Colombia’s successes over the past few years. In some ways, it has been a model in that the US provided critical aid and resources – but the overall expenditures were relatively small – but the Colombians themselves did most of the work. It did require two important elements that are in short supply. First, it has taken over a decade – the relative inattention by the US public and media may have served the country well, allowing policy-makers to pursue a systematic, careful strategy without watching public approval. Also, Colombia’s political class has served up some very capable leaders including former President Alvaro Uribe and the current President Juan Manual Santos.

Here is a post discussing the DEA’s key role in assisting the Colombians.

Posts on the 2008 Hostage Rescue

Whenever there is a dramatic success against terrorists, someone assumes the Israelis are behind it. There was technical assistance, but there was something else as well:

Not every terror attack can be prevented, but Israel has stood in the forefront of reminding the world that force – properly and intelligently applied - can be used to neutralize terrorism, thereby setting the stage for last week’s dramatic events in Colombia.

This recap of the rescue gives a sense of how deeply Colombian intel had penetrated the FARC. A penetration that was critical to assassinated Cano:

Cesar, the commander of the FARC front holding the hostages put them on a helicopter after receiving an order he believed came from the FARC jefe Alfonso Cano. Consider the implications of this: it would be as if someone tricked a General into believing he had just received an order from the President. Such communications are not handled casually. The fact that Colombian intelligence could deliver this fake message probably indicates a very high-level of human and electronic penetration into the FARC’s communications networks.

This post gives some insight into how FARC’s limited WMD program and sheds light onto how the leadership was coming apart:

Reporting on Interpol’s assertion that the files on the captured FARC computers are authentic has focused on potential Chavez-FARC ties. But another bit of FARC news should be noted. Six of FARC commander Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards had plotted kill him, probably to collect the $5 million reward. The plot was discovered and three of the six were killed, the other three escaped and are now aiding the Colombian authorities. This plot was no doubt inspired by the death of another member of the FARC Secretariat, Ivan Rios – again at the hands of his bodyguards. The Colombian government’s decision to pay Rios’ bodyguards the reward no doubt encouraged Mono Jojoy’s bodyguards. This is roughly equivalent to Generals being shot by their own troops.

There is probably no better counter-terror strategy than to get a group to turn on itself. The campaign against the notorious Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in the late 1980s was successful because the paranoid leader, the eponymous Abu Nidal (real name Sabri al-Banna) became convinced that his organization had been infiltrated by the CIA and his subordinates were plotting against him. He became unhinged and began burying them in wet cement. Reportedly, on one night he killed 150 ANO members.

While there are many more posts, This post gives an overview of how clever strategy turned FARC’s strengths into weaknesses:

The two of the FARC’s strengths were the vast territory of Colombia (more than two and a half times the size of Iraq), which gave them many places to hide and their ideological flexibility, which enabled them to enter the drug trade and link with international criminal networks. But Colombia’s size made it difficult for the cadres to meet in person. FARC operatives are vulnerable to interception by security forces when moving long distances. Turning to electronic communications only played into the strengths of the US, which has shared intelligence with the Colombians. With both personal and electronic communications under pressure the FARC’s command and control structure has deteriorated. In the 1990s the Colombian government granted the FARC a demilitarized zone. The re-establishment of a de-militarized zone is the FARC’s primary demand in negotiations over the approximately 700 hostages they hold. The need this zone to bring the leaders together – not necessarily for physical or weapons training – but for strategic communications.

The FARC’s engagement in massive criminal activity has been a strength because it kept the organization flush financially and created links for the organization to acquire new technology and skills. But this too has become a weakness. The massive involvement in narcotics trafficking has decimated any credibility the FARC might have once had with the Colombian people – now they are viewed as little more than another cartel. At the same time, the easy money has led to corruption and “lack of ideological rigor” among many FARC commanders. Also, the international criminal networks are subject to infiltration. Only days before the Raul Reyes assassination, the Department of Justice indicted 11 FARC commanders and collaborators based on information obtained from satellite phones purchased in Miami that were being monitored by the DEA. In 2001 the DEA managed to sell four tapped satellite phones to the FARC.

The tactical successes, such as infiltrating satellite phones are impressive. But the real victory, in turning FARC’s strengths to weaknesses, is at the strategic level.

Confluence of Veeps - Past & Present

2011-11-05T22:39:00.000-04:00

In 1975, in the wake of Watergate, Congress began investigating the CIA. President Ford, a former VP replaced the CIA director with George H.W. Bush (a future VP.) Also, to head off the congressional investigations he assigned his own VP, Nelson Rockefeller, to head a committee. Reportedly the White House chief of staff orchestrated these moves. In the case of Rockefeller he was trying to weigh Rocky down with committee work so he couldn't get anything done as the chair of the Domestic Policy Council. Rumsfeld had also brough Bush into the CIA to hurt his future political career - Rumsfeld harbored presidential ambitions of his own. Decades later Rumsfeld's machinations were remembered and his appointment to Defense was not a popular move amongst the Bushies.

But Rumsfeld had an important ally in the Bush 43 administration. His old deputy and successor at the Ford White House, future VP Dick Cheney.

I can think of several points where two past, future & present VPs worked together (any where the President had been VP for starters) but FOUR on one particular issue must be some sort of record.

Pakistani Bombs (Nuclear & Demographic)

2011-11-05T22:22:00.006-04:00

Jeffrey Goldberg's terrific piece in the Atlantic Monthly on Pakistan's nuclear program had an important detail. Since the raid on Abbotabad, in which OBL was killed, Pakistan's fears for its nukes have increased. They see the primary danger to their nukes as coming, not from jihadis, but from Indian or American agents. The OBL raid (on top of years of American drone strikes) demonstrated to the Pakistanis that they do not really have control over their own airspace. The response, Goldberg reports, is to shuttle nukes between various sites - by unmarked van. This may perplex US intelligence, but it dramatically increases vulnerability to Pakistani jihadis.

Of course, as Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling points out, possessing one nuke may not do a terrorist group much good. They are complicated devices and the only way to be certain it works is to actually detonate it. Still, the prospect of Pakistan's jihadis acquiring one is worrisome.

While American frustration with the Pakistanis is well-earned, Pakistani paranoia about the safety of their nukes is not completely irrational. It is difficult to imagine any nuclear-armed country being comfortable with the knowledge that another power can penetrate their airspace at will and carry out complex armed operations. Reportedly, for many Russians, the Nunn-Lugar program which was intended to help the Russians secure their nuclear infrastructure is seen by many "Russians on the street" is obviously being a devious American plan to secretly take control of their nukes.

For that matter, it is difficult to imagine Americans being sanguine in a comparable situation. That Goldberg provides some modest detail about what an American military plan to secure Pakistani nukes might look like cannot but further inflame Pakistani fears. Hopefully Pakistani leaders will also notice Goldberg's claim that China will tolerate an American effort against Pakistan's nukes. China and Pakistan have a long, deep relationship. Pakistan has touted China as a true friend and sought to turn to them to replace their American patrons who place all kinds of moral demands on them. But the Chinese aren't stupid. They do value Pakistan, as a balance against India and as an ally when approaching the Muslim world. But they almost certainly recognize the complexities of the place and don't want to get dragged in too deep.

Goldberg notes, and most observers share this view, that the focus on hitting al-Qaeda has prevented a wide-range of other key issues from being raised effectively with the Pakistanis. There are no shortage, of these issues - but the biggest one - as I've written before is Pakistan's slow motion collapse as a state. The combination of increasing economic pressures, environmental catastrophe, ethnic splits, and weakening institutions makes it tough to see how the state can hold together. Pakistan is more akin to a nuclear-armed Yemen. The whole state is a bomb.

One would like to think that a "Marshall Plan" for Pakistan could turn the place around. But the historic weakness of Pakistani institutions makes this unlikely. The resources exist within the country for a turnaround. About a quarter of the national budget is spent on defense, Pakistan's wealthiest don't pay taxes, and much of the economy is part of the unofficial sector. Properly harnessed and turned to critical needs - such as revitalizing agriculture and building a proper education system - and a more prosperous, stronger Pakistan could emerge. But these things do not occur quickly and the turnaround time is decreasing fast.

VP Garret Hobart - hot or not?

2011-11-04T16:36:00.000-04:00

In my endless quest for vice presidential influence it is always a pleasure to learn something new and non-trivial!

Garrett Hobart, McKinley’s first vice president, mattered – his home (VPs had to arrange their own lodging until 1975) was called the “Little Cream White House” (which had once been McClellan’s HQ) and he was often referred to as “Assistant President.”

One newspaperman wrote:

For the first time in my recollection, and the last for that matter, the Vice President was recognized as somebody, as a part of the Administration, as a part of the body over which he presided.

Hobart had been the speaker of the New Jersey House, President of the New Jersey Senate, and was a wealthy attorney for the railroads. He was not McKinley’s choice for VP, but the Republican party needed New Jersey and he fit the bill (although he was caught between his desire to enjoy a private life and his ambition and sense of duty.)

What is fascinating (to me at least) are the sources of Hobart’s unique influence. He was by all accounts an engaging individual who gave prudent advice. His wife looked after McKinley’s wife, who was ill and found her duties has First Lady onerous. The Hobarts also entertained Washington, sparing the McKinley's that duty. Hobart also helped McKinley manage his investments. Was this personal connection sufficient to allow McKinley to break a decades-old institution of ignoring the VP? Does it also matter that Hobart, having never held national office, was not a political threat?

Rise of Palestinian Islamic Jihad

2011-11-04T16:33:00.001-04:00

Hamas has been quiet, but Islamic Jihad has stepped up to the plate with attacks on Israel. Is HISH becoming IHIJ?

The intrepid Eli Lake has a report asking whether Hamas is moderating. Strictly speaking, no. But they are pragmatic. The Gaza faction is now finding itself running a mini-state and clashing with Israel is expensive. The Shalit deal is an incentive to kidnap more Israeli soldiers, but it also may buy Hamas some breathing space to begin working with Fatah again. Lake’s report focuses on Khaled Mashal, Hamas’ Damascus-based leader. The Damascus faction, recipient of Baathist largesse, usually spearheaded the toughest line against Israel. But Lake notes that the Syrian turmoil may be influencing Mashal’s outlook.

Again, Hamas is not suddenly becoming the Quacker Friends! But they may be seeking a modus vivendi like Hezbollah in Lebanon has achieved. They don’t love Israel, but they have other commitments that make open warfare expensive.

Islamic Jihad has no identity other then violence. Although smaller then Hamas, it has always focused on high-quality terror attacks. It also has been heavily sponsored by Iran – unlike Hamas and Hezbollah it does not have a broad social base of its own. An uptick of Islamic Jihad violence is likely as members of Hamas’ armed wing join up looking for action.

Meanwhile, Iran may be losing its most valuable ally in Syria and Hamas may have other fish to fry. But Iran still needs a stake in the conflict with Israel, thus Islamic Jihad fits the bill.

Meanwhile, turmoil in Sinai continues and the possibility of loose weapons of Qaddhafi’s arsenal ending up in Gaza remains – the spark to Gaza’s gasoline.

Simple Idea for Background Reading

2011-11-03T21:48:00.000-04:00

I wandered by the UMD library today and picked up The American Presidency: An Analytical Approach, by UMD prof Irwin Morris (who I don't know.)

Writing about the VP, I need a decent foundation on the study of the president and the presidency. There are endless volumes devoted to the topic. But Morris' book, which is designed as a good undergrad textbook, provides a strong overview of theories and the state of the field.

For background reading, an up to date textbook is a good idea - I wish I had thought of it a few years ago - would have saved me a lot of time trolling around in back issues of Presidential Studies Quarterly.

Gaming LeT

2011-11-03T21:43:00.003-04:00

The TerrorWonk has been busy lately, so I haven’t been blogging much (although I am going to try to turn that around for NaBloPoMo . One of the things I was busy with was a pair of papers on Lashkar-e-Taiba that were presented at EISIC/OSINT conference in Athens in September. One paper used SOMA to analyze the behavior of LeT. SOMA is a modeling system developed at UMD, we’ve gotten some interesting findings from it looking at other terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. I’ve written a fair amount about SOMA and more is coming on LeT.

The other paper was a game theoretic analysis of LeT. This was a new area for yours truly and as the subject matter expert I developed the scenarios and payoff matrix (ie what are the different combinations of moves the different players could make and how happy (or unhappy) in each combination is each player. Basically the study found that situations where LeT’s best option was to disband its armed wing were situations in which the US and India double-teamed Pakistan so that the military cracked down hard on LeT. Several papers in India interviewed us and discussed our work (see the LCCD homepage for links), but of them The Telegraph of Calcutta article included this very nice graphic that nicely encapsulates the project.

Two particularly interesting things struck me (as a novice to game theory) about this project. First, in game theory the players seek the Nash equilibrium (named for the Nobel prize winning mathematician) in which no actor can increase their payoff without causing a decrease in some other player’s payoff. But our work included “mixed equilibria” in which players did not simply adopt one strategy but shifted between strategies. This better reflects how nations act. Sometimes, nations systematically switch between policy options. In other cases different components of the state pursue different strategies – some elements of the Pakistani military crackdown on LeT while others continue to provide support.

The other point is that one criticism is that it did not include several key players such as China or Pakistani public opinion. True enough – but in some regards that only strengthens the overall concept. That is, with five actors and 13 possible actions between them there were hundreds of possible combinations. More players and actions means even more combinations – more than a person can systematically analyze.

So, as I’ve written before, models can’t necessarily replace human judgments but by systematically analyzing enormous combinations of data and scenarios they can identify possibilities that humans might miss.