Thoughts From The Frontline

The Glide Path Option

John Mauldin — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 04:54:00 GMT

The Present Contains All Possible Futures
The Ugly Unemployment Numbers
Argentinian Disease
The Austrian Solution
The Eastern European Solution
Japanese Disease
The Glide Path Option
Philadelphia, Orlando, and Phoenix

The present contains all possible futures. But not all futures are good ones. Some can be quite cruel. The one we actually get is dictated by the choices we make. For the last few months I have been addressing the choices in front of us, economically speaking. Today I am going to summarize them, and maybe we can look for some signposts that will tell us which path we're headed down. For those who are new readers and who would like a more in-depth analysis, you can go to the archives at www.investorsinsight.com and search for terms I am writing about. And I will start out by briefly touching on today's ugly unemployment numbers, with data you did not get in the mainstream media.

But first, let me welcome the readers of EQUITIES Magazine to this letter. The publisher is sending the letter to you directly. This letter is free, and all you have to do to continue receiving it is type in your email address at www.investorsinsight.com. Likewise, I have arranged for my regular readers to get a free subscription to EQUITIES Magazine, if you would like. You can go to www.equitiesmagazine.com. For those who don't know, I write a brief monthly column for them.

The Ugly Unemployment Numbers

The headlines said unemployment, as measured by the "establishment survey," was down by 190,000; and even though that was slightly worse than forecast, market bulls were cheered by the fact that the number was not as bad as last month's. It is an improvement that we are not falling as fast.

Well, maybe. What I did not see in many of the stories I read was that the number of unemployed actually soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey. The establishment survey polls larger businesses; the household survey actually calls individual households.

Let's look at the real number in the establishment survey. If you don't seasonally adjust the number, the actual change in unemployment for October was 641,000, or about 450,000 more than the seasonally adjusted number. And the Bureau of Labor Statistics added 86,000 jobs that they simply guess were created through the so-called birth-death ratio. Interestingly, the birth-death ratio number is not seasonally adjusted, so it is just added to the unemployment number. http://www.bls.gov/web/cesbd.htm

The total (U-6) employment rate is at a record high of 17.5% (this includes those who are part-time for economic reasons). There are now over 10.5 million people who have lost their jobs since the beginning of the downturn.

My favorite slicer and dicer of data, Greg Weldon (www.weldononline.com), offers up an even more horrific number. As I have noted before, if you have not looked for work in the last four weeks, the BLS does not count you as unemployed. Quoting Greg:

"Moreover, when we combine the monthly change in the number of Unemployed, with the number Not in the Labor Force, we might consider the result to be a proxy for the actual 'change' in the underlying labor market situation ... in which case, October's figure of 817,000 represents the fourth LARGEST yet, behind last month's (September's) second largest figure of 1,021,000 ... for a two-month combined figure of 1.838 million, in newly Unemployed, or no longer 'in' the Labor Force ...

"... the second LARGEST two-month total EVER posted, barely trailing the December-08/January-09 total 1.955 million.

"Bottom line ... basis this measure AND the 'Total Unemployment Rate,' we could conclude that not only is there NO 'improvement' in the labor market, but moreover, that it continues to DETERIORATE, intently."

There are plenty more implications in the data, but let's turn to the topic of the day.

The Present Contains All Possible Futures

Like teenagers, we as a US polity have made a number of bad choices over the past decade. We allowed banks to overleverage and, in the case of AIG (and others), sell what were essentially naked call options of credit default swaps, based on their firm balance sheets, far in excess of their net worth; and that put our entire financial system at risk. We gave mortgages to people who could not pay them, and did so in such large amounts that we again brought down the entire world financial system to the point that only with staggering amounts of taxpayer money was it brought back from the brink of Armageddon. We assumed that home prices were not in a bubble but were a permanent fixture of ever-rising value, and we borrowed against our homes to finance what seemed like the perfect lifestyle. We did not regulate the mortgage markets. We ran large and growing government deficits. We did not save enough. We allowed rating agencies to degrade their ratings to a point where they no longer meant anything. The list is much longer, but you get the idea.

Now, we are faced with a continuing crisis and the aftermath of multiple bubbles bursting. We are left with a massive government deficit and growing public debt, record unemployment, and consumers who are desperately trying to repair their balance sheets.

If present trends are left unchecked, we will need to find $15 trillion in the next ten years, just to pay for US government debt, let alone state, county, and city debt. And perhaps some loans for business will be needed? Where can all this money come from? The answer is that it can't be found. Long before we get to 2019 there will be an upheaval in the market, forcing what could be unpleasant changes.

We are left with no good choices, only bad ones. We have created a situation that is going to cause a lot of pain. It is not a question of pain or no pain, it is just when and how we decide (or are forced) to take it. There are no easy paths, but some bad choices are less bad than others. So, let's review some of the choices we can make. (Again, I am being very general here. You can go to the archives for more specifics. This is a summary letter.)

Argentinian Disease

One way to deal with the deficit is to do what Argentina and other countries have done: simply print the money needed to cover the deficits. Of course, that eventually means hyperinflation and the collapse of the currency and all debt. There are writers who think this is an inevitable outcome. How else, they ask, can we deal with the debt? Where is the political willpower?

One large hedge-fund manager in Brazil humorously remarked that Argentina is a binomial country. When faced with two choices (hence binomial) they always made the bad choice. Could it happen here?

Hyperinflation is not an economic event; it is a political choice. I think last Tuesday's election is a sign that the voter population is beginning to pay attention to the need for something more than talk of change. There is growing discomfort with the size of the deficits. Further, the Fed would have to cooperate in order for there to be hyperinflation, and I think there is only a very slight (as in almost zero) chance of that happening. Could Congress change the rules and take over the Fed? Anything's possible, but I seriously doubt there is any appetite in saner Democratic circles for such a thing to happen.

I think the chances of hyperinflation in the US are quite low. It would be the worst of all possible bad choices.

The Austrian Solution

Here I refer to the Austrian school of economic theory, based on the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, et al. There are those in the Austrian camp who argue the need to do away with the Fed, return to the gold standard, allow the banks that are now deemed too big to fail to go ahead and fail, along with any businesses that are also mismanaged (such as GM and Chrysler), and leave the high ground to new and more properly run.

In their model, government spending is slashed to the bone, as are (in most cases) taxes. The advantage is that, in theory, you get all your pain at once and then can begin to recover from what would be a very bad and deep recession. The bad news is that you risk getting 30% unemployment and another depression that could take a very long time to climb out of.

Now, let me say that I have GREATLY simplified their argument. If you want to learn more you can go to www.mises.org. It is an excellent web site for all things Austrian. While I am not Austrian, I have spent a lot of time reading the literature and have certain sympathies for this view.

That being said, this also has almost no chance of being implemented. In Congress, only my friend Ron Paul is its advocate. Most Austrian followers are Libertarian by nature, and that is just not a political reality for the coming decade.

The Eastern European Solution

As it turned out, Niall Ferguson (last week I wrote about his brilliant book, The Ascent of Money) was in Dallas last night, and I was graciously invited to hear him. He gave a great speech and signed books, and then we went to a local bar and proceeded to solve the world's problems over Scotch (Niall) and tequila (me), and went farther into the night than we originally intended. He's a very fun and knowledgeable guy.

As we were talking about possible paths, he brought one to mind that I hadn't thought of. He reminded me of the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as the nations of Eastern Europe broke from the former Soviet Union. They started with very weak economies and simply overhauled their entire governments and economies in a rather short period of time, though not in lockstep with one another. Privatization, lowered taxes, etc. were the order of the day.

We here in the US are always talking about the need for reform. We need to reform health care or education or energy. In Eastern Europe they did not reform in the sense that we use the word. In many cases they simply started from scratch and built new systems. They had the advantage that there was general agreement that things did not work the way they had been, so there was more room for change.

Today in the US there are large constituencies that resist change. We only get to tinker around the edges, when real structural change is needed. Sadly, we agreed that here there is not much chance of major change. We can't even get the obvious changes needed in the financial regulatory world.

Sidebar: I am outraged at the paltry proposed financial "reforms." Rahm Emanuel said that no crisis should be allowed to go to waste. The Obama administration is wasting this one. How can we allow banks to be too big to fail? Where is the reinstatement of Glass-Steagall? If we are going to allow large banks to exist, then their leverage must be reduced to the point where their failure would not risk the system and require taxpayer dollars. I don't care if that makes them less profitable. They are making those large profits because they have taxpayers implicitly behind them, and I get no dividend payments from them, the last time I checked. Where is Fannie and Freddie reform (and their breakup)? No mention of an exchange for credit default swaps? (And yes, I know that such an exchange would reduce the number of swaps and the profitability of them. That is the point. They are dangerous if allowed to become too big a market.) This bill reads as if bank lobbyists wrote it. Where is the populist outrage? We have let the fox set up the rules for running the hen house. Shame on us all if we allow this to happen.

Japanese Disease

I have written a lot over the past year about the problems facing Japan. Their population is shrinking, as is their work force. They are running massive fiscal deficits and have done so for almost 20 years. Government debt-to-GDP is now up to 178% and projected to rise to over 200% within a few years. They started their "lost decades" with a savings rate of almost 16%, and are now down to 2% as their aging population spends its savings in retirement. They have had no new job creation for 20 years, and nominal GDP is where it was 17 years ago.

As bad as our problems are here in the US, their bubble was far more massive. Values of commercial property fell 87%! Their stock market is still down 70%. They had twice as much bank leverage to GDP as the US. (Think about how bad off we would be if bank lending was twice as large and had even worse defaults and capital shortfalls!)

And yet, they Muddle Through. Productivity has kept their standard of living reasonable. Up until recently their exports were strong. The trading floors of the world are littered with the bodies of traders who have shorted Japanese government debt in the belief that it simply must implode. While I believe that it eventually will, if they stay on the path they are on, Japan is a very clear demonstration that things that don't make sense can go on longer than we think.

Richard Koo (chief economist of Nomura Securities, in Tokyo) argues passionately that Japan had a balance-sheet recession, and that the only way for Japan to fight it was to run massive deficits. Banks were not lending and businesses were not borrowing, as both groups were trying to repair their balance sheets, which were savaged by the bursting of the bubble. It is said that at one time the value of the land on which the Emperor's Palace sits in Tokyo was worth more than all of California. Clearly this was a bubble that puts our housing bubble to shame.

So, I understand the point that there are differences between Japan and the US . But there are also similarities. We too have had a balance sheet recession, although here it was mostly individuals and financial institutions that have had to retrench and repair their balance sheets.

Japan elected to run large deficits and raise taxes. As I wrote in the October 16^th letter (http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/thoughts_from_the_frontline/archive/2009/10/17/muddle-through-r-i-p.aspx), "Savings equal Investments:

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is defined as Consumption (C) plus Investment (I) plus Government Spending (G) plus [Exports (E) minus Imports (I)] or:

GDP = C + I + G + (E-I)

I don't want to go on at length again, but basically, the literature I quoted suggests that government stimulus and deficits have no long-run positive effect on GDP. In fact, the work done by Christina Romer, Obama's chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, shows that tax cuts have a three-times-greater positive effect on GDP, and tax increases have the same level of negative effect.

In the equation above, if you increase government spending it will have a positive effect in the short run on GDP, but not in the long run. In essence, the increase in "G" must be made up by savings from consumers and businesses and foreigners.

But "G" does not enhance overall productivity. Government spending may be necessary but it is not especially productive. You increase productivity when private businesses invest and create jobs and products. But if government soaks up the investment capital, there is less for private business.

And that is Japanese disease. You run large deficits, sucking the air out of the room, and you raise taxes, taking the money from productive businesses and reducing the ability of consumers to save. Then you go for 20 years with little or no economic or job growth.

This is the path we currently seem to be on. The Japanese experience says that it could last a lot longer than people think before we hit the wall; because if savings rise in the US, and if banks, instead of lending, put that money on deposit with the Fed, as they are now doing (in order to repair their balance sheets), the US could run large deficits for longer than most observers currently believe.

We will need 15-18 million new jobs in the next five years, just to get back to where we were only a few years ago. Without the creation of whole new industries, that is not going to happen. Nearly 20% of Americans are not paying anywhere close to the amount of taxes they paid a few years ago, and at least ten million are now collecting some kind of unemployment benefits or welfare.

Choosing large deficits does not reduce the amount of pain we will experience, it just seemingly reduces it in the short term and creates the potential for a serious economic upheaval when the bond market finally decides to opt for higher rates. This path is a bad choice, but sadly, in reality it is one we could take.

The Glide Path Option

A glide path is the final path followed by an aircraft as it is landing. We need to establish a glide path to sustainable deficits (could we dream of surpluses?). That is because at some point there will be recognition, either proactively or forced upon us by the bond market, that large deficits are unsustainable in the long term.

If Congress and the president decided to lay out a real (and credible) plan to reduce the deficit over time, say 5-6 years, to where it was less than nominal GDP, the bond market would (I think) behave. Reducing deficits by $150 billion a year through a combination of cuts in growth and spending would get us there in five years.

The problem is that there is real pain associated with this option. Remember that equation above. Absent a growing private sector, if you reduce "G" (government spending) you also reduce GDP in the short run. You have to take some pain today in order to do that. But you avoid worse pain down the road: a bubble of massive federal debt that has to be serviced will be very painful when it blows up, as all bubbles do.

The Glide Path Option means that structural unemployment is going to be higher than we like (which is actually the case with all the options). And the large tax increases that come with this option will by their very nature be a drag on growth (and cause a double-dip recession in 2011). We can debate tax increases all we want, but I sadly think we will soon have a VAT tax. There are no good options. I just hope that we cut corporate taxes enough when we do create a VAT, that it will make our corporations more competitive, which will be a boost for jobs.

That's pretty much it. This is not a problem we can grow ourselves out of in the next few years. We have simply dug ourselves into a huge hole. This is not a normal recession. There is not a "V" ending to this recession. We are going to have deal with the pain. It will be the pain of reduced returns on traditional stock market investments, a lower dollar, low returns on bonds, European-like unemployment, lower corporate profits over the long term, and a very slow-growth environment. But if we choose this path, we will get through it in the fullness of time.

And of course, then we will eventually have to deal with the $70 trillion in our off-balance-sheet liabilities in Medicare and Social Security and pensions. Sigh. But that's for another time.

Philadelphia, Orlando, and Phoenix

I really am more optimistic than this letter makes me seem. But if you ignore reality, then you have no chance to figure out how to make the best of your situation. It is the efforts of hundreds of millions of individuals trying to make their own lot a little better than will get us back to a robust economy.

Monday I fly to Philadelphia and then the next day to Orlando for two speeches, and then the following week a quick trip to Phoenix, then home to start to plan for Thanksgiving. I will be in New York the first weekend of December (the 4^th) for Festivus, a great fundraiser for kids sponsored by Todd Harrison and the team at Minyanville (http://www.rpfoundation.org/), Interestingly, they hold it every year at a "Texas" barbecue joint. Look me up if you are there.

Tiffani has been out the last two days of this week. She is due in seven weeks or less, and her hips are expanding. The pain is too much right now for her to walk up the stairs to the office, so she is working from home. The doctor says this is the one time that her pain is not a sign of something bad. She is being a trooper and not taking any pain meds.

It has been 30 years since I was around a pregnant lady for more than a few hours, and it does bring back some memories. Watching her grow and change has brought back the sense of awe over how our bodies are designed.

Ryan and Tiffani have decided on the name Lively for my first granddaughter, to add to the two new grandsons this year. From zero to three grandkids in just six months! Kind of makes me dizzy.

I really enjoyed my time in South America. Rio is quite beautiful and I want to go back and spend some time.

Have a great week. There will be enough good friends and family that I know I will. And tomorrow night I finally get to go to a Dallas Mavericks game. We may have a real team this year.

Your always optimistic at the beginning of the season analyst,

John Mauldin

Catching Argentinian Disease

John Mauldin — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 02:47:00 GMT

Catching Argentinian Disease?
The Ascent of Money
The Independence of the Fed Threatened
A Few Quick Thoughts on the Dollar, GDP, and the Recession
Uruguay, Philadelphia, Orlando, and then...

I have been in South America this week, speaking nine times in five days, interspersed with lots of meetings. The conversation kept coming back to the prospects for the dollar, but I was just as interested in talking with money managers and business people who had experienced the hyperinflation of Argentina and Brazil. How could such a thing happen? As it turned out, I was reading a rather remarkable book that addressed that question. There are those who believe that the United States is headed for hyperinflation because of our large and growing government fiscal deficit and massive future liabilities (as much as $56 trillion) for Medicare and Social Security.

This week, we will look at the Argentinian experience and ask ourselves whether "it" - hyperinflation - can happen here.

The Ascent of Money

I will be quoting from Niall Ferguson's recent book, The Ascent of Money. I cannot recommend this book too highly. In fact, I rank it up with my all-time favorite book on economic history, Against the Gods, by the late (and sorely missed) Peter Bernstein. There are very few books I read twice. There are too many books and not enough time. This book I will have to read at least three times, and soon, and I have a lot of underlines and mark-ups in it already.

If there were one book I could require every member of the Congress to read, it would be this one. As I read it, I am struck again and again by how fragile and yet resilient our economic systems are. Fragile in the sense that governmental policy mistakes, no matter how well-intentioned, can destroy the wealth of a nation, and resilient in that it doesn't happen more often.

In his introduction Ferguson writes, "The first step towards understanding the complexities of the financial institutions and terminology is to find out where they came from. Only understand the origins of an institution or instrument and you will find its present day roles much easier to grasp."

As is often said, those who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it. If you want to understand what is happening in the economy, what the consequences of our choices could be, then I strongly suggest you get The Ascent of Money. It is easy to read, engaging, full of moments where you are led to pull together different ideas into an "Aha!" Ferguson is a brilliant writer and historian, and we are lucky to have this book at a time when it is sorely needed. (order it at Amazon.com)

As I have been writing, the United States in particular, and the developed world in general, are faced with a series of very unpleasant, if not downright bad choices. The time for good choices was ten years ago. Now we face the prospect of painful decisions, no matter what we do. It is not a matter of pain or no pain, of somehow avoiding the consequences of our bad decisions, it is simply deciding how much pain we will take and when, or allowing the pain to build up to a climactic event. Today we look at what I think would be the worst choice of all.

Catching Argentinian Disease

At the beginning of the 20^th century, Argentina was the seventh richest nation on earth. It's very name means "silver." "As rich as an Argentine" was a byword. Even after falling from the heights through a series of bad decisions, the country was still so wealthy that, in 1946 when new president Juan Peron first visited the central bank, he could remark that "There was so much gold you could barely walk through the corridors."

Argentina had actually defaulted on its debt in the late 19^th century, not once but twice! But still they managed to avoid destroying the currency and devastating the country. But in 1989, after years of massive budget deficits that were financed with borrowing from abroad and Argentinian citizens, the country was left with so much debt and no one was willing to lend it any more money, that the leaders felt compelled to resort to the printing press.

My Uruguayan friend and Latin American partner, Enrique Fynn, tells me of his experience of going to Buenos Aires and buying a pack of cigarettes one evening. He went into the store the next morning for another pack, and the price had doubled. He came back that evening and the price had doubled again (thankfully for his health, he has quit!). There were no prices on any items in the grocery stores. There was a man with a microphone who would announce the prices of various items, often increasing the price every few hours by 30% or more.

Workers would get their pay in cash and rush to the store to buy anything, as by the end of the week their pay would be worthless. Of course, shelves were empty. The US dollar was king, and could purchase things at amazing prices. I heard stories that were truly compelling. (It made me wish I had gone shopping in Buenos Aires at the time!)

Interestingly, the dollar is still the real medium of exchange. I was told by several people that if you want to buy a house for half a million dollars, you bring the physical cash to the closing. One person counts the money and the other checks the paperwork and title. Argentina has the second largest hoard of physical dollars in the world, only exceeded by Russia. Is it any wonder they are concerned with the value of the dollar?

Let's look at some quotes from Ferguson (emphasis mine):

"The economic history of Argentina in the twentieth century is an object lesson that all the resources in the world can be set at nought by financial mismanagement... To understand Argentina's economic decline, it is once again necessary to see that inflation was a political as much as a monetary phenomenon...

"To put it simply, there was no significant group with an interest in price stability...

"Inflation is a monetary phenomenon, as Milton Friedman said. But hyperinflation is always and everywhere a political phenomenon, in the sense that it cannot occur without a fundamental malfunction of a country's political economy."

Look at the chart below. Using realistic assumptions, It suggests that the annual US government fiscal deficit will approach $2 trillion in 2019. How can we come up with what looks to be about $15 trillion over the next ten years? The Argentinian answer was to print the money.

In the US, the short answer is that unless the US consumers become a massive saving machine, to the tune of 8% or more of GDP and rising each year, and willingly put their savings into US government debt, it's not going to happen. So sometime in the coming years, interest rates are likely to start to rise in order to compensate bond investors for what they perceive as risk. That will bring us to some very difficult and painful choices.

As I wrote a few weeks ago, this scenario could be averted IF the Obama administration produced a credible plan to lower the deficit over time and stuck to it. But today's thought process is about what happens if they don't.

Ferguson pointed out in the quotes above that hyperinflation is always and everywhere a political decision. Governments have to choose to print money. In theory and in practice, what would happen if the Fed decided to accommodate a politicized US government that wanted to spend money on favorite projects and support groups, maybe even deserving programs like health care or defense or pensions or Social Security? Money they could not borrow?

Then Peter Schiff and like-minded thinkers would be right. Once you start down that path, it is hard to stop short of the brink. Brazil got to 100% inflation per month and has really lowered that level over time, but it is not easy.

In such a scenario, you want to own hard assets. Gold. Foreign currencies. Stocks. Almost anything other than the currency that is being printed.

I was asked at almost every speech about that scenario. In Latin America, hyperinflation is not a theoretical issue; it has been reality. More than one person commented on that no one in US economics schools studies hyperinflation. It is required material in Latin America. For many Latin Americans, the dollar has been their safe haven. And now they are worried, with good reason.

For the record, I do not think the US will experience hyperinflation as long as the Fed maintains its independence. Read the speeches from various Fed governors and regional presidents. These are strong personalities, and they understand that going down that path ends in massive tears. Bernanke warned just a few weeks ago that the government needs to get serious about the fiscal deficit. Watch the rhetoric from the Fed heat up after his reconfirmation and the confirmation of two new governors in the first quarter.

The Fed has committed to buy a fixed amount of government debt in its quantitative easing program. That commitment will be finished by the end of the first quarter (if I remember correctly). Then comes the tricky part.

I have been writing for a long time that the main force in the economy right now is deflation. The Fed will fight deflation tooth and nail. But they don't have to buy government debt to fight deflation. They can buy mortgage securities, credit card securities, commercial paper, etc. That will have the effect of easing without encouraging the government to run massive deficits. And such debts are naturally self-liquidating, while government debt is not, at least not in the same way.

I believe the Fed will maintain its independence. Not to do so is to court economic disaster of the first order. These are bright and serious men and women. They get it.

The Independence of the Fed Threatened

The risk is that something changes to compromise their independence. And sadly, there is some risk. Let me quote my fishing buddy friend David Kotok:

"It's now official. The proposed legislation to reform America's financial service supervision includes granting the Secretary of the Treasury a veto over Section 13(3) emergency action by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. If this becomes law, it will be a sad day for the independence of America's central bank.

"The Secretary of the Treasury, a very senior cabinet position, is appointed by the President and meets with the President in the Oval Office weekly. The governors of the Federal Reserve Board are also appointed by the President. Both cabinet officers and Federal Reserve governors are confirmed by the US Senate. There are supposed to be seven governors; politics has purposefully limited this to five throughout the three-year financial crisis period.

"The Federal Reserve governors are supposed to serve staggered 14-year terms with all seven seats filled. Instead, we have been governed by the present five-member, politically configured board.

"The original seven-governor construction was designed to insulate them from political pressure, for very good reasons. Decades of monetary history throughout the world have disclosed what happens when political influence on a central bank intensifies. The Weimar Republic and Zimbabwe are evidence of the worst inflationary effects of politics. The Great Depression in the US and the nearly two-decade deflationary recession in Japan demonstrate that monetary policy is not only inflation-prone. When central banks are under political influence you can get fire or you can get ice.

"In Japan, the central bank contends with two members of the cabinet sitting in on its deliberations. There is no way to know how much of the last 15 years of deflation and recession is attributable to the inside political pressures placed on the governors of the Bank of Japan. But there is evidence to suggest political influence, especially when you observe how little the Bank of Japan has engaged in asset expansion during this crisis."

This is the nose of the camel under the tent. Starting down this road is very worrisome indeed. I find it appalling that Tim Geithner and Larry Summers went along with this. This is a very clear attempt by the political class to put political pressure on the Fed. I hope the Fed responds with vigor. I can tell you that the officials of whom I am aware will not take kindly to pressure. And that might be an understatement.

(Yes, I am aware of the problems of the Fed being able to decide whom to bail out and why. It is not a perfect world. But better the Fed than Congress.)

All that being said, if the Fed starts to increase its buying of government debt above its initial commitment, then my "optimistic" scenario of a very rough economic patch, which I have been outlining the past few months, is far too rose-colored. I do not think it will happen, but I can guarantee you, I and a lot of other people will be watching.

A Few Quick Thoughts on the Dollar, GDP, and the Recession

Just a few quick notes. When world trade collapsed, so did the need for US dollars, which is what the world uses to transact business. The data looks like world trade is finding a bottom and maybe even recovering somewhat. That means there will be the need for more dollars. And since everybody and their mother are short the dollar, there could be a vicious snap-back rally. I am still bearish the US dollar (and the yen and the euro and the pound) over the long term, but there is the potential for a real rally here.

And my friend Mish Shedlock commented on the US GDP report, which said the US GDP rose 3.5%:

"Today the market is cheering over what is actually an ugly report. A misguided Cash-for-Clunkers added a one-time contribution of 1.66 percentage points to GDP. Auto sales have since collapsed so all the program did is move some demand forward. Government spending increased at 7.9 percent in the third quarter which is certainly nothing to cheer about. Personal income decreased $15.5 billion (0.5 percent), while real disposable personal income decreased 3.4 percent, in contrast to an increase of 3.8 percent last quarter. Those are horrible numbers. The savings rate is down, which no doubt has misguided economists cheering, but people spending more than they make is one of the things that got us into trouble. The only bright spot I can find is exports. However, even there we must not get too excited as imports rose much more."

John Williams notes that one-time stimulus or inventory items represented 92% of the reported quarterly growth. The nature of the stimulus-related gains was that they tended to steal business activity from the future. The months ahead are the future. Accordingly, fourth-quarter quarterly GDP change will likely turn negative, again. (The King Report)

And David Rosenberg writes: "Only economists see the recession as being over; the man on the street sees it a little differently, perhaps less enthused by the fact that a lower rate of inventory destocking is arithmetically underpinning GDP growth at this time. Put simply, a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll just found that 58% of the public believe the economic recession still has a ways to go -- and that is up from 52% in September and means that the private investor, unlike the hedge fund manager, is not interested in adding risk to the portfolio even after a 60% surge in the equity market.

"Only 29% of those polled believe the economy has hit bottom -- imagine having that psychology with nearly zero interest rates, a bloated Fed balance sheet and unprecedented fiscal deficits (poll was taken from October 23-25). Nearly two in three (64%) said the rally in the stock market (still a bear market rally -- not the onset of a new bull market) has not swayed their view (or ours for that matter)."

Uruguay, Philadelphia, Orlando, and then...

I am finishing this letter in Montevideo, Uruguay. I have been in Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro this week. I must say that Rio is beautiful, very green and lush with marvelous beaches, which I sadly only got to drive past. I will come again. I fly back Sunday and am home for a week, then speaking trips to Philadelphia and Orlando. Then my schedule only shows a few days in New York in early December for Festivus with the gang from Minyanville, and Europe in January. I am sure other things will come up, but I am looking forward to being home for awhile.

My friends at International Living have been writing about Uruguay, and I was really looking forward to visiting the country. I have spent a few days with partner Enrique Fynn in this delightful place. Turns out it is the Switzerland of South America. Reasonable bank secrecy laws, and trades zones where you are not taxed on any business you do outside of Uruguay. Many international companies set up their headquarters here. Beautiful beaches, friendly people, and the charm of a small country, plus what will be a brand new airport in a few weeks, which can get you several times a day to any part of the region, directly to Europe, and one hop away from any major city in the world. You can learn more about the country, and other countries you may want to live in or have a second home in, by subscribing to International Living.

One of the laugh lines I use in my speeches down here is that if the Fed actually does start to monetize the debt, I will have to move to Uruguay. I could make worse choices.

Have a great week. I think this weekend I will switch it up from the heavy reading I have been doing and find some science fiction. Reality is way too scary.

Your ready to be in his own bed analyst,

John Mauldin

The Best of Times

John Mauldin — Sat, 24 Oct 2009 02:52:00 GMT

It's The Best of Times
The Elements of Deflation
It's More Than Half Full
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay

What's a Fed to do? We get talk about tightening and taking away the easy credit, but we got the fourth largest monetization on record last week. This week we examine the elements of deflation, look at some banking statistics that are not optimistic, and then I write a reply to my great friend Bill Bonner about why it's the best of times to be young. I think you will get a few thought-provoking ideas here and there.

But before we get to the main letter, I want to recommend a book to you. I am on a 17-day, 12-city speaking tour. It is rather brutal, but I did it to myself. However, one of the upsides of traveling is that I get quiet time on airplanes to read books. I am working my way through a very large stack of books on my desk. One that caught my eye - and I'm glad it did - is a book by Tom Hayes called Jump Point: How Network Culture is Revolutionizing Business. Hayes writes about how we are getting ready to experience a cultural change every bit as profound as the Industrial Revolution. He argues that as the 3 billionth person gets online sometime in 2011, it will shift the dynamic of how we interact as businesses and consumers. We get to 5 billion by 2015. The mind boggles.

Clearly, it is already changing things, and I am not sure if I buy Hayes' thesis that 3 billion is a magical number, though it is great marketing. That being said, I found something on almost every page that I underlined or highlighted. This book made me think about the future in ways that my kids already get but Dad doesn't.

I like to read books about "important stuff" by people who have done a lot of thinking about their subjects, and who can write easily and fluidly and communicate their thoughts without weighing me down with unnecessary verbiage. Hayes has done that. (I am sure some of you, my patient readers, wish I could be better at that!)

No long review here. Go to Amazon and read the reviews. One writer wrote: "I gave the book 5 stars not because it was perfect -- I think Hayes's enthusiasm sometimes makes him jump to conclusions - but because there are so many ideas and observations here that it would take ages to put something like this together from other sources."

I agree. If you are in business, any business, you need to read this. As an aside, I will insist that all my partners worldwide get this book and read it. You can go to Amazon.com and buy the book. And Tom, if you get this (and I bet one of your friends will forward it to you), call me.

The Elements of Deflation

One of the advantages of travel is that it gives you time away from the tyranny of the computer to think. (Am I the only one who feels like I am drinking information through a fire hose?) But getting the information is important too, as it gives you something to think about. And I have been thinking a lot lately about deflation.

I get asked at almost every venue where I stop, whether I think we will see inflation, or deflation. And I answer, "Yes." And I am not trying to be funny. I think the primary forces in the developed world now are deflationary. When asked if I don't think that the Fed monetizing debt of all kinds won't eventually be inflationary, I answer, "We better hope so!"

Let's quickly summarize some of the ideas from the last few months of this letter. Just as water is made up of two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen, so deflation has its own elemental structure.

The first element is Rising Unemployment. There has never been a sustained inflationary period without wage inflation. Wages are basically flat and falling. With 9.8% unemployment, 7% underemployed (temporary), and another 3-4% off the radar screen because they are so discouraged they are not even looking for jobs, and thus are not counted as unemployed (who made up these rules?), it is hard to see how wage inflation is in our near future.

Think about this. Only a few years ago, less than 1 in 16 Americans was unemployed or underemployed. Today it is 1 in 5. That is a staggering, overwhelming statistic. Mind-numbing.

Keynes said that you should stimulate the economy in recessions in order to bring back consumer spending. That is not going to happen this time. As my friends at GaveKal point out, this time we will have to have an Austrian (economic) recovery, or a business-spending recovery. My argument will be, when I am with them in Dallas in December at their conference, "Where are we going to get business-investment spending when banks aren't lending and capacity utilization is at an all-time low?" This, of course, leads the Keynesians to jump in and say, "The government has to step up and jump-start consumption!" Which means more debt. Wash. Rinse. Repeat.

The next element of deflation is massive Wealth Destruction. Two bear markets and a housing market collapse have put the American consumer on the ropes. And the next bear market will bring him to the canvas.

Then we have Reduced Borrowing and Lending, as consumers are paying down debt and banks are reducing their lending. Both are necessary in a credit crisis-caused recession. Bank lending is basically back to where it was two years ago, and shows no sign off rebounding. Banks, as I have written, are buying US government debt in an effort to shore up their balance sheets. Lending to small business, the real engine of job creation, is sadly decreasing each month. (See graph below.)

Next up in our elemental list we have Decreased Final Demand and its counterpart Increased Savings. Although the savings rate has come back down to 3% from 6% a few months ago, almost every expectation is that it will rise over the next 3-5 years back up to the 9% level where it was only 20 years ago. The psyche of the American consumer has been permanently seared. Consumption and savings habits are being changed as I write.

And of course we must address the element of Low Capacity Utilization. While capacity utilization is rebounding, it is still lower than at any time since the data has been collected, other than the last few months. It is hard to see where businesses are going to get pricing power, when not only US but world capacity utilization is still extremely low. The chart below is not the stuff that inflation is made of.

And let's just quickly throw in Massive Deleveraging and $2 trillion in Bank Losses and a Very Weak Housing Market. Which brings us to a Slowing Velocity of Money.

As I have written on several occasions, prices are a function of the amount of money times the velocity of money. If the velocity of money is slowing, the amount of money can rise without bringing about inflation. It is a delicate balance, but nonetheless the hyperventilation in some circles about the coming hyperinflation is, well, overinflated. Simplistic. Economically naive.

The Fed is going to do what it takes to bring about inflation (in my opinion). But they will not monetize US government debt beyond what they have already agreed to. If they need to "print money" to fight deflation, they can buy mortgage or credit-card or other forms of private debt, which have the convenience of being self-liquidating. Read the speeches of the Fed presidents and governors. I can't imagine these people will recklessly monetize US debt. You don't get to their level without having a stiff backbone. (Yes, I know the gold bugs will call me terminally naive. We will have to wait to see who is right. Peter Schiff, care to make a bet on this one?)

Bernanke warned Congress again last week about rising deficits. Watch the deficit rhetoric coming from the Fed after the next two governors are appointed next year, side by side with Bernanke's reappointment. There will be a line drawn in the sand. Some in Congress will not be happy, but my bet is that the Fed will maintain its independence. If they do not, then my recent letters will prove far too optimistic (and many of you protest my rather less-than-positive suggestion of a double-dip recession). But I must admit I cannot imagine that happening. And there are not enough votes in Congress to change that independent status. There is a day of reckoning coming with the US debt. And thank God for that.

Bottom line: The Fed will do what it takes to keep us from deflation. They will deal with the problems of the ensuing inflation. I wrote six years ago that the best outcome from all the easy monetary policy and budget deficits would be stagflation. I see no need to change that assessment. I am not happy with stagflation, but as I came into my young adult life in the '70s (see below), I know that we can deal with that. The far more worrisome prospect is continued trillion-dollar deficits.

It Is the Best of Times

Now let's change the topic. My friend Bill Bonner, of Daily Reckoning and Agora Publishing fame, recently wrote about his mother. Bill also turned 60 recently. I wrote to him about the similarities between our mothers. Both were born in hard circumstances, on farms that had no indoor plumbing. They joined the WACs and met their husbands. They struggled raising families. Bill and I both grew up in rather humble circumstances (to put a mild spin on it).

That exchange caused Bill to write about the future our kids face. He has six kids and I have seven. He has graciously allowed all my kids to invade his chateau in rural France (where they mingle with his kids), and has invited us back next summer. I think Bill is the best writer, the best "turner of a phrase," in the business. I often feel like a house painter standing in front of a Rembrandt when I read his work.

But Bill is a tad pessimistic. He makes me look like Larry Kudlow. He wrote (among other books) Financial Reckoning Day, which has just been updated and is now titled Financial Reckoning Day Fallout: Surviving Today's Global Depression. It makes for some interesting reading. Get it with Jump Point.

Now to the point. As I said, Bill wrote about the future our kids face. I will repeat what he said and then respond. Bill's thoughts:

"We sat in a cab yesterday, stuck in traffic in central London. We watched people walk by and wondered. What are they thinking about? What do they want out of life? What do they think of themselves?

"There were hundreds of them...different shapes...different sizes. A businessman in a pin-striped suit, briefcase in hand, concentrating on his sales report; he almost stepped in front of a motorcycle. A salesgirl, grotesquely overweight...yellow hair streaked with brown...wishing she hadn't had so much to drink the night before. A lawyer daydreaming about his secretary. A man who would have rather been fishing...still in his waxed coat. A woman annoyed about something. A heavy construction worker, his legs splayed outward as he walked. A tense young woman who dared not look up. A woman worrying about her son. A man thinking about buying a new car. One man trying to remember a line from a song he learned 30 years ago. Another talking to herself. One looked like a doctor taking an afternoon stroll. Another was stark raving mad.

"All of them walking along...from one place to another...shuffling along...the living towards the dead.

"We were thinking of our children. What a different world they grow up in. And yet, it is still the same too. A man might have been stuck on a London street 50 years ago...and hundreds of years ago he might have watched the same shopkeepers and carpenters walk by, each caught in his own thoughts like a fly in a spider's web.

"Our old friend John Mauldin wrote to say that his mother's experience was not much different than ours. She joined the WACs during the war...met John's father...and then nature took her course.

"But both John and your editor had a big advantage in life. We both caught the upswing.

"Not so with our children. They inherit a different world. America was the world's leading nation in the '50s and '60s. And it was growing in power and wealth - rapidly. We grew up with it. Things were getting better and better...we were sure we'd live much grander, richer, and more exciting lives than our parents. The sky was always the limit!

"Now, America is in decline. China's economy grows while hers declines. The Far East has savings, while she has none. The Asia nations are net exporters, making huge profits...while American industries are judged too old, too expensive, and too highly regulated to compete. Americans have debt up the kazoo, while their competitors have little. A young person in America has to look forward to supporting 70 million retired baby boomers...and paying for their drugs, their food, their wars, and their bailouts.

"For our children - ours and John's - the situation on a personal level is different too. Coming from poor families, we could look forward to much more wealth and material success than our parents ever knew.

"We came back to Ireland this week for a reason that our parents would never have dreamed of. Your editor has set up a family office. It is a very modest affair by family office standards. The typical family office manages a fortune of $100 million, according to The New York Times. We may not even be on the same planet with these rich families; but we are in the same universe. That is, we try to think about...and manage...our wealth as rich people do...as a family legacy or an endowment, not as a retirement fund.

"What wealth we have accumulated - even if it is paltry - will be held by a family-owned corporation. Then, the corporation, run largely by the adult children, manages the assets - from our base in Ireland.

"Your editor, freed from the responsibility of managing his own money, will be free to wander and think...like a vagabond, a gypsy, a refugee, an itinerant mendicant...forced to sup on whatever is at hand and take lodging wherever he can find it - but favoring the Four Seasons and Chateau Margot when they are available.

"Whatever else this does, it puts the children in a very different situation from their parents. Instead of starting out with nothing, they're starting out with something. While this would seem to be a big advantage to them, it has huge hidden disadvantages. Like America itself, they are in danger of finding themselves slipping downhill. Instead of expecting things to get better, they may find it hard even to hold onto what they've got. Instead of the "Morning in America" that Ronald Reagan promised, they may find that it seems more like evening, both in their personal as well as their national lives.

"'From shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations,' say the French. The grandfather begins without a coat. His grandson ends that way.

"But what to do? Spend it all now...so the children begin with the same clean slate we had? Move to Brazil or India - countries with more obvious upside?

"In the deep, cosmic end, it probably doesn't matter. The advantage to starting out on an upper rung of the ladder may be about equal to the disadvantage of having to worry about falling off. Who can know?

"Every man has to play the cards he's been dealt. What else can he do? He may have a humpback or a beautiful voice. He may have had a hard upbringing or a soft head. He may have a fortune worth of poetry in his soul but not a dime in his pocket. As far as we can tell, every young man starts out even. Each one begins life in the same place - where he is. And every generation takes what it is given, and makes the best of it.

"The real advantage in life is having the gumption to get on with it; no one knows where that comes from."

It's More Than Half Full

Ok, Bill, let's review those wonderful days from whence we sprang, so fraught with the advantages of having nothing. So potent with opportunity. It was the middle of the '70s when we started our careers. Inflation was high and rising. The Soviets were seen as a major threat. Japan was beating our brains out and buying everything, even if nailed down (like Pebble Beach and New York skyscrapers). I had to borrow money at 15% (or more) to buy paper in order to meet customer demands for printing. And guess what? The banks got into trouble and called loans willy-nilly. (My bank even called my mother and threatened her to pay off my loan - against written agreements - and she did. Evil sons of bitches. The more things change... And that bank did fail, I report delightedly! Not that I hold a grudge.)

There were multiple successive and ever-deeper recessions. Gold was rising and the dollar was seen as a joke. Howard Ruff (a good friend to both of us when we were starting out!) and almost every newsletter writer were telling people to buy gold and freeze-dried food to protect themselves against a near-certain economic, if not apocalyptic, catastrophe. Unemployment was high and rising for a decade.

The correct answer to the question, "Where will the jobs come from?" back then was, "I don't know, but they will." And that is the correct answer today.

In 20 years, no one will want to come back to the halcyon days of 2005. Our kids (all 13 of them) are getting ready to live through what will be the most exciting period in human history. There will be a century's worth of change, measured by the standard of the 20^th century, just in the next ten years, and then we will double that pace in the next ten after that. Medical miracles will mean our kids and grandkids will live a lot longer than their dads, although I intend to be writing well into my 80s, like our mutual hero Richard Russell.

There will be whole new industries developed in the US. How do I know that? Follow the money. The rest of the world spends a fraction of what we do on research and development. Where do you go if you are looking for venture capital?

Do I care if the Chinese and the "developing" world are far better off, relatively speaking, than the US in 20 years? Not a whit. Good on them. I hope they make discoveries and inventions and grow new businesses that benefit us all. But we are not going into some long dark night. We, and our kids, get to choose how we respond to what is the reality of the day.

Our nation had to almost hit the wall in 1980 before a Volker could come along and force us to take the pain of recession to beat back inflation. And we will have to come perilously close to the wall this time before we take action as a nation. Way too close for comfort. Maybe you are right, and we have a soft depression. I hope not; but even so, the world will be better, far better, in 20 years, with far more opportunities than today.

It was not fun starting new businesses in the '70s and early '80s. But we did. I remember coming to Baltimore and being (literally) afraid to get out of the car to visit your offices in the slums. But that was what you could afford. A far cry from the chateau in Ouzilly.

I lived in a small mobile home. Tiffani was born there, and we converted part of the kitchen to be her bedroom. (Yes, I was white "trailer trash.") But I got up every morning just like you did and killed as many alligators as I could. The rest had to wait 'til the next day.

And that is the legacy our kids have. They know what it is to wade into the swamp every morning. Never quitting. In thinking about this, you may be the father I respect the most. You have raised your kids to be multilingual children of the world. What a work ethic. How did you get them to scrape window shutters at your chateaus? (I actually saw this, and my kids marveled. Thereafter I threatened to make them go live with you when they didn't behave!)

You have given your kids the opportunity to follow their dreams, even demanded that they do so. And such dreams they (and mine) have. Will they succeed? Who knows? But they will go at it with gusto, in a world with more opportunities than you and I ever imagined 40 years ago. And, oh boy, were we optimists back then. How else could we have done what we did? If we believed the rhetoric that the world was coming to an end, would we have dared to venture out?

You cannot have raised your kids to be such bold adventurers without instilling in them a certain high level of optimism. I am going to out you, Mr. Bonner. You present yourself to your readers as a bona fide end-of-the-world pessimist. But you are a really and truly a closet optimist. Your whole business empire (and what an empire it has become!) is based on finding people who are optimists, in the sense that they think they can actually get people to send them money for what they write. Which they do! Even if it is to read why the world will come to an end, which thankfully it never does.

You are right in this: it is personal gumption that makes or breaks us. There are those who started out with less than we did (hard to imagine but true) and made a lot more. And there are those who started out with far more and made less. But there are very few who are happier than either of us. Or luckier.

Our kids? It is not the times that dictate the man (or daughter!), but the response of the man which dictates his own time. Today promises a brighter future for someone young than any other time in history, whether they are in the US or Brazil or China. They just have to seize it.

And as our kids do just that, and as the millions of kids of those who read us do so, and the billions of kids who are just now getting ready to bust loose all work to achieve their dreams, the world is going to be a far more fantastic place. Smooth ride? Not a chance. We didn't get one; and in thinking through history, there have not been many smooth rides. Why should we think that will get any better? Our kids will just have to live with our generational (and individual) iniquities, government debt and all, and figure out how to master their own fates. But if I had a choice to take the '70s or today? In less than a heartbeat I would choose today. And I bet you would too!

(Side note: You can subscribe to the Daily Reckoning and read more of Bill's great prose. Warning: it is bearish, but lively and fun.)

Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay

Tonight I am in Orlando, where I spoke at the Commonwealth national conference. I have been to a few conferences here and there, but I must admit to being impressed. A conference for brokers and advisors who are affiliated with them, it was exceptionally well done. And a very smart crowd. These guys have attracted some exceptional talent.

Tomorrow morning I fly back to Dallas, where I get to see my new grandson, Hayden, for the first time. Born this week a little early while I am on the road, I get a call at 3 am on Monday telling me the news and sending me a picture. Wow. The heck with deficits and deflation. How can you not be an optimist?

Then later in the afternoon I am off for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, speaking in four cities and meeting with clients (and future clients) of my Latin American partner, Enrique Flynn. And then back to Philadelphia, again in Orlando, Scottsdale, and one trip to New York in early December. Then not much else is scheduled - but past performance says that will change.

There is a steak and a bottle of wine waiting for me down the hall, so it is time to hit the send button. Have a great week. I know I am. I love South America, and look forward to coming back to you with my impressions.

Your wondering who made up this schedule analyst,

John Mauldin

Muddle Through, R.I.P?

John Mauldin — Sat, 17 Oct 2009 19:50:00 GMT

Muddle Through, R.I.P?
Savings Equal Investments
Japanese Disease
Who Will Buy the Debt?
The New Muddle Through Economy
On the Road Again

I first wrote about the Muddle Through Economy in 2002, and the term has more or less become a theme we have returned to from time to time. In 2007 I wrote that we would indeed get back to a Muddle Through Economy after the end of the coming recession. If you Google the term, at least for the first four pages more than half the references are to this e-letter. I get a lot of flak from both bulls and bears about being either too optimistic or too pessimistic. Being in the muddle through middle is comfortable to me.

Last week I expressed my concern that we as a country are taking actions that could indeed "Kill the Goose" of our free-market economy. I rightly got letters asking me how I could maintain Muddle Through in the face of that letter. I have given it a lot of thought and research. How likely are we to muddle through in the face of $1.5 trillion and larger deficits? Today we take another look at Muddle Through. It should be interesting.

But first, two housekeeping items. I want to welcome the 150,000 members of the National Association of the Self-Employed to this letter. They have asked me to be a special consulting economist to their group, and they will send this letter each week to their members. Since its beginning in 1981, the National Association for the Self-Employed has pioneered support for micro-businesses and the self-employed, and been a forceful advocate for small business in this country. (www.nase.org) I am honored. I am pleased to add you to my 1 million closest friends. I hope you find it useful.

Second, I will be going to South America at the end of next week, to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Sao Paulo and Rio. I will be speaking in those cities and traveling with my new Latin American partner, Enrique Fynn of Fynn Capital (based in Uruguay). If you would like to find out about this tour or what services he can help you with, you can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and sign up and Enrique will get in touch with you. And as always, if you are an accredited investor, you can go to that website and one of my partners in the world will get back to you. (In this regard, I am president of and a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, member FINRA.) And now to the letter.

Muddle Through, R.I.P.?

I defined a Muddle Through Economy in the past as one of slow growth (in the area of 1-2%) and a slack employment environment, such as we had in 2002 and the early part of 2003. In early 2007, I suggested we would return at some point to such an environment at the end of the recession I was predicting.

I am not surprised about the response of the Fed to the current recession and credit crisis, whether it's the large monetization of debt or the low interest rates. Assuming they more or less remove the monetary easing in a reasonable manner, there is nothing that would make me think we do not eventually recover, albeit at a very slow Muddle Through pace, with a jobless recovery that lasts for several years. It will not be pleasant, but we'll survive.

However, gentle reader, never in my wildest dreams did I think we could be looking at government deficits of $1.5 trillion dollars and actually budgeting future deficits of over $1 trillion as far as the eye can see. And there is real reason to think that under current plans, $1 trillion deficits are optimistic. Look at the graph above from the Heritage Foundation. They suggest that current policy would bring us closer to a $2 trillion deficit by 2019.

And that assumes nominal growth that is north of 3% and unemployment dropping back below 5% in reasonably short order. If you make less optimistic assumptions, the number can become much larger rather quickly. Where do we find that much money to finance that large a deficit? We will look at what might be the answer, but first we need to look at a basic concept in economics.

Savings Equal Investments

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is defined as Consumption (C) plus Investment (I) plus Government Spending (G) plus [Exports (E) minus Imports (I)] or:

GDP = C + I + G + (E-I)

(For the wonks out there, GDP is usually termed "Y".)

You can calculate national savings as GDP minus consumption and government spending. That means that investment equals savings plus net exports. If there are no net exports, then money must come back into the US from outside the country to finance investments, along with savings.

This equation is known as an identity. An identity is an equality that remains true regardless of the values of any variables that appear within it. That means it is not a guess or an approximation. It is simple reality.

Thus, if there is a government deficit, there must be savings by both consumers and businesses, plus capital flows from outside the country, to offset that deficit in order for there to be any money left over for investments.

In the short run, an increase in government spending can offset a decline in consumption (a recession), but absent savings a government deficit crowds out investment in the long run. There must be savings in order for there to be investment. And without investment, you do not get job growth or economic growth.

Japanese Disease

Some readers wrote this week telling me I am far too worried about a rising government deficit. Right now we are at roughly 42% of debt to GDP. In 1989, at the start of the lost decades, Japan had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 51%. Now it is at 178%, and the world has not come to an end for them. In fact, they are running massive government deficits today and plan to do so for a long time. Why, I am asked, can't we be like Japan? And my answer is that it is possible, but the cost that Japan has paid has been high.

In 1989, private Japanese debt (businesses and consumers) was at a debt-to-GDP ratio of 212%. Now it is at 110%. And the total of both government and private debt is roughly the same (within 5%) of where it was 20 years ago. Along with running large trade surpluses, private debt has been exchanged for government debt. Savings have fallen from the mid-teens to about 2% today, as the country is rapidly aging and now using its savings to live on. And how much has all that government spending helped the country? Before I answer that, read these paragraphs from Hoisington Asset Management's latest letter (last week's Outside the Box):

"The federal government's promise to extricate the U.S. economy from this recession involves more spending (increasing public debt) and more subsidies for consumers, such as car rebates and home buying incentives (more private debt). In other words, more debt is supposed to solve the problem of over-indebtedness. The truth is that this policy merely indentures its citizens further without providing any income for repayment of debt. In previous letters we have discussed the fact that the government spending multiplier is zero (read Professor Robert Barro's book, Macroeconomics - a Modern Approach, p. 370).

"This means there is no long term income benefit from stimulus programs. According to the latest academic research, the most recent $800 billion stimulus plan will boost economic activity in the short run, but will surely depress economic activity over time. The government problem is complicated by the fact that the tax multiplier is 3, meaning that a 1% change in taxes will change GDP by about 3% over time. More recent research (Barro & Redlick, September 2009, "NBER Working Paper 15369") suggests that a 1% cut in the marginal tax rate would raise GDP in the ensuing year by 0.6%. With the deficit rising due to a zero spending multiplier, the tendency will be to try to raise taxes to pay for this higher level of expenditures, which will further depress aggregate spending and output."

For all intents and purposes, Japan has had no growth for almost two decades. Their nominal GDP is where it was 17 years ago, and the number of employed people is at 20-years-ago levels. An aging population has masked their unemployment problems, as older citizens retire. Their savings went to government debt. Taxes were raised numerous times. Since government deficit spending has no long-term multiplier effect, growth has been nonexistent. (By the way, that research about multiplier effects has also been done by Christina Romer, the chairman of the current President's Council of Economic Advisors, and further explored by European economists. There is general agreement on these facts.)

In 1998, the US had a total debt- (government plus private) to-GDP ratio of 260%. Today it is 373%. We have added over $15 trillion in debt, yet total employment today is roughly where it was 9 years ago. But the current economic leadership wants to solve the problem of too much debt with even more debt. I am sympathetic with the idea that in the short run the government should step in and the Fed should print (within limits) money to keep us from deflation. But the equation we spent time on earlier suggests that if we continue to run massive deficits, we run the risk of catching Japanese disease - a decade-long (or longer) period of slow growth and high unemployment, especially since our population is growing and our Boomers are going back to work (and surveys suggest they intend to work longer).

Large government deficits choke off the very investment that we need to create jobs. In the name of doing good, the unintended consequence is to make it more difficult for small businesses to start up and create jobs. And we all know that small business is the engine for job creation.

The way out of the current morass is to create jobs and increase productivity. But if the government runs deficits of $1.5 trillion, that means whatever savings (corporate and consumer) we have will not go into the investments we need, but into government debt.

Who Will Buy the Debt?

Now, let's go back to the problem of who will buy the debt. How can we find $1.5 trillion each and every year? Some of it will come from foreign central banks, as we continue to run a trade deficit. Once those dollars leave our shores, they do not disappear. They can only go back into a dollar-denominated investment. Up to now, that has typically been US government debt. If China decides to use its dollars to buy commodities or other assets, whoever sells them the assets now has the dollars and must decide what to do with them. So give or take a few billion, about $400 billion will come back to the US from our trade deficit next year. That still leaves $1.1 trillion.

Upon reflection, and cutting to the chase, I think that the buyers of the debt could be US banks for quite some time. The next graph shows commercial and industrial loans at US banks falling precipitously. Banks have (correctly) tightened lending standards, but that means that small and medium-sized businesses, which account for over 85% of all jobs, have been cut off from the life blood of growth. Is it any wonder they are cutting jobs at a prodigious rate?

The next graph shows bank credit (of all types), going back to 1974. Notice that even during recessions (gray shaded areas) bank lending either grows or at the most goes flat. But now we are experiencing something new: bank lending is falling. Notice the sharp increase in lending in 2008 as corporations decided to draw down their banks' lines of credit, afraid that the banks might cut back. And with good reason, as banks did exactly that.

So where do banks put their cash and reserves they are not lending? At the Fed and in Treasury debt. If you can leverage capital at ten to one (as banks can) and if you get 2% (for longer-term debt) and if you only have costs of, say, 50 basis points (or 0.5%), you can make a return on equity of 15% with no risk.

And that is what we are seeing. Banks are taking the money the Fed is printing and the government is giving them and putting it back at the Fed. Bank reserves at the Fed are exploding. And they are likely to continue to do so, since bank balance sheets are still deteriorating, especially at smaller and regional banks exposed to commercial real estate loans. Banks own 45% of commercial real estate loans, compared to only 21% of single-family loans. Banks (in general) are going to have to raise capital and reduce their loan portfolios in order to keep within the guidelines for adequate reserve capital. Small wonder that my friend Chris Whalen (one of the real experts on banks) thinks we will see over 400 banks fail in this cycle.

One quick chart to further highlight the problem that banks are facing. I have been writing for several years that commercial real estate loans will be the next shoe to drop. Moody's calculates that commercial real estate prices have dropped 30%. Over a trillion dollars in commercial real estate loans are coming due in the next few years. Banks are going to continue to reduce their loan portfolios in order to deal with the massive write-offs they are going to have to make. And my bet is they put those reserves they are not lending into government debt.

Given that the current Congress is hell bent on massively raising taxes in 2011, we are likely to dip back into recession by then, if not before. Remember, taxes have a multiplier effect of three. That means tax cuts increase GDP (over time) by three times their amount. But tax increases reduce GDP by three times the increase. That will make deficits worse, and unemployment will again start to rise from already high levels. Twenty states have already raised sales taxes, and more are raising other taxes. It is a vicious spiral.

The New Muddle Through Economy

This is not a prescription for a return to normal growth. We are headed for a New Normal that is less than what the market currently believes. Unless the deficit comes under control at some point, we face the real prospect of catching Japanese Disease and suffering yet another lost decade. Can we Muddle Through? We have no choice but to do so. But it will not be fun. It will not be long-term 2% growth and employment going back to 6% any time soon. Can we reverse the course? With a different attitude and leadership in Congress, maybe we can. But it won't happen next year, and it's unlikely in 2011.

I am afraid we will have to put my old friend Muddle Through, as I previously defined him, back in his box for a while. But wait, if my friend at PIMCO, Mohammed El-Erian, can tell us we are going to a "New Normal," then I can decide that we are going to a "New Muddle Through Economy." Just not one as benign as I used to think.

In the end, that is what we will do. We will figure out how to deal with the environment in which we find ourselves. That is what free markets and entrepreneurs do. Things will sort out, but not before we have what could be an even more difficult crisis, which will force us to make hard choices.

As an aside, I am not expecting that we will see the crisis I am thinking of any time soon. We can move along with positive GDP for some time. I am thinking of the longer term, 1-3 years out. We will become complacent. I will get letters telling me I am too pessimistic. Just as I did in late 2006 when I said we would be in a recession by late 2007. But I firmly believe we will see a double-dip recession within another 18 months (at the most). Stock markets drop on average about 40% in a recession. Adjust your portfolios accordingly.

On the Road Again

I am writing tonight from Detroit. Tomorrow I will be in New York watching the Yankees/LA game. I will be the guy in the second row behind home plate in the Dallas Cowboys jacket. I will be on Yahoo Tech Ticker on Monday morning, so you should be able to go to Yahoo and see me later that afternoon. Then Philadelphia on Tuesday, speaking at my partner Steve Blumenthal's CMG conference for investment advisors. They have a very interesting platform of trading advisors. You can see them at http://cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp

I had a great deal of fun at the New Orleans conference, being with old friends and meeting new ones. David Tice (of the Prudent Bear Fund) was an exceptional host for dinner at Emeril's. I was surprised that Karl Rove actually remembered me after nine years. I thoroughly enjoyed spending some quality time with my friend Ron Paul. We share a lot of concerns about the future of the Republic. I was pleasantly surprised by how thoughtful Howard Dean was. And very personable.

I go to Houston on Wednesday, Orlando on Thursday, and then South America on Saturday. I will be doing a lot of writing from hotel rooms, but all in all it will be fun. You have a great week, and remember that in 10 years none of us will look back and want to return to 2009. 2019 will be better than we can possibly imagine. We just have to make sure we all get there!

Time to hit the send button and find an adult beverage. All the best,

Your going to miss the Old Muddle Through analyst,

John Mauldin

Killing the Goose

John Mauldin — Sat, 10 Oct 2009 03:07:00 GMT

Killing the Goose
What Were We Thinking?
Let's Play Turn It Around
Detroit, the Red Sox and the Yankees, and Traveling Too Much

Peggy Noonan, maybe the most gifted essayist of our time, wrote a few weeks ago about the vague concern that many of us have that the monster looming up ahead of us has the potential (my interpretation) for not just plucking a few feathers from the goose that lays the golden egg (the US free-market economy), or stealing a few more of the valuable eggs, but of actually killing the goose. Today we look at the possibility that the fiscal path of the enormous US government deficits we are on could indeed kill the goose, or harm it so badly it will make the lost decades that Japan has suffered seem like a stroll in the park.

And while I do not think we will get to that point (though I can't deny the possibility), for reasons I will go into, there is the very real prospect that the upheavals created by not dealing proactively with the problems (or denying they exist) will be as bad as or worse than the credit crisis we have gone through. This is not going to be something that happens overnight, and the seeming return to normalcy that so many predict has the rather alarming aspect of creating a sense of complacency that will only serve to "kick the can" down the road.

This week we look at the problem, and then muse upon what the more likely scenarios are that may play out. This is a longer version of a speech I gave this morning to the New Orleans Conference, where I also offered a path out of the problems. This letter will be a little more controversial than normal, but I hope it makes us all think about the very serious plight we have put ourselves in.

Let's review a few paragraphs I wrote last month: "I have seven kids. As our family grew, we limited the choices our kids could make; but as they grew into teenagers, they were given more leeway. Not all of their choices were good. How many times did Dad say, ‘What were you thinking?' and get a mute reply or a mumbled ‘I don't know.'

"Yet how else do you teach them that bad choices have bad consequences? You can lecture, you can be a role model; but in the end you have to let them make their own choices. And a lot of them make a lot of bad choices. After having raised six, with one more teenage son at home, I have come to the conclusion that you just breathe a sigh of relief if they grow up and have avoided fatal, life-altering choices. I am lucky. So far. Knock on a lot of wood.

"I have watched good kids from good families make bad choices, and kids with no seeming chance make good choices. But one thing I have observed. Very few teenagers make the hard choice without some outside encouragement or help in understanding the known consequences, from some source. They nearly always opt for the choice that involves the most fun and/or the least immediate pain, and then learn later that they now have to make yet another choice as a consequence of the original one. And thus they grow up. So quickly."

What Were We Thinking?

As a culture, the current mix of generations, especially in the US, has made some choices. Choices which, in hindsight, leave the adult in us asking, "What were we thinking?"

We made a series of bad choices and suffered the credit crisis because of it. Now, as a nation, we are in the middle of making an even worse choice, one that will leave us with no good choices - only choices of pretty bad to awful. Let's begin with a quote from a recent client letter by my friends at Hayman Advisors (in Dallas).

"Western democracies, communistic capitalists, and Japanese deflationists are concurrently engaging in what may be the largest, global financial experiment in history. Everywhere you turn, governments are running enormous fiscal deficits financed by printing money. The greatest risk of these policies is that the quantitative easing will persist until the value of the currency equals the actual cost of printing the currency (which is just slightly above zero).

"There have been 28 episodes of hyperinflation of national economies in the 20th century, with 20 occurring after 1980. Peter Bernholz (Professor Emeritus of Economics in the Center for Economics and Business (WWZ) at the University of Basel, Switzerland) has spent his career examining the intertwined worlds of politics and economics with special attention given to money. In his most recent book, Monetary Regimes and Inflation: History, Economic and Political Relationships, Bernholz analyzes the 12 largest episodes of hyperinflations - all of which were caused by financing huge public budget deficits through money creation. His conclusion: the tipping point for hyperinflation occurs when the government's deficit exceed 40% of its expenditures.

"According to the current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projections, US federal expenditures are projected to be $3.653 trillion in FY 2009 and $3.766 trillion in FY 2010, with unified deficits of $1.580 trillion and $1.502 trillion, respectively. These projections imply that the US will run deficits equal to 43.3% and 39.9% of expenditures in 2009 and 2010, respectively. To put it simply, roughly 40% of what our government is spending has to be borrowed. [Emphasis mine]

"One has to ask whether the US reached the critical tipping point. Beyond the quantitative measurements associated with government deficits and money creation, there exists a qualitative aspect to such a scenario that may be far more important. The qualitative perceptions of fiscal and monetary policies are impossible to control once confidence is lost. In fact, recent price action in metals, the dollar and commodities suggests that the market is already anticipating the future."

Let me point out that the deficits for 2010 assume a rather robust recovery, and so they could turn out to be much worse, especially if unemployment continues to rise and Congress decides (rightly) to extend unemployment benefits.

The interest on the national debt in fiscal 2008 was $451 billion. Even though the debt has exploded, the interest for fiscal 2009 is down to "only" $383 billion. My back-of-the-napkin estimate says that is over 20% of total 2009 tax receipts. I guess when you take interest rates to zero and really load up on short-term debt, it helps lower interest costs. (More on that future problem later.) http://www.savingsbonds.gov/govt/reports/ir/ir_expense.htm

The fiscal deficits are projected to be about 11% of nominal GDP, which is now roughly $14.3 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office currently projects that deficits will still be $1 trillion in ten years.

Last spring I published as an Outside the Box a very important paper by Dr. Woody Brock on why you cannot grow government debt well above nominal GDP without causing severe disruptions to the overall economic system. If you have not read it, or would like to read it again, click here.

I am going to reproduce just one table from that piece. Note that this was Woody's worst-case assumption, adding 8% of GDP to the debt each year, and not the 11% we are experiencing today. The Congressional Budget Office projections are now even worse, and that assumes a very rosy 3% or more growth in the economy for the next five years. Under Woody's scenario, the national debt would rise to $18 trillion by 2015, or well over 100% of GDP, depending on your growth assumptions. Take some time to study the tables, but I am going to focus on 2015 and not the outlier years.

$1.5 trillion dollars means that someone has to invest that much in Treasury bonds. Let's look at where the $1.5 trillion might come from. Let's assume that all of our trade deficit comes back to the US and is invested in US government bonds. Today we found out that the latest monthly trade deficit was just over $30 billion, or $370 billion annualized (which is half what it was a few years ago). That still leaves $1.13 trillion that needs to be found to be invested in US government debt (forget about business and consumer loans and mortgages).

Killing the Goose

$1.13 trillion is roughly 8% of total US GDP. That is a staggering amount. And again, that assumes that foreigners continue to put 100% of their fresh reserves into dollar-denominated assets. That is not a safe assumption, given the recent news stories about how governments are thinking about whether to create an alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. (And if I was watching the US run $1.5 trillion deficits with no realistic plans to cut back, I would be having private talks too. They would be idiots not to do so.)

There are only three sources for the needed funds: either an increase in taxes or people increasing savings and putting them into government bonds or the Fed monetizing the debt, or some combination of all three.

Now the Fed is in fact monetizing a portion of the debt as part of its quantitative easing program, and US consumers are saving more. Tax receipts are way down. I can tell you there is a great deal of angst in New Orleans tonight about the Fed monetization. This is traditionally a "gold bug" conference, and many of the participants and speakers see only inflation in our future.

Long-time readers know that I think the Fed has been able to get away with its rather large monetization program because of the massive deflationary forces let loose in the world by the credit crisis, which is forcing a monster deleveraging regime all over the world. Where has all the money gone that the Fed has printed? Right back onto the Fed's balance sheet as bank reserves. The banks are not lending, so this money does not get into the system in the usual manner associated with fractional reserve banking. Until that happens, and is accompanied by increasing wages and employment, inflation is not in our immediate future.

And this brings us to our conundrum. You cannot continue to run deficits significantly larger than nominal GDP for too long without risking the demise of the economic system. Ask Argentina or any of the other nations where hyperinflation occurred, as detailed in the study mentioned above. But we are in a deflationary environment, so the Fed can monetize the debt far more than any of us suppose without risking immediate and spiraling inflation.

But there is a limit to the Fed's ability to do so without causing real inflation. First, as long as the Fed is independent, at some point they will simply have to tell Congress we can no longer monetize the debt. While I am sure that some of you doubt they would do so, the Fed officials and economists I have been around are pretty adamant about that. There is a line they will not be pushed past. It may be further than I like, but it is there.

The Fed cannot simply buy up all the debt needed to fund the government. Again, no one on the FOMC would either advocate or allow that. That would in fact start us down a very dangerous path rather quickly. Therefore, they must have a large number of willing bond buyers outside the Fed. The good news, gentle reader, is that we will find someone to buy that debt. That is also the bad news. Let's go back 30 years.

Legend now has it that Paul Volker single-handedly took the inflation bull by the horns and ripped them off. Now, it took fortitude to do that in the face of certain recession and high unemployment. Those were not fun days. But his partner in the deed was the bond market. Bond investors simply demanded higher returns, because they were really worried about inflation.

At some point, if we do not get the government deficit under control, the bond market is once again going to react. Seemingly overnight, real (inflation-adjusted) rates are going to rise, and will do so rapidly. And I am not talking about 1 or 2%. You just cannot have 8% of a $14-trillion GDP go into US government debt every year, forever, at today's low real rates.

Let's play a thought game. If you take 8% of US consumer spending and save it, and it finds its way into government bonds, you have reduced consumer spending and therefore the actual GDP. But how about those who want to invest in stocks? Foreign bonds and currencies? New businesses? Loans of all types? How much are we going to have to save to get the necessary capital? How high will the saving rate have to be to finance all those other activities in a world where debt securitization is still anemic?

Some will point to Japan and their government debt-to-GDP ratio, which will soon be over 200%, a far cry from where we are today. Why can't we grow our debt to 200%? Because the Japanese have long had a culture of saving and investing in government bonds. It's what you do to support the country. But even they will run into a wall as their savings rate continues to drop, because so many of their citizens are retired and are now selling bonds to finance retirement. They too are running massive fiscal deficits, on the order of the size of the US deficits. And does anyone really want to have two lost decades, like Japan?

How long can we go before there is an upheaval? I don't know. The markets can remain irrational or complacent for a lot longer than most of us think. It could be years. Or not. Suddenly, it will be July 2008 and the bond vigilantes stampede.

But now, we seemingly can borrow with no consequences. The deflation that is in the air, plus the lack of bank lending holds, down the normal inflation impulses. We as a nation are leveraging ourselves up. We're partying like it's still 2005. The music is playing and we are dancing. Our Congress is trying to figure out how to run even higher deficits.

At some point, the consequences will be significant. There are two paths, and it is not clear which one we will take. First, we might see inflation kick in and actual rates rise. Since so much of our national debt is short-term debt, that means yet another rise in the deficit as rates rise. Mortgage rates rise, putting pressure on the housing market. There will be even more pressure on commercial mortgages. Consumer debt will be harder to get and cost more. It will mean funding costs for businesses will rise, and that hurts employment. It would be a return to the 1970s of high interest rates and stagnant growth in a very slow-growth environment.

Second, we could see deflation kick in and, even though rates stay more or less where they are, real (after-deflation) rates could rise as they did in the '30s and in Japan.

Some of my most knowledgeable friends argue for the inflation side, and others take the deflation side. I tend to think the Fed will fight deflation until we get inflation, but the consequences will not be pleasant. There is no benign path.

How can we avoid such an upheaval? The only way is to make some very difficult choices. There have to be some adults making the choices, as the teenagers now in control clearly cannot make them.

As I have written in the past, we can run deficits of 2% of GDP for a very long time, which in a few years would be about $300 billion. It is my belief that if the bond market and world investors saw a credible plan to put us on a path to a deficit no larger than 2% of GDP, the dire upheaval that is in our future could be avoided.

But that will mean some painful choices. It is not a matter of pain or no pain, it is just deciding when and how bad it will be. The longer we wait, the worse the consequences.

Let's Play Turn It Around

There are businessmen who are called turnaround specialists. They come into companies that are sick but have a basic competency, and that with the right management can be made into viable concerns. Generally, the choices the new management makes are painful to those involved, but they are necessary if the enterprise is to remain a going concern.

So, for the next few pages, I am going to suggest some things we can do to turn the US around. They are not easy fixes, and I know a lot of readers will not like what they read or will disagree on points. But something like this is going to have to be done, or we risk killing the goose.

First, we must acknowledge the deficit is out of control, and spending must be cut. If we raise taxes by as much as the Obama administration now wants to, we will most assuredly put the country back into a deep recession in 2011. Think what raising taxes in 1937 did to a nascent recovery. A $3-trillion-dollar budget is 20% of the US economy. That is just simply too much.

Quick fact. The most credible studies show that government expenditures exert no multiplier effect on the economy. Actually, they show them to be very slightly negative. This is not just in the US. However, the tax effect has a multiplier of 3! If we raise taxes by $300 billion in 2011, that will slam the economy in the face. Further, we will collect less taxes than projected, as economic activity will fall.

You cannot cure a too much debt problem with more debt. We cannot borrow our way into prosperity. Every crisis of the past decades has been a result of too much debt and leverage and we seem to want to repeat the past mistakes, hoping that this time it will be different. It won't.

Ok, now let's play the Turnaround Hammer Game.

+ We should start with a 5% acrossthe-board cut in spending in all programs. Federal employees, except for military personnel, should see a 5% cut in pay as part of that program. The average federal worker makes $75,419 a year, while the average in the private sector is $39,751. The rest of us are taking pay cuts in the form of higher taxes. No cost of living increases, etc. We are on an austerity program and need to do what it takes. If a program is deemed too important to be cut, then another program has to be cut more.

Then the next year another 2.5% cut across the board. And then an absolute freeze on the overall budget size until the deficit is 2% or less of GDP.

+ Social Security must be fixed now. We all know that it is going to have to be done, so why not just do it? Means testing should be a part of the mix. As an idea, for every $10,000 in income a retiree has, he gets $1,000 less in SS payments. And increase the retirement age down the road. When SS was launched, retirement age was 65. But the average life span was 65. There are other things we can do, but whatever our poison of choice is, we need to take it.

+ Medicare must be revised, with real health-care reform. The national debt is $56 trillion if we count unfunded liabilities, much of which is Medicare. It will become a nightmare around the middle of the next decade. Adding more expenses now without cutting elsewhere makes no sense. If we kill the goose, no one will get anything excect very empty promises.

Side note: there actually is a lot of waste in the system. Software should be written that analyzes every patient and procedure and produces an outcomes-based analysis of what is reasonable, rather than throwing every test at every patient. And the government should make sure, even if it has to spend the money, that the updated system is in place in every hospital and clinic in the country. And doctors should be given access to it so they can decide what type of care is appropriate to prescribe. And health-care reform means tort reform.

Today, I got a note from a friend of mine who just had yet another heart attack. It seems his stent is now blocked by 50%. He is a vet, and his primary care is the Veterans Administration. The Veterans Hospital system will not do a procedure to unblock the stent until it is 70% blocked. He does not have any money, so he is simply waiting to have another heart attack. I am really looking forward to government-run health care.

+ Each year we allow almost 1 million immigrants into the US, mostly family of people already here. I suggest that for the next two years we stop that. Instead, let anyone who can buy a home, passes basic screening, and can demonstrate the ability to pay for health insurance immigrate to the US and get a temporary green card. If they behave, then the card becomes permanent after four years.

We almost immediately put a floor on the housing market, absorb the excess homes, and within a year the housing-construction market, along with the jobs that are now gone, will be back. That is stimulus that costs the taxpayers nothing.

+ While I can't believe I am writing this, taxes are going to have to rise, if for no other reason than this Congress is hell bent on raising taxes. But rescinding the entire Bush tax cuts, plus adding a 10% surcharge as Congress wants to do in one fell swoop, is an absolute guarantee of a recession. So do it gradually over (say) 4 years, and then reinstitute the cuts when the deficit is under 2% of GDP. Remember the negative tax-multiplier effect of raising taxes. And the definitive work on that was done by Obama's chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Christina Romer.

We should consider a VAT tax and a major cut/reorganization of the corporate tax. We need to encourage corporations to hire more, and you do that by taxing less. Let's make our corporations more competitive, not less. Our taxes are much higher than those of any of our major competitors. And please forget that insane carbon tax. If you want to cut emissions, do it straightforwardly by raising taxes significantly on gasoline. Don't back-door it on consumers. (And I am NOT advocating such a policy.)

+ An aggressive tax benefit for new venture-capital money that is invested in new technologies will result in new industries. The only way we can grow our way out of this mess is to create whole new industries, like we did in the late '70s and '80s. (Think computers and the internet and telecom.)

+ Unemployment is likely to continue to rise and last longer than ever before. We have to take care of the basic needs of those who want work but can't find it. Unemployment insurance should be extended to those who are still looking for work past the time for benefits to expire, and some program of local volunteer service should be instituted as the price for getting continued benefits after the primary benefits time period runs out. Not only will this help the community, but it will get the person out into the world where he is more likely to meet someone who can give him a job. But the costs of this program should be revenue-neutral. Something else has to be cut.

+ We have to re-hink our military costs (I can't believe I am writing this!). We now spend almost 50% of the world's total military budget. Maybe we need to understand that we can't fight two wars and support hundreds of bases around the world. If we kill the goose, our ability to fight even one medium-sized war will be diminished. The harsh reality is that everything has to be re-evaluated. As an example, do we really need to be in Korea? If so, why can't Korea pay for much of the cost? They are now a rich nation. There are budgetary fiscal limits to being the policeman for the world.

+ Glass-Steagall, or some form of it, should be brought back. Banks, which are subject to taxpayer bailouts, should not be in the investment banking and derivatives-creating business. Derivatives, especially credit default swaps, should be on an exchange, and too big to fail must go. Banks have enough risk just making loans. Leverage should be dialed down, and hedge funds selling what amounts to naked call options in any form, derivative or otherwise, should be regulated.

Let me see, is there any group I have not offended yet? But something like I am suggesting is going to have to be done at some point. There is no way we can continue forever on the current path. At some point, we will hit the wall. The fight between the bug and the windshield always ends in favor of the windshield. The bond market is going to have to see a credible effort to get back to a reasonable deficit, or we risk a very difficult economic environment. The longer we wait, the worse it will be.

It is not going to be easy to persuade a majority of Americans that we need to do something now. More realistically, we are going to probably have to begin to experience a crisis of some type to get politicians motivated to do something.

This last Tuesday, I spoke to the Financial Leadership Association at the University of Texas at Dallas. It was mostly undergraduates, and my assigned topic was how financial research impacts our investment decisions. In touched on the topic above, in less detail, but pointing out that at some point we are going to have to bring the deficit under reasonable control. I got some push-back, as some could not understand why we just couldn't keep running deficits, as we simply owe it to ourselves. I tried to explain, but for a few of them I was not getting through (though I think most got it). And these were the finance students! I shudder to think what the sociology department would be like.

We are not going back to normal, although it is likely we will see some form of Statistical Recovery. But we cannot get complacent. Somewhere out there is the real potential for another crisis, which will dwarf the last one. You will not want to be long much of anything when it happens, except hedged or liquid investments. Though admittedly, this could go on for a long time. I just don't know how long "long" is. Other than it will be too long and then not long enough.

Detroit, the Red Sox and the Yankees and Traveling Too Much

I leave for Detroit next Friday and speak at a private conference on Saturday, then rush to the airport to fly to New York. My friend Barry Habib has second-row behind-home-plate tickets to what we hope is a Yankees - Boston Red Sox playoff championship game. That would have to be one of the most exciting games to watch - the emotions will run as high as in any sporting event around. So I find myself in the strange position of cheering on both the Yankees and the Red Sox in the first round of playoffs, and hoping that there is not a four-game sweep in the second.

Dinner with the guys at Yahoo Tech Ticker on Monday, and then an early train to Philadelphia, where I will speak at a conference hosted by my friends and partners at CMG. Dinner that night, a very early flight to Dallas, change airports, fly to Houston to speak at Salient Partners, then a late-night flight back to Dallas, up early to fly to Orlando to be with Jon Sundt of Altegris at the Commonwealth conference, fly back early (sigh) Saturday morning to Dallas, drive home, pack, and take an overnight flight to Buenos Aires to start a speaking tour with new Latin American partner Enrique Fynn, then on to Montevideo, Uruguay, Sao Paulo. and Rio de Janeiro, and then back to Montevideo for a day of R&R. Then back home Monday. I am already tired.

Tomorrow I get to hear Karl Rove (wonder if he will remember me from our Texas days?), Howard Dean, Charles Krauthammer, and a lot of friends, then a series of parties tomorrow night. I always enjoy coming to The Big Easy for this conference. (Note to Chinese and Spanish translators: the Big Easy is a nickname for New Orleans. I can't expect them to know that one.)

It is time to hit the send button, as I have to speak at my next session. You have a great week, and remember that together we will get through all the coming problems. Just keep paying attention.

Your worried about all the unintended consequences analyst,

John Mauldin

Another Finger of Instability

John Mauldin — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 03:00:00 GMT

Fingers of Instability
Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles
Stability Leads to Instability
A Stable Disequilibrium
3 Billion and Counting
The Texas Senate Race - A Game Changer
60 Years and Counting

"To trace something unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a feeling of power. Danger, disquiet, anxiety attend the unknown - the first instinct is to eliminate these distressing states. First principle: any explanation is better than none... The cause-creating drive is thus conditioned and excited by the feeling of fear ..." Friedrich Nietzsche

This weekend I turn 60 and have been a little more introspective than usual. I am often told that the letter I wrote well over three years ago on ubiquity and complexity theory and the future of the economy was the best letter I have ever done. I went back to read it, and it has aged well. I basically outlined how a financial crisis would unfold, and now it has.

On reflection, I think that there are perhaps other, even larger, events in our future than the recent credit crisis and recession; yet, just as in 2006, there is a great deal of complacency. But as we will see, there are fingers of instability building up that have the potential to create large disruptions, both positive and negative, in our future. And for the political junkies in the room, I offer a brief insight into what may be one of the more intriguing behind-the-scenes developments in recent years. Now, to the letter.

"Any explanation is better than none." - Nietzsche

And the simpler the explanation, it seems in the investment game, the better. "The markets went up because oil went down," we are told (except that when oil went up, then there was another reason for the movement of the markets). But we all intuitively know that things are far more complicated than that. However, as Nietzsche noted, dealing with the unknown can be disturbing, so we look for the simple explanation.

"Ah," we tell ourselves, "I know why that happened." With an explanation firmly in hand, we now feel we know something. And the behavioral psychologists note that this state actually releases chemicals in our brain that make us feel good. We become literally addicted to the simple explanation. The fact that what we "know" (the explanation for the unknowable) is irrelevant or even wrong is not important in achieving the chemical release. And thus we look for reasons.

The credit crisis happened because of Greenspan's monetary policy. Or maybe it was a collective mania. Or any number of things. Just as the proverbial butterfly flapping its wings in the Amazon triggers a storm in Europe, maybe an investor in St. Louis triggered the credit crisis. Crazy? Maybe not. Today we will look at what complexity theory tells us about the reasons for earthquakes, tornados, and the movement of markets. Then we look at how the world and that investor in St. Louis are all tied together in a critical state. Of course, what state and how critical are the issues.

Ubiquity, Complexity Theory, and Sandpiles

We are going to start our explorations with excerpts from a very important book by Mark Buchanan, called Ubiquity: Why Catastrophes Happen. I HIGHLY recommend it to those of you who, like me, are trying to understand the complexity of the markets. Not directly about investing, although he touches on it, it is about chaos theory, complexity theory, and critical states. It is written in a manner any layman can understand. There are no equations, just easy-to-grasp, well-written stories and analogies.

As kids, we all had the fun of going to the beach and playing in the sand. Remember taking your plastic buckets and making sandpiles? Slowly pouring the sand into an ever bigger pile, until one side of the pile started an avalanche?

Imagine, Buchanan says, dropping one grain of sand after another onto a table. A pile soon develops. Eventually, just one grain starts an avalanche. Most of the time it is a small one, but sometimes it builds on itself and it seems like one whole side of the pile slides down to the bottom.

Well, in 1987 three physicists, named Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Weisenfeld, began to play the sandpile game in their lab at Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York. Now, actually piling up one grain of sand at a time is a slow process, so they wrote a computer program to do it. Not as much fun, but a whole lot faster. Not that they really cared about sandpiles. They were more interested in what are called nonequilibrium systems.

They learned some interesting things. What is the typical size of an avalanche? After a huge number of tests with millions of grains of sand, they found that there is no typical number. "Some involved a single grain; others, ten, a hundred or a thousand. Still others were pile-wide cataclysms involving millions that brought nearly the whole mountain down. At any time, literally anything, it seemed, might be just about to occur."

The piles were indeed completely chaotic in their unpredictability. Now, let's read this next paragraph from Buchanan slowly. It is important, as it creates a mental image that helps me understand the organization of the financial markets and the world economy. (emphasis mine)

"To find out why [such unpredictability] should show up in their sandpile game, Bak and colleagues next played a trick with their computer. Imagine peering down on the pile from above, and coloring it in according to its steepness. Where it is relatively flat and stable, color it green; where steep and, in avalanche terms, 'ready to go,' color it red. What do you see? They found that at the outset the pile looked mostly green, but that, as the pile grew, the green became infiltrated with ever more red. With more grains, the scattering of red danger spots grew until a dense skeleton of instability ran through the pile. Here then was a clue to its peculiar behavior: a grain falling on a red spot can, by domino-like action, cause sliding at other nearby red spots. If the red network was sparse, and all trouble spots were well isolated one from the other, then a single grain could have only limited repercussions. But when the red spots come to riddle the pile, the consequences of the next grain become fiendishly unpredictable. It might trigger only a few tumblings, or it might instead set off a cataclysmic chain reaction involving millions. The sandpile seemed to have configured itself into a hypersensitive and peculiarly unstable condition in which the next falling grain could trigger a response of any size whatsoever."

Something only a math nerd could love? Scientists refer to this as a critical state. The term critical state can mean the point at which water would go to ice or steam, or the moment that critical mass induces a nuclear reaction, etc. It is the point at which something triggers a change in the basic nature or character of the object or group. Thus, (and very casually for all you physicists) we refer to something being in a critical state (or use the term critical mass) when there is the opportunity for significant change.

"But to physicists, [the critical state] has always been seen as a kind of theoretical freak and sideshow, a devilishly unstable and unusual condition that arises only under the most exceptional circumstances [in highly controlled experiments]... In the sandpile game, however, a critical state seemed to arise naturally through the mindless sprinkling of grains."

Thus, they asked themselves, could this phenomenon show up elsewhere? In the earth's crust, triggering earthquakes, or as wholesale changes in an ecosystem - or as a stock market crash? "Could the special organization of the critical state explain why the world at large seems so susceptible to unpredictable upheavals?" Could it help us understand not just earthquakes, but why cartoons in a third-rate paper in Denmark could cause worldwide riots?

Buchanan concludes in his opening chapter, "There are many subtleties and twists in the story ... but the basic message, roughly speaking, is simple: The peculiar and exceptionally unstable organization of the critical state does indeed seem to be ubiquitous in our world. Researchers in the past few years have found its mathematical fingerprints in the workings of all the upheavals I've mentioned so far [earthquakes, eco-disasters, market crashes], as well as in the spreading of epidemics, the flaring of traffic jams, the patterns by which instructions trickle down from managers to workers in the office, and in many other things. At the heart of our story, then, lies the discovery that networks of things of all kinds - atoms, molecules, species, people, and even ideas - have a marked tendency to organize themselves along similar lines. On the basis of this insight, scientists are finally beginning to fathom what lies behind tumultuous events of all sorts, and to see patterns at work where they have never seen them before."

Now, let's think about this for a moment. Going back to the sandpile game, you find that as you double the number of grains of sand involved in an avalanche, the likelihood of an avalanche becomes 2.14 times more likely. We find something similar with earthquakes. In terms of energy, the data indicate that earthquakes become four times less likely each time you double the energy they release. Mathematicians refer to this as a "power law," a special mathematical pattern that stands out in contrast to the overall complexity of the earthquake process.

Fingers of Instability

So what happens in our game? "... after the pile evolves into a critical state, many grains rest just on the verge of tumbling, and these grains link up into 'fingers of instability' of all possible lengths. While many are short, others slice through the pile from one end to the other. So the chain reaction triggered by a single grain might lead to an avalanche of any size whatsoever, depending on whether that grain fell on a short, intermediate or long finger of instability."

Now, we come to a critical point in our discussion of the critical state. Again, read this with the markets in mind (again, emphasis mine):

"In this simplified setting of the sandpile, the power law also points to something else: the surprising conclusion that even the greatest of events have no special or exceptional causes. After all, every avalanche large or small starts out the same way, when a single grain falls and makes the pile just slightly too steep at one point. What makes one avalanche much larger than another has nothing to do with its original cause, and nothing to do with some special situation in the pile just before it starts. Rather, it has to do with the perpetually unstable organization of the critical state, which makes it always possible for the next grain to trigger an avalanche of any size."

Now, let's couple this idea with a few other concepts. First, Nobel laureate Hyman Minsky points out that stability leads to instability. The more comfortable we get with a given condition or trend, the longer it will persist and then, when the trend fails, the more dramatic the correction. The problem with long-term macroeconomic stability is that it tends to produce unstable financial arrangements. If we believe that tomorrow and next year will be the same as last week and last year, we are more willing to add debt or postpone savings in favor of current consumption. Thus, says Minsky, the longer the period of stability, the higher the potential risk for even greater instability when market participants must change their behavior. (And, three years later, we can now all see that truth. But it was not as obvious to a lot of people in 2006.)

Relating this to our sandpile, the longer that a critical state builds up in an economy, or in other words, the more "fingers of instability" that are allowed to develop a connection to other fingers of instability, the greater the potential for a serious "avalanche."

Or, maybe a series of smaller shocks lessens the long reach of the fingers of instability, giving a paradoxical rise to even more apparent stability. As the late Hunt Taylor wrote, in 2006:

"Let us start with what we know. First, these markets look nothing like anything I've ever encountered before. Their stunning complexity, the staggering number of tradable instruments and their interconnectedness, the light-speed at which information moves, the degree to which the movement of one instrument triggers nonlinear reactions along chains of related derivatives, and the requisite level of mathematics necessary to price them speak to the reality that we are now sailing in uncharted waters.

"... I've had 30-plus years of learning experiences in markets, all of which tell me that technology and telecommunications will not do away with human greed and ignorance. I think we will drive the car faster and faster until something bad happens. And I think it will come, like a comet, from that part of the night sky where we least expect it."

A second related concept is from game theory. The Nash equilibrium (named after John Nash) is a kind of optimal strategy for games involving two or more players, whereby the players reach an outcome to mutual advantage. If there is a set of strategies for a game with the property that no player can benefit by changing his strategy while (if) the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.

A Stable Disequilibrium

So we ended up in a critical state of what Paul McCulley called a "stable disequilibrium." We have players of this game from all over the world tied inextricably together in a vast dance through investment, debt, derivatives, trade, globalization, international business, and finance. Each player works hard to maximize their own personal outcome and to reduce their exposure to "fingers of instability."

But the longer we go on, asserts Minsky, the more likely and violent an "avalanche" is. The more the fingers of instability can build. The more that state of stable disequilibrium can go critical on us.

Go back to 1997. Thailand began to experience trouble. The debt explosion in Asia began to unravel. Russia was defaulting on its bonds. Things on the periphery, small fingers of instability, began to impinge on fault lines in the major world economies. Something that had not been seen before happened: the historically sound and logical relationship between 29- and 30-year bonds broke down. Then country after country suddenly and inexplicably saw that relationship in their bonds begin to correlate, an unheard-of event. A diversified pool of debt was suddenly no longer diversified.

The fingers of instability reached into Long Term Capital Management and nearly brought the financial world to its knees.

So, where are the fingers of instability today? Where are the fault lines that could trigger another crisis? Are there any early warning signs? I see two possibilities, one positive and one negative.

Chad Starliper sent me the following graph. It shows the debt-to-GDP ratio for the US, adding in various levels of debt. For instance, the ratio of debt to GDP for all levels of government debt is 87%. But if you add household and business debt along with the GSE (government-sponsored enterprises) like Fannie and Freddie, the ratio rises to 331%. If you add in future benefits of Social Security and Medicare, the number becomes more like 1,000%.

The Obama administration tells us that the government deficit is going to be well over $1 trillion a year for at least ten years. And that does not take into account the outlier years in the 2020s when the really heavy lifting of Social Security and Medicare kicks in.

There is a truism that goes a little like, "If something can't happen, then it won't." Let me make a prediction. We won't have a trillion-dollar deficit in ten years. Why? Because it can't happen. The market will simply not allow it.

As I have written, we can run large deficits almost forever, as long as the deficits are less than nominal GDP. While it may not be the wise thing to do, it does not bring down the system.

But when you start adding to the deficit in amounts significantly larger than nominal GDP, there is a limit. Each dollar, like the grains of sand, adds to the potential instability of the system. Is it $2 trillion more? $3 trillion? No one can know, but the longer it goes, the worse the ensuing financial earthquake will be.

The current political class and their intentions are dangerously close to killing the golden goose. It is one thing to steal the eggs; it is an altogether different thing to kill the goose through ignorance of the consequences. And the size of the deficit, for as long as they plan to have it, will most assuredly kill the goose.

Just as I was writing in 2006 about the potential for a crisis, and yet the party went on for quite some time, I think the party can limp along now. But there will come a point when the party is over. Interest rates on the long end will rise precipitously, forcing mortgages up and making the deficit even worse. It will be an even worse crisis than the one we have just gone through. And there will be fewer options for policy makers, and none of them will be good or pleasant. And it will take most people unawares. They will see the current trend and project it into the future. And they will be hit hard.

Can we avoid this calamity? Yes, we can wrestle the US budget deficit back under some kind of control, close to nominal GDP or on a clear trajectory to get there within a reasonable time (say, a few years). As noted above, we can run deficits close to nominal GDP almost forever. But there is no political willpower to do that now. And so, the market will at some point force the hand of the political class. That investor in St. Louis, or China or (????) will decide not to buy government debt at such low rates. The avalanche will start. And everyone will be surprised at the ferocity of the crisis. Except you, gentle reader. You have been warned.

Let me re-emphasize that point. If we do not get our act together, the results could be truly serious. And it is not just the US. Japan, as I have written, unless it changes, will hit the wall in the next few years. There are some really sick actors in Europe. You are going to have to be far more nimble and prepared for this next crisis, should it arise, than you were for the last one. Over the next few months, I will be devoting some space to helping us think through how we do that.

3 Billion and Counting

And now for something a little more positive. From the beginning of the wireless revolution and the development of the internet, it was not until 2001 that we finally had one billion people connected. It only took another six years to add another billion. And sometime in 2011, somewhere in the world, we will add yet another billion. We are adding some 70,000 people a day, with smarter and cheaper computers, phones, and netbooks. By some estimates, there will be five billion connected to the network by 2015.

A study done in 2005 of 21 developing countries by Leonard Waverman of the London Business School "... showed that an extra 10 mobile phones per 100 people in a typical developing country leads to an additional 0.59% of growth in GDP per person." (Jump Point)

Think of each one of those additional connected people as a grain of sand. We have already seen a large surge in productivity from the internet and mobile phones. Farmers in India now know what the prices are for their products and don't have to take lowball offers from middlemen. Fishermen in Indonesia can call around and find where they can get the best price for their day's catch.

Tom Hayes argues in his book Jump Point that, because of the growing connectivity, rather large changes are coming to the way we organize our lives. It is a very interesting book and one that I will review in depth at some point.

But what Hayes calls the Jump Point is what I referred to as critical mass. "In mathematics it is called a 'jump discontinuity.' In engineering, this is known as a 'step phase change.' In climatology, it is called an 'abrupt delta.' I call it a Jump Point - a change in the environment, in this case the business environment, so startling that we have no choice but to regroup and rethink the future." (from the introduction)

Not all of the changes are benign. The potential for business and marketing models to be turned on their head is rather striking. I recommend the book to those who are thinking about the future. It is easy to read, provocative, and well written. You can get it at Amazon.com.

I wrote this three years ago: "Today more than ever your portfolio should be targeting absolute return strategies. In a world with fingers of instability that may be connected in ways we have not seen in the past, caution is the order of the day. If we do see a slowing US economy later this year, the average complacent investor is not going to be happy as his diversified portfolio all seems to be going south at the same time."

That is still true today. To talk with my recommended managers around the world you can go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws if your net worth is $1.5 million or more. If you are in the US and are still on your way to becoming an accredited investor, you can sign up at http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp. (In this regard, I am president and a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, member FINRA.)

The Texas Senate Race - A Game Changer

Indulge me for a moment while I delve into a little inside politics. I used to be very involved in Texas politics, but when I sold my business in 1999 and had to go back to work for a living, I mostly left out political commitments, although I do keep up and have a lot of friends. There is something happening in Texas that has the potential to shake things up, and I thought I would give my readers a heads up.

Long-time Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison has let everyone know that she intends to come back to Texas and run for governor next year against current governor Rick Perry, who is going to run for his third term. Hutchison has indicated that she will resign sometime this fall, which will give Perry the right to appoint a Senator to fill the seat. He has told associates that if he does, the appointment will be a game changer. Who in the Texas political landscape could be termed a game changer? Not one of the half dozen middle-aged white guys who would love the appointment. Not that some of them would be bad choices, just not a game changer. Another woman? There is not one who has run a statewide race and has the necessary experience.

Then there is my long-time good friend Michael Williams. Michael has run statewide three times as the chairman of the Texas Rail Road Commission which, despite the name, is responsible for energy as well as railroads. It is a very powerful post in Texas. He is wildly popular with the grass roots and conservatives in the state. He is one of the best speakers on the stump in the country. He has a powerful command of the energy problem we face. He is totally electable as a Senator. And he is black.

Now that is the definition of a game changer. He will burst on the national scene with a presence. If Governor Perry truly wants to do something that will change the game not just for Texas but for the country, he will appoint Michael at his first opportunity and allow him to run in the primary as a sitting Senator. Michael will be at my birthday party Saturday night, along with his beautiful and extremely smart wife, Donna. Next week on the 12^th of October I will be hosting a small private fundraiser at my home for those interested in meeting Michael. You can click here to respond.

And for the locals wanting to help in the campaign, Michael's web site is http://www.williamsfortexas.com.

60 Years and Counting

I turn 60 on Sunday, although we will be celebrating with parties on Friday and Saturday. For whatever reason, when I turned 50 I was apprehensive. I can quite honestly say that I am excited about this birthday, and the future. For all the problems we are facing as a country and as a world linked together, I think this is the most exciting time to be alive in the history of the world. And the next 30 years are going to be much better than the last 60!

And you, gentle reader, are part of my reason to be so optimistic about the future. I continue to be amazed that so many people find the writings of this humble analyst to be worth their time. In truth, we are all constantly bombarded with more and more emails, advertisements, phone calls, letters, books, papers, and information, and it is getting harder and harder to focus on what is really critical. You give me the most important gift that anyone can receive in the Information Age, and that is the gift of your attention. You have hundreds of opportunities to divert it elsewhere, and yet you give me some of your precious time. I am grateful, and will always strive to make this letter worthy of your interest.

Finally, my good friend Sir Ed Artis of Knightsbridge fame, who is now in the Philippines, writes that he urgently needs funds to ship needed medical and relief supplies that have been already donated and are waiting on the docks. The disaster in the Philippines is quite tragic and calls out to those of us around the world who can help. You can go to http://currentmissions.blogspot.com/ to learn more and to donate.

My daughter Tiffani points out that I have guests arriving for my party and I need to hit the send button, so have a great week. I am going to run and enjoy my friends and some great Texas barbeque.

Your always in a critical state analyst,

John Mauldin

Welcome to the New Normal

John Mauldin — Sat, 26 Sep 2009 04:59:00 GMT

What We See
And What We Don't See
The Statistical Recovery
A Double-Dip Recession?
Welcome to the New Normal
Birthdays, New Orleans, and then the Road Trip from Hell

Unemployment is high and rising. But if the recession is over, won't employment start to rise? The quick answer is no. We look deeper into the Statistical Recovery and find yet more reasons to be concerned about near-term deflation. This week we consider all things unemployment and ponder the need to create at least 15 million jobs in the next five years to return to a full-employment economy - and the implications for both the US and world economies if we don't. Economic is often about what we can clearly see, and yet it is understanding what we can't see that gives us true insight. We start with a collection of facts that we can see and then begin a thought exercise to find the implications.

What We See

First, the unemployment rate is now officially at 9.7%. We are approaching the official high we last saw at the end of the double-dip1982 recession. In the chart below, notice that unemployment rose throughout 1980 and then began to decline, before rising rapidly as the economy entered the second recession within two years. Also notice the rapid drop in unemployment following that recession, as opposed to the recessions of 1991-92 and 2001-02, which have been characterized as jobless recoveries. Unemployment was as low as 3.8% in 2000 and saw a cycle low of 4.4% in early 2007.

(For the record, all this data is available on the Bureau of Labor Statistics website. There is a treasure trove of data. They are quite open about what they do and how they do it. When I call to ask a question, they are quite helpful. How people interpret the data is not their fault.)

This headline unemployment number (9.7%) is what we see when we read the paper. What we typically don't see is the real number of unemployed. For instance, if you have not actively looked for a job in the last four weeks, even if you would like one, you are not counted as unemployed. You are called a "marginally attached" or "discouraged" worker. Often there are very good reasons for this. You could be sick, dealing with a family emergency, going back to school, or not have transportation.

Right now, about one-third of marginally attached workers actively want jobs but have not bothered to look because they believe there are no jobs in their area, at least not for them. If you add that extra 758,000 to the unemployment data, you get what is called U-4 unemployment, which today is 10.2%. If you count all marginally attached workers the unemployment number is 11% (U-5 unemployment).

And if you add those who are employed part-time for economic reasons (i.e., they can't get full-time jobs) the unemployment number rises to 16.8%. (That is called U-6 unemployment.)

Now, stay with me for the next two tables taken directly from the BLS website. The first is the total number of people in the US civilian work force. Notice how each year the number of potential workers rises. In fact, the number of workers has risen by about 15 million over the last ten years. This is from population growth and from immigration. Also notice that the normal rise did not happen last year. That is because the number of discouraged workers has risen rapidly and, as noted above, they are not counted. We will revisit this point later. But for now, there are 154,577,000 people in the available work force.

Next we look at the tables for the actual level of employment. Here we note that we are down almost 8 million jobs sincd the onset of this recession, and that there are almost 15 million people unemployed.

Going back to the part-time workers, there are roughly 9 million people who are working part-time because of business conditions, or those are the only jobs they could find. The average work week is at an all-time low of 33 hours. The chart below is from my friend David Rosenberg.

David wrote in a special report today:

"What does all this mean? It means that when the economy does begin to recover, when we finally get to the other side of the mountain, companies are going to raise their labour input first by lifting the workweek from its record low. Just to get back to the pre-recession level of 33.8 hours would be equivalent to hiring three million workers. And, the record number of people working part-time against their will are going to be pushed back into full-time, which will be great news for them, but not so great news for the 125,000 - 150,000 new entrants into the labour market every month. They won't have it so easy because employers are going to tap their existing under-utilized resources first since that is common sense. Also keep in mind that there are at least four million jobs in retail, financial, construction and manufacturing jobs lost this cycle that are likely not coming back. In fact, the number of unemployed who were let go for permanent reasons as opposed to temporary layoff rose by more than five million this cycle. This compares to the 1.2 million increase in the 2001 tech-led recession and in the 1990-91 housing-led recession (when Ross Perot talked about the sucking sound of jobs into Mexico)."

Then there is the matter of average weekly earnings. If you adjust for inflation, workers are making roughly what they did in 1980. The chart is straight from the BLS website.

And What We Don't See

Those are the facts. Now it's time to look at what we don't see, and what you don't read or hear from the mainstream media.

We saw above that we are adding about 1.5 million workers to the workplace every year. That means over the next five years we are going to need 7.5 million jobs just to maintain that growth, or about 125,000 a month. That is on the low side of what economists normally estimate, which is around 150,000 per month. If we used the 150,000 estimate, it would mean we need 9 million jobs.

There are at least 1 million (and probably more like 2 million) discouraged workers who would take jobs if the economy got better. You can derive that number by going back to early 2007 and seeing the level of discouraged workers. That means, by the end of 2014 we are going to have 163 million people in the work force (see table above).

Today we have 139.6 million jobs, and that number is likely to slip at least another half million (last month the economy lost 216,000 jobs, with a very suspicious birth-death ratio accounting for a lot of job creation). So let's call it 139 million current jobs.

Let's assume that we would like to get back to a 5% unemployment rate. That would not be stellar, but it would certainly be better than where we are today. Five percent unemployment in late 2014 will mean 8.1 million unemployed. To get to 5% unemployment we will have to create 14 million jobs in the five years from 2010-2014. (163 million in labor pool minus 8 million unemployed is 155 million jobs. We now have 139 million jobs, so the difference is roughly 15 million.) Plus the equivalent of 3 million jobs that Rosenberg estimates, just to get back to an average work week. And maybe the extra 1.5 million a year I mentioned above.

But let's ignore those latter jobs and round it off to 15 million. Let's hope that by the beginning of next year we stop losing jobs. That means that to get back to 5% unemployment within five years we need to see, on average, the creation of 250,000 jobs per month. As an AVERAGE!!!!!

Look at the table below. It is the number of jobs added or lost for the last ten years. Do you see a year that averaged 250,000? No.

If you take the best year, which was 2006, you get an average monthly growth of 232,000. If you average the ten years from 1999, you get average monthly job growth of 50,000. If you take the average job growth from 1989 until now, you get an average of 91,000 a month. If you take the best ten years I could find, which would be 1991-2000, the average is still only 150,000. That is a long way from 250,000.

Want to get back to 4%? Add another 25,000 jobs a month to 2006.

Let's jump forward to next September. We will need at least 1.5 million jobs to take into account growth in the population. Plus another half million jobs that we are likely to lose before we start to grow again. What is the likelihood of average job growth of 160,000 a month? Anyone want to take the "overs" bet?

Go back to 2003, the year after the end of the last recession. A few hundred thousand jobs were created. Why so slow? Because employers gave more time to those who were already employed and to part-time workers. Because of the near-certain loss of jobs for the next few months and the slow recovery, it is a very real possibility that unemployment will still be well over 10% a year from now.

Even with robust growth of 200,000 jobs a month thereafter for the next two years, unemployment will still be close to or over 9%. That would only be an additional 1.8 million jobs (making the most optimistic assumptions) over the new jobs needed for population growth.

A Double-Dip Recession?

And that is before this administration makes the economically suicidal move to raise the top tax rate by 10%. The popular image is that those who pay the highest tax rate are Wall Street execs, bankers, and corporate moguls. The reality is that 75% of them are small business owners, and they are responsible for the large majority of new jobs that are going to be needed, not to mention a large part of consumer spending. If you tax them more you are going to get fewer jobs (as they will have less to invest) and less consumer spending.

A tax increase of the size being contemplated, with unemployment at today's level, will guarantee a double-dip recession, which of course means that unemployment will rise, not fall. Go back and look at that chart on unemployment. Notice the very steep rise in the second recession of the early '80s. That is what we could be facing.

Without getting too political, think about elections in 2010 with unemployment levels still rising. And fast-forward to 2012, with deficits (optimistically) projected to be almost $1 trillion and rising. With a tax increase giving us another recession? Will the bond market provide another $4 trillion? My question is, from where?

There has never been a period of serious inflation in the US without wage inflation. But real incomes are falling, and there is little reason to believe we will see wage pressures within the next few years. The opposite is likely to be the case.

Today's Wall Street Journal tells us that 5 million people have been unemployed for over 6 months. And the longer you are unemployed, the harder it is to get a job. That means you have to settle for a job with less income than you had before.

The only group to see a rise in employment? Those over the age of 55, as they have to take a job, any job, so they can save for retirement.

The Statistical Recovery

The economy is in the process of bottoming. The year-over-year comparisons are getting easier. We will find that new level of spending and economic activity and grow from there. But it is going to be awhile before we get back to full employment. While the numbers may say recovery, it is not going to feel like one.

Let's review quickly what I have written about the last four weeks. We have enormous excess capacity - capacity utilization is about 68%. Banks are cutting back on their loans, and consumers and businesses are borrowing less. Housing is likely to be in a funk for at least two years. We are deleveraging, which is causing the velocity of money to slow.

All of this is very deflationary. Will the Fed print enough money to reflate the economy? You better hope so. Will we have to deal with it later? Of course. We have no good choices. We are in for a long five years, at the least. Yes, there will be opportunities, and new industries will be created. But it won't happen overnight.

Welcome to the New Normal.

Birthdays, New Orleans, and then the Road Trip from Hell

Next weekend I celebrate my 60^th birthday, and family and friends from around the world are flying in. We are going to party for at least 2-3 days. All I can say is, I have a very eclectic group of friends and it is going to be fun for all of us. If I write a letter, it will be earlier in the week.

I will be in New Orleans the following weekend, then start a 17-day trip with only a few nights in my bed, and every day a plane or new city. Although I enjoy traveling and meeting people, this may be a little much, though I must say I am looking forward to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It has been awhile since I have been south.

I stopped by to visit my #2 daughter (Melissa) last night. She works in a local watering hole while going to school. It is quite popular and is usually quite crowded. Last evening it was untypically quiet.

I asked, "What's up?" The manager and Melissa began talking about how slow things were getting, about how friends who were regulars had lost their jobs and had to move back in with parents. With few exceptions, it is slower than a few years ago everywhere I go. A recent Gallop poll said 71% of people are cutting back and 90% are watching what they are spending. 33% said their companies are cutting back on hiring.

Every poll or survey I see shows businesses deciding to cut back. Talking with my kids (the six who are young and in the work force), it is a rather difficult time. But then I think that I had to enter the workforce in 1975, not a very good year or decade. And we all made it, if not very easily. We lived very modestly (to say the least) for those first years.

And so it goes. Each generation has to learn how to deal with adversity and the problems of starting out. Many of those in my generation are now trying to figure out how to deal with a retirement that does not look nearly as comfortable as it did a few years ago.

I still hope we can Muddle Through.

Have a great week. I see parties, barbeque, golf, and lots of friends in my week ahead. And you make some time to enjoy life as well.

Your glad to get to 60 analyst,

John Mauldin

The Hole in FDIC

John Mauldin — Sat, 19 Sep 2009 04:15:00 GMT

Elements of Deflation, Part 3
Outrageous! - Artificial Deflation!
If You Are in a Hole, Stop Digging!
The Hole in the FDIC
How Can Just Four Stocks Be 40% of the NYSE Volume?
New Orleans and a Mauldin Migration to Europe

This week we continue to look at what powers the forces of deflation. As I continue to stress, getting the fundamental question answered correctly is the most important issue we face going forward. And the problem is that we cannot use the usual historical comparisons. This week we look at one more factor: bank lending. I give you a sneak preview of what will be an explosive report from Institutional Risk Analytics about the problems in the banking sector. Are you ready for the FDIC to be down as much as $400 billion? This should be an interesting, if sobering, letter.

But first, Dennis Gartman and Greg Weldon will be joining me next week for another Conversation with John Mauldin. This is my subscription service where I sit down with my friends and let you eavesdrop on our conversations (we also transcribe them). Dennis and Greg are two of the premier traders and data mavens in the world, and we will be all over the world of commodities, currencies, and the markets. I can tell you, it will be one exciting conversation for me.

It won't be too long before it will be time to do another Geopolitical Conversation with George Friedman. George and I are doing a conversation quarterly, and right now it is a bonus if you subscribe to Conversations with John Mauldin, but the plan is to offer it separately for $59. Now, here is the important part: all current subscribers and anyone who subscribes now will receive these Geopolitical Conversations free, as a thank you. If you have not yet subscribed, you can do so and receive a discount by clicking the link and typing in the code JM47 to subscribe for $149. This is a large discount from our regular price of $199; plus, we are including the bonus Geopolitical Conversations that are worth $59. And now, to the regular letter.

Outrageous! - Artificial Deflation!

Speaking of deflation, let me mention something I find totally outrageous. Normally, I actually take up for the bureaucrats who are stuck with the task of trying to monitor inflation. It is a tough job, and like Monday-morning quarterbacks, everybody thinks you should have done it differently. I can understand the rationale for hedonic measurements, housing rent equivalents, etc., even if I don't agree with them. You have to set some rules and live with them. But the latest imbroglio is disgraceful.

It seems the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the CPI next week, will treat the subsidy received by those 800,000 car buyers who bought a car in the "Cash for Clunkers" program as if the price of a car fell by $4,500. Really? My tax dollars account for nothing?

This does several things. It will decrease the inflation used to adjust the GDP for this quarter. Not the end of the world, but annoying But what really matters is that the CPI is used to calculate Social Security increases and interest paid on TIPS.

If I tried to defraud one of my clients using such accounting legerdemain, I would be shut down, sued, and taken to court (at the minimum) by the host of regulators who look over my shoulder. And I should be! You don't make such changes in the rules to your own benefit. But that is what the BLS did. This policy should be overruled immediately. There are enough deflationary forces in the world without having to artificially create some more. OK, off the soapbox and onto the banking system.

If You Are in a Hole, Stop Digging!

Right outside my office window I am watching what is to me a visual parable for the banking crisis that has beset the world. I lease a rather large home in a nice, quiet neighborhood in Dallas, and moved my office here last year, as we can use the extra bedrooms and sitting areas. Besides saving a lot (!) of money (always a good thing), it gives me a ten-second commute as I walk down the hall to the back of the house. Tiffani and I each save over a month in driving time a year. That is huge.

My quiet neighborhood changed a few weeks ago. Trying to sleep in the morning after the Paul McCartney concert, I awoke to find with my bed literally vibrating. Earthquakes in Texas? No, it seems my neighbor decided he needed a bigger home, and the first thing to be done was to tear down the old one, which they did rather efficiently, if not quietly, over the next few days. We literally had glasses and other items vibrating in the house.

Then, after removing a large pecan tree, they proceeded to dig 25-foot-deep holes (26 of them!) and fill them with iron and concrete piers on my side of the lot. The plans called for a rather large basement, and the very experienced builders (exceptionally nice guys) wanted to make sure the earth did not move, causing my home to have problems. So for three days I had a very noisy drill literally ten feet away from my window (I wrote an e-letter during one of those days).

Now, since the other sides of the lot were on a street or backed up to an alley, they did not put in piers there. No homes to worry about. I did not think much of it, as these guys had built some of the biggest and nicest homes in the area. They then proceeded to dig a very large hole, as the basement was going to be quite expansive. It turns out you have to dig the hole bigger than the actual size of the basement, since you have to have room to put up forms to pour concrete, etc. And you have to excavate on an angle. At the end of the process, most of the lot was slanting downward toward the end of the hole near the alley.

Then the clouds darkened, and the builders realized we were in for a little rain. (You can start to guess!) They took precautions and put heavy plastic over the sides of the hole to keep the sides dry. And then the rains came. Texas rains. The plastic was pulled from its wall and the street side of the hole began to literally wash back into the hole as we watched, going all the way back to and under the sidewalk. The poor builders showed up and began the process of trying to mitigate the damage, but it had been done and only got worse as it continued to rain for three days. The next morning I was the temporary owner of lake-front property. Those piers on my side were starting to be exposed.

They brought in crews for emergency repairs to the sides of the hole, and they really went after it. What to do then? It seems that the only thing to do was to fill the hole back up and start all over, only this time putting piers around the whole property. Which is what they are doing now. But since they had taken all the original dirt away, they are now having to take dirt from the rest of the property to fill the hole they will redig later.

It seems to me the banking crisis was somewhat like that. We allowed our banks to dig a hole, but we only had regulations on one side of the hole, and a patchwork of systems to shore up the securitizations, credit default swaps, and the entire shadow banking system.

Then the rains came and the whole thing fell apart. What we are now engaged in is the process of filling in the hole and putting rules in place to keep the system intact when we start the next building project. And since we hauled off all the old dirt or, in the case of the banks, had to write off hundreds of billions of dollars, we now have to find new dirt to fill in the hole. A very expensive operation, to say the least. Remind me never to build a house.

The Hole in the FDIC

And speaking of holes, let's look at a huge one that is looming at the FDIC. Institutional Risk Analytics (IRA) is maybe the premier bank-analyst service in the country. They charge over six figures for their flagship service. Good friend and Maine fishing buddy Chris Whalen runs the show and was kind enough to send me some of his new data, which they have not yet released to the public. You get it here first. (www.institutionalriskanalytics.com)

IRA takes the data from the FDIC and crunches it with their own set of risk parameters. While the FDIC has a little over 400 banks on its current "watch" list, IRA gives 2,256 banks an "F." They project that over 1,000 banks will either fold or be taken over during the current cycle. To date in 2009, a total of 92 banks have failed across the country, compared with 25 for all of 2008, according to the FDIC. 900 more to go. Ouch.

How much money are we talking about? The banks rated F have total insured assets of $4.46 trillion. So far in this cycle banks that have been taken over by the FDIC are showing losses of 25%!

Turning to a note from IRA: "An important point in the analysis is that estimated losses for failed bank resolutions by the FDIC are running around a quarter of failed bank assets, a level much higher than between 1980 and 1995, when failures cost an average 11 percent. Our firm's long-held view of the likely loss rate peak for the US banks in this credit cycle is 2x 1990 loss rates or, as noted by the IMF, around 4 percent of total loans. Since total loans and leases held by all FDIC-insured banks was some $7.7 trillion as of Q2 2009, the IMF estimate implies a cumulative loss of over $300 billion.

"If you start with the internal assumptions used by our firm that roughly half of the banks currently rated "F" or some 1,000 banks will fail and/or be merged with another institution and that the loss to the FDIC bank insurance fund will be approximately 20-25% of total assets, then the cost of these resolutions to the FDIC through the full credit downturn could be in excess of $400-500 billion. Keep in mind that in making this alarming estimate we ignore other banks currently in ratings strata above "F" and that some of these institutions may indeed fail as well. Also, our overall "worst case" or maximum probable loss ("MPL") for large US banks above $10 billion in assets is $800 billion through the current credit cycle."

From almost $60 billion last fall, the FDIC's reserves have been drawn down to only about $10 billion today (after set-asides), a 16-year low. A quick look at the FDIC's own data shows us how inadequate those reserves are compared to the deposits they are now insuring. The FDIC only has about two-tenths of one cent for every dollar of assets it covers. Look at this chart from my friends at Casey Research.

The FDIC can borrow $100 billion in an emergency line of credit, and through 2010 it can get another $500 billion. But if and when that money is borrowed, it will have to be paid back. Remember the money that was lost in the savings and loan crisis 20 years ago? The FDIC had to borrow a mere $15 billion. We are still paying that 30-year loan back.

The FDIC has two options to replenish its insurance fund in the short run: it can charge banks higher fees or it can take the more radical step of borrowing from the US Treasury. It has already levied a "special fee" that garnered over $5 billion.

Now, let's hold that thought, as we will come back to it in a minute.

A growing economy requires a growing credit market. If credit is shrinking it signals a receding economy. But banks are having to raise capital, and that means many banks are having to curtail lending. First, let's look at a chart of total bank loans for the last five years. Notice that there was a big jump in late 2008 as commercial paper became hard to obtain and businesses hit their credit lines. Since then banks have been cutting back.

This next chart is again total bank loans but goes back to 1947. Notice that loan growth was relatively smooth with only a few sideways drifts during recessions and never dropping significantly, as it has in the last year. And the data suggests that banks intend to keep reducing their loan exposure as they try to increase their capital (at least the large number of banks that have problems).

Consumer credit-card lending is down. Banks have cut their outstanding and unused bank lines to corporations. I can go on and on, but you get the picture. Remember the money that the Fed used to purchase toxic assets so that banks could lend? They are increasingly using that money to buy Fannie and Freddie loans and banking the interest in an effort to improve their profitability.

Why are they raising capital? Because their loan losses are high and rising. Look at this chart from Northern Trust. What it shows is consumer loan losses rising, and so far there is no sign of those losses topping out. The lines are still going up. The same can be said for real estate loans at commercial banks, which are now running over 9% delinquent. These are loans the banks kept on their books.

Everyone knows that commercial real estate loans are the next shoe to drop, and write-offs may be as large as $400 billion. This will force some banks to go under, but other banks will simply have to absorb the losses.

Now, let's come back to the FDIC. Sheila Bair, who heads the agency, has emphatically said that the FDIC will not ask Congress for a capital infusion. That means, as noted above, that the FDIC will have to either use their credit lines or ask for more "one-time" special-fee contributions.

If the FDIC borrows the money, and it is highly likely they will, they are going to have to raise the rates they charge member banks for the government backing. And to pay back $3-400 billion? Rates will have to be raised quite high, on the very banks struggling to raise capital and make a profit.

This is going to be a huge drain on future profits of US banks for a very long time. It is going to make it even harder for them to increase their capital – and they need to. But it has to happen. Zombie banks, those that are bound to fail, need to be taken out and put into stronger hands so that credit growth can once again start to rise. But this will not happen overnight. It is going to take time.

While I am writing about US banks, this is a problem all over the developed world. Banks that have to raise capital and reduce loans are not growing credit and are a drag on growth. As credit shrinks it is a large deflationary force. And that is not even taking into account the implosion of the shadow banking system.

Yes, we are seeing statistical growth in the economy this quarter and probably the next. But unemployment is rising and wages and incomes are falling. We will go into that next week.

We are in for a very poor, jobless recovery, and the risk of falling into a double-dip recession is quite high. The stock market is pricing in a steep V-shaped recovery in both GDP and corporate profits. I am not convinced.

How Can Just Four Stocks Be 40% of the NYSE Volume?

Before I hit the send button, a brief comment on a very odd market happening. It appears that recently up to 40% of the volume in the NYSE is in just four low-priced financial stocks. "According to Reuters, four beaten-up financial companies - Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Fannie Mae (FNM), and Freddie Mac (FRE) - have accounted for upwards of 40 percent of the trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange to begin this week."

The stocks are basically churning in price. Why is this? There are a lot of theories, so let me offer one of my own. I think it has a lot to do with flash trading. As I wrote in a previous letter, with high-frequency program trading hedge funds and sophisticated brokers can make as much as 0.5 cents buying and selling a share of stock at breakeven. Supposedly, the exchanges pay these premiums for adding liquidity. But we are seeing liquidity in stocks where none is needed.

The SEC announced this week that they are going to look into halting these programs. Good. It can't come too soon. Allowing certain funds and brokers to basically front-run the average fund or individual because they have their servers on the actual trading floor is just wrong. This must stop. And if program trading is actually driving the volume in these four names, it needs to be stopped as soon as possible.

Candidly, I have no way of knowing what the true reason for the volume is. Maybe it is something simple and innocent. But I am deeply suspicious. I doubt it's people buying Bank of America, which has seen its volume as high as 238 million shares, or Citi at 973 million shares, in ONE day! This for stocks that are severely financially impaired? Someone needs to be on top of this. As in Monday.

New Orleans and a Mauldin Migration to Europe

Today Tiffani finished using 960,000 of my American Airline miles to buy tickets for my seven kids, three of their spouses, one toddler, and three babies (two of whom are not yet here) to Paris, where the entire clan will wander down through France to northern Italy and end up in Rome next June. I am giving those in the area fair warning. Actually, it sounds like a very fun adventure. I have been to part of that area, and I am really looking forward to showing the kids castles, beaches, and art. And pizza in Rome!

I celebrate my 60th birthday the first weekend of October, then fly to New Orleans to be at the annual New Orleans Conference, October 8-11. The speaker line-up is better than ever. I find this to be one of the best conferences I go to very year. I have been attending on and off for over 25 years. You should think about this one. http://www.neworleansconference.com/speaker-eblast-JohnMauldin/

Then I will spend the next weekend in Detroit, then probably go to New York, then Philadelphia for a CMG conference October 20, then down to Houston, over to Orlando, stop to change clothes and pack at home, and then fly off on a whirlwind trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, speaking at a series of CFA conferences. Denver and Orlando in mid-November, and nothing else so far. Switzerland and London in January.

It's time to hit the send button. Have a great week, and take your banker to lunch – he needs a friend (and let him have the bill!).

Your never wanting to build a home analyst,

John Mauldin

Elements of Deflation, Part 2

John Mauldin — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 16:59:00 GMT

Elements of Deflation, Part 2
The Velocity Factor
Y=MV
Sir, I Have Not Yet Begun to Print
There Are No Good Choices
Washington DC, San Diego, and New Orleans, etc.

Just as water is formed by the basic elements hydrogen and oxygen, deflation has its own fundamental components. Last week we started exploring those elements, and this week we continue. I feel that the most fundamental of decisions we face in building investment portfolios is correctly deciding whether we are faced with inflation or deflation in our future. (And I tell you later on when to worry about inflation.) Most investments behave quite differently depending on whether we are in a deflationary or inflationary environment. Get this answer wrong and it could rise up to bite you.

The problem is that there is not an easy answer. In fact, the answer is that it could be both. Today I got another letter from Peter Schiff, who seems to be ubiquitous. He says the rise in gold is because of rising inflation expectations among investors. Gold is predicting inflation. Maybe, but the correlation between gold and inflation for the last 25-plus years has been zero. I rather think that gold is rising in terms of value against most major fiat (paper) currencies because it is seen as a neutral currency. The Fed and the Obama administration seem to be pursuing policies that are dollar-negative, and they give no hint of letting up. The rise in gold above $1,000 does not really tell us anything about the future of inflation.

In fact, it is my belief that if the Fed were to withdraw from the scene of economic battle, the forces of deflation would be felt in short order. The answer to the question "Will we have inflation in our future?" is "You better hope so!"

I wrote in 2003, when Greenspan was holding down rates too long in order to spur the economy, that the best outcome or endgame over the course of the full cycle would be stagflation. I still think that is the most likely scenario. The Fed will fight deflation and knows how to do that. They also know what to do when inflation becomes too high. But there is a cost.

It is not a matter of pain or no pain; it is a matter of choosing which pain we will face and for how long, and perhaps in what order. As I wrote a few weeks ago, like teenagers, we as an economic polity have made some very bad choices. We are now in a scenario where there are no good choices, just less-bad ones.

In a normal world, the amount of monetary and fiscal stimulus we are witnessing would produce inflation in very short order. That is what has the gold bugs of the world excited. It is their moment. They keep repeating that Milton Friedman taught us that inflation was always and everywhere a matter of too much money being printed. The answer to that is that the statement is mostly true, but not always and not everywhere (think Japan). The reality is somewhat more nuanced. Let's review something I wrote last year about the velocity of money, and this time we are going to go into the concept a little more deeply. This is critical to your understanding of what is facing us.

The Velocity Factor

When most of us think of the velocity of money, we think of how fast it goes through our hands. I know at the Mauldin household, with seven kids, it seems like something is always coming up. And what about my business? Travel costs are way, way up; and as aggressive as we are on the budget, expenses always seem to rise. Compliance, legal, and accounting costs are through the roof. I wonder how those costs are accounted for in the Consumer Price Index? About the only way to deal with it, as my old partner from the 1970s Don Moore used to say, is to make up the rise in costs with "excess profits," whatever those are.

Is the Money Supply Growing or Not?

But we are not talking about our personal budgetary woes, gentle reader. Today we tackle an economic concept called the velocity of money, and how it affects the growth of the economy. Let's start with a few charts showing the recent high growth in the money supply that many are alarmed about. The money supply is growing very slowly, alarmingly fast, or just about right, depending upon which monetary measure you use.

First, let's look at the adjusted monetary base, or plain old cash plus bank reserves (remember that fact) held at the Federal Reserve. That is the only part of the money supply the Fed has any real direct control of. Until very recently, there was very little year-over-year growth. The monetary base grew along a rather predictable long-term trend line, with some variance from time to time, but always coming back to the mean.

But in the last few months the monetary base has grown by a staggering amount. And when you see the "J-curve" in the monetary base (which is likely to rise even more!) it does demand an explanation. There are those who suggest this is an indication of a Federal Reserve gone wild and that 2,000-dollar gold and a plummeting dollar are just around the corner. They are looking at that graph and leaping to conclusions. But it is what you don't see that is important.

Now, let's introduce the concept of the velocity of money. Basically, this is the average frequency with which a unit of money is spent. Let's assume a very small economy of just you and me, which has a money supply of $100. I have the $100 and spend it to buy $100 worth of flowers from you. You in turn spend the $100 to buy books from me. We have created $200 of our "gross domestic product" from a money supply of just $100. If we do that transaction every month, in a year we would have $2400 of "GDP" from our $100 monetary base.

So, what that means is that gross domestic product is a function not just of the money supply but how fast the money supply moves through the economy. Stated as an equation, it is Y=MV, where Y is the nominal gross domestic product (not inflation-adjusted here), M is the money supply, and V is the velocity of money. You can solve for V by dividing Y by M.

Now let's dig a little deeper. Y, or nominal GDP, can actually written as Y=PQ, that is, GDP is the Price paid times the total Quantity of goods sold. Therefore, since Y=MV, the equation can be written as MV=PQ. But the point is that Price (P) is tied to the velocity (V) of money. You can increase the supply of money, and if velocity drops you can still see a drop in the "P," or inflation.

Now, let's complicate our illustration just a bit, but not too much at first. This is very basic, and for those of you who will complain that I am being too simple, wait a few paragraphs, please. Let's assume an island economy with 10 businesses and a money supply of $1,000,000. If each business does approximately $100,000 of business a quarter, then the gross domestic product for the island would be $4,000,000 (4 times the $1,000,000 quarterly production). The velocity of money in that economy is 4.

But what if our businesses got more productive? We introduce all sorts of interesting financial instruments, banking, new production capacity, computers, etc.; and now everyone is doing $100,000 per month. Now our GDP is $12,000,000 and the velocity of money is 12. But we have not increased the money supply. Again, we assume that all businesses are static. They buy and sell the same amount every month. There are no winners and losers as of yet.

Now let's complicate matters. Two of the kids of the owners of the businesses decide to go into business for themselves. Having learned from their parents, they immediately become successful and start doing $100,000 a month themselves. GDP potentially goes to $14,000,000. But, in order for everyone to stay at the same level of gross income, the velocity of money must increase to 14.

Now, this is important. If the velocity of money does NOT increase, that means (in our simple island world) that on average each business is now going to buy and sell less each month. Remember, nominal GDP is money supply times velocity. If velocity does not increase and money supply stays the same, GDP must stay the same, and the average business (there are now 12) goes from doing $1,200,000 a year down to $1,000,000.

Each business now is doing around $80,000 per month. Overall production on our island is the same, but is divided up among more businesses. For each of the businesses, it feels like a recession. They have fewer dollars, so they buy less and prices fall. They fall into actual deflation (very simplistically speaking). So, in that world, the local central bank recognizes that the money supply needs to grow at some rate in order to make the demand for money "neutral."

It is basic supply and demand. If the demand for corn increases, the price will go up. If Congress decides to remove the ethanol subsidy, the demand for corn will go down, as will the price.

If the central bank increased the money supply too much, you would have too much money chasing too few goods, and inflation would rear its ugly head. (Remember, this is a very simplistic example. We assume static production from each business, running at full capacity.)

Let's say the central bank doubles the money supply to $2,000,000. If the velocity of money is still 12, then the GDP would grow to $24,000,000. That would be a good thing, wouldn't it?

No, because only 20% more goods is produced from the two new businesses. There is a relationship between production and price. Each business would now sell $200,000 per month or double their previous sales, which they would spend on goods and services, which only grew by 20%. They would start to bid up the price of the goods they want, and inflation would set in. Think of the 1970s.

So, our mythical bank decides to boost the money supply by only 20%, which allows the economy to grow and prices to stay the same. Smart. And if only it were that simple.

Let's assume 10 million businesses, from the size of Exxon down to the local dry cleaners, and a population which grows by 1% a year. Hundreds of thousands of new businesses are being started every month, and another hundred thousand fail. Productivity over time increases, so that we are producing more "stuff" with fewer costly resources.

Now, there is no exact way to determine the right size of the money supply. It definitely needs to grow each year by at least the growth in the size of the economy, plus some more for new population, and you have to factor in productivity. If you don't then deflation will appear. But if the money supply grows too much, then you've got inflation.

And what about the velocity of money? Friedman assumed the velocity of money was constant. And it was from about 1950 until 1978 when he was doing his seminal work. But then things changed. Let's look at two charts, the first from Stifel Nicolaus Capital Markets.

Here we see the velocity of money for the last 109 years. The left side of the chart shows the velocity of money using both M2 and M3 (measures of the money supply.)

Notice that the velocity of money fell during the Great Depression. And from 1953 to 1980 the velocity of money was almost exactly the average for the last 100 years. Lacy Hunt, in a conversation that helped me immensely in writing this letter, explained that the velocity of money is mean reverting over long periods of time. That means one would expect the velocity of money to fall over time back to the mean or average. Some would make the argument that we should use the mean from more modern times since World War II, but even then mean reversion would mean a slowing of the velocity of money (V), and mean reversion implies that V would go below (overcorrect) the mean. However you look at it, the clear implication is that V is going to drop. In a few paragraphs, we will see why that is the case from a practical standpoint. But let's look at the first chart.

Y=MV

And then let's go back to our equation, Y=MV. If velocity slows by 30% (which it well has in terms of M3 – and it is down more than 15% in terms of M2) then money supply (M) would have to rise by that percentage just to maintain a static economy. But that assumes you do not have 1% population growth, 2% (or thereabouts) productivity growth, and a target inflation of 2%, which mean M (money supply) would need to grow about 5% a year, even if V were constant. And that is not particularly stimulative, given that we are in recession. And notice in the chart below that M2 has not been growing that much lately, after shooting up in late 2008 as the Fed flooded the market with liquidity.

Bottom line? Expect money-supply growth well north of what the economy could normally tolerate for the next few years. Is that enough? Too much? About right? We won't know for a long time. This will allow armchair economists (and that is most of us) to sit back and Monday morning quarterback for many years.

But this is important. The Fed is going to continue to print money as long as they are not confident deflation is no longer a problem. They can't tell us what that number is because they don't know. My guess is if they did tell us the markets would simply throw up, especially the bond market, which would of course make the situation from a deflation-fighting point of view even worse.

Sir, I Have Not Yet Begun to Print

Remember the story of John Paul Jones? An American naval officer during the American Revolution (the French gave him a medal, although the British referred to him as a pirate), he engaged a larger British ship off the coast Yorkshire. He literally tied his boat to the larger ship and they shot cannons and guns at point blank range. Legend has it that he was asked to surrender, as his ship was sinking. He is supposed to have replied, "Sir, I have not yet begun to fight!"

When faced with the possibility of deflation, I can almost hear Bernanke saying, "Sir, I have not yet begun to print!"

When will they know when enough is enough? When the velocity of money stops falling. When we see two quarters in a row where the velocity of money is rising, then it is time to start investing in inflation hedges.

Now, why is the velocity of money slowing down? Notice the significant real rise in velocity from 1990 through about 1997. Growth in M2 was falling during most of that period, yet the economy was growing. That means that velocity had to have been rising faster than normal. Why? It is financial innovation that spurs above-trend growth in velocity. Primarily because of the financial innovations introduced in the early '90s, like securitizations, CDOs, etc., we saw a significant rise in velocity.

And now we are watching the Great Unwind of financial innovations, as they went to excess and caused a credit crisis. In principle, a CDO or subprime asset-backed security should be a good thing. And in the beginning they were. But then standards got loose, greed kicked in, and Wall Street began to game the system. End of game.

What drove velocity to new highs is no longer part of the equation. The absence of new innovation and the removal of old innovations (even if they were bad innovations, they did help speed things up) are slowing things down. If the money supply had not risen significantly to offset that slowdown in velocity, the economy would already be in a much deeper recession.

The Fed has more room to print money than most of us realize. How much more? My bet is that we'll find out. Will they print too much at some point? Probably.

There Are No Good Choices

What we are looking at in our near future is not inflation. We are in a period where the Fed is in the process of reflating, or at least attempting to do so. They will eventually be successful (though at what cost to the value of the dollar one can only guess). One can have a theoretical argument about whether that is the right thing to do, or whether the Fed should just leave things alone, let the banks fail, etc. I find that a boring and almost pointless argument.

The people in control don't buy Austrian economics. It makes for nice polemics but is never going to be policy. My friend Ron Paul is not going to be allowed to make monetary policy, although he might get a bill through that actually audits the Fed. I am much more interested in learning what the Fed and Congress will actually do and then shaping my portfolio accordingly.

A mentor of mine once told me that the market would do whatever it could to cause the most pain to the most people. One way to do that would be to allow deflation to develop over the next few quarters, thereby probably really hurting gold and other investments, before inflation and then stagflation become (hopefully) the end of our perilous journey. Which of course would be good for gold. If you can hold on in the meantime.

Is it possible that we can find some Goldilocks end to this crisis? That the Fed can find the right mix, and Congress wakes up and puts some fiscal adults in control? All things are possible, but that is not the way I would bet.

While there are some who are very sure of our near future, I for one am not. There are just too damn many variables. Let me give you one scenario that worries me. Congress shows no discipline and lets the budget run through a few more trillion in the next two years. The Fed has been successful in reflating the economy. The bond markets get very nervous, and longer-term rates start to rise. What little recovery we are seeing (this is after the double-dip recession I think we face) is threatened by higher rates in a period of high unemployment.

Does the Fed monetize the debt and bring on real inflation and further destruction of the dollar? Or allow interest rates to rise and once again push us into recession? (A triple dip?) There will be no good choice. The Fed is faced with a dual mandate, unlike other central banks. They are supposed to maintain price equilibrium and also set policy that will encourage full employment. At that point, they will have to choose one over the other. There are no good choices. I can construct a number of scenarios. All end with the same line: there are no good choices.

Washington DC, San Diego, and New Orleans, etc.

It is time to hit the send button. I have struggled through this letter with a very upset stomach. I rarely eat pizza, but my son and his friends ordered and I ate half of a very good pizza with everything, which I very rarely do. It really kicked my gut. Maybe that is why I am a little more bearish than normal tonight.

I fly to Washington, DC on Sunday and will have dinner with good friend Neil Howe (of Fourth Turning fame). I am really looking forward to that. Neil is a very interesting dinner partner. I do some consulting on Monday and then catch a long night flight to San Diego. I will be at the Schwab conference on Tuesday, September 15. If you are going to be there, look me up. I will be at the Altegris booth at the first break and then the Gemini booth with my partners from CMG, where we will be talking about the new mutual fund. (You can learn more about it by reading a report I have prepared, entitled "How to Deal with Volatility in Extraordinary Markets - Introducing the CMG Absolute Return Strategies Fund." Simply click here.) And there will be books there!

That is my only trip in September. But then it gets interesting. I celebrate my 60th birthday the first weekend of October, then fly to New Orleans to be at the annual New Orleans Conference, October 8-11. The speaker line-up is better than ever. I find this to be one of the best conferences I go to very year. I have been attending on and off for over 25 years. You should think about this one. http://www.neworleansconference.com/speaker-eblast-JohnMauldin/

Trey came home tonight a little discouraged, with four of his friends. He had been at his first school dance (8th grade). "Dad, I got a Bohac." This is bad. Mr. Bohac is a very reasonable, pleasant enough fellow. However, he is also the vice-principal, and as such is the nemesis of 8th-grade boys. When you get called down for whatever reason, you get what they call a Bohac, which means you have to go to his office. I grimaced. What had he done? A fight? Girls? My mind went through a dozen bad scenarios in about 3 seconds. My stomach, already roiled, immediately got worse.

As it turns out, he simply wore the wrong kind of shorts to the dance. Seems he didn't know the dress code for the dance here in Highland Park. He evidently was not the only one. When he changed and all the kids left the house, I must confess I did not see any difference. Oh well. With any luck, this will be his only Bohac this year. And Dad can live with that.

I'll leave you with this thought I gleaned from a newsletter from Australia called The Privateer (www.the-privateer.com).

"In 1909, the US federal government had an annual budget of $US 0.8 Billion. With this it governed a population of just over 90 million people. The cost of government was about $9 per capita. In 2009, the US federal government has an annual budget of $US 3,550 Billion. With this it governs a population of just over 300 million people. That's a cost of about $11,675 per capita."

Are we 1200 times better off?

Have a great week. With all my flying, I might make it through a few books on my desk this week. I will let you know if anything should be on your radar screen.

Your trying to Muddle Through analyst,

John Mauldin

The Elements of Deflation

John Mauldin — Sat, 05 Sep 2009 04:43:00 GMT

The Elements of Deflation
The Failure of Economics
The Super Trend Puzzle
Final Demand and Income
Unemployment Was NOT a Green Shoot
Washington, DC, San Diego, and Johannesburg

As every school child knows, water is formed by the two elements of hydrogen and oxygen in a very simple formula we all know as H2O. Today we start a series that starts with the question, What are the elements that comprise deflation? Far from being simple, the "equation" for deflation is as complex as that of DNA. And sadly, while the genome project has helped us with great insights into how DNA works, economic analysis is still back in the 1950s when it comes to decoding deflation. Notwithstanding the paucity of understanding we can glean from the dismal science, in this week's letter we will start thinking about the most fundamentally important question of the day: is inflation, or deflation, in our future?

But quickly, I want to thank the many people who wrote very kind words about last week's letter. Many thought it was one of the better letters I have done in a long time. If you did not read it, you can read it here. And of course, you can go there and sign up to get this letter sent to you each week for free. Why not become of my 1 million (plus and growing) closest friends?

The Failure of Economics

Among the economists and writers I regularly read, there are some who, if they agree with me, I go back and check my assumptions - I must have been wrong. Paul Krugman is one of those thinkers. I admit to his brilliance, but his left-leaning philosophy does not particularly square with mine, and I find that most of the time I disagree.

That being said, I strongly encourage you to read his essay in the New York Times Magazine, which comes out this weekend. It is worth the high price of the Times to read it, if you can't get it online. It is a very hard critique and analysis of the failure of current macro and financial economic thought, which didn't even come close to predicting the current financial malaise. Indeed, as he points out, most schools of thought said the state we are in could not happen. You can read at the essay if you are a member, or register for free if you are not. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?_r=1.

Krugman writes, as I have in repeated columns, that we have taught two generations of economists and financial practitioners faulty theories. Even now, believers in the Efficient Market Hypothesis and CAPM hold to their beliefs in the face of clearly contrary evidence. It is a very thought-provoking piece and worthy of a long weekend read. He names specific names and pulls no punches. This is as close to starting a barroom brawl as you get in economic circles.

He calls for a return to and fresh analysis of Keynesianism. Sigh. I would go further. A plague on all their houses. Whether Keynes or Friedman (monetarism) or von Mises (the Austrian school of economics) or the rather new school of behavioral economics, they all have deficiencies and (sometimes gaping) holes in their logic. At the same time, they all contribute to our general understanding of the world, and there are benefits to studying them.

Let me risk an analogy. It is like reading about some religious scheme for interpreting the world and then becoming a true believer, arguing for that point of view as received wisdom - it's your belief system. Five Nobel laureates say this and seven say that. My guru is smarter than your guru. Look at how the math proves this point. And so on...

Krugman concludes: "So here's what I think economists have to do. First, they have to face up to the inconvenient reality that financial markets fall far short of perfection, that they are subject to extraordinary delusions and the madness of crowds. Second, they have to admit - and this will be very hard for the people who giggled and whispered over Keynes - that Keynesian economics remains the best framework we have for making sense of recessions and depressions. Third, they'll have to do their best to incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics.

"Many economists will find these changes deeply disturbing. It will be a long time, if ever, before the new, more realistic approaches to finance and macroeconomics offer the same kind of clarity, completeness and sheer beauty that characterizes the full neoclassical approach. To some economists that will be a reason to cling to neoclassicism, despite its utter failure to make sense of the greatest economic crisis in three generations. This seems, however, like a good time to recall the words of H. L. Mencken: 'There is always an easy solution to every human problem - neat, plausible and wrong.'"

I agree we need to examine our assumptions. I am not sure that makes me want to unreservedly embrace Keynes. Keynesians missed as badly as anyone else in this crisis. Yes, the Austrians generally called some of the problem, but their solutions call for 25% unemployment and an unworkable global economy and a serious depression. Not sure that I want to sign up for that, either. And, they totally discount the concept of the velocity of money, which we will look at next week.

We need a new and better economic understanding, not some semireligious adherence to dogma laid down by men who were in no way familiar with current world conditions. Keynes, von Mises, Fisher, Schumpeter, Minsky, Hayek, Smith, et al. were giants. They absolutely must be read and understood. But a real science builds on the work of the former generations and does not hold onto theories as if they were scripture.

As much as many economists would like to think so, economics is not a precise science. A global economy cannot yield to hard math in the way that one can model a protein, at least not with any model that has yet been offered. At best, the models let us see through a glass darkly, suggesting the potential for connections between a few variables, while assuming that all others are held constant. It is precisely the illusion that we can model the economy that got us into the current mess.

(By the way, good friend Paul McCulley has written a very interesting essay on why the Fed has to change their models on inflation targeting - the Taylor Rule is not up to the task - and whether or not to deal with bubbles before the fact, rather than mopping up after they burst. What was assumed has clearly not worked. You can read it at www.pimco.com.)

I am often asked what school of economic thought I adhere to, and the answer is, none. I would rather try to get it right. And rather than argue for one policy or another (which admittedly I sometimes do), it is more important to figure out what those who actually will effect policy will do, and then make sure we are not in the way of the train they are sending down the tracks. Agree with Krugman or not, he is one of the principal conductors on the train.

And that brings us back to the elements of deflation.

The Super-Trend Puzzle

I am a big fan of puzzles of all kinds, especially picture puzzles. I love to figure out how the pieces fit together and watch the picture emerge, and have spent many an enjoyable hour at the table struggling to find the missing piece that helps connect the patterns.

Perhaps that explains my fascination with economics and investing, as there are no greater puzzles (except possibly the great theological conundrums or the mind of a woman, about which I have only a few clues).

The great problem with the economic puzzles is that the shapes of the pieces can and will change as they rub against one another. One often finds that fitting two pieces together changes the way they meld with the other pieces you thought were already nailed down, which may of course change the pieces with which they are adjoined, and suddenly your neat economic picture no longer looks anything like the real world.

(Which is why all of the mathematical models make assumptions about variables that allow the models to work, except that what they end up showing is not related to the real world, which is not composed of static variables.)

There are two types of major economic puzzle pieces. The first are those pieces that represent trends that are inexorable: they will not themselves change, or if they do it will be slowly; but they will force every puzzle piece that touches them to shift, due to the force of their power. Demographic shifts or technology improvements over the long run would be examples of this type of puzzle piece.

The second type is what I think of as "balancing trends," or trends that are not inevitable but which, if they come about, will have significant implications. If you place that piece into the puzzle, it too changes the shape of all the pieces of the puzzle around it. And in the economic super-trend puzzle, it can change the shape of other pieces in ways that are not clear.

Deflation is in the latter category. I have often quipped that when you become a Federal Reserve Bank governor, you are taken into a back room and are given a DNA change that makes you viscerally and at all times opposed to deflation. Deflation is a major economic game changer. You can argue, as Gary Shilling does, that there is a good kind of deflation, where rising productivity and other such good things produces a general fall in prices, such as we had in the late 19^th century.

But that is not the kind of deflation we face today. We face the deflation of the Depression era, and central bankers of the world are united in opposition. As McCulley quipped to me this spring, when I asked him if he was concerned about inflation, with all the stimulus and printing of money we were facing, "John," he said, "you better hope they can cause some inflation." And he is right. If we don't have a problem with inflation in the future, we are going to have far worse problems to deal with.

Saint Milton Friedman taught us that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. That is, if the central bank prints too much money, inflation will ensue. And that is true, up to a point. A central bank, by printing too much money, can bring about inflation and destroy a currency, all things being equal. But that is the tricky part of that equation, because not all things are equal. The pieces of the puzzle can change shape. When the elements of deflation combine in the right order, the central bank can print a boatload of money without bringing about inflation. And we may now be watching that combination come about.

Final Demand and Income

For instance, inflation always seems to be accompanied by higher wages. That makes sense, as workers want more to justify their labor if prices are rising. But today we have wages dropping over time. Yes, even though wages went up this month by 0.3%, it was all due to a one-time increase in the minimum wage. Without that government mandate wages would have been flat or falling. Look for wages to fall over the rest of the year.

There are no pricing pressures on wages. Look at this very eye-opening graph from my friends at one of my must-read letters, The Liscio Report. (www.theliscioreport.com).

Throughout the last decade, the number of strikes involving a thousand or more workers averaged about 22 (but averaged over 300 annually from the time they started tracking this item). We are on target this year for 2, an amazing 62-year low. Indeed, we have the opposite happening. Workers are seeing jobs lost, wages being slashed, hours being cut back, and a loss of benefits, as businesses react with cost cuts to the lack of demand.

While it is technically possible to have inflation with rising unemployment and falling wages, it would take a great deal of monetization to achieve, and that will bring us to a new idea in a few paragraphs.

Unemployment Was NOT a Green Shoot

But quickly, let's look at today's unemployment numbers. This was not the way one would want to celebrate Labor Day. Unemployment rose to 9.7%. Some take comfort in that unemployment in the Establishment Survey (where they call existing business and poll them) was only down by 216,000, which admittedly is better than 600,000 but is still a very bad number. Rising unemployment is not the stuff that inflation is typically made of. And there are reasons to think the picture may be worse than that. Here are a few thoughts from David Rosenberg:

"What was really key were the details of the Household Survey, which provide a rather alarming picture of what is happening in the labor market.

"First, employment in this survey showed a plunge of 392,000, but that number was flattered by a surge in self-employment (whether these newly minted consultants were making any money is another story) as wage & salary workers (the ones that work at companies, big and small) plunged 637,000 — the largest decline since March (when the stock market was testing its lows for the cycle). As an aside, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also publishes a number from the Household survey that is comparable to the nonfarm survey (dubbed the population and payroll-adjusted Household number), and on this basis, employment sank — brace yourself — by over 1 million, which is unprecedented. We shall see if the nattering nabobs of positivity discuss that particularly statistic in their post-payroll assessments; we are not exactly holding our breath."

The ISM numbers came out this week and, while manufacturing is up, the service industry (which is far larger) is still contracting, and the employment elements in the surveys show employers are still planning to cut jobs. Think about almost 11% unemployment next summer in the middle of the political season. Watch the competition among politicians to demonstrate they care and "get it." And watch as they spend your money to show how much they care.

And from the above mentioned Liscio Report: "As we outlined back in May, financial crises hammer employment, resulting in average losses of 6.3% followed by a long flat line. We hate to point it out, but we're currently down 4.8% from the December 2007 onset, and if US job losses in this recession stay in line with the major financial recessions in "advanced" countries studied by the IMF, we stand to lose another 1.8 million jobs. Some of those will likely be taken out in upcoming benchmarks, stimulus money has some clout, and no one has a reliable crystal ball, but we need to remember where we are in a painful cycle if we see some hopeful flickers."

That would take us to well over 11% unemployment.

Interesting statistic. Want to know where wages are rising? Think federal government workers. The gap between civilian and government workers was less than $13,000 nine years ago, but now is almost $30,000. Inflation has been 24%, but government wages are up 55%. According to a recent release from Rasmussen Reports, a government job remains "the top employment choice in today's economic environment." (chart from Clusterstock)

States, counties, and cities are having to make deep cuts, in both jobs and programs. Today's Wall Street Journal talks about the cuts in state after state. States cannot print money like the US can, so at some point they have to either raise taxes or cut spending to balance their budgets. Raising taxes just makes it less profitable for businesses to remain in your state. There is a very high correlation with high state taxes and unemployment.

The following chart shows how rapidly income taxes are falling. Sales tax receipts are down. At some point voters are going to demand that their federal government show some of the same restraint that households, cities, and counties are being forced into. My bet is that next year raises for government workers, even those in unions, will come under attack. They won't be cut, but watch as political backlash builds.

Without federal stimulus, the GDP of the US would have been over minus 6% in the second quarter, not the minus 1% it was. The third quarter would be flat to down and not the plus 3% it is likely to be. Housing and autos will turn down as the stimulus on those markets goes away.

I think it is very possible we will see a negative GDP by the first quarter of next year. Unemployment will still be rising. Deflation will be more of a problem, because the housing component (the largest portion of the consumer-inflation index), based roughly on rentals, is clearly under pressure. While we don't have enough space this week to go into detail, savings are up and consumer spending is down. Without the stimulus, things would be much worse.

Here's the kicker. Expect to see a big push for another large stimulus package next spring (and maybe sooner), as the effects of the current one wear off. The government wants to bring back demand by getting consumers to spend again. And you can count on unemployment benefits being extended. A tax holiday on Social Security taxes below a certain income? In the short run they can do it, but at a long-run cost.

It is going to be hard for a Democratic administration to not push for another large stimulus. That is what Krugman and his fellow travelers will be pushing. Classic Keynesian thinking wants both for the government to run large deficits and for the central bank to print more money. Remember, last year I said that the Fed would print a lot more money than they are talking about in the current plans. They are going to have the cover to do so, because deflation is going to be seen as the problem.

Next week, we will look at money supply and the velocity of money, savings, consumer demand, and more as we further explore the complex molecule that is deflation.

But one last thought, as I have had a lot of questions on gold recently. "Isn't gold telling us that inflation is coming back?" The answer is no. Since the early '80s the correlation between gold and inflation has dropped to zero. Gold has had very little to say in the last 30 years about inflation.

But what it may be saying is that paper currencies are a problem. Gold is going up not only in dollar terms, but in euros, pounds, yen, and more. My view is that gold should be seen as a neutral currency. The dollar is the worst currency in the world, except for all the others. Is it possible the Fed will not respond and print more money next year? Sure. And the dollar could rise as deflation kicks in. The only time we saw the purchasing power of the dollar rise in a sustained manner was during deflation, in the last century.

The race is not always to the swiftest or the fight to the strongest, but that's the way to bet. And right now, my bet is the Fed will print money to fight a double-dip recession and deflation. And gold would be one way to play that bet.

Washington, DC, San Diego, and Johannesburg

Quick inside industry note: Many RIA and brokers have left some of the large brokerage firms to go with smaller broker dealers or start up as independent investment advisors. Some of the larger firms had platforms that accessed the world's top hedge-fund managers. Now that the advisors are independent, they are looking for a similar platform.

Altegris Investments has a world-class lineup of top-tier hedge-fund managers that advisors can access for their clients at much lower minimums. Altegris employs 65 people and has over $2 billion under management. They focus solely on alternative investments. They have 10 staff members dedicated to research and due diligence on the hedge-fund universe. I know Jon Sundt (CEO of Altegris) personally and I know that he is driven to find the best investment talent in the world. If you are an advisor for high-net worth-clients, you should go to www.accreditedinvestor.ws and sign up and they will call you.

And if your clientele consists mostly of smaller clients, you should look at the platform of trading advisors at CMG. http://cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp

Next week I have to go to Washington, DC for a quick trip and then the next night fly to San Diego for the Schwab conference. Coincidentally, both Altegris and CMG will be at the conference. I will be around those booths on Tuesday the 15th. Look me up.

And next Tuesday I will speak via satellite to a CFA conference in Johannesburg. I've done a lot of TV over satellite, but not a full, hour-long speech and Q and A. This should prove interesting.

It is getting late and time to hit the send button, so I will cut my remarks short and just wish you a happy Labor Day and a great week.

Your ready for a holiday analyst,

John Mauldin

An Uncomfortable Choice

John Mauldin — Sat, 29 Aug 2009 17:59:00 GMT

An Uncomfortable Choice
What Were We Thinking?
Frugality is the New Normal
And Then We Face the Real Problem
The Teenagers Are in Control
Choose Wisely
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, New Orleans, Detroit, and More

We have arrived at this particular economic moment in time by the choices we have made, which now leave us with choices in our future that will be neither easy, convenient, nor comfortable. Sometimes there are just no good choices, only less-bad ones. In this week's letter we look at what some of those choices might be, and ponder their possible consequences. Are we headed for a double-dip recession? Read on.

An Important Announcement

But first, I want to make a very important announcement. There are not many times in a career when you can say that something new has been created in the financial services industry and that you have been a part of it. But now I can say that and, I must admit, with a little pride in helping to bring a new creation into the world.

For years, Steve Blumenthal and I have shared a passion for bringing Absolute Return Strategies to all investors, not just the wealthy and institutional investors.

I want to introduce you to a new mutual fund, one that is different than the typical long-only equity mutual fund. My friends and partners at CMG have created a mutual fund that is comprised of 9 different trading strategies, a "fund of trading strategies," so to speak; and it's one that I believe will be strategically suitable for the economic environment that I think we face. And, as a mutual fund, it is open to all investors.

You can learn more about it by reading a report I have prepared, entitled "How to Deal with Volatility in Extraordinary Markets - Introducing the CMG Absolute Return Strategies Fund." Simply click here.

If you are an investment advisor or broker, you especially should read about this new fund and contact CMG directly for more information and reports. Full disclosure: as a consultant to the Advisor to the fund, my investment advisory firm does participate in the fees. And be sure and read all the disclosures and risk factors in the document.

And now, let's look at the choices we face.

An Uncomfortable Choice

As our family grew, we limited the choices our seven kids could make; but as they grew into teenagers, they were given more leeway. Not all of their choices were good. How many times did Dad say, "What were you thinking?" and get a mute reply or a mumbled "I don't know."

Yet how else do you teach them that bad choices have bad consequences? You can lecture, you can be a role model; but in the end you have to let them make their own choices. And a lot of them make a lot of bad choices. After having raised six, with one more teenage son at home, I have come to the conclusion that you just breathe a sigh of relief if they grow up and have avoided fatal, life-altering choices. I am lucky. So far. Knock on a lot of wood.

I have watched good kids from good families make bad choices, and kids with no seeming chance make good choices. But one thing I have observed. Very few teenagers make the hard choice without some outside encouragement or help in understanding the known consequences, from some source. They nearly always opt for the choice that involves the most fun and/or the least immediate pain, and then learn later that they now have to make yet another choice as a consequence of the original one. And thus they grow up. So quickly.

But it's not just teenagers. I am completely capable of making very bad choices as I approach the end of my sixth decade of human experiences and observations. In fact, I have made some rather distressing choices over time. Even in areas where I think I have some expertise I can make appallingly bad choices. Or maybe particularly in those areas, because I have delusions of actually knowing something. In my experience, it takes an expert with a powerful computer to truly foul things up.

Of course, sometimes I get it right. Even I learn, with enough pain. And sometimes I just get lucky. (Although, as my less-than-sainted Dad repeatedly intoned, "The harder I work the luckier I get.")

Each morning is a new day, but it is a new day impacted by all the choices of the previous days and years. Tiffani and I have literally interviewed in depth well over a hundred millionaires, and talked anecdotally with hundreds over the years. I am struck by how their lives, and those of their families, come down to a few choices. Sometimes good choices and sometimes lucky choices. Often, difficult ones. But very few were the easy choice.

What Were We Thinking?

As a culture, the current mix of generations, especially in the US, has made some choices. Choices which, in hindsight, leave the adult in us asking, "What were we thinking?"

In a way, we were like teenagers. We made the easy choice, not thinking of the consequences. We never absorbed the lessons of the Depression from our grandparents. We quickly forgot the sobering malaise of the '70s as the bull market of the '80s and '90s gave us the illusion of wealth and an easy future. Even the crash of Black Friday seemed a mere bump on the path to success, passing so quickly. And as interest rates came down and money became easier, our propensity to acquire things took over.

And then something really bad happened. Our homes started to rise in value and we learned through new methods of financial engineering that we could borrow against what seemed like their ever-rising value, to finance consumption today.

We became Blimpie from the Popeye cartoons of our youth: "I will gladly repay you Tuesday for a hamburger today."

Not for us the lay-away programs of our parents, patiently paying something each week or month until the desired object could be taken home. Come to think of it, I am not sure if my kids (15 through 32) have ever even heard of a lay-away program, not with credit cards so easy to obtain. Next family brunch, I will explain this quaint concept. (Interestingly, I heard about a revival of the concept on CNBC radio, coming back from dropping Trey off at school this morning. Everything old is new again.)

As a banking system, we made choices. We created all sorts of readily available credit, and packaged it in convenient, irresistible AAA-rated securities and sold them to a gullible world. We created liar loans, no-money-down loans, and no-documentation loans and expected them to act the same way that mortgages had in the past. What were the rating agencies thinking? Where were the adults supervising the sand box?

(Oh, wait a minute. DThat's the same group of regulators who now want more power and money.)

It is not as if all this was done in some back alley by seedy-looking characters. This was done on TV and in books and advertisements. I remember the first time I saw an ad telling me to call this number to borrow up to 125% of the value of my home, and wondering how this could be a good idea.

Turns out it can be a great idea for the salesmen, if they can package those loans into securities and sell them to foreigners, with everyone making large commissions on the way. The choice was to make a lot of money with no downside consequences to yourself. What teenager could say no?

Greenspan keeping rates low aided and abetted that process. Starting two wars and pushing through a massive health-care package, along with no spending control from the Republican Party, ran up the fiscal deficits.

Allowing credit default swaps to trade without an exchange or regulations. A culture that viscerally believed that the McMansions they were buying were an investment and not really debt. Yes, we were adolescents at the party to end all parties.

Not to mention an investment industry that tells their clients that stocks earn 8% a year real returns (the report I mentioned at the beginning goes into detail about this). Even as stocks have gone nowhere for ten years, we largely believe (or at least hope) that the latest trend is just the beginning of the next bull market.

It was not that there were no warnings. There were many, including from your humble analyst, who wrote about the coming train wreck that we are now trying to clean up. But those warnings were ignored.

Actually, ignored is a nice way to put it. Derision. Scorn. Laughter. And worse, dismissal as a non-serious perpetual perma-bear. My corner of the investment-writing world takes a very thick skin.

The good times had lasted so long, how could the trend not be correct? It is human nature to believe the current trend, especially a favorable one that helps us, will continue forever.

And just like a teenager who doesn't think about the consequences of the current fun, we paid no attention. We hadn't experienced the hard lessons of our elders, who learned them in the depths of the Depression. This time it was different. We were smarter and wouldn't make those mistakes. Didn't we have the research of Bernanke and others, telling us what to avoid?

In millions of different ways, we all partied on. It wasn't exclusively a liberal or a conservative, a rich or apoor, a male or a female addiction. We all borrowed and spent. We did it as individuals, and we did it as cities and states and countries.

We ran up unfunded pension deficits at many local and state funds, to the tune of several trillion dollars and rising. We have a massive, tens of trillions of dollars, bill coming due for Social Security and Medicare, starting in the next 5-7 years, that makes the current crisis pale in comparison. We now seemingly want to add to this by passing even more spending programs that will only make the hole deeper.

Frugality is the New Normal

I could go on and on, but I think you get the point. The time for good choices was a decade ago. It would have been more difficult at the time, so that is not what we did. And now we wake up and are faced with a set of choices, none of them good.

Reality is staring back in the mirror at the American consumer, and especially the Boomer generation. The psyche of the American consumer has been permanently seared. We are watching savings beginning to rise and consumer spending patterns change for the first time in generations. Even as the authorities try to prod consumers back into old habits, they are not responding. Borrowing and credit are actually falling. Banks, for whatever reason, now want borrowers to actually be able to pay them back. Go figure.

Frugality is the new normal. We are resetting the underpinnings of a consumer-driven society to a new level. It will require a major overhaul of our economy. The normal drivers of growth - consumer spending, business investment, and exports - are all weak, and it is only because of massive government spending that the second quarter was not as bad as the two previous quarters and that the coming quarter will be positive.

But what then? How long can we continue with 10%-plus GDP deficits? We have an economy that is in a Statistical Recovery, fueled by government largesse. In the real world, we are watching unemployment rise, and it is likely to do so through the middle of next year. Deflation is in the air. Capacity utilization is near all-time lows. Housing numbers are only bouncing because of the government program of large tax credits for first-time home buyers and lower home prices. It will be years before construction is significant.

We will be faced with a choice this fall and early next year. If you take away the government spending, the potential for falling back into a recession is quite high, given the underlying weakness in the economy. A few hundred billion for increased and extended unemployment benefits will not be enough to stem the tide. There will be a groundswell for yet another stimulus package. Another 10% of GDP deficit is quite likely for next year.

As I (and Woody Brock) have made very clear in these e-letters, deficits that are higher than nominal GDP cannot continue without dire consequences. Good friend Richard Russell writes today:

"The US national debt is now over $11 trillion dollars. The interest on our national debt is now $340 billion. This is about at 3.04% rate of interest. In ten years the Obama administration admits that they will add $9 trillion to the national debt. That would take it to $20 trillion. Let's say that by some miracle the interest on the national debt in 10 years will still be 3.09%. That would mean that the interest on the national debt would be $618 billion a year or over one billion a day. No nation can hold up in the face of those kinds of expenses. Either the dollar would collapse or interest rates would go through the roof."

That would be at least 30% of the national budget. How would your household do, paying that much as interest? How can you operate when interest payments are 30% or more of the budget? Do you borrow to pay the interest? And the Obama administration openly admits to deficits of over a trillion a year for the next ten years, under very rosy growth assumptions. Anyone outside of Washington and rosy-eyed economists think we will grow 4% next year? I am not seeing many hands go up.

And Then We Face the Real Problem

If we do not maintain high deficits, it is likely we fall back into recession. Yet if we do not control spending, we risk running up a debt that becomes very difficult to finance by conventional means. Monetizing the debt can only work for a few trillion here or there. At some point, the bond market will simply fall apart. And it could happen quickly. Think back to how fast things fell apart in the summer of 2007. When perception of the potential for inflation changes, it changes things fast.

The problem is that we are now in a very deflationary world. Deleveraging, too much capacity, high and rising unemployment, falling real incomes, and more are all the classic pieces of the formula for deflation.

Let's look at what my friend Nouriel Roubini recently wrote. I think he hit the nail on the head:

"A combination of higher official indebtedness and monetization has the potential to yield the worst of all worlds, pushing up long-term rates and generating increased inflation expectations before a convincing return to growth takes hold. An early return to higher long-term rates will crowd out private demand, as lending rates on mortgages and personal and corporate loans rise too. It is unlikely that actual inflation will emerge this year or even next, but inflation expectations as reflected in long-term interest rates could well be rising later in 2010. This would represent a serious threat to economic recovery, which is predicated on the idea that the actual borrowing rates that individuals and businesses pay will remain low for an extended period.

"Yet the alternative - the early withdrawal of the stimulus drug that governments have been dispensing so freely - is even more serious. The present administration believes that deflation is a worse threat than inflation. They are right to think that. Trying to rebuild public finances at a deflationary moment - a time when unemployment is rising, and private demand is still contracting - could be catastrophic, turning recovery into renewed recession."

There are no good choices. Nouriel, optimist that he is (note sarcasm), suggests that there is a possibility that the government can manage expectations by showing a clear path to fiscal responsibility that can be believed. And thus the bond markets do not force rates higher, thereby thwarting recovery.

And technically he is right. If there were adults supervising the party, it might be possible. But there are not. The teenagers are in control. Instead of fiscal discipline, we are hearing increased demands for more spending. Please note that the very rosy future-deficit assumptions assume the end of the Bush tax cuts at the close of 2010. But raising taxes back to the level of 2000 does not make the projected future budget deficits go away.

I mean, seriously, does anyone think Pelosi or Reid are going to lead us to fiscal constraint? Obama talks a good game, but he has not offered a serious deficit-reduction proposal, other than further tax increases. And by serious, I mean we need cuts on the order of several hundred billion dollars. The Republicans lost their way and their power (deservedly, in my opinion). Just as at the high school prom, the very few adults are being ignored.

It is the proverbial rock and the hard place. Cut the stimulus too soon and we slide back into a deeper recession. Let the budget spin out of control for a few years and we will see inflation return, with higher rates and a recession. Raise taxes by 1.5-2% of GDP in 2010 and we are shoved back into recession.

There are no good choices. If we do the right thing and cut the deficit, it means very hard choices. Can we keep our commitments to two wars and our massive defense budget? Medicare and Social Security reform are not painless. Education? Research? The "stimulus"? But cutting the deficit by hundreds of billions while raising taxes by even more than is already in the works, is not the formula for sustainable recovery.

Have we grown up? Are there adults in the room? Sadly, I don't think there are enough. We are still a nation of teenagers. We will do whatever we can to avoid the pain today. We will kick the can down the road, hoping for a miracle. Will we grow up? Yes, but the lessons learned will be hard.

There are no statistical signs of an impending recession. We are not going to get an inverted yield curve this time, which made it relatively easy for me to predict recessions in 2000 and 2006. We are in a deflationary, deleveraging world. A far different world than in the past.

I see little room for us to avoid a double-dip recession. It would take the skill and speed of former Cowboys running back Tony Dorsett hitting a very small hole in the line to break us into the open. I see no running back in our national leadership with such ability. As I have outlined above, recession could be triggered again in any number of very different economic environments. It all depends on the choices we make. But the choices lead to the same consequences, at least in my opinion.

As I wrote in August 2000 and August 2006, I write again in August 2009: there is a recession in our future. I was early both of those times and I am early now, maybe two years early, though I doubt it. And as I pointed out both of those last times, the stock market drops an average of over 40% during a recession. When I was on Kudlow in October of 2006, I was given a hard time about my recession call and prediction of a bear market. I think it was John Rutherford who dismissed my bearish vision. And he was right for the next three quarters, as the market proceeded to rise another 20%. I looked foolish to many, but I maintained my views.

You have choices. You can buy and hold (buy and hope?) or you can develop a strategic alternative. The next bear market, as I wrote in 2003 and in Bull's Eye Investing, will likely be the bottom. (It takes at least three of them to really take us to the bottom.) But the next one will change perceptions for a long time. Valuations will drop. Savings will rise even more. And a generation will grow up. The adults will return. Chastened. Scarred. Shaken. But we will Muddle Through. That is what we do. Even my teenagers.

Choose wisely.

Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, New Orleans, Detroit, and More

Only a month ago my fall schedule looked surprisingly light. And then reality hit. I will be at the Schwab conference in San Diego on September 15. If you are going to be there, drop me a note. That is my only trip in September. But then it gets interesting. I celebrate my 60th birthday the first weekend of October, then fly to New Orleans to be at the annual New Orleans Conference, October 8-11. The speaker line-up is better than ever. I find this to be one of the best conferences I go to very year. I have been attending on and off for over 25 years. You should think about this one. http://www.neworleansconference.com/speaker-eblast-JohnMauldin/

Then I will spend the next weekend in Detroit, then probably go to New York, then Philadelphia for a CMG conference October 20, then down to Houston, over to Orlando, stop to change clothes and pack at home, and then fly off on a whirlwind trip to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, speaking at a series of CFA conferences. Orlando in mid-November ... and nothing else so far. Switzerland and London in January.

I recently did an interview with King World News that was quite frankly one of the best interviews I have ever done. Eric King really got me going. It is in two parts. I give you the link to the first part, and the second is in their archives. There are also interviews with a very serious group of names. I am flattered to be included. Click here.

It is time to hit the send button. I am resisting the temptation to launch into politics, so I need to quit before I do. Suffice it to say, we could see some big changes as we work through our teenage years, back to adulthood.

Speaking of good choices, the wedding last weekend was fabulous. I am delighted with my new son-in-law. Life goes on, even as my kids struggle to get enough hours of work and money. Henry is at UPS, and work hours are way down and they have a new son. Chad finally got a new job, which may give him enough hours to survive, but not a lot of money. For those of you who think I live in an ivory tower, I do have a view into the lives of seven kids who are very real people, as well as those of lots of friends. I am very well aware of how tough it is out there, and realize how blessed I am.

You have a great week. Tomorrow I get to go the Dallas Cowboys game in the new stadium in a suite, courtesy of a friend who got the seats from Jerry Jones himself. Not sure where, but it sounds cool. Sometimes life gives you lucky breaks.

Your amazed to still be writing after all these years analyst,

John Mauldin

The Statistical Recovery, Part Three

John Mauldin — Sat, 22 Aug 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The Statistical Recovery, Part Three
Capacity Utilization Set to Rise
A Real Estate Green Shoot?
The Deleveraging Society
Some Thoughts on Secular Bear Markets
Weddings and Ten Years of Thoughts From the Frontline

This week we further explore why this recovery will be a Statistical Recovery, or one that, as someone said, is a recovery only a statistician could love. We look at capacity utilization, more on housing, some thoughts on debt and deflation, and some intriguing charts on volatility in the last secular bear-market cycle. This letter will print a little longer, but there are lots of charts. I have written this during the week, and I finish it here in Tulsa, where Amanda gets married tomorrow. (There is no deflation in weddings costs!)

Thanks to so many of you for your enthusiastic feedback about my latest Accredited Investor Newsletter, in which I undertook to examine the impact of last year's dramatic increase in volatility on the performance of hedge funds and to ascertain those elements that led to success in the industry, such as select Global Macro and Managed Futures strategies, as well as the challenges. If you are an accredited investor (basically anywhere in the world, as I have partners in Europe, Canada, Africa, and Latin America) and haven't yet read my analysis, I invite you to sign up here: www.accreditedinvestor.ws

For those of you who seek to take advantage of these themes and the developments I write about each week, let me again mention my good friend Jon Sundt at Altegris Investments, who is my US partner. Jon and his team have recently added some of the more successful names in the industry to their dedicated platform of alternative investments, including commodity pools, hedge funds, and managed futures accounts. Certain products that Altegris makes available on its platform access award-winning managers, and are designed to facilitate access for qualified and suitable readers at sometimes lower investment minimums than is normally required (though the net-worth requirements are still the same).

If you haven't spoken with them in a while, it's worth checking out their new lineup of world-class managers. Jon also tells me they just added yet more brilliant minds to their research team, making it, in my opinion, one of the foremost teams in the industry, focused solely on alternative investments. I invite you to have a conversation with one of their professional and seasoned advisors. (In this regard, I am president and a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, member FINRA.) Now, let's jump into the Statistical Recovery.

Capacity Utilization Set to Rise

Capacity utilization is a concept in economics that refers to the extent to which an enterprise or a nation actually uses its installed productive capacity. Thus, it refers to the relationship between actual output that is produced with the installed equipment and the potential output that could be produced with it, if capacity was fully used.

The chart below shows that capacity utilization in the US is at an all-time low, around 68%. That means that with the equipment we already have in place we could produce almost 50% more goods than we are now producing. However, most analysts think that 80% capacity utilization is a very good number.

If you look very closely at the bottom right-hand detail, you can see that there is a small uptick in last month's data. Whether or not this is the "bottom" remains to be seen. But if it is not the bottom, it is close. You can only shut down so much production before inventories fall to levels that require restocking. And we are getting close to that level in many industries.

Before we wander too far away from the graph, I want you to notice that past dips (circa the recessions of 1968, '74, and '80-'82) had V-shaped recoveries in capacity utilization. But in the 1990-91 recession it took longer than it did in past recessions, and in the most recent recession (2000-02) the recovery took longer and we did not actually "recover" for four years.

Again, most analysts feel that a capacity utilization of 80% or more is pretty indicative of solid growth. To get back to that level, we would have to see an almost 20% rise in manufacturing. That is unlikely to happen all that fast, for several reasons.

First, consumers are retrenching and saving. We just simply are not going to need or want as much stuff. Second, unemployment, as I noted last week, is crimping the ability of consumers to spend. The recovery we are likely to see is going to be sluggish and not produce new jobs for quite some time. Again, that stifles demand.

The country (and the world) is adjusting to the New Normal. It is some level of overall economic activity that is different than what we have enjoyed during the reigning paradigm of the last 30 years.

Manufacturers are going to ramp up more slowly than in the past, especially as many companies have the ability to tailor their production to consumer demand much faster now, due to automation.

As I have repeatedly said, the world is awash in excess capacity. We simply built too much productive capacity to be utilized in the New Normal. One way of dealing with too much capacity is to simply close the plants. That is what is happening in the paper and memory-chip industries. Other industries are engaging in mergers to reduce or "rationalize" capacity. While that process is a good thing, it does mean that unemployment rises or stays higher longer.

The building of inventories counts as a rise in GDP. Conversely, reducing inventories gets counted as a lack of growth. We have just about reduced inventories all we can. As companies begin to rebuild inventories, that will translate into a statistical increase in GDP. But if capacity utilization is still only (say) 73%, it still shows a weak economy with not many new jobs and reduced corporate profits, compared to a few years ago. It will be a rather long time before the jobs that have been lost this cycle will come back. Will the statistical comparison of data from a year ago look positive? Are things improving? The answer will be yes. But it will not feel like it for those who are looking for new jobs or higher income or more sales.

Look at it this way. We have dug ourselves into a 12-foot hole over the past two years. The data now suggests that we have stopped digging, which is always a good idea if you are in a hole. At some point we will have figured out how to add some dirt to the bottom to get us back up to an 8-foot hole. Will we be better off statistically? Absolutely. But we will still be in a hole. Unemployment falling back to 8% in 2011 will still feel like we are in a hole, but the statistics will say GDP is positive. And that is because we are so far down, the year-over-year comparisons are starting to look good.

As an aside, it would be highly unusual for inflation to show up with low capacity utilization and rising unemployment. Businesses and workers simply do not have pricing power.

A Real Estate Green Shoot?

The housing news has been less bad of late. Home-builder sentiment is marginally higher. Today we learn that sales are up month-over-month, and actually year-over-year, on a seasonally adjusted basis, which is some of the best news on the housing front we have had in two years. Sales of existing homes were the highest since August of 2007. Have we seen the bottom? The following chart shows that while actual homebuilding activity is still down, the annual comparisons are getting easier and activity seems to be leveling out.

Note, however, that this is yet another aspect of the Statistical Recovery. For two years, the continual drop in home building reduced the GDP numbers every quarter. If homebuilding activity simply stops falling, as it appears to be, then housing will stop being a negative as far as GDP is concerned. Will we get back to the levels of 2005? Not for many decades and with a much larger population. We are now finding the New Normal as far as home construction is concerned.

And before we get too celebratory, my friend John Burns of John Burns Real Estate Consulting suggests we may be seeing a false bottom. What we are seeing is the result of a government program that offers first-time home buyers $8,000 if they buy a home by November 30; and that program is working, especially at the lower end of home prices (as you would expect, and as it should.) 31% of home sales in July were involved with this program. But like Cash for Clunkers in automobiles, this is pushing demand for homes from next year into this year.

John offers us the following chart that gives us what he thinks is happening in the markets, from his surveys. He thinks that we saw a "false bottom" in April of this year and that activity will peak in November, before going on to the actual bottom, from which there will be a long, slow recovery.

There are millions of homes being brought onto the market through foreclosures -- two million vacant homes for sale, plus, builders are still building. It will simply take some time to work through the inventory.

There are some who wonder why home builders keep building if inventories are so high. First, for many of the larger public companies, to stop activity altogether would be commercial suicide. You can't just stop without dying. Further, many of them have financial commitments that require them to build in order to make something to pay back the loans, even if they lose money. Maybe they won't build McMansions or in Florida, but they will find out what will sell and where and build there. Smaller builders have the option of not building "spec" homes (homes built without a buyer already lined up, that is, on speculation). Like my neighbor who just tore his house down this week (can they ever do that fast!) and plans to build a large new home, much of the home activity will be pre-sold for the next few years. (I can't tell you how much I look forward to the sound of hammers and saws next door as I write and read.)

The Deleveraging Society

My friend Ian McAvity offers us the following chart, which shows the level of total debt to GDP. It has been rising steadily since 1981 and is now at a ratio of 3.75. Even though consumers and businesses are cutting back on borrowing, the US government is more than making up the difference; so for awhile, at least, we will see total debt to GDP continue to rise. Side note: even with all the money the Fed is printing, M-1 is flat for the last year.

One of the drivers of the growth of the last 30 years has been financial innovation and the ability to increase leverage. Specifically, securitization made it possible to finance a whole array of debt, from credit cards, student loans, and auto loans, to exotic residential mortgages of all kinds, commercial mortgages, corporate bonds, hotel financing, and regular bank loans that were spun out into SIVs and off the banks' books, thereby freeing up capital – and on and on. If it moved, someone could (and did) figure out how to get it into a security and sell it. And it was easy to sell as long as it had a rating from an established rating agency.

Much of this securitization is plain vanilla and a very good thing, as it gives investors a way to get more fixed income. But the rating agencies started using models that were obviously flawed to create the ratings. Massively flawed. Incompetence immortalized in a spreadsheet. When I and others began to write about the problems with CDOs and CDOs squared in 2006, they continued to rate them with the same flawed models. Even when the rules for getting a mortgage changed, they did not change their models. And it isn't that they couldn't have been aware. The TV was rife with ads talking about the various mortgages available, yet the rating agencies used models based on completely different types of mortgages.

And now? If you are sitting at the fixed-income desk at a pension or insurance fund, it is worth your job to take the word of a rating agency. Therefore, securitization is moribund. Will it come back? Yes. But it will take time.

But that is the problem. The world of finance is going to its own New Normal. It will be a world that is less leveraged. The growth in leverage that helped spur growth on the way up is a drag on growth as it is wound down.

Again, it would be highly unusual to see inflation in a deleveraging world. It would be a massive failure on the part of the Fed to allow serious inflation (as in the 1970s) to come back to the levels that some are talking about. I mean, it's possible, but it's far from the most likely outcome.

I had this conversation with Paul McCulley earlier in the year, as we were all deep in the deflation/inflation discussion. He looked at me and said, "John, we better hope the Fed can create some inflation. If they can't, we're in real trouble."

I will write about the current lack of inflation and its future prospects in a future letter; but producer price indexes are way down all over the world, and the CPI (consumer price index) is down year-over-year.

The single most important question for investors to get right over the next few years is whether we face an inflationary or deflationary future. And while there are many who are so positive that they know the answer, and we find people arguing all sides of the issue, I am not persuaded that we have the information we need to make that determination. It could go several ways. My best guess (hope?) is that we get through this bout of deflation and have to deal with some mild, 3-4 % real inflation, not the commodity price-driven kind, which is not monetary inflation. But this will be a multi-year cycle. I will be writing about this for a long time.

Some Thoughts on Secular Bear Markets

Yesterday my good friend Ed Easterling dropped by, as he was in Dallas, down from Portland. Ed co-authored a few chapters with me in Bull's Eye Investing, on secular market cycles. He had a chart that I asked him to get to me for your perusal. The last secular bear market was 1966-82. He charted the ups and down in that market and noted the percentage rises and falls. It was as volatile then as it is now. There were some breathtaking ups and downs. With every rise, pundits declared the end of the bear market, only to have the market fall dramatically again. Take a few moments to gaze at the chart:

What drives the volatility? My contention is that bull and bear cycles should be seen in terms of valuation instead of price. Markets go from high valuations to low valuations and back to high. It is an age-old story. We have done about half the work we need to do to get back to low valuations. These cycles average of 17 years. We are less than ten years into this one.

I believe we are going to lower valuations in terms of price-to-earnings ratios. This can be done by the market going sideways and earnings rising, or the market dropping, or some combination. Look at the graph below, and notice the slow and steady drop in P/E ratios (bottom chart) and the very volatile markets that accompanied that fall. I agree with Ed; we should not be surprised at today's volatile markets. And we should expect more volatility and large price movements. Both up and down. (Some of the best charts anywhere are at www.crestmontresearch.com.)

Weddings and Ten Years of Thoughts From the Frontline

This month starts my tenth year of writing Thoughts from the Frontline. I started the letter in August of 2000 with less than 2,000 readers. Every letter since January, 2001 is in the archives. The letter now goes to well over one million readers each week, plus is posted on dozens of independent web sites. I am somewhat overwhelmed at the response, but am very grateful. I can honestly say that I am having more fun today than at any time in my life. Thank you for being part of it all.

I have written this letter in airports, hotels, airplanes, cars (I am finishing this one in a car, riding to the rehearsal dinner for my daughter's wedding) and today wrote a lot at the Golf Club of Oklahoma, waiting for the wedding rehearsal. (First time writing in a golf club ... and now I'm about to walk into Dave and Buster's, where I'll wrap this up.)

It is going to be a beautiful wedding, outdoors with beautiful lake views, and the weather is slated to be perfect. We played golf today with the new inlaws, and surprisingly, the weather was pleasant for Tulsa in August. I fought the course and the course won.

Tomorrow is a late brunch with all the guys and then we go to watch Inglorious Basterds, which I have been waiting for for a long time. Good movie for a testosterone-laden crowd.

It is a little sentimental this weekend. My second daughter (Amanda) getting married. All the kids in one place. New grandson Caleb here. Tiffani (girl) and Chad's SO Dominique (another boy) very pregnant. New boyfriends here and there. 60 years looking at me in a few weeks. And thinking about how time just is flying by. How could it be nine years of writing every week to my closest friends?

It is time to hit the send button. I am sitting at the table with all my kids. They know Dad has to finish, but are tolerant. Have a great week. And remember that valuations, when it come to family and friends, only climb higher as time passes.

Your really happy with life analyst,

John Mauldin

The Statistical Recovery, Part 2

John Mauldin — Sat, 15 Aug 2009 00:49:00 GMT

The Statistical Recovery, Part Two
A Recovery Statisticians Can Love
A Few Thoughts on the Housing Market
Some Thoughts from Maine
Tulsa, Birthdays, Weddings, and Paul McCartney

A few weeks ago I first used the term "statistical recovery" to describe the nature of today's economic environment. Today we are going to further explore that concept, as it is important to have a real understanding of what is happening. This coming "recovery" is not going to feel like a typical one, and those expecting a "V"-shaped recovery are simply making projections from previous economic recoveries, which, based on the fundamentals, are not warranted. And of course, a few thoughts coming back from Maine are in order. There is a lot to cover, and this may take more than one letter.

But first, let me note to subscribers to Conversations with John Mauldin that we have posted my Conversation with George Friedman of Stratfor and will soon post a very interesting Conversation I had with John Burns (of John Burns Real Estate Consulting) and Rick Sharga of RealtyTrac. These may be the two most knowledgeable people on the housing market in the country. There is a lot of poorly informed speculation about the housing market, and I think this Conversation will help clear away a lot of the fog. PLUS, they both agreed to allow me to post their eye-opening PowerPoint stacks to Conversation subscribers (normally only available to their clients), so you get a very special bonus. And finally, David Galland of Casey Research is allowing me to post a most thought-provoking interview he did with Neil Howe. This is one of the best things I have run across in a long time. I do work on giving my Conversations subscribers good value.

George and I are going to be doing a regular quarterly Conversation called Geopolitical Conversations with John Mauldin and George Friedman. We believe that these new Conversations will help you better understand not only the global political landscape but also how it affects the financial umbrella that we are under. In this first Conversation, we talked about the "exogenous" risks to the markets (those from outside the markets themselves) posed by the geopolitical world.

We will offer this service, which will be priced separately, at some point in the near future. Now, here is the important part: all current subscribers and anyone who subscribes now will receive these Geopolitical Conversations free, as a thank you. (Current members can log in now.) If you have not yet subscribed, you can do so and receive a discount by clicking the link and typing in the code JM47 to subscribe for $149. This is a large discount from our regular price of $199; plus, we are including the bonus Geopolitical Conversations that are worth $59. And now, to the regular letter.

The Statistical Recovery

The unemployment numbers came out last Friday, and Steve Liesman of CNBC did several interviews live from Leen's Lodge in Maine. I postponed an hour of fishing to be on air with Martin Barnes (of the Bank Credit Analyst) to comment on the numbers. Everyone seemed quite excited that the US lost "only" 247,000 jobs. However, it is still almost twice as large as a year ago, and at that time 128,000 lost jobs seemed pretty bleak. However, comparing it to the average of 692,000 lost jobs per month in the first quarter, those looking for good news immediately started talking about how a recovery is around the corner.

The unemployment numbers are some of the most seriously revised numbers in all of government data. The first monthly estimate is notoriously imprecise. Why people make investment decisions based on this release is beyond me. As I mention continuously, because of seasonal adjustment factors, the unemployment numbers understate job losses in a recession and also understate job gains in a recovery. About the most we can get from the current data is the broad trend. Admittedly, the trend is getting better, but we are still in a hole and no one has stopped digging.

What we can see is that we are down 6.7 million jobs since the beginning of 2008! We have roughly eliminated the job growth of the last five years. And that does not take into account the 150,000 new jobs that are needed each month just to maintain the employment rate because of the increase in population. It took 55 months once the 2001 recession was officially over to get back to the previous employment peak. That is 4.5 years, gentle reader, and we are further down now and faced with massive deleveraging. It is going to take a lot longer this time. Let's look at some of the reasons why.

I took a different tack in the CNBC interview. I pointed out that even though it is possible (likely?) we will see a positive number for GDP for the third quarter, it is not going to feel like a recovery for quite some time.

By the middle of next year (2010), when I think we will finally hit an unemployment bottom, we will be down close to 8 million jobs, wiping out all the jobs created since the middle of 2004. Unemployment is likely to be more than 10%, unless they keep playing games with the number.

A Recovery Statisticians Can Love

What I mean by that remark is that the unemployment number went down even though we lost 247,000 jobs. How can that be, you ask? Well, the government assumes that if you were not looking for a job within the last month, then you are not unemployed; therefore, on a statistical basis the number of people unemployed went down by 400,000. (There are 2.3 million such discouraged workers.) More in a minute on the problem that will cause down the road.

Assume that we will need 9 million jobs over the next five years (150, 000 jobs a month for 60 months) and add the 8 million lost jobs. That means we have to add 17 million jobs in the next five years to get back to the 4.5% unemployment of 2007, let alone the under-4% we saw in 2000.

That means we need to grow employment by about 12% over the next five years. But it's worse than that. What is known as U-6 unemployment is over 16%. There are another approximately 8.8 million people who are either working part-time but want full-time jobs or are among the 2.3 million discouraged workers as mentioned above.

(The definition of U-6 unemployment from the BLS web site: "Marginally attached workers are persons who currently are neither working nor looking for work but indicate that they want and are available for a job and have looked for work sometime in the recent past. Discouraged workers, a subset of the marginally attached, have given a job-market related reason for not looking currently for a job. Persons employed part time for economic reasons are those who want and are available for full-time work but have had to settle for a part-time schedule." http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm.)

Let's make the assumption that the part-time workers want to go to full-time (which they say they do). Typically employers will increase the hours of part-time employees before adding new workers. That will be a major drag on potential job growth. It is the equivalent of creating at least 4 million jobs, except that no new jobs are created. Plus, those who want jobs but are not looking will come back into the market if jobs are available. That adds another 2 million. Now we are seeing the need for 23 million new jobs in five years, to get back to the "Old Normal."

That is an increase of 15% total employment from today's levels over the next five years. That type of jobs growth will only happen with significant economic growth. Normally, you should expect the economy to rebound to at least 3% trend GDP growth. That is what has happened historically. But we are not in the Old Normal. We are entering the era of the New Normal, where looking back at historical trends will prove to be misleading at best.

On average, and VERY roughly, you would think you would need a minimum of 15% real GDP growth over five years to get us back to what we think of as acceptable levels of unemployment. Actually you would need more, as productivity growth lessens the need for more workers. Oh, and add in the Boomer-generation workers who are not going to retire because they now cannot afford to.

(I think we will be lucky to have 10% real GDP growth in the next five years, for a host of structural reasons that we will be going into below and over the next few weeks.)

Unemployment will be rising for at least another two quarters and probably through the middle of next year. That should not surprise us too much, as unemployment kept rising for almost two years after the last recession, which many dubbed "the jobless recovery." The recession ended in 2001, but as the graph below shows, the unemployment rate rose until the middle of 2003.

We may have a "statistical recovery." The numbers may be positive for a variety of reasons only a statistician could love, but it is not going to feel like a recovery to the rest of us. Maybe that is why consumer confidence took another hit today, dropping to its lowest level since March, helping to drive the market down.

The economists at economy.com, who normally have a bullish tinge to their writing, said it succinctly: "Confidence will struggle to gain ground in the months to come, as consumer budgets remain stretched. Little wage income, prospects for reduced bonus payments, reduced access to credit, and no capital gains are all constraining consumers' ability to meet their financial needs and recover from the sharp drops in wealth they have experienced. Many consumers are struggling to pay their debts. Supports are coming from reduced layoffs, equity market gains, and stimulus such as the cash for clunkers program, but that is proving inadequate to lift spirits so far. It will likely be some time before conditions turn enough for confidence to improve decisively. Key drivers of confidence include developments in the labor and housing markets and the path of energy and equity prices."

(My friend Bill Bonner described the Statistical Recovery as being just like a female impersonator. He is just like a real woman in every way, except for the essential ones.)

The consumer's sense of discomfort is shared in executive suites across the country. "Chief Executive Magazine's CEO Index, the nation's only monthly CEO Index, dropped to 63 in July, after showing gradual improvement. All components of the index are down, with Employment Confidence taking the largest hit...

"What's worse is that pessimism over employment is reaching new heights. The Employment Confidence Index declined 25 percent with 57 percent of CEOs expecting continued decrease in employment next quarter. Over 95 percent rate the current employment environment as bad—the highest level for 2009. Less than 5 percent think employment conditions are normal and virtually no one (0.4 percent) thinks they are good." (The Bill King Report)

A Few Thoughts on the Housing Market

Bill also sent me a link to a very interesting survey of the real estate market. Those in the real estate business will find this of value, although it makes for grim reading. (http://www.campbellsurveys.com/AgentSummaryReports/AgentSurveyReportSummary-June2009.pdf)

Three (of the sixteen) of their summary bullet points stood out:

The market for home purchases can be divided into segments of 26% for damaged REO, 23% for move-in ready REO, 14% for short sales, and [only!] 36% for non-distressed properties. [REO means "real estate owned," typically by a bank as a result of a foreclosure.]
43% of homebuyers are first-time homebuyers, 29% are current homeowners (relocation or retirement homes), and another 29% are investors.
Only 31% of non-REO home sale listings are unforced or optional; other major reasons for listings include financial stress (including short sales), long distance relocation, and divorce or estate sales.

Think about that for a minute. Two-thirds of home sales are either foreclosures or banks taking a loss on the mortgage. Of the remaining 36%, only 10% are as a result of something we could call a normal selling process. And that is nationwide. There are lots of places where foreclosures are low. Reading this report anecdotally, there are large areas (California, Nevada, Arizona, Florida) where almost the only housing action is distressed or forced sales, that is, sales at a significant discount to original asking price.

Look at the chart below from Rick Sharga at RealtyTrac. Today we learned from them that foreclosures set a new monthly record of 360,149 properties that received a default or auction notice or were seized last month. One in 355 households got a filing, the highest monthly rate in RealtyTrac records. Many hard-hit areas have rates higher than 1 in 39 homes! Foreclosures are now running about six times higher than just four years ago.

And there is little relief in sight. There is typically about one foreclosure for every 6-10 jobs lost. It will be higher this cycle, as so many homebuyers are underwater on their mortgages and have little incentive to try and keep up payments while they are unemployed. Further, there are 500,000 REO-owned homes that are not on the market as of yet (what Sharga calls shadow inventory), and a wave of foreclosures will result from option ARMs and Alt-A loans resetting next year. Note: July's record numbers are not in the chart below.

John Burns gives us the next graph, which is an estimate of foreclosures for the coming years. (www.realestateconsulting.com)

Notice that he estimates more foreclosures next year than this year, with very little relief until 2014! This does not bode well for housing prices, which are a big factor in consumer sentiment, which is a big factor in consumer spending.

It does mean that renters can find some very good deals, as there are now areas (like Phoenix) where it is cheaper to buy smaller homes than to rent. Remember the statistic above that first-time home buyers are 43% of the market and investors another 29%? Lower prices make housing more affordable, and with the government incentive programs for first-time buyers really working (for once), the lower end of the housing market may actually stabilize sooner than the overall market.

As I wrote almost two years ago, the housing market will not bottom before 2011 and maybe into 2012. We just built way too many homes in our exuberance; and with tightening lending standards (as there should be) the number of people who can qualify for a mortgage is down, although (again) falling prices make homes more affordable. The median price in California is down by 60%. (Although I saw today where Bill Gross bought a tear-down on the water in Newport Beach for $23 million. That will help the average some.)

Homeowner vacancy rates are close to 3% of total homes, which is well over 2 million homes. Many of these are not yet on the market.

Retail sales were down in July. And that was with Cash for Clunkers in full force. The headlines said that economists were shocked. Really? Consumers are saving more, and actually paying down credit-card and bank debt. We will go into those details more next week, as it is getting close to time to hit the send button.

Some Thoughts from Maine

Last weekend I got to go to Leen's Lodge at Grand Lake Stream in Maine (www.leenslodge.com - highly recommended) to meet with 35 economics types and their friends. This is a very knowledgeable group, with a lot of well-known names. We fish in the morning, meet at a campsite for lunch (drink wine and eat what we caught), fish some more, go back to the lodge, eat a gourmet meal and drink some more wine, and then go on talking. This goes on for 2-3 days. I throw my diet to the wind, and pay for it over the next month, but it's worth it.

On Friday Steve Liesman and some local guides bring out their guitars and entertain, with a lot of loud, if somewhat off-key, singing from the crowd. (Liesman, by the way, really can play the guitar quite well.) On Saturday night we bet on the future of the markets and events - typically small amounts, and lots of side bets. This year I won five out of six side bets I made last year.

As usual, bets were all over the board. But a few interesting ones surfaced. David Kotok and George Friedman offered rather (for this crowd) large sums to take on all comers that Bernanke would not be reappointed. I took part of that offer, as did a number of others (for the record, the Fed economists at the meeting do not bet and were quite closed on the topic). I was surprised at the intensity of that debate. This is a well-informed crowd when it comes to Fed policy and actions, and if this question is (politely) contentious among friends in July of 2009, what will it be like in the latter part of the year, when Obama has to make the appointment (Bernanke's appointment is up in January of 2010)? And among those who do not get along? This could be a very noisy appointment process.

A few years ago (2006 and 2007), I was repeatedly told I was "too bearish." Now, my Muddle Through prediction was seen either as overly optimistic or the most likely scenario by a large number of attendees. The concerns about the credit markets are still quite strong, with many thinking we will be facing banking problems for years. There were more than a few who bet that Citibank will not be around in its current form by this time next year. (I did not take that bet.)

A number of participants saw a double-dip recession as a distinct possibility. I think it is a probability in 2011 as the Bush tax cuts expire. If Congress moves up the increase in taxes to 2010, which is what the House Democrats want, that recession could start in 2010.

Tulsa, Birthdays, Weddings, and Paul McCartney

Today is my mother's 92^nd birthday, so I need to leave soon, as she eats early. The order of the day is Luby's Cafeteria. Interestingly, she had me when she was 32, and Tiffani is 32 and will have her first around Christmas. Other than her hearing, mother is still going strong, if a little more slowly, and shows no real signs of letting up. She is now bionic, with two new knees and hips over the last decade.

Next week I leave for Tulsa on Thursday to prepare to give away my daughter Amanda on Saturday to a nice young gentleman, Allen Porter. They (along with her twin sister Abigail) say they intend to move to Dallas after the first of the year, which will make Dad happy, as all the kids will be in the local area. A little golf on Friday morning with the new in-laws, parties, and so on. It should be a large wedding and a fun weekend. They have lots of friends, it seems. I do intend to write my letter as usual.

I also intend to be in the bar on Thursday night at the Hilton at 9:30-45, assuming Southwest is on time. If anyone cares to meet, feel free to drop by.

Thinking about Mother's birthday reminds me that I turn 60 on October 4. For whatever reason, it is not bothering me like 50 did. Maybe 60 is the new 45? Paul McCartney is now 66, and is on the road with what I am told is a very good show. I will find out Wednesday when he plays Dallas and I get to go to the new Cowboy Stadium to see him play. With most of his set scheduled to be Beatles tunes, I am really looking forward to being there. I got to see Eric Clapton last month. He is on top of his game. Maybe blowing through 60 is not all that bad.

Have a great week. I shall.

Your hoping I can avoid paying for another wedding for a few years analyst,

John Mauldin

Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast

John Mauldin — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 18:07:00 GMT

Six impossible things before breakfast, or how EMH has damaged our industry
The Dead Parrot of Finance
The Queen of Hearts and impossible beliefs
Slaves of some defunct economist
Prima facie case against EMH -- Forever blowing bubbles
The EMH 'Nuclear Bomb'

The Efficient Market Hypothesis, according to Shiller, is one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought. EMH should be consigned to the dustbin of history. We need to stop teaching it, and brainwashing the innocent. Rob Arnott tells a lovely story of a speech he was giving to some 200 finance professors. He asked how many of them taught EMH - pretty much everyone's hand was up. Then he asked how many of them believed it. Only two hands stayed up!

And we wonder why funds and banks, full of the best and brightest, have made such a mess of things. Part of the reason is that we have taught economic nonsense to two generations of students. They have come to rely upon models based on assumptions that are absurd on their face. And then they are shocked when the markets deliver them a "hundred-year flood" every 4 years. The models say this should not happen. But do they abandon their models? No, they use them to convince regulators that things should not be changed all that much. And who can argue with a model that was the basis for a Nobel Prize?

I am again out of town this week, but I have been saving a speech done by my friend James Montier of Société Générale in London on the problems with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EFM). While parts of it are wonkish, there are also parts that are quite funny (at least to an economist).

Ideas have consequences, and bad ideas usually have bad consequences. The current maelstrom from which we are emerging (finally, if in fits and starts) has many culprits. A lot of bad ideas and poor management that came together to create the perfect storm. Today, we look at some of the ideas that are part of the problem but are too often glossed over because they are "academic" and not of the real world. However, gentle reader, academic ideas that are taught and accepted as gospel by 99% of the professors have real-world consequences. Where does your money manager stand on these topics? It does make a difference. And now, let's jump into James's speech.

Six impossible things before breakfast, or how EMH has damaged our industry

What follows is the text of a speech to be delivered at the CFA UK conference on "What ever happened to EMH". Dedicated to Peter Bernstein - Peter will be fondly remembered and sadly missed by all who work in investment. Although he and I often ended up on opposite sides of the debates, he was true gentleman and always a pleasure to discuss ideas with. I am sure Peter would have disagreed with some, much and perhaps all of my speech today, but I'm equally sure he would have enjoyed the discussion.

The Dead Parrot of Finance

Given that this is the UK division of the CFA I am sure that The Monty Python Dead Parrot Sketch will be familiar to all of you. The EMH is the financial equivalent of the Dead Parrot. I feel like the John Cleese character (an exceedingly annoyed customer who recently purchased a parrot) returning to the petshop to berate the owner:

"He's passed away, This parrot is no more, He has ceased to be! He's expired and gone to meet his maker. He's a stiff! Bereft of Life, he rests in peace! If you hadn't nailed him to the perch he'd be pushing up daisies! His metabolic processes are now history! He's off the twig! He kicked the bucket. He's shuffled off his mortal coil, run down the curtain and joined the bleedin' choir invisible! This is an ex-parrot!!!"

The shopkeeper (picture Gene Fama if you will) keeps insisting the parrot is simply resting. Incidentally, the Dead Parrot Sketch takes on even more meaning when you recall Stephen Ross's words that "All it takes to turn a parrot into a learned financial economist is just one word - arbitrage".

The EMH supporters have strong similarities with the Jesuit astronomers of the 17th Century who desperately wanted to maintain the assumption that the Sun revolved around the Earth. The reason for this desire to protect the maintained hypothesis was simple. If the Sun didn't revolve around the Earth, then the Bible's tale of Joshua asking God to make the Sun stand still in the sky was a lie. A bible that lies even once can't be the inerrant foundation for faith!

The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has done massive amounts of damage to our industry. But before I explore some errors embedded within the approach and the havoc that they have wreaked, I would like to say a few words on why the EMH exists at all.

Academic theories are notoriously subject to path dependence (or hysteresis, if you prefer). Once a theory has been adopted it takes an enormous amount of effort to dislocate it. As Max Planck said "Science advances one funeral at a time".

The EMH has been around in one form or another since the Middle Ages (the earliest debate I can find is between St. Thomas Aquinas and other monks on the 'just' price to charge for corn, with St. Thomas arguing that the 'just' price was the market price). Just imagine we had all grown up in a parallel universe. David Hirschleifer did exactly that: welcome to his world of the Deficient Markets Hypothesis.

"A school of sociologists at the University of Chicago proposing the Deficient Markets Hypothesis - that prices inaccurately reflect all information. A brilliant Stanford psychologist, call him Bill Blunte, invents the Deranged Anticipation and Perception Model (DAPM), in which proxies for market misevaluation are used to predict security returns. Imagine the euphoria when researchers discovered that these mispricing proxies (such as book/market, earnings/price and past returns), and that mood indicators such as amount of sunlight, turned out to be strong predictors of future returns. At this point, it would seem that the Deficient Markets Hypothesis was the best-confirmed theory in social science.

To be sure, dissatisfied practitioners would have complained that it is harder to actually make money than the ivory tower theorists claim. One can even imagine some academic heretics documenting rapid short-term stock market responses to news arrival in event studies, and arguing that security return predictability results from rational premia for bearing risk. Would the old guard surrender easily? Not when they could appeal to intertemporal versions of the DAPM, in which mispricing is only corrected slowly. In such a setting, short window event studies cannot uncover the market's inefficient response to new information. More generally, given the strong theoretical underpinnings of market inefficiency, the rebels would have an uphill fight."

In finance we seem to have a chronic love affair with elegant theories. Our faculties for critical thinking seem to have been overcome by the seductive power of mathematical beauty. A long, long time ago, when I was a young and impressionable lad starting out in my study of economics I too was enthralled by the bewitching beauty and power of the EMH/rational expectations approach (akin to the Dark Side in Star Wars). However, in practice we should always remember that there are no points for elegance!

My own disillusionment with EMH and the ultra rational Homo Economius that it rests upon came in my third year of university. I sat on the oversight committee for my degree course as a student representative. Now at the university I attended it was possible to elect to graduate with a specialism in Business Economics, if you took a prescribed set of courses. The courses necessary to attain this degree were spread over two years. It wasn't possible to do all the courses in one year, so students needed to stagger their electives. Yet at the beginning of the third year I was horrified to find students coming to me to complain that they hadn't realised this! These young economists had failed to solve the simplest two-period optimisation problem I can imagine! What hope for the rest of the world. Perhaps I am living evidence that finance is like smoking. Ex-smokers always seem to provide the most ardent opposition to anyone lighting up. Perhaps the same thing is true in finance!

The Queen of Hearts and impossible beliefs

I'm pretty sure that the Queen of Hearts would have made an excellent EMH economist.

"Alice laughed: "There's no use trying," she said; "one can't believe impossible things."

"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was younger, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.""

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland.

Earlier I alluded to a startling lack of critical thinking in finance. This lack of 'logic' isn't specific to finance, in general we, as a species, suffer belief bias. This a tendency to evaluate the validity of an argument on the basis of whether or not one agrees with the conclusion, rather than on whether or not it follows logically from the premise.

Consider these four syllogisms:

No police dogs are vicious.
Some highly trained dogs are vicious.
Therefore some highly trained dogs are not police dogs.
No nutritional things are inexpensive.
Some vitamin pills are inexpensive.
Therefore, some vitamin pills are not nutritional.
No addictive things are inexpensive.
Some cigarettes are inexpensive.
Therefore, some addictive things are not cigarettes.
No millionaires are hard workers.
Some rich people are hard workers.
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich people.

These four syllogisms provide us with a mixture of validity and believability. The table below separates out the problems along these two dimensions. This enables us to assess which criteria people use in reaching their decisions.

As the chart reveals, it is the believability not the validity of the concept that seems to drive behaviour. When validity and believability coincide, then 90% of subjects reach the correct conclusion. However, when the puzzle is invalid but believable, some 66% still accepted the conclusion as true. When the puzzle is valid but unbelievable only around 60% of subjects accepted the conclusion as true. Thus we have a tendency to judge things by their believability rather than their validity - clear evidence that logic goes out of the window when beliefs are strong.

All this talk about beliefs makes EMH sound like a religion. Indeed, it has some overlap with religion in that belief appears to be based on faith rather than proof. Debating the subject can also give rise to the equivalent of religious fanaticism. In his book 'The New Finance: The Case Against Efficient Markets', Robert Haugen (long regarded as a heretic by many in finance) recalls a conference he was speaking at where he listed various inefficiencies. Gene Fama was in the audience and at one point yelled "You're a criminal....God knows markets are efficient".

Slaves of some defunct economist

To be honest I wouldn't really care if EMH was just some academic artefact. The real damage unleashed by the EMH stems from the fact that as Keynes long ago noted "practical men... are usually the slaves of some defunct economist".

So let's turn to the investment legacy that the EMH has burdened us with: first off is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). I've criticised the CAPM elsewhere (see Chapter 35 of Behavioural Investing), so I won't dwell on the flaws here, but suffice it to say that my view remains that CAPM is CRAP (Completely Redundant Asset Pricing).

The aspects of CAPM that we do need to address here briefly are the ones that hinder the investment process. One of the most pronounced of which is the obsession with performance measurement. The separation of alpha and beta is at best an irrelevance and at worst a serious distraction from the true nature of investment. Sir John Templeton said it best when he observed that "the aim of investment is maximum real returns after tax". Yet instead of focusing on this target, we have spawned one industry that does nothing other than pigeonhole investors into categories.

As the late, great Bob Kirby opined "Performance measurement is one of those basically good ideas that somehow got totally out of control. In many cases, the intense application of performance measurement techniques has actually served to impede the purpose it is supposed to serve."

The obsession with benchmarking also gives rise to one of the biggest sources of bias in our industry - career risk. For a benchmarked investor, risk is measured as tracking error. This gives rise to Homo Ovinus - a species who are concerned purely with where they stand relative to the rest of the crowd. (For those who aren't up in time to listen to Farming Today, Ovine is the proper name for sheep). This species is the living embodiment of Keynes' edict that "it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally". More on this poor creature a little later.

Whilst on the subject of benchmarking, we can't leave without observing that EMH and CAPM also give rise to market indexing. Only in an efficient market is a market cap-weighted index the 'best' index. If markets aren't efficient then cap weighting leads us to overweight the most expensive stocks and underweight the cheapest stocks!

Before we leave risk behind, we should also note the way in which fans of EMH protect themselves against evidence that anomalies such as value and momentum exist. In a wonderfully tautological move, they argue that only risk factors can generate returns in an efficient market, so these factors must clearly be risk factors!

Those of us working in the behavioural camp argue that behavioural and institutional biases are the root causes of the outperformance of the various anomalies. I have even written papers showing that value isn't riskier than growth on any definition that the EMH fans might choose to use (see Mind Matters, 21 April 2008 for details).

For instance, if we take the simplest definition of risk used by the EMH fans (the standard deviation of returns), then the chart below shows an immediate issue for EMH. The return on value stocks is higher than the return on growth stocks, but the so-called 'risk' of value stocks is lower than the risk of growth stocks - in complete contradiction to the EMH viewpoint.

This overt focus on risk has again given rise to what is in my view yet another largely redundant industry - risk management. The tools and techniques are deeply flawed. The use of measures such as VaR gives rise to the illusion of safety. All too often they use trailing inputs calculated over short periods of time, and forget that their model inputs are effectively endogenous. The 'risk' inputs such as correlation and volatility are a function of a market which functions more like poker than roulette (i.e. the behaviour of the other players matters).

Risk shouldn't be defined as standard deviation (or volatility). I have never met a long-only investor who gives a damn about upside volatility. Risk is an altogether more complex topic - I have argued that a trinity of risk sums up the aspects that investors should be looking at. Valuation risk, business or earnings risk, and balance sheet risk.

Of course, under CAPM the proper measure of risk is beta. However, as Ben Graham pointed out beta measures price variability, not risk. Beta is probably most often used by analysts in their calculations of the cost of capital, and indeed by CFOs in similar calculations. However, even here beta is unhelpful. Far from the theoretical upward sloping relationship between risk and return, the evidence (including that collected by Fama and French) shows no relationship, and even arguably an inverse one from the model prediction.

This, of course, ignores the difficulties and vagaries of actually calculating beta. Do you use, daily, weekly or monthly data, over what time period? The answers to these questions are non-trivial in their impact upon the analysts calculations. In a very recent paper, Fernandez and Bermejo showed that the best approach might simply to assume that beta equals 1.0 for all stocks. (Another reminder that there are no points for elegance in this world!)

The EMH has also given us the Modigliani and Miller propositions on dividend irrelevance, and capital structure irrelevance. These concepts have both been used by unscrupulous practitioners to further their own causes. For instance, those in favour of repurchases over dividends, or even those in favour of retained earnings over distributed earnings, have effectively relied upon the M&M propositions to argue that shareholders should be indifferent to the way in which they receive their return (ignoring the inconvenient evidence that firms tend to piss away their retained earnings, and that repurchases are far more transitory in nature than dividends).

Similarly, the M&M capital structure irrelevance proposition has encouraged corporate financiers and corporates themselves to gear up on debt. After all, according to this theory investors shouldn't care whether 'investment' is financed by retained earnings, equity issuance or debt issuance.

The EMH also gave rise to another fallacious distraction of our world - shareholder value. Ironically this started out as a movement to stop the focus on short-term earnings. Under EMH, the price of a company is, of course, just the net present value of all future cash flows. So focusing on maximizing the share price was exactly the same thing as maximizing future profitability. Unfortunately in a myopic world this all breaks down, and we end up with a quest to maximize short-term earnings!

But perhaps the most insidious aspect of the EMH is the way in which it has influenced the behaviour of active managers in their pursuit of adding value. This might sound odd, but bear with me while I try to explain what might upon cursory inspection sound like an oxymoron.

All but the most diehard of EMH fans admit that there is a role for active management. After all, who else would keep the market efficient - a point first made by Grossman and Stigliz in their classic paper, 'The impossibility of the informational efficient market'. The extreme diehards probably wouldn't even tolerate this, but their arguments don't withstand the reductio ad absurdum that if the market were efficient, prices would of course be correct, and thus volumes should be equal to zero.

The EMH is pretty clear that active managers can add value via one of two routes. First there is inside information - which we will ignore today because it is generally illegal in most markets. Second, they could outperform if they could see the future more accurately than everyone else.

The EMH also teaches us that opportunities will be fleeting as someone will surely try to arbitrage them away. This, of course, is akin to the age old joke about the economist and his friend walking along the street. The friend points out a $100 bill lying on the pavement. The economist says, "It isn't really there because if it were someone would have already picked it up".

Sadly these simple edicts are no joking matter as they are probably the most damaging aspects of the EMH legacy. Thus the EMH urges investors to try and forecast the future. In my opinion this is one of the biggest wastes of time, yet one that is nearly universal in our industry. Pretty much 80-90% of the investment processes that I come across revolve around forecasting. Yet there isn't a scrap of evidence to suggest that we can actually see the future at all.

The EMH's insistence on the fleeting nature of opportunities combined with the career risk that bedevils Homo Ovinus has led to an overt focus on the short-term. This is typified by the chart below which shows the average holding period for a stock on the New York Stock Exchange. It is now just six months!

The undue focus upon benchmark and relative performance also leads Homo Ovinus to engage in Keynes' beauty contest. As Keynes wrote:

"Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the price being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preference of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees"

This game can be easily replicated by asking people to pick a number between 0 and 100, and telling them the winner will be the person who picks the number closest to two-thirds the average number picked. The chart below shows the results from the largest incidence of the game that I have played - in fact the third largest game ever played, and the only one played purely among professional investors.

The highest possible correct answer is 67. To go for 67 you have to believe that every other muppet in the known universe has just gone for 100. The fact we got a whole raft of responses above 67 is more than slightly alarming.

You can see spikes which represent various levels of thinking. The spike at fifty reflects what we (somewhat rudely) call level zero thinkers. They are the investment equivalent of Homer Simpson, 0, 100, duh 50! Not a vast amount of cognitive effort expended here!

There is a spike at 33 - of those who expect everyone else in the world to be Homer. There's a spike at 22, again those who obviously think everyone else is at 33. As you can see there is also a spike at zero. Here we find all the economists, game theorists and mathematicians of the world. They are the only people trained to solve these problems backwards. And indeed the only stable Nash equilibrium is zero (two-thirds of zero is still zero). However, it is only the 'correct' answer when everyone chooses zero.

The final noticeable spike is at one. These are economists who have (mistakenly...) been invited to one dinner party (economists only ever get invited to one dinner party). They have gone out into the world and realised the rest of the world doesn't think like them. So they try to estimate the scale of irrationality. However, they end up suffering the curse of knowledge (once you know the true answer, you tend to anchor to it). In this game, which is fairly typical, the average number picked was 26, giving a two-thirds average of 17. Just three people out of more than 1000 picked the number 17.

I play this game to try to illustrate just how hard it is to be just one step ahead of everyone else - to get in before everyone else, and get out before everyone else. Yet despite this fact, it seems to be that this is exactly what a large number of investors spend their time doing.

Prima facie case against EMH -- Forever blowing bubbles

Let me now turn to the prima facie case against the EMH. Oddly enough it is one that doesn't attract much attention in academia. As Larry Summers pointed out in his wonderful parody of financial economics "Traditional finance is more concerned with checking that two 8oz bottles of ketchup is close to the price of one 16oz bottle, than in understanding the price of the 16oz bottle".

The first stock exchange was founded in 1602. The first equity bubble occurred just 118 years later - the South Sea bubble. Since then we have encountered bubbles with an alarming regularity. My friends at GMO define a bubble as a (real) price movement that is at least two standard deviations from trend. Now a two standard deviation event should occur roughly every 44 years. Yet since 1925, GMO have found a staggering 30 plus bubbles. That is equivalent to slightly more than one every three years!

In my own work I've examined the patterns that bubbles tend to follow. By looking at some of the major bubbles in history (including the South Sea Bubble, the railroad bubble of the 1840s, the Japanese bubble of the late 1980s, and the NASDAQ bubble¹), I have been able to extract the following underlying pattern. Bubbles inflate over the course of around three years, with an almost parabolic explosion in prices towards the peak of the bubble. Then without exception they deflate. This bursting is generally slightly more rapidly than the inflation, taking around two years.

Whilst the details and technicalities of each episode are different, the underlying dynamics follow a very similar pattern. As Mark Twain put it "History doesn't repeat but it does rhyme". Indeed, the first well documented analysis of the underlying patterns of bubbles that I can find is a paper by J.S. Mills in 1867. He lays out a framework that is very close to the Minsky/Kindleberger model that I have used for years to understand the inflation and deflation of bubbles. This makes it hard to understand why so many amongst the learned classes seem to believe that you can't identify a bubble before it bursts. To my mind the clear existence and ex ante diagnosis of bubbles represent by far and away the most compelling evidence of the gross inefficiency of markets.

The EMH 'Nuclear Bomb'

Now as a behaviouralist I am constantly telling people to beware of confirmatory bias - the habit of looking for information that agrees you. So in an effort to avert the accusation that I am guilty of failing to allow for my own biases (something I've done before), I will now turn to the evidence that the EMH fans argue is the strongest defence of their belief - the simple fact that active management doesn't outperform. Mark Rubinstein describes this as the nuclear bomb of the EMH, and says we behaviouralists have nothing in our arsenal to match it, our evidence of inefficiencies and irrationalities amounts to puny rifles.

However, I will argue that this viewpoint is flawed both theoretically and empirically. The logical error is a simple one. It is to confuse the absence of evidence with evidence of the absence. That is to say, if the EMH leads active investors to focus on the wrong sources of performance (i.e. forecasting), then it isn't any wonder that active management won't be able to outperform.

Empirically, the 'nuclear bomb' is also suspect. Today I want to present two pieces of evidence that highlight the suspect nature of the EMH claim. The first is work by Jonathan Lewellen of Dartmouth College.

In a recent paper, Lewellen looked at the aggregate holdings of US institutional investors over the period 1980-2007. He finds that essentially they hold the market portfolio. To some extent this isn't a surprise, as the share of institutional ownership has risen steadily over time from around 30% in 1980 to almost 70% at the end of 2007. This confirms the zero sum game aspect of active management (or negative sum, after costs) and also the validity of Keynes' observation that it [the market] is professional investors trying to outsmart each other.

However, Lewellen also shows that, in aggregate, institutions don't try to outperform! He sorts stocks into quintiles based on a variety of characteristics and then compares the fraction of the institutional portfolio invested in each (relative to institutions' investment in all five quintiles) with the quintile's weight in the market portfolio (the quintile's market cap relative to the market cap of all five quintiles) - i.e. he measures the weight institutional investors place on a characteristic relative to the weight the market places on each trait.

The chart below shows the results for a sample of the characteristics that Lewellen used. With the exception of size, the aggregate institutional portfolio barely deviates from the market weights. So institutions aren't even really trying to tilt their portfolios towards the factors we know generate outperformance over the long term.

Lewellen concludes:

"Quite simply, institutions overall seem to do little more than hold the market portfolio, at least from the standpoint of their pre-cost and pre-fee returns. Their aggregate portfolio almost perfectly mimics the value-weighted index, with a market beta of 1.01 and an economically small, precisely estimated CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions overall take essentially no bet on any of the most important stock characteristics known to predict returns, like book-to market, momentum, or accruals. The implication is that to the extent that institutions deviate from the market portfolio, they seem to bet primarily on idiosyncratic returns - bets that aren't particularly successful. Another implication is that institutions, in aggregate, don't exploit anomalies in the way they should if they rationally tried to maximize the (pre-cost) mean variance trade-off of their portfolios, either relative or absolute."

Put into our terms, institutions are more worried about career risk (losing your job) or business risk (losing funds under management) than they are about doing the right thing!

The second piece of evidence I'd like to bring to your addition is a paper by Randy Cohen, Christopher Polk and Bernhard Silli. They examined the 'best ideas' of US fund managers over the period 1991-2005. 'Best ideas' are measured as the biggest difference between the managers' holdings and the weights in the index.

The performance of these best ideas is impressive. Focusing on the top 25% of best ideas across the universe of active managers, Cohen et al find that the average return is over 19% p.a. against a market return of 12% p.a. That is to say, the stocks in which the managers display most confidence did outperform the market by a significant degree.

The corollary to this is that the other stocks they hold are dragging down their performance. Hence it appears that the focus on relative performance -and the fear of underperformance against an arbitrary benchmark - is a key source of underperformance.

At an anecdotal level I have never quite recovered from discovering that a value manager at a large fund was made to operate with a 'completion portfolio'. This was a euphemism for an add-on to the manager's selected holdings that essentially made his fund behave much more like the index!

As Cohen et al conclude "The poor overall performance of mutual fund managers in the past is not due to a lack of stock-picking ability, but rather to institutional factors that encourage them to over-diversify". Thus as Sir John Templeton said, "It is impossible to produce a superior performance unless you do something different from the majority".

The bottom line is that the EMH nuclear bomb is more of a party popper than a weapon of mass destruction. The EMH would have driven Sherlock Holmes to despair. As Holmes opined "It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts".

The EMH, as Shiller puts it, is "one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought". EMH should be consigned to the dustbin of history. We need to stop teaching it, and brain washing the innocent. Rob Arnott tells a lovely story of a speech he was giving to some 200 finance professors. He asked how many of them taught EMH - pretty much everyone's hand was up. Then he asked how many of them believed in it....only two hands remained up!

A similar sentiment seems to have been expressed by the recent CFA UK survey which revealed that 67% of respondents thought that the market failed to behave rationally. When a journalist asked me what I thought of this, I simply said "About bloody time". However, 76% said that behavioural finance wasn't yet sufficiently robust to replace modern portfolio theory (MPT) as the basis of investment thought. This is, of course, utter nonsense. Successful investors existed long before EMH and MPT. Indeed, the vast majority of successful long-term investors are value investors who reject pretty much all the precepts of EMH and MPT.

Will we ever be successful at finally killing off the EMH? I am a pessimist. As Jeremy Grantham said when asked what investors would learn from this crisis: "In the short term, a lot. In the medium term, a little. In the long term, nothing at all. That is the historical precedent". Or as JK Galbraith put it, markets are characterised by "Extreme brevity of financial memory... There can be few fields of human endeavour in which history counts for so little as in the world of finance".

Footnote:
¹- Two economists have written a paper arguing that the NASDAQ bubble might not have been a bubble after all - only an academic with no experience of the real world could ever posit such a thing.

Maine, Tulsa, and Paul McCartney

I am in Maine today with my youngest son Trey (15), who in all likelihood is once again going to catch more fish than Dad. I guess after going through it with his six siblings, I should be used to it by now; but he’s hitting me with, “Dad, when can I get my learner’s permit? Did you know you have to have a learner’s permit for a whole six month’s before you drive? I don’t want to wait until I’m 16.” This conversation or variants of it keep coming up. I tell him I could predict much better when he would get the permit if I knew how he would do in math this year. You gotta love it.

August 22 is fast approaching. Amanda is getting married to a fine young ex-Marine, and of course all the family will be there, along with a large guest list. Seems everyone knows Amanda. It will be a fun two days.

But one day before leaving for Tulsa, I get to visit Penny Lane by way of a Paul McCartney concert at the new football edifice that is Cowboys Stadium in Arlington. I looked at the set of songs he is doing, and the majority are old Beatle favorites. For one night, I will be taken back in time to when I was as young as my kids and music was intoxicating and a powerful force in our lives.

I trust you are enjoying your summer. They go by so fast!

Your realizing that he has an internet addiction problem analyst,

John Mauldin

The Great Reflation Experiment

John Mauldin — Fri, 31 Jul 2009 15:04:00 GMT

The Great Reflation Experiment
The Debt Super Cycle
Some Background on US Inflation
Implications for Investors
A Beach, New York, and Maine

The question we have been focused on for some time now is whether we end up with inflation, or deflation, and what that endgame looks like. It is one of the most important questions an investor must ask today, and getting the answer right is critical. This week, we have a guest writer who takes on the topic of the great experiment the Fed is now waging, which he calls The Great Reflation Experiment.

One of my favorite sources of information for decades has been and remains the Bank Credit Analyst. It has a long and storied reputation. One of their enduring themes has been the debt super cycle. Investors who have paid attention to it have been served well. I am taking a little R&R this weekend, but I have arranged for my friend Tony Boeckh to stand in for me. Tony was chairman, chief executive, and editor-in-chief of Montreal-based BCA Research, publisher of the highly regarded Bank Credit Analyst up until he retired in 2002. He still likes to write from time to time, and we are lucky enough to have him give us his views on where we are in the economic cycles. Gentle reader, we are all graced to learn from one of the great economists and analysts of our times. Pay attention. Central bankers do. You can read his extensive bio at www.boeckhinvestmentletter.com and I will tell you how to get his letter free of charge at the end of this letter. And, he told me to mention that his son Rob is now helping him write, so there is a double byline here. Now, let's just jump in.

By Tony Boeckh and Rob Boeckh

The Crash of 2008/9 should be seen as yet another consequence of long-term, persistent US inflationary policies. Inflation doesn't stand still. It tends to establish a self-reinforcing cycle that accelerates until the excesses in money and credit become so extreme that a correction is triggered. The bigger the inflation, the bigger the correction. Once a dependency on credit expansion is well established, correcting the underlying imbalances becomes extremely difficult. Reflation has occurred after each major correction, and this one is proving no exception. Return to discipline in the current environment would be too painful and dangerous. Once on the financial roller coaster, it is very hard to get off. Moreover, the oscillations between peaks and valleys become increasingly large and unstable.

Policymakers, money managers, and most forecasters have argued that the crash was a "black swan" event, meaning that it had an extremely low probability of occurrence. That is grossly misleading, as it implies that the crash was so far beyond the realm of normal probabilities that it was unreasonable to expect anyone to have foreseen it. That argument has been used to justify the widespread complacency that prevailed in the years leading up to the crash. Policymakers are still failing to recognize the systemic causes of the crash and seem to believe that enhanced regulation will prevent history from repeating. While it is true that regulators were asleep at the switch or looking the other way, they were not the cause.

The Debt Super Cycle

The real culprit is the US debt super cycle, which has operated for decades, mostly in a remarkably benign manner. The inflationary implications of the twin deficits (current account and fiscal), as well as the steady increase in private debt, have been moderated by the integration of emerging markets into the global economy. The massive increase in industrial output from China, India, and others has enabled persistent credit inflation in the US to occur with virtually no consequence to date (other than periodic asset price bubbles and shakeouts). How long the disinflationary impact of emerging-market productivity growth will persist and how long these nations will continue loading up on Treasuries, will be instrumental in determining the course that the Great Reflation will take.

Tougher regulation is surely appropriate, but it will not stop the next inflationary run-up unless the system is fixed. In the final analysis, newly minted money and credit must find a home somewhere.

Some Background on US Inflation

Inflation, to be properly understood, should be defined as a persistent expansion of money and credit that substantially exceeds the growth requirements of the economy. As a consequence of excessive monetary expansion, prices rise. Which prices go up and at what rate depends on a number of factors. Sometimes it is the prices of goods and services that are the most visible symptom of inflationary pressures. That was the case in the 1970s when the Consumer Price Index (CPI) hit a peak rate of 14% per annum. Sometimes it is the prices of assets such as homes, office buildings, stocks, or bonds that reflect the inflationary pressure, as we have seen in more recent years.

When inflation becomes pervasive, and other conditions are supportive, it can engulf a whole industry. We saw this in the financial sector in the period leading up to the crash. The supporting conditions or "displacements," to use the terminology of Professor Kindleberger, were financial innovation, deregulation, and obscene profits and salaries. These drew millions of bees to the honey. All great manias are accompanied by malfeasance, in this case the biggest Ponzi scheme in history and many other lesser ones. It is relatively easy to steal when prices are rising and greed is pervasive. Overspending and a general lack of prudence always become widespread when a mania infects the general public. Rational people can do incredibly stupid things collectively when there is mass hysteria.

The origins of post-war inflation go back to the late 1950s and early 1960s, though some would take it back much further. In the 1960s, the US dollar started to come under pressure as a result of US inflationary policy and foreign central banks' ebbing confidence in their large and growing dollar reserve holdings. The US responded with controls and government intervention in a number of areas: gold convertibility, the US Treasury bond market, the Interest Equalization Tax, and, ultimately, intervention on wages and prices. These moves clearly flagged to the world that external discipline would be subjugated to domestic employment and growth concerns. The policy was formalized when the US terminated the link between gold and the dollar in August 1971, essentially floating the dollar and setting the US on a course of sustained inflation. Of course, the dollar floated down, which, among other things, triggered the massive rise in general prices in the 1970s.

The next episode of credit inflation began in the 1980s, paradoxically triggered by the success of Paul Volcker's move to break the spiral of rising general price inflation through very tight money. He succeeded famously, and the CPI headed sharply lower along with interest rates, setting the stage for the massive US debt binge and the series of asset bubbles that followed. It was easy for the Federal Reserve to pursue expansionary credit policies while inflation and interest rates were falling.

The Great Reflation Experiment of 2009

Private sector credit, the flipside of debt, maintained a stable trend relative to GDP from 1964 to 1982 (Charts 1& 2). After that, the ratio of debt to GDP rose rapidly for the 25 years leading up to the crash, and is continuing to rise. The current reading has debt close to 180% of GDP, about double the level of the early 1980s. The magnitude and length of this rise is probably unprecedented in the history of the world. Even the credit inflation that was the prelude to the 1929 crash and the Great Depression only lasted five or six years.

Prior to government bailouts and stimulus, the panic, crash, and precipitous economic decline of 2008/9 were clearly on track to be much worse than the post-1929 experience. The pervasiveness of leverage - from banks to consumers to supposedly blue-chip companies - and the illusion of stability in the system, were fostered through the 25 years that this credit bubble has grown, basically uninterrupted. The speed and magnitude of the bailouts and stimulus - the end of which we won't see for a long time - aborted the meltdown. However, the story is far from over.

The Great Reflation Experiment ultimately has two components. The first is a rise in federal government deficits, debt, and contingent liabilities. The second is an expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Both are unprecedented since World War II. US federal government debt is likely to reach close to 100% of GDP over the next 8 to10 years, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and supported by our own calculations (Chart 3). Anemic growth, falling tax revenue, increased government spending, and bailouts of indigent states, households, businesses, along with an aging population, will all undermine public finances to a degree never before seen in peacetime. According to CBO data, government debt could reach 300% of GDP by 2050 as contingent liabilities are converted into actual government expenditures. This massive peacetime deterioration in public finances will have grave consequences for living standards and asset markets, particularly in the longer run.

In the short run, huge deficits and growth in government debt are necessary. They will continue to play a crucial role in deleveraging the private sector and in helping to fill the black hole in the economy that has been caused by the sharp increase in household savings. Further out, government deficits will put upward pressure on interest rates. However, much of the economy, particularly housing and commercial real estate, is far too weak to absorb an interest-rate shock. Therefore, the Federal Reserve will have to monetize much of the rise in government debt, making it extremely difficult to unwind the explosion in the Fed's balance sheet and consequent rise in bank reserves - the fuel that could be used to ignite another money and credit explosion.

The bottom line is that the Fed is in a very difficult position. Its room to maneuver is either small or nonexistent, and the markets understand this. That is why there is a sharp divergence between those worried about price inflation and those fearing a lengthy depression.

Implications for Investors

Investors are also in an extraordinarily difficult predicament. From the peak in 2007, household wealth declined by about $14 trillion, over 20%, to the first quarter of 2009. Tens of millions of people had come to rely on rising house and stock prices to give them a standard of living that could not be attained from regular income alone (Chart 4). They stopped saving and borrowed aggressively and imprudently against their assets and future income, some to live better, some to speculate, and many to do both. That game is over.

Pensions have been devastated and people's appetite for risk has declined dramatically. The return on safe liquid assets ranges from 0.60% to 1.20%, depending on term and withdrawal penalties. Reasonable-quality bonds with a five-year maturity provide about 4%. Bonds with longer maturities have higher yields but are vulnerable to price erosion if inflationary expectations heat up. As for equities, people now understand that blue chip stocks carry huge risk. GE, once considered the ultimate "bullet-proof" stock, dropped 83% in the panic, and Citigroup lost 98%. Revelations of massive fraud schemes have further damaged trust and confidence in markets.

Against this backdrop we offer a few thoughts. First, an increase in price inflation as reflected in the CPI is a long way off. The degree of excess capacity in the world is probably the greatest since the 1930s, although excess capacity does get scrapped during recessions. Western economies will remain depressed for years, and China will also be important in keeping inflation down. Its capital investment is larger than the US's in absolute terms. It is currently 40% of GDP and growing at 30% per annum. Profit margins in China will probably get squeezed, which, together with the huge amount of underemployed labor, means that the Chinese will keep driving their export machine at full throttle, continuing to flood the world with high-quality, inexpensive goods. Therefore, investors who need income are probably safe holding reasonably high-quality bonds in the five-year maturity range. A bond ladder is a very useful tool for most people. Holdings are staggered over, say, a five-year time frame, and maturing bonds are invested back into five-year bonds, keeping the portfolio structure in the zero-to-five-year range. In this way, some protection against a future rise in price inflation and falling bond prices can be achieved.

Second, massive monetary stimulus is good for asset prices in the near term (e.g. stocks, bonds, houses, commodities) in a world of very weak price inflation and a soft economy. That is true as long as the economy does not fall apart again, which is very unlikely given all the stimulus present and more to come if needed. Therefore, investors who can afford a little risk should own some assets that will ultimately be beneficiaries of the wall of new money being created and thrown at the economy.

There is a major risk to our relative near-term optimism, and that is the US dollar. Foreign central banks hold $2.64 trillion, overwhelmingly the largest component of world reserves. The US role as the main reserve currency country is compromised by its persistent inflationary policies and current account deficits, a subject high on the agenda at the recent G-8 meeting in Italy and referred to frequently by China, Russia, Brazil, and others. Foreign central banks fear a large drop in the dollar, which would cause them potentially huge losses on their reserve holdings. They don't want more dollars, and yet they don't want to lose competitive advantage by seeing their currencies go up against the dollar. To preserve their competitive position, they have to buy more when the dollar is under pressure. On the other hand, since the 1930s the US has never subjugated domestic concerns to external discipline. Officials may talk of a strong-dollar policy, but their actions always speak differently. Their attitude towards foreign central banks is, "We didn't ask you to buy the dollars." The US has typically seen such buying as currency manipulation to gain an unfair trade advantage.

The most likely outcome is a nervous dollar stalemate or, as Lawrence Summers once described it, "a balance of financial terror." The most important central banks will continue to hold their noses and buy the dollar to keep it from falling too sharply. However, this is a fragile, unstable situation, and the dollar must fall over time. Investors need to diversify away from this risk. There are three obvious ways.

The first is investing in high-quality US equities that have a majority of their earnings and assets in hard-currency countries.

The second is investing in gold and related assets. Gold will probably remain in a tug of war for some time. On the negative side, it is faced with nonexistent global price inflation, even deflation, and a sharp decline in jewelry demand. On the positive side, concerns over U. monetary and fiscal debauchery will almost certainly heat up. As the odds of the latter increase, gold will be a major beneficiary, and investors should have a healthy insurance position in this asset class.

Third, most foreign currencies will also benefit from these fears, and hence investors can also protect themselves by diversifying into non-dollar assets in the best-managed countries. Some of these are emerging markets like China, which are liquid, in surplus, fiscally stable, and still growing well in spite of the global economic downturn. If and when the world economy begins to recover, and should price inflation stay low, asset bubbles are likely to recur. Where and when is always hard to tell in advance. Good prospects are in emerging-market equities, commodities, and commodity-oriented countries.

So, to sum up, in the next six to 12 months we look for a weak but recovering US economy, a continued deflationary price environment, pretty good asset and commodity markets, and continued narrowing of credit spreads. This view is based on the assumption that the new money created has to go somewhere, a stable to modestly falling dollar, and an anemic world economic recovery next year.

A buy and hold strategy has been bad advice for the past 10 years. The S&P is down 45% from its peak in early 2000. The investment world is likely to remain very unstable in the face of the difficult longer-run problems discussed above. Investors, whether they like it or not, are in the forecasting game, and forecasting is all about time lags. The exceptional circumstances of the current environment make any assessment of time lags extraordinarily difficult, and mistakes will continue to be costly. For that reason, holding well above average liquidity, in spite of the paltry returns, is sensible for most people whose pockets are not deep enough to absorb another hit to their net worth. They are in the unfortunate position of having to wait until the air clears a bit and more aggressive action can be taken with higher confidence. Warren Buffet has properly reminded us on numerous occasions that a price has to be paid for waiting for such a time, but then most of us aren't as rich as he is.

A Beach, New York, and Maine

I want to thank Tony and Rob for writing this week's letter. You can go to their website, www.boeckhinvestmentletter.com and see some of their recent letters, or send an email to info@bccl.ca and get put on their regular list for the free letter.

As you are reading this, I am hopefully reading on a beach, relaxing under an umbrella. Tiffani and Ryan are on a cruise in the Caribbean. They just got back the wedding videos from last year, and they are a hoot. They had one cameraman with an old Super 8 camera, so that video looks like something from the 60s. At some point they will put it on You Tube. Interesting to contrast the old format with the new.

I get back late Monday, and then leave early Wednesday for a quick trip to New York and then on to the Shadow Fed fishing weekend organized by David Kotok. My youngest son, now 15, will be with me for our fourth trip. Maybe this year I can catch more than he does. So far, it has not even been close in either quantity or quality.

Each year, we make small bets (bragging rights are more on the line) on where the markets will be the next year. So far, I am money ahead, as I get a few calls right. Last year the financial markets were just starting to melt down as we met. It will be interesting to see if any of us came close this year. There are some fairly well-known names in the room, so it will be interesting to see who got it right. And even more interesting to try and figure out where we will be next year at this time. I will report back.

And that blank spot that was my fall travel calendar? Looks like I will be going to South America in the fall (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay). A few other dates look to be firming up. It has been way too long since I was in South America, and I am looking forward to it.

Have a great week.

Your going to mix in some sci-fi with the economics reading analyst,

John Mauldin