兩者的相同之處在於「預測」這個動作。差別只在技術分析的信徒看起來像是拿者星座圖 (K 線圖) 唬爛的占星術士；基本面分析的信徒 (a la 華爾街分析師) 則想盡辦法讓自己看起來像是包裝在數字、模型、還有西裝之下的衣冠…專家。

預測之於機率遊戲，贏家都是事後定論。但我沒有其他更好的選擇了。

另外分析師 James Mitchell 也提到，比起 Desktop Search，Display Ads、Nexus Phone、Mobile Search 的毛利較低。如果想維持 GOOG 股價成長，短期來說，營收成長比維持毛利率重要，長期來說，跨足 Desktop Search 以外的搜市場也比維持毛利率重要。

之前稍微瞭解到過去一二十年 IBD 與 Research 的利益衝突問題，所以看到後來心血來潮，乾脆把投資報告拉到最後的 disclosures 章節， 瞧瞧高盛和 GOOG 是否也有 IB 業務的往來。答案是：

• Goldman Sachs has received compensation for investment banking services in the past 12 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services in the next 3 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs has received compensation for non-investment banking services during the past 12 months: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had an investment banking services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had a non-investment banking securities-related services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs had a non-securities services client relationship during the past 12 months with: Google Inc. ($564.21)
• Goldman Sachs makes a market in the securities or derivatives thereof: Google Inc. ($564.21)

投資銀行往往為了維護 IB 客戶關係，而傾向於給予 IB 客戶較佳的投資評等。就台灣市場來看，我們常說外資出的報告擺明就是請散戶幫忙抬轎，而比較少提到外資和本土企業之間的 IB 關係。我想這應該是個不錯的研究課題。

其實現在投銀內部都會築起一道 “Chinese Wall”，隔絕 corporate client department 和 investor client department 之間的訊息流通。經歷了半世紀的 IPO bubble，大多投銀也明文規範 IB 部門的營收，不得拿來 sponsor research 部門的 compensation。但檯面下如何運作，咱們就不得而之了。

The greatest of all gifts is the power to estimate things at their true worth.

- La Rochefoucauld, Reflexions; ou sentences et maximes morales

同樣舉上週的例子說明，如果小明投資 $900 元，年利率 11.1%，一年後可以連本帶利拿回 $1,000 元。假設小明想繼續投資，這時，會有兩種情況：

第一種情況，小明每年領出利息，入袋為安。本例中，假設經過了 5 年，每年都把 $100 元利息領出來包紅包，5 年後，小明連本帶利共得到了 $1,400 元。 ( $900 + $100 * 5 )

第二種情況，一樣經過 5 年，但小明把利息留著繼續投資，猜猜 5 年後，原本 $900 元的資本變成多少？答案是 $1,524 元。較第一種情況多了 $124 元。

此時，請特別注意，這兩種投資情境的年報酬率，都是 11.1% 。上面兩種情況的計算過程，可參考這份試算表。

看到這邊，應該也能馬上想起來，啊，第一種情境講的情況就等同於「單利，第二種情境講的就是「複利」。在情境一中，銀行仍可能是採用複利計息，只是「每年把利息抽出」，這樣的行為，所獲得的結果，和單利記息是一樣的。接下來再透過一個例子讓大家見識「複利」的威力。來看看如果把投資時間拉長，會變怎麼樣。

假設小明大學畢業後，把前 4 年辛苦打工賺來的 $100,000 元存入年利率 11.1% 的帳戶，如果採用情境一的方法，也就是每年把利息領出來，不繼續投資，則 45 年後，等小明退休時，這 $100,000 元將變成 $599,550 元。

如果小明心念一轉，把每年的利息都留在帳戶中再投資，那麼，45 年後，原先的 $100,000 元本金會變成多少呢？答案是 $11,400,000。是的，一千一百四十萬圓整。由此可見，時間是投資人的好朋友，時間會對複利造成很大的影響。本例詳細計算方式，請參考這份試算表。

現在讓我們回頭來看創投產業。一般來說，創投資本的投資期間約為 7 – 8 年。而資金在這段期間並不會滋生利息，因此，必須將初期投入資金採等同於「複利」的方式來計算投資報酬率。

從上述小明的例子可以得知，在一樣的年利率條件下。如果每年領走利息，45 年後連本帶利可得到的現金，是原資本的 6 倍。如果不領走利息，則 45 年後可獲得的現金，是原資本的 114 倍。

在風險創投的領域中，投資期間不至於到 45 年這麼誇張，一般來說，標的持有期間約 7 – 8 年，雖然短了些，但也足以產生夠大的複利效應。此外，大部分創投業者會希望投資組合能有個 40% –50% 的年報酬率才像話，若考量到風險，則相對要求的投資報酬率會更高。

假設你投資 $100,000 元在一間新公司，目標是 8 年後，得到 50% 的年複合報酬率，則在期末，你必須要能收回 $2,562,000 元，也就是投入資本的 25.6 倍，才能達成目標。詳細計算過程，請參考這份試算表。

聽起來似乎很難，然而事實上，大部份的風險創投不會第一年就把所有資本投入，而是採取逐期分批投資的策略，所以晚期投入的資金相對「滾」出來的複利就會比較少，也讓同樣報酬率的達成門檻降低。

從上例瞭解到複利在貨幣的時間價值中所扮演的角色後，我們學到兩件事：首先，身為一個投資人，應該盡量將利息再投資，而不是每回利息一發放，就急著領出來變現。再來，身為一個創業家，應該謹慎使用初期資金，資金存留期間越長，後續能產生的報酬就越多，也越容易達到金主們的期望報酬率。

While global Alpha and its investors suffered major losses, and investors in securities underwritten by the firm experienced seriously disappointing performance, the firm and its own investors enjoyed the substantial profits Goldman Sachs produced by taking an astute and almost unique short position in the subprime mortgage market. While some would question whether the firm did not have an overarching fiduciary responsibility to all clients and customers to share its expertise across all three areas, senior management was and is clear: Each business unit is responsible and accountable for doing its best to complete the mission of that particular business – period. No business is its brother’s keeper. Each tub on its own bottom.

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.677

Buffett made his offer “Berkshire is ready to invest $5 billion today in a 10 percent preferred stock convertible at $110 with warrants to buy an additional $5 billion of common stock at $115 per share.” Buffett knew how important his investment would be and, having had real difficulties with his prior investment in Salomon Brothers, knew what term he wanted. Those terms included a unique provision: Each of the four senior executives of Goldman Sachs must sign a pledge that they and their families would not sell any shares of Goldman Sachs stock before Buffett sold his. The details were spelled out to Viniar in a late morning half-hour phone call that ended at noon. Buffett’s offer was firm until four that afternoon. So Goldman Sachs’ leadership had just four hours to decide.

 

They didn’t need four hours. Even with the personal lock-in provision, the answer was clear to everyone by three. Viniar called Buffett. “Sorry, Mr. Buffett is not available. He is away from the office and cannot be disturbed.” It was two O’clock in Omaha — and Buffett was still at lunch with his grandchildren.

 

At 3:30 Eastern Standard Time, Buffett called Viniar back. Goldman Sachs, without question, accepted Berkshire Hathaway’s terms. Done deal.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.699

 As Blankfein and his colleagues looked around the carnage on Wall Street, a few remarkable realities came into focus: Goldman Sachs was strong. It had more capital than it needed – and even more than it could put to use – and it had great liquidity. Even more important for Goldman Sachs’ long term strategy, every one of its competitors would be significantly less powerful. Lehman Brothers had been broken up and parts had gone into Barclays Bank. This would make Barclays stronger, but would it ever be as strong as Lehman Brothers had been? Merrill Lynch’s organization had been damaged and it had surely lost or would lose some of its best customers and its best businesspeople. Citigroup (including Salomon Bothers and Smith Barney) would mostly do “commodity” investment banking now. Its aspiration to be a formidable investment bank was, for now, just that – and aspiration. UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank would all refocus on their commercial banking business. Even Morgan Stanly was unsettled. Did it really intend to make a major commitment, as announced, to retail banking? Its leadership seemed uncertain about its basic strategy, which was surely not a good thing in such challenging times. Blankfien sees Goldman Sachs in good position to compete with commercial banks in providing credit.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.702

But Keynes was right too: ”Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.606

Stunning as it is that it took the firm’s management long decades to “get it” about investment management, GSAM’s history provides a crucial illustration of Goldman Sachs’s unrelenting “try and try and try again” approach to building each of it’s many enterprise businesses: Select one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. Point to a fair hill and say, “Congratulations! You are the Chosen One who can find a way to capture that hill. It will be hard – maybe very hard – but the firm expects great things of you. We know you can do it. Now, get going and… take… that… hill!” When success is achieved, congratulations are given to the successful young stars – and so is another, even more challenging hill. If success is not achieved, the firm selects another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising, but not yet proven young stars. If success is again not achieved, the firm simply selects yet another one or two very able, very ambitious and promising young stars to take the hill. Eventually, the hill gets taken.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.622

One of Paulson’s great advantages in life is that he is always learning – partly through continuous observation of others, partly because he takes criticism easily with no defenses or resistance, and never personally. A weakness is that he is almost oblivious to office politics and for years had to fight the urge to speak his mind immediately, without caution or consideration.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.643

Paulson was a serious student of leaders, seeking to understand why some were so much more effective than others: “The more I observed the most effective leaders, the more I became convinced that the key is to have the right people in your own organization working for you and with you.” Within Goldman Sachs, he soon earned a reputation for having the best people working with him to serve his clients, and for identifying outstanding talent early.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.644

The concept of leadership at Goldman Sachs has changed completely over the past fifty years. Sidney Weinberg was a leader, but in many ways his firm was a proprietorship. While Gus Levy insistently expected many people to do all they could do to build the business, there was no question that he was the leader – in overall pace and direction and on dozens of transactions every day. Whitehead and Weinberg pushed decision responsibility and accountability out to the unit heads. Rubin and Freidman matched even more widely distributed authority and responsibility with centralized accountability to the management committee. Paulson continued the multiplication of decision-making leaders and increased the coordination of operating units through centralized disciplines: risk controls, business planning, and performance measurement at increasing numbers of smaller and smaller, more agile units that were closer to particular markets.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.648

As Bob Steel explains, “First-person singular is only used to describe a mistake, not an accomplishment. It may sound silly but little things like that are quite significant. I’ve never heard a boss at Goldman Sachs say, ‘I just did this.’ If I ever did, I’d be embarrassed.”

Paulson remembers getting his first Goldman Sachs memo back from Jim Gorter. “Good memo!” was written at the top – and every “I” was crossed out in favor of “we.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.659

There are only four ways to gain and keep a significant competitive advantage: more effective recruiting, a stronger culture, a better strategy, and greater intensity of commitment.

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.554

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, few Wall Street firms interviewed MBAs, so Goldman Sachs had little direct competition. Determined to develop intense commitment within the Goldman Sachs system, Whitehead recruited “intensity” people who gave out clear signs of hungering for achievement. Selection was to be based on three equally weighted criteria: one-third on intelligence as measured by grades and SAT scores, one-third on leadership as shown by roles in extracurricular organizations, and one-third on ambition to achieve.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

On purpose, the firm’s offer was – in  comparison to today’s $150,000-plus offers – stunningly small at $3,600, even if adjusted for inflation. Whitehead was determined never to pay more than other companies and preferred to be known to pay less, because if the firm could get the best for less, that sent a message that there must be something special about Goldman Sachs.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.558

Goldman Sachs doesn’t look for top-quartile –- or even top-decile –  MBAs. Convinced that over the long term there is inevitably a major difference between the top 5 percent and the second 5 percent, the firm focuses on recruiting the very best young professionals, selecting carefully for such characteristics as leadership, drive, and appetite for hard work. Starting with the 5 percent most qualified and capable, the firm proceeds to sort out the most effective team-playing contributors – initially through fifteen to thirty interviews and then through actual work experience and direct observation to find the very best 1 or 2 percent.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.559

Always stressing the long-term opportunity of a career with Goldman Sachs, the firm wanted recruits to weigh other factors, believing that those who accept jobs because of salary were more inclined to leave later for a higher offer from somewhere else. The worst thing the firm could do was hire someone, train him for a few years, and then have him go elsewhere for more money.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.561

As J.P. Morgan famously observed, “A man always has two reasons for doing anything thing: a good reason and a real reason.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.577

Risk arbitrage is based on the simple idea that if there are two market prices for the same thing or two equivalent things, they will converge at some points as though pulled together by a rubber band. Arbitrageurs take disciplined actions to create profits by capturing differences in prices for the same item in different markets or of different but interchangeable items in the same market. The price differences they exploit are caused by market inefficiencies or mistakes caused by imbalances of supply and demand due to differences between uncertainty and risk, which differ in ways only experts usually care about. Arbitrageurs increase market efficiency and – indirectly and unintentionally, as Adam Smith famously explained in The Wealth of Nations – they increase the consistency and fairness of markets and therefore the confidence investors have in markets; that helps improve overall economic performance. Arbitrageurs are working in free, competitive markets that are open to everyone, so to earn profits they need to see what others do not see, to see more clearly than others do, or to take actions others would not have considered.

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.464

Insurance companies earn profits by making a market between an individual’s uncertainty and a population’s true risk.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.465

Three factors are crucial for success in arbitrage: extraordinary, unemotional rationality or objectivity in all decisions and actions; superior access to information; and the ability to understand that information and the ability to think unconventionally and rigorously about it.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.466

The facts are king. You always start with the facts – all the facts you can possibly get – and then you develop a logical line of reasoning or argument, and then – and only then – do you develop a opinion. Opinions always come last. Facts, analysis, and logic matter. Ego has no role in analysis or in developing an opinion. Age and experience do not matter – once you’re on the team.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.475

Fife explains, “Leaders should always set the bar high – very high – and then find the way to meet that standard. Trust and consistent execution make you the preferred supplier. Any compromise on standards, and you’re sowing the seeds of your own destruction.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.516

“I learned a long time ago that when somebody spits in your face, if you’re really any good, you do three things: One, declare it must have been a rain drop. Two, wipe it off. And three, renew your determination and commitment.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.530

The CFO of Vickers told a partner, “If a British merchant banker were up all night working to complete a transaction, he would never tell anyone for fear he would look inadequately skillful. But if an American pulled an all-nighter, he would make certain to tell me – as proof of his commitment.”

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

Thornton explains:”In a situation like this, at the very beginning, you, as an individual, are the ‘brand’.” You have nothing to carry you and nothing to fall back on. Going from an initial meeting and general discussion to specific, nuanced advice that is listened to and accepted is a transformation that’s completely dependent on you – what you say and do, how you develop each relationship, how you build up the prospect’s confidence – not just in your firm, not just in your advice, but in you. And that confidence has to be strong enough to prevail against the tide of general opinion and natural resistance to change, which is particularly strong in major financial transactions.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.344

 

By not taking credit, you become more effective. If you do right by people, they win and you win. Frank, always go out of your way to share credit.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

When Brosens had first been put in charge of arbitrage, he had one exciting talent in the division – Eric Mindich, a man in his early twenties whom he wanted to put in charge of risk arbitrage for the firm’s own account. Silfen and Zuckerberg wondered about assigning so much responsibility to such a young star. “Last year was a tough year in arbitrage. Shouldn’t you focus more on this area yourself?”

 

“I believe with a hundred percent of his time, he can do better than I can do with forty percent of my time.”

 

Rubin joined in: “Age is irrelevant. By expending his responsibilities now, you may keep a real star that you might otherwise lose.”

 

Mindich soon became the youngest-ever partner of Goldman Sachs, at age twenty-seven.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.378

Rubin and Friedman were right about the risk that being wisely conservative can deteriorate into defensive caution and about the importance of the firm’s becoming more aggressive. John Whitehead had seen it, and it was an important factor in his decision to retire. But the obvious irony was that the cautious, conservative style Rubin and Friedman found so constraining had been at the core of the strong, team-centered culture, the reputation of integrity at every level, the consistent service to corporate and institutional clients, the strong earnings and solid financials, the persistent and skillful recruiting, the superior management, and the consistently disciplined execution upon which their more aggressive business strategies could now build.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.381

“What’s so fair about keeping tired older partners when that means blocking the best young people and violating our commitment to meritocracy?”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.385

“It’s harder to get a good idea accepted than it is to get a good idea.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.392

The problem Cooperman faced – in addition to the constrains imposed by the firm – was that while long-term investing is in theory what mutual-fund is all about, in practice, short-term performance dominates mutual-fund sales, particularly for organizations that are new to the business.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.429

 

… the real test of a risk-control system would be that it caught not only what you would not expect, but also what you would have thought not possible.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.460

While some other banking firms tried to manage and control with top-down rules, a rules-based management couldn’t possibly keep up with the speed of change in the securities business and couldn’t penetrate the complexities of many different lines of business in many different markets to address specific situations where value-based decisions might be needed. With a principles-base management, responsibility for decisions is pushed down to the men and women on the firing line. Since they know the concepts of the Principles and they know the detailed realities of their specific business, they can be held accountable for knowing and doing the right things in the right way.

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.188

“Assuring professional ethics are really lived by is a bit like being a zoo-keeper,” says partner Roy Smith. “You need lions and tigers to have a really good zoo, but you must keep them under control – or reasonably so.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.197

“The two Johns saw nothing at all wrong with people working very hard and carrying a heavy load," recalls partner Roy Smith. “They were convinced it was better for you to carry more work responsibility – perhaps half again more than you normal capacity – because that meant you accumulated more experience and you would learn more and know more. You’d advance up the learning curve more swiftly and get to a higher level of performance.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.202

Each Analyst was expected and challenged to be an entrepreneur. For example, Joe Ellis made himself the leading retailing analyst on Wall Street. “We began the idea of conducting field trips for institutional analysts to visit retailers back in 1984,” recalls Ellis. ”Now other firms do similar things.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.289

The Analyst’s job is hard and requires many different skills. As Ellis says, “ You have to be very good on financial analysis and on interviewing and on business judgment and market judgment and able to work effectively with institutional investors and the sales force and with corporate executives and investment bankers. It’s complicated. And it’s very hard to serve all of them really well.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.291

Weinberg never took himself too seriously. “The boss needs to lose arguments – not all arguments, but enough to keep everybody honest and responsible for clear thinking. You can’t micromanage this business from headquarters.” About innovative ideas, of which there are great many, he tended to be conservative. But if the young bucks were pressing hard, he liked to give way, saying, “I’m just an old guy, so I don’t know all the ins and outs if this new stuff, so if you’re sure it’s right, let’s go!” He could then observing with a knowing smile, “I can’t lose now, If I was right, they’ll soon be saying, ‘Jesus, maybe the old guy knows the score,’ and if they are right, they’ll feel really good about themselves – and will work even harder.”

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.301

Weinberg kept a plaque inherited from his father that enumerated the many setbacks suffered by Abraham Lincoln on his way to becoming a great president, with the message that enormous success does not come without setbacks.

 

The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, p.303