To Ride, Shoot Straight and Speak the Truth

Weekend metal-blogging.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 16:56:00 +0000

Entombed, "Damn Deal Done"

On the long gun registry.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 21:14:00 +0000

Background for non-Canadians and Canadians who were, until recently, living under rocks: This is regarding Bill C-391, currently passed second reading in the Canadian House of Commons. Bill C-391 would eliminate the federal long gun registry, which was created by the Chrétien government in the early '90s. Under Canadian Parliamentary procedure, the bill now goes to committee to be studied, before going to third reading in the House. The third vote -- which is the final vote -- cannot change the bill in a substantial way. However, once being passed by the House, the bill must be passed by the Senate, which can also study it. As far as I know, the Senate can make significant changes. There has been serious reaction to the passage of this bill through the House, with many commentators calling for those who voted to send the bill to committee -- rather than killing it on the floor -- to resign from their parties and even from the House.

I really don't understand the near-hysteria around the long gun registry.

I mean, I get why people, especially people who have grown up and live in urban areas, are afraid of guns. It's a combination, I think, of the unfamiliarity with something potentially dangerous and the anti-gun propaganda distilled rather effectively through the mass media. The first time I saw an actual gun -- not a prop, but the real thing (which, for what it's worth, was a long gun; I have also seen handguns) -- I had a pretty visceral reaction of fear to it. It was similar to the reaction I had when seeing a bandsaw in operation for the first time -- that is, this is a weird thing that looks rather dangerous. So, that's the first part of the general reaction, I think: many urbanites have never seen, let alone handled, guns. Thus guns are foreign and potentially harmful, so we instinctively recoil, much as we might recoil from a welding torch.

But it was also more extreme than that. I knew that a bandsaw could be used safely; indeed, my shop teacher proceeded to show us how to do that after showing us how to turn the thing on. I also know that a gun can be used safely. But, for some reason, I found the gun more frightening than the bandsaw. And that is what I tend to attribute to anti-gun propaganda: the broad depiction of guns as threatening items and objects of death. The association of the classic shape of a gun -- either a rifle or a handgun -- with fear, intimidation, pain and death strikes me as well-established in our culture, and these are powerful negative emotions. I find further confirmation of this in the tearful testimonies CBC News Network (to pick one) was broadcasting yesterday: crying women, especially mothers, elicit a strong emotional reaction in most people.

So, I understand the fear. I really do. And I think the fear makes sense: it's not crazy or a sign of illness to feel this fear.

But I don't think it's a good ground for sensible policy. Guns are scary, therefore everyone who owns one should be put in some government database? Well, what if you live in a rural area and regularly hunt, thus owning multiple long guns? Or, for that matter, what if you happen to be experienced with guns and own several handguns for your own enjoyment and protection? You would thus not find guns scary, and thus surely conclude there should not be registration in a government database. Emotional reactions generally, because they are utterly subjective, do not make for a productive political discussion -- or a discussion of any kind. They also don't serve, on their own, as reasons for any action.

Of course, the fact that there are emotional reactions is slightly different. That many people find guns upsetting and frightening is something to take into consideration, as is the fact that many people do not. These are potential reasons. But is the fact that people find guns upsetting and frightening good enough reason to make people generally register their guns? Unfortunately, the answer has to be "no". People certainly shouldn't be needlessly frightened or upset, but most who are frightened and upset by guns will never see them, handle them or have to deal with them. For the most part, guns can just be avoided -- at least in the urban areas where there is, I suspect, a greater proportion of negative reaction to guns.

So, the principle I'm working with here is that the fact that people have emotional reactions to something is not in itself good reason to adopt any particular policy. If these reactions are unavoidable, then perhaps there is good reason. In this regard, think of people in minority ethnic groups who live in a society which casually demeans their ethnicity. These reactions are ex hypothesi unavoidable, and so should lead us to try to reduce them. (This will fail at the margins, of course; some emotional reactions are so minor that we expect individuals to deal with them on their own. It's one thing if you're black and everyone calls you "boy"; it's another if you're Jewish and people think the yarmulke is a little silly.) But surely it's reasonable to expect people to avoid deliberately upsetting themselves. Consider people who find it deeply upsetting to see gay couples kissing or holding hands. We shouldn't expect a government policy to be developed in a way that would undo the occurrence of these emotions. Instead, we should demand the offended individuals look elsewhere and not deliberately upset themselves. Everyone has to take at least some responsibility for their own condition, after all.

I tend to think the reactions to guns fall in the latter camp. If you don't like guns, don't look at them. Don't own one. Avoid gun shows. Don't go hunting. And so on.
Once you do that, you'll find that you no longer have these negative, difficult emotions. It just seems like good sense: if guns are upsetting to you, just don't think about them or go near them.

There is, of course, another argument in favour of gun registration, which is the crime argument. It's a little confused, though. We're told both that the long gun registry reduces the occurrence of crimes and that it makes it easier to prosecute crimes. The former is relatively easy to assess; and, from everything I've read, it just isn't true. Since the registry has been in place, crimes involving long guns have not gone down, and may even have increased. We could also consider the impact of similar registries (if there are any) in other jurisdictions to confirm this, but I suspect it's a robust result. There's, after all, no particular reason to think that registering anything will reduce the possibility of crime. The causes of crime have little or nothing to do with whether the object that is used in the crime is legally registered or not. (Has dangerous driving -- a crime -- gone down because all cars are registered?)

The latter cimre-related point in favour of registration is just odd. Many things would make it easier to prosecute crimes, but they are nonetheless unjustified. A national DNA or fingerprint database, for example. Indeed, an international one would make it even easier. National ID cards would help. Implanting everyone with a microchip that could be tracked using a GPS system. And so on, further into the realms of science fiction. But so what? Security is not the only value in society, and it's not the only thing we should expect a government to ensure. And we certainly shouldn't expect a government, or believe a government is justified, to sacrifice anything in the name of security. The things a government is permitted to sacrifice are the things that are less valuable than security: where security is sufficiently important that we will trade in order to achieve it. Think of things like random roadside stops for drunk driving: the inconvenience and loss of freedom are quite minor; the gain in security is, to my knowledge, rather great; hence is it justified.

On this line, then, if there were a significant gain in security from registering long guns, then there would be a good reason to go ahead. After all, registering a gun is a relatively easy matter -- no more painful or expensive than registering a car. So no one could reasonably object. Unless -- and I want to emphasize this -- there is no good evidence to show that we're actually getting more security. And I'm not convinced that we are. Police and prosecutors claim the registry is useful, but that's anecdote -- not data. Are we getting more convictions (successful prosecutions) since the registry than before? Are we successfully arresting and charging and convicting more criminals since the registry than before? If not, the registry is as much a boondoggle as rural MPs (and the Conservative caucus generally) charge it is. If so, then it does have a purpose and should be maintained.

I can only hope that this is the issue that will be discussed in committee before the third reading of the bill, rather than flooding the room with emotionally-charged, but ultimately pointless, grandstanding. (Well, I would so hope, if I weren't already so utterly cynical about the sort of "debate" that's currently in progress.)

Weekend metal-blogging.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 15:21:00 +0000

Been listening to this one a few times. It's grown on me.

Scar Symmetry, "Noumenon and Phenomenon" (And, no, the lyrics don't get Kant right.)

Weekend metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 24 Oct 2009 17:46:00 +0000

Ensiferum, "From Afar"

I like the song. But this video is so cheesy. Seriously -- move!!

(Late) Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 17 Oct 2009 19:49:00 +0000

Skeletonwitch, "Repulsive Salvation"

Long weekend metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 10 Oct 2009 17:53:00 +0000

Emperor, Empty

Dragonforce, Heroes of Our Time

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 03 Oct 2009 01:30:00 +0000

ChthoniC, "49 Theurgy Chains"

Very high on these guys right now. If you don't quite see it, skip to 00:45 and let it play for a little.

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 26 Sep 2009 01:02:00 +0000

Not necessarily a fan of the video, but classic Megadeth song.

Megadeth, "Headcrusher"

(Belated) Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 19 Sep 2009 17:08:00 +0000

The Duskfall, "Shoot It In"

Not the best video, but when you can riff like this, who cares?

Since there's been complaints...

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 17:16:00 +0000

...from the Liberal side of things about NDP "silence" on the pending ways and means motion, let me be one to break it. (Although, really, folks, you have to get on Twitter; we've been kicking it around for a little bit now.) For my money, there's little upside to supporting the Conservatives at this point. The motion will pass anyway, with BQ support. There's also little upside to going along with the Liberals' bizarre shift from reflexive support to reflexive opposition. So, the best move is to go before the cameras, explain why the EI reforms don't go far enough, explain that neither the Liberals nor the Conservatives are covering themselves with glory, and abstain from the vote in protest.

Which is basically what Dr. Dawg said here.

The way forward for the NDP, as I see it, is to refuse to play the game of either Canadian conservative party. (Note the lower-case there.)

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 16:10:00 +0000

Arch Enemy, "My Apocalypse"

Letter regarding University of Toronto Libraries' new fees

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 23:15:00 +0000

[Addressed to my MPP, David Zimmer, as well as other members of the Ontario Parliament, as listed below.]

Dear Mr. Zimmer,

I am writing to you as my MPP, regarding the University of Toronto Libraries' recent decision to charge fees to external borrowers.

By way of background, the Ontario Council of University Libraries (OCUL) includes 21 post-secondary libraries, including the University of Toronto and my university, York. The OCUL manages a number of resource-sharing programs between its members. These include inter-library loan, document delivery, and coordinated purchasing. They also include direct borrowing. For most member libraries, a library card held at one library can be used to obtain a library card at another, with borrowing privileges transferring over directly. So, a graduate student at Ryerson University could obtain a McMaster University library card and borrow as if he or she were a McMaster graduate student.

The University of Toronto Libraries have always been something of a special case. Undergraduates at other universities did not have direct borrowing privileges at U of T libraries. Graduate students and faculty were limited to U of T's undergraduate lending policies (two-week loans with only two renewals). And, if borrowing by inter-library loan, University of Toronto-held books were considered a last resort, in that they would only be delivered if the resource could not be obtained from another OCUL member.

Recently, the University of Toronto Libraries has decided to make itself even more of a special case. The new policy can, in part, be read here: http://discover.library.utoronto.ca/news/fees-for-research-readers-and-direct-borrowers

The gist is this: direct borrowers are, as of October 1, being charged for direct borrowing privileges, at a rate of $200 per year. And, although the webpage does not mention this, visitors will also be charged a $20 weekly fee in order to simply browse the stacks at Robarts Library.

Thus, the University of Toronto Libraries has, with little notice, cut off access to one of the richest academic libraries in Canada. Graduate students and faculty members at York, Ryerson, McMaster, Guelph, and many other universities and colleges in the area rely on the University of Toronto library collections in order to conduct their research and prepare for classes. And the justification seems to be that, because the library is on U of T campus, U of T can determine, entirely on its own, who is permitted to access the resources and how much they must pay for the privilege. Worse, it is my understanding that this decision was not made by U of T Libraries' staff, but directly by Cheryl Misak, Vice-President and Provost.

It is not acceptable for U of T to take it upon itself to levy an arbitrary and excessive fee for a research library that is meant to serve the needs of students, faculty and researchers throughout the province. I trust that you will do your utmost to engage with the relevant members of Parliament and the academic community in order to have this fee removed and the previous level of borrowing privileges restored.

Regards,

Adam Rawlings
Willowdale

CC: The Hon John Milloy, Minister for Training, Colleges and Universities.
Gilles Bisson, Critic, Research and Innovation
Rosario Marchese, Critic, Training, Colleges and Universities
Jim Wilson, Critic, Colleges and Universities, Research and Innovation
Tim Hudak, Leader, Official Opposition
Andrea Horwath, Leader, New Democratic Party of Ontario

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 04 Sep 2009 19:09:00 +0000

Insomnium, "Down With the Sun"

On voter alienation.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 23:27:00 +0000

So, it looks like we may go to a federal election in October. I say "may" because I'm still not entirely persuaded that the Liberals won't try to back off for some reason or another, and I'm also not persuaded that Harper won't sell out his hatred of the seperatists by cutting a deal with the Bloc. But, let's operate on the assumption that the election will happen. I'm not particularly interested here in discussing who will or won't win. Instead, I want to talk about two election-related motivational phenomena, one that has captured popular interest for some time, and one that is just starting to emerge: decreasing voter turnout and disinterest -- even disgust -- with the prospect and process of an election. These can both, I think, be classified as "voter alienation".

The first is certainly well-known. Voter turnout is dropping all over the developed world, to the point that even marginally increased voter turnout -- such as in the 2008 US Presidential election, and the recent Japanese parliamentary election -- is considered worthy of note. "Why" is a more complicated question, as voting itself is a complicated action. There are many motivations for voting at all, and many other motivations for casting a ballot one way or another. Short of a more sophisticated system of voting, there is no way to tell what motivates someone to cast the ballot that they cast, and why they bothered to vote at all. Cases make the point. I may come out to vote because I care about casting my ballot, because I've been paid to, because I'm bored and have nothing better to do, or because my wife is making me. I may vote NDP because I support their environmental policies, their economic policies, or some other policies, because I happen to like Jack Layton and believe he would be a good Prime Minister, or because I happen to know my local NDP candidate and believe he/she would be a good MP. Or, of course, some combination thereof.

It's a simple point, but it gets overlooked: humans very rarely do anything for one motivating reason; it's almost always a combination of different factors which get us to do something, usually after overwhelming a combination of still more factors which pointed towards doing something else. Extremely single-minded people, I suppose, might only have one motivation in mind whenever they do something, but this I take as a rare and highly exceptional case. Voting is no different. So, the simplistic analyses that are trotted out by the mass media and all manner of commentators simply aren't worth taking seriously. The explanation that accounts for why one person doesn't vote may not work for why another, not obviously different, person doesn't vote. And, of course, I'm ignoring the complicating cases of people such as myself who will vote federally, have never voted municipally, and only sporadically vote provincially. Oh, and I've never voted for any student council, either. No single explanation will work for me, clearly.

That said, I think we can group many of the various motivations together into one category. I say "many" because I concede that there are some people who genuinely object to the institution of government and won't participate on that basis. So, put them aside. Who is left? Those who won't vote because they don't care. Those who don't vote because they're disgusted with all parties or candidates. Those who won't vote because they believe the process is stacked against their favoured party or policy. So, we have apathy, disgust, and despair. These motivations all seem to rely on a belief that something isn't working the way it's supposed to. If things are going the way they are supposed to, you don't feel apathy, digust, despair, or any of that host of emotions; instead, you feel content or happy or fulfilled. So, what's driving low voter turnout, I think, is a sense, in other words, that things just aren't right.

Turning to the second phenomenon. It's not as common, but seems to be growing in frequency, especially as we are faced with our fourth federal election in five years. Even that phrase seems to encapsulate the phenomenon: that there is something objectionable about having "too many" elections in "too few" years. It's very unclear on the face of it what might drive this problem. Elections happen whenever a government cannot be legally sustained. Unless we want to live in an autocratic state, there is no choice here. Elections have to happen at certain points in time, and these may be quite regular. Yet, in comments on various news websites, I've even seen calls for outlawing minority governments. Put aside questions of how on earth that would be managed (I can't really fathom it myself), and consider why someone would say something like that. It speaks to a desire for stability, I think, but also and more deeply to a desire to not be bothered. That is, a worldview which sees government as a peripheral annoyance, rather than as a significant social force. This is distinct, you'll note, from the more hardcore forms of libertarianism or anarchism, which would see government as dangerous and/or deeply immoral. And it is, I think, an instance of the belief that things are not going as they should. In this case, that government is somehow failing to do what we charge it to do: instead of running the country, governments are collapsing into election again and again and again.

I'm using "voter alienation" for both these phenomena. I say "voter" because they both clearly affect voters -- voter turnout and voter disgust or disdain for the electoral process itself. I say "alienation" because I think that, at bottom, these both express a belief that government is somehow not part of ordinary society. There's always been an element of this in public attitudes towards government, of course; spitting out "Washington" or "Ottawa" or "London" with disdain is a longstanding shorthand for a myriad of objections to the government of the day. But it seems to have moved on from that to an objection to government itself. Again, not the sort of libertarian/anarchist critique of government, but to an objection to government's bothering us. To government not knowing its proper place and role. To things not being right, and government being the problem rather than the solution.

I'll come back to that "proper place and role" idea, but let me take a brief detour to talk about "voter apathy". I know "voter apathy" is the more common term, and I'm not using it for good reasons. There are some serious problems with this term. For one, it's too limited. As noted above, non-voters may be motivated by anger, despair, or disgust, none of which qualifies as apathy. simply inaccurate. "Apathy" describes an emotional grey state, a lack of interest or feeling toward something. For example, I am apathetic towards cars. Except insofar as they are an instrument of transportation, I don't really care about them one way or the other. The deep passion any number of people feel for different makes, models, styles, and so on just doesn't move me. When it comes to voting, the phenomenon is not adequately characterized as apathy. Many who do not vote or who are disgusted by elections are not apathetic -- indeed, they're often angry, depressed, disappointed, revolted, states which cannot accurately be considered apathy.

For two, it's demeaning. Calling voters who object to the process of voting and the process of election "apathetic" is almost a way of infantalizing them. Apathetic voters, rather than alienated voters, are too juvenile to have the appropriate feelings and motivations of an adult citizen. Apathetic voters are almost like spoiled teenagers unable to deal with the unfairnesses of life. Alienated voters, by contrast, are excluded, sometimes forcefully. Alienated voters have been rejected by the choices of other people, and thus can demand that these other people justify and account for these choices. In short, apathetic voters have deficient characters, while alienated voters have been wronged. So, I understand why "voter apathy" is the preferred term, as it gets people off the hook for what they have done.

So, to recap. The problems are declining voter turnout and increasing disgust with elections. The motivation, I think, is a sense that things aren't right, that government isn't fulfilling its proper role. I call it "voter alienation" because "voter apathy" is an inappropriate term. I could spend some time discussing the proper role of government, and whether government has any proper role at all. But I think that would take some time, and I'm not sure of my own thinking on the issue. So, let me make two assumptions. I think these assumptions are certainly widely-shared views, although I concede that they are not universal. First, I assume that government has some proper role; that is, that the question of the legitimacy or justification of government power isn't answered with the claim that government is never legitimate. And, second, that this role somehow involves acting for the best interests of the citizenry. The issue of what counts as a "best interest" is difficult: are best interests what people want? what people say they want? what people should want? in what sense of "should"? Similarly difficult is the issue of how one might act for those interests: by passing laws? upholding the constitution? privatization? But I think most people, when they think of government, have some sense that this is what government is for.

What can we do to reverse the course of voter alienation? I'm not trying to assess what would be successful -- that's a matter for investigation, experiment and testing -- but what, in principle, seems like it might work. One thing that clearly won't work is chastising or deriding alienated voters. That clearly will only serve to deepen the sense of alienation, of being excluded, by setting up an opposition between the "parental" figure (the chastisers) and the "children" (the alienated). Another thing that clearly won't work is insisting on the social duty of voting. The issue is that alienated voters believe the other side of the social bargain has been betrayed, that government is not doing what it was set up to do. Given that government has failed to live up to its end of the deal, alienated voters believe that they would be foolish (at least!) to continue to live up to their end.

The basic idea has to be to create a more responsive government and electoral system. If the problem is that an increasing number of voters are being alienated by the system, then we need to give these voters reason to believe they are not alienated. That is, we need to convince alienated voters that the systems are working as they should, that government is working towards their best interests, and thus that they are obligated to live up to their end of the social bargain referred to above. I see two guiding principles here.

1. Responsiveness

Government needs to actively become involved in, and thus more relevant to, the lives of people. Not in the sense of passing laws or conducting an endless series of referenda -- the former is invasive, the latter abdicates their responsibilities. I mean that the people who are supposed to represent us in government need to realize that it is no longer acceptable for them to vanish into heavily-guarded buildings to negotiate largely in secret and occasionally engage in public performance in the House or the Senate. We need to see the negotiations. All of them. Unless it's a matter of national security, I see no justification for any of the process of government or Parliament to be behind closed doors.

We also need to be taken seriously by our alleged representatives. Far too few are interested in hearing what we, their constituents, think or want or need. Even fewer are interested in engaging with us outside of election campaigns. Even politicians with Twitter accounts or blogs rarely read and respond to them themselves. One of the few things I admired about Garth Turner was his willingness to have an open comments section on a frequently irascible blog. I realize that politicians are busy, especially as they become more senior. I suspect strongly that back-benchers have absolutely no excuse for not maintaining a blog, responding to their own email, and tweeting occasionally. Furthermore, it is not difficult to have a small staff that manages one's online presence and serves a similar function to the assistant(s) of a busy executive -- converting short notes into full prose, explaining positions, passing on sentiments and ideas, and so on. And even the most senior US politicians take time to conduct townhall meetings with constituents, where they can be challenged and argued with face-to-face.

When it comes to parties, the point here is similar to that above. Parties are quasi-governmental entities, after all; party affiliation is at least as important as personal views, whether running for office or serving in office. Furthermore, we have a very large country, containing some very large ridings, wherein it is often difficult to get noticed by the media and by voters without the money and resources of a fair-sized party. Running parties in a top-down fashion is deeply alienating to voters, for the same reasons that running a distant and removed government is alienating. So, the same sort of solutions need to apply here. Open it up. Take the ideas of party members seriously. Listen to those who aren't members, and engage with their concerns. And so on.

Finally, when it comes to voting, voting is largely a passive action in the worst sense. It's an action which rarely has any serious impact. I'm not convinced that proportionality is the cure for what ails us, but certainly every vote needs to somehow count towards the outcome of all elections. If votes don't count, then why cast them? If voting isn't important, if it doesn't make a difference, then you'd have to be somewhat irrational to bother voting. So, there needs to be some kind of change here: multi-member ridings, transferrable votes, preferential balloting, etc. Many different systems have been tried, and there is much evidence available on their success in resolving the problems of voter alienation (as well as many other problems). This should be the easiest change to make.

2. Openness

It needs to be easier to get into government. Right now, the barriers that have been erected serve to convince many -- I include myself here -- that to run for office is simply not worth it. It's too much trouble, it's an invasive process, and so on. Obviously, this is a form of alienation. The same applies to forming parties, getting official party status in the house, and so on and so forth. Of course there have to be processes and procedures. But these do not have to be restrictive; indeed, they should only be organizational. It's the difference between having a limit on when you can drink alcohol (a restrictive process) and needing to drive on the right-hand side of the road (an organizational one). The former prevents certain citizens from doing something, by creating a limit. The latter dictates how something is to be done, if one chooses to do it. Right now, the barriers for entry in order to run for office, and so on, are all restrictive. They are intended to narrow the number of people and organizations that are contending for public office. The problem is, though, that these offices are ours. They exist in order to serve our interests. It's up to us to decide who fills them, not for those who hold them to determine that we are somehow not worthy.

Voting should be open as well. That is, it should be something that is similarly easy to do, and not something that bears a heavy burden of restrictions. Certainly one has to prove one's citizenship (or residency, or some such -- basically, that one has a stake in the outcome) and identity (that one is indeed the person one claims to be, and is thus entitled to the vote) in order to vote. That seems quite reasonable. But beyond that, why is voting as difficult as it is? Why line up to vote? Keep in mind that it's becoming easier to do most anything -- order food, organize utilities for one's home, buy a home, buy a car, get married, get divorced, plan a vacation, etc. Why isn't it getting easier to vote? As with changing voting systems, there are many different ways of organizing the process of voting, with much research discussing benefits and problems. What we're doing clearly isn't working, so why not change it?

I don't pretend this is any more than a sketch. But I want to conclude by suggesting what sorts of policies might enact these principles, and fill in some more detail. Some obvious ones first. A change in the electoral system, such as to STV, MMP or IRV. Reducing the requirements for voting, such as introducing online voting. Engagement with voters (for parliamentarians) and with party members (for party officials, candidates, etc.) through Twitter, blogs, Facebook, and other such services. Recording and broadcasting all government business in an easily-accessible way, so that citizens can see, track, discuss and affect what officials are doing.

We could also use some serious reform of the House, Senate, the federal courts, and the role currently filled by the Crown, which I've given in increasing order of detachment from voters and thus from all citizens. The office of the Prime Minister is not defined explicitly anywhere in Canadian law. And thus the Prime Minister's level of power is always in flux. There are no clear rules governing cabinet posts. There is no way of removing MPs from office if they fail to fulfill their obligations to constituents.

When it comes to the Senate, while its Constitutional role is fairly clear, it is very unresponsive to citizens and very much a closed boy's club. The courts are worse. Clearly both the Senate and the courts should be filled by people with relevant expertise. But there is no formal process for selecting such people from the populace at large. An election is not necessarily the solution, but why, at least, don't we have a public process for selecting Senators and judges?

Finally, the Crown is a hereditary office, yet has tremendous power under the Constitution. Many Commonwealth countries -- for example, Ireland, India, Pakistan -- have replaced the Crown with an elected President, with varying levels of importance and power. I don't see how having an important office that all Canadians could focus attention on, that would respond to the interests and ideas of Canadians, that all Canadians could contend for could do anything but reduce alienation.

Generally, alienated voters who despise the process of voting and the cycle of elections need to see that the government is playing its role, that it matters to their lives, and that they can actually affect it in a serious and meaningful way. Without that, alienation will continue to spread. And the reason to be concerned is, ultimately, that the end of that process is a rejection of the civil authority. We already have a majority of voters who find themselves at least somewhat alienated. If this number continues to increase, it is hard to see how the government could continue to claim to be anything other than an irrelevant relic.

(Early) Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 04:00:00 +0000

Not in town on Friday, so you're getting it today.

Pain, "Follow Me"

Busy few weeks

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 00:50:00 +0000

Here's what I've been working on:

Draft of first dissertation chapter: http://www.students.yorku.ca/~madswan/research/papers/rawlings-chapter1draft.pdf

Draft of second dissertation chapter: http://www.students.yorku.ca/~madswan/research/papers/rawlings-chapter2draft.pdf

Comments are, of course, welcome. Either send to @ADHR on Twitter or use my academic email (linked on my academic webpage in the right column). Revisions are ongoing and writing on further chapters continues.

Hope to have something by way of a substantive blog post next week.

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 21 Aug 2009 19:11:00 +0000

Korpiklaani, "Vodka"

If you can get this song out of your head, you're far, far stronger than me.

Twitter has collapsed.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Sat, 15 Aug 2009 17:08:00 +0000

Did we do that? Hopefully, it's just another one of Twitter's bizarre failures.

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 18:41:00 +0000

Tyr, "Hold the Heathen Hammer High"

On freedom: (3) The value of freedom

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 02:14:00 +0000

Human freedom is based on, as I've said, the idea of a self being constituted by a particular set of causes. One is free insofar as one can affect what happens -- especially what one does -- with these causes. Political freedom, I've argued, is fundamentally about expanding the range of political abilities humans have, and only secondarily about not restricting what humans do. Thus, political freedom, in the primary sense, is about expanding the range of causes with which a human being can affect what happens; it is about making us more able to take control of the world around us, both natural and social. This is really the point of political freedom: to allow us to express our human freedom more completely and more widely.

Today I want to consider the issue of what would make this idea of freedom valuable -- and whether it actually is. As I see them, values are identified by playing a particular functional role in practical reasoning. To be a value is to make a difference to how we should think about what we should do. So, for example, prudence is unquestionably a value: that is, there's no serious doubt that there is at least some worth in being cautious and discrete in one's conduct, in ensuring that one acts in an efficacious and considered fashion. Why is prudence a value? It is, in my view, because prudence is something we should take into account when deciding what we should do; when I am deciding, for example, whether to write this or not, whether writing this is the action I should take, one thing I should take into account (insofar as I am thinking rationally) is whether it would be prudent. An action's being prudent, by virtue of being prudent, gives me a reason that I should use in my practical deliberations.

So, reason-giving can be taken as symptomatic of value. Something is valuable insofar as it is the sort of thing that gives rise to reasons; therefore, if something gives rise to reasons, we have reason to believe that is is valuable. Not decisive reason, of course, as reason-giving is only a symptom of value, but I find it difficult to characterize value generally in any other terms. I'll run with this one, then.

There are two outstanding issues here before I can draw a connection to political freedom. First, what are reasons, in this sense? And, second, what is it to deliberate practically?

Reasons in this sense are practical reasons (which, FWIW, I take to exhaust the category of all reasons). That is, they are reasons for doing something; they are considerations that speak in favour of a particular course of action. If I am thirsty, that doing so would get me a drink is a reason for opening the fridge. If I am in danger, that doing so would protect me is a reason to hide. And so on. Reasons in this sense are not necessarily conclusive; they can just be favouring reasons. If I am on my way to work and see a man lying in pain on the side of the road, his pain is a reason for my helping him, but my needing to be at work is a reason for not helping him (as I will be late if I do). These two reasons are in conflict, in that the actions they favour cannot both be done. And most situations are far more complex than this: we face a multitude of considerations which speak in favour of a similar multitude of various possible actions. Some of these actions we can do in combination, others we cannot, and some we can only do in particular orders. So, practical deliberation exists to help us sort through the various reasons which exist in any given practical situation, to help us determine which of the favoured actions is the one most favoured -- that is, the one we have most reason to do, and therefore the one we should do, all things considered.

Practical deliberation, then, depends on a certain facility of judgement. It is not, despite some prominent attempts to distill it to such a thing, a mechanical procedure. Aristotle had his practical syllogism; for example:

All lies are wrong.
To say p would be a lie.
Therefore, I should not say p.

(The form here isn't perfect, but it's close enough.) Bentham had his utilitarian calculus, which assigned numerical values to about a dozen different qualities of pleasures; upon adding and subtracting the pleasures and pains from all possible courses of action, we should, according to Bentham, do whatever led to the highest numerical result. All such procedures break down at the extremes. The practical syllogism cannot capture the sort of deliberation involved in deciding between two courses of action: it is not possible to fit such a choice into the major premise, minor premise, conclusion structure. Similarly, the utilitarian calculus, ignoring its very limited account of value, is sufficiently unwieldy as to be useless in most concrete situations.

So, I rest practical deliberation on a well-informed, well-developed capacity for judgement. That is, to deliberate between competing reasons for action is to have the ability to assess them in an informed and experienced fashion. And this ability exists in a sufficiently refined and educated character.

Do reasons arise from political freedoms? That is, does the range of political abilities afforded to humans by being in political society give us reasons which should figure in to our practical deliberations? I tend to think that the range of political abilities does give us reasons for action -- indeed, that it has to give us reasons for action. Political freedoms connect to human freedoms, as I have already argued; and, human freedoms are, in sum, the ability to enact changes in the world. Human freedom, then, is the capacity to respond to reasons for action -- to take action on the basis of reasons. So, anything that serves human freedom must give reasons, for freedom and reasons go together. (I acknowledge this is a little vague, but I hope the basic point is clear.) Given the connection between political freedom and human freedom, and the connection then from human freedom to reasons for action, it must be the case that political freedom gives us reasons for action (and thus freedom is always valuable). That is, that something would affect freedom or relate to freedom in some way always favours or speaks towards some particular course of action.

Are these favouring reasons or conclusive reasons, though? Can they be defeated by other reasons, and, if so, can they be defeated easily and quickly or only by considerations of very great significance? I think that freedom gives us only favouring reasons, but that is an instance of a broader point: that nothing, really, on its own, gives us conclusive reasons. Conclusive reasons, I think, can only be generated out of the process of practical deliberation; they cannot be the input of this process. This is not a hard position to motivate, as all that is required is the point that any reason can, in principle, be defeated by some other reason. Even something as fundamentally important as life can be defeated by other reasons; self-sacrifice is, after all, not always irrational. If death is not always a reason not to do something -- indeed, if death can be a reason to do something -- then it follows, I think, that there is no value which gives rise to reasons that cannot, in principle, be ignored.

So, freedom could be overcome by other things; the reasons it gives us may be defeated. But can freedom be easily defeated? I tend to think it can't. Since freedom is fundamental to the idea of acting for reasons -- of rational action at all, that is -- to allow its reasons to be defeated is, in a sense, to allow reason to defeat itself. I don't see that this is contradictory, but it is, I think, quite a difficult state to achieve. What would be required is a case where giving up one's freedom is necessary in order to protect one's freedom: we could think of limiting our freedom to speech, imposing a limitation on my ability to express threats, in order to protect others from serious harm (i.e., the legitimate and serious threats), or of limiting our freedom of movement, imposing a limitation on our ability to move around our nation, because being in certain areas (e.g., toxic waste sites) could cause us serious harm. Harm is not a blanket reason that will always swamp freedom, but it certainly can. (After all, certain harms will inhibit our ability to act on the basis of reasons at all.)

To summarize, then: human freedom is based on, as I've said, the idea of a self being constituted by a particular set of causes. One is free insofar as one can affect what happens -- especially what one does -- with these causes. Political freedom is fundamentally about expanding the range of political abilities humans have, and only secondarily about not restricting what humans do. Thus, political freedom, in the primary sense, is about expanding the range of causes with which a human being can affect what happens; it is about making us more able to take control of the world around us, both natural and social. This is really the point of political freedom: to allow us to express our human freedom more completely and more widely. Freedom always gives rise to reasons for action, as freedom and reasons go together; therefore, freedom is valuable. It is significantly valuable, but not overwhelmingly so. Freedom can be defeated by other reasons, but only in extenuating circumstances by other, significantly weighty considerations, such as the prevention of harm.

(I'm not yet sure what I want to do for next week. I'll try to come up with something a little less theoretically-oriented, though.)

Friday metal-blogging.

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 22:39:00 +0000

Hacride, "Perturbed"

Third part of freedom series coming next week (working on a short week this week due to the holiday).

Friday metal grind-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 31 Jul 2009 13:34:00 +0000

Double-shot for the long weekend.

Brutal Truth, "Sugar Daddy" (kicks in at about 1:43)

Napalm Death, "Plague Rages"

On freedom: (2) Political freedom

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 02:43:00 +0000

Last week, I concluded the following about the nature of freedom as such:

That, then, would be what I take human freedom to be: that there are some causes which can be counted as (part of) the human self. We are free insofar as (and to the extent that) there is some part of us which makes a causal difference to what we think and do.

This week, I want to discuss how I see this connecting to political freedom. There is a difference between the two concepts. While (and I'm not going to get too far into this as I don't have it particularly straight) I take most things about the world to be structured by human practices and institutions, it's clear to me that political institutions do not exhaust those practices and institutions. That is, there are more kinds of things we do and (rule-based) structures we make than those which count as political. Religions, for example, are not a kind of state; they are a different sort of institution. The same can apply to universities, families, and so on. It would be a mistake, then, to try to read political freedom off from human freedom as such.

How do we get to political freedom from human freedom, then? Standardly, political freedom consists of two basic ideas. On the one hand, one is free insofar as one is not restricted by political institutions. This is the sort of freedom that is captured by the ideas of being free to associate with others or being free to move within a country's borders. On the other hand, one is free insofar as one is granted abilities by political institutions. This is the sort of freedom that is captured by the ideas of being free to vote or free to seek public office.

The former is, these days, not particularly controversial. It was controversial when it was first suggested by the Enlightenment thinkers, as it runs against some deep-rooted principles that existed in ancient (and thus also in mainstream medieval) thought. For now, though, since I take it as not controversial, I'll just leave it lie.

The controversial one is the latter type of freedom. Which is odd, really, as it also has Enlightenment roots. We can find it, for example, in the work of Rousseau, who (in)famously noted that one can be "forced to be free". The sense Rousseau makes of this superficially contradictory phrase is that in giving up natural freedom (the sort of freedom one has outside of society) one gains civic freedom (the sorts of freedom that can only exist within society). This is why I picked upon the freedom to vote and the freedom to seek public office above: these make no sense outside of political society. The idea of a "vote" is only sensible within political society; without such an institution, there is no such thing as a vote. The same applies to the idea of a "public office". (And, indeed, it applies to many other freedoms.)

So, freedom in the political sense consists both of the lack of restriction by political institutions and the granting of new abilities by political institutions. On the face of it, these are in serious tension with each other -- forget whether they are in tension with human freedom. That is, in order to create new abilities, it seems that political institutions must impose restrictions on us. In order for there to be public offices, for example, there must be powers associated with those offices, powers which can be used on others. So, if we want to have the freedom to run for public office, we must give up the freedom to not be restricted by those who hold public office. And vice versa -- if we want to maintain the lack of restriction, we must give up the existence of public offices. (Libertarians note that this applies to police as well as to politicians.)

Therefore, as a general principle, we can endorse the following: the more abilities government creates, the more restrictions it imposes; the fewer restrictions it imposes, the fewer abilities it creates. The question is what are we committed to in terms of a priority relation if we commit ourselves to the idea of human freedom. (As I said last week, I will take up the question of whether freedom is actually a valuable thing in next week's final part of this series.)

On the one hand, let us take lack of restriction as fundamental. We could defend this in the following way. In many cases, the state's interference in the lives of adults is not simply not legitimate, as it thus (necessarily ) infringes on their freedoms. However, many forms of state interference are in the lives of (literal or effective) children. And it is legitimate for the government to limit children, as, by definition, children are not full adults and thus not deserving of the full range of adult freedoms. For example, someone who has repeatedly demonstrated that they cannot handle the responsibility of caring for their own children can be deprived of those children or forced to live under state restrictions.

On the other hand, let us take the creation of abilities as fundamental. We could defend this in the following way. In many cases, the state's interference is a legitimate source of freedom for the adult. New abilities could be created through enforced education, for example, and this amounts to saying that the adult's freedoms are expanded. So, an adult who is compelled to go through (say) an apprenticeship would gain skills that expand the actions the adult is capable of taking. Far from limiting the freedoms of the adult, state interference would expand them.

I think the second is more plausible, for two reasons. First, the sense of freedom in terms of not being restricted by political institutions is irrelevant if one has no abilities to act politically. Having a maximal set of political freedoms in the second sense is a pre-condition on having any political freedoms in the first sense. This is, in my view, the fatal flaw in libertarianism: libertarians seem to believe that political freedom in the sense of lack of restriction can exist even when political freedom in the sense of having abilities is entirely absent. But this makes no sense, as without abilities to do things, there is no sense in which one's abilities can be restricted.

Second, favouring the second sense as primary over the first sense as secondary provides a more plausible justification for interfering in the freedom of children. We are not justified in interfering because they are somehow less worthy of being unrestricted than adults; instead we are so justified because they are less developed than adults and it is our responsibility to encourage and promote their development.

With the tension within political freedom resolved, we can now make some headway in connecting political and human freedom. Human freedom is based on, as I've said, the idea of a self being constituted by a particular set of causes. One is free insofar as one can affect what happens -- especially what one does -- with these causes. Political freedom, I've argued, is fundamentally about expanding the range of political abilities humans have, and only secondarily about not restricting what humans do. Thus, political freedom, in the primary sense, is about expanding the range of causes with which a human being can affect what happens; it is about making us more able to take control of the world around us, both natural and social. This is really the point of political freedom: to allow us to express our human freedom more completely and more widely.

Now, I'm not suggesting a massive project of government intervention in the lives of adults in the name of increasing their political, and thus human, freedoms. I tend to think that government's role is mostly passive when it comes to treating adults. That is, it provides a background set of conditions and opportunities (which have nothing to do with freedom), and encourages people to take advantage of them. If some adult refuses to take advantage of them, that is a legitimate choice insofar as the adult is a full-fledged adult. The government's role is to create the full set of political freedoms -- as a subset of the causes that amount to human freedom -- and then, and only then, back off. (Many physical adults will not meet the definition of "adult" in this sense, but I'm fine with that result).

(We can see this most clearly when it comes to euthanasia. If someone decides, say, that they don't want to live with the ravages of Alzheimer's, government and society have no business refusing to allow that decision, or removing the opportunities to act on it. Right now, pre-Alzheimer's, insofar as the adult is a full adult with full grasp of their capacities and a full set of political freedoms, to limit their choice to end their lives is to treat them as more limited than they are, as less than a full adult, solely on the basis of the choice that is made. But no choice -- save possibly for the choice to make no more choices -- is less legitimate than any other, as long as it is made from a position of full rationality and full information. (Within reasonable practical limits, blah blah.))

But, generally, I would endorse more government intervention, and intervention from other state institutions, in order to expand our abilities to act. For example, I would endorse poverty reduction programs to give adults greater ability to engage in the economic aspects of political institutions. I would also endorse reducing the barriers to education so that adults could expand their range of freedoms through that mechanism. And so on.

Yeah, I don't have a pithy conclusion for this one. Deal. Next time: the value of freedom.

Comments

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Tue, 28 Jul 2009 21:57:00 +0000

Those who pay attention to such things will have noticed that I have done all that I can to remove comments from the blog. Not deleting comments that already exist (although they have been hidden), but preventing the existence of new ones.

This is not just a random decision on my part, though. There's basically three options for comments:

Open
Moderated (at various levels)
None

I don't like open. That tends to degenerate into something like the infamous YouTube comments sections. There are places with good communities that police themselves, but this requires a certain critical mass that, if I'm honest, this blog will never achieve. It is possible to police an open comments section oneself, but this usually turns into a very rigid form of censorship, wherein all views that are not one's own are immediately deleted without warning or apology. For examples, see "Tories, Blogging".

That's why I don't like moderated comments, of any sort -- whether it's comment approval, requiring registration, policing an open comments section, or what have you. It's too easy to disappear comments that one doesn't favour down the memory hole. Sometimes this may be justified, and sometimes it may not be. But there's a real temptation to let the personal trump the important and dispose of insightful remarks that, in the heat of the moment, one simply doesn't find worthy of approval. I know I've done it, and I'm confident that others with moderated comments sections would, if they were honest, admit it as well.

So, given that the choices are swill, ego-gratification, or nothing, I choose "nothing". It's not ideal, I grant, but it's better than the other options that I see. I can, of course, still be reached for reply on anything blogged herein -- Twitter is probably the best option, as 140 characters of even the swilliest swill is rarely sufficient to annoy me (and TweetDeck has a "clear tweets" function that I enjoy).

(If enough suggest it (and I have no idea what would constitute "enough", so don't ask) I may set up an email address in lieu of a commenting form. That might turn into another form of comment moderation, though, hence why I'm not interested in doing it at the moment.)

Friday metal-blogging

noreply@blogger.com (ADHR) — Fri, 24 Jul 2009 19:45:00 +0000

Slayer, "War Ensemble"

War Ensemble - Slayer from rogertm on Vimeo.