This case deals with being in contempt of court, but in a family law context. Being in contempt of court means to disobey an Order made by the Honourable Court that works to defy the dignity and authority of the Court. With this said, the husband in this case breached several Orders made by the Court, and hence he was in contempt of Court.

The husband was given 60 days to provide disclosure and information that was required to determine child support. The opposing counsel requested three Orders of disclosure documents, and the husband did not provide the above. The opposing counsel provided an extension for the husband, and the husband failed to comply with all the orders. It should be noted that all the Orders referred to were made on consent, which means the mother did not arbitrarily impose the terms of the Orders on the husband.

The mother decided to bring to the Court’s attention that her husband failed to comply with the various Orders, and she asked the Honourable Court to find that her husband was in contempt. However, the mother decided to adjourn her claim of contempt and came up with another Order that the father was to follow.

The issue before the court was whether the latest Order made by the mother replaces the former breached Orders, and hence the latest Order that has been complied with by the husband negates all earlier breached Orders. The mother argued that the compliance of the latest Order does not cancel out all the former breached Orders. Instead, the single complied order could only be used to affect the penalty of contempt of Court, and not abolish the contempt.

The criteria for being in contempt of court includes:

1. the breached Order should state clearly what should and should not be done
2. the party who disobeys the Order must do so deliberately, and
3. the evidence must show contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court was not impressed with the husband’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation for his misconduct. Moreover, the Court loathes such actions because they cause undue delay that prejudices the other party. Also, such breaches that pass without consequence in the Court may bring the whole administration of justice into disrepute and undermine the dignity of the Court.

The Court did find that the husband was in contempt, but his compliance with the latest Order only went towards assessing the penalty for the other breached Court Orders. The moral of the case at bar is that when counsel is replacing one Order with another, counsel should be unequivocal in drafting of further Orders in stating that any additional Orders even if complied with will not cancel out or act as a means of relief for former breached Orders. At the end of the day, the Court found that there was contempt, and the husband was to pay the wife $8,500.00 as a penalty for his contempt.

The parties separated in 2005 after a 21 year marriage. At the time of separation, their only daughter was about to begin her post-secondary education.

The main issue in this Ontario Court of Appeal case is whether the trail judge erred in awarding Ms. Rioux a lump sump amount of $100,000.00. This amount was intended to cover retroactive child support, educational expenses, retroactive spousal support, reimbursement for other expenses, and equalization. The problem with this lump sum payment is that the trial judge was not clear as to whether spousal support would be paid to Ms. Rioux in addition to this lump sum amount.

On appeal, the court determined that additional spousal support payments would be made because the $100,000.00 lump sum payment could not possibly cover Mr. Rioux’s spousal support obligations. The equalization payment made up roughly $90,000.00 of this $100,000.00 and spousal support payments for a 21 year long traditional marriage where the husband earns over six times more income than the wife should total far more than $10,000.00.

The court decided that Ms. Rioux would receive spousal support from Mr. Rioux in the amount of $1,500.00 per month for five years, at which point in the time this spousal support award would be open to review by either party. The court stated that Ms. Rioux should become self supporting during this time period. Ms. Rioux was 49 years old at the time of this appeal.

In addition to ordering spousal support, the court ordered that Mr. Rioux keep Ms. Rioux as the sole beneficiary of his health benefits so long as he is covered through his employment and so long as he is required to support Ms. Rioux.

This case deals with the issue of the custodial parent’s ability to move with the children without the consent of the other parent. Both the mother and father were seeking interim custody of the two children of the marriage, ages 7 and 8. The parties cohabited for 6 years, and married for almost 1 year. The parties decided to separate as the mother developed an extra-martial relationship with another man. The father moved out and allowed the children to remain in the matrimonial home with the mother. The parenting arrangement was that each parent had the children on alternate weekends and some weeknights.

The matrimonial home is situated in London, Ontario. However, the mother unilaterally decided to take the children, leave their matrimonial home, and move to Kerwood, Ontario which is 45 minutes away from the matrimonial home. The mother’s reasoning for the move was that London lacked affordable accommodations. Since the matrimonial home became vacant, the father decided to move in the matrimonial home and the children continued the same parenting regime between London and Kerwood.

The mother contended that she left the matrimonial home because she was informed by the father that the matrimonial home was going to be sold and she would be forced to find alternate accommodations. Also, the mother mentioned she has a close friend nearby the new home in Kerwood. Conversely, the father stated that the mother was not paying for rent while in the matrimonial home as he paid the rent, and the father denied that he said the matrimonial home was being sold.

The Court had to decide what is in the best interests of the children. This means the Court attempts to preserve the status quo as much as possible in order to prevent any disruptions to the children’s daily lives. Although the mother claimed being the primary caregiver, the father also spent considerable time with the children and was capable of caring for them. The Court determined that the best interests of the children would be served if they lived in the London matrimonial home with their father. The children had their sports and school in London which showed their connection to that matrimonial home. Moreover, the father could rely on the support of the paternal grandparents. The mother’s proposed arrangement for the children was that she could rely on her aunt to care for the children. However, it was brought to the Court’s attention that the aunt was convicted of manslaughter and potentially an alcoholic. The Court decided that based on the acrimonious relationship between the parties, an order of interim joint custody would not be appropriate. Hence, the Court determined that it would be in the best interests of the children for the father to have interim custody and the mother would be the access parent.

In this case, the husband sought (i) a reduction in child support because his income decreased by $20,000.00, (ii) better disclosure from the wife regarding her current income and her plans to find employment, and (iii) the return of his belongings.

The husband’s child support payments were reduced and Justice Flynn left it to the trial judge to determine the return of the husband’s belongings. The main issue in this case is the responsibility of both parties to show their efforts to find employment.

The husband’s child support payments were reduced because the husband showed that his decrease in income was the result of extenuating circumstances, and through no fault of his own. He was also able to show that, although unsuccessful, he made efforts to increase his income.

The wife, on the other hand, showed no efforts to maximize her employment opportunities. With regards to her income, she merely stated that she had none. As a result, an income of $15,000.00 (an amount that she was believed to have earned as a dance and yoga instructor) was imputed and she was ordered to provide documentary evidence of her efforts to maximize her income.

This case shows that, when no children or other dependents require full-time care, both parties have an obligation to make efforts to find and maximize employment and educational opportunities. This obligation applies equally to parties who are already employed and to those who did not work during the marriage.

In this case, the husband and wife voluntarily attended arbitration regarding their matrimonial matter. The wife was granted a lump sum for spousal support arrears, and an equalization payment. However, subsequent to the arbitration award, the husband went bankrupt. The most contested issue within this matter was whether the wife could claim priority over other creditors to the husband’s half share of the sale proceeds of the jointly owned matrimonial home. The wife decided to bring the matter to the Court one day before the husband declared bankruptcy.

The total amount of spousal support due to the wife was about $182,000.00. The Bank of Nova Scotia acted as a trustee in bankruptcy for the husband. The Bank of Nova Scotia was agreeable to the wife having a priority claim for the above amount. However, two issues remained. These issues were whether the wife could claim priority over the husband’s half share of the sale proceeds to satisfy the equalization payment to her and whether the wife could satisfy the balance of her equalization claim against the husband’s RRSP. This became an issue as recent amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act have made RRSP’s beyond the reach of a normal creditor. The Bank argued that the wife would not have any priority over the husband’s share of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home regarding the equalization payment that the husband owed to the wife. The wife contested that her equalization claim could be satisfied against the husband’s share of the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home and his RRSP. Thus, the wife wanted her claim for an equalization payment to have priority over the Banks.

Given that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award of the wife’s equalization payment, the Court dealt with the two mentioned issues. The first issue about the wife claiming priority over the husband’s half share of the sale proceeds to satisfy the equalization payment was accepted by the Court. The Court acknowledged that when the Bank is acting as a Trustee for the husband, their interests in the matrimonial home proceeds are secondary to any existing equities such as the obligation to satisfy the equalization payment to the wife which was determined in the arbitration award prior to the husband filing for bankruptcy.

The second issue about the wife satisfying the remainder of her equalization claim against the husband’s RRSP was also accepted by the Court. The Court decided that a bankrupt’s pension should be used to satisfy a claim for equalization as a pension does not form one of the assets under the control of the Trustee. This meant that the Court could order such remedy as the pension is an exempt asset from bankruptcy. The Court found that if the husband could concurrently claim bankruptcy and keep his pension without paying the equalization payment, this would be unfair. The Court decided that since the husband could not satisfy his equalization obligation to his wife, a more intrusive order was suitable. Thus, the Court ordered that the husband’s RRSP be transferred to the wife through a spousal rollover.

This case is an appeal of an arbitration decision. The parties have two children, aged 15 and almost 18 at the time of this appeal. In July of 2008, the arbitrator decided that the father intentionally alienated the children from the mother, who had not seen the children in 10 years. The arbitrator’s decision gave the mother full custody of the children and the ability to force the younger child and the father to participate in a Family Workshop. It also forbid the father from having contact with the younger child, outside of therapy, for three months after the completion of the Workshop, and forbid the older child from having contact, outside of therapy, with the younger child if he decided not to participate in the Workshop.

Justice Herman decided that the arbitrator’s finding of parental alienation would stand, but that the remedy could not because it was based upon the evidence of a psychologist, who although experienced in parental alienation therapy, did not meet with the children or take their particular circumstances into account.

Justice Herman ordered an expedited trial because (a) time was of the essence because of the age of the children, (b) she had no evidence upon which to make a proper decision because the expert evidence did not take the child’s particular interests into account, and (c) she could not simply allow an assessment because that would allow the assessor to decide the case instead of the courts and would likely lead to a trial where the assessor could be cross-examined. She also decided that this expedited trial could not address the mother’s relationship with the older child because he was almost 18.

This case highlights the importance of child specific evidence because the child’s best interests cannot be determined on general expert evidence that does not take the child’s special needs and circumstances into account. It also shows the importance of the age of the children because it is far more difficult to ensure that teenagers, especially those 18 and older, participate in therapy than it is to ensure that younger children attend therapy sessions.

As Justice Herman noted, it is a shame that after 10 years of alienation, an arbitration, an appeal, and several court appearances, the mother is no closer to re-establishing a relationship with her youngest child and that she may never have the chance to re-establish her relationship with her eldest child.

This case dealt with the division of property on martial breakdown. When couples separate there is no tangible division of the property, but there is a calculation used to determine the net asset value of each person during the marriage. A financial snapshot is taken of the value of the assets owned by each spouse on the date of marriage and on the date of separation. The wealthier spouse pays half of the difference of the higher net asset value. This calculation is used so that each spouse ends up with assets of equal value for the duration of their marriage. Hence, the calculation is known as an equalization payment.

In this case, the husband and wife were married for ten years. There were no children of the marriage and both parties were 58 years old. The legal issues included deciding which assets were eligible for a deduction and determining the true value of their marital assets (i.e.: their business, jewellery, and various real properties) as both parties had different values for the same property. This issue came down to whose testimony was most credible, and based on the husband’s inconsistent statements, the Court found the wife’s testimony regarding the values for marital property more convincing.

Within the case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was also faced with the issue of whether the Court is willing to enforce a traditional marriage contract under Muslim law, known as maher. Basically, this entitles the wife to a sum of money [$20,000.00 in this case] that is given to her upon marital breakdown as agreed by contract. Contracts for maher are seen as being intrinsic to Muslim law as the money given to the woman is part of the husband’s moral obligation. It is important to note that the maher is an agreement paid to the spouse in addition to and without prejudice to the husband’s obligations under the Ontario Family Law Act. Both parties did not obtain independent legal advice and neither party provided financial disclosure. At the culmination of the martial ceremony, neither spouse retained a copy of the marriage contract. However, given that setting aside a marriage contract is a discretionary power of the Court, the Court in this case found that given the nature of the terms were simple and the husband understood his obligation, the Court upheld the marriage contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada Marcovitz v. Bruker decision has held that although the dispute has a religious facet, it does not make it non-justiciable. This means that individuals can transfer their moral obligations into legally binding ones. Accordingly, the Court decided to uphold the traditional marriage contract based on the grounds that the marriage contract was binding under the Family Law Act. The Act allows parties to enter into a marriage contract in which both parties agree upon their respective rights and obligations upon separation. The marriage contract may cover ownership and division of property, spousal support obligations and various matters of settlement. However, there is a prohibition against contracting out of a possessory right of the matrimonial home, determining custody and child support obligations. In this case, the marriage contract is enforceable because it was made (1) in writing, (2) signed by both parties and (3) witnessed. There was no evidence of incapacity or duress which makes the marriage contract in this case valid.

The parties in this case included a mother (grandmother to the children) and daughter that were involved in custody litigation. The daughter is a single parent with sole custody of all three children. The daughter forbids the grandmother of any access to the children. There has been ongoing volatility and acrimony in the mother-daughter relationship. Due to this strained relationship, the grandmother had become estranged from the children. The grandmother was asking the Honourable Court for access to her grandchildren, and she claimed grandparent alienation.

Justice Pazaratz’s decision was premised on the paramount principle of what is in the best interests of the children. Justice Pazaratz ordered that the children have indirect access to the grandmother via mail and any other form of direct access or communication was restrained. The judge considered the best interests of the children by taking into account the children’s wishes not to see their grandmother although somewhat influenced by their mother’s negativity, and the obvious fact that the ongoing poor rapport between mother and daughter would have a deleterious affect on the children during access visits.

Historically, third parties including grandparents lacked a legal right to claim access to grandchildren. However, with the contemporary view of extended families and access being determined by what is in the best interests of the children (i.e.: how strong, important, and healthy such a relationship will be to the child) access to third parties is considered by the Court. In this decision, the judge rightfully distinguished access is not about what is in the best interest of the grandparent, rather the question is what is in the best interest of the children. Justice Pazaratz decided that the insistence of access on the grandmother’s terms coupled with the fact that the parties ongoing conflict would disrupt and stress the children does not warrant direct access for the grandmother.

This case involved a common law relationship of five years. During the last year of the relationship, and moreover during the breakdown of the relationship, Ms. McLean developed health problems that made her dependent on her partner, namely Mr. Danicic. Ms. McLean decided to claim spousal support. During the course of their litigation, Mr. Danicic attempted to threaten and embarrass his ex-common law spouse if she proceeded with her claim against him. One of the many disheartening and threatening actions of Mr. Danicic included threatening to disseminate nude photos of Ms. McLean and himself to Ms. McLean’s family.

Based on Mr. Danicic’s vindictive actions, Justice Harvison Young did award damages for the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. A tort is considered a civil wrong for which an action for damages could be brought. Mr. Danicic was seen to be overly hostile, threatening, and embarrassing to his ex-common law spouse. Ms. McLean was said to be extremely distressed and suffered acute anxiety and fearfulness due to the malicious and assaulting conduct exhibited by the aggressor spouse.

This decision seems to be irreconcilable with the 2009 decision of Lo v. Lo. In Lo, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Canada Frame v. Smith decision that the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering has no place in family law as it would act as a weapon for spouses who have been emotionally hurt to injure the other and reinforce vindictive behaviour and the spin-off effects on children could be harmful.