Travis Noakes' research

A research article’s digital cul-de-sac. How to fix an academic paper that is hidden and/or unreachable

2026-02-14T17:22:00.077+02:00

Written for researchers keen to understand potential obstacles to their articles not being readily searchable via academic indexes and search engines thanks to broken linkages, a metadata mismatch or non-submission. Updated- 22 March 2026

Most researchers are keen for their works to be well-indexed, quick-to-find, and reliably linked to their academic publisher’s landing page from search engine results. This is especially true for scholars whose performance reviews include consideration of their works’ impact in reaching interested readers. Such impact scores can include citations, amplification and readership, as tracked via altmetrics and other sources.

This post provides an example to illustrate why a research author should not assume that every article of theirs will be properly indexed. As result, this work may not be seen by potentially interested parties searching for pertinent work with salient keywords, despite the work's merits. Metadata mismatches and broken linkages can unwittingly emerge during academic publishing, and may persist if not checked, flagged, and corrected. This post gives helpful advice for correcting or working around a few key problems. It shares the practical example of errors that impacted a South African journal article's availability after its digital publication on the 1st of December, 2025:

'Brandjacked for social media advert fraud'- a ghost in the fog...

The first publication from a research project that began in 2021, Brandjacked for social media advert fraud: Microcelebrities' experiences of digital crime, was published in the Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology & Victimology journal. Ordinarily, new articles should only take a few weeks after being indexed by an an academic metadata aggregator, such as Crossref, before featuring on authors' academic profiles. Crossref can update researchers' ORCID and Google Scholar records, followed by listings on academic social networks. These may be preceded by results in search engines and in Artificial Intelligence results (such as Grok). While search results for Brandjacked were quickly available from the last two, it could not be found under any of the former by February, 2026.

This post explores such challenges, the root cause of the article not being be properly indexed for academic searches, plus the work-arounds that Brandjacked's authors followed. While their paper technically existed, it could not efficiently be shared online by the four co-authors, with some listing results defaulting to a 'page not found' error message, rather than the publisher's article landing page:

Multiple URLs as expected

A normal part of the academic publishing process sees several URLs being created for a particular publication. In Brandjacked's case, these are from the handle.net domain (pointing to hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2) and journals.co.za's (onto journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2). Sabinet African Journals (journals.co.za) is a searchable platform providing a comprehensive, full-text collection for over 600 African-published electronic journals. Handle.net is developed by the Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI) to support a distributed information system for persistent, unique, and actionable identifiers (handles) for digital objects over the internet. The Handle System is the underlying technology used by the Digital Object Identifier (DOI) setup for identifying content, particularly for digital publishing and commerce.

Brandjacked's DOI value changed post-publication

A DOI is a unique, permanent alphanumeric string that is assigned to digital objects. DOIs include a prefix always starting with 10 and a suffix, separated by a forward slash (/). Prefacing the DOI with doi.org creates an actionable link. Originally, the Brandjacked article was allocated the DOI 10.10520/ejc-crim_v2025_nse1_a2. However, this was subsequently changed to 10.10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2 to reflect the article’s publication as the second in the 38th volume’s third issue. Commonly linked to journal articles, books, and research datasets, each DOI should provide a stable, long-lasting link to a research output’s internet location, regardless of whether its online address [or Uniform Research Location (URL)] gets changed.

Social media shares…

On social media, academics, researchers and scholars typically share the DOI version of URLs, since a DOI's usage is the primary identifier for tracking comments and mentions via altmetrics. Attention for academic publications is typically sparse, with most not being shared via social media, and a significant portion only being shared once via popular platforms. Only a few papers, often with high public interest or "quirky" topics, receive the vast majority of shares. To help Brandjacked's visibility, I wrote a 31 tweet long thread at x.com/travisnoakes/status/2001585342000898177, shared a LinkedIn post at linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7407406366052569089/, and wrote this public Facebook post at facebook.com/share/p/1BtsXaJtQC/.

… but no AltMetrics listing yet

On the Brandjacked article’s landing page, the altmetrics badge only shows a question mark at the date of this post's publication (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Screenshot of No AltMetrics listing for Brandjacked article,12 Feb 2026.

Nor are results for the Brandjacked article shown on app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?search_mode (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Screenshot of No AltMetrics listing for Brandjacked article,12 Feb 2026.

As a research blogger, I like to share Altmetrics badges for my publications, but none is available for Brandjacked via badge.dimensions.ai/details/doi/10.10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2?domain=https://journals.co.za. Nor for a PlumX badge, searching with Branjacked's DOI value at https://plu.mx/plum/a/?doi=10.10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2.

No automatic ORCID profile article update

Each of Brandjacked’s four authors have an Open Researcher and Contributor ID (ORCID) address. This is a 16-digit persistent digital identifier (e.g., 0000-0001-9566-8983) that uniquely identifies research-contributors all over the world. Like the DOI value does for research outputs, ORCID resolves name ambiguity. It links all research publications, datasets, and grants to an individual, regardless if their name or institution changes. Authors can set their ORCID profile to be automatically updated with research outputs that are linked to them. As at this post’s publication date, the Brandjacked article had not automatically been linked to any of its authors’ ORCID profiles.

Google Scholar links to a 404 error

The academic search engine, Google Scholar, is popular due to offering the widest automatic global indexing of scholars' works. Its account holders can create manual entries for their research outputs, or select pre-existing records featuring their author name. In Brandjacked’s case, I created a manual record in late December, since no record for this paper was available for selection (Figure 3). Since then, Google Scholar has come to list two versions of the article.

Figure 3.Screenshot of Two versions of Brandjacked on Google Scholar, 12 Feb 2026.

The top version, which can be Saved and Cited, produced a '404 not found' error when clicked through to Acta Criminologica (Figure 4).

Figure 4.Screenshot of DOI not resolved from Google Scholar, 12 Feb 2026.

Thinking that this may have been caused by the manual record I created featuring the initial DOI, I chose to delete the article from my record. Then went into Google Scholar trash and selected ‘Delete Forever’. However, the article available for manual selection (Figure 5) still links to a '404 not found' result.

Figure 5. Screenshot of Google Scholar manual selection of Brandjacked, 12 Feb 2026.

Report a failed DOI link via doi.org

A manual entry created on ResearchGate (at researchgate.net/publication/398814505_Brandjacked_for_social_media_advert_fraud_Microcelebrities'_experiences_of_digital_crime_in_South_Africa) lists the correct DOI (Figure 6), but it also showed a '404 not found' error when attempting to link to the digital publication.

Figure 6.Screenshot of ResearchGate DOI being correct for Brandjacked, 12 Feb 2026.

At least this page presented an option to report the failed DOI. So, I submitted this error report to DOI: "The article 'Brandjacked for social media advert fraud' should be available at this DOI. Related working URLs are: https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2 & https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2. Thanks in advance for fixing this."

Figure 7. Screenshot of DOI error report for Brandjacked, 12 Feb 2026.

As a shortcut for checking-and-reporting DOI errors, authors should open www.doi.org, then scroll down to the 'Try resolving a DOI name' section. There they can enter a DOI value to check it, and report a DOI URL address that fails in throwing a '404 not found' error.

Figure 8. Screenshot showing DOI Prefix 10.10520 Not Found error message, 12 Feb 2026.

Just a few downloads...

Acta Criminologica’s ‘Open Access’ policy initially provides restricted access via the South African Bibliographic and Information Network (SABINET)'s archives. These are available via university libraries’ annual SABINET subscription for SABINET African Electronic Publications (SA_ePublications). There is a 12-month open access embargo from the date of publication/loading on the Criminological Society of Africa (CRIMSA)’s website.

Perhaps being published before the Christmas holidays in an access-restricted versus open-journal format contributed to Brandjacked only being downloaded five times in the first two months. But even achieving that readership is not been helped by a ghost-listing amidst a heavy stream of academic publications. As Trend MD reports, nearly 8,000 research articles are published each day. In this flood of information, the visibility of our niche publication is hampered through not being indexed in aggregators for academic (meta-)data or authorial content registries. Consequently, it is vital for scholars to work with the journal, their publisher, and co-authors to achieve work-arounds. Authors should also build awareness around remedying any root causes that undermine their visibility of their academic work.

Emailed the editor

Given that the landing page URL is throwing a '404 not found' error and the DOI is not resolving, it seemed likely that the error was a flaw on the publisher's end. In response, I wrote to the journal's editor requesting that the Crossref metadata be updated. I hoped that the journal’s production team could soon ensure that: (i) the landing page URL for the article is correctly mapped to its DOI. And that (ii) the metadata provided to Crossref and other aggregators could be updated to reflect a functional DOI link. As this issue impacted other articles in the Cybercrime special issue, it seemed crucial to fix for the visibility of all its authors’ articles.

Subsequent investigation spotlighted that the failure for the DOI to resolve actually applied to all articles in the journal: prior to 2017, the 'Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology & Victimology' journal was known as 'Acta Criminologica: Southern African Journal of Criminology'. Its first issue started in 1988, and entering its first ever article's DOI produces exactly the same error as shown in Figure 8.

Feedback from the publisher

A product manager for content services at SABINET replied to the editor's query that the DOI link is not working as the journal is not using registered DOIs yet. The 10.10520 prefix is a "dummy" DOI that SABINET uses to ingest content. By contrast, the persistent link to resolve each article is at a fully-functioning https://hdl.handle.net address.

The product manager offered to reach out to the Google Scholar team to ask that they use the handle link rather than the DOI code, unless they use the complete URL. She also flagged that the DOI issue can only be addressed for future Acta Criminologica articles once their allocated actual DOIs are registered with Crossref. This issue relates to a broader problem around the visibility of African journals that Asubiaro and Onaolapo (2023) have spotlighted- their 'low representation in Crossref, a free indexing infrastructure that could be harnessed for building an African‐centric research indexing database, is concerning'. This paper flags how less than fifty percent of journals from Africa feature in Crossref.

Not being indexed there has an important knock-on effect, as it provides data for other bibliographic databases. These include Dimensions, The Lens and Scilit. In the Lens' case, it serves global scholarly records. These are compiled and harmonised from Crossref and PubMed, enhanced with OpenAlex and UnPaywall open access information, CORE full text and links to ORCID. Data from The Lens can be imported into ORCID records, allowing authors to synchronise their records.

A manual ORCID listing

In the absence of such synchronisation for Brandjacked, I could not select a DOI or handle.net address in ORCID for automatically linking to my record. Instead, I created a manual one. Its entry route provided an option to define both the DOI's 'identifier value' (10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2) and the full identifier URL's address (https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-crim_v38_n3_a2) (Figure 9). I asked my co-authors to add this manuscript to their ORCID records, which correctly resolves to the publisher's article landing page.

Figure 9. Screenshot of applying the handle.net identified in manual ORCID listing, 16 Feb 2026.

However, each author was unable to select this listing for automatic addition, despite entering the assigned DOI index number, the full handle.net address (Figure 10) or the journal's URL.

Figure 10. Screenshot showing handle.net URL does not work for co-author selection via ORCID, 16 Feb 2026.

Instead, I shared a screenshot of the details I used (Figure 11) which each author copied for adding the same details.

Figure 11. Screengrab of manual ORCID entry for co-authors to copy, 16 Feb 2026.

By using the same DOI and handle.net address, we wanted to ensure that just one record was captured via ORCID for our paper (versus four separate records for all co-authors!).

A manual Academia.edu entry

Like ORCID, Academia.edu's manual field entries for an article support both the entry of the DOI value, and also related Links/URL (Figure 12). This contrasts to ResearchGate's support for just one DOI address.

Figure 12. Screenshot of adding handle.net entry to manual Academia.edu record, 16 Feb 2026.

Cannot get (a) Kudos (addition)

Kudos is a networking platform designed to increase the visibility, reach, and impact of published research It supports scholars with explaining their work in plain language, and adding salient context. In theory, a DOI, article title or recent manual entry on ORCID should support Kudos with finding 'Brandjacked for social media advert fraud'. However, none of the three searches worked (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Screenshot of Kudos search options - DOI, text search & ORCID, 16 Feb 2026.

I emailed Kudos' support team to flag this issue, asking if there was an alternate route for authors to add a publication. They replied that Kudos currently depends on the entry of DOIs: 'Please be aware that we do plan to create more options to add a publication to Kudos in the future and this is on our product roadmap. In the meantime we recommend that you kindly contact your publisher and ask them to send published work metadata to Crossref so it is more discoverable, and appears in Kudos and other online services' (email correspondence, 4 March, 2026),

Who is responsible for submitting to Crossref?

The primary responsibility for submitting and maintaining Crossref entries typically lies with the publisher in being formal Crossref members. CRIMSA publishes Acta Criminologica : African Journal of Criminology & Victimology. The editor ensures that high-quality metadata (such as ORCIDs and funding info) is received from authors before manuscript approval. CRIMSA would then be responsible for submitting accepted articles' bibliographic metadata (including URLs and references, plus registering DOIs), then ensuring this information remains up-to-date. The publisher handles the technical side of generating "Crossref XML" files, or using deposit tools.

Like many small organisations though, CRIMSA's office bearers may be stretched across many roles. So, not able to prioritise learning how to do Crossref submissions as a new responsibility, let alone find the time to do them. The extra funds to pay for such work may also not be available.

In the near future, CRIMSA's academic journal does plan to submit metadata to Crossref for new articles. I have encouraged Acta Criminologica's editor to organise that its full archive becomes retroactively registered with Crossref. The estimated cost of $0.15 per article’s uploaded meta-data should hopefully not prove a showstopper. Supplying the correct metadata for all articles will benefit this journal's visibility, and hopefully support not just its altmetrics results being listed, but also Acta Criminologica being listed on journal portals used to rank and compare academic journals (and country-level scientific output). Notably, the free Scimagojr and Scilit portals.

Conclusion

After overcoming the challenges of review, revisions, and achieving a digital publication, academic authors may face a new challenge- following up that their publications are well-indexed. As this post illustrates, this must not be assumed. Rather authors must check that their article's DOI identifier does indeed link to their article's publication page. And that their paper's social media impact and amplification is being correctly reflected via that page's Altmetrics badge.

If there is a problem, it is most likely to be taking place in the earliest phase of the Research Data Lifecycle (RDLC)- this broad concept is used to describe the "cradle-to-grave" journey of research data:

In terms of sharing research outputs, it includes curation of metadata that is standardised, ensuring outputs are both disseminated, and findable via academic search engine optimisation (ASEO). And that the article's reach, amplification and media interest can be measured via Altmetric statistics.

In the case of our article, the DOI indexing flaw lay in phase 1 of output sharing. The journal does not supply metadata for its articles to the academic metadata aggregator, Crossref. Instead, the journal's publisher setup a temporary DOI as a workaround. While this may work as a stopgap measure, it poses a major obstacle for scholars keen to share the work with centralised registries in phase 2, since each co-author must manually create an ORCID record. In phase 3, academic aggregators (such as Google Scholar) may direct users to a 'page not found' response on doi.org or from the journal's website. In phase 4, researchers may face a similar problem on academic social networks (such as ResearchGate) which require an accurate DOI link. For phase 5, the ability of altmetrics services to track an article's amplification, reach and media interest is scuppered. By contrast, the article's citations are still tracked.

However, until this happens, authors keen to share their Acta Criminologica publications via their scholarly profiles and social networks must do a lot of extra work. My colleagues and I followed work-arounds to address the placeholder DOI index information in phases 2 to 4. These included listing their article's and/or handle.net address in manual entries on ORCID's centralised registry, academic aggregators (e.g. Google Scholar or Bielefeld Academic Search Engine). Plus, shifting to using the handle.net address in academic social network posts. These work-arounds required extra labour from the four authors, three of whom are independent and not formally affiliated to any university. As the journal publisher already covers the journal's Crossref fees, such extra work can readily be avoided. Hopefully, the journal will put aside the resources necessary for generating the required XML metadata, and for depositing its full archive, plus new publications via Crossref's record manager.

Related suggestions

Journal publishers and editorial teams can help their authors upfront by being transparent about what the opportunities and limitations of their journal's current indexing are in relation to sharing publications online. Plus, publishers should provide advice to authors for how these strengths and weaknesses support, or limit, the online visibility and potential amplification opportunities for their new works. For example, in Acta Criminologica : African Journal of Criminology & Victimology's case, it has several strengths, such as indexing works in the reputable databases of SABINET and African Journals OnLine (AJOL). However, its metadata is not currently submitted to Crossref, nor does the journal appear in Scopus title lists. As described regarding Crossref, this requires authors to make several work-arounds to ensure their articles become visible via centralised registries and academic aggregators. Authors must also accept that they cannot source altmetrics for their work, and cannot use services solely reliant on DOI link entries.

Publishers and editorial teams who provide transparency about their journals' academic indexing issues, could also make public their plans to resolve them. This would be performing a helpful service, not just for their authors, but also for potential case-study research in an area for which there seems to be a dearth of detailed local descriptions to learn from. With less than half of African journals being indexed in Crossref, there must be systemic problems preventing their indexing. Learning in detail from African journal publishers and editors on why this is the case, plus how it might be addressed on the ground, would seem a worthwhile gap for scholars to research, and close.

N.B. Kindly add a comment below if you have any related suggestions or other feedback...

Brandjacked for social media advert fraud: Microcelebrities' experiences of digital crime in South Africa

2025-12-18T11:14:00.015+02:00

Written for readers interested in the virtual epidemic of digital crime and online scams.

The Noakes Foundation established the Fake Celebrity Endorsement (FCE) research project in 2023 to address research gaps regarding the brandjacking of South African public figures in fake social media adverts. I’m delighted to share that the FCE's first peer-reviewed article is now available in a special Cybercrime issue from Acta Criminologica: African Journal of Criminology and Victimology. {Please note that the journal's ‘Open Access’ policy initially provides restricted access via the SABINET archives. These are available via university libraries’ annual SABINET subscription for SA_ePublications (Sabinet African Electronic Publications). There is a 12-month open access embargo from the date of publication/loading on CRIMSA’s website, so expect external access to be available from January, 2027}.

Japhet, Travis, Karen and Taryn in The Cellars-Hohenhort's garden.

The article was written by myself, Dr Taryn van Niekerk, Dr Karen Heath and Mr Japhet Mutomb Kayomb to begin covering the cybervictimization experiences of a hard-to-reach sample of South African public figures. This post provides some context to the (i) neglected digital crime problem that our scholarly contribution spotlights before summarising (ii) the article's literature review, (iii) the research and its key findings, (iv) their broader implications, plus (v) suggested areas for future research:

i. Digital crime cybervictimisation as a neglected research problem in the Global South

A massive footprint of digital crime looms right across South Africa. Pumped through a hypnotic body of popular social media platforms that include; Alphabet's YouTube, Bytedance's Tik Tok, Meta's Facebook, Instagram & WhatsApp, Microsoft's LinkedIn and xAI's X. Forced labour cybercrime compounds pump billions of scam adverts through these platforms daily into the path of locals' scrolling fingers. Once clicked on, algorithms push even more scam slop to users. Once tricked, victims are completely unsupported. They have no recourse against cybercriminals cloaked behind expensive privacy services. Nor will an apology be forthcoming from unscrupulous and unrepentant advertising hosts. Notably, Meta earned 16 billions of dollars of ill-gotten gains in a year from sharing criminal clientele's adverts (Horwitz, 2025).

In South Africa (SA), it can be unclear to victims which authorities to report these crimes to. Financial victims will not be reimbursed by their bank, and cannot expect support from law enforcement or other local authorities (Noakes, 2025). This complete lack of societal support for victims of 'digital crime' distinguishes this online crime from 'cybercrimes'. These target corporations, whose employees are often better positioned to respond with the support of corporate technical teams and cybersecurity countermeasures (Olson, 2024). For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, SA businesses were targeted with spear phishing emails impersonating colleagues, line managers, and senior executives (Minnaar, 2020: 45). Executives in blue-chip companies using cyber defence services, such as ZeroFox, benefit from proactive monitoring and countermeasures versus executive impersonation. In stark contrast, even the most influential public figures outside corporate cannot access such costly support for fighting digital crimes.

Their scale approximates an epidemic, with Africa being among the fastest growing regions in terms of cybercrime activities (Kshetri, 2019). Its rapid growth of digital crime follows patterns in the Global North, where cybercrime now represents up to half of all crime (Aebi, Caneppele & Molnar, 2020). Growing at 15 percent a year, the economy of cybercrime would be the third largest in the world if it were considered a nation. Only the economies of the United States and China are larger (Bo, Franceschini & Li, 2025). A recent taxonomy of scams (Zhou et al., 2024) identifies that many different types contribute to a rapidly evolving fraudulent economy:

   1 Financial fraud (e.g. phishing “employment” scams)
   2 Identity theft (impersonation and brandjacking of small businesses)
3 Internet health scams (weightloss ads brandjacking doctors)
4 Advert fraud (marketing fake “pop concert” tickets)
5 E-commerce and product scams (non-existent “flash sales”)
6 Online harassment (cyberstalking, cyberbullying and doxxing)
7 Social engineering (business phone fraud and cold calling scams)
8 Crowdfunding and charity scams (a fake crowdfunding site purportedly linked to a political party’s “fundraiser for student bursaries and groceries”)
9 Lottery and prize scams (unsolicited messages claiming recipients have won prizes, and that they should pay a fee or provide their bank details)
10 Employment scams (impersonate hiring companies to request fees for job placements)
11 Romance and relationship fraud (cyberdating that leads to “employment” offers)
   12 Spam (unsolicited SMS and email communications featuring marketing offers or scams)
13 Miscellaneous (QR phishing code scams that elude email security software)

In stark contrast to the high prevalence of digital crime, little research addresses people’s cybervictimisation experiences in responding to online scams. In response, we wrote a paper that starts covering South African public figures whose reputations were brandjacked for fake endorsements. This ever-evolving digital crime can involve six scam types: 1. financial fraud, 2. identity theft, 3. internet health scams, 4. advert fraud, 5. e-commerce and product scams, plus 7. social engineering.We also address how digital crime content spans a myriad of digital services: from (A) ads on popular social networks to "research reports" on academic networks; across (B) search engine results, blogs and online forums; from (C) clickbait news to fake business index listings, plus shopfronts; and (D) onto local fulfilment via global retailers or local sellers.

The inspiration for our paper started in 2019, from when the reputations of Prof Tim Noakes and Dr Michael Mol were repeatedly brandjacked for fake endorsements, primarily in Facebook ads for non-existent products (e.g. ketogummies). Dr Karen Heath, myself and other reps worked to raise public awareness of these scams, and to stop them on social networks. We didn’t have much success with the latter, especially on Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, where most victims reported being scammed. With Prof Noakes and Dr Mol's revictimization being an intractable problem in 2022, I identified a gap in scholarship on this particular digital crime. The Noakes Foundation's Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices project launched the FCE as a new Digital Visibility Risks theme. It catalysed novel interdisciplinary work between health communication, psychological and digital forensic experts for understanding cybercriminals’ fake endorsement adverts on social media platforms, and celebrities experiences in responding. In 2023, Dr Adrie Stander (Advanced Digital Forensics) did an Open Source Intelligence investigation that established the vast extent of the scam. This investigation also revealed that the scammers used professional tools, such as CloudFlare. This made even locating their continental origin impossible.

ii. Literature review

The team’s ongoing literature review suggested an opportunity to respond to an urgent call for 'exploratory cybervictimisation research that can help address ever-expanding patterns of online victimisation’ (Halder, 2021, 4-6). Just as FCE micro-frauds typically evade detection by authorities, they also seem by-in-large to have escaped scholarship. There seemed to be no scholarly accounts of SA celebrity influencers’ lived experiences of cyber-victimisation, brandjacking, and impersonation. This contrasted to many press reports- we tracked how over 50 SA celebrities had been brandjacked by 2024. Brandjacking is the allegedly illegal use of trademarked brand names on social network sites (Ramsey, 2010, p. 851).

The psychologist and victimisation expert, Dr Taryn van Niekerk, led our interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of celebrities' and their reps' accounts. Taryn also led a literature review on cybervictimisation across the North-South divide. It unpacks the development of Northern scholarship on cybervictimology, plus the growing literature on this topic from the global South. Importantly, it highlights the gap in knowledge around the subjective experiences of digital victims, and more specifically, microcelebrities. Our paper proposes that the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of victim identity within global Southern cybercriminological scholarship can be reimagined. We further suggest what is required to develop a body of scholarship that yields insights into cybervictims' needs, and routes to recourse.

iii. Research and key findings

During the preliminary research process, we tested our approach by interviewing representatives from The Noakes Foundation. In late 2024, Price Green Creative Studio approached over 50 SA celebrities’ agents to request they participate in cybervictimisation research. Almost all in this hard-to-reach sample declined, despite generous incentives. Such research resistance is an interesting topic in itself, as Professor Michel Anteby describes in The Interloper (2024). The agents’ common feedback was that their celebrities were concerned about the potential for revictimisation. They seemed unfamiliar with how research ethics would protect them. For example, as part of securing ethical approval, the FCE organised cybervictimisation experts to provide psychological support should interviews have proved traumatising.

We completed fieldwork in early 2025, with: Dr Michael Mol and a rep; Shashi Naidoo; Prof Tim Noakes; and his representatives having done separate, semi-structured interviews. Their feedback supported an exploration of how individuals’ positions as public figures shaped their lived experiences as victims of complex webs of digital crime. The findings showed how fake endorsements and brandjacking were experienced as relentless and as interwoven with other forms of online fraud, highlighting the deep intricacies of their mechanisms. These digital crimes varied in their severity, ranging from impersonation to sextortion for child pornography, leaving trauma and emotional chaos in their wake. They were furthermore aggravated by their unknowable and unpredictable nature, leaving many unanswered questions. Each celebrity victim was left without closure i.e., who the cybercriminals were, where the crime originated, where they might next be brandjacked online, and if it would ever end! Finally, as novices in cybercrime fighting, both the celebrities and their representatives attempted varied techniques to stop the work of ‘savvy cybercriminals’; however, many described this battle as grim and having minimal impact.

iv. Broader implications from our research

These findings have important practical implications for SA’s regulatory environment, digital crime reporting and law enforcement authorities, plus victim support:

New laws are urgently needed to regulate social media platforms that profit significantly from scam advertisements. For example, Meta’s internal documents describe how it fears regulation as the only credible threat to its scam advertisement business (Horwitz, 2025). Regulation could mandate reporting on advertising fraud, impose penalties for slow takedowns of scams, and provide local micro-agencies (e.g., Meta Trusted Partners based in South Africa) with the opportunity to take down scammers’ accounts and content. Artificial intelligence watermarking could also be mandated for identifying AI-generated content to aid in tracing its provenance.

The epidemic of digital crime may largely go unreported and remain invisible to local law enforcement authorities. This gap must be addressed by the state increasing support for formal channels to report digital crime. Regular, publicly accessible reports on digital crime and cybervictimisation could be mandated to raise awareness while also supporting platform accountability.

It seems likely that there will be a long wait before regulatory and enforcement measures are in place to protect victims of cybercrime. In the interim, an anti-digital crime network could be established to advocate for and provide support to victims and future targets of online scammers’ digital crimes. This network could raise funds for the neglected area of digital crime scholarship in the Global South, tackling important gaps, such as who is vulnerable and what types of preventative education are most impactful.

Addressing this paper’s meaningful questions about ‘risk’ and victimhood in the online domain can offer opportunities for more extensive dialogue about cybervictimisation experienced by the broader public. As a digital crime, fake celebrity endorsements target private individuals and the general public with limited access to resources for combating fraud. Many of the financial victims are elderly, with little disposable income.

We trust that our research may additionally inform legal and social media policies that can better support South African victims of this crime. Such a contribution seems highly salient for the challenging environment that SA law enforcement faces in resolving online crimes.

v. Suggested areas for future research

Our study offers an exploratory focus on a novel area of research and recommends that future studies develop this focus on microfrauds and their cybervictimisation of civilians. Research on cyber victims must gain traction to motivate digital platforms and law enforcement to better assist individual victims. This study illuminated just three SA public figures’ cybervictimisation experiences, but other local celebrities’ experiences may differ according to their contrasting roles and types of exposure. There is also an opportunity to explore public figures' experiences in the Global North. Scholars can also address how realities ‘on the ground’ prevent brandjacking cases from being stopped, and what some solutions might be.

There are many future research directions that could enhance the understanding of digital crimes and cybervictimisation in the Global South. In particular, researchers could expand our understanding of the online experiences of victimisation beyond public figures to include everyday citizens. Scholars can urgently contribute to our understanding of who may be vulnerable, how they are targeted online, and the damage they experience. Academics can also contribute to a growing understanding of how individuals can be better empowered to guard against the myriad of digital crimes from which labour compounds and Big Tech profit. For example, little is known about how multi-cultural anti-crime communications might be improved for more effective outreach. The development of knowledge by SA scholars on cybervictimisation, digital crime reporting, and regulatory remedies, along with anti-crime education, seems vital for assisting citizens in combating the overlooked frontline of digital crime.

To further mobilise this body of work to ensure SA’s protection of digital consumers, this study offers several recommendations for future research and the development of policy. In stark contrast to the well-resourced cybercrime fighting efforts in the corporate sector, digital crimes that target ordinary individuals are often neglected. Therefore, there are significant incentives for expanding this body of work on digital crime, particularly from a Global South perspective, where cybercriminological scholarship is growing and requires further insights into victims’ experiences and support. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study’s utilisation of IPA as a qualitative tool to gain insights offered meaningful observations into the relational experience of victimhood shared by the participants. It demonstrated how cybervictimisation is experienced as persons-in-context and contributes to the extensive literature on IPA by providing novel insights into digital forms of victimisation.

Help support our future research

The size of the digital crime problem is vast, but little scholarship of it exists. This is directly related to how the global leaders behind research funding far prefer prioritising making grants to tackle the "harms" (unproven) of (mis-, dis- and malinformation). This MDM- with no A focus, seems to be an addictive topic for censorious 'hall monitors' in the Communication and Media Studies fields.

Not so for The Noakes Foundation which has worked with Price Green Creative Studio to prepare a funding proposal 'Protecting South Africans from “petty” digital crimes: a case for urgent funding'. It proposes to tackle key areas in (v) future digital research, and research funders are welcome to contact me for a copy on noakest@cput.ac.za. I also welcome advice on any related external funding opportunities linked to digital crime in SA.

Gratitude

Our article developed from a collaboration between two public benefit organisations. I greatly appreciate The Noakes Foundation’s and Dr Mol's support, plus the research participants’ contributions. The qualitative research contribution of psychologist Dr Taryn van Niekerk was integral to our manuscript. In particular for leading the literature review and applying a critical interpretative phenomenological approach’s analysis from Big Q Qualitative Specialists (Pty) Ltd. Thanks too, Dr Adrie Stander and Dr Alize Pistidda-Scheenstra for digital forensic advice. And Mrs Megan Lofthouse for assisting with the project’s fieldwork, plus Dohne Green from Price Green Creative Studio for driving outreach to celebrities' agents. The authors also greatly appreciate the legal advice of John Spengler and Adam Pike of Pike Law regarding local laws and regulations that cover fake celebrity endorsements and social media advertising frauds. Thanks too to Dr Ashwill Phillips and Professor Francois Steyn for their journal’s positive response to our abstract's submission. Plus for their assistance in the review process and organising helpful reviews that helped particularly with addressing our article’s context and contributions to the field. We also appreciate The Criminological Society of Africa (CRIMSA)'s for its role in supporting and publishing Acta Criminologica.

In the press

Lyse Comins from the Mail and Guardian has covered our concerns in Meta criticised for slow action as deepfake adverts target South African celebrities (2024).

Comments welcome

I am particularly interested in comments related to scholarly collaborations, digital crime research funding leads, or offers related to anti-digital crime networking support.

Understanding the resistance health experts face in dissenting from medical science orthodoxy and challenging its dogmas during COVID-19 #WNS2025

2025-10-20T09:37:00.015+02:00

Written for those keen to understand the resistance that health experts face in challenging dogma, plus why new knowledge might not change public health policy, or the Medical Sciences field.

On Saturday the 18th, I gave a talk that addressed the World Nutrition Summit (2025)'s theme- 'Rewriting the Rules: Nutrition, Science and Chronic Disease'. My speech focused on two cases of evidence-based contributions from health experts being confronted by heavy resistance for challenging COVID-19 policy. This talk’s three sections addresses the many ways in which even the agency of eminent experts is not as free to shape public health policy as they might hope, or even reasonably expect. This talk's insights emerge from a new research project with Dr Piers Robinson aiming to develop a framework for the challenges that eminent experts negotiate whilst criticising dogmas. Below is the talks slides on Slideshare, and the transcript that I read:

Section 1 - Two cases of resistance

SLIDE 1

Given the great lies that Nick Hudson identifies*, it's important to understand how the evidence-based contributions from health experts can confront heavy resistance for challenging supposedly scientific guidelines.

* Nick spoke earlier about 'Hudson's Razor'- how false scientific propaganda can readily be identified in it featuring; (i) a global crisis, (ii) a need for a global solution to this threat, and (iii) being accompanied by strong censorship. His talk addressed the large scale scams of (a) statins, (b) the COVID-19 phenomenon, and (c) "man-made" climate change.

#2
As regards “Rewriting the rules" this talk’s three sections speaks to the many ways in which even the agency of eminent experts is not as free to shape public health policy, as they might hope, or even reasonably expect. This presentation’s insights emerge from a new research project aiming to develop a framework for the challenges that eminent experts negotiate whilst criticising dogmas. Hopefully, such research helps us better understand all the ways in which critics' autonomy is reduced. Particularly as they become vulnerable to strategic campaigns from powerful decision makers.

Here follows two cases from very different contexts: The first is for a frontline doctor in Mitchell’s Plain who was censored against sharing his successful COVID-19 treatment protocol. The second is for a US presidential health adviser whose evidence-based challenge to lockdowns, etc. became sidelined. Both cases suggest the high levels of resistance that experts face in attempting to “rewrite the rules” with their individual contributions. Even during a “public health emergency” that should necessitate health experts challenging each others' ideas to uncover the best scientific explanations!

In his practice just 30 kilometers away, Dr Rapiti was one of a few brave doctors who continued to see patients at the start of COVID. This was despite him being 72 years old then, placing him at higher risk. Early into COVID, both international and local authorities advised clinicians that there was no treatment for the “novel coronavirus”. In stark contrast, Dr Rapiti developed a successful, low-cost protocol for treating almost 4,000 patients. He’s drafting a 100+page book that shares Table 10 on the right. It illustrates this protocol's success across each COVID wave.

His practice believed that health authorities’ guidance disagreed with the foundational principle of medicine- to treat early and prevent deterioration. Its patients were treated with an aggressive, high-dose protocol of: Ivermectin, corticosteroids, anti-inflammatories, anticoagulants, and targeted nutritional supplementation. This protocol’s cost ranged from R 400 to 700 per patient (so under $30). Interestingly, his practice avoided COVID-19 testing as being a needless expense that often-produced false positives. He argued that to do testing was not cost-effective medicine, when many of his patients could barely afford food. Plus, the obvious diagnosis was pneumonia* requiring urgent treatment.

* Dr Rapiti adds (email correspondence, 21.10.2025), 'A major contributing factor for my huge success during the Delta phase was that I discovered a set of simple clinical tools which helped me to predict COVID pneumonia and to treat it before it was detectable on X-ray or on MRI scans. With approach I was able to nip the disease in the bud, ensure rapid recovery and prevent major complications. I was never recognised for this finding which could have been widely used by under-resourced countries in Africa, Asia and South America.'

Instead of learning from Dr Rapiti’s direct patient experience and early therapeutic successes, academic institutions and policy makers ignored it. Similarly, the video content that he shared on his successful protocol was censored by YouTube and Facebook. Plus, his interviews on BiZNews, and talks to the Good Hope Christian Church.

On Instagram and Medium, he was deplatformed entirely for "contravening community standards". He also experienced interference against speaking out for Ivermectin on Heart 104FM. Several doctors wrote to Radio 786, warning against featuring Dr Rapitis’ outspoken views on COVID-19 vaccines and the pandemic. His scheduled talk there was cancelled and he was never invited to speak on 786 again. Instead of radio audiences having access to open views in SA's "free society", the airwaves were dominated by official COVID narratives.

Dr Rapiti’s outreach on the US’ National Public Radio became an opportunity for a journalist to smear his practice’s use of Ivermectin… drawing on Professor Salim Abdool Karim’s critique of this “untested” drug... by then proven to work on over 700 of Robert's patients! Dr Rapiti was smeared in Google’s search results, and by fact checkers. In response to content takedowns by major social networks, his practice’s weekly Sunday communications shifted to Rumble, Substack, Telegram and Twitter (now X). These platforms did not remove content, such as his 300 videos showcasing successes.

Dr Rapiti continued with community outreach on Loving Life internet TV, Dr Tess Lawrie’s show, the Good Hope Christian Centre, and the station LN42. Many people then began contacting him regarding treatments for their post- mRNA vaccination injuries. Many were also affected by mental illness, which his practice was unusual in addressing via psychotherapy.

#10

His practice continues to develop its holistic psychological approach- promoting the low-carb lifestyle, and prescribing a 14 hour digestive break. Learn more about this innovative work on Dr Rapiti's website, Substack, or by reading his book on addiction treatments.

#11

During COVID, Robert gathered many testimonials, which included this pertinent example. His intervention supported a daughter in releasing her 71-year-old father from hospital where he was receiving a poor quality of care.

#12

Benefiting from home-care and following Dr Rapiti’s protocol, the patient recovered within six weeks. He moved off oxygen and could shower, eat and move freely. Such success as evidenced in this testimonial would seem valuable information?

#13

A public health response typically requires non-conventional thinkers to develop low-cost solutions for rapid treatment innovation. In Dr Rapiti’s chats with me, he raised an interesting point about “missing information” in COVID-19 being itself a source of misinformation. He flagged that it should be a point of concern that the learnings of many frontline doctors seemed ignored, despite their successes. At the same time, the voices of academic experts who did not treat patients were dominant in setting policy. He did not believe it was sound that his observational studies, and the empirical results from his practice, should face vilification and censorship.

#14

The next case is very different in foregrounding how a pro-vaccine US presidential health advisor’s argument for ending lockdown measures, and their negative impacts, became ignored for reasons of political perception. The title of Dr Atlas’ 2021 book “A Plague Upon Our House’ references Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet in which Mercutio curses the feuding Montague and Capulet families, he was no member of. Like Mercutio, Dr Atlas blamed the heavily polarised Republican versus Democrat struggle for the persistence of bad policy choices. In particular, lockdowns’ catastrophic economic harms that worst impacted America’s working class, and African Americans. Instead, Dr Atlas argued for focused protection in two 2020 articles for the Hill. The second foregrounded the five key facts, in pink here, that seemed ignored by advocates for total lockdowns.

#15

Due to his public health expertise and prominent criticism of the poor scientific basis for lockdowns, Dr Atlas was approached to be a presidential health adviser. In visiting the White House to be screened for this role, he became concerned at how simple PCR testing indicators still informed the government’s response after six months. By contrast, he believed that the five points in pink should have by then have been in use. He was also concerned that the COVID-19 Task Force did not have a public health expert on it, believing this contributed to that Force ignoring an analysis of the steep costs that lockdowns cause, particularly to society’s most vulnerable- children, the poor and the elderly.

#16

At the same time, Dr Atlas was concerned at the negative bias of America’s mainstream pro-Democrat broadcast media, who keenly flagged any poor outcomes to spotlight Trump administration was "not listening to The Science™️". The expert presence of Dr Atlas at media briefings threatened this narrative.

Likewise, providing scientific support for reopening businesses and schools challenged official COVID-19 policy. As Dr Atlas’ activities were also perceived as potentially aiding Trump’s re-election, he describes becoming a target for smears in the mainstream media, censorship on social media platforms, plus criticism from senior academic peers. Many examples are provided in his book, but my talk is short, so I’ll cover key examples: For starters YouTube pulled down a Hoover interview in which Dr Atlas spoke to why reopening schools would be safe, with children’s low-risk of COVID. Likewise, an expert panel discussion on the flawed scientific rationale behind the extended lockdowns, outdoor masking, plus masking of children, was removed under YouTube’s ‘medical misinformation policy’ in March, 2021.

#17

Twitter also temporarily banned Dr Atlas’ account after he questioned the efficacy of masks. Despite quoting sources, such as the CDC, WHO, and Oxford, and reiterating official mitigation protocols. He was reinstated after recognizing his Twitter censorship, but remains highly concerned at the implications for science in a supposedly “free society” that such censorship holds. This includes Facebook’s removal of 7 million pieces of COVID-19 dissent and an unfair Wikipedia profile claiming Atlas spread “misinformation”. In a seemingly unprecedented move, the Stanford Faculty Senate issued a resolution claiming that Dr Atlas had “fostered” falsehoods and misrepresentation of science. Prof John Cochrane wrote an interesting critique of this resolution, asking its authors to provide concrete examples of the opinions and statements they took issue with before he might sign it. They did not reply.

#18

In addition to chilling open debate, the resolution also catalysed threats to Dr Atlas that necessitated a police presence outside his home and the installation of expensive home security equipment. While Dr Atlas was successful in providing more protection for people in nursing homes, he was ultimately frustrated in changing policies around testing, lockdowns and re-opening education. A strong example of policy inertia was evidenced in attempt to redefine the CDC’s guidelines on COVID testing: To improve timely results for priority cases, Dr Atlas had motivated that new guidelines should provide clearer guidance on both focused testing for the vulnerable, and for the public. After this new testing guidance was published it received pushback from talking heads on TV, senior Democrat politicians and public health organisations.

#19

After a two-week flurry of attacks, the CDC posted guidance that reverted to the old measures- the power of public perception seeming to trump scientific revisions. Media control was also evidenced both via the White House’s failure to publicise a meeting between its Secretary of Health and Human Services, and Professors Bhattacharya, Gupta and Kulldorff. Likewise, the BBC pulled out of interviewing them unless a perspective for the lockdown narrative could be included. This after the BBC had featured only pro-lockdowners for months! Alongside CNN, Forbes, Politico, New York Times, The Washington Post and other media, dissenters were demonized after calling for focused protection and reopening. "Herd immunity" became a weaponized term, while COVID-19 fears were exaggerated to manipulate support for lockdowns.

#20

Such fear-mongering pushed unhinged individuals to harass Dr Atlas in Washington DC, and via social media. He resigned from his public health advisor position in December. Despite presenting stong arguments, he was unable to change the COVID Task Force’s policies for mass testing, business lockdowns and educational closures. His case serves as another cautionary tale on “Rewriting the rules” as it bridges many concerns: Political polarisation infecting medical science and academia, contributing to a desire to censor alternate viewpoints. The power of the mainstream media in propagandising for a fake scientific consensus, and smearing dissenters. Finally, scientific discovery can be actively suppressed by bureaucrats, when enabled by conflicted politicians, and further abetted via censorship on Big Tech.

#21

Despite being a public health policy expert, Dr Atlas’ most valuable contributions were blocked by bureaucrats. They ensured that lockdowns, mass testing, masking, and educational facility closures were applied, whilst their negative impacts went largely undiscussed.

#22

Drs Atlas and Rapiti’s cases suggests 11 key points on resistance: Both doctors were well-positioned to challenge COVID-19 narratives due to their extensive medical knowledge. Each had to negotiate a huge asymmetry between their resourcing versus the orthodoxy’s. A sanctions stack’s pressure influenced the duration and motivation of their respective resistance- while Dr Scott Atlas left the White House in anger and disgust, Dr Rapiti has become even more motivated to challenge the status-quo. During COVID-19 he was leading his practice at all hours, so could not formally contribute to the academic literature on his successes. This suggests how during an emergency the scholarly literature will exclude important frontline knowledge as “missing information”. Many scholars may not appreciate the extent of this, thanks to The Science™️’s heavily controlled “health communication for consensus” architecture.

#23

Despite their expertise, both doctors were quickly presented as part of a medical “fringe” for raising inconvenient questions. In terms of changing policy, Dr Atlas' opportunity to contribute as a presidential adviser proved not to be as influential as he expected, given that powerful networks he seemed unfamiliar with were actually controlling COVID-19 policy. These two slides help explain why changing policy, knowledge to ‘Rewriting the Rules' is so hard, even for the most eminent dissidents. At a meta-level, there is also the challenge of a lack of explicit disclosure around what the Undone Science is. Likewise, scientific suppression’s role in supporting bias is under-researched. A lack of awareness around health communication as propaganda, scientific suppression and Undone Science, are all important blind-spots in the academic Health Sciences, and its literature.

#24

Blindness to all three pose an obstacle for academics and their students understanding what is taught as truth. A topical example is the recent promotion for the EAT-LANCET’s “planetary health diet”

(see https://cluelessdoctors.com/2019/01/19/the-eat-lancet-commission-the-worlds-biggest-lie/).

First funded by mega billionaire Gunhild Stordalen and launched in 2019, this diet was updated by the EAT-Lancet Commission 2025. 20 of the most influential critics of the original diet were targeted for pre-bunking in advance through the Meat vs EAT LANCET report. It falsely claims that the meat industry not only funded criticism of the original “planetary health diet” but also directed dissenters in their successful backlash. This report is just one of many “health communication” pieces planned by the GPPP’s plant-based, processed food stakeholders for their One Health approach.

Section 2 - Unanswered questions from the COVID-19 “public health” response (AKA a Global Biodefence Public-Private Partnership’s Chorus Effect)

#25

Such an example points to how the “public health” response context in which experts operate in

can serve as a mirage, concealing the apposite agendas of funders.

#26

Here are some questions that required answering but seem not to have been prioritized during COVID-19. Both doctors contributed to this knowledge in the brackets shown here. Framing resistance to their answers, helps us learn how authoritarian networks block knowledge contributions that might catalyze social change.

#27

Experts’ free speech and civil rights were heavily constrained during COVID-19. Like most countries, South Africa did not see the practice of active academic freedom with robust debate on campuses, or even in many journals. Nor did its national science organisations fund unorthodox research, notably as regarding personal health prevention, or into brave physicians' development of successful, low-cost protocols.

#28

Before COVID-19, such brave frontline work would be a key part of a standard public health emergency response. As per (ii) in a list of five guidelines described in Debbie Lerman’s book. While COVID saw the healthcare capacity increase, points (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) were ignored. The Deep State goes Viral's compelling explanation is that by mid-March the COVID response had been transferred in many countries from Departments of Health to Military and National Security agencies. This shift supported a “quarantine until vaccine” approach, previously applicable for countering bio-terrorism. With this change, public health planning switched to non-stop ‘lockdown until vaccination’ communications.

#29

Such an unprecedented shift reflected the triumph of a ‘dual-use’ endeavour: The National Biodefence complex’s collaboration with the Global Public-Private Partnership (GPPP). Its agents are shown in the table on the right. ’Dual use’ describes efforts that may serve both military and civilian objectives.

Pathogens can be bioweapons, but they can also spread naturally. Countermeasures from the Pandemic Preparedness Industry can be used against both natural outbreaks and bio-terror attacks. After 9/11, biodefence research grew dramatically, supported by government and non-profits keen to support the study of pandemic counter-measures. The civilian side of this research was mostly funded by public health agencies and mega-nonprofits interested in vaccine development to control natural disease outbreaks.

As these were potentially useful against bio-terror attacks too, it was unsurprising that these fields merged into a dual-use entity called ‘biodefense’ or “health security”. This symbiotic military/civilian enterprise could attract more funding and exert greater influence than biodefence or pandemic preparedness alone.

#30

The growth of such collaboration in the USA, also coincided with a shift of power away from nation states, as capital and political power migrated into the GPPP. This is the context of a “health security” leviathan for mRNA vaccination emerging during COVID-19, as an indispensable system “too big to fail”. Its alignment to long term GPPP Great Reset ambitions, provides an interesting context to ground

resistance in each case: Dr Rapiti proved that a viable, low-cost treatment existed, which would pose a threat to Emergency Use Authorisation of the experimental “vaccines”. Likewise, Dr Atlas’ questioning of lockdowns, mass testing, and masking challenged the environment of fear necessary for maintaining social control past the roll-out of mass vaccination. Do read the books below for more on this nefarious reality.

#31

The Global biodefence PPP builds on the large influence of Big Pharma, which already exerts a huge amount of financial control via the ‘Chorus effect’. Journalist John MacGregor’s book spotlights this effect. There is huge commercial buy-in across all key social agents, which poses a challenge for them

appreciating any value in “heretical” vaccine critiques, such as in the books on the right.

#32

Research into the resistance dissidents face can help us better appreciate the complicated context of why experts confront suppression of evidence-based contributions. Resistance research can also help scholars appreciate how scientific suppression impacts what is neglected, or entirely absent in the scholarly literature.

Section 3 - Flagging the impacts of powerful resistance to experts

#33

This section addresses how the field of resistance studies help us understand suppression versus those attempting to ‘rewrite the rules’. Resistance studies supports understanding marginalized social agents who aim at developing intellectual autonomy and oppositional ways of thinking for combating epistemic injustice from networks of power exercising domination. Unusually, we focus on cases where resistance is readily identifiable, since COVID-19 dissenters inevitably must strive to gain visibility for their contributions.

#34

In preliminary research, we are collating cases for varied types of experts' COVID-19 contributions, where individuals describe facing strong resistance.

#35

These myriad of examples presents an opportunity to address a neglected topic; how institutional and other structural constraints work against dissident experts. Answering the first question entails exploring the concern of systematic bias against dissent in the top medical journals. While the second addresses how experts felt constrained in making their critical contributions. The third covers the myriad of constraints that led to a bias for the official COVID-19 narrative in medical academia.

#36

Due to its broad interdisciplinary nature, resistance studies is well-suited for describing the Undone Science of COVID, plus the varied tactics that authorities can use to suppress legitimate academic contributions from a diverse group of experts.

#37

For example, the typology of ‘Internal Challenges in Medicine’ spotlights a continuum from resistance into rebellion, and onto heresy. Heresy is a suitable concept for our cases since medical orthodoxy has the power to define which COVID contributions were “unacceptable”, meriting greater resistance and marginalisation.

#38

Delborne’s conceptual framework is useful for describing the contrarian science of COVID dissidents and the types of impedance and outright suppression their contributions faced in failing to be reviewed, or to receive strong counter-arguments against their ideas. Plus, resistance to their research program, and even dissidents’ entire scientific field.

#39

The “Classification for Suppression Methods in Science” will also be referenced, since it is likely that the experts we interview will describe self-censorship, experiencing external complaints, blocking of their outputs, with attempts to stigmatise and discredit their work. And direct attacks on career prospects.

#40

The first characteristic, in pink here, that Prof Martin flagged in ‘Censorship in Science: Deeper Processes ' (2024) flags how scholarship would seem dangerously one-sided if it does not fairly address treatment paradigms outside of costly mRNA vaccination. The 13 unanswered questions spotlighted in the previous section speak to ‘Undone Science’. Last, the issue of incorporated science is flagged- GPPP investors are not disinterested parties, as the COVID-19 response transferred trillions of dollars of wealth from us, as private citizens, to the GPPP’s supporters.

#41

The previous frameworks are just a small sample of what’s been written on institutional resistance against dissenting individuals. We will be writing a review article to define what’s been done. This will ground our research plans and help us develop a comprehensive framework for undergirding our hard cases and research articles. The two cases shared with you today spotlight that the suppression of experts’ contributions is not a minor matter. Hopefully, our project will raise greater awareness for this, whilst contributing to policies that can better support the rights of individuals to express credible dissent, and to over-write bad rules, and the lying rulers who enforce them.

#42

Thank you for listening to our work.

#43

And thanks to the team that supports TNF’s Academic Free Speech focus, and to CPUT and the Organisation for Propaganda Studies.

#44

Thanks too to the Nutrition Network for this opportunity.

#45

Please contact me on with any questions, comments or concerns about this presentation…

The Meat vs EAT-LANCET report as a targeted smear - the example of misinformation on Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes

2025-10-06T00:41:00.039+02:00

Written to highlight bias in a report with a covert agenda, plus to defend Prof Noakes’ online reputation from yet another Big Food-funded smear.

Published in September 2025, The Changing Markets Foundation’s Meat vs EAT LANCET publication positions itself as a credible, investigative report. By contrast, I argue that it should rather be understood as a covert 'smear' communication event. In simple terms, a smear is 'an effort to manipulate opinion by promulgating an overblown, scandalous and damaging narrative' (Attkisson, 2017). The goal is often 'to destroy ideas by ruining the people who are most effective at communicating them' (p.3). The ‘Meat vs EAT-LANCET’ report fulfils a smear's criteria; its investigation uses inconclusive evidence to defame critics of the original “planetary health” diet (Willett et al, 2019) as shills for the meat industry.

As a communication event, ‘Meat vs EAT-LANCET’ is located within a long-running scientific argument and diet controversy. This concerns; what constitutes a healthy diet for individuals, the best food systems to support this, who gets to decide, and what research merits funding. In the Health Sciences and related fields, this rivalry pits two sides against each other. The dominant orthodoxy promotes high carbohydrate diets that suit the interests of the plant-based and processed food industry. In contrast, dissenting experts advocate for low carb lifestyles, plus real foods from the farming of livestock and regenerative agriculture (Teicholz, 2014). It is not co-incidental that the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report's release occurred shortly before the next communication from the orthodoxy- the EAT-Lancet Commission report (2025). The former's release was planned to pre-empt criticism of 2025's report by smearing the most influential critics of its 2019 pre-cursor. Such blowback seems motivated by the low-carb critics' initial successes- for example, a flagship launch event was planned at the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Geneva, Switzerland, but the WHO pulled out. Its withdrawal ‘followed a massive online backlash, which had concentrated on one of the report’s recommendations: to cut global red meat consumption by 50 percent’ (Carlile, 2025).

As described in Lars Magne Sunnanå’s Substack post (‘A diet to save the planet - brought to you by a Wall Street bet on margarine’), the supporters of Environment, Agriculture, and Transformation (EAT)'s Commission learnt from this failure. The EAT-Lancet Commission 2025 report's release will be better co-ordinated- with 70 scientists, new safeguards against "misinformation", plus many more partners and allies ready to defend the research. Other plans include involving scientific institutions like Harvard and Cornel to produce and publish a range of translation articles, alongside a campaign with a “celebrity influencer group”. Funders that include the Rockefeller Foundation and Gates Foundation, plus sponsors such as the Flora Food Group are providing additional support. Widespread coverage can be expected in scientific publications and key media to promote the revised diet. It merits consideration why the steep fees of a large PR campaign were supported by the report's funders to make this the report 'du jour', versus funding other forms of outreach (such as open debates on its merits?).

Published on the 3rd of October, The EAT-Lancet Commission 2025 report is part of a broader campaign for EAT and its collaborators to establish themselves as an “independent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for food systems. Should they succeed, their IPCC will likely be able to increase its sponsorship and attract more funders. At the same time, the proposed IPCC for Food is part of an agenda to "streamline" decisions on food systems. Driven by an few highly influential actors, this initiative has the risk of imposing a narrow view of science by excluding many voices on food systems (IPES, 2021).

From a PR perspective, the Meat vs EAT-LANCET communication event is part of a pre-emptive campaign. Its funders hope that by framing the most influential critics of the “planetary health” diet (PHD 🙄) as surrogates for the meat industry, the content of their arguments can be ignored. The report frames critics of the 2019 report as: (i) being funded by an “evil” meat industry; (ii) taking funds from its PR agencies; and (iii) being co-ordinated by them in an attempt to discredit “the science”. This frame suggests that influential individuals' criticism of the “planetary health” diet is commercially-driven, anti-science heresy. Such framing illustrates Wolpe's (1994) insight that "heresy" is socially constructed by orthodoxy. Its defenders have the power to define which views are unacceptable and will face marginalisation. Here the orthodoxy presents critics of the EAT-LANCET commission to be an amoral group of duplicitous outsiders. They are “attacking” a virtuous group of meat-industry-fighting truth seekers, whose noble role is to “defend the science”. In stark contrast, critics of the PHD are presented as basely-motivated. They are defamed as reliant on the meat industry’s financing and planning for launching a significant online “backlash”. This publication's argument is very close to calling for action to get rid of influential experts who have dared to contest the EAT-Lancet's scientific guidance (Stanton, 2025).

A biased “research” report with a covert agenda

As a communication event, the report is a patently transparent smear tool which seeks to create a digital pillory for the critics of the original EAT-Lancet 1999 reports’ many flaws (Hirvonen et al., 2020, Zagmutt et al. 2019, 2020). The Meat vs EAT-LANCET report is biased, its authorship is opaque, and its funding sources are hidden:

The obfuscation of funding sources is typical for the network funding man-made climate change research (Nordangård, 2024A), plus other projects that support of Agenda 2030 (Nordangård, 2024B). The Meat vs EAT-LANCET report does not disclose who its funders are, nor does it make an ethical acknowledgment for how that funding shapes its choice of subject and potential biases. The report is a co-production of two non-profits embedded within the Davocracy (Camus, 2022). Renaud Camus' neologism blends "Davos" (referring to the World Economic Forum and its global elites) with "-cracy," describing a managerial, cybernetic regime. Its financial powers—such as banks, multinational corporations and Big Tech - strive to exert sovereign control over human populations. This is facilitated via Global Public-Private Partnerships (GPPP) that stoke exaggerated fears, such as climate change catastrophism (West, 2023), that the GPPP's Social Development Goals (SDG) grant it the mandate to address. Dovetailing with this ideology, The Changing Markets Foundation strives to ‘shift market share away from unsustainable products and companies, and onto environmentally and socially beneficial solutions’.

Changing Market’s analysis in the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report was built off original research done by Ripple Research an “AI-for-Good advisory firm”, owned by the NPO Śrāvaṇa in Switzerland. Ripple is committed to ‘designing solutions for the most pressing global challenges and to effectuate enduring large-scale social impact through our unique Human+AI approach.’ Both non-profits are are bedfellows in having GPPP stakeholder clients who benefit directly from scientific dissent to their industries being miscast as “misinformation”. As part of an "Infodemic", all dissent versus climate change, mRNA vaccines and the WHO’s COVID-19 policies can be simplistically grouped. All such content becomes labelled as "misinformation" from amoral “misinfluencers", even when produced by eminent experts with decades of scholarship in their field! Such simplistic analysis for an "Infodemic" ignores the fact that disinformation, misinformation and malinformation (MDM) from authorities may well have far worse impacts than voices raising dissent, as was evident during COVID-19 (Noakes, Bell, & Noakes, 2022).

It the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report was ethical, it would disclose that its creation is riddled with conflicts of interest. Even with such disclosure, this negative PR exercise would not warrant being placed in the ‘research report’ genre. As an academic report, it would be desk-rejected as unworthy of peer review; it is not a fair-minded exploration of evidence, but merely serves to support a witch-hunt based on tendentious allegations stretched to seem credible. This is another hallmark of the smear, it salaciously works to confirm what a lot of people (e.g. vegetarians, vegans and processed food addicts) want to believe. A smear works by confirming its audiences' pre-existing suspicions (Attkisson, 2017, p.4). As Goebbels observed in his diary, propaganda works best when those who are being manipulated are confident that they acting in their own free will. In this case, sympathetic readers are primed to ignore that it was not poor science that motivated the independent experts' critique. Instead they are asked to believe the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report's claim that the "potential of the report to lead to regulation and societal change" posed a serious threat to the interests of Big Meat and Dairy. In response it co-ordinated a 'significant online backlash – against the report’s findings and the Commission itself' (p.5).

Misinformation in the report regarding @ProfTimNoakes

Despite being four years in the making, the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report is riddled with errors and falsehoods. This post's focus is on the errors in my father's example, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes, following the example of Dr Georgia Ede's line-by-line rebuttal on X.

Mentioned by name 18 times in the report, he is often referred to as “mis-influencer Tim Noakes”, instead of by his hard-earned academic titles (Dr or Emeritus Prof). The "mis-influencer" GPPP neologism describes ‘individuals or entities actively spreading or amplifying mis- or disinformation within digital spaces, to influence wider narratives and opinions'. (p.3) Presumably the report’s choice strives to hypnotise readers- hoping a lie repeated often enough becomes true. Smearing also demeans its target, following another tactic of Goebbels. Propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets for hatred. In this reports' case, all twenty mis-influencers are demeaned. At the same time, this open report's smear seems also to be an attempt at tying the term "mis-influencer" to "Tim Noakes" results via search engine results and AI answers that have crawled Meat vs EAT-LANCET's pages.

On page 14, the report shows that @ProfTimNoakes has not shared original tweets featuring the #ClimateFoodFacts or #Yes2Meat hashtags. The report asserts that the ClimateFoodFacts tag was co-ordinated via the Red Flag agency, “likely on behalf of” the Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA). By its own criteria, this page suggests that Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes was NOT involved in the AAA influence campaign via Red Flag. He never posted any original (e.g. "sponsored") #Yes2Meat tweets.

Page 16’s two-sentence smear “biography” for the 'Doctor/health influencer' Tim Noakes alleges he has a “Career built out of promotion of high meat diets. Red Flag consulting identifies his content in a report back about the success of its campaign to discredit EAT-Lancet. He is also likely one of the ‘experts’ Red Flag refers to having briefed." Firstly, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes only endorsed the low-carb lifestyle from 2010, having taught a high-carb diet for the previous thirty years of his academic career. To claim that his career was “built out” of promoting red meat is defamatory and false. Secondly, neither Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes nor The Noakes Foundation even knew that Red Flag consulting existed before the report. Nor has either ever been approached by the Animal Agriculture Alliance or any other of its representatives. Just as it is defamatory and false to term Tim Noakes a “mis-influencer”, it is also patently false to claim that he and/or his foundation have been paid to critique a seriously flawed EAT-Lancet report. That said, the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report does use plenty of hedging expressions and false innuendo, instead of factual statements. A wise choice, as the use of insinuation, not stating facts, protects the Changing Markets Foundation from being at risk for a defamation suit from this report's twenty targets.

On page 22, the report continues its smear of red meat funding collusion by asserting that Tim Noakes and other experts were identified as “relevant” to Red Flag’s campaign in its leaked document. Given the high Twitter visibility of @ProfTimNoakes and the other 19 accounts, it is not surprising that they would be mentioned in any report on influential low-carb, keto and/or carnivore lifestyle accounts. However, this should not be conflated with them being social media “influencers”- individuals desirous of using their large audience reach to peddle marketing campaigns for advertisers. Based on the Changing Markets Foundation and Ripple’s analysis of the engagement levels of these accounts, “it is likely that these are the ‘experts’ Red Flag highlights as having briefed and who ‘substantively engaged’ with criticising EAT!Lancet.” Again, the analysts hedge their false claims with “it is likely”, and do not not explain the basis for asserting such a "likelihood".

On page 29, "Tim Noakes" is described as a “Health influencer” here, rather than the doctor, scientist and academic (or Professor Emeritus) that he is. In contrast, page 36's section, Doctors, and health and wellness ‘experts’, acknowledges that “Tim Noakes” has medical training. But it claims that he, Shawn Baker and Gary Fettke have all had “issues with their medical licences because of the dietary advice they promote.” Again this is a false assertion, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes has never had any concern with “issues” regarding his medical license. Any issues were in the minds of the diet dictators that tried, and failed, to end his academic career (Noakes and Sboros, 2022). Their attacks had no legitimate basis, and therefor no credible chance for success. Further, the claim that since Prof Noakes fell under the category of doctor mis-influencer that he “played a pivotal role in the pushback against EAT!Lancet, unleashing #Yes2Meat…” is false. As the report states on page 14, @ProfTimNoakes did not share original tweets featuring the #Yes2Meat hashtag.

Instead of focusing on Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes’ significant contribution to the academic literature on nutrition in page 37, the report’s profile for him one-sidedly focuses on controversies. This is a hallmark of authors more intent on writing a smear than preparing a balanced appraisal (Attkisson, 2017). For example, the Changing Markets Foundation writes: ‘Noakes was investigated by South African health authorities in 2014, after a dietician complained about a tweet in which he had told a mother she should wean her baby onto low-carbohydrate, high-fat foods. He was cleared of misconduct in April 2017.’

Another clear indicator of bias in The Changing Markets Foundation's and Ripple Research’s report lies on page 63. None of Professor Tim Noakes’ books or seminal articles are referenced in this one-sided bibliography. Perhaps if the reports"investigators" had read Challenging Beliefs, Waterlogged, Lore of Nutrition or Real Food on Trial, they would appreciate that Prof Noakes if highly critical of industry’s influence on science. A red flag (pun alert 😉!) that he is highly unlikely to be persuaded to participate in a paid-for campaign by Red Flag, or any other funder. Rather his participation in the debate is driven by a concern for the actual science that the EAT-LANCET Commission neglects. This is due to the false-beliefs associated with a plant-based, climate catastrophe ideology (well-described by West, 2023). It is therefor unsurprising that ‘Meat vs EAT-LANCET’ report is shockingly inaccurate, written to serve as the propaganda smear agenda of the EAT-LANCET Committee. As Dr Zoe Harcombe wisely stated, the report is “the very epitome of misinformation - disinformation indeed - of which it accuses others.”

A report mirroring the Davocracy groupthinkers' biases

The globalist group, EAT-Lancet, is a well-funded by NGOs and corporations. Like most GPPP linked charities, it is unaccountable to the public. Its funders are keen for a high -carbohydrate, mostly plant-based “planetary diet" to be prescribed everywhere, and for everyone. EAT-Lancet and its co-believers work primarily through cities to force/"nudge" reductions in red meat, aiming to drastically reduce livestock for reducing climate emissions. This planetary friendly diet is apparently intended to provide a scientific basis for a ’1.5 degree-aligned’ global food system. While beautifully designed by Pietro Bruni of www.toshi.ltd, this report’s tosh (pun #2 alert 😉!) conceals the funding money grabbing aims of researchers behind it. As too, the nefarious globalist agenda of GPPP stakeholders keen to sideline meat and dairy in favour of the industrial slop that its stakeholders would prefer we eat to “save the planet” (not incidentally reducing our health, boosting the wealth of billionaire "philanthropists", and aiding depopulation).

The GPPP has been criticised as being an unelected network of governments, corporations, and international organisations, that use manipulative control mechanisms to seize global resources and achieve economic dominance. Critics including civil society groups and organisations, such as Public Services International, have highlighted concerns with the GPPP. These include its lack of transparency, accountability, and undue private influence over public policy. The GPPP skirts these issues through deploying deceptive terminology. Terms like "inclusive," "sustainable," "equity," and "resilience" mask the GPPPs true intentions, promoting a false image of environmental care, whilst advancing a covert agenda. Notably, the GPPP has created an asset rating system tied to Sustainable Development Goals and Stakeholder Capitalism Metrics, that serve to support technocratic economic and social control by redefining and commodifying the "global commons." Hubristic claims like the "planetary diet" are all part of a well-considered propaganda approach to shape and control media discourse via definitional pattern control. The authors of the ‘Meat vs EAT-LANCET’ report use of the neologism "mis-influencer" serves as an example of this in enabling them to determine who falls under this new category, rather than speak to earlier examples. In addition to such control, another aim of the report is to serve as a wrap-up smear that can be linked in results from Search Engines, Artificial Intelligence chats, plus on Wikipedia to the twenty "mis-influencers" profiles. This is a contemporary tactic through which high-profile dissidents are targeted by the playbook of 'Big Food'... who copied and built on the Tobacco industry’s original edition (Brownell et al., 2009).

Don't believe the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report's hype, the EAT-Lancet Commission's 2025 report is just a bad GPP sequel. If the planetary health diet was a product of honest science, it would not fear critics pointing out the PHD's faulty reasoning. And it would not need to smear experts with made-up claims in a fake "report" for pre-bunking an inevitable "backlash" of well-deserved critique.

If you have suggestions for improving this post, do comment below, or contact me.

Online resources

Brownell, K. D., & Warner, K. E. (2009). The Perils of Ignoring History: Big Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food? The Milbank Quarterly, 87(1), 259–294. doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2009.00555

Camus, R. (2022, August 10). [Journal entry on davocratie and global remplacisme]. renaud-camus.net/journal. Defined the term 'Davocracy' in his French journal. Vauban Books is his English publisher, vaubanbooks.com.

aleph2020.org/opinion/activist-tactics-and-the-discrediting-of-scientists-leroy-et-al-2023

Professor Frédéric Leroy and colleagues wrote an opinion piece examining a coordinated effort by a small group of animal rights activists, backed by aligned media outlets (e.g., DeSmog, Sentient Media, The Guardian, Vox), to discredit established experts and organisations in the domain of livestock agriculture.

lams.substack.com/p/a-diet-to-save-the-planet-brought Lars Magne Sunnanå’s Substack English post describes new industry backers of the EAT-Lancet 2.0 report, and their communication concerns after the backlash to the first version.

Nina Teicholz, PhD and Dr Gary Taubes' Substack addresses industrial-strength corruption of nutrition science and guidelines, focused on the US, at unsettledscience.substack.com/archive?sort=new

Noakes, T. M., Bell, D., & Noakes, T. D. (2022). Who is watching the World Health Organisation? ‘Post-truth’ moments beyond infodemic research [COVID-19; divisions in knowledge labour; intergroup contradictions; international health organisation; mRNA vaccines; pandemic.]. Transdisciplinary Research Journal of Southern Africa, 18(1), 1–13. doi.org/10.4102/td.v18i1.1263

thenoakesfoundation.org/questioning-the-science-is-not-misinformation-its-the-essence-of-progress is a short response from The Noakes Foundation to the Meat vs EAT-LANCET report.

Stanton, A. A. (2025, October 11, 2025). Understanding The EAT-Lancet 2.0. cluelessdoctors.com. Retrieved

10/14 from https://cluelessdoctors.com/2025/10/11/understanding-the-eat-lancet-2-0/

Wolpe, P. R. (1994). The dynamics of heresy in a profession. Social science & medicine, 39(9), 1133–1148. https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(94)90346-8

zoeharcombe.com/2019/01/the-eat-lancet-diet-is-nutritionally-deficient/ features a factual dissection of the nutritional deficiency of the EAT Lancet diet by Dr Zoe Harcombe. The Meat vs EAT-LANCET report makes no attempt to critique her blog, because its nutritional analysis that confirms dangerous deficiencies is correct.

Books

Attkisson, S. (2017). The smear: How shady political operatives and fake news control what you see, what you think, and how you vote (1 ed.). HarperCollins. harpercollins.com/products/the-smear-sharyl-attkisson?variant=32216080056354

Noakes, T., & Vlismas, M. (2012). Challenging beliefs : memoirs of a career (2 ed.). Zebra Press. penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/challenging-beliefs/9781770224612

Noakes, T. (2012). Waterlogged: the serious problem of overhydration in endurance sports (1 ed.). Human Kinetics. human-kinetics.co.uk/9781492577843/waterlogged/

Noakes, T., & Sboros, M. (2017). Lore of Nutrition: Challenging conventional dietary beliefs (1 ed.). Penguin Random House South Africa. penguinrandomhouse.co.za/book/lore-nutrition-challenging-conventional-dietary-beliefs/9781776092611

Noakes, T., & Sboros, M. (2019). Real food on trial: How the diet dictators tried to destroy a top scientist (1 ed.). Columbus Publishing. realfoodontrial.com

Nordangård, J. (2024). Rockefeller: Controlling the Game. (1 ed.). Skyhorse Publishing. skyhorsepublishing.com/9781510780217/rockefeller/

Nordangård, J. (2024). The Global Coup D'etat: The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Great Reset. (1 ed.). Skyhorse Publishing. skyhorsepublishing.com/9781510782037/the-global-coup-detat/

Teicholz, N. (2014). The big fat surprise: why butter, meat and cheese belong in a healthy diet (1 ed.). Simon and Schuster. simonandschuster.com/books/The-Big-Fat-Surprise/Nina-Teicholz/9781451624434

West, A. A. (2023). The Grip of Culture - The social psychology of climate change catastrophism (1 ed.). The Global Warming Policy Foundation. thegwpf.org/content/uploads/2023/07/West-Catastrophe-Culture6by9-v28.pdf

How to label DJ mixes in Apple Music and organise them into a playlist - an Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival exemplar

2025-09-04T10:54:00.018+02:00

Written for Apple Music users interested in better curating their favourite DJ mixes under one playlist.

Bedroom DJ TraVice here- poorly tagged music files are a pet peeve of mine. I like 'em well-tagged for easy selection. Hopefully this post suggests the value of doing this with the example of a proper playlists creation from Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival's downloads: This Facebook community is dedicated to the 'past, present and future of the atmospheric genre’s sound', as championed by its pioneers LTJ Bukem & DJ Fabio from the early 1990’s. Building on facebook.com/share/g/16JMzzdxzA, this group’s leadership launched a mix series to showcase its community’s DJ mixing talent in 2023. At the time of writing, 20 mixes are available to stream off Soundcloud at soundcloud.com/atmosphericdrumandbass, with 13 offered for free downloaded (see example in Figure 1).

Figure 1. Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival soundcloud download selection

In Apple Music a new playlist is simply created by pressing Apple and N at the same time. After downloading the mixes, they can be placed in a playlist by dragging them there from Songs, or simply right clicking on the mix and selecting <Add to playlist>, then choosing ’ Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival’.

Figure 2. Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival mixes playlist in Apple Music

While playlists can be ordered any number of ways for viewing via <Viewing Options>, I like to use the filenames to clearly indicate the order of release (01 - 13). They must also clearly indicate the series they are from through a consistently applied title (yes, the exact same one for readily displaying the entire series in searches!).

With all 13 mixes in the playlist (see Figure 2), it’s now time to improve the labelling of each mix. To improve on Figure 3’s example below, I must enter labels into DJ Illesta’s mix’s fields.

Figure 3. DJ Illesta Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival 1 Apple Music info's starting point

There's much that can be added- artist, album, album artist composer, year, rating, bpm and comments. The extent of which depends on your interest(s). Likewise some labelling choices will be fairly subjective. Take genre for example, I use “drum and bass”, because most of this genre in my library defaults to the softer atmospheric style. However, aficionados of the hard jungle style may choose that to be their default. They may also prefer using DnB or drum & bass, while I use “drum and bass - hardstep” for grittier tracks/mixes.

It’s also important to appreciate that Apple Music’s labelling/tagging system is not designed around labelling DJ mix-sets. This is a meta-problem, since DJs are musicians whose medium is often a blend of other musical artists’ production and sounds. Apple Music’s labelling is understandably geared to the latter’s conventional works. It would struggle to cope with the "meta-mentalness" of a DJ doing a continuous remix of another DJs productions and remixes- for example, try labelling the producer DJ Lenzman’s 2020 mix of DJ Redeyes' tracks!

With an academic hat on, this challenge suggests the multimodal difficulty of labelling DJ’s music work via Apple Music (and iTunes)'s textual labels. Its indexing system caters to original musicians/composers, versus producers, remixers and DJs. For example, there is no dedicated option for adding a DJs setlist. Instead one can appropriate <Comments> (for very short set-lists) or <Custom Lyrics> (for more typical ones, eg. over thirty minutes). Since Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival provides setlists for each mix, these are easy enough to copy-and-paste as “Custom Lyrics”- see Figure 4.

Figure 4. DJ Illesta Atmospheric Drum & Bass Apple Music track listing in lyrics

Since there is no <DJ> identifier, I often add DJ before an artist's name. This makes it easier to select from DJs under the Artists view, depending on one’s mood… Also for a mix of one artist’s work by another DJ (such as Sasha’s “Voyage of Ima” remix of producer BT’s album), it seems apt to use “Composer” to reflect the DJ’s role. {That said, for popular/mainstream DJs, I do lose the DJ to ensure Apple Music manages them by their artist name}.

Figure 5 shows what the completed details page looks like- much better than Figure 2's starting point!

Figure 5. DJ Illesta Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival 1 Apple Music info complete + cover

Working to update the labels of many files is a schlep, so speed things up by creating a cut-and-paste file. This also helps ensure consistency across labelling.

My txt file simply contained the:
Album title format
0# Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival Mix Series - DJ
Album
0# Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival Mix Series
Grouping
Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival Mix Series
Date

2022 2023 2024 2025
Track
1

Disc number

In each song, I set the track number to be 1 of 1 to reflect an entire DJ's mix. In contrast, the disc number follows the Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival mix series' order, e.g. disc number of 1 to start my curation of 13. This seems apt in being similar to the sequential serialisation of podcasts.

N.B. As you work to add information to each "song" please note that these updates do not automatically reflect in your Apple Music playlist’s display. So, click to another list, then return to yours for updating its view.

And here’s Figure 6's end result- an Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival playlist with all mixes extensively labelled, plus all album covers added.

Figure 6. Atmospheric Drum & Bass Revival Mix Series playlist with full information

Nice one, selecta DJ TraVice! Your drum-n-bass playlist is now optimally prepared to rinse out...

Fellow trainspotters welcome to rant-&-RAVE in the moderated comments below 👇

From Sand Based (1997) to the createwithpixels app (2025)

2025-06-12T16:59:00.018+02:00

Written for those interested in the createwithpixels app's development history.

Create With has recently released its createwithpixels app on Google Play and the Apple Store. This amateur bitmap editor is for novices wanting do low-resolution raster designs on their mobile phones, or tablets. Easy to learn, the app offers a resizable pencil, plus web-friendly colour palette. Images can be exported locally, or shared via a createwithpixels.com library. Here's a short, visual story on key developments towards the app:

1997 "Sand Based"exhibit

Fellow Middlesex MA in Digital Art graduate, Stephen Wolff, and Travis worked on a concept inspired by his 'Sand Based' exhibit. Figure 1's screenshot showed how a sprite created interesting aesthetic trails. They originally wanted to design software that would give its end-user more control over the serendipitous effects of algorithmic rendering...

Figure 1. Almonds and pomegranates (cycle 3), Sand based exhibit (1997)

Figure 2's from Travis' exhibit as part of the MA Digital Arts 1996-97 group's year-end show. Middlesex University's Centre for Electronic Arts' exhibited at OXO towers, London).

Figure 2. Sand Based installation by Travis Noakes for his Middlesex University MA in Digital Art year-end's exhibit (1997).

Figures 3 & 4. Jython test bitmap graphic captures (2001)

Michael Cope wrote Jython scripts for Travis to achieve a similar effect in a PC's browser (see Figures 3 & 4).

2003 Pixel Player

In doing a student project for the CTI Education Internet Development Specialist Diploma, Travis developed a mock website's graphic user interface (GUI) for a bitmap animator.

Figure 5. Pixel Player graphic user interface concept page 5 (2004)

He first named it Pixel Player, then Easy Pixels (see Figure 5). Workwise, Stephen and Travis were busy for Loopo/Max Gate Digital and Winning Wellness/BODYiQ/Virgin Life Care, respectively. Nonetheless, work on the bitmap animator continued as fun 'digital art for bitmaps sake' diversion. In 2008, Travis setup Crafty Pixels CC (T/A Create With) as a vehicle for pursuing his auteur-ish visual design projects.

2008-9 Crafty Pixels GUI concept

Figure 6. craftypixels.com mockup (2009)

Figure 7. Crafty Pixels desktop application GUI mockup (2009)

One of which was to mock-up a Crafty Pixels website (Figure 6) and desktop application (7)- this fancy screensaver's pre-sets could be adjusted in real time. Stephen Wolff developed a private prototype for Travis and he to experiment with.

Figures 8 & 9. Pixel Player bitmap outputs (2008)

The prototype was promising in supporting some pleasing aesthetic outputs (yebo, yes, Figures 8 & 9!)

2010 createwithpixels.com - private Alpha for desktop

Travis wrote a PhD in Media Studies proposal to study the use of creatwithpixels.com and other bitmap drawing software in High Schools. However, his preliminary research at an elite one suggested that focusing on free online portfolio software would be more worthwhile for the Visual Arts. In response, he pivoted to developing a visual arts e-portfolio syllabus (2011-13) at a private school with its HOD, and a repurposed one for a government school...

2012 createwithpixels.com - public Alpha

Max Gate Digital released a public website at createwithpixels.com, and a test hosting site at beta.createwithpixels.com. Travis' lead supervisor, Dr Marion Walton kindly permitted him to reference Processing bitmap code she wrote for a coding outreach project at an iKamva Youth branch.

Figure 10. Create With Pixels homepage (2012)

Figure 11. createwithpixels.com configure wizard GUI (2014)

Figure 12. createwithpixels.com elements wizard GUI (2014)

2016-18 Beta GUI for a mobile createwithpixels app

Figure 13. createwithpixels library GUI (2016)

Figure 14. Color selection in the createwithpixels bitmap editor GUI (2016)

Following createwith.net's launch, with fresh Create With branding by Jon Whelan consulting, Jon developed a matching, revised front-end for createwithpixels (see Figures 13 & 14).

Figure 15. createwithpixels.com testing on iMac

This new GUI focused on bitmap illustration, versus serendipitous animations. It also added a scalable version for small-screen, mobile phone use (NOT shown in Figure 15!) An MA in Digital Art colleague, Dr Julie Freeman (Translating Nature) reviewed the app, and provided many helpful suggestions on its improvement, plus future development possibilities.

2023-25 createwithpixels app v.1 development

Michael Pretorius and Rafeeq Weideman, both then at Younglings Africa, worked to prepare createwithpixels' front-end for Apple iOS and Google Android apps. Michael continued work on the app's front-end as a freelancer, liaising with Stephen Wolff to integrate with the back-end. In 2025, the Android version was approved by the Google Play Store. Likewise, the iOS version was approved by Apple's app store.

'Art is long, life is short.' Hippocrates.

Techniques for suppressing health experts' social media accounts (7 - 12, part 2) - The Science™ versus key opinion leaders challenging the COVID-19 narrative

2025-06-06T09:46:00.024+02:00

Written for researchers and others interested in the many techniques used to suppress COVID-19 dissidents' social media accounts, and digital voices.

This is the second post alerting readers to the myriad of techniques that social media companies continue to use against key opinion leaders that question the dominant consensus from The Science™. While examples are provided for techniques versus prominent critics of the official COVID-19 narrative, these are also readily applied for stifling the emergence of other issue arenas. These range from the United States of America's support for forever wars via a ghost budget (Bilmes, 2018), to man-made climate change, and from low carbohydrate diets to transgender "gender affirming" medical surgery ideology. These dogmatic prescriptions by the global policy decision makers of the Global Private Partnership (G3P or GPPP) are presented as a "scientific consensus", but are unscientific when protected from being questioned- especially by legitimate experts with dissenting arguments.

In COVID-19's case, its proponents may claim that lockdowns, masking, distancing and genetic vaccines were based on science. In reality though, these measures were policy directives decided well in advance inside the G3P (Iain Davis, 2021). At the same time, its macro-level stakeholders have been busy for decades developing a 'consensus architecture' that precludes radically different interpretations from its preferred scientific dogmas. For example, "man made climate change" has become anchored as an issue, both scientifically and politically, through a decades-long program of sponsorship from the Rockefeller family, one of the world's leading private research funders (Nordangård, 2024). This has shaped the climate science field, where scientists selectively present data to align with policy goals that promote a fear-led narrative of urgent action (Pielke, 2010). The climate science community, particularly the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), relies on panic and "pro-social" censorship versus irrefutable evidence for advancing the anthropogenic model, sidelining dissenting perspectives and stifling critical debate as inherently unworthy. In pro-social censorship, work is 'rejected, and individuals cancelled, not because the work is substandard or flawed, but because it threatens to undermine a cherished ideology or someone else’s concept of societal safety and harmony. Such censorship is never portrayed as such, of course; the reason given is always that the individual(s) concerned were peddling substandard work leading to harmful misinformation.' (Ridgway, 2025).

Professor Brian Martin's framework for information control (2025) addresses the key aspects of overarching censorship, often miscast as being "pro-social" counter-"disinformation". The framework describes that the methods for information control against contrarian views are classifiable into four types, which form an interrelated ecology: (i) flooding, (ii) ignoring, (iii) censoring, and (iv) attacking: (i) Information flooding sees dominant views presented in a unified front, overwhelming contrary views by volume and consistency. (ii) Ignoring includes the absence of research on alternative approaches, failure to report on dissenting research, and not mentioning challenging views. (iii) Censoring involves active measures to prevent the circulation of contrary information and views. (iv) Attacking includes steps taken to silence and penalise individuals with heterodox views, and campaigns to discredit alternatives to the officially-sanctioned approaches. My blog discusses how dissident accounts and their content have been (iii) censored in the Fifth Estate's most popular social media platforms. This post focuses on social media censorship techniques against accounts that are more serious than the six described in part 1. Such content suppression is best contextualised as just one strategy within a broader propaganda omniwar that has weaponised language and made deceit ubiquitous (Hughes, 2024):

#7 Concealing the sources behind dissidents' censorship

An important aspect of information control is that the sources behind it will be very well hidden from the public. For the organisers of propaganda, their ideal targets do not appreciate that they are receiving propaganda, nor should they recognise its source. Their audiences' ignorance is a key aspect of psychological warfare (otherwise known as 5th generation warfare (Abbot, 2010, Krishnan, 2024). Likewise for censors, its targets and their followers should ideally not be aware that they are being censored, nor able to identity the sources of their censorship. Accordingly, there is significant deception around the primary sources for social media censorship being the platforms themselves, and their policies. Instead, these platforms are largely responding to co-ordinated COVID-19 narrative control from G3P members who span each of the six estates*.

{* Departing from the original 'French Estates of the Realm' framework, the contemporary estates can be defined as: A First Estate that consists of the government or ruling class. The Second Estate comprises the economic or social elite—think wealthy business magnates, corporate leaders, or influential families who hold disproportionate power through money and networks. The Third Estate is the general populace who don’t wield concentrated wealth or political authority - the working and middle classes who form the bulk of citizenry. The Fourth Estate consists of journalists and news outlets who can be a distinct force where holding power to account and shaping public opinion. The Fifth Estate describes the rise of digital platforms that support the more independent collectivity of networked individuals (Dutton, 2023). This contributes to a more pluralist role of individuals in shaping democratic political accountability, whilst impacting nearly every sector of society. During the COVID-19 event, the BMGF rivalled corporations and governments in its influence. This reflects the growing importance of the Sixth Estate (multinational non-profit organisations) in driving consensus for The Science™. The vast scale of international philanthropy from trillionaires arguably constitutes a contemporary Sixth Estate, since these charities operate as a distinct force with a unique role. In most societies, large public benefit organisations (PBOs) typically operate outside government, corporate, and traditional media spheres, while focusing on advocacy, social change, or public welfare. Large charities can mobilise resources, influence policy, and amplify disenfranchised voices in ways that neither the mainstream press, nor online platforms can do alone. Charities assumed independence from profit motives or government control gives a different kind of credibility and reach to PBOs, arguably qualifying them as a separate "estate." At the same time, large charities have greater opportunities and leverage for working towards long-term goals. In contrast, most political figures, listed companies, and other organisations have to deliver on short-term objectives, and are more exposed to critique}

Opaque choices to suppress COVID-19 counter-narratives via the Fourth and Fifth media estates were largely demanded by external Global Private Partnership parties- G3Ps are structured collaborations between international intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, WHO and WEF, and private companies to achieve shared goals and objectives. The G3Ps form a worldwide network of stakeholder capitalists and their partners who co-operate with global governance (UN), above state and society. The UN co-operates with G3P partners to set global agendas and policies, which then cascade to people in every nation via a policy intermediary, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a product of G3P collaborators, COVID-19 thought-policing is just one topic that the global industrial censorship complex's (GICC) broader work addresses. The GICC's activities seek to protect lucrative fabricated crises narratives as "settled science". The Science™ dictates urgent, universal solutions, which directly benefit the G3P's policy makers and corporate members- In the case of the COVID-19 event, the UN, WEF, WHO and its G3P corporate partners circumvented national sovereignty (whereby a nation’s laws cannot be subject to those of an outsider) to promote a monopolistic “World Health” policy. Its implementation primarily benefited an ‘elite cabal of media-, tech-, large pharma-, centralized finance, nongovernmental “pathophilanthropic,” and transnational corporations’ (Malone et al. 2024, p. 338). This corporatism (AKA fascism) contributed to a massive wealth gain for billionaires of $5 trillion from 2020–2021 (Oxfam, 2022). Oxfam notes that this was a larger increase than in the previous 14 years combined!

The well-funded, complicity theorists for a COVID-19 "Infodemic" (for example- Calleja et al., 2021, Caulfield, 2020, DiResta, 2022, Schiffrin, 2022) may genuinely believe in advocating for censorship as a legitimate, organic counterweight to "malinformation". In contrast, researchers at the Unlimited Hangout point out that this censorship is highly centralised, aiming at opinions that are deemed "illegitimate" merely for disagreeing with the positions of the most powerful policy makers at the G3P's macro-level. Ian Davis writes that the G3P policy makers are Chatham House, the Club of Rome, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Rockefellers and the World Economic Forum. Each guides international policy distributors, including the; International Monetary Fund, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations, World Health Organisation, plus "philanthropists" {eg. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF)}, multinational corporations and global non-governmental organisations..

Mr Bill Gates serves as an example of the Sixth Estate exercising undue influence on public health, especially Africa's: His foundation is the largest private benefactor of the World Health Organization. The BMGF finances the health ministries in virtually every African country. Mr Gates can place conditions on that financing, such as vaccinating a certain percentage of a country’s population. Some vaccines and health-related initiatives that these countries purchase are developed by companies that Gates’ Cascade Investment LLC invests in. As a result, he can benefit indirectly from stock appreciation. This is alongside tax savings from his donations, whilst his reputation as a ‘global health leader’ is further burnished. In South Africa, the BMGF have directly funded the Department of Health, SA’s regulator SAHPRA, plus its Medical Research Council, top medical universities and the media (such as the Mail and Guardian’s health journalism centre, Bhekisisa). All would seem highly motivated to protect substantial donations by not querying Mr Gates’ vaccine altruism. However, the many challenges of the Gates Foundation’s dominating role in its transnational philanthropy must not be ignored. Such dominance poses a challenge to justice- locals’ rights to control the institutions that can profoundly impact their basic interests (Blunt, 2022). While the BMGF cannot be directly tied to COVID-19 social media account censorship, it is indisputable that Mr Gates' financial power and partner organisations indirectly suppressed dissenting voices by prioritising certain COVID-19 treatment narratives (Politico, 2022A, 2022B).

At a meso-level, select G3P policy enforcers organise that macro-level's policy directives are followed by both national governments (and their departments, such as health) and scientific authorities (including the AMA, CDC, EMA, FDA, ICL, JCVI, NERVTAG, NIH, MHRA and SAGE). Enforcers strive to prevent rival scientific ideas gaining traction, and thereby challenging its policymakers' dictates. These bodies task psychological 'nudge' specialists (Junger and Hirsch, 2024), propagandists and other experts with convincing the public to accept, and ideally buy-into, G3P policies. This involves censorship and psychological manipulation via public relations, propaganda, disinformation and misinformation. The authors of such practices are largely unattributed. Dissidents facing algorithmic censorship through social media companies' opaque processes of content moderation are unlikely to be able to identify the true originator of their censorship in a complex process. Content moderation is a 'multi-dimensional process through which content produced by users is monitored, filtered, ordered, enhanced, monetised or deleted on social media platforms' (Badouard and Bellon, 2025). This process spans a 'great diversity of actors' who develop specific practices of content regulation (p3). Actors may range from activist users and researchers who flag content, to fact-checkers from non-governmental organisations and public authorities. If such actors disclose their involvement in censorship, this may only happen much later. For example, Mark Zuckerberg’s 2024 letter to the House Judiciary Committee revealed that the Biden administration pressured Meta to censor certain COVID-19 content, including humour and satire, in 2021.

#8 Blocking a user’s access to his or her account

A social media platform may stop a user from being able to login to his or her account. Where the platform does not make this blocking obvious to a users' followers, this is deceptive. For example, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes' Twitter account was deactivated for months after querying health authorities' motivations in deciding on interventions during the COVID-19 "pandemic". Many viewers would not recognise that his seemingly live profile was in fact inactive, since it looked to be active. The only clue was that @ProfTimNoakes had not tweeted for a long time. This was highly unusual.

This suspension followed Twitter's introduction of a “five-strike” system, with repeat offenders or egregious violations leading to permanent bans. Twitter's system tracked violations, with the first and second strikes resulting in a warning or temporary lock. A third strike resulted in a 12-hour suspension, while a 7-day suspension followed a 4th strike. Users faced a permanent ban for a 5th strike. In Professor Tim Noakes' case, he was given a vague warning regarding 'breaking community rules etc.' (email correspondence, 24.10.2022), this followed him noticing a loss of followers and his tweets reach being restricted. Twitter 'originally said I was banned for 10 hours. But after 10 hours when I tried to re-access it they would not send me a code to enter. When I complained they just told me I was banned. When I asked for how long, they did not answer.' In reviewing his tweets, Prof. Noakes noticed that some had been (mis-)labelled by Twitter to be "misleading" before his suspension (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Screenshot of @ProfTimNoakes' "controversial" tweet on President Macron not taking COVID-19 'experimental gene therapy' (24 October, 2022)

Prof Noakes had also tweet-quoted Alec Hogg’s BizNews article regarding Professor Salim Abdool Karim’s conflicts of interest, adding 'something about' cheque book science. The @ProfTimNoakes account was in a state of limbo after seven days, but was never permanently banned. Usually, accounts placed on “read-only” mode, or temporary lockouts, required tweet deletion to regain full access. However, @ProfTimNoakes latest tweets were not visible, and he was never asked to delete any. In addition to account login blocks, platforms may also suspend accounts from being visible. But this was not applied to @ProfTimNoakes. In response to being locked out, Prof Noakes shifted to using his alternate @loreofrunning account- its topics of nutrition, running and other sports seemed safe from the reach of unknown censors' Twitter influence.

#9 Temporary suspensions of accounts (temporary user bans)

Several dissident COVID-19 experts reported temporary suspensions of their Twitter accounts after contradicting official public health narratives, or Twitter’s "COVID-19 misinformation policies". Two examples are the epidemiologist's Dr. Martin Kulldorff's account, @MartinKulldorff, and the journalist Mr Alex Berenson's, @AlexBerenson:

@MartinKulldorff was temporarily suspended after a March 15, 2021 tweet stating that not everyone needed the COVID-19 vaccine, especially those with prior natural infection or young children. As this diverged from CDC guidelines, Twitter flagged the tweet to be misleading, disabling user's options to reply or like that tweet.

Alex Berenson faced multiple suspensions, also for questioning the necessity of mRNA vaccines, plus their efficacy. @AlexBerenson was temporarily suspended in the summer of 2021, with a permanent ban following shortly after. Internal Twitter communications obtained through Berenson’s lawsuit against the platform, revealed that White House officials had raised concerns about Berenson’s account during a meeting in April with Twitter executives. Senior COVID adviser Andy Slavitt asked why Berenson 'hasn’t been kicked off the platform', suggesting that Berenson was a key source of vaccine misinformation. Berenson’s lawsuit against Twitter resulted in his reinstatement in July 2022.

#10 Permanent suspension of accounts, pages and groups (complete bans)

In contrast to Twitter's five-strikes system, Meta's Facebook's was not as formalised. It tracked violations on accounts, pages and groups. The latter serve different functions in Facebook’s system architecture (Broniatowski, et al. 2023): only page administrators may post in pages, which are designed for brand promotion and marketing. In contrast, any member may post in groups. These serve as a forum for members to build community and discuss shared interests. In addition, pages may serve as group administrators. From December 2020, Meta began removing "false claims about COVID-19 vaccines" that were "debunked by public health experts". This included "misinformation" about their efficacy, ingredients, safety, or side effects. Repeatedly sharing "debunked claims" risked escalating penalties to individual users/administrators, pages and groups. Penalties ranged from reduced visibility to removal and permanent suspension. For example, if a user posted that 'COVID vaccines cause infertility' "without evidence", this violated policy thresholds. The user was then asked to acknowledge the violation, or appeal. Appeals were often denied if the content clashed with official COVID-19 narratives.

Meta could choose to permanently ban individual-, fan page- and group- accounts on Facebook. For example, high-profile repeated offenders were targeted for removals. In November 2020, the page "Stop Mandatory Vaccination", which was one of the platform’s largest "anti-vaccine" fan pages was removed. Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s Instagram account was permanently removed in 2021 for "sharing debunked COVID-19 vaccine claims". The non-profit he founded, Children’s Health Defense was suspended from both Facebook and Instagram in August 2022 for its repeated violations of Meta’s COVID-19 misinformation policies.

Microsoft's LinkedIn generally has stricter content moderation for professional content than other social networks. It updated its 'Professional Community Policies' for COVID-19 to prohibit content contradicting guidance from global health organisations, like the CDC and WHO. This included promoting unverified treatments and downplaying the "pandemic"’s severity. Although LinkedIn has not disclosed specific thresholds, high-profile cases evidence that the persistent sharing of contrarian COVID-19 views—especially if flagged by users, or contradicting official narratives—would lead to removal. Dr. Mary Talley Bowden, Dr. Aseem Malhotra, Dr Robert Malone, and Mr Steve Kirsch and accounts have all been permanently suspended.

#11 Non-disclosure of information around banning's rationale for account-holders

Social media platforms' Terms of Service (TOS) may ensure that these companies are not legally obligated to share information with their users on the precise reasons for their accounts being suspended. Popular platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn and X can terminate accounts at their sole discretion without providing detailed information to users. Such suspensions are typically couched opaquely in terms of policy violation (such as being in breach of community standards).

Less opaque details may be forthcoming if the platform's TOS is superseded by a country, or regional bloc's, laws. In the US, section 230 of its Communications Decency Act allows platforms to moderate content as they see fit. They are only obligated to disclose reasons under a court order, or if a specific law applies (such as one related to data privacy). By contrast, companies operating under European Union countries are expected to comply with the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA). Here, platforms must provide a 'statement of reasons' for content moderation decisions, including suspensions, with some level of detail about the violation. Whilst compliant feedback must be clear and user-friendly, granular specifics may not be a DSA requirement. In the EU and USA, COVID-19 dissidents could only expect detailed explanations in response to legal appeals, or significant public pressure. Internal whistleblowing and investigative reports, such as the Facebook and Twitter files, also produced some transparency.

One outcome of this opaque feedback is that the reasons for dissidents' COVID-19 health experts' accounts being suspended are seldom made public. Even where dissidents have shared their experiences, the opaque processes and actors behind COVID-19 censorship remain unclear. Even reports from embedded researchers, such as The Center for Countering Digital Hate's "Disinformation Dozen", lack specificity. While it reported how Meta permanently banned 16 accounts, and restricted 22 others, for "sharing anti-vaccine content" in response to public reporting in 2021. However, the CCDH did not explicitly name the health experts given permanent suspensions. Hopefully, a recent 171-page federal civil rights suit by half of the dissidents mentioned in this report against the CCDH, Imran Ahmed, U.S. officials & tech giants will expose more about who is behind prominent transnational censorship & reputational warfare (Ji, 2025).

#12 No public reports from platforms regarding account suspensions and censorship requests

Another important aspect of deception around social media censorship is that the most popular digital platforms have never provided ongoing, public reports for the number of accounts they suspend, and why. Nor do platforms that exercise censorship share ongoing information on who requests what accounts be suspended, and their rationales. Consequently, researchers and the public are unlikely to appreciate the scope of censorship that does occur on social media platforms, and who the authors behind it are, G3P policy enforcers, or otherwise.


Figure 2. Slide on 'Critical social justice as a protected ideology in Higher Education, but contested in social media hashtag communities' (Noakes, 2024)

This is an important gap due to its implications for free speech. Many 'Critical Social Justice' assumptions and beliefs seem protected from debate in Higher Education and in the Fourth Estate. Likewise, the most popular social networks of the Fifth Estate may also be providing stealthy protection for G3P agenda dogmas via censorship. As this is never made available as part of the public record, it remains mostly hidden from the public, and largely inaccessible to scholarship.

More about censorship techniques against dissenters on social networks

N.B. I am writing a third post on account censorship during COVID-19, that will cover at least three more serious techniques. Do follow me on X to learn when that is published. Please suggest improvements to this post in the comments below, or reply to my tweet thread at https://x.com/travisnoakes/status/1930989080231203126.

Wanted - Fair critics of 'Promoting Vaccines in South Africa: Consensual or Non-Consensual Health Science Communication?'

2025-04-09T19:02:00.006+02:00

Written for health science communication researchers concerned with genetic vaccination promotion being non-consensual and a form of propaganda.

Since June 2023, Dr Piers Robinson, myself and Dr David Bell have submitted the titular manuscript to nine journals with no strong reviews, and many desk rejects without solid explanation. This is despite our journal search from 2024 focusing on seemingly suitable journals that met the criteria of tackling (i) health communication, (ii) propaganda, and (iii) previously having shared controversial articles questioning the official COVID-19 narrative. Since we cannot identify any viable new targets, we have decided to share our manuscript as a pre-print on SSRN and ResearchGate. We hope that readers there can at least offer solid, constructive criticism of our work.

As scholars know, every journal submission can take many hours for preparing the related documentation, plus formatting the manuscript to a journal's stylistic specifications, etc. To compensate for such lengthy academic labour, authors might reasonably expect that editorial teams will be highly ethical in providing detailed reasoning behind desk-rejections. Where there is a strong pattern of such feedback being absent, or poor, on controversial topics, dissident authors may justifiably perceive that they are negotiating an academic journal publication firewall. Why would editors be reluctant to go on record for their reasons for desk-rejection, if they are indisputable? Even when editorial staff's feedback is highly critical, this is still constructive for authors. They can then completely revise their manuscript for submission to new journals. Or perhaps save time, by confronting the reality that their manuscript's non- or weak-contribution means it must be abandoned!

Our frustration with not receiving constructive criticism is similar to accounts from many other dissenters against the official COVID-19 narrative. Notably, Professors Bhattacharya and Hanke (2023) documented dissidents’ censorship experiences via popular pre-print options. And Professor Norman Fenton (in Fighting Goliath, 2024) and Dr Robert Malone (in PsyWar, 2024) provide compelling accounts of shifting from being welcome journal authors and conference speakers, to unpublishable for any manuscript critical of COVID-19 statistics or treatment policies. Such experts would seem unlikely to have produced fallacious research unsuited to peer review given their high levels of expertise, plus long publication records.

Our wannabe-journal article tackles an important, albeit controversial, question, How might pharma- or medical propaganda be distinguished from health communication? South Africa's (SA) case of COVID-19 genetic vaccine promotion is described for how incentivization, coercion and deceptive messaging approximated to a non-consensual approach- preventing informed consent for pregnant women. In terms of generalisability, this case study can be described as a hard case- given the status of pregnant women as perhaps the most vulnerable and protected category in society, one expects health communicators to be extremely cautious about adopting non-consensual methods of persuasion. We show that this was indeed the case in South Africa, making it more likely that such tactics were used for other less vulnerable groups.

In desk rejecting our work, editors and reviewers may well have thought that evaluating persuasive communication in terms of whether or not it is deceptive and non-consensual is not, in some sense, a legitimate research question. In stark contrast, as Dr Piers Robinson argues (at the end of this Linked thread), our research question is indeed, 'an essential part of evaluating whether any given persuasion campaign can be said to meet appropriate ethical/democratic standards. With the attention to fake news and disinformation, there is in fact much in the way of scholarly attention to questions of deceptive or manipulative communication. So we are not asking a question that is not asked by many others and across a wide range of issue areas. And we utilised a conceptual framework developed and published elsewhere.'

Another concern may be that our manuscript it "biased" to 'reach a predetermined outcome'. This ignores the possibility that our work could have found no evidence of deceptive communication, and none for incentivization. However, the evidence presented does strongly support a major concern that pregnant women were incentivised, deceived and coerced into taking (poorly-tested) genetic vaccines (whose side-effects are also poorly tracked). In the absence of detailed editor rejection feedback, it's hard for us to improve our argument for a hoped-for peer review that's fair.

It's also important to acknowledge the context in which our paper was written, which is of considerable scientific concern over the COVID-19 event. Notably, rushed guidance based on weak evidence from international health organisations could well have perpetuated negative health and other societal outcomes, rather than ameliorating them (Noakes, Bell & Noakes, 2022). In particular, health authorities rushed approval of genetic vaccines as the primary response, and their "health promotion" seems a ripe target for robust critique. Particularly when successful early treatments were widely reported to have been suppressed so that Emergency Use Authorisation for genetic vaccines could be granted (Kennedy, 2021).

An unworthy topic?

Our negative experience of repeated, poorly (or un-) explained rejections would seem to suggest that presenting South Africa's case of COVID-19 genetic vaccine promotion as pharmaceutical/medical propaganda was not worthy of academic journals' review- even for those promising to tackle scientific controversies and challenging topics.

Not unexpectedly, SSRN removed our pre-print after a week, providing the following email rationale: 'Given the need to be cautious about posting medical content, SSRN is selective on the papers we post. Your paper has not been accepted for posting on SSRN.' So, no critique of the paper's facts or methods, just rapid removal of our COVID 19 "health communication" critique. In SSRN 's defence, its website's FAQs do flag that 'Medical or health care preprints at SSRN are designed for the rapid, early dissemination of research findings; therefore, in most instances, we do not post reviews or opinion-led pieces, as well as editorials and perspectives.' So perhaps the latter concern was indeed the most significant factor in SSRN's decision... But with no explicit/specific explanation for its rationale for its decision, it's also possible that our critique of COVID-19 "health science communication" weighed more heavily as a factor by human decision makers. Alternately, an Artificial Intelligence agent wrote the rejection email, triggered by our sensitive keywords. COVID-19 + proganda = (a must reject routine.)

A history of a manuscript's rejection in one image

We acknowledge that the initial submissions of our manuscript may well have been out-of-scope for the preliminary journals, or outside of the particular contributions to knowledge that they consider.

Figure 1. Nine journals that rejected 'Promoting Vaccines in South Africa' (2025)

Over two years, we also refined our manuscript to narrowly focus on 'non-consensual Health Science Communication', versus propaganda. While the latter is accurate, we recognised that it could be too contentious for some editors and reviewers, so revised the initial title. Our analysis was clearly bounded to describe the ways in which non-consensual persuasion tactics were employed in South Africa to promote uptake of the COVID-19 vaccines. There are several vulnerable categories (such as teenagers), and we decided to focus on pregnant women, or women wanting to be mothers. We explored the local incentives and coercive measures (both consensual and non-consensual) that were used in South Africa during the COVID-19 event. Our manuscript then critiqued deceptive messaging on the safety of the Pfizer BioNTech Comirnaty® vaccine in a Western Cape government flyer. We also contrasted the South Africa Health Products Regulatory Authority's vaccine safety monitoring and reporting of adverse events following immunisation (SAHPRA AEFI) infrormation, contrasting how it (does not) report on outcomes for women's health, versus the Vaccine Adverse Report System (VAERS SA). If there is a methodological flaw in this approach, we are open to suggestions on improving it.

That said, there are some changes that we would like an opportunity to argue against. For example, our title might be criticised for not addressing harms to "pregnant people". However, following such advice would distract from how genetic vaccines have proven especially damaging to biological females. Likewise, our definition of "health science communication" can be criticised as a narrow one, especially for South Africa's myriad of health contexts. While this is true and we should gloss this limitation, we must also prioritise what is core to focus on within a 10,000 word limit. Expanding our focus to include a broad view of science communication in SA would inevitably require the removal of evidence related to the Organised Persuasive Communication Framework's consensual versus non-consensual aspects. This would distract from our paper's core focus.

The demands above may well be intended to create a more 'open minded' and 'less binary' paper. Nonetheless, should they be the primary reason for desk-rejection, they actually serve to undermine the broader academic discourse. Particularly the contribution our critique can play in supporting consideration for what constitutes genuine health communication in public health emergencies. Our paper's departure from a "progressive" imperative in its title and focused concepts, should not trump the paper's potential role for catalysing valuable discussions around medical/pharmaceutical propaganda. Especially around the consequences of health communications from SA authorities being deceptive, and potentially ill-suited for supporting informed consent. When combined with hefty financial reward incentives, and the coercion of losing one's livelihood, it seems irrational to argue against a non-consensual approach's existence. One threatening pregnant women, their foetuses and babies. Surely, this warrants concern for academia in being apposite to genuine health communication via persuasion that allows for free and informed consent?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!

The inspiration for our original manuscript

The original paper was drafted for a special issue of the Transdisciplinary Research Journal of Southern Africa. It focuses on ‘Efficacy in health science communication in a post-pandemic age: Implications for Southern Africa’. In a small way, our review article was inspired as a critique of two assumptions in the call for the special issue's opening paragraph: (1) 'Much of the broad population and indeed more of the intelligentsia than one would imagine arguably remain to a greater or lesser degree sceptical of science' and (2) 'widespread suspicion of the origin of the virus seemingly fuelled by conspiracy theories, and of surprising levels of vaccine hesitancy voiced in a range of guises.'

In the first place, there is a different between science, and following The Science™ from a transglobal vaccine cartel. Individuals or groups did have sound scientific grounds to reject genetic vaccination. Indeed, individuals with PhDs were most likely to reject being "vaccinated" with a rushed and poorly-tested product. Secondly, the theory that COVID-19 emerged from the Wuhan lab is not a "conspiracy theory", but just one of four possible explanations {the others being zoonotic (animal-to-human) origins, a deliberate bio-weapon release, or a prior endemicity ‘discovered’ by an outbreak of testing}.

To flag the danger of assumptions, such as (1) and (2) being presented as "fact", our review originally sought to spotlight a major, but neglected, issue in the health communication field: what is pharmaceutical propaganda and how does it differ from health communication. Media studies and health communication scholars should be exercising hyper-reflexivity in considering how the communications they study typically emerge in an externally directed field. Their field's solutionist emphasis is often driven by powerful external groupings’ motives, such as national government departments or multinational pharmaceutical companies. Such actors can be incentivised to manipulate messaging for reasons other than the simple concern to protect the public's wellbeing during a perceived crisis or emergency.

Our reflexive article was originally rejected without explanation by one of the special issue’s editors. I have tweeted about how such behaviour is unacceptable, plus how AOSIS could update its policy to specify that an editor must provide explicit feedback on the reasons for desk rejection. This would meet COPE’s guideline that editors meet the needs of authors. Otherwise rejected authors might suspect that an AOSIS journal is not championing freedom of expression (and rather practicing scientific suppression) and is not precluding business needs (e.g. pharmaceutical support) from compromising intellectual standards. Tackling the danger of “successful” communications for dangerous pharmaceutical interventions as pharmaceutical propaganda is important, particularly given the rise of health authoritarianism during a “pandemic”.

Constructive criticism, plus new journal targets welcome?

We believe that our topic of how incentivization, coercion and deceptive COVID-19 messaging approximates a non-consensual approach is highly salient. Without sound rationales for the rejections of our paper, academic social networks seem the most promising fora for receiving constructive criticism. Drs Robinson, Bell and I welcome such feedback. Kindly also let me know in the comments below should you know of a health communication journal that supports COVID-19 dissent, champions academic freedom and would be interested in giving our submission a fair review?

Future research

Dr Robinson & I are collating the accounts of prominent health experts who have described negotiating an academic journal publication firewall. There is an opportunity to formalise research into the problems of censorship and bias during COVID-19, documenting case studies and further evaluating what this tells us about academia. We will work on a formal research proposal that also includes developing an original definition for dissenters' 'academic journal publication firewall' experience(s).

Techniques for suppressing health experts' social media accounts, part 1 - The Science™ versus key opinion leaders challenging the COVID-19 narrative

2025-03-29T21:18:00.009+02:00

Written for researchers and others interested in the many techniques used to suppress COVID-19 dissidents' social media accounts, and digital voices.

There has been extensive censorship of legitimate, expert criticism during the COVID-19 event (Kheriaty, 2022. Shir-Raz et al, 2023. Hughes, 2024). Such scientific suppression makes the narrow frame visible for what the sponsors of global health authoritarianism permit for questioning of The Science™. In contrast to genuine science which innovates through critique, incorporated science does not welcome questioning. Like fascism, corporatist science views critiques of its interventions to be heresy. In the COVID-19 event, key opinion leaders who criticised the lack of scientific rigour behind public health measures (such as genetic vaccine mandates) were treated as heretics by a contemporary version of the Inquisition (Malone et al., 2024). Dissidents were accused of sharing "MDM" (Misinformation, Disinformation and Malinformation) assumed to place the public's lives at risk. Particularly in prestigious medical universities, questioning the dictates of health authorities and their powerful sponsors was viewed as being unacceptable, completely outside an Overton Window that had become far more restrictive due to fear- mongering around a "pandemic" (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Narrowed Overton Window for COVID-19. Figures copied from (p137-138) in Dr Joseph Fraiman (2023). The dangers of self-censorship during the COVID-19 pandemic. In R. Malone, E. Dowd, & G. Fareed (Eds.), Canary In a Covid World: How Propaganda and Censorship Changed Our (My) World (pp. 132-147). Amazon Digital Services LLC - Kdp.

Higher Education is particularly susceptible to this groupthink, as it lends itself to a purity spiral, which in turn contributes to the growing spiral of silence for "unacceptable views". A purity spiral is a form of groupthink in which it is more beneficial to hold some views than to not hold them. In a process of moral outbidding, individual academics with more extreme views are rewarded. This was evidenced at universities where genetic vaccine proponents loudly supported the mandatory vaccination of students, despite them having minimal, if any, risk. In contrast, scholars expressing moderation, doubt or nuance faced ostracism as "anti-vaxxers". In universities, there are strong social conformity factors within its tight-knit community. Grants, career-support and other forms of institutional support depend on collegiality and alignment with prevailing norms. Being labeled a contrarian for questioning a ‘sacred cow’, such as "safe and effective" genetic vaccines, is likely to jeopardise one’s reputation, and academic future. Academic disciplines coalesce around shared paradigms and axiomatic truths, routinely amplifying groupthink. Challenging reified understandings as shibboleths can lead to exclusion from conferences, journals and cost scholars departmental, faculty, and even university support. Particularly where powerful funders object to such dissent!

Here, administrative orthodoxy can signal an “official” position for the university that chills debate. Dissenters fears of isolation and reprisal (such as poor evaluations and formal complaints for not following the official line) may convince them to self-censor. Particularly where the nonconformist assesses that the strength of opinion against his or her opinion is virulent, alongside high costs to expressing a disagreeable viewpoint- such as negotiating cancelation culture. Individuals who calculate that they have a low chance of success to convince others, and are likely to pay a steep price, self censor and contribute to the growing spiral of silence. The COVID-19 event serves as an excellent example for this growing spiral’s chilling effect versus free speech and independent enquiry.

COVID-19 is highly pertinent for critiquing censorship in the Medical and Health Sciences. Particularly as it featured conflicts of interest that contributed to global health "authorities" policy guidance. Notably, the World Health Organisation promoted poorly substantiated and even unscientific guidelines (Noakes et al., 2021), that merit being considered MDM. In following such dictates from the top policy makers of the Global Public-Private Partnership (GPPP or G3P), most governments' health authorities seemed to ignore key facts. Notably: i. COVID-19 risk was steeply age-stratified (Verity et al, 2019. Ho et al, 2020. Bergman et al, 2021); ii. Prior COVID-19 infection can provide substantial immunity (Nattrass et al., 2021); iii. COVID-19 genetic vaccines did not stop disease transmission (Eyre et al. 2022, Wilder-Smith, 2022); iv. mass-masking was ineffective (Jefferson et al., 2023. Halperin, 2024); v. school closures were unwarranted (Wu et al., 2021); and, vi. there were better alternatives to lengthy, whole-society lockdowns (Coccia, 2021, Gandhi and Venkatesh, 2021. Herby et al., 2024). Both international policy makers' and local health authorities' flawed guidance must be open debate and rigorous critique. If public health interventions had been adapted to such key facts during the COVID-19 event, the resultant revised guidance could well have contributed to better social-, health-, and economic outcomes for billions of people!

This post focuses on six types of suppression techniques that were used against dissenting accounts whose voices are deemed illegitimate "disinformation" spreaders by the Global public-Private Partnerships (G3P)-sponsored industrial censorship complex. This an important concern, since claims that the suppression of free speech's digital reach can "protect public safety" were proved false during COVID-19. A case in point is the censorship of criticism against employee's vaccine mandates. North American employers' mandates are directly linked to excess disabilities and deaths for hundreds and thousands of working-age employees (Dowd, 2024). Deceptive censorship of individuals' reports of vaccine injuries as "malinformation", or automatically-labelling criticism of Operation Warp Speed as "disinformation", would hamper US employee's abilities to make fully-informed decisions on the safety of genetic vaccines. Such deleterious censorship must be critically examined by academics. In contrast, 'Disinformation-for-hire' scholars (Harsin, 2024) will no doubt remain safely ensconced behind their profitable MDM blinkers.

This post is the first in a series that spotlights the myriad of account suppression techniques that exist. For each, examples of censorship against health experts' opinions are provided. Hopefully, readers can then better appreciate the asymmetric struggle that dissidents face when their accounts are targeted by the censorship industrial complex with a myriad of these strategies spanning multiple social media platforms:

Practices for @Account suppression

#1 Deception - users are not alerted to unconstitutional limitations on their free speech

Social media users might assume that their constitutional right to free speech as citizens will be protected within, and across, digital platforms. However, global platforms may not support such rights in practice. No social media company openly discloses the extent to which users' accounts have, and are, being censored for expressing opinions on controversial topics. Nor do these platforms explicitly warn users what they consider to be impermissible opinions. Consequently, their users are not be forewarned regarding what may result in censorship. For example, many COVID19 dissidents were surprised that their legitimate critiques could result in account suspensions and bans (Shir-Raz, 2022). Typically, such censorship was justified by Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Tik Tok, Twitter and YouTube, due to users' violation of "community rules". In most countries, the freedom of speech is a citizen’s constitutional right that should be illegal to over-ride. It should be deeply concerning that such protections were not supported in the Fourth Estate of the digital public square during the COVID-19 event. Instead, the supra-national interests of health authoritarians came to supersede national laws to prevent (unproven) harms. This pattern of censorship is noticeable in many other scientific issue arenas, ranging from criticism against man-made climate change to skeptics challenging transgender medical ideology.

#2 Cyberstalking - facilitating the virtual and physical targeting of dissidents

An individual who exercises his or her voice against official COVID-19 narratives can expect to receive both legitimate, pro-social and unfair, anti-social criticism. While cyberstalking should be illegal, social media platforms readily facilitate the stalking and cyber-harassment of dissidents. An extreme example of this was Dr Christine Cotton's experiences on LinkedIn. Dr Cotton was an early whistleblower (Jan, 2022) against Pfizer's COVID-19 clinical trial's false claims of 95% efficacy for its treatments.

Her report identified the presence of bias and major deviations from good clinical practice. In press interviews, she reported that the trial did ‘not support validity in terms of efficacy, immunogenicity and tolerance of the results provided in the various Pfizer clinical reports that were examined in the emergency by the various health authorities. Christine shared this report with her professional network on LinkedIn, asking for feedback from former contacts in the pharmaceutical industry. The reception was mostly positive, but it and related posts were subject to a rapid content takedown by LinkedIn, ostensibly for not meeting community standards. At the same time, her profile became hypersurveiled. It attracted unexpected visits from 133 lawyers, the Ministry of Defence, employees of the US Department of State, the World Health Organisation, and others (p142). None of these profile viewers contacted her directly.

#3 Othering - enabling public character assassination via cyber smears

Othering is a process whereby individuals or groups are defined, labeled or targeted as not fitting in within the norms of a social group. This influences how people perceive and treat those who are viewed as being part of the in-group, versus those in an out-group. At a small scale, othering can result in a scholar being ostracised from their university department following academic mobbing and online academic bullying (Noakes & Noakes, 2021). At a large scale, othering entails a few dissidents on social media platforms being targeted for hypercriticism by gangstalkers.

Cyber gangstalking is a process of cyber harassment that follows cyberstalking, whereby a group of people target an individual online to harass him or her. Such attacks can involve gossip, teasing and bad-jacketing, repeated intimidation and threats, plus other fear-inducing behaviours. Skeptics' critical contributions can become swamped by pre-bunkers and fellow status-quo defenders. Such pseudo-skeptics may be sponsored to trivialise dissenters' critiques, thereby contributing to a fact choke against unorthodox opinions.

In Dr Christine Cotton's case in March 2022 her name was disclosed in a list as part of a French Senate investigation into adverse vaccine events. A ‘veritable horde of trolls seemingly emerged out of nowhere and started attacking’ her ‘relentlessly’ (p143). These trolls were inter-connected through subscribing to each others’ accounts, which allowed them to synchronise their attacks. They attempted to propagate as much negative information on Dr Cotton as possible in a ‘Twitter harassment scene’. Emboldened by their anonymity, the self-proclaimed “immense scientists” with masters in virology, vaccines, clinical research and biostatistics, launched a character assassination. They attacked her credentials and work history, whilst creating false associations (“Freemasonry” and “Illuminati”).

This suggests how identity politics sensibilities and slurs are readily misused against renegades. In the US, those questioning COVID-19 policies were labelled “far right” or “fascist”, despite promoting a libertarian critique of healthcare authoritarianism! In addition, orchestrators of cybermobbing tagged dissidents accounts to be those of someone who is: 'anti-science', 'an anti-vaxxer', 'biased', 'charlatan', 'celebrity scientist', 'conspiracy theorist', 'controversial', 'COVID-19 denier', 'disgraced scientist', 'formerly-respected', 'fringe expert', 'grifter', 'narcissist with a Galileo complex', 'pseudo-scientist', 'quack', 'salesman', 'sell-out' and 'virus', amongst other perjoratives. Such terms are used as a pre-emptive cognitive vaccine whose hypnotic language patterns ("conspiracy theorist") are intended to thwart audience engagement with critical perspectives. Likewise, these repeatedly used terms help grow a digital pillory that becomes foregrounded in the pattern of automated suggestions in search engine results.

In this Council of the Cancelled, Mike Benz, Prof Jay Bhattacharya, Nicole Shanahan and Dr Eric Weinstein speculate about hidden censorship architectures. One example is Google's automated tagging for "controversial" public figures. These can automatically feature in major mainstream news articles featuring COVID-19 dissidents. This is not merely a visual tag, but a cognitive tag. It marks "controversial" individuals with a contemporary (digital) scarlet letter.

In Dr Cotton's case, some trolls smeared her work in raising awareness of associations for the vaccine injured to be helping “anti-vaccine conspiracy sites”. She shares many cases of these injuries in her book and was amazed at the lack of empathy that Twitter users showed not just her, but also those suffering debilitating injuries. In response she featured screenshots of select insults on her blog at https://christinecotton.com/critics and blocked ‘hundreds of accounts’ online. In checking the Twitter profiles attacking her, she noticed that many with ‘behavioural issues were closeby’. Dr Cotton hired a ‘body and mind’ guard from a security company for 24-hour protection. Her account was reported for “homophobia”, which led to its temporary closing. After enduring several months of cyber-harassment by groups, a behaviour that can be severely be punished by EU law, Dr Cotton decided to file complaints against some of them. Christine crowdfunded filing legal complaints against Twitter harassers from a wide variety of countries. This complaint sought to work around how cyber harassers think anonymity is suitable for avoiding lawsuits for defamation, harassment and public insults.

#4 Not blocking impersonators or preventing brandjacked accounts

Impersonator's accounts claiming to belong to dissidents can quickly pop up on social media platforms. While a few may be genuine parodies, others serve identity jacking purposes. These may serve criminal purposes, in which scammers use fake celebrity endorsements to phish "customers" financial details for fraud. Alternately, intelligence services may use brandjacking for covert character assassination smears against dissidents.

The independent investigative journalist, Whitney Webb, has tweeted about her ongoing YouTube experience of having her channel's content buried under a fact choke of short videos created by other accounts:

Instead of blanket censorship, I am having YouTube bury all my actual interviews/content with videos that use short, out of context clips from interviews to promote things I would never and have never said. Below is what happens when you search my name on YouTube, every single… pic.twitter.com/xNGrfMMq52
— Whitney Webb (@_whitneywebb) August 12, 2024

Whether such activities are from intelligence services or cybercriminals, they are very hard for dissidents and/or their representatives to respond effectively against. Popular social media companies (notably META, X and TikTok) seldom respond quickly to scams, or to the digital "repersoning" discussed in a Corbett Report discussion between James Corbett and Whitney Webb.

In Corbett's case, after his account was scrubbed from YouTube, many accounts featuring his identity started cropping up there. In Webb's case, she does not have a public profile outside of X, but these were created featuring her identity on Facebook and YouTube. "Her" channels clipped old interviews she did and edited them into documentaries on material Whitney has never publicly spoken about, such as Bitcoin and CERN. They also misrepresented her views on the transnational power structure behind the COVID-19 event, suggesting she held just Emmanuel Macron and Klaus Schwab responsible for driving it. They used AI thumbnails of her, and superimposed her own words in the interviews. Such content proved popular and became widely reshared via legitimate accounts, pointing to the difficulty of dissidents countering it. She could not get Facebook to take down the accounts, without supplying a government-issued ID to verify her own identity.

Digital platforms may be disinterested in offering genuine support- they may not take any corrective action when following proxy orders from the US Department of State (aka 'jawboning') or members of the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence agency. In stark contrast to marginalised dissenters, VIPS in multinationals enjoy access to online threat protection services (such as ZeroFox) for executives that cover brandjacking and over 100 other cybercriminal use-cases.

#5 Filtering an account's visibility through ghostbanning

As the Google Leaks (2019) and Facebook- (2021) and Twitter Files (2022) revelations have spotlighted, social media platforms have numerous algorithmic censorship options, such as the filtering the visibility of users' accounts. Targeted users may be isolated and throttled for breaking "community standards" or government censorship rules. During the COVID-19 event, dissenters' accounts were placed in silos, de-boosted, and also subject to reply de-boosting. Contrarians' accounts were subject to ghostbanning (AKA shadow-banning)- this practice will reduce an account’s visibility or reach secretly, without explicitly notifying its owner. Ghostbanning limits who can see the posts, comments, or interactions. This includes muting replies and excluding targeted accounts' results under trends, hashtags, searches and in followers’ feeds (except where users seek a filtered account's profile directly). Such suppression effectively silences a user's digital voice, whilst he or she continues to post under the illusion of normal activity. Ghostbanning is thus a "stealth censorship" tactic linked to content moderation agendas.

This term gained prominence with the example of the Great Barrington Declaration's authors, Professors Jay Bhattacharya, Martin Kulldorff, and Sunetra Gupta. Published on October 4, 2020, this public statement and proposal flagged grave concerns about the damaging physical and mental health impacts of the dominant COVID-19 policies. It argued that an approach for focused protection should rather be followed than blanket lockdowns, and that allowing controlled spread among low-risk groups would eventually result in herd immunity. Ten days later, a counter- John Snow Memorandum was published in defence of the official COVID-19 narrative's policies. Mainstream media and health authorities amplified it, as did social media given the memorandum's alignment with prevailing platform policies against "misinformation" circa-2020. In contrast, the Great Barrington Declaration was targeted indirectly through platform actions against its proponents and related content:

Stanford Professor of Medicine, Dr Jay Bhattacharya’s Twitter account was revealed (via the 2022 Twitter Files) to have been blacklisted, reducing its visibility. His tweets questioning lockdown efficacy and vaccine mandates were subject to algorithmic suppression. Algorithms could flag his offending content with terms like “Visibility Filtering” (VF) or “Do Not Amplify”, reducing its visibility. For instance, Bhattacharya reported that his tweets about the Declaration and seroprevalence studies (showing wider COVID-19 spread than official numbers suggested) were throttled. Journalist Matt Taibbi's reporting on the "Twitter Files" leaks confirmed that Twitter had blacklisted Prof Bhattacharya's account, limiting its reach due to his contrarian stance. YouTube also removed videos in which he featured, such as interviews in which he criticised lockdown policies.

The epidemiologist and biostatistician, Prof Kulldorff observed that social media censorship stifled opportunities for scientific debate. He experienced direct censorship on multiple platforms, which included shadowbans. Twitter temporarily suspended his account in 2021 for tweeting that not everyone needed the COVID-19 vaccine ('Those with prior natural infection do not need it. Nor children'). Posts on X and web reports indicate Kulldorff was shadowbanned beyond this month-long suspension. The Twitter Files, released in 2022, revealed he was blacklisted, meaning his tweets’ visibility was algorithmically reduced. Twitter suppressed Kulldorff's accurate genetic vaccine critique, preventing comments and likes. Internal Twitter flags like “Trends Blacklisted” or “Search Blacklisted” (leaked during the 2020 Twitter hack) suggest Kulldorff's account was throttled in searches and trends, a hallmark of shadowbanning where reach is curtailed without notification. Algorithmic deamplification excluded Prof Kulldorff's tweets from being seen under trends, search results, or followers’ feeds- except where users sought his profile directly. This reflects how social media companies may apply visibility filters (such as a Not Safe For Work (NSFW) view). Kulldorff also flagged that LinkedIn’s censorship pushed him to platforms like Gab, implying a chilling effect on his professional network presence.

An Oxford University epidemiologist, Professor Gupta faced less overt account-level censorship, but still had to negotiate content suppression. Her interviews and posts on Twitter advocating for herd immunity via natural infection amongst the young and healthy were often flagged, or down-ranked.

#6 Penalising accounts that share COVID-19 "misinformation"

In addition to ghostbanning, social media platforms could target accounts for sharing content on COVID-19 that contradicted guidance from the Global Private Partnership (GP3)'s macro-level stakeholders, such as the Centre for Disease Control or the World Health Organisation. In Twitter's case, it introduced a specific COVID-19 misinformation policy in March, 2020, which prohibited claims about transmission, treatments, vaccines, or public health measures that the COVID-19 hegemony deemed “false or misleading.” Such content either had warning labels added to it, or was automatically deleted:

Tweets with suspected MDM were tagged with warnings like “This claim about COVID-19 is disputed” or with labels linking to curated "fact-checks" on G3P health authority pages. This was intended to reduce a tweet’s credibility without immediate removal, whilst also diminishing its poster's integrity.

Tweets that broke this policy were deleted outright after flagging by automated systems or human moderators. For instance, Alex Berenson’s tweets questioning lockdown efficacy were removed, contributing to his eventual ban in August 2021. In Dr Christine Cotton's case, Twitter classified her account as “sensitive content”. It gradually lost visibility with the tens of thousands of followers it had attracted. In response, she created a new account to begin ‘from scratch’ in August 2022. The Twitter Files revealed that such censorship was linked to United States government requests (notably from the Joe Biden administration and Federal Bureau of Investigations). For example, 250,000 tweets flagged by Stanford’s Virality Project in 2021 were removed by Twitter.

In March 2020, Meta expanded its misinformation policies to target COVID-19-related MDM. Facebook and Instagram applied content labelling and down-ranking, with posts allegedly featuring MDM being labeled with warnings (such as 'False Information' or 'See why health experts say this is wrong') that linked to official sources. Such posts were also down-ranked in the News Feed to reduce their visibility. Users were notified of violations and warned that continued sharing could further limit reach or lead to harsher action. In late 2021, down-ranking also became applied to “vaccine-skeptical” content not explicitly violating rules but potentially discouraging vaccination. Posts violating policies were removed outright.

With LinkedIn's smaller, professional user base, and the platform's lower emphasis on real-time virality, led it to prefer the outright removal of accounts over throttling via shadow-bans. Accounts identified as posting MDM could face temporary limits, such as restricted posting privileges or inability to share articles for a set period. LinkedIn users received warnings after a violation, often with a chance to delete the offending post themselves to avoid further action. Such notices cited the policy breach, linking to LinkedIn’s stance on official health sources. This approach to COVID-19 MDM followed LinkedIn’s broader moderation tactics for policy violations.

In Dr Cotton's case, she shared her Pfizer COVID-19 clinical trial's critique on LinkedIn to get feedback from her professional network of former contacts in the pharmaceutical industry. This first post was removed within 24 hours (p.142), and her second within an hour. This hampered her ability to have a debate on the methodology of Pfizer's trial with competent people. Prof Kulldorff also had two posts deleted in August 2021: one linking to an interview on vaccine mandate risks and another reposting Icelandic health official comments on herd immunity.

Accounts that posted contents with links to external, alternate, independent media (such as Substack articles or videos on Rumble) also saw such posts down-ranked, hidden or automatically removed.

This is the first post on techniques for suppressing health experts' social media accounts (and the second on COVID-19 censorship in the Fifth Estate). My next addresses more extreme measures against COVID-19 dissidents. Do follow me on X to be alerted when new posts are published.

Do share your views by commenting below, or reply to this tweet thread at https://x.com/travisnoakes/status/1906250555564900710.

Celebrities cannot stop their brandjacking, since many authorities are unable to help!

2025-02-05T12:40:00.035+02:00

Written for cyber- and digital crime researchers and reporters. Plus, brandjacked celebrities and their representatives.

In discussion with reporters and PR experts, most seemed to be under the mistaken impression that celebrities enjoy a viable route to stop their brandjacking in scam adverts on social media platforms. I wrote this post to explain that although SA public figures seem well-resourced and influential, none have a viable route to prosecuting their brandjackers due to an absence of support from many authorities:

Since 2019, The Noakes Foundation has supported research into the brandjacking of influential celebrities' reputations on social media, and other poorly moderated platforms. The Fake Celebrity Endorsement (FCE) research team is documenting how this digital crime is an inscrutable, traumatic experience for celebrities, their representatives, and the financial victims who report being conned by fake endorsements. In addition to being traumatised by being featured in fake adverts, microcelebrities are further traumatised by the many reports from fans of their upset at being conned. A few celebrities have become targets for recurring cybervictimisation with no recourse, resulting in repeat trauma.

The FCE distinguishes 'digital crimes' from 'cybercrimes': Micro-fraudsters typically target private individuals with limited access to resources for combating digital crime. This contrasts to cybercrimes in which corporations are attacked (Olson, 2024). They are often well positioned to support their employees with costly resources that private individuals cannot afford. Research into the latter is well-resourced, as is interventions to stop it. By contrast, the fighting of digital crimes that impact private citizens are poorly resourced, particularly in the Global South. In the case of fake celebrity endorsements, press reports of this scam suggest that the problem grows each year- eleven South African celebrities fell victim to it in 2024, up from two in the first reports of 2014.

Fake celebrity endorsement is a digital crime that may require many authorities in society to combat it. Below is a list of the roleplayers that might potentially help prevent digital crimes:

1) celebrity influencers,

2) financial victims,

3) social media advertising providers,

4) Poorly-moderated content hosts,

5) banks,

6) cyber defence companies,

7) cybercrime reporters and statistics gatherers (industry researchers),

8) cybercrime educators,

9) anti-crime activists (PBOs and NGOs),

10) social media platforms (eg Big Tech),

11) financial investors,

12) government politicians,

13) the police,

14) international law enforcement,

15) local law,

16) Higher Education and its funders,

17) Product regulators.

While digital crime victims might expect support from these thirteen other role-players, this post spotlights their limitations. Some simply are unable to prioritise fighting fake celebrity endorsements, while others' interests may not be served in tackling this crime!

Figure 1 - the brandjacking digital crime process

Figure 1 shows a simplified process of the fake endorsement phishing scam. The authors of this digital crime are unknown- they can range from gangs, to the invisible threat of AI and bot armies, to even military intelligence agencies raising funds. Not only do these cybercriminals exploit scamming ecosystems inside popular social media platforms, they also exploit related ecosystems on platforms such as Huione Guarantee (now "Haowang Guarantee"), a Cambodian conglomerate. It offers a messaging app, stable coin, and crypto exchange, and has facilitated $2 billion in transactions. Such platforms are integral to the industrialisation and scaling-up of online scams, for example through supporting the outsourcing of scammers' money-laundering activities (The Economist, 2025).

1) Celebrity influencers

On digital media, celebrity influencers are 'micro-celebrities', who can also be 'influencers' (if paid to share content). Micro-celebrities may not be aware of the dangers of hyper-visibility, since there are no 'Here Be Dragons' signs at the on-ramps to creating their digital profiles. Here, celebrities agree to legal contracts that are heavily one-sided in favour of social media platforms versus users (Sarafian, 2023). These contracts do not place an onus on social networks to warn or protect their users from digital visibility risks; such as brandjacking and impersonation. The FCE project has approached almost 50 South African celebrities via their agents to participate in its research. Each's reputation was reported to have been stolen for scam adverts. Despite offering incentives, only three (plus select representatives) agreed to participate. Most may want to put their negative experiences behind them, while fearing reputational risks from being involved in a research process they are unfamiliar with, and whose outputs may be misperceived as potentially damaging. So, a big challenge exists in persuading micro-celebrities to contribute their experiences to research, so that they can be shared to inform digital crime fighters' responses.

2) Financial victims

Fans who have developed a parasocial relationship with a particular celebrity they follow, may genuinely believe that the fake endorsement adverts are a legitimate offer. Notwithstanding, the product’s promise seeming to be too good to be true. Having been conned, its victims may be ashamed, or in denial. Many may consider their financial loss not worth reporting (as a micro-fraud versus a serious crime). Even if victims are willing to report the digital crime, it may not be obvious which authority the crime is best reported to.

3) Social media advertising services

Online advertisers, and digital platforms, may not understand or monitor the threat of digital crimes, such as celebrity brandjacking. It is not well-defined and may also be challenging to report on, since it spans several crimes itself: 1) impersonation; 2) non-consensual image sharing; and 3) the infringement of a public figure's intellectual property (through copyright violation of still images and audio-video). In addition, the crime causes; 4) reputational damage by suggesting a public figure’s association with a scam that often involves 5) financial fraud and hacking. Social media advertising complaint reporting formats only permit the reporting of one type of infringement at a time. This potentially leaves a blindspot, as users cannot report all the aspects that characterise the celebrity brandjacking crime. If it is a widespread problem, social media advertisers may also prefer not to flag it as a concern, thereby protecting their public reputations. Albeit, at the expense of celebrity and other financial victims.

4) Poorly-moderated content hosts

To make their offers seem more credible, scammers also post fake content on poorly-moderated sites (such as "clickbait news", "positive reviews" on online forums, and "scientific papers" on academic social networks). Even if such fake content is reported and removed, it can be quickly shifted by scammers to worse-moderated hosts...

5) Banks

As the financial victims legitimately authorise payments off their own accounts, victims do no enjoy recourse via their banks. To avoid new transactions from scammers, these victims often have to pay banks for new cards after terminating their old ones. It is unclear what role banks could adopt in combating digital crimes, wherein clients are defrauded whilst following a seemingly legitimate payment process.

Figure 2 - Authorities who could contribute to fighting digital crimes

6) Cyber defence companies

Cyber defence businesses are focused on providing profitable services to corporates. Such services are often unaffordable to even the wealthiest celebrities in SA. However, some may be fortunate to work for companies that use cyber defence services that pro-actively monitor cyberspace, and warn employees against digital impersonation and related risks. Such services include Darkivore, Flashpoint, Netcraft (FraudWatch International), SGS and ZeroFox. It does not seem that cyber defence companies can produce a profitable service that supports rapid responses to fake endorsements and related crimes. Even if it such a service was not unaffordable, most SA celebrities have not been targeted for revictimization. So it seems unlikely they would subscribe to such a service annually.

7) Cybercrime reporters and statistics gatherers

While there have been many reports for weight-loss and money-making cryptocurrency scams featuring particular celebrities, the media, celebrities agents and PR companies seem to report on these brandjackings as once-off events. Reports typically cover the latest flare-up to negatively impact one or two stars, plus their fans. At the same time, cybercrime statistics do not include this digital crime, whose costs to victims in SA are unknown, and difficult to aggregate. This points to a need for developing an holistic view of digital crime from consolidated reports. Research into digital crimes that can bridge the work of journalists and crime statisticians seems urgently needed to describe such crime's extant, frequency and costs to society. Developing robust reporting mechanisms for digital crimes (particularly ones that are challenging like 'fake social media adverts for phishing' {as they include several sub-crimes}) would seem an important contribution that law enforcement, researchers and statisticians can make. Reporters and researchers can also develop robust definitions of emergent digital crimes to grow awareness of them. This should aid more accurate reports.

8) Cybercrime researchers, and educators, in companies
In a similar collaborative vein, cybercrime researchers and educators in companies are working together to help combat digital crimes targeting their employees and clients. In particular, banks and insurance companies in SA are pro-actively raising awareness around phishing and other common digital crimes. This is done in communications that range from email newsletters, to pop-up warnings that clients must acknowledge reading post log-in.

9) Anti-crime activists (PBOs and NGOs)
Anti-digital crime education tends to focus on educating high school students and working professionals with preventative knowledge in English. However, our research into fake celebrity endorsement victims' online commentary suggest that most are over fifty five, with English being their second language, at best. In response, The Noakes Foundation has supported the development of modules in English for educating silver surfers on the most common digital crimes. Ideally, though, these modules (and reportfakeendorsement.com's content) should be available in South Africa's 11 official languages.

10) Social media platforms and their Big Tech owners
Social media companies, and their Big Tech owners, would seem to have a particular responsibility for protecting users from digital crime threats on their platforms. In contrast, there is a decade-long history in SA of even influential celebrities not being well-supported via speedy responses to their brandjacking, and scam adverts are seldom taken down based on celebrities', their representatives' and other victims' reports.

The most popular platform for this scam in SA is Meta's Facebook and Instagram. Meta does not understand the content that its users share (Horwitz, 2023). Further, it does not report on scam ecosystems based inside its own platforms. Consequently, neither Facebook nor Instagram can pro-actively identify digital crimes, let alone quickly adapt their systems to stop emergent threats from micro-fraudsters. It's left up to whistleblowers, former employees, investigative journalists and researchers to create awareness on these platforms' serious flaws, such as it being used as a scammers' ecosystem tied to scam-as-service ones. This would seems at odds with corporate responsibility- Meta should publicly report regarding its progress in tackling scam-ecosystems on its FB, WhatsApp and Instagram platforms. It could also pro-actively warn vulnerable users, such as the aged, against the latest scam risks.

In a sense, digital crimes by cybercriminals on social networks can be considered a parasitic attack within a larger parasitic host: Meta’s Facebook and Instagram are infomediaries that misrepresent themselves as symbionts in supporting users’ communal connections online. In reality, Meta’s business model is parasitic in relying on 3 000 000 000 users to share content (Robbins, 2018). Much of this content is not the work of original/creative producers, but rather sampled from content that's proved popular on other platforms. In essence, social media platforms are middlemen between content creators and their audiences, taking most of the profits from advertising. These platforms also take the intellectual property of online content creators. In the Global South this serves as a form of neocolonial data extraction as Big Tech multinationals from the Global North extract its data, with little being reciprocated. For example, while powerful celebrities in the US can enjoy access to dedicated Facebook support, there is no equivalent offering for influential SA users. Instead, they are lucky to stumble onto internal staff or Trusted Partners who can best help them respond to the Facebookjacking or Instajacking crimes.

In contrast to the usefulness of human insiders, reports to Meta's AI that manages users' reports of dubious accounts and content is simply not capable of recognising malicious advertisers' accounts; At face value, there is in nothing “wrong” with how the scammers’ accounts are set up - They have have a human profile (fake name) managing a business profile (fake name and business). Reporting the scam accounts is useless, since the fraudsters fill-in all the right criteria to fly under the radar! The scammers use 'Like Farms' and a network of fake profiles to all create a sense of legitimacy through 'liking, sharing and commenting' on posts and ads. The criminals also use a “legitimate website” - this is a bought domain and hosing and (questionable design) - selling a “product” and accumulating data of visitors' info and credit card details. All this seems to be legitimate business behaviour to AI, but is malicious and AI cannot detect that. Scammers use a (stolen) credit card, or hijacked meta Ads manager profile and run advertIf this content had truly been verified by a human it would have been taken down immediately. Even to the most untrained eye it was obvious that this content was a deep fake.s through their “business page”. This works for a short while until the card or the account are stopped, and then they just create another one. These ADs are selling a product online, the product is seemly harmless and well within the legal parameters of Meta's Community standards. The fact that its a fake product is immaterial to Meta, the onus in on the customer to know when they are being scammed, and if users try to report this to be a harmful product, it doesn’t work” as that is deemed a matter of personal opinion! Where such content is checked by a human moderators, the content is so obviously fake that they taken it down quickly.

It appears that Meta's Facebook and Instagram are turning a blind eye to this digital advertising crime. The benefit to META is clear with them reaping the rewards through advertisers' spending: Trustfull's 2024 report expects Deep Fake Fraud to reach $ 15.7 billion in 2024. Meta is set to take a large chunk of that ad-spend revenue in distributing fake, malicious content. It’s hard not to draw to the conclusion that it seems irrelevant to META if the content is genuine or a scam, or if the account used to promote these scams has been hacked or cloned. Either way, META and Facebook still profits.

11) Financial investors

Investors are focused on the bottom-line of financial profit. To achieve it, social media platforms' developers spotlight the metrics of an ever-increasing flow of communication marking their platforms' commercial expansion. Given this all-consuming quantitative focus, it's unsurprising that these platforms' developers and investors are largely disinterested in paying the costs to understand the negative experiences on platforms. Particularly when combating these might impede their growth and monetisation!

12) Government politicians

SA's parasitic political class has been slow to take action for protecting its citizenry from the excesses of social media platforms, and digital crimes on them. For example, it has not protected the intellectual rights of original digital content producers by passing a Creators Bill of Rights to limit their online exploitation. On social media, SA creatives do not retain copyright, have rights of termination and appeal, etc. Globally, most online content creators struggle to make a living from the work that they do. Social media companies' oligarchic power and their poor regulation by the law contributes to this. Further, policy inactivity may suggest that government decision makers' are guided by Big Tech's funding and political support, more-so than its digital creatives' rights and needs.

13) Local police

Brandjacking is not viewed as a serious crime by SA authorities who might be expected to intervene as guardians. Cybercrime experts in the SA police have to focus their limited resources on fighting severe digital crimes (like the online trafficking of children, drugs, and guns). They simply cannot address digital crimes that have not been shown to have serious impacts on their victims, such as phishing micro-frauds.

14) International law enforcement

In contrast to under-resourced local law enforcement authorities, global ones (such as Interpol) are better resourced to potentially offer some form of response to digital crimes on social media. However, until decent stats and reports for digital micro-frauds are documented and shared with global authorities, these digital crimes are not notifiable, so cannot be directly investigated at an international level.

15) Local law

Even if a foreign criminal network behind a scam is found though investigation, and the legal frameworks exist for their extradition, the costs for local law enforcement to prosecute scammers may well prove prohibitive to the State. The global proceeds of online fraud are probably more than $500bn a year, so another major concern is that online fraudsters have become rich and powerful enough to corrupt entire governments (Scam Inc podcasts, 2025). Scam "businesses" can turn countries into the cyber-scam equivalent of narco-states, and their operations can be found all over the world. Broadly, 1.5 million scammers are at work, from Namibia up to the Isle of Man, and from Mexico across to Fiji (The Economist, 2025). Where scam bosses have strong clout within a political system, it becomes impossible to enact policies that undermine their fraud. Corrupted states, such as Cambodia, would seem unlikely to extradite criminals who pose a reputational risk in potentially implicating senior state officials. Extradition from lawless places, such as Myanmar, is also impossible.

16) Higher Education and research funders

Like banks, universities are stepping up their preventative digital crime awareness communications, and attracting research funding to build scholarship into cyber- and digital crimes. More generally, universities can lead discourse on the digital crimes issue, catalysing inter- and trans-disciplinary collaborations. Funders of university grants might support design thinking, or strategic design activities to develop solutions for the seemingly intractable brandjacking micro-fraud. Likewise, ethical research into the issues that emerge in researching digital crimes under fake personas. Given that the brandjacking of influential scholars would seem to also pose reputational risks to their university-as-employer, related research could be motivated as a neglected, but potentially valuable contribution.

17) Product regulators

Fake celebrity endorsements typically promote dubious products, that may actually be delivered. As such, customers may assume that they are protected by local regulators for those particular product types. For example, British doctors have been brandjacked to market "wonder drugs" that cure blood pressure. "Their" customers might assume that they are protected by the UK's General Medical Council. However, this falls outside the GMCs remit, which can only address with promotions from genuine doctors on its register. The GMC cannot tackle 'computer generated videos' by unknown fraudsters (Stokel-Walker, 2014). It seems unlikely that any product regulator can help with tackling fake products marketed by unregistered and anonymous cybercriminals.

Celebrity, you are on your own in responding to digital crime?!

It should be clear that celebrities are unlikely to be supported in stopping fake social media adverts. While five key authorities are working to raise awareness against digital crimes (5, 7, 8, 9 & 16), there is little-to-no help available from eight (3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15 & 17). At the digital crime's fountainhead (10 & 11), social media platforms are actually disincentivised against tackling the problem. In the absence of support from criminal prosecutors, the law or cybercrime fighting businesses, it should be clear that the guardianship role of social media companies is non-negotiable. Social media platforms that are heavily used by scammers, could take responsibility for this by entrusting micro teams of moderators around the world to review adverts. Verification by well-trained human resources who can disable fraudulent accounts seems to be the best answer to stopping brandjacking on social media. The current AI approach is failing miserably, with counter-technologies many steps behind cybercriminals' "innovations".

There is not enough being done at an entry level to assist smaller companies and the general public who are constantly being attacked by digital crimes. The accounts of celebrities, plus their representatives, whom we've interviewed suggest that pressure must urgently be placed on social media platforms to provide effective brandjacking reporting, and prevention, tools. Without these, deep fake adverts can spread quickly- reaching tens-of-thousands of people a day. At the same time, celebrities must focus on building rapid awareness in the media, plus at the site of the digital crimes, to alert potential victims.

Just as celebrity co-operation is important, so is that by civil society organisations who can collaborate for pressuring authorities to act in a more responsible and pro-active manner in tackling digital crime. For example, Anna Collard (SVP Content Strategy and Evangelist at KnowBe4 Africa) is doing important work in building networks that can collaborate in educating the public around the dangers of cyber- and digital crimes. Likewise, international and local networks must motivate for sounder strategic interventions from key role players to thwart global networks.

Serious funding is also needed to support awareness programs for educating vulnerable groups. In particular, communities like the elderly are a very high risk, though being less tech- and media savvy. Public benefactors are also needed to assist educational initiatives, like ReportFakeEndorsement, with reaching a broad audience and for greatly increasing the research being done into new digital crimes, and how to thwart them.

Please comment with suggestions to improve this post

I am not an expert on all 13 authorities and their responses, so welcome any constructive corrections for improving what's been shared above. Please comment below, so that I can review your feedback, and perhaps update this blogpost, acknowledging you for your advice, below.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Dr Taryn van Niekerk for proposing the term ‘unchartered territory’ to describe celebrities’ (and their reps) challenges as novices responding to a brandjacking. That insight helped inspire this post, which maps authorities in an 'unknown territory', and the support they might offer, or cannot. Also, The Noakes Foundation and the FCE team appreciate Mr Byron Davel's advice regarding the ZeroFox offering. Plus the broader field of brand protection, and cyber-defence against dark web operations. TNF also appreciates the journalist Lyse Comins' critique of Meta's slow action in her news article- Meta criticised for slow action as deepfake adverts target South African celebrities.

A role for qualitative methods in researching Twitter data on a popular science article's communication

2024-12-22T14:01:00.019+02:00

Written for scholars and students who are interested in using qualitative research methods for research with small data, such as tweets on X.

Myself, Dr Corrie Uys, Dr Pat Harpur and Prof Izak van Zyl's open-access paper, 'A role for qualitative methods in researching Twitter data on a popular science article's communication' identifies several potential qualitative research contributions in analysing small data from microblogging communications:

Qualitative research can provide a rich contextual framing for how micro-practices (such as tweet shares for journal articles...) relate to important social dynamics (... like debates on paradigms within higher-level social strata in the Global Health Science field) plus professionals' related identity work. Also, in-depth explorations of microblogging data following qualitative methods can contribute to the research process by supporting meta-level critiques of missing data, (mis-) categorisations, and flawed automated (and manual) results.

Published in Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics journal's special topic, Network Analysis of Social Media Texts, our paper responds to calls from Big Data communication researchers for qualitative analysis of online science conversations to better explore their meaning. We identified a scholarly gap in the Science Communication field regarding the role that qualitative methods might play in researching small data regarding micro-bloggers' article communications. Although social media attention assists with academic article dissemination, qualitative research into related microblogging practices is scant. To support calls for the qualitative analysis of such communications, we provided a practical example:

Mixed methods were applied for better understanding an unorthodox, but popular, article (Diet, Diabetes Status, and Personal Experiences of Individuals with Type 2 diabetes Who Self-Selected and Followed a Low Carbohydrate High Fat diet) and its Twitter users' shares over two years. Big Data studies describe patterns in micro-bloggers' activities from large sets of data. In contrast, this small data set was analysed in NVivo™ by me (a pragmatist), and in MAXQDA™ by Corrie (a statistician). As part of the data preparation and cleaning, a comprehensive view of hyperlink sharing and conversations was developed, which quantitative extraction alone could not support. For example, through neglecting the general publication paths that fall outside listed academic publications, and related formal correspondence (such as academic letters, and sharing via open resources).

My multimodal content analysis found that links related to the article were largely shared by health professionals. Its popularity related to its position as a communication event within a longstanding debate in the Health Sciences. This issue arena sees an emergent Insulin Resistance (IR) paradigm contesting the dominant “cholesterol” model of chronic disease development. Health experts mostly shared this article, and their profiles reflected support for the emergent IR paradigm. We identified that these professionals followed a wider range of deliberation practices, than previously described by quantitative SciComm Twitter studies. Practices ranged from being included as part of a lecture-reading list, to language localisation in translating the article's title from English to Spanish, and study participants mentioning being involved. Contributing under their genuine identities, expert contributors carried the formal norms for civil communication into the scientific Twitter genre. There were no original URL shares from IR critics, suggesting how sharing evidence for an unconventional low-carbohydrate, healthy fats approach might be viewed as undermining orthodox identities. However, critics did respond with pro-social replies, and constructive criticism linked to the article's content, and its methodological limitations.

The statistician's semantic network analysis (SNA) confirmed that terms used by the article's tweeters related strongly to the article's content, and its discussion was pro-social. A few prominent IR individual advocates and organisations shared academic links to the article repeatedly, with its most influential tweeters and sharers being from England and South Africa. In using Atlas.ti and MAXQDA's tools for automated sentiment analysis, the statistician found many instances where sentiment was inaccurately described as negative when it should have been positive. This suggested a methodological limitation of quantitative approaches, such as QDAS, in (i) accurately analysing microblogging data. The SNA also uncovered concerns with (ii) incorrect automated counts for link shares. Concerns i & ii indicate how microblogging statistics may oversimplify complex categories, leading to inaccurate comparisons. In response, close readings of microblogging data present a distinct opportunity for meta-critique. Qualitative research can support critiques of microblogging data sources, as well as its use in QDAS. A lack of support for static Twitter data spreadsheet analysis was concerning.

Meta-inferences were then derived from the two methods' varied claims above. These findings flagged the importance of contextualising a health science article's sharing in relation to tweeters' professional identities and stances on what is healthy. In addition, meta-critiques spotlighted challenges with preparing accurate tweet data, and their analysis via qualitative data analysis software. Such findings suggest the valuable contributions that qualitative research can make to research with microblogging data in science communication.

The manuscript's development history

In 2020, Dr Pat Harpur and I selected an outlier IR scientific publication based on its unusually high Twitter popularity. At that time, the editorial, 'It is time to bust the myth of physical inactivity and obesity: you cannot outrun a bad diet' had been tweeted about over 3,000 times (now nearing 4,000 according to Altmetric!). However analysing this highly popular outlier stalled after its static export in qualitative data analysis software proved unsuitable for efficient coding. The large quantum of tweet data also proved very difficult to analyse. Accordingly, we shifted focus to a popular article that had been shared as an episode of a broader, long-running IR versus cholesterol debate. Even with its relatively small volume of tweets, organising this data for qualitative analysis proved challenging. For example, it was necessary to refine the Python extraction code, while cross-checks of static vs Twitter search results necessitated the capture of “missing” conversations.

We originally developed a multimodal analysis of these tweets, which focused on their relationship to Twitter user's profiles, potentially reflecting a wide range of communication goals. Our manuscript was submitted in 2022 to Science Communication, where Professor Susanna Priest kindly gave in-depth feedback on changing the original manuscript's contribution to a methodological one. We tackled this through developing a rationale for qualitative research with small data in the majorly revised article, which Dr Corrie Uys did a semantic network analysis for, while I revisited the social semiotic analysis.

If you have any questions, comments or concerns about our article, please comment below.

Acknowledgements

Funding is scarce, and often non-existent, for South African social media research projects. The article is the fifth in the Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices theme, thanks to The Noakes Foundation’s ongoing support. We appreciate Jana Retief and Jayne Bullen's assistance with related funding applications, plus the launch at Younglings Africa's Social Media Internet Laboratory for Research (SMILR) in 2019. The authors also appreciate the Cape Peninsula University of Technology and the Department of Higher Education for providing additional internal funding.

The authors would like to thank Younglings Africa's founder, Alwyn van Wyk, and all the SMILR project team members who assisted us: Shane Abrahams, Tia Demas, Scott Dennis, Ruan Erasmus, Paul Geddes, Sonwabile Langa, Russell Magaya, Joshua Schell and Zander Swanepoel. In addition, we are grateful to the senior software data analysts, Cheryl Mitchell (2021-22) and Darryl Chetty (2019-20), who guided Younglings in their Twitter data extractions, and QDAS import preparations.

We also thank the Design and Research Activities Workgroup in CPUT's Faculty of Informatics and Design, plus the Centre for Communication Studies for feedback on our work-in-progress presentation in 2021.

P.S. Related research manuscript from the team

In reducing our manuscript’s word count, we cut a fair amount of content that we intend to use for our next collaboration: ‘Overcoming qualitative analysis challenges when using small data - workarounds in exploring Twitter conversations’. Expressions-of-interest from journal editors are most welcome.

After half-a-million views, "Dr Noakes" erection dysfunction "advert" taken down by Facebook + suggested actions for META to do better

2024-08-29T16:54:00.026+02:00

I am pleased to report that The Noakes Foundation has succeeded in getting a fake 'Dr Noakes' advert for erectile dysfunction pills removed from META. This is after a month of trying varied methods without success to stop the brandjacking of Professor Tim Noakes' identity, and his impersonation via deepfake reels and accounts on Facebook.

Brandjacking is the ‘allegedly illegal use of trademarked brand names - on social network sites’ (Ramsey, 2010 p851). Cybercriminals misuse the trademarks of others without authorization. For example, ‘Facebookjacking’ and ‘Instajacking’ see public figures’ usernames, account names, and/or digital content being used for fake accounts and video "adverts" on Meta’s respective popular social networks- Facebook and Instagram. Such brandjacking via fake celebrity endorsement spans several types of crime: (1) Impersonation, (2) Non-consensual image sharing, and (3) the Infringement of a public figure's intellectual property through copyright violation of still images and audio-video. In addition to causing (4) Reputation damage to the public figure through suggesting association with a scam, cybercriminals may use it for (5) Financial fraud and hacking. Given that these are serious crimes, it is worrying that public figures in South Africa seem to receive minimal, if any, support from social media companies for stopping the fake endorsement digital crime. There is also a gap in scholarship for how public figures worldwide, and in SA, might best tackle this persistent crime.

Figure 1. Screenshot from the fake 'Dr Noakes' erection dysfunction advert on Facebook (2024)

On Thursday the 25th of July we were first alerted to a deep fake advert featuring Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes that ran on META's Facebook, and Tik Tok. As Figure 1 shows, the Facebook advert had been viewed over 584,000 times, liked by 637 accounts, and received 56 comments. While much of the likes and comments may be from bots, such high viewership of the reel itself is highly concerning. It suggests how rapidly a cybercriminals' adverts spread to potential victims- at over 16,000 views per day!

Figure 2. Screenshot of scammers' Facebook account featuring "Dr Tim Noakes" erection pill adverts (2024)

Figure 3. Scammer account location behind fake Facebook Dr Tim Noakes adverts (2024)

Our initial Facebook advert lookup revealed that one page was running four adverts (Figure 2). This account ("Tristan") was managed from Nepal and India (Figure 3).

Figure 4. Screenshot of fake Tristan account header behind Dr Tim Noakes adverts on Facebook (2024)

This fake account page also leveraged fake interactions to suggest that it was liked, and followed (Figures 4 and 5).

Figure 5. Screenshot of fake "Tristan" Facebook account details behind Dr Tim Noakes adverts (2024)

This account was reported to Facebook via a third-party. During this “warning period”, the account's owners launched four new "Dr Tim Noakes" campaigns. Each was documented and reported to Facebook. Interestingly, the links to the online store “sites” were dead ends. However, a 'Call Now' button could still support a call agent's phishing of victims financial details.

The absence of a link for data gathering suggested that this scam was primarily not for phishing such sensitive data, or selling fake products. Rather the advert's design seems geared for stealing advertising revenue via deepfake creation. The scammers hack into the "advertiser"'s Meta account to distribute fake adverts that run up tens-of-thousands of dollars in spend. In this case it was a government-based account from an unknown location. Such adverts may also carry malware, with users clicking on them being vulnerable to hacking. These paid ads also have the impact of pushing potential followers to the advertiser’s page. More followers results in more people seeing the content, and Meta indirectly benefiting from the cybercrime's increased visibility by achieving higher advertising rates.

Figure 6. Screenshot of scammers' "Hughles" Facebook account (2024)

Figure 7. Screenshot of scammers' "Hughles" Facebook account's Dr Tim Noakes adverts (2024)

The scammers flick-flacked between varied accounts in committing this cybercrime- they initially used "Hughles" (Figures 6 and 7), "Cameron Sullivan Setting", and "Murthyrius" in launching the same deepfake ads. By the 28th of July, 13 of these "adverts were taken down by Facebook, but the scammers shifted to new accounts, "Longjiaren.com" (Figure 8) and "Brentlinger" (renamed "Brentlingerkk" after we reported it). On the 29th of August, these accounts and their adverts were disabled by Facebook.

Figure 8. Screenshot of Longjiaren.com scammers Facebook account for fake adverts (2024)

Such adverts typically reach viewers outside The Noakes Foundation, Nutrition Network and Eat Better South Africa’s networks. Their audiences know Professor Noakes does not endorse miracle weight loss and other cures. To reach vulnerable publics, The Noakes Foundation has run Facebook alerts to warn about this latest cybercrime. Ironically, the most recent advert attempting to flag the "Dr Noakes" scam was blocked by Facebook advertising (Figure 9)!

Figure 9. Facebook rejects anti scam ad from The Noakes Foundation (2024)

Actions for META to do better in fighting cybercrime on its platforms

As Anna Collard (KnowBe4) spotlights in her recent interview with eNews, social media platforms are a vital source for news in Africa. Consequently, these platforms must be held more accountable for any slow responses to synthetic- and deep-fakes. It is greatly concerning that META's Facebook platform is so rife with many serious crimes (ranging from sextortion and child-trafficking to drug pushing).

META can be more pro-active in tackling such cybercrimes {plus less serious ones like fake celebrity endorsement}, by prioritising these seven steps below:

1) Actively communicate that all users' must have a 'zero trust' mindset;
2) Create a compliance team that is dedicated to thwarting cybercriminals' activities;
3) Offer at least one human contact on each META platform for serious reports of criminal misuse;
4) Promote frequent reporters of cybercrime by referring them to META's Trusted Partners or Business Partners for rapid aid;
5) Encourage external research on every platform regarding cybercriminals' activities (such initiatives could develop inexpensive tools. For example, for celebrities' reps to protect public figures from being deep faked in "adverts");
6) Provide more feedback on what was influential in reporting cybercrime for accounts and content to be removed. Without such feedback, fraud reporters may not be sure which reports are most effective;
7) Have a recommendation system in place for support networks that cybervictims can approach (such as referring South Africans to its national CyberSecurity hub).

In addition, META might consider these suggestions from The Noakes Foundation's Report Fake Endorsement initiative, to: (8) enhance deepfake detection technology, (9) apply stricter verification processes, (10) increase transparency and reporting tools, (11) support local educational initiatives, (12) promote collaborations with local cybercrime experts, (13) implement proactive monitoring systems to detect unusual patterns in ads, and (14) reinforced consequences for violations.

By sharing this "Dr Noakes" case study (and developing others), The Noakes Foundation hopes to raise awareness of the fake celebrity endorsement cybercrime, plus the importance of Big Tech guardians stepping up to fulfil their responsibilities. We are also liaising with sympathetic allies (KnowBe4® Africa Security Awareness, Orange Defence, Wolfpack Information Risk and others) to grow the networks necessary to better support cybercrime prevention in South Africa.

Much can be done for targeted digital literacy education for vulnerable targets of cybercrime (such as #StopTheScam for silver surfers). We will also continue advocating that capable guardians (such as META, Twitter and TikTok) become more pro-active in protecting vulnerable publics on their platforms. Their gatekeeping role is vital, as the traditional bulwarks against crime (education, the police and the law) seem unable to catch-up with the "evolution"of global cybercrimes!

META profits off fake celebrity endorsement ads (& no, "Dr Noakes" cannot help your erection problem 🙄!)

2024-08-22T13:34:00.030+02:00

Yes, the "Dr Noakes" advert below for men’s erection problems is the latest brandjack of Prof Noakes' identity on Facebook (and Tik Tok). So-called "Bretlinger"'s recent deep fake advert (Figure 1) features "Tim Noakes" promising a "second youth" through "science" for those suffering from erectile dysfunction. This Facebook reel is accompanied with the text; 'I⁣'⁣v⁣e⁣ ⁣d⁣o⁣n⁣e⁣ ⁣t⁣h⁣i⁣s⁣ ⁣t⁣h⁣r⁣e⁣e⁣ ⁣t⁣i⁣m⁣e⁣s⁣ ⁣–⁣ ⁣a⁣n⁣d⁣ ⁣f⁣o⁣r⁣ ⁣f⁣i⁣v⁣e⁣ ⁣y⁣e⁣a⁣r⁣s⁣ ⁣n⁣o⁣w⁣,⁣ ⁣I⁣ ⁣h⁣a⁣v⁣e⁣n⁣'⁣t⁣ ⁣h⁣a⁣d⁣ ⁣a⁣n⁣y⁣ ⁣i⁣s⁣s⁣u⁣e⁣s⁣ ⁣w⁣i⁣t⁣h⁣ ⁣e⁣r⁣e⁣c⁣t⁣i⁣l⁣e⁣ ⁣d⁣y⁣s⁣f⁣u⁣n⁣c⁣t⁣i⁣o⁣n⁣.⁣ ⁣W⁣r⁣i⁣t⁣e⁣ ⁣d⁣o⁣w⁣n⁣ ⁣m⁣y⁣ ⁣p⁣r⁣e⁣s⁣c⁣r⁣i⁣p⁣t⁣i⁣o⁣n⁣ ⁣f⁣r⁣o⁣m⁣ ⁣D⁣r⁣.⁣ ⁣T⁣i⁣m⁣ ⁣N⁣o⁣a⁣k⁣e⁣s⁣:⁣ ⁣a⁣n⁣ ⁣e⁣a⁣s⁣y⁣ ⁣w⁣a⁣y⁣ ⁣t⁣o⁣ ⁣r⁣e⁣s⁣t⁣o⁣r⁣e⁣ ⁣y⁣o⁣u⁣r⁣ ⁣m⁣a⁣n⁣h⁣o⁣o⁣d⁣ ⁣i⁣n⁣ ⁣s⁣e⁣c⁣o⁣n⁣d⁣s⁣.' (Don't expect many men will be reporting to Facebook, or publicly commenting for being scammed with this particular health problem 😡).

Figure 1. Screenshot of fake "Bretlinger" company's advert reel for "Dr Noakes" erection product on Facebook (2024)

The Noakes Foundation and friends have reported this cybercriminals'* advert many times to META. BUT guess what, just like R Kelly... META Facebook's bots and human reviewers "do not see anything wrong" with the ad! Apparently adverts stealing a person's reputation, plus Facebook users' hard-earned money is no problem for META, since the scam is not going "against Facebook's community standards" (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Facebook support message reply to fake "Dr Noakes erection advert" report (2024)

Even if Facebook is just a conduit for sharing ads that are strictly the advertiser's responsibility, META still faces a legal risk in benefiting from crime (receiving "advertising" fees repeatedly!). For several months, The Noakes Foundation's representatives have provided a third-party with spreadsheets of scam accounts and hyperlinks for META's reference. This seemed effective in blunting the persistent brandjacking of Professor Tim Noakes' reputation across Facebook and Instagram. However, META has shifted position and will no longer use these spreadsheets. Paraphrasing, META thinks that 'none of the adverts are threatening or will lead to grievous bodily harm or death'.

As previously described for Twitter (now X), there is a familiar pattern of popular social media platforms turning a blind eye to cybercriminals' creation of imposter accounts to launch phishing attacks via fake adverts. Our preliminary research (2022-23) revealed that Facebook and Instagram were the most popular platforms reported by the financial victims of the Dr Michael Mol and Tim Noakes brandjackings. Cybercriminals are now also making use of Tik Tok for widespread promotion of the "Dr Noakes' erection solution'. While their earlier brandjacks have used synthetic content, the latest feature deep fake videos of Tim speaking for most of the "advert".

As "Tim's" Facebook advert is accompanied by negative comments from victims (such as "You stole my money!") it is seems inconceivable that a genuine, impartial, humane reviewer can argue that such scamming content is "acceptable". * Perhaps an alternate explanation is that META is following orders from powerful outsiders in not applying its own policies! In exploring the patterns of this cybercrime's victims, it is notable that low-carbohydrate experts were targeted across continents. Amongst the fake advertising for them, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes' stands out for his likeness/reputation having been re-used the most. It is not unrealistic to hypothesise that Western intelligence agencies may ask social media platforms to ignore content that degrades the reputations of prominent state propaganda critics. Dr Piers Robinson suggested this hypothesis based on experiences in facing character assassination via corporate media after setting up the Working Group on Syria, Media and Propaganda. It stumbled upon a strategic deception, perpetrated by the US, UK and French governments, regarding chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and their improper investigation. As Piers tweeted, 'from detaining and interrogating journalists such as Julian Assange, Richi Medhurst, Vanessa Beeley and Kit Klarenberg, through to smearing/character assassination across social media against Sharyl Attkisson, there are a myriad of ways used to suppress dissent.'

Prof Noakes has also faced character assassination after publicly challenging health propaganda related to "The Science"™ behind the US government's (high-carbohydrate-promoting) food pyramid, plus the worldwide promotion of (poorly/untested) COVID-19 genetic "vaccinations". Perhaps META's repeated failure to block these adverts is not an oversight of its responsibility to its users, but rather deliberate in following external directives. Worse, some scams may not be just the work of cybercriminals, but also be supported by intelligence agencies experimenting with fake endorsements as a new tool in their character assassination arsenal?!

In an interview on the Deepfake content 'explosion', a Facebook spokesperson recently stated that 'Content that purposefully intends to deceive or exploit others for money violates our policies, and we remove violating content when its found.' Interestingly, this spokesperson did not detail what META's response is to content being reported. There is also a missed opportunity to check whether the Facebook response to the reported victims and their representatives (Leanne Manas, Patrice Motsepe, Elon Musk, Nicky Oppenheimer, President Cyril Ramaphosa and Johann Rupert) actually corroborates this PR claim. In the case of the Noakes Foundation and Prof Noakes, certainly not!

Regardless of the scam's sources, The Noakes Foundation, its associates and I will continue to raise public awareness (via reportfakeendorsement.com and other channels) against fake celebrity endorsement ads. Such activism helps the general public develop zero trust in any "endorsements". These are NO endorsements from Professor Tim Noakes (or his associates at The Noakes Foundation, the Nutrition Network and Eat Better South Africa NPC). We will continue to research and advocate for social media platforms to take pro-active steps for preventing a decade long micro-fraud. It costs vulnerable South Africans millions of Rands each year, whilst also harming celebrities' reputations-and-wellbeing.

Online companies and social media platforms must do more to protect vulnerable audiences from fraudsters. Ironically, The Noakes Foundation's recent post warning about the latest scam has a comment section that then gets used as the next fraud trap. Scammers offer "help" to victims on it, promising that they can "find the criminals" and get a victim's "money back". These FB accounts may be bots that are automated to add comments to posts featuring tags such as 'hack(ed)', 'scam(med)', 'deepfake', etc.

Figure 3. Screenshot of The Noakes Foundation scam alert post on Dr Noakes scam with scammer comments, top (2024)

This scam alert attracted 16 comments, almost all of which seem dubious. Whilst the comments seem to be from "individual" accounts, they may also be synchronised from a "bot farm" to reduce a post's visibility. On X, tweets that are replied to by dodgy accounts are algorithmically penalised by being adding to a blacklist. If true on Facebook, then this co-ordinated commentary might also be evidence of a malicious actor trying to reduce the visibility of The Noakes Foundation's response to a scam.

Figure 4. Screenshot of scammer comments to The Noakes Foundation's scam alert post for the Dr Noakes scam, bottom (2024)

META's Facebook and Instagram do not offer its public page managers any option to quickly respond to a barrage of scammy, fake comments. As a result, in addition to responding to fake ads, organisations must also use scarce resources to manage this scammy commentary. Each dodgy Facebook user's comment (Figure 4) must be- hidden and reported (as false information) one-at-a-time. Likewise for blocking each account, and hiding their feed. The Noakes Foundation is going to flag to META that it must provide page administrators with decent tools to efficiently tackle the 'fake comments' threat. Let's just hope that META is not turning a blind eye to that threat, too...

To paraphrase ALIEN's Ash synthetic's sardonic comment to humans faced confronting the Xenormorph threat, 'I can't lie to you about your chances, but you have my sympathies... in dealing with META (and the CIA)!'

Figure 5. ALIEN Ash sympathies meme

Content suppression techniques against dissent in the Fifth Estate - examples of COVID-19 censorship on social media

2024-07-26T12:36:00.060+02:00

Written for researchers and others interested in the many methods available to suppress dissidents' digital voices. These techniques support contemporary censorship online, posing a digital visibility risk for dissidents challenging orthodox narratives in science.

The Fourth Estate emerged in the eighteenth century as the printing press enabled the rise of an independent press that could help check the power of governments, business, and industry. In similar ways, the internet supports a more independent collectivity of networked individuals, who contribute to a Fifth Estate (Dutton, 2023). This concept acknowledges how a network power shift results from individuals who can search, create, network, collaborate, and leak information in strategic ways. Such affordances can enhance individuals' informational and communicative power vis-à-vis other actors and institutions. A network power shift enables greater democratic accountability, whilst empowering networked agents in their everyday life and work. Digital platforms do enable online content creators to generate and share news that digital publics amplify via networked affordances (such as 💌 likes, " quotes " and sharing via # hashtag communities).

In an ideal world, social media platforms would be considered to be a public accommodation, and the Fifth Estate's users would benefit from legal protection of their original content, including strong measures against unjustified suppression and censorship. The latter should recognise the asymmetric challenges that individual dissenters, whistleblowers and their allies must confront in contradicting hegemonic social forces that can silence their opponents' (digital) voices: As recently evidenced in the COVID-19 "pandemic", the Twitter Files and other investigations reveal how multinational pharmaceutical companies, unelected global "health" organisations, national governments, social media and traditional broadcast companies all conspired to silence dissent that oppossed costly COVID-19 interventions. Regardless of their levels of expertise, critics who questioned this narrative in the Fourth or Fifth Estate were forced to negotiate censorship for the wrong-think of sharing "dangerous" opinions.

Such sanctions reflect powerful authorities' interests in controlling (scientific) language, the window of permissable opinion, and the social discourses that the public might select from, or add. Under the pretext of public "safety", the censorship industrial complex strong arms the broadcast media and social media companies into restricting dissidents' voices as "misinformation" that is "unsafe". Facing no contest, the views of powerful officialdoms earn frequent repetition within a tightly controlled, narrow narrative window. At the same legitimate reports of mRNA injuries are falsely redefined to be "malinformation", and censored.

Consequently, instead of a pluralist distribution of power in the Fifth Estate that can support vital expression, powerful authorities are enforcing internet policy interventions that increasingly surveil and censor users' digital voices. Infodemic scholars whose work endorses such suppression would seem to be ignorant of how problematic it is to define disinformation, in general. Particularly in contemporary science, where: knowledge monopolies and research cartels may be dominant; dissenting minds should be welcomed for great science, and a flawed scientific consensus can itself be dangerous. Silencing dissent has important public health ramifications, particularly where the potential for suggesting, and exploring, better interventions becomes closed. Science-, health communication, and media studies scholars may also ignore the inability of medical experts to accurately define what disinformation is, particularly where global policy makers face conflicts of interest (as in the World Health Organisation's support for genetic vaccines).

Censorship and the suppression of legitimate COVID-19 dissent is dangerously asymmetrical: health authorities already benefit from ongoing capital cascades whose exchange largely serve their interests. Such exchanges span financial, social, cultural, symbolic and even other (e.g. embodied) forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986:2018). By contrast, individual critics can quickly be silenced by attacks on their limited capital, effectively preventing their exercise of the basic right to free speech, and delivering sustained critiques. A related concern is that the censorial actions of artificial intelligence designers and digital platform moderators are often opaque to a platforms' users. Original content creators may be unaware that they will be de-amplified for sharing unorthodox views, as algorithms penalise the visibility of content on 'banned' lists, and any accounts that amplify "wrongthink".

Content suppression on social media is an important, but neglected topic, and this post strives to flag the wide variety of techniques that may be use in digital content suppression. Techniques are listed in order of seemingly increasingly severe techniques:

#1 Covering up algorithmic manipulation

Social media users who are not aware about censorship are unlikely to be upset about it (Jansen & Martin, 2015). Social media platforms have not been transparent about how they manipulated their recommender algorithms to provide higher visibility for the official COVID-19 narrative, or in crowding out original contributions from dissenters on social media timelines, and in search results. Such boosting ensured that dissent was seldom seen, or perceived as fringe minority's concern. As Dr Robert Malone tweeted, the computational algorithm-based method now 'supports the objectives of a Large Pharma- captured and politicised global public health enterprise'. Social media algorithms have come to serve a medical propaganda purpose that crafts and guides the 'public perception of scientific truths'. While algorithmic manipulation underpins most of the techniques listed below, it is concealed from social media platform users.

#2 Fact choke versus counter-narratives

A fact choke involves burying unfavourable commentary amongst a myriad of content. This term was coined by Margaret Anna Alice to describe how "fact checking" was abused to suppress legitimate dissent.
An example she tweeted about was the BBC's Trusted New Initiative warning in 2019 about anti-vaxxers gaining traction across the internet, requiring algorithmic intervention to neutralise "anti-vaccine" content. In response, social media platforms were urged to flood users' screens with repetitive pro-(genetic)-vaccine messages normalising these experimental treatments. Simultaneously, messaging attacked alternate treatments that posed a threat to the vaccine agenda. Fact chokes also included 'warning screens' that were displayed before users could click on content flagged by "fact checkers" as "misinformation".

With the "unvaccinated" demonised by the mainstream media to create division, susceptible audiences were nudged to become vaccine compliant to confirm their compassionate virtue. At the same time to retain belief in mRNA genetic vaccine "safety", personal accounts, aggregated reports (such as "died suddenly" on markcrispinmiller.substack.com) and statistical reports (see Cause Unknown) for genetic vaccine injuries became suppressed as "malinformation" despite their factual accuracy. Other "controversial content", such as medical professionals' criticism of dangerous COVID-19 treatment protocols (see What the Nurses Saw) or criticism of a social media platform's policies (such as application of lifetime bans and critiques of platform speech codes) have been algorithmically suppressed.

Critical commentary may also be drowned out when platforms, such as YouTube, bury long format interviews amongst short 'deep fake' videos. These can range from featuring comments the critic never made, to fake endorsements from cybercriminals (as described on X by Whitney Webb, or Professor Tim Noakes on YouTube).

#3 Title-jacking

For the rare dissenting content that can achieve high viewership, another challenge is that title-jackers will leverage this popularity for very different outputs under exactly the same (or very similar) production titles. This makes it less easy for new viewers to find the original work. For example, Liz Crokin's 'Out of the Shadows’ documentary describes how Hollywood and the mainstream media manipulate audiences with propaganda. Since this documentary's release, several videos were published with the same title.

#4 Blacklisting trending dissent

Social media search engines typically allow their users to see what is currently the most popular content. In Twitter, dissenting hashtags and keywords that proved popular enough to feature amongst trending content, were quickly added to a 'trend blacklist' that hid unorthodox viewpoints. Tweets posted by accounts on this blacklist are prevented from trending regardless of how many likes or retweets they receive. On Twitter, Stanford Health Policy professor Jay Bhattacharya argues he was added to this blacklist for tweeting on a focused alternative to the indiscriminate COVID-19 lockdowns that many governments followed. In particular, The Great Barrington Declaration he wrote with Dr. Sunetra Gupta and Dr. Martin Kulldorff, which attracted over 940,000 supporting signatures.

After its publication, all three authors experienced censorship on search engines (Google deboosted results for the declaration), social media platforms (Facebook temporarily removed the declaration's page, while Reddit removed links to its discussion) and on video (Youtube removed a roundtable discussion with Florida's Governor Ron DeSantis whose participants questioned the efficacy and appropriateness of requiring children to wear face masks).

#5 Blacklisting content due to dodgy account interactions or external platform links

Limited visibility filtering also occurs when comments are automatically commented on by pornbots, or feature engagement by other undesirable accounts. For example, posts mentioning the keywords/subjects such as 'vaccine, Pfizer' may receive automated forms of engagement, which then sees posts receiving such "controversial" engagement becoming added to a list ensuring these posts censorship (see 32 mins into Alex Kriel's talk on the 'The Role of Fake Bot Traffic on Twitter/X'.

Social media platforms' algorithms may also blacklist content from external platforms that are not viewed to be credible sources (for example, part of an alternative {alt-right} media), or seen as competing rivals (X penalises the visibility of posts that feature links to external platforms).

#6 Making content unlikeable and unsharable

This newsletter from Dr Steven Kirsch's (29.05.2024) described how a Rasmussen Reports video on YouTube had its 'like' button removed. As Figure 1 shows, users could only select a 'dislike' option. This button was restored for www.youtube.com/watch?v=NS_CapegoBA.

Figure 1. Youtube only offers dislike option for Rassmussen Reports video on Vaccine Deaths- sourced from Dr Steven Kirsch's newsletter (29.05.2024)

Social media platforms may also prevent resharing such content, or prohibit links to external websites that are not supported by these platforms' backends, or have been flagged for featuring inappropriate content.

#7 Disabling public commentary

Social media platforms may limit the mentionability of content, by not offering the opportunity to quote public posts. User's right-to-reply may be blocked, and critiques may be concealed by preventing them from being linked to from replies.

#8 Making content unsearchable within, and across, digital platforms

Social media companies applied search blacklists to prevent their users from finding blacklisted content. Content contravening COVID-19 "misinformation" policies was hidden from search users. For example, Twitter applied a COVID-19 misleading information policy that ended in November, 2022. In June 20023, META began to end its policy for curbing the spread of "misinformation" related to COVID-19 on Facebook and Instagram.

#9 Rapid content takedowns

Social media companies could ask users to take down content that was in breach of COVID-19 "misinformation" policies, or automatically remove such content without its creators' consent. In 2021, META reported that it had removed more than 12 million pieces of content on COVID-19 and vaccines that global health experts had flagged as misinformation. YouTube has a medical misinformation policy that follows the World Health Organisation (WHO) and local health authorities guidance. In June 2021, YouTube removed a podcast in which the evidence of a reproductive hazard of mRNA shots was discussed between Dr Robert Malone and Steve Kirsch on Prof Bret Weinstein's DarkHorse channel. Teaching material that critiqued genetic vaccine efficacy data was automatically removed within seconds for going against its guidelines (see Shir Raz, Elisha, Martin, Ronnel, Guetzkow, 2022). The WHO reports that its guidance contributed to 850,000 videos related to harmful or misleading COVID-19 misinformation being removed from YouTube between February 2020 and January 2021.

PropagandaInFocus describes how LinkedIn users are subject to a policy of misinformation that prevents content being shared that 'directly contradicts guidance from leading global health organisations and public health authorities'. Dr David Thunder shared an example of his automated LinkedIn post removal for (1) sharing a scientific study that confirmed that children are at negligible risk of suffering severe disease from COVID-19, and (2) questioning the FDA decision to approve Emergency Use Authorisation for COVID-19 vaccines for children as young as 6 months old. No matter that many other studies confirm both positions, LinkedIn took this post down and threatened to restrict his account.

#10 Creating memory holes

Extensive content takedowns can serve a memory-holing aim, whereby facts and memories of the past become suppressed, erased or forgotten for political convenience. Long after the COVID-19's "pandemic", an Orwellian Ministry of Truth continues to memory-hole many health authority decision makers' failures, plus those of the mainstream media's and most national governments. As discussed here on YouTube by Mary Lou Singleton, Meghan Murphy and Jennifer Sey, such failures included: mandating masking and school-closures for children (who were never at risk); never questioning the official COVID-19 statistics (such as CNN's 'death ticker'); straight quoting Pfizer press releases as "journalism", whilst mocking individuals who chose to 'do their own research'.

Dr Mark Changizi presents four science moments on memory-holing. In X video 1 and X video 2, he highlights how memory-holing on social media is very different from its traditional form. He uses X (formerly X) as an autobiographical tool, creating long threads that serve as a form of visual memory that he can readily navigate. The unique danger of social media account removal/suspension for censorship extends beyond losing one's history-of-'use' on that platform, to include all 'mentions' related to its content (ranging from audience likes, to their reply and quote threads). This changes the centrally-controlled communication history of what has occurred on a social media platform. Such censorship violates the free speech rights of all persons who have engaged with that removed account, even its fiercest critics, as they also lose an historical record of what they said.

By contrast decentralised publications (such as hardcopy publications) are very hard for authorities to memory hole, since sourcing all hardcopies can be nearly impossible for censors. While winners can write history, historians who have access to historical statements can rewrite it. As COVID-19 memory-holing on social media platforms challenges such rewriting, its users must think around creating uncensorable records (such as the book Team Reality: Fighting the Pandemic of the Uninformed). In X video 3, he highlights that freedom of expression is a liability, as expressions push reputation chips on the table. The more claims one stake's, the greater the risk to one's reputation if they're wrong. So, another aspect of memory holing lies in an individual's potential desire for memory-holing their own platform content, should they prove to be wrong. In X video 4, Dr Changizi also spotlights that the best form of memory-holing is self-censorship, whereby individuals see other accounts been suspended, or removed for expressing particular opinions. The witnesses then decide not to express such opinions, since it might endanger their ability to express other opinions. While such absence of speech is immeasurable, it would seem the most powerful memory-holing technique. Individuals' silencing their own voices do not create history.

#11 Rewriting history

Linking back to the Fact Choke technique are attempts at historical revisionism by health authoritians, and their allies. An example of this are claims in the mainstream media that critics of the orthodox narrative were "right for the wrong reasons" regarding the failure of COVID-19 lockdowns, the many negative impacts of closing schooling, businesses, and enforcing mandatory vaccination policies.

#12 Concealing the motives behind censorship, and who its real enforcers are

Social media platforms not only hide algorithmic suppression from users, but may also be misused to hide from users the full rationale for censorship, or who is ultimately behind it. Professor David Hughes prepared a glossary of deceptive terms and their true meanings (2024, pp 194-195) to highlight how the meaning of words is damaged by propaganda. A term resonating with technique #9 is “Critical” - pretending to speak truth to power whilst turning a blind eye to deep state power structures.

The official narrative positioned COVID-19 as a (i) pandemic that had zoonotic (animal-to-human) origins, and alternate explanations were strongly suppressed. As this is the least likely explanation, other hypotheses merit serious investigation as they are more plausible. SARS-COV-2 might have stemmed from (ii) an outbreak at the Wuhan Lab's "gain of function" research, or a (iii) deliberate release in several countries from a biological weapons research project? (iv) Critics of these three explanations allege that a prior endemicity was ‘discovered’ by an outbreak of testing. Some critics even dispute the existence of SARS-COV-2, alleging that (iv) viral transmission is unproven, and that the entire COVID-19 "pandemic" is a psychological propaganda operation.

By silencing dissident views like these, social media platforms stop their users from learning about the many legitimate COVID-19 debates that are taking place between experts. This is not a matter of keeping users "secure" from "unsafe" knowledge, but rather networked publics being targeted for social control in the interests of powerful conspirators. In particular, the weaponised deception of social media censorship suits the agenda of the Global Public-Private Partnership (GPPP or G3P), and its many stakeholders. As described by Dr Joseph Mercola in The Rise of the Global Police State, each organisational stakeholder plays a policy enforcement role in a worldwide network striving to centralise authority at a global level.

Figure 2. Global Public-Private Partnership (G3P) stakeholders - sourced from IainDavis.com (2021) article at https://unlimitedhangout.com/2021/12/investigative-reports/the-new-normal-the-civil-society-deception.

G3P stakeholders have a strong stake in growing a censorship industrial complex to thwart legitimate dissent. Critiques of the official COVID-19 "pandemic" measures are just one example The industrial censorship complex also strives to stifle robust critiques of (1) climate change "science", (2) "gender affirming" (transgender) surgery, (3) mass migration (aka the Great Replacement), (4) and rigged "democratic" elections, amongst other "unacceptable" opinions. Rather than being for the public's good, such censorship actually serves the development of a transhumanist, global technocratic society. The digital surveillance dragnet of the technocracy suits the interests of a transnational ruling class in maintaining social control of Western society, and other vassals. This will be expanded upon in a future post tackling the many censorship and suppression techniques that are being against (ii) accounts.

N.B. This post is a work-in-progress and the list above is not exhaustive- kindly comment to recommend techniques that should be added, and suggestions for salient examples are most welcome.

Presentation notes for Cybermobs for online academic bullying - a new censorship option to protect The Science™ ’s status-quo

2024-01-08T10:40:00.010+02:00

Written for viewers of the Slideshare presentation.

Here is the transcript of the talk that accompanied https://www.slideshare.net/TravisNoakes/cybermobs-for-online-academic-bullying-2023pptx. For more on its background, click here.

Slide #1
Thanks for the joining this talk on how academic cybermobs can serve as a new censorship option for protecting scientific orthodoxy. Mobs that seek to silence dissenters are a small part of a much greater concern regarding the censorship of legitimate disagreement… and scientific truths online.

#2
You can all read faster than I can speak, so please do for this organizer of my presentation. After introducing yours truly and The Noakes Foundation (TNF), I am going to define the key concepts of The Science, scientific suppression, undone science, digital voice and online censorship

#3
And how digital voice in the Fifth Estate is useful for working around scientific suppression, changing science and guidelines. Dissidents who succeed in gaining public attention can face hard and soft forms of censorship, which include the distinctive actions of an academic cybermobs, plus facing as a myriad of forms of censorship on digital platforms. The talk closes with the challenges of researching academic cybermobs and a brief intro into celebrity cybermobbing research that TNF assists.

My doctorate was in Media Studies and my research is qualitative and highly interdisciplinary. It spans the fields of culture, digital media, education and the health sciences. A common thread is exploring how individual’s communicative agency relates to social structure. I am an Adjunct Scholar at CPUT, whilst also volunteering at The Noakes Foundation (TNF) for its brand development as evidenced via its new website, plus you’ll see emoji sticker designs from my Create With business in this presentation too.

TNF largely supports research into low-carbohydrate lifestyles as Big Food and Big Pharma generally don’t. I lead TNF’s Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices research project to explore how dissident researchers use digital voice for promoting their research, whilst negotiating scientific suppression and censorship from supporters of The (Current) Science™. The Science™️ is a phenomenon in Higher Education whereby tenured staff must defend the correct science of their time, arguing against alternate explanations. It has a religious overtone, as orthodox scientists strive to protect their life-long contribution of “correct beliefs” against questioning from heretical outsiders. Measures to protect The Science™️’s body of knowledge can include suppression and even “legitimate” censorship of “harmful” counter-opinions and interpretations. The Science™️ is unscientific as it does not encourage dissent’s radically different interpretations of the data.

It’s important to recognise that scientific censorship of differing opinions may only be a last-resort, because the formal assimilation of what is considered prestigious research is so powerful. Therefor before my presentation tackles academic cybermobs, the ‘safe’, incremental knowledge that Higher Education’s funders and leadership support must be critiqued: In media, a few powerful social agents can effectively control research capacity by only funding research directions that serve their business interests. At the same time, false ethical concerns can be used to delimit what’s good to research in a field. TNF’s research beneficiaries have plenty of experience with submitting research proposals that are repeatedly blocked because of dogma that “Eating fat is harmful”, so participants who are urged to do so (and eat less “healthy” sugar in highly processed foods) WILL BE harmed. Ethical compliance in academia can serve unethical ends in slowing, if not preventing, competition between paradigms. Another concern is that conflicts of interest in supporting the silent long-term interests of third-party funders are often undisclosed. Mr Bill Gates is much wealthier now that when he promised to give away his fortune… In part, thanks to the BMGF’s philanthropic support for genetic vaccine research and Mr Gates’ investments in the companies that sell this product. At worst, academic research can be likened to a buyer’s market for real-estate in which the funders as buyers strongly dictate the agenda. In the Health Sciences, huge competition exists between many researchers keen to secure scarce funding from the few large funders who might provide it.

Such public critical reflection on how funders impact academic freedom is disincentivized as career-limiting for most academics. For PANDA, TNF and any research beneficiary, Bourdieusian epistemic reflexivity can provides a vital tool to interrogate their scientific interrogation. The concept of reflexivity helps to spotlight how scholars make judgements of which research problems to focus on and what gets excluded… Perhaps a dominant paradigm can be identified that is a restrictive gatekeeper to new challengers, or a relativist ‘anything goes’ approach is missing the woods for the trees? Pierre Bourdieu’s relational critique helps us fit how our and other scholars’ interpretations link not just to disciplinary fields as agents, but are structured in relation to broader, dynamic social patterns and causalities.

For example the sociology of scientific knowledge helps us understand why economic capital is foundation to developing the other academic capitals shown here. Economic capital from donors (or long-term knowledge investors like Mr Gates) not only support the fieldwork, outputs, academic relationships and prestige in different types of capital exchange within the Higher Educaton field, but contribute to the ongoing development of academic fields and what’s considered legitimate and most valuable in them. Likewise, what is neglected or ignored as shown in the example on the right. That may range from low-cost COVID-19 treatments… to the related deprioritisation of other major health concerns, such as HIV, TB and Malaria in Africa, as described by Dr David Bell. Capital exchange also helps situate whether symbolic recognition for research is high (such for mRNA innovation), low or non-existent.

Clearly, a complex inter-relationship of extant (and future) capitals is at work in Higher Education (HE) relationships. They typically underpin a “safety first” knowledge landscape where the ideas on the right are endorsed as unquestionably “beneficial”. It is in the interest of The Science™’s business funders to maintain such a beneficient impression with HE experts serving as a bulwark of talking heads versus “science deniers”. The Science™ favors an absence of scientific controversy in HE. This absence suggests universal, expert consensus, and that there is no no need to consider new explanations as the truth is settled. Where debates do occur, Scientific Controversy research methods {such as Venturini and Munk’s ‘Controversy Mapping’ (2022)} can be applied. These help scholars frame the actors, their networks and alliances, plus the debates themselves. However, an economic focus on how capacity for which viewpoints receive funding and develop the strongest capacity would seem the most useful avenue for a sociology of scientific knowledge to develop an holistic picture for what scientific explanations are routinely supported in Higher Education… Conversely, which promising ones receive no support (or are incapacitated) as Undone Science... These evidence potential areas of scientific suppression.

#10

There is important research that could be done, but is not encouraged by the dominant orthodoxy of The Science™. Undone Science exists where research projects’ potential findings may be counter to The Science™’s funders publicity and other interests. For example, international health organisations are unlikely to fund communication studies into how the guidelines they endorsed and paid to amplify caused harms that outweighed overstated risks and inflated benefits. Similarly, multinational genetic vaccine manufacturers will not fund research regarding personal responsibility and low-cost treatments… Related findings may pose an existential threat to Big Pharma’s businesses- especially those that profits from experimental drugs being mandated and tested on so-called “patients” at their own risk.

#11

In contrast to ‘undone science’, scientific suppression speaks to impedance of research that is unfair, unjust and counter to academic standards of behaviour. In theory, academics should enjoy the right to context the prescribed orthodoxy in their academic work and lives. This right seeks to protect academics from the vested interests of other parties, giving those who’ve earned the right an opportunity to speak their truth. It’s a foundational right that should support scholars with advancing and expanding knowledge, for example by accommodating diverse voices. Without strong support for this right, scientific autonomy is unsustainable where funders’ and administrators’ needs subsume any independent scholarship.

#12

True scientific autonomy poses a risk to the powerful, especially where its findings suggest an improved, alternative way of doing things (such as eating low-carb diets for controlling diabetes, versus solely injecting Insulin meds daily). So, in our contemporary marketized universities, which increasingly rely on corporate funding, the on-the-ground financial realities of pleasing long-term funders will contradict the ideals of autonomy, objectivity and free speech. Powerful internal and external groups do not support building capacity for risky research or controversial debates that might upset powerful funders. Rather they fund incrementalistic research in support of more-of-the-same. ‘Revolutionary technology’ mRNA products simply boost Big Pharma’s existing business models. Embedded academics are keen to create debates on the importance of mandatory vaccination, rather than whether the mRNA platform is sufficiently tested to merit being termed a ‘vaccine’. Aware that there is no equal treatment or due process, especially for dissidents with a public following, skeptics protect their reputations and career trajectories by self-censoring, avoiding the time-drain of debating The Science™’s truth. If academics or students have challenging conversations, these may be policed for “wrongthink” leading to career cancelation, especially if their pursuit of objective scientific truth conflicts with the “current thing”. A university may promote “safe spaces”, but these seldom include research into controversial ideas that must confront complex ethical challenges.

#13

The market university is just one site of knowledge production in which social groups try to dominate the development of educational knowledge. Professor Henry Kwok et al. argues that the global health crisis of COVID-19 presents…a fertile ground for exploring the complex division of knowledge labour in a ‘post-truth’ era. In contrast to post-truth which has many definitions and a broad conceptualisation, knowledge production is positioned as a narrow concept well suited for exploring the social conditions of knowledge. This slide’s example shows three ‘fields’ under Rules- Each transformation of knowledge takes place in a particular field (see Table 1), within which different expert agents work. Discourse is produced in HE by a range of agents; A process of Pedagogisation then occurs in which specialist medical knowledge that is inaccessible to the public is recontextualized. Knowledge becomes translated into novel forms that non-specialist audiences might access and understand more readily. What counts as ‘valid’ knowledge and practice in the division of knowledge labour is determined by evaluative rules. Here government officials decide how COVID-19 policy should impact the public in response to guidance from experts. This analysis clarifies that researchers should explore the relations between and within each division’s fields. Such analysis reveals areas of contradiction and conflict between fields, and even agents within them.

#14

Contradictions occur between agents and agencies with different interests, which are directed by and reflected in their divergent goals. An analysis of these contradictions is helpful for broadening our understanding of where ‘post-truth’ moments lie… In this example for the WHO’s infodemic research agenda, it can illustrate examples of disinformation that the WHO’s infodemic research agenda might miss or neglect. As Dr David Bell, my father and I wrote, the WHO leads the infodemic research agenda and positions itself and its international health organisation partners to be evaluators of what “misinformation” is. This has the potential to create an intragroup contradiction, when infodemic scholars at universities research the WHO’s decisions but learn that these and related guidance have shifted dramatically, sometimes with no clear justification!

#15

For example, Abir Balan’s work here lists the key guidelines provided by the WHO for ‘mitigating the risk and impact of epidemic and pandemic influenza’. However, a cursory glance shows that the public health measures applied in 2019 would be radically altered just months later. Scholars who are dependent on research funding from the WHO (or those whose funding sustains it, such as BMGF) would seem unlikely to criticise such sudden and unexplained shifts in guidance.

#16

Conventional division of knowledge labour diagrams place the tertiary academic field as the leader of discourse production. By contrast, the division for mRNA vaccine research (see Table 3) highlights how companies manufacturing vaccines drive contemporary research and the distributive rules in knowledge labour. Only wealthy pharmaceutical companies have the financial and other resources to drive mRNA research at scale and at warp speed. This of course creates a massive conflict of interest because whether the company producing these therapies will ultimately benefit financially from the future sales of these therapies depends entirely on the published efficacy and safety results from their own research! Another contradiction exists between the deliberation and recontextualisation fields, where vaccine-manufacturing pharmaceutical companies can use their large online advertising budgets to influence content on digital platforms and fact-checking. For example, dissident health professionals and academic scholars who promoted personal responsibility faced censorship, not just on campus and by medical authorities, but also on the most popular social media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter).

#17

Such censorship of digital platforms is an important concern, since social media platforms have enabled dissident experts to network their expertise and launch conventional science projects that evolved from anecdotes into published research. As Holmberg’s scholarship shows, online low carb high fat diet advocacy was very important for contesting the flawed nutritional guidelines of the National Swedish Food Agency. This raised political awareness around low carb diets and provided vital opportunities to contest the nutritional authorities with academic research that helped to change Sweden’s nutritional guidelines.

#18

Professor William H Dutton argues in his recent The Fifth Estate book that social media platforms now form part of a Fifth Estate. In a recent email to the Association of Internet Researchers he describes how his book ‘makes a case for the internet and related media and communication technologies enabling the most important power shift of the digital age. A network power shift has been driven by enabling ordinary people to search, originate, network, collaborate, and leak information in ways than enhance their informational and communicative power. In such ways, the internet is empowering many ordinary individuals to form a more independent collectivity of networked individuals—a Fifth Estate. This network power shift enables greater democratic accountability, whilst empowering networked individuals in their everyday life and work. Suggesting these platforms importance in how digital content creators generate and share news that digital publics amplify via networked affordances.'

#19

Professor Holmberg is one of very few scholars who have written how dissident scientists have successfully exercised digital voice to change both science and government guidelines. There is a large research gap concerning empirical research into scientific censorship. We do know that it has two forms: hard and soft. Authorities try to prevent dissemination with the former… or pressurize dissidents with threats of reputational damage and exclusion from their fields of knowledge production. With dissenters’ digital voices emerging as as potent force for creating social movements via the powerful Fifth Estate

authorities’ desires to exercise censorship via Big Tech’s social media platforms is an emergent reality.

#20

Naim and Bennett (2014) proposed this 21st century censorship matrix for government influence on the production and dissemination of information and opinion. Such censorship can be obvious, in being direct and visible. In contrast, it may be hard to sport as stealthy and/or indirect.

#21

This is a similar matrix for what has been evidenced against low-carb scholars, from Australasia to South Africa, the USA onto Scandinavia. Various roleplayers aim to prevent research and teaching into the insulin resistance model inside Academia, and to create the perception amongst online audiences that the science behind LCHF is illegitimate, unscientific and promoted by self-serving charlatans.

#22

Senior scientific dissidents with a public following will be a lightning rod for such attacks, since their position highlights that the science is not settled. My father, Emeritus Professor Noakes, has made this major contribution to his institutional employer over a long academic career. He shifted to a low carb, or Banting lifestyle in 2011 and shared the benefits of a low-carb lifestyle which supported the reversal of diabetes.

#23

Heavily processed, Big Food industries and insulin-pushing Big Pharma businesses want to limit the public’s attention to low-carb science as it threatens their profits. Such powerful companies can support these strategies for breaking the causal chain between Prof Noakes’ information dissemination and individuals’ willingness to act. In Prof Noakes’ case, they could support critics who sought to delegitimate his research journal publications and books he wrote on low carb; pseudo-skeptics questioned his credibility and that of "Tim Hoax"’s associates in a myriad of publications. Their attacks could involve many forms of cyber harassment.

#24

Daniel Citron’s excellent book, ‘Hate Crimes in Cyberspace’, provides this common definition for harassment on page 124- ‘Harassment is typically understood as a willful and malicious ‘course of conduct’ directed at a person that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and that does cause the person to suffer distress.’

#25

The term ‘cyber harassment’ is necessary, as Citron points out, for describing how the reach and pervasiveness of the internet can exacerbate the injuries that targets suffer; In cyber harassment, there is an interesting paradox between how the texts, images, sounds and videos shared by cyber harassers seem banal and trivial BUT the impact of this content can actually threaten families, careers and lives! Repeated privacy invasions, threats of violence and attacks on a target’s reputation may sabotage their professional and family lives, future opportunities…and even lead to suicide or its recipient “going postal”.

#26

Fortunately, Professor Noakes is very tough and has survived nearly a decade of such cyber harassment with such experiences shared in this partially pseudonymized case.

#27

There are many activities that the perpetrators of cyber harassment can follow… All should be regarded seriously as they can result in emotional, physical and professional harm to their targets. Using Tim’s example, I’ll talk through two threats that you may be unfamiliar with: The first is ‘Google bombing’ in which a search engine page is gamed to elevate the rankings of negative and destructive pages… in this case, if you search for Prof’s ‘Lore of Nutrition’ book, but what first appears is a biased, negative review from a pediatrician… versus the many positive reviews that this book earned. A technical explanation for this high-ranking of the review is certainly not its quality… rather that it is cited on Wikipedia, which Google deems a credible source. The second threat are “digital pariah” profiles created by Wikipedia’s and Rationalwiki’s editors’ choices. Such “crowdsourced” profiles are strongly shaped by an anti-dissident editorial bias. Remember that when next you are asked to donate by the “independent” Wikipedia.

#28

Digital pariah profiles and Google Bombs are digital extensions of academic workplace mobbing techniques. Academic mobbing seeks to eject scholars from academia, involving aggressive techniques for ostracization. Recontextualising an A1 rated scientist’s career and books as flawed are clearly an example of this. Unlike organic trolling from complete strangers, colleagues in an academic cybermob can launch concerted attacks. This makes academic cybermobbing a distinct, emergent threat.

#29

Dissidents voicing pro Insulin Resistance model and offering low carbohydrate advice communicate in diverse issue arenas, ranging from the model’s science to the lifestyle’s impact on agriculture. These are PR areas that corporations, institutions and their employees have high stakes in. Dissidents may attract direct and indirect criticism from any of these agents concerned about such issues.

#30

What was notable in Prof Noakes’ case was the vast number of South African and International bodies who had stakes in challenging his opinions. Health organisations and academic institutions may also become involved in correspondence.

#31

The criticisms from work colleagues here would seem unethical and unacceptable in most workplaces. They also create a problem for the recipient in how to respond appropriately to such criticism with no germane successful examples to follow. Here we see the types of slurs used on Twitter and elsewhere that hypercritical interlocutors used in arguing that Professor Tim Noakes had morphed into a dangerous “anti-science” hack.

#32

Academic cybermobbing differs from workplace mobbing which is defined as an embodied covert process inside a university employee’s faculty’s department. Here are 16 key points covering the ways in which academic cybermobbing can be worse. In particular, the network of attacking groups and individuals is often visible, making it easy to jump on the bandwagon. Sensationalist criticism is encouraged by digital platform algorithms that reward controversy with attention - cyber mobs drive circles of outrage that contribute to spiraling cyber harassment. A dissident can easily exhaust him or herself trying to respond to many phases of criticism from different groups on many platforms across different timezones. And there may well be no institutional recourse against colleagues whose freedom of speech ironically undermines the aforesaid for dissidents. Overall there is complete asymmetry between a dissident’s capabilities to respond, and critics myriad of opportunities for attack.

#33

The agents in an academic cybermobbing can also differ to those in academic mobbing, While the latter will have private orchestrators and supporters who are all academics in a shared field, an academic cybermobbing can involve recontexualisers from other fields. For example, public criticism from trolls keen to syphon off a dissident’s public views. As a public spectacle, it is also concerning for dissidents when their colleagues simply act as witnesses and bystanders to cyber harassment.

#34

Participating in criticism of dissidents can also be used for capital exchange. Pseudo-skeptics can gain hypervisibility as thought leaders, that they cannot achieve without holding PhDs and making real contributions to academia. Likewise, reaping symbolic capital in terms of the numbers of followers they attract. Dogmatists can earn social capital bridging them with to new groups, plus their defence of the orthodoxy may reap rewards ranging from content payments to securing better academic positions.

#35

While I use negative terms such as dogmatist and pseudo-skeptic, it is important to keep in mind that the academic defenders of The Science™ do readily justify their censorship activities as well-meaning, benevolent for their peers and the public, and pro-social overall for human wellbeing.

#36

Overt censorship tactics are not only applied by platforms, but can be requested and applied by defenders of the Science™ in certain instances. For example, mobs can launch matrix attacks for deplatforming their targets. Dissidents can be reported for being in breach of platform safety… such as Twitter’s pre-Musk COVID-19 communication policy.

#37

Digital platforms have many covert censorship mechanisms that can be used for stifling free speech. Around 24 of them are listed on this slide and the next…

#38

While academic cybermobs may not be responsible for such tactics, they certainly may take actions to promote systematic censorship against the misinformation from dissidents to prevent its assumed harms. This itself may have a serious harm in serving as scientific censorship that will suppress accurate information, such as supporting a fake consensus for dysfunctional interventions.

#39

It is hard to research such censorship and there are many obstacles to researching academic cybermobs even if you can find scarce funding. These include: there not being a strong rationale or examples one can follow. One must access data under highly restrictive research user agreements. There can be much missing data (cyber harassment from private, deleted or banned accounts is not provided via APIs). Data is provided in structures that can make it hard to track key analytical foci (e.g. conversation threads on X (healthy conversations). There are challenges in cleaning the data and representing the original users’ experience (spreadsheet data vs multimodal tweets). There are also important ethical challenges in researching colleagues’ anti-social activities and producing research outputs from them!

#40

One challenging, but less ethically difficult proposition is to explore the activity of cybermobs outside academia. For example, The Noakes Foundation, Younglings Africa and the SMILR lab support PhD candidate Pinky Motshware with studying celebrity cybermobs. Their attacks led to life changing outcomes for local black male celebrities, which Pinky is preparing case studies for.

#41

Thank you for your attention and continued support.

Cybermobs for online academic bullying - a new censorship option to protect The Science™ ’s status-quo

2023-12-11T14:09:00.007+02:00

Written for individuals interested in what academic cybermobbing and the Science™is, plus how both stifle opportunities for challenging research and academic free speech in Higher Education.

I prepared the presentation below for a talk to PANDATA’s Open Society on December the 6th, 2023. Thank you to Domini Gordon for organising the talk, and Dr Piers Robinson for facilitating the questions.

This talk addresses how how academic cybermobs now serve as a new censorship option for protecting scientific orthodoxy. Such mobs attempts at silencing dissenters are a small part of a much greater concern regarding the censorship of legitimate disagreement and scientific truths at university, and online. This presentation has extensive notes, so should be easy to follow (or you can follow the Open Society Rumble account and view my uploaded talk once it's shared there).

Feedback to the presentation was positive, with the audience agreeing that it is necessary to formalise a critical space within universities where viewpoint diversity and boundary-breaking research can be promoted. For example, universities could consider how to support apolitical funding for adversarial research collaborations. Universities must also motivate for funding from government to address the lack of funding outside medicine for innovative, and potentially controversial, research. Without action to support such academic freedom, funders' biases will continue to constrain all research conflicting with their interests.

There is also an opportunity to highlight institutional entanglements from corporates (for example, AstraZeneca and Oxford University), plus to contribute research on the drivers for censorship across different issue arenas, and the agents involved (stretching across broadcast media, multinational companies, political lobbies, intelligence agencies and government).

The Noakes Foundation, Pandata and other dissident research supporters should also work to connect to groups working for academic free speech, and mutually promote their work. These include:

The recently launched University of Austin
FIRE Foundation for Individual Rights and Free Expression
The Brownstone Institute
Quilette
Heterodox Academy
Free Speech Union
Academic Freedom for All
Do Better Academia
FreeX and LoofWired

Likewise, for anti-bullying groups, such as:

P.S. My X (formerly Twitter) list for 'Anti workplace bullying' features these and other groups.

The audience suggested several individuals who have been targets of academic cybermobbing for germane case studies. These included three past speakers to Open Society, Professor Michaela Schippers, Dr Laurens Buijs and Professor Paul Frijters.

I enjoyed learning from the audience, and hope to present to the Open Society in the not-too-distant future with in-depth research examples for academic cybermobbing. These may present interesting contrasts to the Emeritus Professor's case written about in 'Distinguishing online academic bullying'!

If you have any questions about this presentation or concerns, please post a blog comment below.

Noteworthy disparities with four CAQDAS tools: explorations in organising live Twitter (now known as X) data

2023-09-26T17:36:00.006+02:00

Written for researchers interested in extracting live X (formerly Twitter) data via Qualitative Data Analysis Software tools

Social Science Computer Review (SSRC) has just published a paper by yours truly, Dr Pat Harpur and Dr Corrie Uys to https://doi.org/10.1177/08944393231204163. As the article's title suggests, we focus on the contrasting the Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS) packages that currently support live Twitter data imports.

QDAS tools that support live data extraction are a relatively recent innovation. At the time of our fieldwork, four prominent QDAS provided this: only ATLAS.ti™, NVivo™, MAXQDA™ and QDA Miner™ had Twitter data import functionalities. Little has been written concerning the research implications of differences between their functionalities, and how such disparities might contribute to contrasting analytical opportunities. Consequently, early-stage researchers may experience difficulties in choosing an apt QDAS to extract live data for Twitter academic research.

In response to both methodological gaps, we spent almost a year working on a software comparison to address the research question (RQ) 'How do QDAS packages differ in what they offer for live Twitter data research during the organisational stage of qualitative analysis?'. Comparing their possible disparities seems worthwhile since what QDAS cannot, or poorly, support may strongly impact researchers’ microblogging data, its organisation, and scholars’ potential findings. In the preliminary phase of research, we developed a features checklist for each package, based on their online manuals, product descriptions and forum feedback related to live Twitter imports. This checklist confirmed wide-ranging disparities between QDAS, which were not unexpected since they are priced very differently- ranging from $600 for an ATLAS.ti subscription, to $3,650 for a QDAMiner (as part of the Provalis Research’s ProSuite package, which also includes WordStat 10 & Simstat).

To ensure that each week's Twitter data extractions could produce much data for potential evaluation, we focused on extracting and organising communiqués from the national electrical company, the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom). ‘Load-shedding’ is the Pan South African Language Board’s word of the year for 2022 (PanSALB, 2022), due to it most frequent use in credible print, broadcast and online media. Invented as a euphemism by Eskom’s public-relations team, load-shedding describes electricity blackouts. Since 2007, planned rolling blackouts have been used in a rotating schedule for periods ‘where short supply threatens the integrity of the grid’ (McGregor & Nuttall, 2013). In the weeks up to, and during, the researchers’ fieldwork, Eskom, and the different stages of loadshedding strongly trended on Twitter. These tweets reflected the depth of public disapproval, discontent, anger, frustration, and general concern.

QDAS packages commonly serve as tools that researchers can use for four broad activities in the qualitative analysis process (Gilbert, Jackson, & di Gregorio, 2014). These are (a) organising- coding sets, families and hyperlinking; (b) exploring - models, maps, networks, coding and text searches; (c) reflecting - through memoing, annotating and mapping; and (d) integrating qualitative data through memoing with hyperlinks and merging projects (Davidson & di Gregorio, 2011; Di Gregorio, 2010; Lewins & Silver, 2014).

Notwithstanding the contrasts in the costs for different QDAS packages, it was still surprising how much the QDAS tools varied for the first activity, (a) ‘organising data’ in our qualitative research project: Notably, the quantum of data extracted for the same query differed, largely due to contrasts in the types and amount of data that the four QDAS could extract. Variations in how each supported visual organisation and thematic analysis also shaped researchers’ opportunities for becoming familiar with Twitter users and their tweet content.

Such disparities suggest that choosing a suitable QDAS for organising live Twitter data must dovetail with a researcher’s focus: ATLAS.ti accommodates scholars focused on wrangling unstructured data for personal meaning-making, while MAXQDA suits the mixed-methods researcher. QDA Miner’s easy-to-learn user interface suits a highly efficient implementation of methods, whilst NVivo supports relatively rapid analysis of tweet content.

We hope that these findings might help guide Twitter social science researchers and others in QDAS tool selection. Our research has suggested recommendations for these tools developers to follow for potentially improving the user experience for Twitter researchers. Future research might explore disparities in other qualitative research phases, or contrast data extraction routes for a variety of microblogging services. More broadly, an opportunity for a methodological contribution exists regarding research that can define a strong rationale for the software comparison method.

The authors greatly appreciate the SSRC's editor, Professor Stephen Lyon, advice on improving our final manuscript. We also thank The Noakes Foundation for its grant AFSDV02- our interdisciplinary software comparison would not have been possible without funding to cover subscriptions to the most extensive versions of MAXQDA Analytics Pro and QDA Miner. All authors are affiliated with the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) and appreciate CPUT's provision of licensed versions of ATLAS.ti.

Please comment below if you have any questions or comments regarding our paper?

Four categories for Anti-Bullying Apps (ABAs), with examples for each

2023-08-21T10:23:00.060+02:00

Written for people interested in learning about the wide range of anti cyber harassment apps that exist.

There are many Anti Bullying Apps (ABAs) seeking to inform and assist recipients of cyber harassment. Some ABAs may even assist cyberbullies with curbing their anti-social behaviours. ABAs vary in their specific functions and features. These can be categorised into three groups [1]: (1) general protection, (2) information, and (3) reporting to authorities. This post suggests a fourth, (4) in-platform interventions (such as Instagram's anti-bullying tools). This accommodates tools that are distinct in being specifically developed to exist inside a particular platforms (such as WhatsApp, versus being a standalone app outside it). Such sub-apps (or tools) may also combine different aspects of the top three categories:

1 General protection

1.1 Bark at https://www.bark.us/learn/cyberbullying is an online protection tools for US parents to limit the amount of time their children spend on various websites, view their children’s browsing history, and for receiving alerts when keywords and phrases that might indicate bullying or harassment in their child’s electronic communications (such as text messages). Mentioned in [1].

1.2 BullStop at https://www.bullstop.io/ aims to help young people's proactive combating of cyberbullying, and monitors social media accounts by regularly reviewing messages as they are received. It uses artificial intelligence for analysing these- flagging offensive content like abuse, bullying, insults, pornography, spam and threats. [1]

2 Information

2.1 ActionPoint aims to help families build stronger communication skills, set healthy boundaries for social media use, define a teen's cyberbullying risk and identify instances of cyberbullying. Ultimately its designers seek to decrease the negative outcomes associated with cyberbullying (view app's research at https://ysilva.cs.luc.edu/BullyBlocker/publications&posters.html).

2.2 Bully Mysteries (available as an Android package to download and install from https://apkcombo.com/bully-mysteries-4cv/udk.android.apptoapp.mystery.l1c5/) is an interactive mystery app that includes the chapter, 'The Case of the Cyberbully'- In it, 'A defenseless victim is being mercilessly harassed by someone. But who could it be and for what purpose? Katie and TC are extra motivated to solve this case and help protect those who can’t protect themselves!'. [6]

2.3 ClearCyberbullying (available as an Android package to download and install from https://apkcombo.com/clearcyberbullying/com.Clear.CyberBullying/) uses Drama Education for creating awareness on cyber-bullying among students and then develop an education video-games exploiting traditional “Puppet characters” or “shadow theatres” coming from the six partners countries. The project at https://www.clearcyberbullying.eu/ seems to have been discontinued. [6]

2.4 Cyberbullying by Grey Lab (available as an Android package to download and install from https://apkgk.com/com.iggnovation.cyberbull) provides information on 'what cyberbullying is, why it works and how to prevent it'. [6]

2.5 Cyberbullying First-Aid was developed in Germany by the klicksafe Youth panel for Android and Apple users. https://www.klicksafe.de/en/materialien/cyber-mobbing-erste-hilfe-app described how the app includes short videos from the coaches Tom and Emilia for recipients of cyberbullying. The app gives 'those affected concrete tips on how to behave, encourage them and accompany in the first steps to take action against cyberbullying. In addition to legal background information and links to anonymous counseling centers, there are tutorials on how to report, block or delete offensive comments on social media platforms such as Instagram, YouTube and TikTok or in the messenger WhatsApp.' The app is available in English, French, German, Luxembourgish, Lithuanian and Slovenian, dependant on the user's device's language setting. [6]

2.6 Cyberbullying Vaccine (available in Korea) aims to provide parents, guardians and other adults with an indirect experience of cyberbullying. [2]

2.7 Klikd at https://klikd.co.za/the-app/ covers many topics, ranging from how to manage tricky people online and cyberbullying, to online reputation to phone addiction. Each module contains multi-faceted components for keeping t/weens engaged throughout their learning journey. The app includes talks by teens, card games and quizzes, and offers plenty of opportunity for reflection. Parents and schools as also supported through updates. [9]

2.8 Know Bullying app at https://healthysafechildren.org/knowbullying-app gives US guardians and parents information on how to discuss online risks and cyberbullying with their children. The app was developed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to; explain the warning signs of bullying, and to offer advice for parents on talking to their kids about bullying. It includes important strategies for preventing bullying for kids in varied age groups (3-6, 7-12, and older). [3]

2.9 Sit With Us is a US Apple app developed by a 16 year old. Natalie Hampton wanted to help pupils set up inclusive lunches with classmates who typically eat alone. [7]

2.10 SpeakOut! aims to help children and other vulnerable people with accessing the internet safely. The UK app presents storylines that tackle the topics of cyber bullying, grooming, sexting, fake news, body image and racism. The app was developed in response to 'the growing need for support specifically targeting 10-14 year olds as they face increased challenges as preteens and young teenagers growing up in a highly connected environment.' For example, the app tackles cyberbullying by featuring tools and techniques that help users recognise online bullying, and how to respond. [7]

2.11 Stand Up to Bullying shows an interactive educational video featuring Lucky Kat, The Kat Patrol, The Cheese Posse and Daren the Lion. It teaches children to identify the different types bullying and to know what to do when they see it happening. The app contains five (5) chapters of informative animation that cover verbal bullying, physical attack and nonverbal bullying. The final chapter instructs them on how to make a plan for when they see any of these situations. Each chapter closes with question and answer sections to support open discussion with kids and students. [7]

2+ Informational games

2.12 Cyberbully Zombies Attack at https://toucharcade.com/games/cyberbully-zombies-attack was developed by NetSmartz® Workshop, a program of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children® and Gamelearn. The online game helps kids, tweens and teens learn how to handle cyberbullying [6]. It was funded by Sprint through its 4NetSafety(SM) program.

2.13 Cybersafe is a game for Android and Apple that Goffs School UK students created to help children deal with cyberbullying. [6] The app contains 3 fun mini games - each tackling a different issue chosen by the students: 'Detective Charlee: An endless flying game which teaches children to collect cyberbully evidence, by taking screenshots of nasty comments on social networks, to email to a trusted friend or adult. PaS$w0rdBlockr: A challenging puzzle game which encourages children to keep their passwords safe and be wary of people hacking their online accounts. Goof Run: An endless running game with helpful cyberbully advice along the way, set in a colourful chatroom.'

2.14 Professor Garfield Cyberbullying features a Garfield comic strip with examples of cyberbullying and advice on how to deal with it. These are followed by a short interactive quiz that tests what kids have learned. It is available on Apple. [6]

3 Reporting to authorities

3.1 117 Chat at https://apkcombo.com/117-chat/com.ucs.police_chat/ provides school violence-related real-time chatting in consultation with South Korea's National Police Agency. [2]

3.2 BRIM: Bullying Reduction Intervention and Monitoring provides tools and resources to US teachers, principals, counselors, and others in school communities to help tackle bullying.

3.3 Bully Button from https://bullybutton.fortresgrand.com complements US schools' anti-bullying programs by providing a multi-platform process for administrative intervention in situations of; abuse, bullying, cyberbullying, and social aggression.

3.4 CyberBully Hotline apk (available as an Android package to download and install from https://www.apkmonk.com/app/com.groupcast.android.cyberbullingapp/) provides 'schools with their own unique local phone number, to which students and parents can send a 100% anonymous text or voice message. School administrators can then send back replies which go directly to the person sending the report, without ever knowing their phone number or identity. This guaranteed anonymity provides a welcoming environment for addressing issues of bullying, violence, fighting, theft, harassment, and safety.' [6]

3.5 Dunk A Bully at https://www.dunkabully.com aims to educate users about bullying by providing examples and questions and answers to learn from. It also enables users to select a counselor for messaging anonymously [8].

3.6 FamiSafe at https://famisafe.wondershare.com is one of five apps described in resource [3] which parents/guardians can install on their child/ward's phone. Available on Android, Chrome, Kindle, iOS, Mac and Windows, FamiSafe empowers users to 'locate their kid’s phone, monitor app usage, site usage, and screen time'. The app also allows parents/guardians to filter web content and block certain apps.

3.7 Guardian Angel at https://guardianangelmobile.com is available on Android and Apple. It is designed to help children and teenagers 'cope with the horrors of childhood violence such as bullying and family related problems.' It includes: access to a 24hr crisis hotlines; optional, anonymous reporting directly to the child’s counsellor or social worker; playlists for affirmation, meditation and motivation; and journaling options. [6]

3.8 Speak Up! For Someone at https://www.gospeakup.com enables students to record bullying and to report it anonymously and securely to school officials. It's available for Apple users, and Android ones. [8]

3.9 STOPit Solutions at https://www.stopitsolutions.com allows individuals (including parents, peers, and community members) to anonymously report harmful images, messages, and videos to government entities that can provide victims with help. Individuals can also connect with trained crisis counsellors from the Crisis Text Line™ for assistance. [3]

3.10 Toot Toot is an Apple app funded by the UK's Department for Education which gives 'pupils and parents a voice by providing a safe and anonymous way to speak about concerns such as bullying, harassment, mental health and racism.' Its key features are: anonymous reporting from parents and pupils, from anywhere. Staff can log safeguarding and behaviour incidents to create a full picture. Admins and mentors receive notifications when new cases are logged. Users can quickly and simply manage their cases. Admins and mentors get a whole organisation overview to identify key trends in data. [7]

3.11 Upstander is an Android app at https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.ayaan.upstander develop as a student initiative to make schools bullying-free. It is a mobile platform through which students can report bullying instances at varying degrees of anonymity. [8]

3+ Reporting to self

3.12 ReThink – Stop Cyberbullying at https://www.rethinkwords.com/whatisrethink is a non-intrusive service that seeks to detect and stop cyberbullying before it does damage. Its users are flagged to reconsider potentially offensive content before re-sharing it. [5]

4 Platform-specific

4.1 BullyBlock or BullyBlocker for Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/thebullyblocker) seems to have been superseded by the Action Point app (see 2.1) . BullyBlock resulted from research that 'designed, implemented and evaluated automated cyberbullying identification tools for social networks'. The mobile app for Facebook included several such tools. [1]

4.2 Instagram's Rethink and Restrict are described in https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48916828. Rethink uses 'artificial intelligence to recognise when text resembles the kind of posts that are most often reported as inappropriate by users'. Rethink prompts users to pause and consider what they are saying before sharing content flagged as potentially being inappropriate. Restrict is 'designed to help teens filter abusive comments without resorting to blocking others - a blunt move that could have repercussions in the real world'.

4.3 Shushmoji® for WhatsApp is an anti-chat harassment resource (for Apple or Android users) that provides end-of-conversation stickers and information on tactics individuals can use against chat harassment. See general FAQs at https://www.createwith.net/shushmoji-app-faqs.

4.4 Vodafone’s #BeStrong Emoji Keyboard is available on Android devices. This keyboard developed from the Be Strong Online anti-bullying initiative. A suite of #BeStrong support emojis aimed help young people convey compassion and support to friends who are being bullied online. The idea for a support emoji was first brought to Vodafone by anti-bullying ambassador Monica Lewinsky. The app's emojis were chosen by 'almost 5,000 young people around the world, who identified with them as symbols of compassion and solidarity'. [7]

Conclusion

The examples of apps above are largely from the developed world's Anglo- and Asian spheres, with the full usability of these apps often being restricted to their country of origin (notably, Korea, the UK and US). Kindly let me know of any other interesting resources and/or ABAs in the moderated comments section below? Or you contact me directly. I will update this post on an ongoing basis with suitable recommendations for new apps/resources, plus new ones my research uncovers.

P.S. There are several apps listed in the resources below that are not highly-ranked for Google searches, nor available via the Apple or Android app stores (or may be hidden from searches from South Africa). These are Back Off Bullies [6], Be Cybersafe Game [6], Cyberbullying by Maple Tree [6], Cyberbully Hotline [6], Delete Cyberbullying [6], I Am Witness and Put an End to Cyberbullying [6].

N.B. The many discontinued anti-bullying apps suggest the importance of ongoing investment of human and financial capital. Sustaining ABAs availability requires costly resources to address code updates, app promotion and ongoing refinement.

Resources

[1] U.S. Parents' Intentions to Use Anti-Bullying Apps: Insights from a Comprehensive Model (2023) by Brittany Wheeler, Katie Baumel, Deborah Hall and Yasin Silva describes new technological avenues for parents and other guardians to reduce their child’s cyberbullying risk. The authors focus on understanding the factors that predict parents' intentions to use ABAs.

[2] 'The application of anti-bullying smartphone apps for preventing bullying in South Korea' by Insoo Oh in Tackling Cyberbullying and Related Problems - Innovative Usage of Games, Apps and Manga.

[3] 'Most useful bullying apps' at https://famisafe.wondershare.com/anti-bullying/usefull-anti-bullying-apps-or-ideas-for-parental-control.html.

[4] 5 Anti-Bullying Apps Every Family Should Have

[5] Anti-bullying apps are popular, but do they work?, Wyman, Christina (2022) in Wired magazine features an interesting critique of ABAs' limits, and their potential value, https://www.wired.com/story/anti-bullying-apps-schools-children.

[6] Topcu-Uzer, C., & Tanrıkulu, İ. (2018). 3 - Technological solutions for cyberbullying. In M. Campbell & S. Bauman (Eds.), Reducing Cyberbullying in Schools (pp. 33-47). Academic Press. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-811423-0.00003-1

[7] Top 10 anti-bullying apps at https://www.kcom.com/home/discover/categories/tech-corner/top-10-anti-bullying-apps/

[8] Searching #Antibullyingapp via Instagram - https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/antibullyingapp/

[9] Recommended by this blog's readers.

[10] Pilkington, Ben. (2018/2025) A Comprehensive Cyberbullying Guide for Parents. https://www.wizcase.com/blog/a-comprehensive-cyberbullying-guide-for-parents.

Twitter Support must do better for helping celebrity and public victims of a global diet phishing scam!

2023-06-29T16:04:00.034+02:00

Worldwide, diet scammers are marketing fake “endorsements” from celebrities across social media adverts, search engine ads and online content to phish victims’ financial details. The sheer volume of content the fraudsters produce is very difficult for celebrities and their representatives to tackle alone. One major obstacle to stopping the false marketing of “miracle weightloss products” is the reluctance of social media platforms to take down fake accounts and ads timeously. The fraudsters typically run the ads regionally for a few days in which they are displayed to hundreds of thousands of people. Just a fraction of an ad’s viewers need to share their financial details for the scam to be highly profitable!

This post presents the underwhelming example of reporting diet phishing accounts to Twitter Support as a way to spotlight the difficulties of tackling fraud via social media platforms. Hopefully publicly shaming @TwitterSupport will encourage its leaders to help address the global diet phishing scam properly, whilst also providing decent reporting options for celebrities and their representatives:

South African celebrities hijacked in fake diet adverts

A major factor in the “success" of this global scam (it has been running since 2014!) is the poor response from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and other social media companies to formal requests to close fake accounts and their advertisement campaigns. Their ineffective responses are legally shortsighted: social media companies that repeatedly permit diet phishing ads on their platforms are complicit in a fraud, and possibly in the delict of passing off. For example, in South Africa, the diet phishing scam has undoubtedly harmed the reputation of Prof Tim Noakes and The Noakes Foundation through its fraudulent, direct misrepresentation, of fake products. These have certainly confused the public and @TheNoakesF has lost goodwill from the many victims of the fraud’s misrepresentation!

Prof Noakes, is just one of many well-known individuals whose identities have been hijacked. The South African version of the scam has seen: Minki van der Westhuizen, Jeannie D (@Jeannieous), Basetsana Kumalo (@basetsanakumalo), Nkhensani Nkosi (@NkhensaniNkosi1), Shashi Naidoo (@SHASHINAIDOO), Tumi Morake (@tumi_morake), Dawn King (@DawnTKing), Ina Parmaan (@inapaarman) and Dr Shabir Madhi (@ShabirMadh) all having their reputations tarnished.

Since Prof Noakes’ identity was first hijacked in 2020, The Noakes Foundation (TNF) and partners (such as Dr Michael Mol and Hello Doctor) have tried many options to stop the scam. For example, TNF developed and publicised content against it via blogposts, such as Keto Extreme Scams Social Media Users Out of Thousands. TNF also produced these videos: Professor Tim Noakes vs. Diet Phishing: Exposing a Global Scam with Fake Celebrity Endorsements, Dr Michael Mol highlighting Diet Scams and Prof Noakes Speaks Out Against The Ongoing Diet Scam. Sadly, The Noakes Foundation’s repeated warnings to the public don’t seem to be making much difference in preventing new victims!

American, Australian, British and Swedish celebs hijacked, too!

In the United States, the diet phishing scam has also stolen the identities of major celebrities. Most are in popular TV franchises: Oprah Winfrey (@Oprah), Dr Mehmet Oz (@DrOz) Dr Phil (@DrPhil), Dolly Parton (@DollyParton), Kelly Clarkson (@kellyclarkson), the Kardashian Family (@kardashianshulu + @KimKardashian), Kelly Osbourne (@KellyOsbourne), Chrissy Teigen (@chrissyteigen), Martha Maccallum (@marthamaccallum), Blake Shelton (@blakeshelton) and #TomSelleck 🥸. It’s a Magnum opus of fraud!

Amazing female celebs in the United Kingdom have also seen their identities stolen. Diet phishing scammers have hijacked the IDs of Holly Willis (@hollywills), Amanda Holden (@AmandaHolden), Anne Hegerty (@anne_hegerty) and Dawn French (@Dawn_French). Even the British (@RoyalFamily) has not been immune, with the targeting of Catherine, the Princess of Wales (@KensingtonRoyal) and the Former Queen Elisabeth II, RIP and God Bless. Sadly, Meghan Duchess of Sussex, has been targeted too...

Down Under, well-known Australian personalities, such as its national treasure Maggie Beer (@maggie_beer) and Farmer Wants A Wife host Sam Armytage (@sam_armytage) have had their identities misused for fake #weightloss endorsements. And also Mr Embarrassing Bodies Down Under himself, Dr Brad McKay (@DrBradMcKay).

In Sweden, Dr Andreas Eenfeldt (@DrEenfeldt from @DietDoctor), another leader in the low carbohydrate movement, has been targeted in promotions of fake #keto products. Sadly, the fake ads seem to generate far more attention and action than his or my father's health advice!

N.B. The examples above are not extensive in terms of all victims. We largely know of celebrities in the Anglosphere whose identities were stolen, then featured in English language reports and related search engine results.

Deceptive "Tim Noakes" Twitter accounts market Keto Gummies

Just as the celebrity names stolen for the fake ads change often, so do the product names. A few examples of these fake names are Capsaicin, FigurWeightLossCapsules, Garcinia, Ketovatru and KetoLifePlus. Be warned that new "products" are added every month! One particularly common term used in the scammers' product names is "Keto Gummies". A recent Twitter search for "Tim Noakes keto gummies" suggested many fake accounts in Figure 1 (just the top view!), plus diverse "product" names.

Figure 1. Twitter search results for Tim Noakes keto gummies (fake product accounts) (20 June, 2023)

Twitter Support does not think fake accounts are misleading and deceptive?!

These accounts have clearly been setup to fraudulently market "keto gummies" by suggesting an association with "Tim Noakes". So, the logical response for any representative of The Noakes Foundation would seem to be reporting each fake account for violating Twitter’s misleading and deceptive identities policy, right?

Figure 2. Reporting the fake Tim Noakes Keto Gummies account to Twitter support

This is a very time consuming process- in the first place, the same complaint must be individually submitted for each account. Secondly, the representative reporting these complaints must also upload and/or email related proof of ID, business and legal documentation to Twitter Support before it will consider investigating whether impersonation is taking place.

Fake Twitter accounts, including those below, were reported to Twitter, with support documentation:
@NoakesGumm28693 0327118996    @TimNoakesHoax 0327120384
@TimGummies 0327119602                @NoakesGumm91126 0327119675
@gummies_tim 0327120030                @TimNoakes_ZA 0327119741
@tim_gummies 0327118910                @NoakesSouth 0327118634
@timnoakesketo0 0327119362              @NoakesGumm22663 0327119487

In each case, @TwitterSupport replied that the following accounts are NOT in violation of Twitter’s misleading and deceptive identities policy. This would seem to contradict the obvious evidence that Tim Noakes' name has been hijacked by scammers for misleading victims with a fake product!

The Noakes Foundation has supplied its legal team with Twitter's related correspondence for review. I will update this post as developments progress (or fail to!) with the remarkably unhelpful and potentially criminally negligent @TwitterSupport.

This "Tim Noakes keto gummies" Twitter account is not deceptive?!

Figure 3. Fake @TimNoakesKetoGummies account

Figure 3 shows a typical example of a fake account's style. It uses Tim Noakes' name, plus stock photography in marketing a non-existent product. It only tweeted on May the 24th, and is followed by one person. Any knowledgeable complaint reviewer would surely consider this to be a case of a scammer creating a misleading and deceptive account for gaming Twitter's search engine. However, Twitter Support does not agree, nor explain why in its generic correspondence around each scam account.

From stealing victims' banking details to delivering dubious products

As fitness expert Reggie Wilson (@fitforfreelance) deftly explains in his 30 second video, Keto Gummies cannot work. It is most concerning that The Noakes Foundation has received reports that scammers are now delivering a physical product to South African victims. Not only are fake #KetoGummies products being marketed locally via takealot.com BUT are also offered internationally via Amazon.com, and possibly other major online retailers!

Just as the scammers link themselves to celebs on Twitter, they also target the popular television franchises they're from. Notably: AmericasNextTopModel, DragonsDen, The Kardashians, The Oprah Show and Shark Tank. On Twitter, national businesses are also being misrepresented as selling these fake products, such as Walmart in the US, Jean Coutu pharmacies in Canada and Dischem in South Africa. Type in keto gummies into these retailers search engines and you will see that many options pop up, some seemingly associated with popular celebrities and TV franchises.

The Noakes Foundation is keen to work with affected celebrities, their representatives and business to raise the pressure on social media companies to make a proper response to the scammers and fake ads they host. Do let us know if you would like to help using the comments below, or by emailing reportdietscam@gmail.com.

Recommendations for QDAS developers from 'Noteworthy disparities with four CAQDAS tools- explorations in organising live Twitter data', forthcoming

2023-06-22T16:47:00.001+02:00

Dr Corrie Uys, Dr Pat Harpur and I are working on a manuscript that explores the research implications of differences in Qualitative data analysis software (QDAS) packages’ support for live Twitter data imports. This paper's software comparison contrasts the four prominent QDAS tools that support such imports, namely ATLAS.ti™, NVivo™, MAXQDA™ and QDA Miner™. We discuss key discrepancies in their use during the organisational phase of qualitative research and address related methodological issues.

Outside the paper's scope, our software comparison also uncovered several suggestions that developers of these QDAS tools might follow to improve the user experience for Twitter researchers:

1 Make tweets easier to sort & link them to their original context

QDAS typically present a myriad of isolated tweets in one spreadsheet document that seems to divorce tweets from their conversational context. Researchers would benefit from being able to order and sort tweets as data. QDAS should also provide the option to quickly link to the original tweet in Twitter. Only NVivo made it relatively efficient to see the original context of a tweet in a Twitter discussion.

2 Provide more extensive support for modes and Twitter affordances

Linking to the original context with Twitter is particularly important where audio, emoji, font, image, and video modes and Twitter affordances for hashtagging and @mentions disappear. These may not be imported into QDAS spreadsheets as QDAS tools differ widely in the data they extract for Twitter affordances and modes.

3 Support conversational analysis

Research into Twitter conversations was poorly supported by all four QDAS tools. Each presented a myriad of isolated tweets, with no way to display the original conversational thread. QDAS and Twitter should work together for providing qualitative researchers with ready access to Twitter exchanges. The added benefits of API2 functionality (such as conversation tracking) seem MIA in QDAS. Such integration would seem a useful step for promoting wider research into healthy conversations that Twitter described in 2018 as an important business priority.

4 Provide examples for live Twitter data analysis

QDAS companies that provide Twitter import functionality should provide resources that address not only how to extract data, but also examples of how their software is used in analysing microblogging data. While Twitter is actively encouraging and training academic researchers to transform raw JSON into CSV files for research purposes, QDAS companies seem to provide scant examples for live Twitter data analysis. The online resources they provide could be improved by adding examples. For example, we look forward to seeing how QDAS are used in analysing Twitter conversation threads.

5 Spotlight the black box of Twitter data organisation

QDAS developers could make the ‘black box’ of Twitter data organisation visible by showing a model of the data undergirding the tweets, and also the spreadsheet's data excludes. Researchers could benefit from such an overview for the great deal of Twitter fields that are missing.

6 Missing in extraction

Another black box concerns the process of data extraction from Twitter. While the functionality of running live imports for select criteria is efficient, more information could be shared regarding the context of the extraction. For example, what are the internal and external limits on the maximum number of tweets a QDAS can import.

Do let us know what you think of these suggestions by submitting a comment below, or contacting me.

Use the Shushmoji app to learn anti chat harassment tactics and end anti-social conversations with WhatsApp chat stickers

2023-04-15T13:55:00.009+02:00

Written for people wanting to learn strategies for ending chat harassment in WhatsApp and use chat stickers for this.

Apple users can now feed their trolls with Shushmoji chat stickers in WhatsApp using the free Shushmoji app at https://apps.apple.com/us/app/shushmoji/id1639680705. The app works on Mac, iPhone, iPad and iPods with an M1 chip (or later) and running Mac OS.11 (or later).

The Shushmoji app's sticker packs cover garden-variety trolls, academic bullies, silly asses, pesky sinners and torturous types. Check out two examples of their use below {or there's five here, thirty examples here or via Pinterest !} Download the app to use its free set with 30 stickers; premium sets are available for in-app purchase.

Create With Cape Town's Shushmoji app is also available for Android users at https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.createwith.shushmoji&hl=en&gl=US. It's compatible with Android phones and tablets.

Stop silly troll! chat sticker example	Stop sinner! chat sticker example

The Shushmoji app also offers twenty anti-chat harassment tactics cards. These fall under four strategies for stopping trolls: ignore, report, respond and prevent. Install the app to scroll through all twenty cards on your phone or tablet.

Ignore strategy index card	Ignore tactic card

Why develop a Shushmoji app?

In the first place, there are few end-of-conversation chat sticker designs. Secondly, there also seemed a need for an anti-chat harassment cyber toolkit that targets of cyberbullying could quickly access for tactics. Hopefully knowledge of these can helps expand cyberbullying recipients' understanding of what else is possible than simply being silent and enduring harassment!

Being silent echoes the conventional advice, Do Not Feed the Trolls (DNFTT). It reflects how there are many downsides to communicating with harassers, since they are likely to be mentally unstable (Barnes, 2018). Online trolls score low in the Big Five Personality scores of agreeability and conscientiousness, but score high in Dark Tetrad traits of- narcissism, Machiavellianism, sub-clinical psychopathy and/or everyday sadism. Attempting rational engagement with perpetrators of cyber harassment is likely to provoke retaliatory attacks in excess of the original abuse. This may be further escalated via circling cyber vultures and mobs. Such amplification is common to unmoderated platforms where destructive, hostile and bigoted behaviour is rewarded with likes and re-shares.

While the responsibility for harassment should lie with its perpetrators, society often blames the victims for “putting themselves out there” (Citron, 2014). This reflects a slow-changing social reality in which support for targets of cyber harassment grows at a glacial pace; whether in institutional and organisational culture and policies, or in law and its enforcement. Individuals who fight back against cyber harassment must take a risky gamble in weighing up this battle's pros and cons. For many, the potential benefits of nudging discussion towards norms of respect, whilst repairing any reputational damage, seem unlikely to outweigh the severe downsides of escalating cyber-harassment.

Create With Cape Town's end-of-conversation stickers were designed to support targets' ability to disengage from cyberbullies. Unlike the DNFTT tactic, it does not mute their voice and right-of-reply.
These chat stickers can help end chats-gone-bad, whilst showing trolls and their audiences what one thinks of their behaviour.

Support using the Shushmoji app

Helpful FAQs on using the Shushmoji app are available at https://www.createwith.net/shushmoji-app-faqs/: These cover general users at http://bit.ly/3RfrAIG, Android users at http://bit.ly/3Hlt2VB and Apple users at http://bit.ly/3Y5akZ5.

Shushmoji app credits

Two intern teams from Younglings Africa coded the Shushmoji app in 2020 and 2021: Led by Russel Magaya, 2020’s Android development team comprised Diego Mizero, Shane Abrahams, Ethan Jansen and Johan van der Merwe.

In 2021 the development team focused on Apple and Android versions. It was led by Joshua Schell with Lindani Masinga and consisted of Zaakirah Abrams, Arthur Butler, Rayaan Karlie and Zainab Hartley.

Younglings Developer Solutions' Michael Pretorius completed the Android development in 2022 and the Apple roll-out in early 2023.

Shushmoji feedback

We trust you enjoy using the Shushmoji app. Any comments, concerns or suggestions on the #Shushmoji app, can be shared with me via Create with Cape Town’s email form at https://www.createwith.net/contact/. Do be patient for a reply- it may take one full working week for non-urgent correspondence.

Alternately, hashtag #Shushmoji and #CreateWithCapeTown and give a shout-out to our Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn or Twitter accounts. Cheers!

A summary of 'Who is watching the World Health Organisation? ‘Post-truth’ moments beyond infodemic research'

2022-12-23T09:51:00.007+02:00

Written for infodemic/disinfodemic researchers and those interested in the scientific suppression of COVID-19 dissidents.

Dr David Bell, Emeritus Professor Tim Noakes and my opinion piece 'Who is watching the World Health Organisation? ‘Post-truth’ moments beyond infodemic research’ is available at https://td-sa.net/index.php/td/article/view/1263. It was written for a special issue, 'Fear and myth in a post-truth age’ from the Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa (see call at https://aosis.co.za/call-for-papers-special-collection-in-journal-for-transdisciplinary-research/).

A major criticism this paper raises is that infodemic research lacks earnest discussion on where health authorities’ own choices and guidelines might be contributing to ‘misinformation’, ‘disinformation’ and even ‘malinformation’. Rushed guidance based on weak evidence from international health organisations can perpetuate negative health and other societal outcomes, not ameliorate them! If health authorities’ choices are not up for review and debate, there is a danger that a hidden goal of the World Health Organisation (WHO) infodemic (or related disinfodemic funders’ research) could be to direct attention away from funders' multitude of failures in fighting pandemics with inappropriate guidelines and measures.

In The regime of ‘post-truth’: COVID-19 and the politics of knowledge (at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01596306.2021.1965544), Kwok, Singh and Heimans (2019) describe how the global health crisis of COVID-19 presents a fertile ground for exploring the complex division of knowledge labour in a ‘post-truth’ era. Kwok et al. (2019) illustrates this by describing COVID-19 knowledge production at university. Our paper focuses on the relationships between health communication, public health policy and recommended medical interventions.

Divisions of knowledge labour are described for (1) the ‘infodemic/disinfodemic research agenda’, (2) ‘mRNA vaccine research’ and (3) ‘personal health responsibility’. We argue for exploring intra- and inter relationships between influential knowledge development fields. In particular, the vaccine manufacturing pharmaceutical companies that drive and promote mRNA knowledge production. Within divisions of knowledge labour (1-3), we identify key inter-group contradictions between the interests of agencies and their contrasting goals. Such conflicts are useful to consider in relation to potential gaps in the WHO’s infodemic research agenda:

For (1), a key contradiction is that infodemic scholars benefit from health authority funding may face difficulties questioning their “scientific” guidance. We flag how the WHO ’s advice for managing COVID-19 departed markedly from a 2019 review of evidence it commissioned (see https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35444988).

(2)’s division features very different contradictions. Notably, the pivotal role that pharmaceutical companies have in generating vaccine discourse is massively conflicted. Conflict of interest arises in pursuing costly research on novel mRNA vaccines because whether the company producing these therapies will ultimately benefit financially from the future sales of these therapies depends entirely on the published efficacy and safety results from their own research. The division of knowledge labour for (2) mRNA vaccine development should not be considered separately from COVID-19’s in Higher Education or the (1) infodemic research agenda. Multinational pharmaceutical companies direct the research agenda in academia and medical research discourse through the lucrative grants they distribute. Research organisations dependant on external funding for covering budget shortfalls will be more susceptible to the influence of those funders on their research programs.

We spotlight the overwhelming evidence for the importance of (3) personal responsibility. In the COVID-19 pandemic, its discourses seemed largely ignored by Higher Education leadership and government. We flag how contradictions in (3)’s division of knowledge labour in a pandemic can explain such neglect. Personal responsibility is not a commercial site for generating large profits, some of which may be donated in supporting academic research. Research into effective, low-cost interventions seems to be at odds with the economic interests of both grant recipients and Big Pharma donors. Replacing costly treatments with low-cost alternatives would not only greatly diminish the profitability of existing funders, but also reduce the pool of new ones, plus the size of future donations. It is also important to reflect on how else the scientific enterprise at university lends itself to being an arena for misinformation. New information in science that refutes existing dogma does not become accepted immediately. Therefore a period exists when new ideas will be considered as misinformation especially by those with an agenda to suppress its acceptance.

However, from the perspective of orthodoxy, views that support new paradigms are unverified knowledge (and potentially "misinformation"). Any international health organisation that wishes to be an evaluator must have the scientific expertise for managing this ongoing ‘paradox’, or irresolvable contradiction. Organisations such as the WHO may theoretically be able to convene such knowledge, but their dependency on funding from conflicted parties would normally render them ineligible to perform such a task. This is particularly salient where powerful agents can collaborate across divisions of knowledge labour for establishing an institutional oligarchy. Such hegemonic collaboration can suppress alternative viewpoints that contest and query powerful agents’ interests.

It is concerning how many Communication and Media Studies researchers are ignoring such potential abuse of power, whilst supporting censorship of dissenters based on unproven "harms". Embedded researchers seem to ignore that the Centers for Disease Control, National Institute for Health and the WHO’s endorsement of multinational pharmaceutical companies’ products is a particularly troubling development: it marks a ‘new normal’ of institutional capture by industry sponsoring regulators who become their ‘lobbyists’. This contrasts to the silo efforts of external influence in the past, for example by lobbyists working for Big Tobacco or Big Food. They spun embedded scientific research touting the ‘benefits’ of smoking and processed foods. At the same time, evidence of harm was attacked as "junk science".

At least with cigarettes and ultra-processed foods, many individuals have the choice to buy or avoid paying. In stark contrast, tax-paying publics have no such option in avoiding the steep costs of mRNA vaccines. Public taxes pay for these treatments, while less expensive and potentially more effective interventions are ignored. Paying for vaccines takes funding away from interventions that would address wider and more pressing global health needs, in particular, poverty, malaria, tuberculosis and T2DM.

This paper alerts researchers to a broad range of ‘post-truth’ moments and flags the danger of relying on global health authorities to be the sole custodians of who is allowed to define what comprises an information disorder. Challenges to scientific propaganda from authorities captured by industry should not automatically be (mis-) characterised as low quality or harmful information. Rather, the digital voices of responsible dissenters can be valuable in protecting scientific integrity and public health (for example, @ProfTimNoakes should not be blocked from his Twitter account for expressing dissent!)

Our article results from collaboration between The Noakes Foundation and PANDA. The authors thank JTSA’s editors for the opportunity to contribute to its special issue, the paper’s critical reviewers for their helpful suggestions and AOSIS for editing and proof-reading the paper.

This is the third publication from The Noakes Foundation’s Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices (AFSDV) project. Do follow me on Twitter or https://www.researchgate.net/project/Academic-Free-Speech-and-Digital-Voices-AFSDV for updates regarding it.

I welcome you sharing constructive comments, below.

Banner design changes for Google Play Store's approval of the Shushmoji app

2022-08-29T08:39:00.000+02:00

Written for designers and marketers submitting edgy banners for approval with Google Play Store apps

In submitting the Shushmoji app to the Google Play store, several changes were required to the app's promotional banners before Google Play approved the app. The changes that Create With Cape Town made may be of interest to other designers preparing edgy campaigns, given Google Play Store's somewhat opaque feedback- the store simply flags which designs are rejected, but does not specify exactly which elements must change.

Below is a Slideshare presentation featuring the varying banner iterations - see if you can spot the differences? The answers follow below...

Adding an age-restriction to all banners (slides 8 to 14)
The first major change was adding a 13+ graphic in the bottom right of the presentation to comply with the policy that ‘app’s marketing imagery and text must make it clear that the app is only for young people aged 13 or older’. Subsequently, the Google Play Store calculated this rating for each country based on its app questionnaire. It decided on to a revised age restriction of 12+, so this banner is not inaccurate but will be updated with the next app version's submission.

Changing banner 3 (contrast slide 5 vs 17 & 18)

"Mother Grundy Google” does not like zap signs or mentions of 'ass', let alone 'a**'! The latter are a particular problem when Create With Cape Town wants to promote a 'silly ass' emoji sticker set.

So, the banner's title was changed to 'End conversations with silly donkeys'. The WhatsApp screen graphics were also changed- the 'silly ass' part of 'Hey, silly ass' sticker set was blurred to make it obvious that the banner title is "censored". Lastly, in the left’s WhatsApp exchange ’the same species as you’ was changed to simply ‘humanity’. Out of an excess of caution, End it! was changed to End the chat! We did not want our AI Google overlord's algorithm to misinterpret 'End it!' as telling someone to end their life.

Changing banner 4 (contrast slide 4 vs 21)

Surprisingly, this Stop, silly troll! set's banner was not initially flagged in the review process, despite it also featuring a zap sign.

That risqué 'ass hole’ Shushmoji in the bottom right was also removed.

All the changes above proved sufficient to meet the Google Play Store's approval of the Shushmoji app.

If you experienced similar challenges with your app's submission, kindly let us know in the comments below, cheers 👍!

Want emoji stickers to end #WhatsApp chats with #cyberbullies? The #Shushmoji app on #Android is here!

2022-08-26T09:12:00.017+02:00

Written for emoji sticker fans and recipients of harassment via WhatsApp.

The Shushmoji app for WhatsApp on Android is now available via Google Play. This app was developed as an easy method of using Shushmojis as end-of-conversation points versus cyberbullies. As the Shushmoji ® name suggests, the app's emoji stickers are intended to silence irritating noise, just like a 'shush!’ silencing noisy brats.

Check out examples for Shushmoji use in WhatsApp on Pinterest or createwith.net.

The app was initially developed for Create With by interns at Younglings Africa. Michael Pretorius at Younglings Development Studio (YDS) completed the app for the Google Play Store's vetting. An Android version was developed first, since Younglings Africa had experience developing for it. It's also the easiest to develop and secure approval for. {P.S. Mac fans, YDS is working on an Apple iOS version for release in the fourth quarter}.

As this Slideshare presentation explains, my research into online academic bullying and strategies for countering cyber-harassment inspired both the Shushmoji ® concept and its apps. I maintain a Google research spreadsheet (http://bit.ly/2D8qv0k) that shares many strategies against cyber-harassment, plus links to salient online resources. One strategy is for a recipient of cyber-harassment to use emoji stickers for flagging the end-point of a low-value/anti-social conversation. However, high-quality designs that address a wide range of cyber-harassment activities seem to be M.I.A!

The Shushmoji emoji sticker sets were developed in response to this visual aesthetic communication gap. In the app, 30 stickers are available to use for free. Users may purchase sticker sets for the themes they like.

There are currently five sets to buy:

Stop, silly troll! was designed by Janine Venter to poke fun at all-too-common types of cyber-harassment.

Stop, sinner! was also drawn by Janine to flag many naughty (and not nice!) behaviours.

Stop, academic bully! was illustrated by Marlon Albertyn to spotlight the different kinds of academic bullies one can meet in the Ivory Tower.

Stop, silly ass! was drawn by Dominique Whelan, who loves drawing donkeys and worked on the set for "a(ss) laugh". These stickers flag a**holes with silly ass emoji stickers speaking to their asinine behaviours.

Stop, torturer! was illustrated by Studio Dolby and spotlights torturous "conversationalists".

An educational rationale also exists where Shushmojis can illustrate the particular dodgy roles and/or anti-social strategies that cyber harassers follow. For those interested in sampling these stickers, the vector designs for each set are for sale via: Silly Troll, Academic bully, Silly Ass, Sinner and Torturer.

New Shushmoji sets are planned (such as Stop, Dumb Bot!) to close visual gaps for different roles and types of harassment (vs. doxxers and bot farm orchestrators). Hopefully, each set will prove useful for those wanting to express disinterest in continuing chats with cyberbullies. WhatsApp stickers should prove useful to flag this and a perp’s particular style of harassment. Of course, the stickers may also be used to poke fun at tactless friends and colleagues…

Please download the app, use it and let the world know of your good experience via a Google Play Store app review.

N.B. For updates on the Shushmoji ® app versions, you can follow Create With on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter or LinkedIn, ta.

P.S. Several app iterations were trialed by Younglings Africa before the app's approval. Zaakirah Abrams led the most recent testing- her 2022 Shushmoji app report is here.

Eight conceptual challenges in developing the 'online academic bullying' framework

2022-04-23T11:31:00.011+02:00

Written for scholars interested in understanding online harassment from academic cyberbullies, plus the development of the online academic bullying routine activity theory (OABRAT) framework

In developing our 'Distinguishing online academic bullying' article, Prof Tim Noakes and I trimmed the manuscript several times. Reworking some of these cuts in this post may offer value through addressing the methodological challenges we encountered in proposing our article's OABRAT framework. Seven conceptual challenges were overcome its development, while an eighth was encountered post-publication:

1 NEW FORMS OF POWER IMBALANCE

2 BEYOND TROLLS: ACADEMIC CYBERBULLIES AS DECEIVERS, FLAMERS, ETC.

3 CYBER HARASSMENT AS SCIENTIFIC SUPPRESSION VERSUS "HERESY"

4 FOREGROUNDING THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE

5 ACADEMIC CYBERMOBBING, SEPARATE FROM AN ACADEMIC MOB

6 GUARDIANS AGAINST VICTIMS OF ACADEMIC CYBERBULLYING

7 ACADEMIC BULLIES MAY TARGET OUTSIDERS FROM ANYWHERE

8 A COMPLEX FORM FOR AN EXTREME CASE

1 NEW FORMS OF POWER IMBALANCE

Conventional definitions of cyber-bullying suggest a power imbalance in which one aggressor is more powerful than his or her victim (Englander, Donnerstein, Kowalski, Lin, & Parti, 2017). By contrast, an established academic may be easily be targeted by individuals of varied statuses; who can mount frequent attacks as part of cybermobs. OAB differs from the conventional definition of cyberbullying in that there need not be a one-to-one power-imbalance in favour of the bully. It can include varied power relationships between a victim and his or her attackers: a standard power-imbalance may exist in the victim being on a lower rung of an academic cultural hierarchy within a particular field than the bullies (e.g. Cardiology has greater prestige than Sports Medicine in the medical field). However, a senior scholar may still be the subject of collegial mobbing (Davenport, Elliot and Schwartz, 1999). For example, the Emeritus Professor was attacked online by junior academics and non-scholars, from within his field and from other disciplines (see Figure 1 for his university).

Figure 1. Faculties and departments in which employees persistently criticised the Emeritus Professor on social media (Travis Noakes, 2020)

Attacking a scientific dissident as a pre-defined target seemed to provide attackers with an instant form of credibility- they did not have to prove their symbolic credentials to gain visibility. Few of the professor's blogging critics were Health Science scholars. Despite making no scholarly contribution to the debate, some academic cyberbullies seemed to achieve visibility as opinion "leaders" online. This shows how micro-celebrity hijacking can apply for Higher Education (HE) employees. Academic bloggers criticise public intellectuals for "wrongthink" thereby gaining attentional capital- blogged critiques by "independent" critical thinkers can convert into appearances on broadcast media.

Power imbalances may also result from other differences in a victim’s status versus his or her attackers. These can span inequalities in capital (Bourdieu, 1986), notably social and cultural capital- a scholar who defends an unorthodox position is at a disadvantage in terms of her social capital. She will struggle to draw support against unfair criticism by organic groups of academic cyberbullies.

Another dimension of power imbalance may lie in technical cultural capital- an OAB recipient who has less knowledge of the digital platform(s) on which she is being attacked may be at a serious disadvantage. For example, cyberbullies can use advantages in their ‘digital dimensions’ (Paino & Renzulli, 2013) of cultural capital for gaining greater visibility. They can leverage a myriad of online presences for amplifying their attacks, whilst leveraging multiple chains of digital publication that are difficult for a victim to reply to.

This suggests another imbalance whereby OAB recipients will struggle to defend themselves against asymmetrical cyber-critiques. It may be exhausting to respond to frequent criticisms, across a myriad of digital platforms and conflicting timezones.

2 BEYOND TROLLS: ACADEMIC CYBERBULLIES AS DECEIVERS, FLAMERS, ETC.

Definitions of cyberbullying are in themselves broad, since they may also cover electronic bullying and internet harassment (Berne et al., 2013). Likewise, classifications for academic cyberbullies’ roles and behaviours must be wide-ranging to address how bullies can readily draw on many repertoires for anti-social communication. A highly agentive cyberbully could draw on practices that meet several characteristics- the mocking "jokes" of a malevolent troll, the swearing attacks of a 'flamer' and a 'deceiver''s misrepresentations in their self-presentation (e.g. a self-proclaimed "philosophe(r)"/"scholar" without a PhD). We chose not make sharp distinctions between an academic bully’s and other online deviants' roles and behaviours, since this could actually include areas that strongly overlap. At the same time, we were mindful that defining OAB as a particular form of harassment by HE employees was important to ensure OAB does not become a catchall. There is a danger that definitions of harassment that are generalised can be misused in bad faith to apply to mere criticisms or mildly unpleasant language (Jeong, 2018).

A flexible OAB framework for academic cyberbullies also had to be future-proof in accommodating new methods. While there are many characteristic behaviours that mark cyberbullying, the denigration of a scholar’s symbolic capital via scholarly publications that tie-in with weaponised micro-celebrity is another unique layer that other forms of cyberbullying lack. Weaponised micro-celebrity considers how highly prolific micro-celebrities, whose content has the potential to polarise public opinion, are hijacked for attention by traditional media through disproportionate and sensationalist coverage. Their viral persona, fame and content becomes reappropriated as place-holders for various causes by broadcast media (Abidin and Brown, 2018). This resonates with the examples of unscrupulous advertisers who illegally use micro-celebrities' profiles and made-up quotes in fake campaigns that market non-existent products. Such as the Emeritus Professor's image and name being hijacked to market "products" by "Keto Extreme" (2022) and "Ketovatru” (2021) (The Noakes Foundation, 2022).

3 SCIENTIFIC SUPPRESSION VERSUS BIO-MEDICAL HERESY "JUSTIFIES" HARASSMENT

Another conceptual challenge lay in framing how academic cyberbullies' hyper-agentive practices could potentially threaten academic free speech and scientific innovation. Both are threatened where a powerful grouping lays claim to a monopoly on scientific truth. It will follow a win-or-lose competitive approach in defending its belief system as the dominant set of ideas (Martin, 2004). The term ‘heresy’ remains useful for describing ideological challenges that threaten the values of a dominant orthodoxy, such as biomedicine. In the Emeritus Professor's case, the supporters of the dominant “cholesterol” model of chronic disease development (CMCDD) can view a rival scientific model, such as the Insulin Resistance Model of Chronic Ill Health (IRMCIH) paradigm, as a heretical field. The beliefs of health experts who promote IRMCIH are viewed as heretical because they threaten the current health care model for the treatment of many chronic diseases. Dissidents question past research findings and the resulting interventions prescribed for treating most patients with chronic diseases.

When a challenger to orthodoxy begins to attract attention from patients, the general public and the press, then those in power will take active steps to protect the reigning paradigms (Martin, 2004). Adherents to the dominant ideology will view such individuals' questioning of the central values of their CMCDD orthodoxy as performing heresy. Heresy is created by the response of the orthodoxy when its views' delineate attacks as beyond the pale (Wolpe, 1994). Defenders of CMCDD might justify their harassment in believing that only high carbohydrate/low fat diets are “healthy”. Followers of this belief have argued that pursuing any other ideas or approaches constitute a "threat to public health". Following this rationale, such critics may argue for censorship of dissidents' "dangerous" work and to limit digital publics' exposure to state-of-the-art IRMCIH science news.

In highly-polarised debates, HE employees can develop social capital for themselves, and 'negative social capital' for opponents, by using digital platforms to confront heretics, apostates, rebels and dissenters. Negative social capital (Wacquant, 1998) is the engineered dislike and distrust of a person or group by other people and groups. This capital is the antithesis of social capital as it results in its wilful destruction. The examples of cyberbullies creates a chilling effect whereby witnesses of harassment will be reluctant to engage with the proponents of heresy. Their future vocational trajectories may be at risk when grouped with heretical "outsiders".

Defenders of the status-quo enjoy visibility as part of dominant networks and can readily spotlight “heretics” for criticism via formal and informal channels, such as social media. Recipients must negotiate rapidly-spreading disinformation, defamation, misrepresentation-of-argument and even character assassination HE employees involved in such adverse actions typically explain their actions as being justified in maintaining 'academic standards'' (Martin, 2020). However, such actions are detrimental in silencing dissenters' and whistleblowers' free speech, thereby stifling scientific debate and potential innovations.

4 FOREGROUNDING THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE

The perspective of the victim is frequently neglected in research into online hostility (Jane, 2015). Our initial drafts of the manuscript focused on different styles of attack from academic cyberbullies. Subsequent drafts shifted to developing a unique, decade-long, pilot study for a cyberbullying recipient's case. We hoped his experiences of novel forms of OAB harassment might resonate with other recipients. Since we could not find any similar lengthy example of a scholar's online victimisation, we trusted his case would be informative for cyberbullying researchers, plus anti-bullying policy decision makers in HE.

5 ACADEMIC CYBERMOBBING- SEPARATE FROM AN ACADEMIC MOB

The Emeritus Professor's case study was closely linked to a formal mobbing at his former academic institutional employer. In the initial manuscript, we foregrounded this strong overlap: His employer's neglect of rules and policies against harassment by its employees provides a fertile space for harassment (Benatar, 2021). Senior leaders followed a dominating conflict culture (DCC) approach (Desrayaud et al., 2018) in protecting the Faculty of Health Science's (FHS) CMCDD orthodoxy from criticism. Although DCC actively encourages discourse about incompatible goals and ideas, DCC does not acknowledge the validity of opposing views. In a toxic DCC workplace, dissent is ignored and support for dissenters is withheld. Explicit bullying is seen as an acceptable response to intellectual differences and overt mobbing is also condoned. In this respect, attacks on the Emeritus Professor were similar to the bullying of other senior scholars that university leadership clearly tolerated (Benatar, 2017; Coovadia, 2015; Crowe, 2017; Crowe, 2019; McCain, 2020; Plaut, 2020; Soudien, 2015; Steer, 2019; Vernac News, 2019). In 2019, his employer's institution acknowledged that bullying was a major concern amongst staff (Feris, 2019), but has yet to recognise the importance of addressing DCC in its FHS. One positive recent development is that an anti-bullying policy was passed (2021). Albeit, a very late response to its former Ombudsman's recommendation from 2012 (Makamandela-Mguqulwa, 2020).

In university workplaces, bullies can use a justification of “academic freedom” to condone actions that would be unacceptable in other workplaces (Driver, 2018). For example, an academic lecturer (who is neither a scholar nor a scientist) published thirty blog posts that criticised the Emeritus Professor's popularisation of LCHF science. Although by no means an academic peer, this junior lecturer might justify such fervent criticism of a fellow employee at the same university as a necessary part of academic freedom in an institute of higher learning. Nevertheless, such obsessive behaviour from a low-ranking, under-qualified employee seems unlikely to be acceptable at any other place of employment.

In collating the varied forms of harassment from "academic colleagues", it was unsurprising that we initially considered a recipient's OAB as being inseparable from an experience of academic mobbing in the HE context. However, the manuscript's reviewers flagged that it could be separate- especially for targets outside HE. In response, we designed the OABRAT framework to accommodate a separate phenomenon.

Such separation also addressed concerns that the private, departmental ostracisation of ‘academic mobbing’ in HE (Seguin, 2016. Khoo, 2010) is a very different negative phenomenon from the public attacks that academic cyberbullies launch. Unlike the largely concealed backstabbing of an academic mob, academic cyberbullies criticisms are public. OAB recipients can readily spot critics and their networks in digital criticisms, such as group petitions. Like others cybermobbers, public attacks fall within a spectrum that can include: i. drive-by harassment, ii. low-level mobbing, iii. sustained hounding and iv. sustained orchestration (Jeong, 2018). Professor Noakes and I are working on a manuscript that explores this spectrum for defining an ‘academic cybermobbing’'s particular characteristics.

6 GUARDIANS AGAINST VICTIMS OF ACADEMIC BULLYING

In addition to considering academic cyberbullies practices and their recipients experiences, it is also vital to address the role of guardians. RAT supports addressing the activities of both the targets of crime, plus their guardians. In academic cyberbullying, it is important to consider how the online activities of a victim could be placing him or her at added risk. It is also worthwhile considering how the lack of action from guardians of civility, whether they be at the scholar’s academic institution or moderators for social media platforms, has an impact. Prevention would seem better than cure for the negative phenomenon of persistent cyber harassment. In OAB, this emerges when a large quantum of criticism from academic cyberbullies creates an easily searchable footprint.

Policies protecting employees at HE institutes from workplace persecution have largely focused on sexual and racial harassment. The danger exists that other forms of persecution may be neglected as seeming relatively unimportant by comparison (Citron, 2007). For example, aggressive behaviours in the workplace may be considered acceptable by default (Rayner, Hoel, & Cooper, 2002). Informal expectations and norms can increase the sense of a lack of accountability online and boost the likelihood of deviant behaviours. Without deterrents or any consequences for academic cyberbullying, bullies may believe that they will not be held accountable for their actions. Worse, hegemonic leadership may actually reward those whose cyberbullying seems to maintain perceptions of consensus. In HE, such rewards are unethical in undermining academic free speech, scientific innovation and motivating academic cyberbullying.

Dubious research and related fake news may be amplified online with impunity where university employers are unwilling to confront their source(s) and defend their scholarly recipients. Even where HE leaders uncover such falsehoods, they may have little enthusiasm for organising retraction or the censure of those who create and spread them. A HE leadership that models being bystanders in the face of cyber harassment from its own employees, would be hypocritical to expect staff to respond as upstanders against OAB.

7 ACADEMIC BULLIES MAY TARGET OUTSIDERS FROM ANYWHERE

In conceptualising OAB, we came to argue that the victims of academic cyberbullies need not be HE employees. Feedback from IRMCIH proponents in varied health professions, plus LCHF entrepreneurs, confirmed attacks from cyberbullies in HE. While our literature review produced many examples of dissenting scientists and academic whistleblowers being confronted academic mobs, there is a gap concerning cases for bullying victims outside HE. This is another area that The Noakes Foundation's Academic Free Speech and Digital Voices (AFSDV) project can address for the IRMCIH scientific issue arena.

After Professor Noakes and I submitted the article for publication, we identified another concern to explore under the AFSDV theme:

8 A COMPLEX FORM FOR AN EXTREME CASE

Our article shared a reporting instrument for OAB recipients. We hoped that targets of academic cyberbullies could use the Google form at https://bit.ly/3pnyE6w for developing reports on their experiences of cyber harassment. However, based on some OAB recipients' feedback, we must prepare a simplified version of the form. The questionnaire speaks to all aspects of cyber harassment the Emeritus Professor experienced by over a ten year period. So while his outlier experience informed the development of a comprehensive and wide-ranging questionnaire, there is considerable scope to shorten it and simplify its questions via new AFSDV research.

GRAPHIC CREDITS

Stop, academic bully! shushmoji™ graphics courtesy of Create With Cape Town.