There is always speculation over the current health and future shape of US-UK relations in the media coverage and political debates over British foreign policy. The arrival of each new occupant of the White House, leader visits to London or Washington and interactions between president and prime minister during meetings of international organisations all generate comment and discussion about the current state of the “special relationship”.

Bilateral visits and summits can see the leaders of both countries reaffirm the close and longstanding “special” bond between the two countries. These declarations might seem particularly important for Britain as the junior partner and during times of wider instability and insecurity.

Taking a wider view, the structures of US-UK relations do not just involve political leaders and their governments and, beneath them, the ongoing functional cooperation between regulators and other public bodies. It also involves the general population in each country: their attitudes towards each other and how they feel about the US-UK relationship.

The US’ commemoration of its 250^th anniversary of independence is a good opportunity to take a closer look at this relationship. While the relationship between both countries is a long one, the “special relationship” dates back only to the beginning of the Cold War in 1946. What then did the British public think of UK-US relations during this time? Looking at historical polling data can shed some helpful light on this.

Credit: LBJ Library photo by Yoichi Okamoto, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

US-UK relations during the Cold War

During the Cold War, Gallup polling shows that British public was certainly well aware of the post-war imbalance in US-UK relations. In the early-1960s and in 1974, as shown inFigure 1, between 59-70 percent said their country was not treated as an equal partner by the US and 18-22 percent said that it was.

Figure 1 – Percentage agreeing that Britain is treated as an equal partner by the US

Source: Compiled from the Gallup volumes for post-war polling in Britain

Figure 2 shows that significant proportions thought Britain’s foreign policy was too reliant on its ally: 65 percent said this was true or partly true in 1962 and in 1965; significantly fewer (45 percent) thought this in 1974, though, probably reflecting the growing impact of EEC membership.

Figure 2 – Percentage agreeing that British foreign policy depends too much on the US

Source: Compiled from the Gallup volumes for post-war polling in Britain

While seemingly recognising the constraints of US-UK relations, most people have supported continued or increased cooperation, as shown in Gallup polling. In 1965, 31 percent preferred more cooperation, and 20 percent wanted no change (with 31 percent backing less), while in 1967 50 percent said US-UK cooperation was about right, with 20 percent saying too close and 13 percent not close enough. Most people in this period wanted to maintain or increase relations with the US on economic or foreign policy matters specifically. In May 1965, 51 percent backed closer or the same level of cooperation (and 31 percent less) with the US on political and military issues. Moreover, as Figures 3 and 4 show, majorities consistently backed the same level or further cooperation on economic matters and foreign policy issues in 1966, in March and May 1967 and in 1974.

Figure 3 – Public opinion towards US-UK foreign policy cooperation

Figure 4 – Public opinion towards US-UK economic policy cooperation

Source: Compiled from the Gallup volumes for post-war polling in Britain

This acknowledged imbalance but continued reliance on relations with the US takes place in the context of the growing recognition of the post-war decline in Britain’s role and influence in world affairs. This was particularly important in the late-1960s and the 1970s as the UK’s global defence posture – “East of Suez” – and capabilities saw significant retrenchment. As Figure 5shows, based on Gallup polling, there was a general decline in the proportion of the public that thought it was important for Britain to try and be a leading world power, with more settling – no doubt reluctantly, for some –  for their country being more like Sweden or Switzerland in international affairs. 

Figure 5 – Public opinion towards Britain’s international role, 1963-78

Source: 1963-75 Compiled from Gallup volumes for post-war polling in Britain; 1978: analysis of the Gallup polling dataset accessed through the Roper Center via the Social and Political Change in Britain (1945-1991) project.

So why did the UK public tend to support continued cooperation? Probably partly due to widespread perceptions that there was a strong commonality of interests between Britain and the US in the Cold War. Based on regular United States Information Agency commissioned surveys undertaken by opinion poll organisations in Western European countries, Figure 6 shows perceptions of the alignment of interests between Britain and each of the superpowers, the US and the USSR. This is calculated as the net score for superpower in each survey. While there was some fluctuation over time, there was often agreement that Britain and the US’ interests were generally aligned, while net negative scores were consistent for Britain and the USSR/Russia (albeit with fewer versions of this question). The Cold War period also featured robust support for the NATO security alliance, which was the major context for US-UK relations at the time.

Figure 6 – Public opinion towards whether the basic interests of Britain are in agreement with the US and USSR/Russia, 1956-76 (net score)

Note: The net score is produced by subtracting the combined percentage responding ‘not at all in agreement’ and ‘not very much in agreement’ from the combined percentage responding ‘very much in agreement’ and ‘fairly in well agreement’.

Sources: Reports from the ‘U.S. government public opinion surveys on security issues in Western Europe’ collection at the Tufts Digital Library; author’s analysis of Gallup opinion poll datasets from the Roper Centre accessed through the Social and Political Change in Britain (1945-1991) project.

Common interests fuelled UK public support for the “special relationship” despite its junior partner status

During the Cold War, the UK public seemed quite realistic about the asymmetry of power and dependent nature of Britain’s status as very much the junior partner in its relations with the US. It also clearly moderated its expectations about the scope of Britain’s international role in a world of superpower rivalry and alliances. But broad support for some level of policy cooperation between the US and UK was a mainstay of public opinion, likely underpinned by the widely perceived commonality of interests.

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The post During the Cold War common interests encouraged the British public to support the US-UK “special relationship”, even as a junior partner first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

On 2 April 2026, LSE’s Phelan United States Centre hosted the event “End of the America era? Looking back, looking forward”, offering insights from Professor Michael Cox, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at LSE and Founding Director of LSE IDEAS, Professor G. John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Princeton SPIA, Professor Stephanie J Rickard, Professor of Political Science in the LSE Department of Government, and Professor Ayşe Zarakol, Professor of International Relations at the University of Cambridge and Politics Fellow at the Emmanuel College. The session, chaired by Professor Peter Trubowitz, Professor of International Relations and Director of the LSE Phelan US Centre, was part of the Phelan US Centre’s America’s Changing Role in the World lecture series.

Is the America era over?

As autocracies rise and Washington turns inward, few questions feel more urgent. Whether the answer lies in economics, political ideals, or the decisions of individual leaders, perspectives diverge sharply. Few panels could have reflected that diversity better than this one.

First, Professor Ikenberry argued that, although they have entered a critical phase, the American era, as well as the liberal international order, are not dead and will reemerge in the future with “a backlash to the backlash”. He thinks that the model of cooperation between democracies remains the most appealing and efficient. In support of his thesis, he highlighted how crises of the order have already happened in the past without bringing the liberal model to an end. Interestingly, he stated that:

“We know international orders rise and fall. International orders die, but usually death comes from murder, not suicide”.

Professor Zarakol examined the issue from a different lens: she clearly divided between American hegemony and the liberal international order and argued that the latter is substantially dead. Liberalism is no longer trusted; its defenders appear increasingly weak, and the value of the institutional bodies that supported it has been declining. Following, she argued that the American hegemony might survive in the future, though without a liberal order supporting it. This would generate a coercion-based order compatible with the US’ isolationist attitudes.

Credit: © 2026 LSE/Andrew Lunn

Professor Rickard brought a structural perspective often absent from these debates: the political consequences of the dramatic expansion of international trade. Increased imports have hit specific communities hard – decimating local industries and labour markets – fuelling bottom-up populist resentment. The fundamental problem, she argued, is the absence of adequate programmes to support the “losers of globalisation”.

Professor Cox argued that the American era is not over, but it is rapidly evolving. The United States maintain an unmatched military, economic, and symbolic power, and continues to craft global politics.

“If the American era is over, nobody told the Americans”.

However, Washington is no longer using that power to promote the liberal order – and that is exactly what is changing the system’s structure.

Who is going to be the architect of the future international order?

Professor Ikenberry regarded the democratic countries as future leaders and stressed the importance of middle-power “coalitions” – such as groups of democracies in East Asia – as the next promoters of the liberal order. Professor Zarakol expressed scepticism towards Ikenberry’s argument, stressing that the definition of “middle power” is extremely vague and the question about the architects of the future remains unanswerable. Professor Rickard suggested that middle powers have already contributed to the multilateral institutions’ work, and they can do that in the future too, although her definition of middle powers was more holistic than Professor Ikenberry’s.

Finally, Professor Cox expressed certainty that China will be the next architect of the global order. He also signalled the risk of a more defined Sino-Russian alignment as a serious threat to the liberal order. Looking at domestic politics, he also denounced the absence of credible solutions to this problem by the US Democratic Party, whose natural call would be to defend liberal values.

The changing role of American power

The discussion ultimately converged on a paradox: American power remains largely intact, but its willingness to underwrite the liberal order does not. As Professor Trubowitz observed in closing, power without credible commitments is a diminished form of power – and the current administration is testing that proposition in real time.

Whether the resulting damage proves reversible, as Professor Ikenberry hopes, or marks a point of no return, as Professor Zarakol fears, may ultimately depend less on the international system than on the American people themselves – and on whether a credible domestic alternative to Trumpism emerges.

Watch the event recording – End of the America era? Looking back, looking forward – 2 April 2026

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The post End of the America era? Looking back, looking forward – LSE Phelan US Centre Event Review first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

“Our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime, a vicious group of very hard, terrible people. Its menacing activities directly endanger the United States, our troops, our bases overseas, and our allies throughout the world.”

So said President Trump on 28 February as his administration launched attacks on the Iranian regime for the second time of his second term. This military action was not anticipated by those watching the Trump administration’s foreign policy, nor by many US allies. Donald Trump has sought to rally the American people behind his attacks on, tapping into decades of anti-Iranian rhetoric from many of his predecessors.

However, despite turning to all his regular tactics to persuade his supporters and distract or confound the media and opposition, Trump has so far failed to gain the levels of support for his actions against Iran that he was clearly hoping to achieve. His approval ratings amongst Republican voters is at a new low of 80 percent (down from 83 percent during the 2025 US strikes on Iran), hitting 54 percent with non-MAGA Republicans. Gas prices in the US are rising, and his comments dismissing these as nothing in comparison to the need to prevent a nuclear armed Iran have further damaged his support in Congress and with voters.

Yet even this stark picture doesn’t do justice to the extent of the damage that this war with Iran has done to Trump’s administration. It has further damaged US relationships with close allies, especially those who traditionally supported the US in military action. US weapons stockpiles have been run down, and there have been claims of food shortages for US sailors involved in operations in the Gulf. Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed expertise in negotiations, so much part of his personal brand, has been tested and found seriously wanting in his attempts to bring Iran to negotiate the end to the war. This damage is all compounded by it being self-inflicted.

The war that wasn’t a war

Trump’s refusal to describe the conflict with Iran as a “war” has become less a matter of strategy than a revealing exercise in political evasion. Trump openly admitted he avoided the term because “you’re supposed to get approval” from Congress, instead rebranding it as a “military operation”. Despite this, he simultaneously referred to it as a war on several other occasions.

The contradiction exposes the limits of the communication style: dominating the narrative by “flooding the zone”, confusing the terminology, and relying on repetition to blur accountability. This approach has worked for years. Trump could usually overwhelm criticism with spectacle and hyper-certainty. However, war, regardless of how it’s otherwise being described, cannot be disguised. Casualties, military escalation, economic instability, and constitutional questions are harder to spin away with slogans or rhetorical improvisation. Trump’s attempts to avoid the word “war” has only drawn more attention to the legal and political implications he is trying to avoid.

For a leader who has sought to portray himself as a straight-talking businessman who is not your typical politician, this kind of linguistic gymnastics, alongside Trump’s disregard for his “no new wars” messaging, damages this brand.

Trump, Iran, and US allies

To say that Trump has an abrasive style in his relations with US allies is nothing new. However, his conduct during this conflict with Iran has worsened the impact of this style. Previously, his communication style, in his own view, has led to increased military spending from NATO allies, and a renegotiated NAFTA treaty in his first administration. Yet, during the Iran conflict, Trump’s style has led to minimal behaviour change from US allies and has only led to damage to the perception of the US globally.

His calls for NATO allies to help the US against Iran, or in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to international trade, fell on deaf ears. His condemnation of the UK for not joining the US in their actions were followed by briefings from the administration that they were looking into UK sovereignty over the Falklands. His response to criticism from German Chancellor Merz on his conduct of the Iran war was to declare Merz “didn’t know what he was talking about”, and to threaten to remove US troops from Germany. Yet, as with the UK, Trump has not been able to build support.

The impact of this conflict on US relations with Gulf allies has arguably been even worse than on US relations with NATO allies. Gulf states have been hit with Iranian retaliation multiple times and not only has this shattered perceptions of safety and security in the region, affecting residents of the Gulf states as well as the tourism industry, it has also resulted in serious damage to gas and oil facilities. The Habshan refinery, the United Arab Emirates’ biggest, will not be repaired fully until 2027.

Whilst Trump reported that he called off a further strike after requests from Gulf allies, this has only addressed some of the Gulf allies’ fears about Iranian responses to US strikes. Qatar recently signalled that they were not involved in the US-Iran talks, and their spokesperson went further, questioning if the talks were even happening.

“P20260406MR-1122” by The White House, United States Government Work

Trump is not serious about the US military

Trump’s handling of the Iran conflict has also revived long-standing concerns about his attitude toward America’s servicemen and women, particularly the dead and wounded. Critics have pointed to repeated reports over the years that Trump viewed military funerals and the return of fallen soldiers as political inconveniences rather than solemn national moments deserving dignity and respect. This was only compounded in March by Trump wearing one of his campaign baseball caps at the dignified transfer of fallen servicemen.

Trump’s aggressive rhetoric around the Iran conflict has also increased concerns about his attitude to military action as well as his view of the rules of war. He has repeatedly boasted about strikes, joking about military force being “fun”. But worse than this insensitive rhetoric, Trump has repeatedly threatened overwhelming destruction and to inflict what could be war crimes in language more suited to reality television than wartime leadership.

Trump’s communication style has further highlighted his disregard for the consequences of military action, and how unseriously he has treated the conflict. The Trump administration has repeatedly been uncomfortable with reporting US casualties from the conflict. The contradiction is striking. A president eager to celebrate displays of force, but drastically less willing to engage with the reality of returning coffins, bereaved families, and the irreversible cost paid by ordinary servicemen sent into conflict.

The Art of No Deal?

The loss of support from Republicans and even MAGA Republicans will be of serious concern in a midterm election year, but Trump’s inability to bring Iran to the negotiating table will surely be one of the biggest shocks for the President. Trump’s “dealmaker” persona is closely identified with him, and he has made a point of protecting and projecting this persona throughout his political career. Yet the Iranian regime’s willingness to repeatedly reject talks, dismiss offers and proposals, and willingness to prolong the conflict have astounded the Trump administration. Trump’s catchphrase that Iran ‘holds no cards’ encapsulates his inability to understand the Iranian position.

The Iran conflict shows the myth of Trump’s effectiveness

What makes this moment so politically dangerous for Trump is that it strikes directly at the foundations of the image he spent years constructing. He built his appeal around strength, disruption, and the promise that only he could outmanoeuvre America’s enemies (and allies) while avoiding the costly entanglements that damaged previous presidents.

Yet the Iran conflict has exposed the limits of that mythology. His instinctive reliance on spectacle, aggressive rhetoric, and personal branding has failed to produce either decisive military success or lasting political support. Trump’s abrasive style is readily associated with him, and typically Trump can portray these interactions as achieving a positive result. But not this time.

The war has revealed an administration increasingly isolated abroad, divided at home, and struggling to explain why American servicemen, taxpayers, and allies are paying the price for a conflict that appears to lack a coherent strategic endgame. Trump’s refusal to acknowledge this reality, whether by avoiding the word “war,” dismissing economic concerns out of hand, or treating peace negotiations as theatre, may ultimately define this episode more than the conflict itself. The central lesson of the Iran crisis is not simply that Trump chose confrontation, but that the political methods which once insulated him from accountability no longer appear capable of containing the consequences of his own decisions.

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The post The Iran conflict has shattered the mythology of Trump’s effectiveness first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

In debates over minimum wage policy, the fate of small businesses is often treated as the central concern. Increases to the lowest allowable wage are commonly described as a threat to independent restaurants, retailers, and service firms, which employ a large share of low-wage workers. These concerns have featured prominently in US policy discussions for decades. Yet the way small businesses respond to higher minimum wages is more complicated than this narrative suggests.

The effects of higher minimum wages on employment and earnings

Across states that have raised their minimum wages in recent years, independent businesses in highly exposed industries, such as hospitality and retailers, do not substantially reduce employment. As Figure 1 shows, firms do not lay off workers but instead moderately reduce hiring. These adjustments are modest in scale and highly targeted. Figure 2 shows that hiring reductions are concentrated entirely among part-time jobs in very low-paying employment relationships, specifically those paying $3,900 or less per year, and particularly those paying $1,000 or less. Jobs associated with higher annual earnings, which are likely to be more stable and/or long-term positions, are essentially unaffected.

Figure 1 – Change in number of employment relationships

Figure 2 – Employment impact by earnings

How small businesses adjust to higher labour costs

Higher minimum wages do impose real cost increases on independent businesses. Since independent businesses do not offset the higher wages by substantially reducing their workforce, average worker pay rises, and labour costs increase accordingly. In highly exposed industries, the total annual wage bills of independent businesses rose by about six percent on average in the years following recent state minimum wage increases, reflecting higher pay for low-earning workers rather than changes in employment levels.

“minimum wage increase july2021_IMG_2199” by Montgomery County, MD, CC BY-NC 2.0

Independent businesses are largely able to accommodate the higher labour costs by increasing revenues. The revenue gains, shown in Figure 3, may reflect modest price adjustments, changes in product mix, or productivity gains. On average, these channels are sufficient to keep owner profits (Figure 4) roughly stable, despite rising wage bills.

Figure 3 – Impact of minimum wage increases on firm revenues

Figure 4 – Impact of minimum wage increases on firm profit

Over time, higher minimum wages also shape which firms operate in low-wage industries. As shown in Figure 5, the number of firms entering the market declines modestly in highly exposed industries. The reduction in the number of new firms is accompanied by a shift in the composition of firms operating in these sectors. New firms in states that raised their minimum wages are, on average, more productive and devote a larger share of revenues to worker pay. Rather than a hollowing out of small business activity, higher wage floors result in a gradual shift toward firms which are better able to operate at higher wage levels.

Figure 5 – impact of minimum wage increases on firms entering and leaving the market

What workers experience

For workers, the effects are clear. Earnings rise substantially for those at the lower end of the wage distribution, with low-earning and young individuals seeing annual earnings gains of 19 and 22 percent, respectively (Figures 6 and 7).

Figure 6 – Effect of minimum wage increases on those on lower incomes

Figure 7 – Effect of minimum wage increases on those aged 15-26

Importantly, these gains do not come with corresponding employment losses. Employment levels among low-wage workers remain broadly stable in the years following minimum wage increases (Figure 8), with no significant reductions in annual employment rates five years after the minimum wage increases among potentially vulnerable groups, including the low-earning labour force, young workers, or teens. One reason is worker reallocation. As hiring slows at some small firms, workers increasingly move toward larger employers that are better positioned to absorb higher labour costs. This mobility helps sustain employment while raising average pay.

Figure 8 – Effect of minimum wage increases on employment of low-earning workers

At the same time, worker retention improves. Firms invest more in their existing employees, reducing turnover and the need for continual recruitment. For workers, this often means more stable jobs alongside higher wages. For firms, this can lead to lower direct costs (e.g. recruiting, training costs) and potentially to higher productivity associated with a more experienced workforce.

A more grounded view of minimum wages

None of this implies that higher minimum wages are costless or that all firms respond in the same way. Some businesses face greater challenges than others, and the effects may differ at very high wage levels or over longer horizons. But recent experience in the United States suggests that the commonly assumed conflict between supporting workers and preserving small businesses is overstated.

When minimum wages rise, workers’ earnings increase, employment remains stable, and small businesses largely endure by adjusting how they operate rather than by shedding jobs. Recognizing these dynamics can lead to better discussions about wage policy that are also better aligned with how labour markets function.

• This article is based on the paper, “Who’s Afraid of the Minimum Wage? Measuring the Impacts on Independent Businesses Using Matched U.S. Tax Returns”, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
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The post Higher minimum wages are good for workers and mean that small businesses operate more effectively first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

Further reading and resources

• Power and Purpose podcast, hosted by Amanda Sloat and Nathalie Tocci – www.ie.edu/insights/podcast-power-and-purpose/
• Nathalie Tocci’s articles in The Guardian – www.theguardian.com/profile/nathalie-tocci

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We’d love to hear what you think – you can send us a message on Twitter @LSE_US, or email us at uscentre@lse.ac.uk.

This podcast was produced by Chris Gilson and Avan Fata.

• Featured image: “P20250923DT-1198” by The White House, United States Government Work
• Note:  This podcast gives the views of the interviewee and host, and is not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, the LSE Phelan US Centre, nor the London School of Economics.

The post Donald Trump and the unmaking of Europe with Professor Nathalie Tocci | The Ballpark podcast first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

In May 2026, the US House of Representatives passed a Farm Bill containing provisions designed to override state animal welfare laws such as California’s Proposition 12. The move followed years of failed legal challenges by pork industry groups, culminating in the 2023 Supreme Court decision in National Pork Producers Council v Ross. Proposition 12 is widely regarded by animal protection organisations as a landmark victory because it restricts some of the most extreme forms of confinement used in modern farming.

Proposition 12 was approved by Californian voters in 2018 with 63 percent support through a ballot initiative. The law established minimum space requirements for breeding pigs, egg-laying hens and veal calves, and required products sold in California to meet those standards, regardless of where they were produced. Given that California imports over 98 percent of its pork, the measure has significant implications for producers supplying the Californian market. A similar reform was introduced in Massachusetts, where Question 3 was supported by 78 percent of the vote in 2016.

To appreciate the significance of Proposition 12, it is important to understand the broader context of US animal welfare law. In the US, meaningful farm animal welfare reform has largely occurred at state rather than federal level, while federal protections remain minimal. Proposition 12 and similar state legislation therefore represent the only realistic pathways for improving farm animal welfare in the US.

Proposition 12, pigs and gestation crates

Proposition 12 prohibits the sale of pork from breeding sows confined in gestation crates. These metal enclosures are so restrictive that pigs can stand up and lie down but are unable even to turn around. The alternative is group housing systems, in which pigs can move freely and engage in substantially more natural behaviour. Group housing systems have welfare challenges, particularly aggression between sows, but they can be managed and they avoid extreme confinement imposed by gestation crates.

Pigs are a highly sentient, social and intelligent species, similar to the dogs we keep as family pets in terms of their emotional and cognitive complexity. The US is the world’s third-largest pig producer, with around 130 million pigs slaughtered annually. Most breeding sows are artificially inseminated and confined in gestation crates throughout their 115-day pregnancy, before being moved to farrowing crates for birth and lactation. After piglets are weaned, the sows are inseminated again, and the cycle of extreme confinement continues.

Gestation crates cause serious physical and psychological suffering. Sows develop pressure sores and injuries from prolonged confinement, and urinary tract infections from lying in their own excrement. The severe restriction of movement imposed by gestation crates prevents almost all natural behaviour and leads to chronic stress, frustration and stereotypic behaviours such as repetitive bar biting and sham chewing.

Leading animal welfare scientists have been highly critical of gestation crates for decades. Donald Broom, the world’s first professor of animal welfare, referred to them as “one of the most extreme examples of cruelty to an animal”. John Webster, architect of the Five Freedoms of animal welfare, has compared gestation crates to permanent solitary confinement in humans.

Gestation crates have been prohibited in the UK since 1999, as well as in other countries including Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. The European Union permits them only for the first four weeks of pregnancy. Beyond California and Massachusetts, eight other US states have banned or phased out gestation crates in pork production.

The US veterinary profession and the Farm Bill

Against this background, the position taken by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) in support of the Farm Bill may come as a surprise.

In both 2024 and 2026, the AVMA wrote (see Figure 1) to Congress offering “strong support” for the Farm Bill to override Proposition 12 and similar state laws. In its 2026 letter, the AVMA states that Proposition 12 is “not scientifically based” and “restricts veterinarians’ flexibility” to provide the best care for animals. In its 2024 letter to Congress, the AVMA went as far as to state that Proposition 12 imposes “arbitrary housing requirements”.

Both AVMA’s letters are published on the National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) website, the leading pork industry lobby group opposing Proposition 12. The NPPC is based in Iowa, the largest pork-producing state in the US.

Figure 1 – The AVMA’s 2026 letter to Congress offering “strong support” for Farm Bill provisions designed to overturn Proposition 12 and similar state legislation

The American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV) has submitted its own letter opposing Proposition 12, describing the law as a “one-size-fits-all” mandate and warning against a “patchwork” of state regulation. The language closely mirrors that used by the NPPC in its own campaigning against Proposition 12. In 2023 the AASV also submitted an amicus brief in the NPPC v Ross Supreme Court case in support of the pork industry.

Swine veterinarians exercise considerable influence over AVMA sow housing policy. The similarity between the AASV and AVMA letters illustrates how sectoral veterinary positions which are closely linked with the pork industry become amplified through national veterinary institutions. As a result, arguments closely aligned with pork industry interests are presented as the position of the US veterinary profession. The AVMA’s 2026 letter makes it clear that the organisation claims to speak for more than 111,000 veterinarians.

Humane Society of the United States, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Are the AVMA’s arguments scientifically credible?

Gestation crates cause such extreme confinement that many readers will reasonably expect them to cause serious suffering. But it is worth considering the arguments advanced by the AVMA and AASV.

First, contrary to claims in the AVMA letters, Proposition 12 and similar state-based laws are clearly science-based. An amicus brief signed by 378 veterinarians and animal welfare scientists in NPCC v Ross includes a detailed scientific review. A 2022 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) scientific opinion provides a further authoritative review. Gestation crates are inherently not capable of providing for the welfare needs of breeding pigs. This follows from the extreme confinement they impose and the restriction of almost all natural pig behaviours.

For this reason, the AVMA argument that Proposition 12 restricts veterinarians’ flexibility to provide the best care for animals does not withstand scrutiny. Given that gestation crates impose such extreme confinement that they cannot meet the welfare needs of breeding pigs, preserving the option to use them cannot credibly be presented as protecting animal welfare.

Furthermore, the AVMA’s framing gives the impression that veterinarians independently choose between different sow housing systems on welfare grounds. Most swine veterinarians work directly for large pork producers or at least are professionally embedded within the pork industry. In reality, sow housing systems are largely determined by the economics and the infrastructure of industrial pork production and not by independent veterinary judgement based on health and welfare.

Deep capture and veterinary ethics

Under the AVMA’s Principles of Veterinary Medical Ethics, veterinarians have responsibilities to relieve suffering, promote animal health and welfare, and act in the best interests of their patients. Gestation crates cause severe suffering and cannot meet the welfare needs of pigs. The AVMA therefore cannot be credibly acting in the interests of its patients by lobbying to overturn legislation banning the sale of pork produced from gestation crates.

The AVMA’s policy position and lobbying on the Farm Bill provide strong evidence of deep capture within the institution and, by extension, within the American veterinary profession. Veterinary authority is being used to support highly intensive industrial pork production systems and to oppose landmark animal welfare reforms grounded in extensive scientific evidence.

Proposition 12 was passed directly by voters, upheld by the Supreme Court, and has been supported by veterinarians and animal welfare scientists in the NPPC v Ross case. Yet the AVMA has repeatedly lobbied Congress to overturn it.

Proposition 12 is now at serious risk of being overturned. As a veterinarian specialising in animal welfare, I have little doubt that this would contribute to severe suffering for millions of US pigs subjected to extreme confinement. As a political scientist, I believe it would represent a fundamental failure of the American veterinary profession, whose representative institutions have repeatedly used veterinary authority to oppose landmark animal welfare reforms.

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The post Who speaks for pigs? The Farm Bill, Proposition 12 and capture of the US veterinary profession first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

President Trump’s decision-making style has been described as a “hub-and-spoke,” one that prioritizes loyalty, limits deliberation, is intuitive, personal, centralized, unpredictable, chaotic and often influenced by the last-person-in the room.

Back in 2017, Speaking at the National Churchill Library and Center, the journalist Robert Costa noted there is not “a guiding principle driving” Trump. He “prides himself,” on being the person who “comes up with the ideas” and “the man at the center.” When asked recently how he makes decisions Trump said, “instinctively… you almost can’t take a pencil to paper, it’s really more of an instinct than anything else.”

Trump’s ad-hoc foreign policy

Foreign policy has come to dominate Trump’s second term with the president’s unstructured, ad-hoc approach has been on full display, with everything from the Ukraine/Russia War and military intervention in Venezuela, to the disruption of long term alliances, threatened acquisitions of Greenland and Cuba, universal tariffs, Latin America, border security, relations with China and most recently the War in Iran.

As we have watched Trump plunge the nation into a wildly unpopular war of choice in the Middle East, it is hard not to reflect on how far afield this approach is from that of most previous administrations and to wonder if we have passed the point of no return when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. Does the Trump presidency mark the death of foreign policy doctrine or is this merely a blip due to the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of this president?

I hope it is the latter and admit to feeling a bit nostalgic for a well-conceived doctrine of the Monroe, Truman, Stimson or Eisenhower type; the overarching principles which guided past administrations, warned future and provided the public with an understanding of the reasons behind critical decisions.

Tests and questions for using military force abroad

Lately, some have become wistful for the foreign policy doctrines of Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell  in particular, perhaps because we harbour the belief if either had been employed by the Trump Administration, then current quagmire in Iran might have been avoided. After all, would anyone applying former Reagan Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s “six tests” for “weighing the use of US forces abroad” go to war in Iran the way Trump did? According to Weinberger, US military power should only be employed if:

1. A vital national interest is at stake
2. We are prepared to commit the forces necessary to win
3. Political and military objectives have been clearly established
4. Forces are sized to achieve each of these objectives
5. The use of force has the support of the American people and their representatives in Congress
6. All other options have been exhausted, and forces are used only as a last resort.

Likewise, Colin Powell’s doctrine which, as political scientist Ian Bremmer explains, amounts to eight questions:

1. Is a vital national-security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear and attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of US action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

If Trump had employed either doctrine it is difficult to imagine that we would currently be contending with the loss of US servicemembers, the deaths of countless Iranians, a closed Strait of Hormuz, gas prices which now average $4.50/gallon, frayed alliances, and a world economy on the brink, among other things. Even the well-known neo-conservative Robert Kagan has recently argued that the US is heading for total defeat in the war.

Credit: National Archives (photo no. c47687-5)

Decisions about going to war need to be guided by standards and principles

The absence of clearly articulated principles in the Trump administration is deeply troubling. In the case of the Iran War, it has left many wondering how and why the decision to go to war was made. Was it, as some have suggested, really a ‘last’ encounter with Benjamin Netanyahu or Senator Lindsay Graham that set him down this path? Was he so “flush with victory” after Nicolas Maduro’s capture from Venezuela that he assumed it could be replicated in Iran?  Was it something else? What did the president and his top advisors consider? What didn’t they take into account? What truly guided their thinking?

The process and methods we use to reach conclusions and make decisions matter. That doesn’t mean that employing standards or tests ensures success; unfortunately, history has shown that isn’t the case. Writing after the end of his presidency  Ronald Reagan outlined how his administration’s experience in Lebanon led it to adopt a set of principles about the use of military force – the articulation of which he felt could be helpful to future leaders.

For all the criticism the Weinberger and Powell doctrines have garnered over the years, much of it warranted, the men who articulated them deserve credit for providing the public and policymakers (both current and future) insight into the factors they weighed during extraordinarily difficult times in the nations’ history.

It is the least the public deserves from officials acting in their name, especially when it comes to an issue as critical as the use of military force.

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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.

The post Donald Trump’s ad-hoc foreign policy approach shows he could learn lessons from past administrations about when to use military force first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

• This article is part of our ‘The 2026 Midterms‘ series curated by Peter Finn (University of Greenwich). The series explores the run-up to the 2026 US midterm elections at the state and national levels. If you are interested in contributing to the series, contact Peter Finn (P.D.Finn@greenwich.ac.uk).

As ever, mayors matter in US politics. At a time when the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) is becoming a bigger presence in city life and the midterm elections are less than six months away, urban leadership is back in focus. It is a good time to consider not only the significance of mayors in US politics but, also, how they build their leadership capital.

Looking at how mayors lead

My new book, Strong Mayors’ and Leadership Capital does just that, by presenting a series of case studies of mayoral leadership from the earlier part of this century: London’s Ken Livingstone & Boris Johnson, Amsterdam’s Job Cohen, and New York’s Michael Bloomberg. It uses the Leadership Capital Index (LCI) to compare mayors from different systems and cultures. The LCI collects data using a series of metrics concerning skills, reputation and relations with stakeholders to “score” leaders and then enable us to see how this capital waxed and waned over time. While the LCI is not a perfect measure, it did provide a means to observe key elements of mayors’ agency in action.

However, it is the book’s key findings for the New York mayoralty and its wider relevance to this year’s midterms that I want to focus on, here. Bloomberg’s mayoralty lasted twelve years (partly due to a controversial constitutional alteration to term limits) and saw him invest heavily economically and politically in the regeneration of New York City. This was set against the backdrop of the economic disruption that immediately followed 9/11 and, later, the 2008-9 Great Financial Crash. During this, he made gaffes and fell afoul of criticisms that are often experienced by politicians at local and national levels. For instance, he was once heavily criticised for clumsily describing New York as a “luxury product” in the middle of discussions about the cost of living. He then went on, unsuccessfully, to seek the Democratic Party nomination for President in 2020. It is a story that has echoes, today.

Mayors can influence the national conversation on the economy and migration

New York’s current mayor, Zohran Mamdani, has built a solid narrative around tackling exactly the kind of economic injustice Bloomberg was accused of perpetuating. This might well be expected, given the sizeable difference in their ideologies. Nevertheless, as ever, the economy remains a key priority for voters ahead of this year’s midterm elections, with 32 percent naming it as their key concern. So, we can expect it to come up in more campaigns at all levels of government as the year presses on. The war with Iran, inflation and longer-term trends in regional inequalities will surely make the cost of living as big an issue in the elections as any informal referendum on Trump personally. Mayors will be central to making the argument for this in those big cities with pronounced historic inequalities – not least of all Washington DC itself.

Mayors will matter in relation to the other big theme of much of the midterms – migration. ICE’s Operation Metro Surge brought headlines that captured global attention. From high-profile deaths in Minneapolis through to sizeable protests in all major cities across the US, the Trump Administration’s actions on migration have propelled city leaders into the headlines for many negative reasons. Frequently, this has been as the expression of opposition to, and political conflict with, the federal government. Most notably, Mayor Jacob Frey of Minneapolis banned federal officials from using city buildings for Metro Surge. With migration joining the cost of living as a key election issue, mayors will be key voices in shaping the election narrative over the coming months.

“Congestion Relief One-Year Anniversary” by Metropolitan Transportation Authority, CC BY 4.0

Indeed, whilst the media often focuses on the outcome of midterms as a predictor for subsequent presidential elections, it is really the narrative that will be important. It is not just what the narrative is that matters, though – who communicates it also counts. Thus, as with Pete Buttigieg in 2020, it is quite possible that we will see mayors stepping forward onto the national stage as candidates in the 2028 Primaries. This is not unusual – John Lindsay in 1972, Rudy Giuliani in 2008 and Buttigieg in 2020 are all examples of former mayors who sought the presidential nomination for either the Republicans or Democrats. And who can forget former Mayor of Wasilla (Alaska), Sarah Palin, who served as John McCain’s Vice-Presidential pick in 2008? Whoever runs for the White House in 2028 for either party, and no matter how quirky they may be, it seems likely that America’s mayors will remain a strong presence in the primaries.

Mayors can push their policy narrative to a national audience

So, mayors remain leaders who spend much of their time and political capital debating and addressing national political themes. From the economy to migration, gun control to security, health to education, mayors matter in America and to a much greater extent than we realise. My book showed how one mayor, Bloomberg, tackled not just the economy but also issues concerning public health and the school system. He was not an especially-good communicator – frequently quite the opposite, in fact – but his voice was clearly heard. Indeed, with his work on international urban climate change, it was heard globally.

But Bloomberg was by no means the only mayor to be heard so widely – two of his successors, Bill de Blasio and Mamdani, have had similar impacts in terms of their policy narratives. Likewise, mayors in other cities have recently found themselves propelled, even if unexpectedly, before the TV cameras to talk about incidents of violence and inequality. That is not about to change, and we should take far greater notice of it if we want to understand the future of American politics.

• Strong Mayors and Leadership Capital will be published by Bloomsbury on 28 May 2026.
• Please read our comments policy before commenting.
• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor the London School of Economics.

The post The 2026 Midterms: How strong mayors will influence the midterms first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

In November 2025, US President Donald Trump wrote to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, demanding that he issue a pardon for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has been on trial since 2020 on corruption charges. With Trump recently reiterating his call for a pardon for the Israeli Prime Minister, how should we read the US President’s demands?

From a constitutional question to a personal obligation

On one level, this is a familiar story of external pressure on a domestic legal process. But the episode also points to a broader development: the growing intrusion of interpersonal politics into world affairs. Here, Trump does not simply intervene as the head of an allied state. He has personalized the demand, turning a constitutional question into a matter of personal obligation. In other words, Trump shifts the ground of the dispute from law and sovereignty to loyalty and interpersonal relationship. This makes it a revealing example of how political actors move between national and personal identities in public.

In our new research, we argue that the ability to influence through diplomacy is not a fixed attribute but something that is accomplished through how people interact with others. Rather than assuming that leaders either simply represent the state or act as private individuals, we examine how they switch hats in real time. To trace these shifts, we draw on sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of “footing” – asking who is speaking, on whose behalf, and with what degree of personal agency. We show that diplomats do not operate through a single, static position: at times they speak as institutional messengers, or as shapers of the message, and at other times in a more openly personal way. We think of state’s representatives as being able to adopt three distinct types of a speaker’s footing:

• The Animator: Someone merely voicing a pre-constructed message (the “messenger”).
• The Author: Someone who frames and selects the content of a message on behalf of the state.
• The Principal: Someone speaking in their “own character,” foregrounding their personal beliefs and agenda.

This framework is especially useful for analysing the March 2026 Trump-Herzog clash. Trump’s remarks on 5 March were unusually direct: he said Herzog “must give Bibi a pardon today,” and called the President “a disgrace”. It was not just a disagreement over legal authority; it was a battle over footing management. While Trump attempted to drag the interaction into a deeply personal space, in response Herzog used institutional language, stating “”The president will examine the request according to the law, the ‌good ⁠of the state, his conscience and free of any internal or external pressure.” This language was a strategic retreat with aim of preserving his ability to make decisions as a sovereign.

Trump’s use of footing management as a coercive move

Trump’s intervention is striking because he does not merely speak as the head of an allied state expressing concern. His remarks are saturated with personal will: what he wants, what Herzog allegedly promised him, and what he is prepared to do if Herzog refuses. Reports that Trump warned, “Tell him I am exposing him”, highlight this shift. These are not the words of a distant institutional messenger, but the language of a political actor inserting his own personal voice into another state’s constitutional process.

At the same time, Trump has taken the footing of the Author by reframing the pardon not as an interference in Israel’s legal order, but as a wartime necessity. In this framing, the issue is not judicial independence but strategic efficiency: Netanyahu, Trump argues, should have nothing on his mind except Iran. By selecting a frame that recasts a controversial demand as a practical, even patriotic necessity, Trump acts as the Author of a new diplomatic narrative: reshaping the content and structure of the discussion.

Trump’s most consequential move, however, is not only how he positions himself, but how he tries to position Herzog. By claiming that Herzog had promised him a pardon “five times,” and by saying that Herzog had “held it over Bibi’s head for a year,” Trump recasts the Israeli president not as a constitutional officeholder exercising legal judgment, but as a person who made a private commitment and then failed to honour it – dragging him out of his institutional footing. Herzog is cast as a political actor who personally owes Trump compliance and is withholding the pardon as “leverage for his own political career.” Trump is not merely pressuring Herzog to act; he is reframing a sovereign’s discretion as broken interpersonal commitment, while portraying Herzog’s restraint as private calculation rather than constitutional responsibility.

Trump’s rhetoric also bypasses Herzog and appeals directly to the Israeli public. In February, he said Israelis should shame Herzog for not pardoning Netanyahu, and earlier in October 2025, he publicly urged a pardon during his address to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset . This is a person-to-collective interaction: a speaker addresses a wider public directly in order to reshape the constraints around another person. Trump is not only asking Herzog to act; he is mobilizing the Israeli public to shame Herzog for not only defying Trump, but also for standing in the way of battlefield achievement. In that sense, Trump’s intervention takes on the character of a public spectacle – even a degradation ritual – aimed at lowering Herzog’s standing before domestic audiences and tightening the pressure on him to comply.

“P20251229DT-0226” by The White House, United States Government Work

Herzog’s strategic institutional retreat

Herzog’s response is revealing because it declines the personalized frame Trump is trying to impose. Rather than answering the accusations directly, or even repeating their content, Herzog’s office retreats into a deliberately brief and scripted institutional position of an Animator. The statement does not engage with the alleged behind-closed-doors promises, the threat of exposure, or the charge of political calculation. Instead, it says that “President Herzog [will] consider the request in accordance with the law, the best interests of the State of Israel, guided by his conscience, and without any influence from external or internal pressures of any kind.” In our terms, this is a strategic withdrawal away from Trump’s Principal footing and a rejection of “fresh talk”. Herzog avoids entering the personalized interaction Trump is trying to create and instead adopts an institutional script that minimizes personal accountability.

The clash is really about how far personal ties can influence other states

What this episode shows, in our view, is not simply that the personal enters diplomacy. That much is obvious. The more important question is who gets to decide when it becomes legitimate, and for what purpose. Trump has tried to pull the interaction into fresh talk, where personal leverage dominates. Herzog answered by reasserting an institutional footing, where legal order, sovereignty, and office remain primary. That, too, is an exercise of agency. Faced with pressure from the leader of a superpower and Israel’s central ally, Herzog has used withdrawal, procedural language, and controlled vagueness to preserve room for sovereign judgment while maintaining political warmth. The clash, then, is not only over Netanyahu’s potential pardon. It is one over how far interpersonal ties can legitimately influence another state’s internal decision-making.

• This article is based on the paper, “Between the national and the personal: The interactional production of agency in diplomacy” in the Review of International Studies.
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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 

The post How Donald Trump has tried to make diplomacy personal first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.

In the first 24 hours of its war on Iran the US military reportedly used the Maven Smart System, a platform meant to assist military personnel in the targeting process, to hit approximately 1,000 targets. According to the Washington Post, the Pentagon employed Maven, which integrates software from several tech companies, to process large amounts of data collected via intelligence, drone footage, or surveillance, among others, and prioritize targets by level of importance.

Given the scale of the US operations in Iran, many commentators and media headlines have called this the “first AI war”. The Chief Technology Officer of Palantir, the data analytics company running Maven, claimed that this was the “first large-scale combat operation driven by AI”. Such statements are somewhat misleading. First, the term “AI” denotes a variety of computational techniques and is often used to refer to automation and autonomy—processes that have been integrated into weapon systems for decades. Second, the Russia-Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza have also shown that AI-based decision-support systems can have a significant role in the military targeting process.

The US’ operations in Iran are not representative of a new, revolutionary trend in warfare. Rather, they illustrate ongoing concerns about the role of the human in the critical process of targeting. These concerns surround changing interactions between humans and technologies in military decision-making, as well as the legal, ethical, and security implications of these dynamics, and whether/how these could be addressed via global governance measures.

Human judgement in the complexity of interactions with AI

Officially, Maven is meant to assist military personnel in the targeting decision-making process. As Palantir’s representative in the United Kingdom stated, “There’s always a human in the loop, so there is always a human that makes the ultimate decision. That’s the current set-up,” adding, “You could think of it as a support tool”. Therefore, this would not be qualified as fully autonomous weapon systems, or so-called ‘killer robots’ that select and engage target without any human intervention.

Yet, there are reasons to scrutinize the quality of the role of the human in this ‘current setup’, even if it is not a fully autonomous weapon. This is especially crucial as the US military intends to make Maven its “official program of record”, as part of the Pentagon’s plan to become an “AI-first warfighting force across all components” of armed forces.

One concern relates to the complexity of networked human-machine interactions in warfare. These dynamics most often do not involve one-to-one interactions. Rather, they are part of a network, a socio-technical system comprising both political aspects, as well as technical aspects including software, hardware, data, or cloud platforms. Many of the latter elements are supplied by the private sector, as highlighted by the prominent role of companies such as Palantir—or Anthropic, prior to its dispute with the Pentagon and designation as a “supply chain risk” to national security. Industry actors therefore play an influential role in this increasing complexity.

The question is whether human personnel have the sufficient time and space to engage in judgements that are appropriate to the operational context. In other domains such as healthcare or education, some studies suggest that routine interactions with generative AI models can diminish users’ writing and thinking skills. In the military context, it is critical to ask whether the dynamics of human-machine interactions, such as over trust in AI outputs or AI’s willingness to please, which can mean that systems align with users’ views even if they are factually wrong, significantly affect personnel’s legal, ethical, and operational decision-making. As an article in Defense One argues, “the real danger of military AI isn’t killer robots; it’s worse human judgement” that results from how humans interact with platforms such as the Maven Smart System.

National Guard Bureau members learn Maven Smart System, by MSG Whitney Hughes https://www.dvidshub.net/image/9532591/national-guard-bureau-members-learn-maven-smart-system. The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoW endorsement.

Human judgement across the lifecycle of AI systems

While it remains unclear whether Maven has been used in the US strike on a school in Minab, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of children, some have asked whether the intelligence failure causing these deaths can be blamed on AI. As argued by other experts, shifting the blame to an “AI problem” to avoid responsibility is another long-standing concern raised by the US’ use of AI in Iran. The intelligence failure was more likely a result of poor human judgement, which may have been exacerbated by the employment of AI systems in contexts of pressure and speed.

This also shows that human judgement is not only exercised at the moment of targeting, but also in decision-making happening at various steps before the use of force, and across the so-called “lifecycle” of AI systems, starting even before they are developed. Humans make decisions on which AI systems to use in the military, and when, where, and how. At every step, including research, design, development, testing, training, use and post-use, safeguards should ensure the exercise of appropriate human judgement.  But agreeing on such safeguards has been and is likely to be, challenging, especially at the international level.

Governance debates on AI in the military domain need more concrete steps

The question of the human role has been a central aspect of global governance debates on AI in warfare, whether they concern autonomous weapon systems or AI-based decision-support systems. Existing governance initiatives highlight the importance of ensuring human judgement in targeting. For instance, debates on autonomous weapons at the United Nations (UN) have considered what it means for humans to exercise “meaningful” human control over weapon systems.  

All three Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summits, a multi-stakeholder initiative co-created by the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea, have noted the need for the human role. The main output of the latest summit, held in Spain in February 2026, mentions that

AI-enabled decision support systems should support, not replace, the exercise of human judgement. The nature and degree of human involvement should be appropriate considering, among other factors, the operational context, the function performed, the technical characteristics and capabilities, as well as human factors such as training and fatigue, and the risks and benefits involved.

While these are good first steps, such statements are most often not accompanied by concrete steps to make sure that the humans involved across the AI lifecycle exercise sufficient judgement.

Shifting AI use means the need for effective governance is more urgent

Crucially, these governance debates are not occurring in isolation from current geopolitical dynamics, and especially the shifts in the US’ policy. The current Trump administration prioritizes the integration AI into any “lawful” military use, without giving details on how “lawful” would be defined, over any form of governance. This represents a shift from Joe Biden’s approach, which attempted to set non-legally binding norms, for example via the 2023 US Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy.

As discussions about how to regulate AI in the military reach a turning point, it’s clear that people must continue to play a key part in deciding who or what becomes a military target. This means we need to keep thinking about how to handle the increasingly complicated ways people and machines work together throughout every step of AI use, from its development to decision-making.

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• Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USAPP – American Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 

The post US use of AI in the Iran conflict highlights the continuing debate around the role of people in warfare first appeared on LSE United States Politics and Policy.