That is, Smith’s economics is a response to his sociopolitical context. And therefore, the implication is that Smith’s political economy be placed in a museum—an archaeological site that we visit occasionally. Another implication to this appears to be that HET is not relevant to contemporary thought because our context is different from that of Smith’s. 

Such an approach to HET, to me, makes it a rather dead subject. Consequently, in the economics curriculum, it serves other core papers such as micro and macro by providing it with context/history and thereby improving student learning/understanding. Yes, this is important, but it makes HET an instrumental subject. However, that, per se, is not an issue because all knowledge in one way or the other are instrumental. 

I see 3 problems with such a view. 

One, it is a reductionist approach because it reduces ideas to the context, be it intellectual (i.e., texts, speeches) or sociopolitical (i.e., laws, wars, conflict). How do we then account for human ingenuity and creativity? Also, how do we understand classics—that have a timeless quality? Or, are we saying that there is nothing in economics that may be applicable across time and space? [On the question of applicability of economic theory, see the discussion in Chapter 6 of my macro book.] 

The second problem is that such a reductionist view of HET inevitably succumbs to the linear view of intellectual progress. Wherein the ideas of Solow are better than Smith objectively speaking and that the ideas of Solow are more relevant to us because, in terms of calendar time, Solow’s work is closer to us than Smith’s. 

The third problem is that we are okay about marginalized ideas remaining forgotten. Studying ideas—texts written by women (and folks whose texts were not popular)—remain invaluable for contemporary thought and action. This perhaps depends on how comfortable we are about ignoring the ideas of our ancestors. (I am currently reading The Penguin Book of Feminist Writing edited by Hannah Dawson; the first text belongs to 1405 and the last one to 2020.)

HET: Understanding Economics

HET allows us to organize past ideas in a meaningful manner. The simplest organizer is that of calendar time. But ideas are forgotten, revived, exhumed, bolstered, expelled, popularized for a variety of reasons and so a simple chronological account cannot provide a sufficient historical account of economic ideas. 

We need to have other ways of organizing so that we understand not only the past better but also the present. Another organizing principle among historians of economic thought is that of ‘school of thought’ or ‘paradigms’. For instance, HET books discuss ‘classical’ and ‘neoclassical’ general equilibrium (Harvey & Gram 1980); ‘neoclassical’, ‘Keynesian’ and ‘Marxian’ (Wolff & Resnick 2012); ‘classical political economy’ and ‘supply and demand theories’ (Bharadwaj 1986). 

Many historians of economic thought, including me, reject the ‘neoclassical’ label. This is because it suggests that there is continuity between ‘classical’ (associated with economists such as Quesnay, Smith, Ricardo) and ‘neoclassical’ (associated with economists such as Say, Walras, Marshall). The analytically satisfactory label is ‘marginalist’—because of their reliance on concepts such as marginal utility, marginal cost, etc. 

HET tells us that competing ideas have always existed; we often only learn about those that have been popular/dominant. For instance, Ricardo disagreed with Say that exchange value is determined by use value. And today’s microeconomics textbooks teach us that commodity prices are determined by cardinal/ordinal utilities. When Keynes and Sraffa were writing, the economic ideas of Marshall were dominant and those of Smith and Ricardo were forgotten. HET allows us to understand that the evolution of ideas has been anything but linear. 

And today as well, research happens in all schools of thought—contrary to what is implied in mainstream textbooks on micro, macro, econometrics, labour. 

The study of HET

We study the world by dividing it into different parts; for instance, the physical and social worlds. Or the natural sciences and human sciences. Or physics and economics. Economics may be further sub-divided into micro and macro. Or labour and ecological economics. 

Within HET, scholars sometimes distinguish between ‘history of economic analysis’ and ‘history of economic thought’ where the former is a subset of the latter. We can find economic thought in Arthashastra but there is no evidence of any theorizing/analysis. 

Another division in HET is that between the internalists and externalists although I think that most of us operate somewhere in that spectrum. The internalists study economic ideas by focusing on previous economic ideas and on the logical framework of that ideas. For example, when studying Ricardo, we read his texts and the texts he was influenced by such as Smith’s Wealth of Nations. My 2021 article ‘On “effectual demand” and the “extent of the market” in Adam Smith and David Ricardo’ is an example of this. When an externalist studies Ricardo, they include his social and political context and interpret his ideas as responses to them. A good example of this is Timothy Davis’s Ricardo’s Macroeconomics: Money, Trade Cycles, and Growth (2005). A good biography warrants a synthesis of the externalist and internalist approaches. 

Summing-up

HET allows us to understand the ebb and flow in dominant paradigms. It makes us aware that history is replete with debates across as well as within paradigms. Indeed, debates spur knowledge production. While most economics textbooks suggest consensus, economics journals (both orthodox and heterodox) suggest dissensus. There are conceptual debates, refinements, revivals and contextual critiques, challenges, applications. Furthermore, adopting an HET perspective in the teaching of microeconomics and econometrics will provide the learner with a critical grounding in history, politics and philosophy. 

I thank Thair Ahmed for helpful comments.

According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘natural’ means “not made or caused by humans”. Viewed this way, there is nothing natural about markets or governments. Both have been created/designed by humans. Consequently, the prices set in markets and the prices set by governments are in no way natural. Yet, marginalist economists (and adherents of the Austrian school) suggest that there is something natural or spontaneous about the prices that emerge in markets vis-à-vis those that are set or administered by governments. This is the mainstream view—propagated via introductory textbooks. 

This post critically engages with James Buchanan’s 1964 article ‘What Should Economists Do?’ published in the Southern Economic Journal as this forms the basis of the posts by Samrudha and Ashish.  The critical appraisal of Buchanan’s article is restricted to his misunderstanding of Adam Smith.

Buchanan’s misunderstanding of Smith

In the very first page of his article, Buchanan calls our attention “to a much-neglected principle enunciated by Adam Smith” (p. 213). The “principle which gives rise to the division of labor” is, quoting Smith, “the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another”. And that its significance “has been overlooked in most of the exegetical treatments of Smith’s work.” 

Buchanan wants economics to be “the theory of markets” and not the “theory of resource allocation” (p. 214). As he writes,

Later in the essay, there is an inaccurate reference to Smith’s invisible hand (p. 217; see my moneycontrol article on Smith here). What Buchanan perhaps ignores or is unaware of is that Smith’s economics is one that emphasizes production, economic growth and development. Contrast Buchanan’s definition of economics provided above with that of Smith. 

And to make sense of economic development, a theory of price is essential (for an elaborate account, see Section 2 of my chapter in The Anthem Companion to David Ricardo—available here).

In the tradition of Petty, Cantillon and Quesnay, Smith distinguishes between “natural prices” and “market prices”. In Cantillon, the corresponding terms are “intrinsic value” and “market prices”. It is important to keep in mind that both “natural prices” and “market prices” are theoretical in nature, with the former at a higher level of abstraction than the latter. If market prices were empirical in nature, there would not be a single market price but a spectrum of prices that vary according to the nature and quality of the commodity as well as the time and location of the market. 

Be it the market or the government, both have been created and designed by humans and will continue to be re-created and re-designed. This, Buchanan recognizes. As he writes, “A market becomes competitive, and competitive rules come to be established as institutions emerge to place limits on individual behavior patterns” (p. 218; emphases in the original). For him, the market is “the institutional embodiment of the voluntary exchange processes that are entered into by individuals in their several capacities. This is all that there is to it” (p. 219). This is where Buchanan goes astray. 

I ask: how voluntary is the process of exchange under capitalism? How voluntary is the process of exchange under patriarchy? How voluntary is the process of exchange under the caste system? Smith is very cognizant of the fact that employers have more power than workers in capitalist societies. Smith is aware that big corporations (with/without support from the government) have more power than small entrepreneurs. Buchanan is unable to view power as a structural feature of our economic system—unlike Smith. One reason for the inability could be his adherence to an extreme version of methodological individualism. 

Conclusion

To conclude, the spaces wherein exchanges are truly voluntary for all parties, I think, are very less. Household? Firm? Village? City? International trade?

Political economy, in the work of Adam Smith, recognizes social classes and social power. And it is this recognition that will enable us to design better markets and governments. And this means better designs for pricing commodities, determining wages, setting interest rates, improving employment levels, and recharging our environment.  

I am now happy to share that several issues I have written about in this space has significantly helped me in writing my book Macroeconomics: An Introduction (2021), published by Cambridge University Press. The conceptual discussions are situated within the Indian context. 

For a preview, see Google Books. 

If you have institutional subscription to Cambridge Core, you can access the ebook. 

The price for the Indian edition is Rs. 495 and will soon be available through Amazon and independent bookstores. 

I had given an early book talk at BITS Pilani, Hyderabad; the video recording is available on my YouTube channel. 

International pre-orders have opened in many countries; for a list see here. 

K/Y ratio in Macroeconomics

The K/Y ratio captures a technological characteristic of the economy as a whole. It conveys to us the amount of capital required to produce one unit of output. A reduction in it therefore implies we require less capital to produce one unit of output. 

Since capital refers to the stock of produced means of production, which are of a heterogenous nature, K for the economy as a whole requires aggregation via prices: k₁p₁+k₂p₂+…+k_np_n=K. That is, K refers to, as H. G. Jones puts it (p. 17) in his 1975 book An Introduction to Modern Theories of Growth, “an index of aggregate capital.” Of course, Y too requires aggregation via prices.

Roy Harrod, in the chapter ‘Capital Output Ratio’ in Economic Dynamics (1973) treats K/Y ratio as a “kindred concept of the capital-labour ratio” (p. 46). Subsequently, he outlines the scope of the capital-labour ratio in economic studies. 

“It is to be stressed that the capital-labour ratio is a useful weapon for comparing alternative methods of producing a given object, for comparing methods of producing different objects or for comparing the changes through time of methods of producing a given object. It is on the whole an unserviceable tool in relation to national income as a whole, but it can be employed in a very rough sort of way for comparing different countries” (p. 48, emphasis added). 

Similarly, Harrod writes that “the concept of the capital labour ratio is not very helpful, if applied to the economy as a whole, owing to the difficulty of assessing the value of K, namely capital as a whole” (p. 50). 

Additionally, I think that such an aggregate conceptualization conceals more than it reveals. For instance, it conceals the nature of interdependence of production in an economy. What if K/Y changes because of a change in the nature of structural interdependence? Or, what if it changes because of a change in the volume and composition of aggregate consumption demand? After all, the volume of investment influenced by consumption. As Keynes rightly writes in Chapter 8 of The General Theory, “capital is not a self-subsistent entity existing apart from consumption”. 

K/Y ratio in Growth Theories

The K/Y ratio is used as an argument in Kaldor’s (1957) stylized facts: ‘steady capital-output ratios over long periods’. Here too, what is it saying about the structural nature of production and consumption in the economy? 

While Kaldor is talking about ex-post K/Y ratios, the ex-ante K/Y ratio plays a crucial role in Harrod’s growth equation g=s/v. Here, s refers to the marginal propensity to save and v refers to the desired or normal K/Y ratio. A decrease in v raises g, or more accurately, the ‘warranted rate of growth’. 

In the super abstract setup of the corn model (as in Ricardo) or the single-commodity model (as in Solow), since the input and the output are the same commodity, aggregate K is a homogenous set. This assumption allows us to sidestep the problems associated with the measurement and aggregation of ex-ante K. 

One cannot help but wonder how Solow’s single-commodity growth model (expressed via the aggregate production function) continues to be applied in growth accounting exercises on actual multi-commodity economies. We had noted some of the theoretical and empirical problems with one such exercise on the Indian economy in a short note in Economic & Political Weekly.  

K/Y ratio and Capital Theories

Capital theories are concerned with the conceptualization, measurement, valuation, determination, and aggregation of capital. Owing to the central role capital plays in production, the choice of the capital theory has a significant impact on both microeconomics and macroeconomics. Moreover, since capital accumulation is central to growth theory, the choice of the capital theory has a significant impact on development theories too. Similarly, on international trade theories; on this subject, you can consult the 1979 book Fundamental Issues in Trade Theory edited by Ian Steedman. 

In sum, while mathematization of the growth models gives us a better sense of its grammar, capital theory helps us understand its epistemology. And it is the latter which can better guide the use of K/Y ratio in economic theories, empirics, and policies.  

HARROD

While Harrod today is probably most well-known for his contributions to growth theory, he made important contributions to the fields of trade cycle theory, imperfect competition, and international economics. While there are 14 references to Harrod in Misak’s Ramsey, there are only eight references to Ramsey in Caldentey’s Harrod’(2019). [If there are two or more mentions of Harrod in a single page, I treat that as one reference.]

Ramsey and Harrod were friends (p. xxxi). Ramsey had known him ‘since 1922, when Harrod spent part of the year at King’s. Frank had taken Harrod under his wing then, introducing him to [G. E.] Moore and others’ (p. 195). After Ramsey was elected a fellow of King’s College, Cambridge in 1924, he renewed his friendship with Harrod, ‘a young left-leaning economics don at Oxford ‘ and they travelled between Oxford and Cambridge for intellectually rich weekends’ (p. 195). Caldentey mentions Harrod experiencing ”tremendous stimuli” after meeting Ramsey in Cambridge as opposed to his ‘frustrating Oxford experience’ (p. 10).

Although Harrod’s paper on the concept of marginal revenue curve was eventually published in the Economic Journal’as ‘Notes on Supply‘ (1930), on Ramsey’s advice, its editor, Keynes, had initially rejected the article in 1928 and had asked for revisions on the treatment of cartels (p. 305). In the meantime, according to Harrod, others had ‘discovered’ his concept and therefore he failed to receive credit for inventing it. Caldentey informs us that Harrod’s initial paper submitted in 1928 was titled ‘Notes on Monopoly and Quasi-competition’ wherein ‘he derived the increment of aggregate demand curve which was later re-baptized, the marginal revenue curve by Joan Robinson’ (p. 18). Moreover, Caldentey notes that in the foreword to the first edition ofThe Economics of Imperfect Competition’(1933), Robinson acknowledges the following individuals for teaching her about the marginal revenue curve: C. H. P. Gifford, P. S. Sloan, and T. O. Yntema (p. 101, n. 30). Also see Caldentey (pp. 18-19, 100-1) for a recounting of the refereeing episode between Ramsey and Harrod, which also makes reference to the three-volume work, The Collected Interwar Papers and Correspondence of Roy Harrod’published by Edward Elgar in 2003 under the editorship of Daniele Besomi.

DOBB

Dobb’s contributions to Marxist economics are well established. I was introduced to his work during my Master’s in Economics at the University of Hyderabad where we read selected parts from Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory’(1973). His collaboration with Sraffa in editing and producing The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo’has also been noteworthy. In Shenk’s Dobb, surprisingly, there is not even a single reference to Ramsey while there are 21 references to Dobb in Misak’s Ramsey.

Dobb was Ramsey’s friend from their undergraduate days (1920-3) at Cambridge (p. 94). They had started their degrees at the same time (p. 79); Ramsey enrolled for mathematics at Trinity College and Dobb for economics at Pembroke College. And during this time, ‘Dobb had considerable influence on Ramsey, both by engaging with him about the kind of socialism that would be best, and by introducing him to workers’ meetings’ (p. 299). While Ramsey was finishing his secondary education at Winchester in 1920, in addition to reading the economics books by Alfred Marshall and Keynes, he also read works by Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin (p. 47). However, according to Misak, it isn’t clear how much they associated with each other after completing their undergraduate studies (p. 87).

In his 1925 doctoral thesis, Dobb tried to bring Marx and Marshall together (p. 300). Shenk points out that Dobb had been trying to synthesize Marx and Marshall even before he started his PhD at the London School of Economics (LSE): ‘Dobb, too, sought to integrate marginalism with classical political economy, but with Marx substituting for Ricardo as the standard-bearer for political economy. ‘ In Dobb’s vision, Marx appears as a theorist of the social, Marshall of the economic’ (p. 36). Dobb’s PhD thesis was published in 1925 as Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress, and Shenk provides us with its outline: ‘Dobb dedicated the first section to economic theory, the second to economic history, and the third to evaluating contemporary economic practices from the perspective developed over the course of the book’ (p. 38). Since Ramsey ‘was considered (and considered himself) a socialist’ (p. 301), Misak argues that Ramsey’s use of utility theory in his paper on optimal saving needs to be seen in the light of the synthesis Dobb had attempted between Marxism and marginalism (p. 302).

Ramsey’s view of the use of mathematics in economics was similar in spirit to that of Dobb (and Keynes): ‘Like Dobb, he thought that one ignores mathematics at one’s peril, for the mathematics has to be right in order for progress in the real world to be made. And some real-world issues are going to be solvable by doing the maths’witness Ramsey’s response to the Douglas Proposals. But he did not think that the mathematician could step in and solve all problems. He agreed with Keynes that we mustn’t be so taken with the precision of mathematics that we erase the outlines of the very thing we are examining. As Ramsey so often put it, one mustn’t be woolly, but one mustn’t be scholastic either’ (p. 326).

SRAFFA

Sraffa has made significant contributions to price theory and capital theory and deserves high praise for his editorship of the collected works and correspondence of Ricardo. I have written on Sraffa earlier.’ While there are only two references to Ramsey in Roncaglia’s Sraffa, there are 18 references to Sraffa in Misak’s Ramsey. Given this scant attention to Ramsey in Roncaglia’s Sraffa, I make use of Heinz Kurz and Neri Salvadori’s essay ‘Sraffa and the Mathematicians: Frank Ramsey and Alister Watson’ first published in 2000 in Piero Sraffa’s Political Economy: A Centenary Estimate, a volume edited by Terenzio Cozzi and Roberto Marchionatti (as republished in Classical Economics and Modern Theory: Studies in Long-Period Analysis, an edited volume by Kurz and Salvadori in 2003).

As Sraffa writes in the preface to his 1960 classic, ‘the central propositions had taken shape in the late 1920’s’ (p. vi). In the following paragraphs, he expresses his gratitude to Ramsey (along with Alister Watson) for ‘invaluable mathematical help’at different periods’, and his greatest debt is reserved for A. S. Besicovitch. Kurz and Salvadori examine Sraffa’s diaries to identify the number of his meetings with Ramsey; according to the dairy entries, they met twice in 1928 (28 June and 11 November) and thrice in 1929 (10 May, 30 May, and 29 November) (p. 190).

The main outcome of their first meeting is capably captured by the following excerpt from Kurz and Salvadori: ‘At first Sraffa appears not to have explicitly distinguished between the quantity and the price or value of a commodity, a fact to which Ramsey immediately seems to have objected. Sraffa then appears to have introduced the distinction during the conversation with Ramsey’. Ramsey then reformulated the system first by putting the system of homogeneous linear equations in its canonical form, then by setting the determinant of coefficients equal to zero in order to get a non-trivial solution’ (p. 197). The key aspects of this meeting are not as ably captured in Misak and it is also incorrectly stated that Sraffa’s famous work related to ‘the determination of prices and’outputs’ (p. 305; emphasis added) whereas the size and composition of output is a given in PCMC.

Ramsey died in the middle of writing his book on truth and probability. Misak draws attention to the fact that after his death the philosopher R. B. Braithwaite published some of Ramsey’s essays in 1931 under the title The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays’(p. 273). According to Misak, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern had reached very similar conclusions in their 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour’(p. 274). And Misak further notes that, the similarity was so striking that John Hicks went to the extent of writing to Sraffa on 3^rd’September 1960 asking if Ramsey’s ideas were transmitted to von Neumann through him (and his ‘mathematical friends’) but Sraffa didn’t reply (p. 274; although a draft of Sraffa’s response is available, it is not clear whether he actually sent it to Hicks). However, after consulting the letter (available here), it is clear that Hicks is actually asking Sraffa how von Neumann arrived at a similar theoretical outlook as Sraffa; and it is not about the similarities between Ramsey and von Neumann as Misak claims.

ON VALUE THEORY

This blog post ends with some critical observations on Ramsey’s engagement with value theory. According to Misak, Ramsey ‘blended neo-classical economics and socialism’ (p. 303). Despite his ‘scepticism about the utility theory of value’, as Misak notes, ‘his two famous papers were written in the neo-classical framework of individuals maximizing utility’ (p. 302). The two important pieces of evidence Misak provides for the former are given in the following excerpt: ‘In his 1924 Apostles paper, he castigated Mill for putting all his eggs in the utilitarian basket. During 1927’28, when his two important papers in economics were written, he was also working on a book in which he hoped to carve out a subtle, naturalist theory of value’ (p. 302). Since this book was not completed, it is difficult to state whether Ramsey would have stood closer to the neoclassical or the classical theory of value. However, Sraffa’s position on the marginalist (or neoclassical) value theory is clear: it is futile. Therefore, unlike Misak, who writes that ‘It’s clear that Ramsey,’like’Dobb and Sraffa, had a complex, pluralistic, view of value’ (p. 302; emphasis added), I would be very reluctant to conjecture a similarity between Ramsey and Sraffa on the question of value theory.

What is returns to scale’ According to marginalist economics, the technique of producing a commodity may be represented by a functional relationship between inputs (say, k’and l) and output (say, y): y’= f(k,l). If all the inputs are multiplied by a positive scalar m, and the resultant output is expressed as m^r’y, then r’represents the magnitude of the returns to scale. If r = 1, the technique exhibits CRS, if r < 1, it exhibits diminishing returns to scale (DRS), and if r’> 1, it exhibits increasing returns to scale (IRS).

Despite the ‘advances’ in mainstream economics research, the marginalist theory of value and distribution still requires the CRS assumption (and the diminishing returns to a factor assumption) to make several key claims. The aggregate production function employed in the Solow growth model is assumed to exhibit CRS. And the Solow growth model forms the core of supply-sidegrowth accounting exercises which are used to make policy prescriptions (for a critique of one such exercise for the Indian economy, see Joshi & Thomas 2013).

The central argument in Clapham’s article is that the categories of diminishing returns, constant returns, and increasing returns industries are ’empty economic boxes’. In other words, from the standpoint of actual economies, these categories lack empirical and historical content. Consequently, industries cannot be classified into one or the other box a priori.

Clapham asks: what does AC Pigou (in his Economics of Welfare) mean when he writes ‘when conditions of diminishing returns prevail’ (p. 305)’ According to Clapham ‘constant returns…must always remain a mathematical point, their box an empty one’ (p. 310). He acknowledges that different kinds of returns have a ‘logical’ and ‘pedagogic value’ which ‘goes so prettily into graphs and equations’ (p. 312). How can we then use this framework to draw policy conclusions given the inability to classify industries a priori into constant, diminishing, and increasing returns’

The following observation by Clapham is insightful and worth thinking about further. He writes that diminishing returns must be balanced with increasing returns to arrive at constant returns (p. 309). Surely, this makes no conceptual sense and neither does it have any basis in empirical reality. As Clapham puts it, with CRS ‘the conception of the balance of forces, man’s organization versusNature’s reluctance, was worked out’ (p. 309). In other words, is CRS an expression of the balancing of the symmetrical forces of IRS (‘man’s organization’) and DRS (‘Nature’s reluctance’)’ For a visual representation, see the images below. If so, it would add to the symmetrical concepts found in the marginalist toolbox, most notably that of supply and demand. However, beyond the ease of exposition symmetry provides us, is it really how the actual world works’

Source: meritnation.com

CRS, DRS, and IRS posit an a priori functional relationship between labour (L) and capital (K), the ‘factors of production’ and output (Y) for an individual firm and for an economy: Y=f(L,K). While the idea underlying the production function, whether industry-level or aggregate-level, that outputs are produced by inputs is commonsensical and intuitive, its expression as a mathematical function isn’t as benign. Since marginalist economics requires continuous functions (often, of a monotonic nature) to ensure the existence of equilibrium, the ‘f’ is able to map infinitesimal combinations of Land Kto a unique Y. This ‘one-way street’, to use Sraffa’s phrase in his 1960 classic Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities(see my blog post Sraffa), between ‘factors of production’ and output is conceptually unsatisfactory because it misses a fundamental aspect about modern economies: the structural interdependence between inputs and outputs. In addition, it assumes that capital goods (K) are infinitely divisible, a very difficult assumption to uphold.

John Eatwell (2008; first published in 1987), in his entry on ‘returns to scale’ published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, also notes the apparent symmetry between IRS and DRS but points out its spuriousness. While there is no evidence of functional relationships in Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Smith’s discussion of division of labour, capital accumulation, and economic growth indicates that he recognised scale-enabled technological progress and Ricardo recognised diminishing returns to land, a non-reproducible input in production. Subsequently, Alfred Marshall, in his Principles of Economics, ‘attempted to formulate a unified, symmetric, analysis of returns to scale which would provide the rationale for the construction of the supply curve of a competitive industry, derived in turn from the equilibria of the firms within the industry’ (Eatwell 2008, p. 140). This point was initially noted by Sraffa 1926, and later much more thoroughly investigated also by Krishna Bharadwaj (1978).

It is well understood that the question of returns to scale is important in the construction of the supply curves which are integral for the marginalist price theory. Therefore, a thorough critical study of mainstream price theory and a renewal in the interest in rival price theories (found in Ricardo, Marx, Sraffa, and Kalecki, among others) are warranted. This is crucial because it is value or price theory which provides us with the economic possibilities a competitive economy generates. If it generates unemployment and worsens inequality, we know that intervention of a particular kind is necessary. However, if it generates full employment and reduces inequality, then it supports the idea of making markets more competitive and reducing government intervention.

REFERENCES

Clapham, J. H. (1922), “Of Empty Economic Boxes.”‘The Economic Journal,’vol. 32, no. 127, pp. 305-14.

Eatwell, John (2008), ‘Returns to Scale’. In: Durlauf S.N., Blume L.E. (eds.) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sraffa, Piero (1926), “The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions.”‘The Economic Journal,’vol. 36, no. 144, pp. 535-50.

Acknowledgement

I thank Mohib Ali for his helpful comments.

This blog post introduces you to the economist Arun Bose (1919-2003) who made important contributions to Sraffian and Marxian literature. Bose was called a ‘Sraffian Marxist’ alongside Ronald Meek and Ian Steedman

Born in Calcutta, Bose had become interested in Marxian political economy by the end of high school. He completed his undergraduate studies (Tripos) at Cambridge University between 1937 and 1940. One of Bose’s recollections of Cambridge is the following: ‘During extra-curricular sessions, both Maurice Dobb and Piero Sraffa discussed economic theory and Marxian political economy, leaving an indelible impression on my mind’. Moreover, Bose was actively involved in student movements there and also joined the Communist Party of Great Britain. In the decade following this, Bose worked as a full-time activist in the Indian communist movement.’

Around 1957, Bose decided to resume his study of economic theory. Under the Commonwealth Universities Interchange scheme, he spent a year at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1960-1. Subsequently, he was asked to join the newly founded Kirori Mal College in Delhi at the behest of the economist B. N. Ganguli and the English professor Sarup Singh. B. N. Ganguli is the author of Indian Economic Thought: Nineteenth Century Perspectives (1977), one of the handful of books dedicated to Indian economic thought. In memoriam, the Economics Department at Kirori Mal has organised public lectures under the auspices of Arun Bose Memorial Lectures.’

Between 1963 and 1965, Bose closely engaged with Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960). Bose published a comment in Economic Weekly (now Economic & Political Weekly) in response to Krishna Bharadwaj’s review of Sraffa’s book entitled ‘Value through Exogenous Distribution’. Bose also published responses to the reviews of Sraffa’s book by Roy Harrod and David Collard respectively in the Economic Journal, one of the main international vehicles for the dissemination of economic ideas. And in 1965, he published an article on Sraffa’s book in the Economic Journal. And during this period, they corresponded; Bose sent Sraffa five letters to which he received responses to all but one (more details about the correspondence is available at the online archives of Trinity College).’

Bose’s next publication was after six years: an essay on Marx in the 1971 volume of the History of Political Economy; it continues to be an important journal devoted to the history of economic thought. Next year, he published another essay on Marx in Science & Society. After another brief hiatus from publication, he published a book in 1975 titled Marxian and Post-Marxian Political Economy; he gave a series of lectures at the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Calcutta with the same title. Bose acknowledges Sukhamoy Chakravarty for reading the book draft and for familiarising him with modern linear economic theory (Chakravarty had also reviewed Sraffa’s book which had appeared in 1961 in Arthaniti, the journal of the Department of Economics, University of Calcutta). I reproduce an excerpt from the book’s preface where Bose describes his reason for being impressed with Sraffa’s work:

‘Piero Sraffa impressed me with his conviction that it was perfectly possible, though difficult, to develop a theory of political economy into an exact science, based on absolute precision of concept ‘ however much we may approximate in empirical work ‘ which would be wielded as effectively as a surgeon’s or a welder’s tools, to dissect or dismantle, and then reassemble the ‘unseen’ interconnections of the economic process, whose cognition is essential for revolutionary political action’ (p. 11; also reproduced in my Artha Vijnana article on p. 29).’

He went on to publish two follow-up books: Political Paradoxes and Puzzles (1977) and Marx on Exploitation and Inequality: An Essay in Marxian Analytical Economics (1980). While a visiting fellow at the Delhi School of Economics (DSE) during 1976-7, Bose delivered lectures on capital theory. (Today, in India, to the best of my knowledge, capital theory is a full course (albeit elective/optional) only at the University of Hyderabad; Bharadwaj had played an important role in designing their MA Economics curriculum along with Amiya Bagchi, Amit Bhaduri, and K. L. Krishna.) A year before his retirement from Kirori Mal College in 1985, Bose published a letter in the Economic & Political Weekly titled ‘Piero Sraffa’; this was in response to P. R. Brahmananda’s obituary of Sraffa in 1983, also in the form of a letter. Brahmananda had himself engaged with Sraffa’s book in a set of three articles in 1963 in the Indian Economic Journal; these were later reproduced in the first volume of the 4-volume Piero Sraffa: Critical Assessments edited by J. C. Wood (1995, Routledge).’

After his retirement, Bose employed his ‘Sraffian Marxist’ approach within a wider social scientific framework to explain India’s socioeconomic condition. In this period, he published the following: an article each in Economic & Political Weekly (1986) and International Review of Sociology Series I (1987); and two books in 1989 titled Theories of Development of Material and Human Resources and Education: Requiem or Rethinking’ and India’s Social Crisis: An Essay on Capitalism, Socialism, Individualism and Indian Civilization. In his Idea of India, Sunil Khilnani identifies India’s Social Crisis as an important contribution to ‘historical sociology’ (p. 218).’

To conclude, there are enough published works by Arun Bose for someone who is interested in writing a dissertation or thesis in the area of Indian economic thought. Moreover, his notes, manuscripts, and correspondence are available for purposes of research at Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML) although I personally found them to suffer from poor penmanship. It is extremely vital that we engage with the ideas of economists such as Arun Bose who provide an alternative way of understanding our economic surroundings.’

According to the

It is surprising to notice that our Chief Economic Advisor (CEA), Krishnamurthy Subramanian, the person responsible for the writing of the Economic Survey, did not object to the following mistake: ‘The ultimate measure of wealth in a country is the GDP of the country’ (p. 14). ‘While GDP or income is a flow concept (measured over a period of time), wealth is a stock concept (measured at a point in time); however, let us try to believe that the chief economic advisor meant income when he wrote wealth. Otherwise, it is an elementary mistake.’

The ES misunderstands Adam Smith’s political economy when it talks about ‘invisible hand’. It is stated that ‘wealth creation and economic development in several advanced economies has been guided by Adam Smith’s philosophy of the invisible hand’ and ‘During much of India’s economic dominance, the economy relied on the invisible hand of the market’ (p. 6). What is the meaning of invisible hand in Smith’ Smith used ‘invisible hand’ as a metaphor to indicate that there are unintended consequences to individual actions and it figures only once in his Wealth of Nations. However, it is true that this term has been appropriated subsequently to paint the image of Smith as a free market economist, which he unarguably was not. As a counter to the view of Smith as a free-market apologist, it is important to note that Smith believed that education should be provided by the government to offset the cognitive ill-effects from division of labour and that it should be affordable to the worker who earns the lowest wage (for more on this, see Thomas 2019).’

According to the dominant economic theory (popularly termed neoclassical but marginalist more accurately), given preferences, technology, and endowments, under conditions of perfect competition, equilibrium prices (of commodities as well as labour) are (Pareto) efficient. [Pareto efficiency means that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off.] Of course, mainstream economists recognise that an outcome might be efficient but it need not be fair. The ES reduces this formal idea to the following: ‘the market economy is based on the principles that optimal allocation of resources occurs when citizens are able to exercise free choice in the products or services they want’ (p. 6). Leaving aside the conceptual issues with the marginalist theory of value and distribution, how can the market economy in reality not just reproduce but also exacerbate the inequalities of wealth (or endowments), income, caste, and gender”

The ES appears to grossly misunderstand both the historical position and conceptual basis of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. But was the market economy dominant during the time of Arthashastra as claimed by the ES’ Here are two excerpts from Thomas Trautmann’s 2012 book Arthashastra: The Science of Wealth (for my critical assessment, see Thomas 2016).’

‘As regards the quantity of rations to be issues to inmates in the king’s household: for upper-caste (Arya) males, the measure is one prastha of rice, one-fourth prastha curry (supa), salt one-sixteenth of the curry and butter or oil one-fourth of the curry. For lower castes, the measures are less. It is one sixth prastha of curry, and half the butter or oil. For women the measure is less by one quarter, and for children, it is less by one half. Thus ration units are proportionate to the status of the person and the body size.”(pp. 57-58)

 

‘In the case of commodities distant in place and time, the Overseer of Trade, expert in determining prices, shall fix the price after calculating the investment, the production of goods, duty, interest, rent and other expenses.’ (as quoted on p. 130)

The above two passages dispel the myth propagated in the ES that market forces had a ‘free’ reign in the past. In fact, it was exactly the opposite. There was a ‘division of labourers’, to use BR Ambedkar’s phrase, and food rations were provided on the basis of caste. Therefore, there existed no mobility of labour, and this is hardly surprising in a caste-based society. Moreover, prices were controlled because they believed in the concept of a ‘fair price’ which the market would not be able to set.’

ES also believes that the growth in incomes will trickle down to all: ‘Greater wealth creation in a market economy enhances welfare for all citizens’ (p. 11; emphasis added). ‘Wealth creation in the economy must ultimately enhance the livelihood of the common person by providing him/her greater purchasing power to buy goods and services’ (p. 14). How’ This happens in theory only if you make strong assumptions and neither is there strong empirical evidence to back this claim. On the same page, it is mentioned that the ‘freedom to choose is best expressed in an economy through the market where buyers and sellers come together and strike a bargain via a price mechanism’ and the reason is the following. ‘Where scarcity prevails and choice between one use of scarce resources [sic] another must be made, the market offers the best mechanism to resolve the choice among competing opportunities’ (p. 11). This is indeed the mainstream teaching of marginalist economics. It is true that marginalist economics views economics as a science of choice (under conditions of scarcity). However, what we require is a theory of production–available in the political economy of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and JM Keynes. In India, there is neither scarcity of labour nor of capital. Ipso facto there can be no scarcity of commodities. What we are faced with is surplus labour and capital; the former is manifested in high labour unemployment and the latter in high excess capacity. The macroeconomic problem is thus one of aggregate demand deficiency.’

The current economic survey applies a (marginalist) microeconomic analysis to our central macroeconomic problem–unemployment (this is not particular to this year; for another such attempt when Kaushik Basu was the CEA, see Thomas 2012). Thus, it argues ‘that government intervention hurts more than it helps in the efficient functioning of markets’ (p. 12). Within the marginalist paradigm, government intervention reduces ‘economic efficiency’ and therefore is discouraged. However, for the most important macroeconomic problem of unemployment, the government ought to play a key role in the economy. This is necessary because domestic private investment is volatile and foreign private investment even more so. It is extremely unjust for any government to transfer its core macroeconomic responsibility of full employment to the private sector.’

[This is a revised version of my talk delivered at a public discussion on the Union Budget on 16 February 2020 organised by Bengaluru Collective, Centre for Social Concern, Ashirvad, and St. Joseph’s College. The link to the video is:’https://www.youtube.com/watch’v=8VA6OmzDp6A]

I first came across Frank Ramsey in the preface to Piero Sraffa’s classic Production of Commodities by the Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (1960). My recent interest in Ramsey is primarily motivated by the following news. Cheryl Misak, a philosopher based at the University of Toronto has recently completed a biography of Ramsey. This blog post provides an introduction to Ramsey’s life and his contribution to the growth theory literature. [It was reassuring to notice that I first blogged about History of Economic Thought (HET) explicitly more than 10 years ago.]

Ramsey was born in 1903. In the year 1920, he read around 45 books, which included Karl Marx’s Capital, Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb’s The History of Trade Unionism, J. A. Hobson’s The Industrial System, J. S. MiIl, and Alfred Marshall’s Industry and Trade. At the age of 19, he was commissioned to review Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), a significant treatise in philosophy, for the journal Mind; the review was published in 1923. Subsequently, he was commissioned to translate Wittgenstein’s work into English. In Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations, there is an explicit acknowledgement of Ramsey. He was acknowledged for his critique/interventions of Bertrand Russell’s and Alfred Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica in a new introduction by the authors. Sraffa, in his PCMC, had acknowledged Ramsey for mathematical help. In 1929-30, Ramsey met with J. M. Keynes, Sraffa, and Wittgenstein to discuss the theory of probability advanced by Keynes and Ramsey and also to discuss Freidrich Hayek’s theory of business cycles. Ramsey also had a close engagement with AC Pigou, a leading marginalist economist who was also the target of criticism in Keynes’s General Theory. Ramsey died in 1930.’

Under the patronage of Keynes, who was the editor of the’ Economic Journal, Ramsey published in it articles on the ‘theory of taxation’ (1927) and the ‘theory of saving’ (1928). In my 2019 article which critically evaluated the Nobel contributions of Paul Romer and Nordhaus, I had highlighted that Nordhaus employs a marginalist growth model drawing from Ramsey (without further comment). Ramsey’s question was the following: how much should a nation save today for future consumption tomorrow so as to maximise consumption across generations’ Nordhaus employs the optimal growth model with environmental protection as an important constraint. And, the rate of interest is seen as a price which equilibrates the society’s time preference. In other words, the rate of interest equilibrates the society’s preference for the future with that of the present. The policy implication when marginalist economists have a significant say in practical matters is as follows. Since the (actual) rate of interest captures the time preference of the society, this rate can be used to decide how much of current gross domestic product (GDP) should be devoted to environmental protection. In effect, not enough resources are being allocated to mitigate climate change and undertake environmental protection.’

Ramsey’s optimal growth theory also underlies Thomas Piketty’s position on economic growth. In his 2015 article in the American Economic Review, he writes that in the standard model ‘where each individual behaves as an infinitely lived family, the steady-state rate of return is well known to be given by the modified ‘golden rule’ r = ‘ + ‘ g (where ‘ is the rate of time preference and ‘ is the curvature of the utility function)’ (p. 2). The reciprocal of ‘ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution which captures how much the representative family wishes to smoothen consumption over time. He uses this to point out that in general (marginalist) economic theory, we arrive at the r>g result–the focal argument in his book Capital in the Twenty First Century (2015; for a critical assessment see Thomas 2017). Furthermore, ‘in steady-state each family only needs to reinvest a fraction g/r of its capital income in order to ensure that its capital stock will grow at the same rate g as the size of the economy, and the family can then consume a fraction 1 ‘ g/r‘ (p. 3). To a marginalist (or neoclassical) economist, as Joseph Stiglitz wrote in an article in 1974, ‘interest rates are just intertemporal prices’ (p. 901).’

Therefore, for both Nordhaus and Piketty, interest rates are ‘intertemporal prices’ which allocate today’s income between today’s consumption and tomorrow’s consumption (today’s saving). As Ramsey (1928) writes, ‘The more we save the sooner we shall reach bliss, but the less enjoyment we shall have now, and we have to set the one against the other’ (p. 545). It is also interesting to note that their use of optimal growth models yields vastly different policy suggestions. While Nordhaus is conservative in his proposals for environmental protection, Piketty is progressive in his proposals to tax wealth.’

The rate of interest in Ramsey, as in Alfred Marshall, is a reward for waiting. Therefore, inequality in Ramsey necessarily arises from the heterogeneity of tastes or preferences; if a family is (relatively) more patient, it saves more than the (relatively) impatient one, and ends up owning all the capital stock (Attanasio 2015). How does this conception differ from the notions of interest rate found in Marx and Keynes’ For Marx, the rate of interest is the part of surplus value which is expropriated by the financial capitalist; the source of it is from the value added by labour. Keynes views the rate of interest as an expression of the preference for liquidity. To conclude, is the conception of the rate of interest found in Ramsey satisfactory for understanding a competitive economy’

REFERENCES

Attanasio, Orazio P.’ (2015), ‘Frank Ramsey’s Mathematical Theory of Saving’, The Economic Journal, 125 (March), pp. 269’294. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12229

Duarte, Pedro (2017), ‘Frank Ramsey’, In: Robert Cord (ed.) The Palgrave Companion to Cambridge Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 2, pp. 649’671.

Monk, Ray (1990), Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, London: Vintage Books.’

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1974), ‘The Cambridge-Cambridge Controversy in the Theory of Capital; A View from New Haven: A Review Article,’ Journal of Political Economy, vol. 82, no. 4, pp.’ 893‘903.

Further reading

Collard, David (2011), ‘Ramsey, saving and the generations’, Generations of Economists, London: Routledge.’

[Most of the contents of this post was informally discussed with my Economics colleagues at Azim Premji University on 19th February 2020.]

[My return to blogging is motivated by the extremely warm response I’ve received in person – in the last 6 months – from several people who have been readers of this blog. I’m also happy to announce the publication of my co-edited book on the history of economic thought.]

The subject matter of microeconomics is enshrined in the economics curriculum at all levels – school, undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral. The central objective of microeconomic theory is to provide a solution for equilibrium price and quantity in both the commodity (say, apples or coconuts) and factor (wage and ‘capital’) markets. Indeed, questions of what is the source of value and what is the exchange value of two commodities have been posed much earlier. You can find answers in Kautilya, Aquinas, Petty, and Cantillon – all of them writing prior to Adam Smith’s foundational treatise on political economy.

Kautilya’s Arthashastra contains discussions of a fair price. Aquinas, drawing inspiration from Aristotle and Christianity, tries to arrive at the notion of a just price. One of the founders of political economy, William Petty, derives the distinction between necessary price and political price and possesses a rudimentary labour theory of value. Following Petty, Cantillon distinguishes between ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘market price’ based on a land-cum-labour theory of value. The contributions of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and Sraffa to value theory follow this tradition of objectively determining value.

The dominant theory of value in contemporary economics is not the objective theories of value found in Ricardo, Marx, or Sraffa but the subjective theories of value whose pioneers are Jeremy Bentham, William Stanley Jevons (whose son taught at Allahabad University), Alfred Marshall, AC Pigou, and Paul Samuelson. The value theory (or microeconomic theory, as it is now called more fashionably) found in the textbooks of Hal Varian or Gregory Mankiw take the following as data when solving for equilibrium prices and quantity: (i) preferences, (ii) technology, and (iii) endowments. On the other hand, Piero Sraffa’s value theory, found in his Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960), takes the following as given when arriving at a solution for prices and one distributive variable: (i) size and composition of output, (ii) technology, (iii) the real wage or rate of profit.

How do you measure the data listed above’ While technology, endowments, and real wage can be measured in terms of the commodity-mix, the rate of profit is a pure number. However, how are preferences measured (or ordered)’ They are measured in a subjective manner. This is one of the core differences between the dominant marginalist theory of value and the Classical/Sraffian objective theory of value. Given this core difference, it is incorrect to treat the objective theory of value found in Ricardo or Marx as a precursor or rudimentary version of modern subjective theory of value. And therefore, it is important that students of economics learn about different value theories in microeconomics.

I shall end by drawing your attention to the practical implications of believing in the marginalist conception of the labour market vis-a-vis that of the classical economists (see an earlier post on wages). Under conditions of perfect competition, the equilibrium real wage is determined by the marginal product of labour. Any intervention, such as a minimum wage legislation or collective bargaining by the workers, results in imperfections and consequently leads to unemployment. However, in classical economics, real wage is exogenously determined though historical and social factors. If you believe in the marginalist conception, the logical policy recommendation is to eliminate any intervention/imperfection (such as minimum wage legislation or collective wage bargaining) whereas if you believe in the classical conception, you would treat collective wage bargaining and minimum legislation as legitimate ways of improving workers’ conditions.

This post argues that value theory matters for both contemporary politics and policy. And consequently, the teaching of microeconomics needs to become pluralistic. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the politics of microeconomics ought to be made explicit. It is, as Keynes, said that we are the ‘usually the slaves of some defunct economist.”