Understanding Society

How are an individual’s political values formed?

2026-03-31T14:35:00.007-04:00

Human beings have attitudes, behaviors, habits, stereotypes, and values. And somehow these mental attributes are developed or acquired in the course of normal human social life. But how, when, and with what results does this process work? And how persistent are a set of attitudes and values once established in the individual?

The topic here is a deeply interesting question — what forms us as the adult human beings with values and a moral framework that we eventually become? For the past fifty years political scientists and social psychologists have discussed a theory of the formation of political attitudes and values that emphasizes the “impressionable years”. This theory holds that children are fairly fluid in their values and political affinities, and that young people are most open to new values and ideas in the years between 17 and 25 — essentially the years of a traditional university education. And there seems to be survey evidence supporting the idea that the formative events of that period in a given person’s life become bedrock to their political identities, with relatively little change in later years.

David Sears is one of the early founders of this approach. He presented some of his ideas as early as 1975, and in 1983 he describes the “impressionable years” hypothesis in these terms:

A third view could be termed the impressionable years viewpoint, which suggests that any dispositions are unusually vulnerable in late adolescence and early adulthood, given strong enough pressure to change. In other stages of life, people are resistant to change, and of course, even in the most vulnerable life stage, they would not change in the absence of substantial pressure to change. At all ages, the content of the disposition is irrelevant. A specific and particularly interesting instance of the impressionable years hypothesis is the generational effect. This occurs when a sizable number of those in the supposedly impressionable life stage (late adolescence and earlly adulthood) are subjected to a common massive pressure to change on some particular issue, for example, when the nation is engaged in an unpopular war. It presumably yields interactions of birth cohort and dispositional content. The final viewpoint is persistence, which suggests that the residues of early (preadult) socialization are relatively immune to change in later years. This asserts a simple main effect of age, with dispositions acquired primarily in the preadult years. (“The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions: The Roles of Attitude Object and Life Stage”, Wheeler and Shaver, Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 1983: 81-82)

This theory suggests that the ambient political and cultural environment of one’s “impressionable years” (18-25) represents a powerful influence upon his or her lifetime political attitudes and values. The theory has been subjected to some rigorous quantitative efforts at empirical evaluation, with some evidence supporting its accuracy. Especially interesting is Krosnick and Alwin, “Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change” (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology [1989] 57: 3 : 416-425). They found a reasonable level of support for the impressionable-years hypothesis. Here is their abstract:

Two hypotheses about the relation between age and susceptibility to attitude change were tested. The impressionable years hypothesis proposes that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood and that susceptibility drops precipitously immediately thereafter and remains low throughout the rest of the life cycle. The increasing persistence hypothesis proposes that people become gradually more resistant to change throughout their lives. Structural equation models were applied to data from the 1956-1960,1972-1976, and 1980 National Election Panel Studies in order to estimate the stability of political attitudes and unreliability in measures of them. The results support the impressionable years hypothesis and disconfirm the increasing persistence hypothesis. A decrease in the over-time consistency of attitude reports among 66- to 83-year-olds was found to be due to increased random measurement error in their reports, not to increased attitude change.

For the Boomer generation (or the middle part of it anyway), the impressionable years were 1966-1974 or thereabouts. Major events during the period? Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968. Major unrest along racial lines occurred in dozens of cities in the US, including Chicago, Newark, and Los Angeles. The Kerner Commission report on urban unrest was released in 1968. The war in Vietnam became more and more divisive for American young people. The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act had been enacted in 1964 and 1965. Large demonstrations took place in Chicago in 1968 during the Democratic Convention. The first Moon landing took place in 1969. The feminist movement became a powerful national voice for equality in 1970 or so. The Watergate scandal and President Nixon’s resignation took place in 1972 and 1974. Tumult, large social protest movements, corrupt politicians, a seemingly “no-exit” war in Vietnam — the impressionable years for men and women born around 1950 were very different from those of people born fifteen years earlier or fifteen years later. With only one or two exceptions, these events helped to create habits of mind that counseled resistance, the power of public opposition to injustice, and the particular evils of American racism.

How does the impressionable-years theory contribute to the question of the rise of far-right attitudes and values (racism, xenophobia, receptivity to an authoritarian leader, male supremacy) among some young American and European men in the 2010s and forward? Were there features of life for young men and preadults in the period of roughly 1995-2010 that would explain the eruption of racist and authoritarian attitudes in the cohort coming of age during those years?

Two large factors are often mentioned. First is the prominence of racist and extremist social media influencers who have captured sizable audience of young men to subscribe to their hateful conspiracy theories. Nick Fuentes is just one example. But this isn’t entirely helpful; aren’t these right-wing entrepreneurs responding to the demand for hate created by an emerging generation rather than creating it? And second is the drumbeat of “anti-woke” impulses, trolling and “owning the libs”, and deliberately flouting norms like “don’t admire the Nazis”, “don’t deny the Holocaust”, or “don’t use the language of vile racism” in political discourse. (This is reflected in the recent scandals of encrypted chats by young GOP activists revealed in fall 2025.) Some of this extends back to the reckless language of conservative activists like Pat Buchanan and the John Birch Society (link), whose ranting took place before many of these young men were born. These “anti-woke” thrusts seen to resonate with this segment of young conservative men. Offending people is the goal, not the unfortunate side effect. And the “manosphere” is where it percolates in social media posts, game chats, Youtube videos, and encrypted Telegram chat rooms. But here again — did the John Birch Society and the Tea Party lay the ground for the radical far-right attitudes of one segment of Gen Z, or do we need to look for other causes that more directly impacted the lives of these young people?

The rise of the political attitudes of far-right extremism among young people is quite dangerous for our democracy, and dangerous for the groups who wind up being the objects of the vitriol. The language and demonstration of racist and neo-nazi social-political attitudes reflected in the “Unite the Right” riots in Charlottesville in 2017 speaks for itself: this is a movement based on white supremacy, Christian nationalism, and nostalgia for “strong leaders” who can fight for these values. And Trump, his closest allies, and his MAGA movement seem to encourage this hate-based ideological world. Stephen Miller is a true believer and Donald Trump has a long history of racist statements and ridicule.

There is another complication as well: the far-right extremist faction of this age group is virulent and uninhibited; but it is a minority of its own generation. There are other “political attitude groups” in the same generation whose values are quite different — egalitarian, anti-racist, and affirmative of the value of an inclusive multicultural democracy. And, of course, there is the large group of young people who are disaffected from existing political institutions in the United Staes, frustrated by diminished opportunities for themselves and others, but inclined to turn away from any kind of political activism at all. They are “disaffected and disinvolved”. So the “impressionable years” hypothesis has a bit of a problem here as well: how is it that the experience world of the United States for young people in the period 1995-2010 gave rise to such different families of political attitudes among its young people? Part of the answer probably lies with the fact that the experiences of daily life differ widely across social and economic classes in the United States, across regions of the country, and across racial lines. So we might hypothesize that young men in Hamtramck, Michigan whose childhood reflected persistent deprivation; who did not find opportunities in high school that led either to better-paying job opportunities or to higher education; and who developed a rising level of resentment when they visited Somerset Mall in Oakland County for the standard of living that would never be theirs might develop political attitudes that highlighted resentment, disassociation from political loyalties, and an openness to antagonism to other ethnic and racial groups.

This topic relates to the questions raised by Desante and Smith in Racial Stasis (link), who focus on whether there has been substantial generational change on the topic of racial attitudes and prejudice since the 1960s.

Group identities and inclusive multicultural democracy

2026-03-03T18:05:00.000-05:00

The United States is a multicultural democracy. This is simply an empirical fact; the country is a democracy (imperfect by many important measures); and it is multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multi-national. So what is involved in helping bring about a transition to an “inclusive” multicultural democracy — a social and political order embodying fundamental equality across all groups, developing a political psychology of mutual respect for the dignity and freedoms of members of other groups, and creating an environment of reasonably harmonious social and political life across and within different communities?

Jack Citrin and David Sears address some of these questions in American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism (2014). The book is a notable contribution in many dimensions, but of special interest to the topic of inclusive democracy is their effort to gain empirical insight into the “ethnic” or group identities of the groups that make up our population, and some ideas about the social processes that contribute to the formation of those identities. Here is how they characterize social identities:

Social identities refer to the dimensions of one’s self-concept defined by perceptions of similarity with some people and difference from others. They develop because people categorize themselves and others as belonging to groups and pursue their goals through membership in these groups. They have political relevance because they channel feelings of mutuality, obligation, and antagonism, delineating the contours of one’s willingness to help others as well as the boundaries of support for policies allocating resources based on group membership. Indeed, the intimate connection between the personal and the social bases of self-regard becomes clear when one recalls how quickly an insult to the dignitity of one’s group can trigger ethnic violence. (Citrin and Sears 2014: 31)

A person’s social identity may depend on many different kinds of personal characteristics: religion (evangelical vs. Protestant vs. Muslim), gender (M, F, X), region (Midwestern vs. South vs. Long Island), or occupation (blue collar, white collar, service). But Citrin and Sears underline the particular importance of racial and ethnic affiliations in U.S. social and political life.

This approach views racial and ethnic minorities as having especially strong ethnic identities, a sense of common fate with fellow group members, and perceptions of discrimination against their own group. These psychological foundations, we suggest, underlie the normative precepts of identity politics and multiculturalist ideology, particularly resonating with its emphasis on privileging ethnicity as a primary social identity. (19)

And they draw special attention to the relatively unique features of African-American identity in the United States, which they refer to as “black exceptionalism”:

Third, the black exceptionalism model hypothesizes that African Americans have always faced a uniquely powerful color line, one that is not completely impermeable but that continues to be difficult to crack. Despite their linguistic assimilation and their significant and ongoing contributions to a common popular culture, many blacks are excluded by the legacy of the past from the level of integration into the mainstream that voluntary immigrant groups have undergone, and, we argue, are continuing to undergo. Indeed, of all the major ethnic and racial groups blacks have, on average, by far the strongest levels of aggrieved ethnic group consciousness. Young blacks are especially likely to have strong group consciousness, suggesting enduring obstacles to interethnic cooperation. (22)

The black exceptionalism perspective argues that African Americans remain subjectd to uniquely high levels of prejudice and discrimination. Key to this view is the notion of the inertial power of history. Even as laws change, fundamental social practices and the mentalities of ordinary people typically follow only slowly, as in the classic contrast of “stateways” with “folkways.” The residues of racial prejudice in the behavior and attitudes of ordinary Americans have persisted long after the Emancipation Proclamation and 1960s-era civil rights legislation eliminated formalized racial inequality from the law books. (35)

It is important to reflect on these last two points. The persistence of racial prejudice and discrimination in US society is evident. There is indeed a “uniquely powerful color line” in the US. Likewise, the consequent social, economic, and political disparities for African American individuals and families are well-documented, whether we consider health status, family wealth, or educational opportunities. Black exceptionalism is not simply a perspective; it is a well understood historical reality (though a reality that the Trump administration is working very hard to conceal). (Here is an earlier post on this topic.)

In this book, and the research supporting it, Citrin and Sears are primarily interested in a problem that is somewhat distinct from the question of white racial attitudes. They are interested in the question of “national identity” in the context of multiple “ethnic or racial identities”, which they regard as the key issue raised by multiculturalism. Does the fact that Alice identifies as an African American woman make her less likely to have a strong affinity with the nation as a whole? Is she less “patriotic” than a typical member of another ethnic group? Is there a process of “assimilation” through which local identities (“Polish-American”, “Cuban-American”) subside in favor of a composite “American” identity? (For that matter, is this part of the hysterical reaction offered to the Bad Bunny halftime show by the right?)

On this orientation, the question raised by American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism is whether specific ethnic and racial identities are compatible with an overarching “civic” or “national” identity. They consider three broad frameworks: cosmopolitan liberalism, soft multiculturalism, and hard multiculturalism. The question of whether levels of “racial and ethnic antagonism” have changed in various groups is secondary. In fact, the topic of generational change in racial attitudes — the question of whether Millennials are less racist than Boomers — is not addressed here directly at all. And yet Sears is himself one of the chief architects of the “symbolic racism” school of thought — the idea that the key change between generations has been the replacement of “old-fashioned biological racism” by a more “color-blind” racism that nonetheless perpetuates antagonism and fear by whites of African Americans.

So how are we to move beyond this “uniquely powerful color line”? Racism is a reality that is conveyed through individual actions and institutional effects. Part of progressive change must take the form of change of attitudes and culture on the part of white people, and of young people in particular. So it is especially important to have empirical and sociological data about the evolution of white racial attitudes since 1950. How have white attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes about African American people changed during these decades? Has there been generational change? The “impressionable years” hypothesis—which suggests that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood, and then “crystallize” and remain stable for the rest of their lives—is a cornerstone of some theories of political socialization (Krosnick and Alwin, “Aging and susceptibility to attitude change”). Did the dramatic moments and struggles of the civil rights movement change the way that young white people thought about their black compatriots? (The revolution was televised!) Did the Obama presidency or the Black Lives Movement move the dial? Are we a less racist society today when it comes to attitudes, stereotypes, and expectations? The arguments offered by DeSante and Smith in Racial Stasis suggest — not very much (link). And Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2022) fills in many of the blanks in Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America. We need to have a new surge of practical thinking about how a more genuinely inclusive and respectful “culture of multiculturalism” will come about.

New thinking about generational change about race

2026-02-26T14:43:00.000-05:00

The United States has a long history of racism against African-Americans, at multiple levels. At the level of individuals, we have a history of negative attitudes, stereotypes, fears, and antagonisms that are built into the social consciousness of white men and women about African-Americans. Racist attitudes about “genetic inferiority”, crime, and other negative stereotypes have persisted since the slave period. At the level of behavior, institutions and individuals in “majority society” discriminate against African-American men, women, and children. The code of inter-racial behavior embodied in the Jim Crow epoch has continuing relevance to contemporary society, and discrimination in employment and other socially important opportunities persists. And then there is “structural racism” or “institutional racism” — the persistence of patterns of disparity and disadvantage for African-American individuals and families that seem to result from the workings of the institutions themselves. Residential segregation and its consequences provide a clear illustration of structural racism, and the persistence of health and longevity disparities by race illustrates the deadly seriousness of these patterns of unequal treatment. (Here is an earlier post on racial disparities.)

Observers have recognized for decades that American society needs to change in order to eliminate these facts of racism and substantive disparity of outcomes. But what kinds of change are called for? There is a comforting theory of change that seems to have some empirical basis. It is the idea that each cohort of Americans has become less racist and more tolerant of diversity than its predecessor cohort. On this account, the “silent generation” (1928-1945) had more explicitly racist attitudes than the baby boomers (1946-1964), Gen X (1965-1980), and Gen Z (1996-?). Each successive cohort was more accepting of racial diversity than its predecessor. This narrative suggests that racism and its legacy will die out as the more tolerant generations replace their less tolerant predecessors. GlobeScan, a global public opinion research organization, published the results of a brief survey on this topic in 2023 (link):

This report offers an empirical snapshot of the change across generations that is evident in some public opinion surveys: that concern about racial discrimination has steadily increased across recent generations of people. This is a comforting storyline for anyone who cares about an inclusive multicultural democracy. But Christopher DeSante and Candis Watts Smith argue in Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics (2020) that the storyline is fundamentally incorrect.

DeSante and Smith do not dispute that the generations since the 1940s have indeed experienced a shift in racial attitudes away from overt and explicit “biological racism”. Generations since the baby boom of the 1950s have internalized more “race-neutral” ways of describing current realities. And they have expressed rising discomfort with the fact of continuing racial discrimination. But these generations — GenX, Millennials, and GenZ in particular — appear not to have moved forward to the logical conclusion — the need for supporting the policy changes that would be effective in addressing the continuing realities of racial discrimination. This is the “stagnation and stasis” to which DeSante and Smith refer in the title of the book: progress on ending racism appears to have stalled.

The heart of their argument involves the question of how to measure “racist attitudes” among individuals. For several decades the primary tool of social-psychological measurement of racial attitudes has been based on the concept of “racial resentment” or symbolic racism. Survey questions were designed to elicit the subject’s level of resentment, fear, or antagonism towards members of another race. DeSante and Smith argue that this approach is no longer satisfactory as a measurement tool. They maintain that racism is inherently multidimensional, involving emotions and cognitive assumptions and frameworks, and a satisfactory measure needs to permit observation of several of these dimensions in the subjects of a survey. Instead they offer a four-dimensional framework that they call FIRE (Fear, Institutionalist Racism, and Empathy), and they use a set of survey questions that allow measurement of each dimension. These questions are designed to capture the emotional and cognitive components of “attitudes about race” among individuals in a racially mixed society.

Their measurement tool elaborates on these four questions:

-- I am fearful of people of other races.
-- White people in the US have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
-- Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations.
-- I am angry that racism exists. (DeSantes and Smith 2020: 227)

The questions are borrowed from several other survey instruments and are validated using statistical tools of consistency and predictive value. Here are the results of using these questions on the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (White respondents only).

The results are striking. Millennials are no less “racist” on average than the population of older whites on each of these measures. Here are the mean values for each question:

-- “Fearful of other races” 3.83 vs. 3.87
-- “Recognize whites have advantages” 2.98 vs. 2.48
-- “Racial problems are rare” 3.64 vs. 3.68
-- “Angry racism exists” 1.78 vs. 1.59

On average, Millennials demonstrate the same level of racist attitudes as older whites. The pattern is somewhat different when we compare “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses to the four questions.

-- “Fearful of other races” 14.36 vs. 14.35
-- “Recognize whites have advantages” 43.06 vs. 59.01
-- “Racial problems are rare” 21.28 vs. 19.59
-- “Angry racism exists” 76.84 vs. 85.37

There are two significant differences in these “agree” responses. Millennials are more likely to agree that “whites have advantages” and agree more frequently that they are “angry racism exists”. Millennials are more likely to disagree or strongly disagree that they are “fearful of other races”. But overall, DeSantes and Smith argue that these differences are small, indicating that little change has occurred between the generations born before 1981 and the Millennials. Millennials have abandoned “old-fashioned racism” but have not advanced much further. Here is their summary statement:

Generally speaking, our results in this chapter also highlight the issue of racial stasis, as signs of the countervailing forces remain visible. For instance, White millennials do present more progressive attitudes. Compared to their predecessors, they are more likely to express anger about racism and more likely to acknowledge their privilege. But we also found that nearly one in five White millennials (20 percent) simultaneously feels angry that racism exists and does not believe Whites have advantages because of the color of their skin…. Ultimately we have a large number of walking contradictions in American society that are helping to produce and perpetuate ongoing racial inequities through their political stances and policy preferences. (244)

So if DeSantes and Smith are correct, then the hope that America’s conflicts over race and racism will disappear as a result of generational replacement is not likely to materialize. Instead, positive and purposeful steps will be needed in the realm of public and semi-public policy in order to address the effects of discrimination and prejudice. And since the burdens of discrimination are cumulative, it is not enough to ensure that opportunities are available on the basis of merit and achievement to solve the problem. If residential segregation makes it less likely that black children will receive equal educational opportunities, then all of their opportunities in later life will be stunted as well. If elementary schools or high schools are racially oriented so that black children on average receive lower quality educations, then “equal opportunity” at the university level is insufficient.

DeSante and Smith do not have much to say about what a “non-racist” mentality and culture would look like, but we can extend their thinking by emphasizing the importance of “education for an inclusive multicultural democracy”. This is a view of “civic education” for all of us based on respect across our various lines of division. A major part of such an education is a clear and honest knowledge of some of the sources of racist oppression and violence that have burdened our society in the past. Another is a deliberate and creative effort by educators, leaders, and students themselves to find our way to some of the ideals articulated by MLK and the beloved community. Without some idea of how young people can be genuinely transformed in their underlying attitudes about race, it is hard to see how the “stagnation of racial attitudes” called out by DeSante and Smith can be disrupted and reimagined. (Here is a more extensive discussion of what is needed for an inclusive multicultural democracy to become a reality; link.)

Maintaining social resilience

2026-01-31T16:46:00.003-05:00

What is needed for a community of diverse people and groups to maintain its resilience in the face of hateful language, incidents, and provocations?

This question is particularly important for universities, which commonly seek to create a climate of welcome and respect for the various groups of students who make them up, and which are sometimes subjected to anonymous hateful attacks through graffiti, email, posters, social media, or other means. University communities have periodically been thrown into tense situations of fear, mistrust, and anxiety by hateful attacks — even when no physical threats of violence have emerged (NYT).

Hateful and racist propaganda campaigns like these are deeply destructive to the cohesiveness of a community for several reasons. They undermine trust across groups — “do those other people think this way about me?”. They harden the separations that sometimes begin to emerge across groups. They may lead to a cycle of “tit for tat” hostilities, which have the inherent possibility of escalation. And possibly they reinforce and amplify the latent hateful assumptions of some people to a more virulent and expressive form.

So how can a diverse and multicultural community best prepare itself for attacks like these? How can students, faculty, and staff “take on hate” in a university community?

One avenue is to devote the effort necessary throughout the community to establish strong forms of affiliation and trust across groups, so that members of different groups have a substantial basis for sustaining confidence in the motivations and allegiances of members of other groups. This means creating avenues of interaction and communication across groups in routine times, not just the occasions of crisis when threats to cohesion arise.

Another is for leaders to be explicit and passionate about the values of inclusion that hold the community together.

Third, an important source of social resiliency results from affirmative organizations that advocate for the values of mutual respect and inclusion and that have established strong networks of relationships throughout the community, both within and across groups. Student organizations can play the lead in creating and supporting such groups.

Another important source of resiliency is realistic communication about the continuing possibility of individual anonymous expressions of hate and intolerance. It is a fact that hateful expressions are possible in every social setting, and in fact we seem to be in a period where such expressions are becoming more common. So a community that is mentally prepared for such assaults is probably better able to resist their pernicious effects than the world that Mary Poppins lives in.

It also makes sense that a community will be stronger and more resilient if its institutions establish confidence in protection of all members of the community against violence and intimidation. Fear is a toxic emotion in a multicultural community. If a community can ensure that racist actions will be appropriately addressed, and that no one needs to fear racist or hateful violence, then the anxieties created by anonymous hateful messages should have less effect on the cohesiveness of the community. This means that effective and predictable policing and law enforcement is an important source of community resilience.

So we might say that a resilient multicultural community is one in which --

there are lasting inter-group ties through organizations and person-to-person relationships;
leaders from civil society and from important organizations publicly espouse the values of inclusion and respect;
there is a broad understanding of the dynamics of hate and the possibility of occasional hateful occurrences; and
there is deep confidence in the ability of the community to provide safety for all its members through effective law enforcement.

These circumstances are likely to build the ongoing trust and commitment to positive intergroup loyalties that will make the community resilient to the efforts of hateful outsiders (or insiders) to disrupt its harmonious fabric of civil life.

How democracies die

2026-01-25T17:23:00.000-05:00

image: Senator Josh Hawley salutes January 6 insurrection

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have written with growing alarm about the threat to our democracy by right-wing extremism. How Democracies Die was sobering when it appeared in 2017, and the publication of Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point (2023) reaches an even higher level of fear for our democratic institutions.

But just as this new democratic experiment was beginning to take root, America experienced an authoritarian backlash so fierce that it shook the foundations of the republic, leaving our allies across the world worried about whether the country had any democratic future at all. Meaningful steps toward democratic inclusion often trigger intense—even authoritarian—reactions. But the assault on American democracy was worse than anything we anticipated in 2017, when we were writing our first book, How Democracies Die. (Tyranny of the Minority, 5)

Levitsky and Ziblatt have spent their careers studying authoritarian regimes and their dynamics, so their assessment of our current situation is eye-opening. And of course, the situation today is worse than what they surveyed in 2023 — much worse. The earlier book focused on the powerful streaks of authoritarianism present in MAGA nationalism — race-baiting, contempt for democratic norms and practices, treating political opponents as contemptible enemies, and barely concealed willingness to defy Federal courts when rulings run contrary to the MAGA agenda. In the current book their focus is on the features of the political institutions (and the elected representatives) which have permitted these authoritarian dreams to come to reality.

They begin by identify a familiar aspect of US politics — the fact that electoral and congressional processes empower “partisan minorities” in dangerous ways.

The U.S. Constitution allows partisan minorities to routinely thwart majorities, and sometimes even govern them. Institutions that empower partisan minorities can become instruments of minority rule. And they are especially dangerous when they are in the hands of extremist or antidemocratic partisan minorities. (Tyranny, 10)

They emphasize that the extremist themes of the MAGA movement — white supremacy, Christian nationalism, anti-immigrant hatred, and glorification of strongman rule — have never been majority views in the US electorate. But a party exploiting these themes has in fact succeeded in gaining control of Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court. And this party has been fully willing to use its power to enforce its agenda on the rest of us.

The authors devote a chapter to several historical episodes of attempted right-wing seizures of power in the twentieth century. The first is an episode in France in 1934 that few of us have heard of. In the 1930s political instability in France, along with economic crises and unemployment, nourished the emergence of a constituency of radical right-wing opposition to French political institutions. These included young men and demobilized soldiers from WWI.

On the afternoon of February 6, 1934, tens of thousands of angry young men, mostly members of veterans’ associations and right-wing militias (or “leagues”) with names like Young Patriots, French Action, and Croix de Feu (Cross of Fire) gathered in or near the prominent Place de la Concorde, across the river from France’s national parliament building. Although the groups diverged in their ideologies and goals, they were united in their hostility toward parliamentary democracy. (Tyranny, 34)

On this winter night a large group of these militants marched on parliament. Clashes with mounted police occurred, and some of the militants were able to enter the parliament. “Members of parliament had to sneak out the back door, frightened for their lives. One minister attempted to escape but was discovered by protesters, who dragged him to the river, changing ‘Throw him in the Seine!’ (He was saved by police officers who happened to be nearby.)” (36)

France’s democracy survived the February 6, 1934, assault. But it was badly weakened. Prime Minister Édouard Daladier immediately resigned. He was replaced by Gaston Doumergue, a right-wing politician who was considered acceptable to the leagues. The goal of some of the insurrectionists had been achieved: the center-left Daladier government had been brought down by street pressure. Right-wing extremists were emboldened and mobilized. (36)

And here is the crucial point: the political leaders of France at this moment of crisis did not stand together in denouncing the violent, anti-democratic assault on the parliament:

Yet France’s leading conservative party, the Republican Federation, took a remarkably tolerant stance toward these extremist groups. Founded in 1903, the Federation had been led for many years by Louis Marin, a man with solid democratic credentials. But in the early 1930s, the party drifted to the right, first flirting with, and then openly embracing, the Young Patriot activists in its midst. Long considered a party of the elite, the Federation grew dependent on the Young Patriots and other far-right leagues as a source of activism and energy. Because the same individuals appeared in both groups, the boundary between the official “party” and the violent activists of the leagues grew harder to discern. (37)

There is a disturbing parallel between the French uprising in 1934 and the January 6 Capitol Insurrection in 2021. It is remarkable and disturbing to see how the Republican Party and Donald Trump have rewritten the history of the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. And Trump’s mass pardon of almost 1,600 individuals who were charged or convicted of crimes on that day makes it clear: he condones (and even encouraged) the actions taken by his supporters on that day. He and his MAGA followers seem to agree with the words quoted by Levitsky and Ziblatt from a vice president of the Republican Federation: “martyrs who can never be sufficiently praised or honored, [they] have paid with their lives…. The blood poured out on February 6, 1934 will be a seed of a great national awakening” (38).

Here is the most important conclusion that Ziblatt and Levitsky draw: the most important bulwark of a democracy is a unified rejection across all political parties of violent and anti-constitutional actions, no matter who stands to gain from those actions. And this is precisely where the Republican Party has failed the American public: it has not reaffirmed our shared democratic principles and has entirely failed to denounce efforts to bypass or destroy our democratic institutions.

Democracies get into trouble when mainstream parties tolerate, condone, or protect authoritarian extremists—when they become authoritarian enablers. Indeed, throughout history, cooperation between authoritarians and seemingly respectable semi-loyal democrats has been a recipe for democratic breakdown. (41)

The phrase “semi-loyal democrats” is key to their analysis. This is the weak link in any democracy in which there is prolonged political conflict. These are politicians who officially affirm the constitution and the rule of law; but who look for gestures and language that will establish common ground with the extremist groups and individuals whose actions most threaten constitution and the rule of law. Democratic institutions are most in peril when “semi-loyal democrats” are most numerous.

To be a loyal democrat, Ziblatt and Levitsky argue that political figures must honor four principles:

expel antidemocratic extremists from their own ranks
sever all ties — public and private — with allied groups that engage in antidemocratic behavior
unambiguously condemn political violence and other antidemocratic behavior
join forces with rival pro-democratic parties to isolate and defeat antidemocratic extremists (41-43)

By these standards, there are very few “loyal democrats” among the elected Republican members of Congress today. John McCain would fall in this category; so would Liz Cheney. Mitch McConnell does not, and, judging from the photo above, neither does Josh Hawley. There are a few others who have shown this kind of principle and courage; but it is not the majority. And this is a great risk to the continuing vitality of our democracy.

The dual state (1938)

2026-01-16T14:17:00.000-05:00

Ernst Fraenkel’s book The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship offers instructive and ominous reading today. Written during the rise of Hitler’s National-Socialist state by a German Jewish lawyer, it serves as a piece of “ethnographic study of the transformation of the authoritarian state” by a covert participant-observer. Fraenkel published The Dual State in 1941 after he left Germany and joined the faculty at the University of Chicago. Fraenkel (1896-1975) was Jewish, but he was also a veteran of World War I and was therefore exempt for a time from the expulsion of Jews from the legal profession. He wrote a detailed analysis of the creation by the Nazi regime of a dual state. His fundamental insight, explored in detail in the book, is that Hitler’s totalitarian state was in fact a “dual” state. It consisted of a fairly traditional system of laws and rules governing business, contracts, property, and other issues of ordinary life in civil society (the Normative State) and simultaneously it embodied a dictatorial state consisting of edicts and executive orders from the Hitler regime (the Prerogative State).

By the Prerogative State we mean that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees, and by the Normative State an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies. (ix)

Fraenkel’s key insight was that this duality was not transitional; it was not simply a moment in time during the process of creating a totalitarian state that governed every aspect of life in Germany. Instead, it was an ongoing necessity created by the fact that Germany required a reasonably predictable legal and business environment in which companies could do the work of preparing for a war economy. The Normative State could not overrule the dictates of the Prerogative State; but the great bulk of transactions in a modern political and economic system do not need special “one-of-a-kind” dictates to function. And at moments of conflict between the apparatus of the two states, the Prerogative State invariably prevailed.

The National-Socialist state is remarkable not only for its supreme arbitrary powers but also for the way in which it has succeeded in combining arbitrary powers with a capitalistic economic organization. One of the basic propositions of Max Weber’s works is that a rational legal system is indispensable for the operation of a capitalistic economic order. (xiv)

Reading The Dual State in 2026 creates a harrowing sense of familiarity: so many of the steps towards dictatorial rule and the Prerogative State in 1933-36 seem to have close parallels with developments in the United States today. Rule by presidential decree, empowerment of legions of unregulated “Homeland Security police”, and methodical dismissal of existing constitutional limitations on the power of the president — these developments are familiar in the US since January 2025, and Fraenkel documents highly similar steps in the creation of the National-Socialist state in 1933-36.

How did the dictatorial state get established in Germany at the end of the Weimar Republic? The answer is prophetic when we consider the strategy pursued since January 2025. Trump promised to be a “dictator for a day”, and has largely attempted to rule by Executive Order rather than by legislation through Congress. He has expressed contempt for the Federal judiciary and the Congress and has made it plain through his actions and decrees that he intends to rule by fiat. This is precisely how Hitler’s regime began, according to Fraenkel:

Martial Law provides the constitution of the Third Reich. The constitutional charter of the Third Reich is the Emergency Decree of February 28, 1933. On the basis of this decree the political sphere of German public life has been removed from the jurisdiction of the general law. Administrative and general courts aided in the achievement of this condition. The guiding basic principle of political administration is not justice; law is applied in the light of ‘the circumstances of the individual case,’ the purpose being achievement of a political aim. (1)

The legal framework of the Prerogative State was established by conferring “absolute dictatorial power [upon] the Leader and Chancellor either personally or through his subordinate authorities…. The sovereign power of the Leader and Chancellor to act unhampered by restrictions is now thoroughly legalized.” (4)

And what about the forces of repression at the command of the state? Fraenkel shows how this function devolved onto the Secret State Police (Gestapo):

Outstanding among the executive branches of the absolute dictatorship is the Secret State Police (Gestapo). This body has always been and still is organized in accordance with state law. In Prussia, the functions of the Gestapo are regulated by three statutes. The Office of the Secret Police was established in April 1933. The Secret State Police was transformed into a special police force in November 1933. The general powers of the Gestapo were finally defined by the Prussian statute of February 10, 1936, which revoked the earlier statutes. (7)

Again, there is a terrible parallel between this development in 1933 and the sudden and reckless expansion and unleashing of Homeland Security and ICE agents against the citizens of numerous US cities. Has Homeland Security become the Trump administration’s Gestapo?

The next step in the formation of the National-Socialist state in 1933 was to formally establish that the security and police organs of the state were no longer subject to legal limitation or review:

In their enforcement of the Decree of February 28, 1933, the police are neither bound by the provisions of the Constitution nor by any other law. The Prussian Supreme Court (Kammergericht) in a decision of May 31, 1935, held that ‘the Prussian Executive Decree (Durchfuhrimgsverordnung) of March 3, 1933, leaves no doubt that Par. 1 of the Decree of February 28, 1933, . . . removes all federal and state restraints on the power of the police to whatever extent is required for the execution of the aims promulgated in the decree. The question of appropriateness and necessity is not subject to appeal.’ (14)

And in fact, the Gestapo simply disregarded the rulings of high courts concerning its actions:

Although the Reichsgericht [court] supported the Supreme Administrative Court, the Gestapo disregarded its decisions. A leading official of the Gestapo, Ministerialrat Eickhoff, characterized theGestapo as a ‘general staff, responsible for the defense measures as well as the equally necessary offensive measures against all the enemies of the state.’ (18)

So any action taken by Gestapo forces was formally and legally unchallengeable. Fraenkel goes into more detail about the “abolition of judicial review” of police actions later in this same chapter, quoting a legal adviser to the Gestapo.

‘The task of combatting all movements dangerous to the state implies the power of using all necessary means, provided they are not in conflict with the law. Such conflicts with the law, however, are no longer possible since all restrictions have been removed following the Decree of February 28, 1933, and the triumph of National-Socialist legal and political theory.’ (23)

This sounds very close to the claims of “absolute immunity” that leaders within the Trump administration have asserted on behalf of Homeland Security and ICE agents in the conduct of their duties. The murder of Renée Nicole Good, it appears, will go entirely unpunished.

Essentially Fraenkel demonstrates that the Prerogative State of National Socialism depends upon the idea that the Supreme Leader and his associates have complete authority in deciding what is to be done for the nation. No courts, no legal framework, no constitution can limit that authority. Fraenkel notes that an earlier advocate for unlimited monarchical power made very similar arguments for the unlimited and unconstrained authority of the “monarch” three centuries earlier:

More than 300 years ago a similar demand was made in England. King James I, in his famous message to the Star Chamber (June 20, 1616), declared that in political questions the decision rested with the Crown and not with the Courts. ‘Encroach not upon the prerogative of the Crown. If there fall out a question that concerns my prerogative or mystery of State, deal not with it till you consult with the King or his Council or both; for they are transcendent matters … As for the absolute prerogative of the Crown, that is no subject for the tongue of a lawyer, nor is it lawful to be disputed. It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do . . . so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this or that. (36)

No wonder the demonstrations around the United States expressing citizen resistance to the authoritarianism of the Trump regime are organized around the slogan, “No Kings!”. We live in a constitutional republic, and no individual or party is unconstrained by constitution and law.

Making a far-right activist

2025-11-25T19:52:00.004-05:00

Far-right supporters of CasaPound

How can we understand some of the factors that lead to the development of far-right beliefs and worldview in young people? Why do a certain number of people in their teens and twenties develop a political fascination with neofascism, anti-immigrant extremism, and a range of racist ideas? Is this an expression of psychopathology just waiting for a trigger? Is it the “politics of cultural despair” re-emerging in the democratic west? Is it economic hopelessness and anger?

Polish-born ethnographer Agnieszka Pasieka has spent the first years of her research career doing in-person ethnography to try to get a better understanding of this issue. Her recent Living Right: Far-Right Youth Activists in Contemporary Europe presents some of her findings. Here are a few short descriptions that she offers concerning the challenges presented to ethnographers who undertake to study far-right organizations and activists.

Transnational ethnography is not easy either. And neither is a (transnational) ethnography of the far right. This book is an attempt to come closer to an understanding of the ideas and practices driving the varied forms of far-right activism that have been unfolding in recent years, both locally and transnationally. It strives to problematize the very ideas of the “local” and the “transnational,” demonstrating, on the one hand, how ethnographic knowledge can help to unpack these notions and, on the other, how research of this sort is a lesson in humility, prompting us to recognize the limits of our ability to define and capture the nature of “here” and “there.” It similarly strives to unpack the notions of the “far-right activist” and the “far-right movement” by juxtaposing common assumptions about who they are and what they represent with the activists’ own understandings. For me, anthropology is the language that mediates this process. (22)

One point that she emphasizes throughout her work is the heterogeneity of paths, beliefs, and worldviews that the activists she studies have experienced. She does not suppose that there is a single pathway or set of causes that lead a young person from adolescent daily life to a political affinity with the far right.

It took time to see through the label “far-right activism” and begin to discover a complex landscape made up of individuals and community, coercion and choice, violence and friendliness, conformism and revolt. It was a journey during which I learned how to get close to and yet keep a distance from people I had previously not even considered talking to, and how to create a respectful research relationship (at times close to friendship) despite the fact that I could not, to say the least, respect some of their claims and actions. It is important to emphasize that although I was accepted as a travel companion, I remained a stranger, sometimes even a suspect one. (22)

Here she articulates two problems that almost any ethnographer must confront: to avoid easy generalizations, and to negotiate the relationship between one’s role as an investigator and the personal rapport that is required in order to gain understanding of the other person’s journey.

Pasieka’s 2022 article, “‘Tomorrow belongs to us’: Pathways to Activism in Italian Far-Right Youth Communities” (link), provides a compact exposure to her style of research and some of her central findings about far-right youth activism. She offers a short historical context of fascist ideology in Italy, and her account focuses on the orientation towards the future that she finds in the language and “grammar” of the fascist and neo-fascist movement. The ethnographic content of the article involves her profiles of three young Italian activists, each with a very different story about their route to what amounts to a neo-fascist set of political commitments. Here is the future-orientation of the fascist/neo-fascist ideology that she describes:

When analyzing their agenda, it appears clear that activists like to present themselves as drawing first and foremost on the “fascism-movement” period as opposed to the “fascism-regime” one (de Felice 1997[1975]). In providing this distinction, Renzo de Felice highlighted the vitality and the revolutionary character of the“fascism-movement,” its emphasis on rebirth and orientation toward the future (ibid.: 28–29). Present-day activists eagerly embrace this vocabulary, particularly the need to adhere to revolution and build a New Man, a new society, and a new civilization. Further, as the“fascism-movement” era was also the one in which the socialist component was accentuated, it corresponds with the view of far-right movements that they are the “true” defenders of the interests of their working-class compatriots. (158)

She describes Leo’s earliest interest in neo-fascist politics in these terms:

Leo explained that he had been an active member of Forza Nuova since late high school, when he joined a meeting after a short encounter with an FN member. Prior to that, he neither held views close to those of FN nor knew much about the group. The first thing he appreciated about it, and at the same time found to be most crucial, was the community’s desire to “break the mold” (uscire dagli schemi): to believe in and create a political alternative. (160)

In spite of her desire not to reach premature generalizations, she closes “Tomorrow belongs to us” by identifying “three key factors” in the appeal of neo-fascist organizations to Italian young people:

My analysis suggests three key factors. The first is the kind of community the far-right promises: this community is presented, and experienced, as having an educational and ethical mission, as focused on“doing,” as providing members with an unconditional support and, fundamentally, as a community that transcends here and now. It is a community grounded in some ideas from the past and simultaneously constituting a model for the future. This aspect best explains people’s fascination with fascism as a movement, such as Codreanu’s grassroots activism. The second factor is that the actions of this community address “injustice”—taking care of neglected co-nationals or forgotten Christians—and speak to the injustice militants claim they too experience. As I indicated, this relates to their experiences of and with ethno-religious diversity and migration which lead them to reevaluate the importance of being rooted in and valuing “national culture.” The community is thus a vehicle which recasts social solidarity in terms of cultural particularism (Feischmidt 2020). The third factor is a lofty vocabulary marking the community discourse: the weight given to altruism and sacrifice, and on their heroic mission and arduous path. Such a rhetoric further reinforces the value of belonging to the community and, by extension, helps to “identify” political opponents (as individualistic, disregarding hierarchies, and lacking any broader vision). (175)

And in Living Right she offers a similar diagnosis:

During a conversation with an Italian activist in which we discussed what made their project special, my interlocutor affirmed: “It is simple. We want people to fall in love with our view of the world. We want to reenchant the world.” Reenchantment—which is necessarily related to the experience of disenchantment and the experience of liberal modernity—opens up numerous interpretative possibilities. It encourages us to discuss the radical nationalist project against the background of a long tradition of antimodernist and anti-Enlightenment critique; to consider it as a kind of Occidentalist narrative; and finally—and perhaps unsurprisingly—to ask whether the process of disenchantment and reenchantment is what radical nationalist activists find most inspiring about the fascist project. (41)

The movements I have been researching are often dubbed fascist or neofascist. These terms are used in political speech meant to cast them as intransigent opponents as well as in scholarly work that tries to make sense of ongoing developments. I acknowledge the importance of the historical dimension both as a source of comparisons for scholars and also, perhaps more critically, as a source on which far-right activists flexibly draw in their interpretations of history, as well as in their activism, to bring about desired futures. While their use of “fascist” grammar and vocabulary is obvious, the ways they are deployed are less so. Rather than assuming activists’ relationship to the past, I ask: What do they do with the past, broadly conceived, to make it speak to the future? (41)

This seems to present a rather idealistic and forward-looking view of the appeal of the ideology of neofascism. And while Pasieka does not ignore the explicit racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Muslim language that is also associated with the Italian neofascist groups she studies, the issue of racism and xenophobia does not enter this closing diagnosis in an explicit way. She refers to “cultural particularism” in this summary, but the motivation of background religious and racial hatred and prejudice does not enter into her summary of the attraction of these parties to young people. We are left here with an impression of “idealistic young people” who are dissatisfied with “politics as usual” and want a new start. But this doesn’t seem to capture the core of neofascist politics and the appeal of these parties and activists.

Pasieka’s somewhat benign view of the motivations of young far-right activists seems to contrast fairly sharply with the findings of other ethnographic researchers of the far right, including Kathleen Blee and Cynthia Miller-Idriss. See in particular the virulent racism that Blee describes in her ethnography of the KKK and the emphasis on racism and violence offered by Blee and Creasap in their review article, “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements” (link).

Right-wing movements in the United States openly and virulently embrace racism, anti-Semitism, and/or xenophobia and promote violence. They include long-standing racist movements such as the KKK; white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and white power skinhead groups; and racialist and violent groups of nationalists and patriots (Gallaher 2004, McVeigh 2009, Zeskind 2009). Their historical orientations vary, with the KKK focused on the Confederacy of the Civil War era, neo-Nazis focused on World War II–era Nazi Germany, and nationalists/patriots focused on the 1776 American Revolution (Durham 2007). Their locations also vary, as the KKK is generally in the South and Midwest, neo-Nazis across the country, and nationalists/patriots in the West and Southwest (Flint 2004a). Most right-wing groups are viciously white supremacist and anti-Semitic, regarding non-whites and Jews as inferior, destructive, and fearsome and seeking to preserve the power and privileges of white Aryans (Blee 2007b, Fredrickson 2002). (Blee and Creasap, 275)

Likewise, Miller-Idriss emphasizes the central part played by racism in mobilization of the far right in the US in Hate in the Homeland. (I should note that Miller-Idriss offers a favorable review of Living Right in Comparative Politics.)

Consider this description offered by Tobias Jones in the Guardian (2/22/2017; link) of the CasaPound movement in Italy. As a piece of documentary journalism it complements Pasieka’s ethnographic research. After describing a covert takeover of an abandoned government office building in Rome, Jones writes:

That building became the headquarters of a new movement called CasaPound. Over the next 15 years, it would open another 106 centres across Italy. Iannone, who had been in the Italian army for three years, described each new centre as a “territorial reconquest”. Because every centre was self-financing, and because they claimed to “serve the people”, those new centres in turn opened gyms, pubs, bookshops, parachute clubs, diving clubs, motorbike clubs, football teams, restaurants, nightclubs, tattoo parlours and barbershops. CasaPound suddenly seemed everywhere. But it presented itself as something beyond politics: this was “metapolitics” , echoing the influential fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who wrote in 1925 that fascism was “before all else a total conception of life”. Until then, fascist revivals had usually been seen, by the Italian mainstream, as nostalgic, uncultured and thuggish. CasaPound was different. It presented itself as forward-looking, cultured, even inclusive. Iannone had been drawn to fascism in his youth because of a “fascination with the symbols”, and now he creatively mixed and matched code words, slogans and symbols from Mussolini’s ventennio” (as his 20-year rule is known), and turned them into 21st-century song lyrics, logos and political positions. In a country in which style and pose are paramount, CasaPound was fascism for hipsters. There were reports of violence, but that – for young men who felt aimless, sidelined, even emasculated – only added to the attraction. Many flocked to pay their €15 to become members.

By the early 2000s, it was no longer taboo for mainstream politicians to speak warmly of Mussolini: admirers of Il Duce had become government ministers, and many fringe, fascist parties were growing in strength – Forza Nuova, Fronte Sociale Nazionale, and various skinhead groups. But where the other fascists seemed like throwbacks to the 1930s, CasaPound focused on contemporary causes and staged creative campaigns: in 2006 they hung 400 mannequins all over Rome, with signs protesting about the city’s housing crisis. In 2012, CasaPound militants occupied the European Union’s oﬃce in Rome and dumped sacks of coal outside to protest on behalf of Italian miners. Many of their policies looked surprising: they were against immigration, of course, but on the supposedly “progressive” grounds that the exploitation of immigrant labourers represented a return to slavery.

Like Pasieka, Jones seems to be providing a kind of “progressive populist” interpretation of this resurgence of fascism — something more hip than the old-fashioned dress, language, and symbols of the crude racism of the 1950s that young people can find an affinity with. Ironically, Jones himself seems to share some of the generational cultural discontent that Pasieka’s ethnographic subjects experience as well. Here is the publisher’s description of his book about Italy, Utopian Dreams:

This is a travel book, an account of the year Tobias Jones spent living in communes and amongst unusual dreamers. It is his attempt to retreat from the ‘real world’ – which is making him emptier and angrier by the day – and seek out the alternatives to modern manners and morality. Instead of cynicism, loneliness and depression is it possible to be idealistic, find belonging and companionship? Are there really groups that transcend the opposites of individualism and community, where you can be truly yourself but also part of something else? With his wife and baby daughter in tow, Jones visits unusual orphanages, retirement villages, detox co-operatives and old-fashioned farmyards, and spends time with spiritualists, time travellers, reformed drug addicts and Quakers. He encounters wildly different communities, some more harmonious than others, which lead him to ask the deeply unfashionable question: do groups that place faith at their centre work better than those that don’t?

The role of political education in social progress

2025-11-09T12:16:00.005-05:00

Stephen Esquith has spent much of his career observing, teaching, and engaging in “conflict societies”, and trying to develop an understanding of how best to move from high-violence to low-violence societies. In particular he has spent a great deal of time in Mali in west Africa. He has come to emphasize the importance of “political education” as a critical ingredient of building an enduring and peaceful community. Here are several passages from his recent book Everyday Peacebuilding through Democratic Political Education where he expresses what he means by “political education”.

To achieve everyday peace between neighboring communities at odds with each other, democratic political education must lead to a dialogue, not just a ceasefire or a peace accord. Demobilization, development, and reintegration will have to be regularly renegotiated, and to do this will require a democratic political education that addresses the emotionally charged nature of this process. I have argued that the arts and humanities can prompt such a radically poised dialogue. (240)

Radical poise can do this collectively through a process of democratic political education that prepares citizens, prospective citizens, and conditional citizens to coordinate their antipodal abilities for self-restraint, resistance, humility, political respect for dignity, and protest. (230)

When appropriately cultivated through a democratic political education in the arts and humanities, radical poise in theory and radically poised processions in practice together have the potential to limit negative political emotions such as anger, hatred, and fear and to coordinate a countervailing set of political virtues (self-restraint, resistance, political respect, humility, and protest) necessary for everyday peacebuilding. [It is] the process of making of liberal citizens. (1,3)

We might paraphrase the idea of political education as “the cultivation, formal and informal, of the attitudes, beliefs, norms, and practices of members of society as they interact with other citizens”.

Esquith has the view that these processes can be facilitated by the arts and humanities, and that the arts and humanities can contribute significantly towards the development of expectations and attitudes that facilitate more peaceful inter-group interactions and cooperation.

Esquith criticizes the tradition of liberal political thought for its tendency to present the problem of political education as one of formulating convincing “theories of justice” based on independent purposive individuals, and for a parallel tendency to reduce citizenship to a purely formal status of individuals within a system of law. The moral status of citizens is reduced to the categories of clientelism and consumerism, in place of a richer phenomenology of inter-personal emotions, obligations, and loyalties. It becomes a transactional conception of citizenship.

In place of this abstract and flat conception of the “citizen” as rational and mutually disinterested individuals, Esquith advances a new conception of democratic social practice that he formulates as radical poise. This virtue is thought to be “capable of (1) coordinating the constituent political virtues and emotions of self-restraint, resistance, humility, political respect for civic dignity, and protest to counter the political violence that fuels forced displacement and (2) constituting a more inclusive demos that embodies these coordinated political virtues and emotions in the exercise of political power with one another, not over others” (Everyday Forms, 4-5). “To be radically poised in such moments of political vertigo is to be actively and imaginatively committed to expanding a diverse demos peacefully even when it seems to be splintering further apart.” (5).

The ideal that Esquith has in mind for a transition to a more peaceful Mali or other existing conflict societies is a powerful one. The goal is to help citizens to a new way of thinking about their society and their neighbors:

That is, to imagine a form of politics that is not a zero-sum competitive contest for power over others but rather a collaborative search for power with one another to constitute a political society, a demos, appropriate in scale and more inclusive in active membership that is capable of resisting and overcoming those forms of anger, fear, and hatred that stereotype and exploit forcibly displaced persons, refugees, immigrants, and fugitives and on which further political violence feeds. (13)

Esquith describes his own strategy in these terms:

My focus is on the prior democratic political education needed to limit negative political emotions and cultivate collective political virtues and the concomitant emotions that orient citizens, prospective citizens, and conditional citizens—the emergent demos—toward alternative conceptions of power so that changes in resource availability and the opportunities to use them can be realistically imagined as part of what I call a radically poised procession. (16)

And later:

To be more effective than the procedures for peacekeeping and peacebuilding that have focused primarily but with inadequate success on liberal state-building and retribution, a process of everyday hybrid peacebuilding through political education must be able to counter negative political emotions, cultivate positive political virtues, and reorient citizens and prospective citizens toward democratic conceptions of political power with mutual trust, imagination, and realistic hope. (87)

Here I would like to extend this line of thought by suggesting a parallel with the problem of moving from a society in which there is a high degree of racism and inter-group antagonism to one in which these negative social emotions have been replaced by more tolerant and respectful ideas about members of other groups. In particular, can the cultural strands of hate and racism that persist in the United States and other liberal democracies through some of the same mechanisms of education that Esquith considers for conflict societies? In my view, the parallel is a deep one. Consider this point about political respect as a democratic virtue:

I will use the word “respect” to refer to a particular kind of respectful political attitude toward others. To treat others with political respect is to respect their rights and responsibilities as equal citizens and to recognize their role in the generation and control of power. (118)

This understanding of respect is directly supportive of a deep conception of equality, and it is flatly incompatible with racism. So when processes of political education succeed in cultivating attitudes of political respect for one’s fellow citizens, these processes are also doing the work of dissolving racist attitudes and behaviors.

Esquith uses the concept of demos throughout the book. The concept requires some explication. He is explicit that the demos is the people of a state, and it is heterogeneous in multiple ways: norms, nationalities, ethnicities, and sometimes legal status (citizen, fugitive citizen, non-citizen). As in classical Greek political philosophy, the demos is distinctly different from the concept of the polis. The polis is held together by a civic culture and shared values; whereas the demos is the people of the nation without any assumption of bonds of loyalty, civic identity, or shared values.

An emergent demos of citizens, conditional citizens, and potential citizens—whatever their formal legal status—must learn to limit the negative political emotions of fear, anger, hatred, and resentment (their own as well as those of others) that drive the cycles of political violence in rich and poor countries alike. (9)

We might say that the role of political education is to find effective institutions, arrangements, and practices through which a demos is transformed into some version of a polis — a political community in which most or all citizens regard each other with respect and value each other’s dignity and freedoms. And this begins to sound more like the vision that Martin Luther King, Jr., described in his vision of a post-racist society, a beloved community.

Affirming democracy

2025-11-06T11:27:00.003-05:00

If you are concerned about the fate of our democratic institutions, the rise of xenophobia and hate, and the rule of law, please consider visiting affirmingdemocracy.org — an ongoing group blog aimed at affirming our democracy and opposing the racism, lawlessness, and authoritarianism we now face.

This group blog describes its goals in these terms —

We are a small group of friends and neighbors who reject the turn to authoritarianism, racism, and lawlessness shown by the current Federal administration. This site will serve as a hub for sharing stories and discussions about the realities facing our country and our many communities.

We support a just and equal multicultural democracy, governed by law and constitution, and we want to work together to return our country to these values. In Rousseau’s words, we support a “free community of equals”.

We have many thoughts and fears about the policies and actions of our government today. We do not have a shared credo, but we are united in our love of freedom, equality, constitution, mutual respect, and civil community.

In particular, many of us notice many of the same things:

We condemn the assault on immigrants and the cruel and lawless enforcement regime the Federal government has enacted.
We are horrified at the assault on Medicaid and the likely effects these policy changes will have on millions of people in our country.
We reject the administration’s attack on scientific and medical research, universities, and academic freedom across the country.
We fear for the future of our country when we consider the ongoing assault on medical research and sound public health planning.
We condemn the current administration for its lawlessness and its contempt for both Constitution and the Federal judiciary.
We abhor the administration’s efforts to censor and dictate the museums, libraries, parks, and collections that document our country’s history and share its art, music, and literature.
We are ashamed of our government’s desertion of Ukraine and the president’s embrace of a bloody-handed dictator, Vladimir Putin.
We are horrified at the embrace of white supremacy and racial resentment that is encouraged by the current government.
We reject the government’s war on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, with full awareness of how far our society must go in order to achieve real justice.

Readers of Affirming Democracy are encouraged to find their own ways of supporting peaceful protest and advocacy in support of our shared democratic values and institutions. There is power in collective protest and shared support for our constitutional system.

A guide to being a sociologist

2025-10-29T22:17:00.020-04:00

Karl Marx Imagined

The social world is more complex and heterogeneous than most parts of the natural world, with diverse causal processes, different tempos of change, and multiple influences on a given outcome of interest. If we want to understand, say, why American psychiatry came to have the institutions and prescriptions that it currently has (as Andrew Abbott wants to do in The System of Professions), we need to consider —

actors at a range of levels (local people, state officials, educational institutions and associations …) who have an interest in the definition of mental-health practices, institutions, and regulations
the legal and educational context that affects the interests and strategies of various practitioners differently
the ways in which other professions connected to mental health and behavior (such as nursing or street-level policing) have influenced the development of the profession of psychiatry

… and many other factors and processes that do not yield to the impulse towards simple answers or single-dimensional hypotheses.

So the intellectual process of sociological inquiry and discovery is itself a complex and obscure one. The reader of a rich sociological analysis of a complex institution like Abbott’s treatment of the professions will quickly understand that this research project could not have been drafted out in detail in advance. Rather, the researcher was obliged to discover his or her own questions and insights as they dig more deeply into the specific institutional and practical realities of the profession. And this leads us to ask, what kinds of intellectual and imaginative capacities are invoked in this evolving analysis? To what extent does sociological theory contribute to a researcher’s ability to understand a new and complex social phenomenon? What is involved in applying a “sociological imagination” to a sociological topic?

David Stark’s Practicing Sociology: Tacit Knowledge for the Social Scientific Craft is a contribution to current thinking about methods of inquiry and uses of theory in sociological research. Stark is an organizational sociologist who has devoted a great deal of attention to “how organizations learn”.

The title is deliberately thought-provoking: is the process of investigating the social world a “craft”, or is it a set of precise methods that can be taught in PhD programs? The difference in perspective on this question is important: a craft involves something like “tacit knowledge”, whereas a precise set of methods sounds quite a lot like an algorithm of discovery. Stark’s view, and the view of many of the contributors to the volume, is that there are important aspects of the practice of sociology that are indeed “craft”-like. They are features of the active lives of academic sociologists that need to be learned through concrete practice in the discipline.

Stark’s introduction to the volume lays the ground for the contributions that follow. He argues that important parts of the research process within the social sciences are almost never addressed within graduate education. Three activities in particular are important: the researcher must “(1) come up with a compelling research topic …; (2) develop a publication strategy; and (3) learn how to improve a manuscript while navigating the process of peer review” (p. 1). And Stark suggests that these topics are both crucial to impactful sociological research, and at the same time, substantially under-developed when it comes time to assist young sociologists to make the transition from learners to researchers and creators of knowledge. Stark’s own comments focus on what are somewhat epiphenomenal aspects of the process of research — deciding who your audience is, choosing a title, making productive academic relationships in fields different from your own. Notably, however, Stark’s comments do not connect at all to the problems of deciding how to proceed empirically, how to define the research questions of interest in one’s project, how to decide about the theoretical or explanatory ideas that might be relevant to this topic. And yet these are in fact closest to the problem of conducting innovative, illuminating research on a difficult sociological topic.

The book consists of short commentaries in which a number of established scholars attempt to formulate their own answers to these three questions. And the contributions are excellent, written by highly creative and productive contributors to a range of fields of contemporary sociology.

The book is presented as a series of discussions of how a range of accomplished sociologists have sought to better understand the social world. But that’s not really what we get. Instead, in line with Stark’s emphasis on the “craft” of sociology, the contributors are mostly inclined to reflect on their own practices of writing and publication through an extended career. And this often comes down to mundane questions about choosing a potential publisher (book or journal article), how to respond most productively to feedback on a piece of work, how to decide when an article or book is “finished”, how to balance conference invitations and ongoing work within one’s own well defined research program, and similar pragmatic questions that arise for working academics. But we don’t get much insight into the creative intellectual work in which the sociologist engages. The contributors are themselves imaginative and innovative sociologists; but none of them really addresses the intellectual and imaginative processes involved in sociological research. Rather, we get pragmatic reflections about which kinds of publication venues are best for pursuing tenure at a research university, or how much time to spend on reviewers’ comments on a submitted manuscript.

We could ask whether the figure in the AI-generated image above conformed to any of Stark’s recommendations. And the answer seems to be almost universally “no”. Marx’s titles were unintuitive and unrevealing about the material in his manuscript; he gave virtually no thought to his “audience”; he had little interest in interdisciplinary discovery and collaboration; and Marx’s own published work was only a tiny fraction of his total corpus. He seems not to have thought at all about the pragmatic challenges raised by Stark. And similar comments seem in order for other founders”and early contributors to the scientific discipline of sociology — Tarde, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, or Merton. Of course there is a bit of “selection bias” here, but these figures all turned out to have great impact within their intellectual worlds.

Confronting race through Rawls's political philosophy

2025-10-02T15:25:00.000-04:00

Rawls believes that a just society must be a pluralistic society, and that means that it must be neutral across (reasonable) comprehensive conceptions of the good. Citizens must be enabled to pursue their own comprehensive conceptions without interference from the state. Does this imply that a comprehensive conception based on the idea of ethnic or racial superiority over another must be condoned? It does not, because Rawls is not in fact neutral across all comprehensive conceptions. He believes there is a background condition that is both morally and sociologically necessary for the maintenance of a just society — the requirement that recognizes equal freedoms, dignity, and opportunity for all groups of citizens and that cultivates citizens who share these commitments. This has a very powerful implication: Rawls’s theory implies the urgent need for finding means of developing citizens who embody respect, tolerance, and compassion for others. This means finding effective means of reducing and eliminating racism in our society.

Consider this short text from section 7 of Political Liberalism:

Think, then, of the principles of justice as designed to form the social world in which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realized, if they are to be realized at all. These principles must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities in background institutions of civil society that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status. (Political Liberalism, 41)

This paragraph merits close attention. Let’s start with the idea of “forming the social world in which our character … as well as our comprehensive views … are first acquired”. This is an acknowledgement of the plasticity of character, conception of the good, and moral powers in real human beings. These features of the person must be acquired, and they are shaped and influenced by the circumstances in which the individual develops. This introduces a fundamental aspect of historicity into the question of justice: a society both shapes the individuals who constitute it and is the result of the moral identities of past generations of individuals. Moral development is a crucial part of the creation and maintenance of a just society.

This idea has an important implication: a society founded on “bad” institutions, practices, and principles will result in the creation of individual persons — the constituents of the next phase of the social order — who are morally flawed. And this implies that the society that they play a role in creating will itself be morally flawed.

As an example, imagine a society in which sons and daughters are treated very differently within the family, with sons having a privileged role and daughters being expected to behave in subordinate ways and to accept different kinds of opportunities (schooling, employment, sports). How will the institutions and social arrangements of adult society be affected by this feature of family behavior? The answer seems clear: privilege and subordination between boys and girls in the family will seem “natural” and this inequality will carry over into civil society. The institutions of a society consisting of individuals shaped within these family norms and practices will themselves reflect the domination and subordination associated with familial roles for boys and girls.

So what kind of principles and practices must a healthy just society embody? The final two sentences of the paragraph bring the point home. The background principles of a just society “must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities … that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status.” Conversely, a society that does not give priority to equality and basic freedoms will result in generations of citizens who are unable to become “free and equal citizens”. Such a society requires reform before it can become a just and equal democracy.

So a just society over time needs to ensure the legal, normative, and institutional principles that establish basic (and equal) freedoms and opportunities. This means that social, familial, or cultural practices that are inconsistent with equal freedoms and opportunities must be altered. The practice of treating daughters as subordinate is toxic to the creation of a just society because it fails to embody the conditions required for creating men and women who understand themselves as free and equal citizens, and who respect each other accordingly.

This line of thought has direct relevance to the history of racism and racial discrimination in the United States and other countries. It is part of what Charles Mills is getting at in his critique of “the racial contract”. If racial subordination and discrimination are woven into the experience of childhood and young adulthood, then the ambient social institutions and practices fail the test Rawls is proposing. They fail to give priority “to basic freedoms and opportunities … that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place”. It is therefore a first priority that such a society, and the state that governs such a society, must make strenuous and sustained efforts at reforming the social environment in which citizens form their “moral powers” and develop their comprehensive conceptions of the good. That means finding effective ways of removing racial subordination and racist ways of thinking from society.

It is a fact that creating a just society is a process of “boot-strapping”, in which one series of improvements lays the basis for new improvements at the next level. Establishing legal and political equality for all groups — a basic tenet of progressive liberalism in the 1950s — was a pressing goal. It is not yet achieved. The next pressing goal is to find ways of changing the experiences that children and young adults have of inter-group relations. Forms of behavior and ideas of prejudice are formed through lived experience; so teachers, family members, members of civic associations and places of worship, and political leaders can provide powerful and transformative examples that cultivate mutual respect, tolerance, and compassion across groups.

But the point to emphasize here is that both activities — establishing equal constitutional rights and liberties, and changing the developmental environment so as to cultivate attitudes of respect, tolerance, and compassion for others — both these activities are mandatory for a “becoming-just” society, according to Rawls’s prescriptions here. The goal of both kinds of reforms is the same: to “enable us to become free and equal citizens” and to participate fully in a just and multicultural society.

Grounds for impeachment

2025-09-30T11:57:00.001-04:00

In his speech to the top officers of the United States military Donald Trump has crossed the line from reckless right-wing authoritarian politician to aspiring fascist dictator. Here is a report from the Washington Post on the unprecedented event; scroll down to Amy Wang’s coverage of his speech. Here are some crucial excerpts from her reporting.

In his speech to top military leaders, President Donald Trump escalated his rhetoric against the “radical left,” repeatedly calling the group “the enemy within” and insisting that he should be able to use military force in American cities.

“I told [Defense Secretary] Pete [Hegseth] we should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military National Guard. But military, because we’re going into Chicago,” Trump said Tuesday at Quantico, referring to his efforts to deploy military to blue cities and states “to keep domestic order and peace.”

Though Trump has, in recent months, frequently attacked blue cities and states, it was the first time he directly addressed military leaders and told them they would be “a major part” of fighting a “war from within” in cities such as San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Los Angeles.

“We’ve brought back the fundamental principle that defending the homeland is the military’s first and most important priority. That’s what it is,” Trump said. “Only in recent decades that politicians somehow come to believe that our job is to police the far reaches of Kenya and Somalia, while America is under invasion from within. We’re under invasion from within. No different than a foreign enemy, but more difficult in many ways because they don’t wear uniforms — at least when they’re wearing a uniform, you can take them out. These people don’t have uniforms, but we are under invasion from within, and we’re stopping it very quickly.”

Dangerous cities … enemy within … invasion from within … demonization of the “radical left” … This is not the language of an American president who is committed to democracy, constitution, equal rights, and the rule of law. This is not the language of a president who respects the idea of a non-political military. It is not the language of a president who respects the rights of citizens to assemble, to protest, to express their values and their opposition in a peaceful manner. It is rather the language of a Mussolini in Italy, a Pinochet in Chile, or a Juan Carlos Ongania in Argentina in 1966.

And who is the “radical left” to whom Trump refers? It seems to be any person or group who disagrees with the MAGA agenda, who objects to Trump’s lawlessness, who rejects the racism and cruelty of his anti-immigration crusade — in short, anyone who is not MAGA. Are reporters next? What about critical bloggers and Youtube hosts or podcasters? What about leaders of civil rights organizations who object to the explicit racism of ICE profiling on the streets of Chicago or Los Angeles? And how about Democrat senators and congressmen and women who oppose Trump’s plans? Are these the “radical left” that Trump wants to wage war against? Is James Comey just the first high-profile persecution by Trump’s Department of Justice that we will see? Are we talking detention camps for liberals? Are we thinking of firing professors whose courses mention racism and slavery?

We have a constitution, and it is very clear about our fundamental rights — rights of freedom of speech, conscience, association, and habeas corpus, and yes, citizenship by birthright. The president demonstrates that he has no respect or adherence to the principles and values that are embodied in our constitution and our system of law.

The president’s threats about waging war against “internal enemies” and using the military to conduct such an assault should be the basis for impeachment. These threats demonstrate a fundamental disregard and disloyalty to our most basic principles of freedom and equality. This shouldn’t be a political party issue; it concerns the loyalty of the president to the constitution of the United States, and the oath he took when he assumed office. Articles of impeachment now!

Racial assumptions in western political philosophy

2025-09-24T14:30:00.000-04:00

A prior post asked whether liberal political philosophy can be “anti-racist”. Charles Mills addresses a related question in much more radical terms. He offers a fundamental critique of European/American liberal philosophy grounded in his view that the “social contract” tradition embodies a comprehensive “racial contract” that embodies racial hierarchy and white supremacy. Here is Mills’s critical overview of the social contract tradition from Hobbes to Rawls:

The social contract is, by definition, classically voluntaristic, modeling the polity on a basis of individualized consent. What justifies the authority of the state over us is that “we the people” agreed to give it that authority. (On the older, “feudal” patriarchal model, by contrast—the model of Sir Robert Filmer, Locke’s target in the Second Treatise—people were represented as being born into subordination.) The legitimacy of the state derives from the freely given consent of the signatories to transfer or delegate their rights to it, and its role in the mainstream moralized/constitutionalist version of the contract (Lockean/Kantian) is, correspondingly, to protect those rights and safeguard the welfare of its citizens. The liberal-democratic state is then an ethical state, whether in the minimalist, night-watchman Lockean version of enforcing noninterference with citizens’ rights or in the more expansive redistributivist version of actively promoting citizens’ welfare. In both cases the liberal state is neutral in the sense of not privileging some citizens over others. Correspondingly, the laws that are passed have as their rationale this juridical regulation of the polity for generally acceptable moral ends.

This idealized model of the liberal-democratic state has, of course, been challenged from various political directions over the past century or so: the recently revived Hegelian moral critique from the perspective of a competing, allegedly superior ideal, a communitarian state seeking actively to promote a common conception of the good; the degraded version of this in the fascist corporatist state; the anarchist challenge to all states as usurping bodies of legitimized violence; and what has been the most influential radical critique up till recently, the Marxist analysis of the state as an instrument of class power, so that the liberal-democratic state is supposedly unmasked as the bourgeois state, the state of the ruling class.

My claim is that the model of the Racial Contract shows us that we need another alternative, another way of theorizing about and critiquing the state: the racial, or white-supremacist, state, whose function inter alia is to safeguard the polity as a white or white-dominated polity, enforcing the terms of the Racial Contract by the appropriate means and, when necessary, facilitating its rewriting from one form to another. (Racial Contract, 111-112)

Mills is especially critical of the choice made by modern liberal social contract theorists like John Rawls to restrict their attention to “ideal theory of justice” without paying attention to the actual systemic injustices that US society embodied. In particular, he is highly critical of the fact that these liberal political philosophers have completely ignored the history and current realities of racial domination and oppression in the United States. He argues, along the lines of the main argument in Racial Contract, that this reflects the continued hegemony of the assumptions of White / European supremacy that he maintains were present within social contract theory from its beginnings.

The retreat of mainstream normative moral and political theory into an “ideal” theory that ignores race merely rescripts the Racial Contract as the invisible writing between the lines. So John Rawls, an American working in the late twentieth century, writes a book on justice widely credited with reviving postwar political philosophy in which not a single reference to American slavery and its legacy can be found, and Robert Nozick creates a theory of justice in holdings predicated on legitimate acquisition and transfer without more than two or three sentences acknowledging the utter divergence of U.S. history from this ideal. (Mills 1997, Racial Contract, 106)

And in Black Rights / White Wrongs (2017) he argues:

Rawls and Nozick may be in conflict over left-wing versus right-wing liberalism, but both offer us idealized views of the polity that ignore the racial subordination rationalized by racial liberalism. Rawls and Sandel may be in conflict over contractarian liberalism versus neo-Hegelian communitarianism, but neither confronts how the whiteness of the actual American contract and its conception of the right and of the actual American community and its conception of the good affects their views of justice and the self. Late Rawls may be in conflict with early Rawls about political versus comprehensive liberalism, but neither addresses the question of the ways in which both versions have been shaped by race , whether through an ” overlapping consensus ” (among whites) or a “reflective equilibrium” (of whites). (Mills 2017 : 32)

An important manifestation of the importance of features of “imperfect justice” is the fact that a current generation of society may embody ways of thinking, stereotypes, and prejudices that serve to reproduce racist, sexist, or religious discrimination in the next generation. Is there any doubt that cultures of discrimination, disparagement, and bias continue to exist in American society? Of course not; the persistence of these attitudes and behaviors are all too evident, even when expressed in indirect and “socially acceptable” ways. And these attitudes and emotions have consequences for the freedoms of the men and women who are the object of these prejudices. Mills writes in The Racial Contract:

Similarly, a study of how “American apart-heid” is maintained points out that whereas in the past realtors would have simply refused to sell to blacks, now blacks “are met by a realtor with a smiling face who, through a series of ruses, lies, and deceptions, makes it hard for them to learn about, inspect, rent, or purchase homes in white neighborhoods. . . . Because the discrimination is latent, however, it is usually unobservable, even to the person experiencing it. One never knows for sure.” (Mills 1997 [quoting Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 84, 97-98]

This is one concrete mechanism of cross-generational racial domination. A few minutes of reflection can allow us to identify numerous other mechanisms through which current racialized thinking leads to future racial domination and disparity. For example, health disparities often derive from assumptions made by caregivers based on racial or gender stereotypes — sometimes entirely unconsciously. Employment decisions are influenced by stereotyped assumptions about a person based on gender, race, or ethnicity. The racial assumptions and attitudes of police officers often lead to differential treatment of members of the public, including increased likelihood of excessive force and firearms against one group as compared to another. And there are many other examples as well.

Failing to consider “non-ideal justice” is crippling for political philosophy, because it leaves completely unspoken the moral fact that discrimination, oppression, and violence are morally and socially unacceptable and that these evils are pervasive in contemporary society; and it leaves no place for focused thinking about how to move from a non-ideal society to a more just society.

So far Mills offers a damning view of the social contract tradition. However, in Black Rights / White Wrongs he suggests that Rousseau does a better job of bringing “domination” into the discussion of justice and the state. Here he draws extensively from Rousseau’s discussion in the First and Second Discourses:

Rousseau can be seen as initiating an alternative, radical democratic strain in contract theory, one that seeks to expose the realities of domination behind the façade and ideology of liberal consensuality. He retains the two key insights captured by the contract metaphor, the constructed nature of the polity and the recognition of human moral equality, but he incorporates them into a more realistic narrative that shows how they are perverted. Some human beings come to dominate others, denying them the equality they enjoyed in the state of nature. (Mills 2017: 36)

Rousseau, then, is at least open to the idea that “non-ideal” features of social life demand philosophical attention. This view creates an entrance for a more fully anti-racist political philosophy within the social contract tradition. It aligns with the political philosophy of republicanism and Philip Pettit’s views in Republicanism : a theory of freedom and government (link), in that Mills’s remarks here emphasize “freedom as non-domination”. If freedom means a set of social arrangements in which no individual or group has the power to dominate others, then a constitution guaranteeing freedom is one that authorizes appropriate steps for recognizing and ending past and present forms of domination.

Mills’s criticisms of the social contract tradition are highly negative. Mills seems to suggest that the tradition is entirely useless as a basis for thinking about justice. However, a more nuanced view would allow that this tradition has largely ignored racial domination, a gaping blindspot that demands correction; but that the abstract philosophical principles through which Rawls, Locke, or Rousseau reasoned about freedom, equality, and consent are indeed appropriate principles for thinking about the just society. Suitably embedded in a philosophy that acknowledges categorical inequality and racism, these principles can in fact be quite radical in their implications for needed reform. And it is worth noting that Rawls does not ignore racial discrimination completely; rather, he looks at its injustice as being obvious and beyond debate. His restatement of this point in Justice as Fairness emphasizes the topic of domination and subservience in language that converges with that of Pettit:

Significant political and economic inequalities are often associated with inequalities of social status that encourage those of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and by others as inferior. This may arouse widespread attitudes of deference and servility, on one side, and a will to dominate and arrogance on the other. These effects of social and economic inequalities can be serious evils and the attitudes they engender great vices… Fixed status ascribed by birth, or by gender or race, is particularly odious (Justice as Fairness, 131).

Particularly odious … that doesn’t sound like a silent endorsement of racial discrimination and domination.

Rawls also addresses the religious arguments used by the abolitionists and by Martin Luther King, Jr., in the context of the issue of public reason versus “comprehensive reason” (arguments based on a particular comprehensive conception of the good). From the point of view of justice, only public reasons have force, since there is no politically relevant comprehensive conception of the good.

On this account the abolitionists and the leaders of the civil rights movement did not go against the ideal of public reason; or rather, they did not provided they thought, or on reflection would have thought (as they certainly could have thought), that the comprehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient strength to the political conception to be subsequently realized. To be sure, people do not normally distinguish between comprehensive and public reasons; nor do they normally affirm the ideal of public reason, as we have expressed it. Yet people can be brought to recognize these distinctions in particular cases. The abolitionists could say, for example, that they supported political values of freedom and equality for all, but that given the comprehensive doctrines they held and the doctrines current in their day, it was necessary to invoke the comprehensive grounds on which those values were widely seen to rest.289 Given those historical conditions, it was not unreasonable of them to act as they did for the sake of the ideal of public reason itself. In this case, the ideal of public reason allows the inclusive view. (Political Liberalism, 251)

His view is that both the 19th-century abolitionists and civil rights activists like MLK made compelling arguments because their “comprehensive” (religious) arguments are entirely supported by public arguments based on equality and equal freedom. Here again, it seems clear that Rawls’s underlying view is one that regards racial inequalities as fundamentally unjust, within the terms of justice as fairness. Though Rawls did not explicitly put this point forward, it is a strong endorsement of the justice of the demands for equality being advanced by the civil rights movement in the 1960s.

Tommie Shelby has done substantial work in attempting to help thread the way between the ideal theory offered by Rawls and the concrete, sociological and historical realities of racial oppression that Mills believes must be incorporated into theories of the just society. Shelby’s 2017 book Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform offers an extensive and nuanced reformulation of “justice as fairness” in terms that do take racial oppression into account. Here is a key paragraph:

Rawls has suggested that if we were to conceive of society as a system of social cooperation over time and took an impartial view of what the distribution of benefi ts and burdens of participating in this scheme ought to be, we could arrive at conclusions about what social justice requires that warrant our rational assent. The idea of society as a fair system of cooperation is a moral notion to be used in the evaluation of institutional arrangements. Social justice is constituted by the legitimate claims and responsibilities individuals have within a fair overall social arrangement. Thought about in this way, justice is a matter of reciprocity between persons who regard each other as equals. Taking this approach to questions of social justice is particularly apt when considering criticisms often made against the ghetto poor. It provides a framework for settling whether the urban poor are doing their fair share in upholding the system of cooperation and whether they are receiving the fair share due them as equal participants in this system. Reciprocity, as a central value in liberal political morality, is the primary normative standpoint from which I reflect on family structure, joblessness, and crime in ghetto neighborhoods. (Dark Ghettos, 20)

Mills in turn expresses his own disagreement with Shelby’s approach to Rawls in “Dark Mores: Some Comments on Tommie Shelby’s Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform“. Shelby offers a concise summary of his own position in “Racial realities and corrective justice: A reply to Charles Mills” (Critical Philosophy of Race 1:2 (2013)):

In all these interventions, the main thrust of Mills’s critique is to emphasize the need to attend carefully to the realities of racial domination and to deny the value of a normative theory that abstracts away from the actual history of racial injustice. However, this critique has been mainly negative, telling us how not to derive principles of racial justice. Apart from vague suggestions that reparations are due for past racial injustices (e.g., for slavery and land expropriation), the positive normative analysis remains undeveloped. What we get instead is an emphasis on the necessity of getting the historical facts right about white supremacy. Mills does not offer his own positive normative principles for condemning or responding to the history of racial domination that he so forcefully describes. By contrast, Rawls does offer a specific set of normative principles of justice that, I argue, can be usefully applied to racial subordination. Mills, so far as I am aware, does not argue that if we were to follow his methodological approach we would arrive at principles that conflict with the ones that Rawls defends. Nor does he specifically attack or attempt to reformulate Rawls’s principles. So our dispute does not turn on the content of those two principles. (link)

Both Mills and Shelby offer deep and valuable new lines of thought to political philosophy, and their debate is a sign of healthy engagement within a field of philosophy that has sometimes come down to disagreements about the third decimal point. Bringing structures of race and domination into the dialogue within political philosophy is profoundly important.

Can liberal political philosophy support anti-racism?

2025-09-05T15:05:00.000-04:00

John Rawls and Philip Pettit agree about the idea that a liberal democracy depends on the idea that all citizens have equal liberties, rights, worth, and dignity. Therefore they also agree that social and legal arrangements that are incompatible with equal rights, equal liberties, and equal dignity are illegitimate. They disagree in some details about what all of this means — Pettit refers to liberty as “the absence of domination” (link), while Rawls emphasizes the liberty to pursue one’s conception of the good in the way he or she chooses (link). But the common ground between these leading advocates of liberal democracy is extensive. And each philosopher provides an unequivocal basis for rejecting mistreatment and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or other social characteristics.

What is less clear is whether either of these philosophers has a place for the idea that an inclusive multicultural democracy — in Rousseau’s conception, a “free community of equals” — has a positive value for the whole of society, and whether enhancing this value is itself a legitimate function of a democratic state. These are separate questions, and it is possible that Rawls and Pettit would affirm the first but deny the second. Rawls’s view in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is largely that the function of the state is (1) to establish and secure the system of law within which all citizens enjoy maximal, equal rights and liberties, and (2) to establish a legitimate majoritarian process through which policies and laws are enacted subject to the authority of the majority of citizens. Anything more extensive than this falls outside the scope of legitimate exercise of coercive authority, according to Rawls. His distinction between a “political conception of the good” and a “comprehensive conception of the good” is crucial for his view of the scope of the state’s authority: the former consists of the minimal commitments that all citizens share concerning the functions and limitations of the state and its legal system; whereas the latter consists of a fully developed set of ideas and values that individuals or groups may adopt for orienting their lives and activities, but concerning which the liberal state must remain neutral (link).

So, for example, the state cannot undertake on its own, without democratically enacted legislation, to ensure a beautiful natural environment, simply on a governmental judgement that “all of society is better off when the natural environment is maintained for public enjoyment”. For Rawls, this judgment falls within a “comprehensive conception of the good”, and cannot be taken as a function of government without majority-supported legislation. By contrast, the state is fully authorized to enact rules and procedures that guarantee free and unfettered elections, because the right to vote is a fundamental democratic right shared equally by all citizens and part of the “overlapping consensus” (the political conception of the good) required for any democracy.

We can raise this question from two related perspectives: the perspective of idealized political philosophy (abstract theorizing about what constitutes a good and well-ordered society and state) and the perspective of the minimum legal and constitutional requirements needed to ensure the equal liberties and rights of individual citizens (minimalist theory). The first is intended to articulate a vision for the future of social life within a democratic society, while the second perspective is intended to articulate the protections of rights and liberties that every legitimate state must embody.

Is there a basis in the “minimalist” version of the liberal democratic state that gives broad authority to government as well as private and public organizations to take positive measures to cultivate attitudes of racial acceptance and respect among their constituents? Can a liberal democratic state enact a set of arrangements through which citizens will learn the values of tolerance and compassion, and learn of the harmful effects of attitudes involving negative stereotypes about members of other groups? And if the answer is that government itself cannot undertake such measures, are private organizations and relatively autonomous public institutions free to do so when it comes to organizing the functioning, supervision, and training of an agency, a private workplace, or a university? Or does the minimalist perspective on political philosophy involve only restrictions on actions that harm others or reduce the freedoms of others, with no basis for undertaking to change how people think? Perhaps “cultivating mutual tolerance, interest, and respect” is itself a value about which reasonable people may differ.

We might imagine, for example, a “liberal cultural separatist” who fully endorses and respects the equal civil and legal rights of member of other groups, and this person condemns discrimination against individuals based on their particular characteristics. However, this person prefers to associate with members of his/her own group and believes that others should do so as well. “Separation of groups is best for the social order,” according to this version of the good society. If so, then according to Rawls the goal of “building a tolerant and inter-connected society” belongs to a “comprehensive conception of the good”, and the state must remain neutral about this value. Citizens are entirely free to form their own associations and advocacy groups around these values, but the state must not take a side.

To put the point somewhat differently, are the ideas of tolerance, compassion, and respect simply specific visions of inter-group relations, to be debated alongside a number of competing views as “comprehensive conceptions of the good” — with the implication that this particular vision cannot be enforced through state mandates? A traditional liberal like John Stuart Mill (and perhaps Rawls as well) might argue that if the values of a tolerant and respectful society make up a compelling idea, then advocates should be able to persuade a majority of citizens to agree. In that case these programs can be democratically enacted through enabling legislation. But if the idea remains “visionary and confined to a small minority” then the state cannot use its coercive power to enact policies based on this vision of a more tolerant society.

On this line of thought the answer to the question is not much different from the formulation offered by J.S. Mill: liberalism is committed to individual freedoms, including freedom of speech and association, and these commitments are fundamental. So the legal system must give substantial deference to the opinions, statements, and programs of individuals, and much of the same deference is due to private and public institutions as well. The task of struggling for anti-racism, toleration, mutual respect, and communication across major racial and ethnic divisions is to be left to private associations rather than to state legislative authority.

On this view of a liberal society, individuals and their free associations have the right to advocate for an inclusive multicultural democracy, and for the steps needed to create such a world. What about other organizations? Is it legitimate for businesses, public school systems, colleges and universities, and labor unions to adopt similar resolutions? Is it legitimate for these organizations within civil society to enact procedures and requirements within their scope that are designed to influence the thinking and behavior of the individuals who make up those organizations? Do private organizations like businesses, private universities, and non-profit organizations have a zone of autonomy that permits them to undertake “pro-inclusiveness” policies, procedures, and training regimes? And what about organizations owned or directed by the “liberal cultural separatists” considered above — do they too have autonomy to enact processes that further embed prejudice and stereotype?

What seems to be lacking within liberalism, both traditional and contemporary, is a way of coping with “imperfect justice” and the fact that the current generation of society may embody ways of thinking, stereotypes, and prejudices that serve to reproduce racist, sexist, or religious discrimination in the next generation. (Charles Mills explores these ideas in The Racial Contract and Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism.) However, to go beyond racism, it seems clear that a process of moral transformation is needed. Children, young people, and adults need to come to understand the history of racist thinking and action in our country and to recognize the value of respecting the equality and dignity of members of other groups.

The assault on “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” programs in universities, corporations, and government departments currently underway (link) seems to reflect a status quo mentality when it comes to racial prejudice and stereotype: “we are who we are, and there is no need for change”. More bluntly, it reflects an ideology of white supremacy. But as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. expressed so vividly, racial equality and justice will only come to pass when the people of our nation have undertaken the hard work of confronting the realities and persistence of racism. Personal transformation is a necessary step on the way to human equality.

These reflections suggest that liberal theories of justice like those offered by Pettit and Rawls need to be supplemented by two things: (1) A clear and developed elaboration of the value of a pluralistic multicultural democracy based on real equality and respect across groups. Such an account will demonstrate both the value of such a society and its connection to profound ideas about liberty, equality, and humanity. (2) A clear account of the extended processes of learning that will be needed to get from here to there. Such an account will incorporate a realistic appraisal of the ways in which persistent racial attitudes and habits inform the next generation’s social environment as well, and it will provide some ideas about how to accomplish these transformations at multiple levels. Achieving racial justice, and ending antagonism and mistrust across groups in society, requires good laws, but it also requires sustained processes of personal transformation for citizens of all ages.

A political philosophy for an inclusive multicultural democracy

2025-09-05T14:05:00.002-04:00

We might say that a political philosophy is a formulation of the normative ideals that the philosopher holds to be primary in implementing the moral and social facts of “assemblages of free individuals in society, with conflicts of interest and belief”. How should such a society be organized? What values should it aspire to realize through its laws and practices? What forms of constitution, law, and state are best for the realization of the individuals who live within the society?

Here I want to lay out the skeleton of a political philosophy incorporating the ideals of an inclusive multicultural democracy. I maintain that a stable and inclusive multicultural democracy is a positive value for the whole of society: all citizens are benefited by a varied and harmonious population of peoples with distinct traditions, values, and practices. This is a society in which there are many groups and identities in society (racial, ethnic, sexual, class, nationality), and in which members of these groups have the moral emotions of compassion and respect towards members of other groups. Difference exists without discrimination and prejudice; more fundamentally, difference exists within the context of a cohesive sense of shared community. Rather than antagonism there is friendship across groups.

This political philosophy corresponds closely to many of the ideas about racial justice formulated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. during his efforts to find a way towards greater racial justice in the United States. Several ideas in King’s political philosophy stand out in particular. First, his idea of the “Beloved Community” emphasizes that the transformations needed to achieve a good multiracial society go beyond establishing formal legal equality for all, to enhancing the moral emotions of compassion and mutual caring as human beings [“Birth of a New Nation” (1957), “Facing the Challenge of a New Age” (1957), “Stride Toward Freedom” (1958)]. The multiracial society that King envisioned involves a cohesive community of mutual respect, understanding, and compassion. Second, King’s discussions of a future for racial justice in America and other countries always invokes the need for moral transformation — for a change in the way that people think about their fellow human beings with compassion and respect. Third, King’s conception of a just future invokes a deep recognition of shared humanity across race, ethnicity, and other group identities. This advances the idea that citizens in a just multicultural democracy will experience the moral emotions of compassion and respect for each other. King described this as a kind of “civic friendship” in which people from different groups succeed in living together harmoniously and leads them to experience a sense of goodwill and shared identity with their fellow citizens.

All of this requires moral transformation of generations of citizens. Freedom from discrimination, violence, and prejudice is only the beginning of a good multiracial society. Rather, real, concrete human beings need to come to think and feel differently about their humanity and the humanity of others around them.

For King these ideas are placed within a religious or spiritual interpretation, but the theological point is not essential; the values King articulates can be equally endorsed from a purely secular and humanist point of view.

What are those good effects thought to follow from achieving a “harmonious, tolerant, and mutually respectful multicultural society”? Several lines of thought are relevant here. Take Martha Nussbaum’s argument that “compassion is the fundamental moral emotion” and her view that compassion must be learned (link). Exposure to the lived experience and traditions of people different from oneself is a powerful way of developing greater compassion for others — and this presumably makes for better neighbors, citizens, and human beings. Or take the idea that “ethnic conflict is a constant threat in divided societies” (link). It can be argued that a multicultural society that has extensive experience in engaging across communities (racial groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, sexual identities) will be more resilient when crises and conflicts arise (link). I’m thinking here of events like disagreements between neighbors that escalate along racial or ethnic lines; occasions when opportunistic political leaders actively cultivate inter-group suspicion and antagonism; or when economic events occur that seem to divide groups along racial, religious, or ethnic lines. A final benefit that we can imagine is the rewarding experience of learning from another person’s experience or traditions about the norms and events that shaped them, and the reflective benefit that such learning can have for one’s understanding of him or herself (link). For reasons like these we might say that we are all better off if we live in a tolerant and respectful community, and the community itself will be healthier and perhaps even more productive as a result.

So achieving a just, stable, and cohesive multicultural democracy is a worthwhile goal. But will a well-ordered liberal democratic state have the authority — and perhaps the duty — to take measures that enhance the workings of a multicultural democracy? These ideas about inclusive democracy make up a feature of a specific political philosophy, a theory of the values that a good and just society ought to strive to realize. But how can these features be realized within a liberal constitution defining “a good and just society”? Would we do better to recognize that these are ideas open to democratic debate for consideration by the population itself?

In order to bring about a “stable and inclusive multicultural democracy”, it seems evident that citizens themselves need to embrace these values. And this means education. This may mean taking steps to change the ways that children, young people, and adults think about the different groups in their society through education, celebrations, and “inclusive practices” in private and public institutions like corporations, places of work, and universities. This may take the form of promoting forms of education for children that emphasize the values of mutual tolerance and acceptance across lines of race, culture, or ethnicity; it may take the form of universities celebrating Juneteenth or the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.; or it may take the form of hosting a reading of the poetry of Audre Lorde or the fiction of James Baldwin. The goal of such activities is to actively encourage the psychology of acceptance and mutual understanding across social, racial, and cultural divisions in our society.

There are obvious ways of connecting “institutional encouragement of inter-group tolerance and respect” to the agreed-upon mandate of achieving “equal rights of liberty, participation, and opportunity” for all groups. It can be argued that persistent prejudice in a segment of a population is itself a mechanism through which out-group disadvantage is maintained (Mills, The Racial Contract). Residential segregation leads to other social ills for the segregated group (health disparities, for example) and so the mechanisms that lead to the persistent residential segregation, which surely include latent prejudice and negative affect towards the out-group, can legitimately be targeted by state programs aiming at reducing prejudice and antagonism. So “anti-prejudice” and “tolerance-enhancing” programs and educational initiatives are a legitimate mechanism for achieving progress towards civil and social equality, to the extent that we can demonstrate that these efforts are efficacious. This is an instrumental justification for public and private programs aimed at reducing prejudice, stereotype, disrespect for others, and outright antagonism.

However, MLK wanted to argue for a stronger view: that achieving a harmonious, tolerant, and mutually respectful multicultural society is good in itself as an important and beneficial goal for the whole of society — not merely instrumentally valuable for achieving civil equality. In fact, it is a fundamental value for a modern democracy. Can this position be supported within liberal political philosophy? And can achieving a tolerant and respectful citizenry be considered a legitimate duty of the state?

There is a strong basis for arguing that a political philosophy articulating the values of a respectful, compassionate, and free community of equals across all groups in society is an excellent basis for thinking about the challenges of twenty-first century social life. We can offer both intrinsic and instrumental reasons for thinking that progress towards this ideal — a version of Martin Luther King Jr.’s Beloved Community — would lead to a better social world. What is less clear is whether a state organized around the principles of traditional liberalism can effectively adopt — or even tolerate — the steps needed to transform society in a more tolerant and compassionate direction. Seen in this light, the struggle over DEI raises profound questions about the possibility of progress towards real racial justice in our democracy.

(Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry’s edited collection, To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr., provides an excellent and detailed new beginning for understanding MLK’s political philosophy.)

The consequences of a trillion dollars

2025-08-24T19:06:00.007-04:00

Many thoughtful people in the US are concerned about the effects that the 2025 federal budget reconciliation law will have on poor people in many states who are currently enrolled in Medicaid health coverage. KFF has put together a comprehensive analysis of the implications of this omnibus act for Medicaid patients here. I asked Gemini for a summary of the impact this massive change in Medicaid will have, with over $1 trillion reductions in Medicaid spending over the coming ten years(!). Here is the analysis Gemini provided:

________

QUERY: what are the main effects of the 2025 budget bill on Medicaid recipients?

GEMINI RESPONSE 8/21/25

The 2025 budget bill, also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), includes significant changes to the Medicaid program, which is expected to have a considerable impact on recipients.

Here are the main effects of the 2025 budget bill on Medicaid recipients:

Significant funding cuts: The bill implements an estimated $1.035 trillion reduction in federal Medicaid spending over ten years. These cuts will necessitate states either increasing their own funding or reducing services, potentially affecting various benefits, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Work requirements: The bill introduces work reporting requirements, referred to as “community engagement” activities, for most Medicaid expansion enrollees aged 19 to 64. These recipients will need to work, volunteer, or participate in educational activities for at least 80 hours per month to maintain their eligibility.
Increased paperwork and administrative burdens: The new requirements will place a greater administrative burden on recipients to verify their eligibility and for states to manage the process, potentially leading to some eligible individuals losing coverage due to difficulties navigating the system.
More frequent eligibility redeterminations: States will be required to conduct eligibility redeterminations for Medicaid expansion adults every six months, rather than annually, starting January 1, 2027. This increased frequency could lead to coverage losses for those unable to complete the renewal process on time or with changes in circumstances.
Cost-sharing requirements: States are now mandated to impose cost-sharing requirements of up to $35 per service for Medicaid expansion enrollees with incomes above 100% of the federal poverty level, says the Center for American Progress. Out-of-pocket costs will remain capped at 5% of family income.
Restrictions on immigrant eligibility: Some categories of lawfully present immigrants will lose eligibility for Medicaid and Medicare under the bill, notes the Center for Medicare Advocacy.
Potential impacts on specific services: Reductions in federal funding might lead states to cut optional benefits, including home- and community-based services (HCBS) that are crucial for individuals with disabilities and older adults.
Increased risk for certain groups: Older adults, people with disabilities, and individuals in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to losing coverage or facing increased costs due to these changes.

It’s important to remember that some provisions of the bill may have delayed effective dates, and future policy changes could still occur.

________

So why is this a big deal for lower- and lower-middle income people in the United States? Because it seems likely that millions of people will lose affordable health coverage, and many thousands of them will sicken and die from preventable illnesses. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (link) estimates that as many as 36 million people are at risk of losing Medicaid eligibility as a result of new work requirements. The Modern Medicaid Alliance is collecting stories of individual people whose Medicaid benefits have been (or will soon be) cancelled (link). These are short items drawn from various news outlets, and they paint a tragic picture from all over the country of the situations that will confront struggling low-income people, young and old, when these new Medicaid reductions begin to hit.

Let’s recall as well that health disparities in the US are severe by almost any measure. Here are disparities of infant mortality in NE Florida noted by Northeast Florida Healthy Start (link).

Health Disparities by Race

And here is a comparison of urban and rural mortality statistics offered by the Rural Health Information Hub (link).

Does anyone seriously doubt that reductions in Medicaid eligibility to millions of individuals will worsen these disparities? And for what? To reduce taxes on the top 1% of income earners in the US.

Caillebotte's silences

2025-08-18T16:47:00.001-04:00

A current exhibition of the paintings of Gustave Caillebotte (1848-1894) at the Art Institute in Chicago is quite remarkable. It demonstrates the eye, the hand, and the sensibility of this great late-Impressionist painter. But the exhibition is remarkable in another way as well: there is almost no evidence in the paintings on exhibit, or the curatorial texts that support the exhibition, that conveys the intense and prolonged social, political, and military conflict of the period from the late 1840s through the defeat of the Paris Commune (1871).

Caillebotte himself served in the French military during the siege of Paris by the Prussian Army (1870-1871). In the text describing the exhibition at the Musée d’Orsay in Paris a curator writes briefly of his service: “But during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), [Caillebotte] was drafted into the 7th Battalion of the Garde Nationale Mobile de la Seine and assigned to the defense of Paris” (link). The detail about his service in the 7th Battalion of the Garde Nationale Mobile is especially telling. Michael Howard describes the Battle of Buzenval in these terms:

The battle of Buzenval, as it was to be called, settled the fate of Paris. More, it destroyed once for all the belief that a People in Arms could overwhelm a trained enemy by sheer numbers and burning zeal. It was the action for which the clubs had for so long yearned—the sortie en masse. Nearly 90,000 men were involved, of whom about half came from the Garde Nationale, and at dawn on 19th January they debouched from Mont Valérien, and advanced against the German defences between Bougival and St Cloud along a four-mile front. (Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 373).

This battle was yet another disaster for the French military. It essentially sealed the fate of the besieged city and forced surrender of the last part of France still resisting German control. If Caillebotte was an active participant in this battle, he would have had traumatic and transformative experiences of war; and if he was held in reserve in the city during this final break-out attempt, he would have had personal knowledge of the significance and suffering created by the siege of Paris and the several unsuccessful efforts to break the siege through counter-attacks. Surely this is an important element in his development as an observant human being and a painter. And yet there is no evidence in his paintings of the impression the trauma of Paris may have had upon him. It would seem that this is an important contextual feature that should play a highlighted role in the curatorial presentation of the exhibition; but it does not.

Stéphane Guégan, a scientific advisor to the Musée d'Orsay in Paris and author of Caillebotte: Peintre des extrêmes, considers the “military presences” in Caillebotte’s paintings. Referring to the first exhibition of the Impressionist group in 1874, he notes that “the [first Impressionist] exhibition did contain a few resounding echoes of the catastrophic situation from which the country was barely emerging: the crushing defeat of the Franco-Prussian War and the ensuing upheaval of the Paris Commune” (“The Shared War”, Gustave Caillebotte: Painting Men, p. 42). But virtually no such references occur in the exhibition that has travelled from Paris to Los Angeles to Chicago. Guégan notes several exceptions: the painting of a soldier in uniform and an almost imperceptible representation of a uniformed soldier in Le Pont de l’Europe.

But neither image gives any sense of the true military catastrophe of the Franco-Prussian War or its aftermath. Instead, the curators have chosen to organize their ideas about Caillebotte’s paintings around the form of masculinity represented by his work.

Contrast Caillebotte’s silence in his painting with that of Jean-Louis Ernest Meissonier, a generation senior to Caillebotte. Here is Meissonier’s 1849 depiction of a massacre he apparently witnessed following the defeat of the workers’ uprising in June 1848.

And here is Meissonier’s 1884 painting representing a scene of death and destruction during the siege of Paris in 1870:

Finally, here is a daguerrotype of a poignant scene following the massacre of Communards following the fall of the Commune in 1871:

The traumas represented in these images were part of the experience and memory of the people of Paris during those decades, including both Meissonier (who was 33 at the time of the 1848 workers’ uprising) and Caillebotte (who was born in 1848 and was a serving member of the Garde Nationale Mobile in 1870-1871 during the final months of the siege of Paris and the suppression of the Commune itself (by French forces). How could either of these painters not have been deeply affected by these traumatic events of contemporary French history? Meissonier’s paintings take note of these fundamental facts, but Caillebotte’s do not. And yet the exhibition gives no historical context at all that would highlight these important and surely formative events.

And what about Meissonier? His depiction of the massacre of workers in 1848 might suggest that he was offering sympathy and homage to the working class men and women who rose up in June, 1848. Alexis de Tocqueville and Alexander Herzen, both observers of the fighting in Paris in June 1848, offered sympathy and sorrow for the violence that overwhelmed the workers’ uprising. Here are comments offered by Herzen:

I listened to the thunder and the tocsin and gazed avidly at this panorama of Paris; it was as though I was taking my leave of it. At that moment I loved Paris passionately. It was my last tribute to the great town; after the June days it grew hateful to me. On the other side of the river barricades were being raised in all the streets and alleys. I can still see the gloomy faces of the men dragging stones; women and children were helping them. A young student from the Polytechnic climbed up on to an apparently completed barricade, planted the banner and started singing the Marseillaise in a soft, sad, solemn voice; all the workers joined in and the chorus of this great song, resounding from behind the stones of the barricades, gripped one’s soul. . . . The tocsin was still tolling. Meanwhile, the artillery clattered across the bridge and General Bedeau standing there raised his field-glasses to inspect the enemy positions. . . . (From the Other Shore, After the Storm, 46)

But this is not the current interpretation of Meissonier’s work. Rather, critics have suggested that the 1849 painting of the massacre at the barricade conveys a middle-class view of the insurrection, and serves as a caution for the future: “insurrection leads to massacre and death”, while the 1888 painting conveys a sense of patriotism and heroism.

An element of historical change that is entirely evident in Caillebotte’s paintings is the transformation of Paris by Baron Haussmann at the direction of Napoleon III. The “Paris Street: Rainy Day” painting above reflects the Haussmannization of Paris — the broad avenues, the “modernization” of life in the city, and the destruction of working class residential areas. This is a central theme in T.J. Clark’s interpretation of mid-century depictions of Paris in The Painting of Modern Life:

It seems that only when the city has been systematically occupied by the bourgeoisie, and made quite ruthlessly to represent that class’s rule, can it be taken by painters to be an appropriate and purely visual subject for their art….. For the House knew well that Haussmann’s modernity had been built by evicting the working class of Paris from the centre of the city, and putting it down on the hill of Belleville or the plains of La Villette, where the moon was still most often the only street light available. And what did painters do except join in the cynical laughter and propagate the myth of modernity? (The Painting of Modern Life, p. 51)

According to Clark, there was an overriding theme of class conflict and a fear of insurrection that drove both Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann in this urban project. They were concerned to “modernize” Paris in a way that would make working class rebellion (and the barricades through which previous uprisings had proceeded) impossible; troops and cannon would be able easily to clear the avenues of insurrection.

There was no disputing that part of Haussmann’s modernity was his wish to put an end to insurrection. He stated as much himself: it was a good argument to lean on when pleading for funds from the Conseil Municipal. Years after the event, he was still musing in his Mémoires over the hidden benefits of the Boulevard Sébastopol: “It meant the disembowelling of the old Paris, the quartier of uprisings and barricades, by a wide central street piercing through and through this almost impossible maze, and provided with communicating side streets, whose continuation would be bound to complete the work thus begun. The subsequent completion of the Rue de Turbigo made the Rue Transnonain [symbolic capital of the barricades] disappear from the map of Paris!” Nor was this merely a matter of hindsight on Haussmann’s part. The details of counterrevolution weighed heavily on the planners’ minds at the time: Napoleon intervened directly in 1857 to prevent the encirclement of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine from being spoiled by a mere architect’s whim: “the construction of arcades on the Boulevard Mazas,” he wrote, “would seriously damage the strategic system of Paris.” The arcades were quietly dropped from the designs. (75-76)

Here again the current exhibition’s curators have seemingly ignored the social and political context of the Haussmannization of Paris. They emphasize the “new modernity”, the dress of the mostly bourgeois men and women passing across the boulevards, and the relaxed scenes of conversation and amusement among Caillebotte’s male friends. But there is no curatorial mention at all of the political fears and imperatives that appear to have driven Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann in this wholesale restructuring of the urban environment of Paris. And there is no suggestion in the paintings on display in the current Caillebotte exhibition of a sensibility on the part of the painter to the underlying conflicts between working class Parisians and the bourgeoisie. There are notes of awareness and sympathy for working men and women in his corpus — for example, in the painting “The Floor Scrapers”. But there is no suggestion of his own awareness of the concrete circumstances of injustice, exploitation, or unnecessary misery in his paintings.

So the social conditions of class and war seem to be almost entirely absent in Caillebotte’s work. There is no sense of “social critique” or self-awareness of upper-middle-class position in these paintings. Caillebotte is silent about the most momentous events that transformed France and Paris during his adulthood, and this is surprising. But it is also surprising that the curators have not taken more notice of this absence.

Real multicultural democracies

2025-08-12T13:06:00.005-04:00

Chicago is a highly diverse city, and it is a good example of life in a multicultural democracy. The image above is a photo of the crowd on Navy Pier on a recent Saturday summer evening. According to local estimates, as many as 120,000 people visit Navy Pier on a Saturday night, and it is a good practical example of the benefits of multicultural democracy. The crowd is highly diverse, with adults and children from all racial groups and many ethnicities and language groups. And there is a substantial degree of social class mixing as well, from young professionals from the North side to working class families from the South and West sides of the city. Turn your head in different directions and you will hear a dozen different languages. The atmosphere is comfortable, fun, accepting, and interactive, with a Latino music performance going on in the open-air music venue, families enjoying a meal from the food court, and a beautiful view of the Chicago waterfront and skyline. It's a fun outing for all the residents of the city. (Chicago's population is about 2.8 million, so a typical Saturday night on Navy Pier in the summer draws almost 5% of the city's residents.)

What are the facts of Chicago's diversity? Chicago's population is now about 2.75 million, of whom 21% are foreign born. According to the US Census Bureau 2020 Decennial Census (link), the largest racial/ethnic communities in the city include White (36%), Hispanic/Latino (30%), Black/African-American (29%), and Asian (7%). 11% of respondents reported "two or more races" in the Census questionnaire. (It will be noted that these population groups add up to more than 100%. The Census Bureau provided some information about changes in methodology in 2020 which may account for this discrepancy; link.)

Segregation in Chicago region

So Chicago is highly diverse. However, the city remains significantly segregated by neighborhood, and these patterns of segregation produce a continuing legacy of disadvantage in terms of important measures of social wellbeing (health, economic opportunity, educational outcomes). The Metropolitan Planning Council and the Urban League have studied these trends carefully, and their "Shared Future" report (link, link) serves both to detail the facts of segregation in Chicago today and to outline some strategies for reversing these trends.

So Chicago's problems of achieving racial equality persist. And yet on a warm August evening in the center of the Chicago Loop, it is possible to see how this city is creating a climate of mutual respect and civic equality. Multiple community-based organizations do the work of striving for racial justice and establishing an inclusive community for all Chicagoans through ongoing efforts, programs, and community alliances. The city's political leadership recognizes that "unity within diversity" must be the beginnings of Chicago's public values and urban politics. And academic institutions like the University of Illinois Chicago's Institute for Research on Race and Public Policy (link) have a continuing commitment to documenting the facts about racial and ethnic equality in Chicago, and identifying policy initiatives that can lead to meaningful progress. It is possible for our society to become more just and more harmonious through our own patient collective efforts.

If we look carefully at the photo of the Navy Pier crowd, we will see something surprising looming over the horizon of this vibrant mass of multicultural humanity. We see in the distance the luxury hotel and tower developed by the president of the United States, located a half-mile up the Chicago River. The contrast could not be more striking, between the glittering symbol of the political movement that is demonizing diversity in our country, versus the social bonds and community spirit of mutual acceptance that constitute the reality of our multicultural democracy.

Langston Hughes caught much of the paradox of race in America when he wrote these lines in 1935:

Let America be America again.
Let it be the dream it used to be.
Let it be the pioneer on the plain
Seeking a home where he himself is free.

(America never was America to me.)

Let America be the dream the dreamers dreamed—
Let it be that great strong land of love
Where never kings connive nor tyrants scheme
That any man be crushed by one above.

(It never was America to me.)

And Walt Whitman was right too when he wrote, "I hear America singing, the varied carols I hear" as his own celebration of the breadth of experience of American society. America sings on Navy Pier and the many other places where citizens do better than politicians at facing the challenge of creating durable multicultural democracy. Being there reinforces one's confidence that the community and diversity of our country will prove stronger than the forces of xenophobia, mistrust, and antagonism that are being mobilized against us.

Ethnography of high-energy physics

2025-07-31T14:30:00.004-04:00

Science proceeds through research communities whose participants share important and often distinctive features of thought and method. This is one of the key insights of the “historical turn” in the philosophy of science initiated in the 1970s (link, link), and it underlies much work within the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies. But what more specifically goes into the “denkkollectiv” (Ludwik Fleck), “research programme” (Imre Lakatos), or “disciplinary matrix” (Thomas Kuhn) of a specific scientific field? One way of gaining knowledge about those features of thinking and experimenting in specific research communities is through immersive study by ethnographers and micro-sociologists. Paul Rabinow offered an especially fruitful example of this kind of investigation in Making PCR (link). Rabinow was specifically interested in discovering the mental and material worlds of biotechnology researchers.

This book focuses on the emergence of biotechnology, circa 1980, as a distinctive configuration of scientific, technical, cultural, social, economic, political, and legal elements, each of which had its own separate trajectory over the preceding decades. It examines the “style of life” or form of “life regulation” fashioned by the young scientists who chose to work in this new industry rather than pursue promising careers in the university world…. In sum, it shows how a contingently assembled practice emerged, composed of distinctive subjects, the site in which they worked, and the object they invented. (Making PCR, 2)

And what about the most esoteric of contemporary scientific research, high-energy particle physics (link)? How does this extended network of researchers think and work as this community seeks out further features of fundamental physics? Peter Galison’s Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics is a brilliant, clear, and extensive exposition of the interface between theory and experiment in physics. Galison thinks of contemporary physics as an overlapping set of three kinds of activity: experimentation, instrumentation, and theorizing. In this book he looks at instrumentation and the machines of physical investigation as a realm that requires its own careful study — from a historical-sociological point of view as well as from an epistemic one.

These machines have a past. To walk through the laboratories of the twentieth century is to peruse an expanse of history in which physics has played many parts. Over here, film for atomic physics, X-ray film out of boxes destined for medicine; over there, a converted television camera rewired as part of a spark chamber. In this corner a piece of preparatory apparatus for a hydrogen bomb, in that a cannibalized bit of computer. Around you in the 1950s the structure of mutable, industrial-style laboratories introduced to physics in the wartime scramble to ready nuclear weapons and radar. Shaped by the exigencies of industry and war, but also shaping the practices of both, the machines of physics are part of a wider technological material culture—neither below it, nor above it. (xviii)

And Galison emphasizes that the realm of “the practice of physics” encompasses many forms of activity: institutions, social networks, extended working groups, peer-reviewed journals, and specialized forms of knowledge developed in industrial, military, and corporate spaces.

Even this penciled sketch is but a partial presentation of the multitude of worlds within physics; there were other worlds beyond. Left out are the different university and national groups participating in large experiments, not to speak of the theorists, phenomenologists, administrators, and industrialists; there are computer programmers simulating runs and figuring out how to acquire, store, and sort the data; there are postdocs running shifts. Somehow, out of it all, comes an argument. This picture of science fits badly into the narrowly construed rationality of the algorithmic, and equally badly into the image of an unreasoned struggle by opposing forces to divvy up the territory of knowledge. Physics as a whole is always in a state of incomplete coordination between extraordinarily diverse pieces of its culture: work, machines, evidence, and argument. That these messy pieces come together as much as they do reveals the presence, not of a constricted calculus of rationality, but of an expanded sense of reason. (xxii)

Moreover, Galison suggests that laboratory machines have “meaning”, in a fairly specific sense: they have been designed and adapted by intentional agents with specific explanatory goals in mind.

I will argue that laboratory machines can command our attention if they are understood as dense with meaning, not only laden with their direct functions, but also embodying strategies of demonstration, work relationships in the laboratory, and material and symbolic connections to the outside cultures in which these machines have roots. (2)

This point amounts to a denial of technological determinism — the idea that technologies (machines) have a specific and inherent logic of development. Against this view, Galison puts forward an “agentic” view of the group processes of instrumentation and experimentation. Individuals and teams make informed guesses about what kinds of probes and instruments will illuminate particular problems, and they design instruments to carry out those investigations. And we can also look at this as a “social embeddedness” conception of the physics laboratory: the physicist (theorist, experimenter, instrument designer) brings with him or her assumptions and mental frameworks drawn from the broader society in which they emerge.

Another important insight Galison offers has to do with the “logic of experimentation” itself. In the empiricist tradition there is the idea that experiments are the means through which observation enforces the constraints of evidence on theory. But Galison emphasizes throughout the book that the nature of “experiment” and “experimenter” has changed dramatically over the past two centuries — perhaps most radically in the past fifty years. “Big science” at CERN or the Fermi Laboratory necessarily involves the extended and collaborative work of thousands of experts and technicians; so who is the experimenter there? Rather, it is necessary to interpret and reinterpret the results of the data collected after high-energy collisions, and these data do not speak univocally for themselves. “It is amid these intimate bits of machines, data, and interpretations that the categories of experiment and experimenter are embodied: defined, dismantled, and reassembled” (7).

Galison offers a novel approach to the problem of “scientific incommensurability”. Introduced by Thomas Kuhn as “incommensurable paradigms” guiding related research communities, the idea has proven elusive. Galison approaches the problem from the point of view of small differences in language and vocabulary across closely related laboratory communities; he uses the anthropologist’s ideas of creoles and pidgins to capture the differences in meaning that he identifies (48). He writes:

Because the picture of physics sketched here is one of distinct but coordinated subcultures, the notion of an interlanguage is a useful decentered metaphor. In different forms the same kind of question arises; How should we think about the relation of theorists to theorists, of theorists to experimenters, of physicists to engineers, of chemists to physicists, of image instrument makers to logic instrument makers, and of the myriad of detector subgroups within a hybrid experiment one to the other? To homogenize these various groups artificially is to miss their distinct ways of going about their craft; to represent them as participating in isolated conceptual schemes “translating” back and forth is to shut our eyes to the productive, awkward, local coordination by which communities, machines, and knowledge get built. Consider three aspects of the interlanguage. (49)

Through these “interlanguages”, Galison suggests, the separate subcultures are able to communicate about the terms and procedures of their collaborations. And this suggests a practical response to W.V.O. Quine’s hypothetical worries about the “indeterminacy of translation” that he believes confronts all inter-linguistic encounters. This is an interesting and clearly formulated framework for seeking to understand the micro-level transactions across research communities in a large research project like the activities conducted at CERN or the Fermi Laboratory. Galison writes:

In many different ways this book is a working out of the following observation: pieces of devices, fragments of theories, and bits of language connect disparate groups of practitioners even when these practitioners disagree about their global significance. Experimenters like to call their extractive moves “cannibalizing” a device. (54)

There is a further point to emphasize in Galison’s approach: his consistent avoidance of the idea that “the experimental method” exists as a general and uniform exercise in empirical science. Against this idea, he emphasizes the contingency and capacity for change that historical studies of scientific episodes display — if we are alert to the fallacy of over-generalization. For this reason he explicitly denies that the episodes he considers in this book point to a common model of “experimentation” that might be incorporated into the philosophy of science or general statements about scientific method:

The chapters of this book, like the Medieval and Renaissance histories I have cited, are grounded in the local. But I resist the designation “case study” because I do not believe that there is a set of defining precepts that can be abstracted from these or other studies to “experiment in general” (or, for that matter, “theory in general” or “instruments in general”). (62)

Rather:

My question is not how different scientific communities pass like ships in the night. It is rather how, given the extraordinary diversity of the participants in physics—cryogenic engineers, radio chemists, algebraic topologists, prototype tinkerers, computer wizards, quantum field theorists—they speak to each other at all. And the picture (to the extent one simplifies and flattens it) is one of different areas changing over time with complex border zones that sometimes vanish, coalesce, and even burgeon into quasi-autonomous regions in their own right. (63)

This is history of science at its best: attuned to the contingency and heterogeneity of various scientific research practices, sensitive to the powerful influence of context (political, ideological, economic, military) on the conduct of science, and respectful as well of the quality and rigor of scientific work when it is done well.

Anthropologist Arpita Roy took up some of these questions through an extended period of field work at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) beginning in 2007, during which she interacted intellectually and practically with dozens of physicists as they performed their scientific work. The primary result of Roy’s ethnography is her recent book, Unfinished Nature: Particle Physics at CERN. The book is most interesting when the author reports and discusses specific conversations and topics that came up with a range of specialists during her field work (theorists, experimentalists, instrumentalists, engineers, computer analysts). These conversations offer the reader a basis for reaching his or her own conclusions about the micro-culture of the CERN technical environment. Also useful is her discussion of the explosion that occurred in the accelerator tunnel in September 2008 and that interrupted work for about fourteen months. And the stated goal of the book is valuable as well:

In that vein, it is not my intention to offer an exhaustive description of a science nor a prescription for a better science but to look closely at some of the presuppositions that serve in an interesting way to connect the technical procedures of a laboratory with wider principles of intellectual classification…. By presuppositions, I mean the class of beliefs that is collectively and unconsciously held by participants and of which they are unaware but that informs every aspect of scientific thinking and activity. (5)

The book is less convincing when the author turns to reflections drawn from Marx, post-modern thinkers, and other areas of philosophy. It is unclear, for example, how Marx’s conception of the division of labor is genuinely illuminating when it comes to understanding the workings of a large laboratory complex. There is a division of labor in this institution, of course; but Marx’s delineation seems to shed little light on this fact (any more than Durkheim’s discussion might have done).

Detailed inquiries into the concrete practices and mentalities found in “big science” laboratories and research institutes are important contributions to both the sociology of science and eventually to our understanding of the epistemic standing of physics. Realist philosophers of science are confident in one of the dualities criticized by Arpita Roy — the distinction between the knower and the properties of the physical world, or the distinction between subject and object — but the cognitive and social practices involved in the scientific enterprise are deeply interesting in their own right, and ethnographic studies of the ways in which scientists and engineers go about their work are deeply interesting. Ludwik Fleck attempted such studies in the 1930s, and this tradition of investigation of “science in the making” has proven to be profoundly insightful (link, link). And emphasis on extra-scientific features of “context”, including gender, race, business interests, and national security pressures is plainly relevant to the conduct of big science — the military-industrial complex described by President Eisenhower almost 75 years ago.

Arrtificial intelligence tools for historians

2025-07-19T19:24:00.001-04:00

Historical research may seem to be a field in which AI tools will be especially useful. Historians are often confronted with very large unstructured digital collections of documents, letters, images, treaties, legal settlements, contracts, and diplomatic exchanges that far exceed the ability of a single human researcher to sift and analyze for valuable historical insights. Can emerging tools in the AI revolution help to make systematic use of such historical collections?

Earlier applications of new quantitative methods of analysis of historical data

Several earlier periods of innovation in twentieth-century historical research suggest that historians can often borrow fruitfully from new methods and analytical tools developed in other sciences. The cliometric revolution of the 1980s (Fogel and Elton 1984; Rawski 1996; Wright 2015) brought tools of econometrics, demography, and statistics more fully into play in historical inquiry. Historians have made extensive and productive use of quantitative methods borrowed from the social sciences to investigate questions concerning the health status of various historical populations and the standard of living in different cities and regions (Crafts 1980; Lee and Feng 1999; Allen 2000; Allen, Bengtsson, and Dribe 2005). These tools usually depend upon the availability of structured databases of comparable data over time—for example, census data, birth, marriage, and death records, military records of recruits, and price data for representative goods (wheat, rice, salt). There are issues of comparability, reliability, and validity that arise in these applications of large historical datasets, but these issues are no more difficult for historians than for sociologists or political scientists. Another major area of innovation was the geospatial revolution of the 1990s (Presner and Shepard 2016; Skinner, Henderson, and Yuan 2000; Thill 2020). Efforts to place historical data and events into spatial order have been very productive in suggesting new historical patterns and causal influences not visible in purely narrative accounts. G. William Skinner’s pathbreaking work on the economic regionalization of China is an outstanding example (Skinner 1977), and Peter Bol and colleagues have collaborated in the establishment of a major historical GIS database for China (Bol 2006; Bol 2007). So it is quite understandable that some contemporary historians are interested in the potential value of emerging tools of digital humanities, semantic search, and big-data analytics in their efforts to make sense of very large archives of digitized text and image materials.

However, archival collections of interest to historians present special obstacles to digital research. They are usually unstructured, consisting of collections of heterogeneous text documents, contracts, local regulations, trial documents, imperial decrees, personal letters, and artifacts and images. Moreover, the meaning of legal, political, and religious vocabulary is sometimes unclear from a modern perspective, so translation and interpretation are problematic. The written language of the documents itself is problematic. Often handwritten, interspersed with references and asides in other languages, and often using vocabulary that has no exact modern equivalent, the task of interpreting each historical document itself is challenging for the historian and for the software system. Are there tools that allow the historian to sift, summarize, categorize, and highlight the texts, sentences, and paragraphs that are included in a large archival collection? Major new capabilities have emerged in each of these areas that have substantially enhanced the ability of historians to classify and analyze very large unstructured text databases and archives. These capabilities involve advances in machine learning, large language models, semantic search tools, and big-data analytics. Like any innovation in methods of inquiry and inference, it is crucial for researchers to carefully evaluate the epistemic reliability of the tools they utilize.

Digital humanities

In the past several decades scholars in the humanities, including comparative literature, art history, and various national literatures, have explored applications of computational tools for the analysis of digital texts that permit a breadth and depth of analysis not previously available. These research efforts are now described as digital humanities. Several handbooks and overviews on digital humanities have appeared (Schreibman, Siemens, Unsworth 2004; Schreibman, Siemens, Unsworth 2016; Eve 2022). The goals of research within the field are varied, but in almost all cases the research involves computational analysis of large databases of text, image, and video documents, with the general goal of discovering large patterns that may be undetectable through traditional tools of literary or art-history analysis. Franco Moretti’s Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History (2005) and Distant Reading (2013) offer excellent examples. Moretti wishes to explore “world literature”; and the field of documents included in this rubric is too large for any single critic or research team to read closely all the available works in the field. Moretti writes, “A larger literary history requires other skills: sampling; statistics; work with series, titles, concordances, incipits—and perhaps also the ‘trees’ that I discuss in this essay” (2013: 67). In place of the insights of close reading, Moretti emphasizes the value of “distant reading” and the effort to discover broad and long patterns across national literatures and centuries. This requires using analytical tools of computational social science to classify texts, identify word patterns, create spatial networks, and (perhaps) to algorithmically assign markers to topics and styles in the texts subject to analysis. Martin Paul Eve writes, “Under such a model, the idea is that computational detection of style, theme, content, named entities, geographic place names, etc. could be discerned at scale and aggregated into a broader and continuous literary history that would not suffer from the same defects as a model that required one to read everything” (Eve 2022: 130).

Efforts in the digital humanities have evident relevance to the problems presented by large text and image datasets available in many areas of historical research. One promising area of application involves using big data tools of text analysis—for example, machine learning, content extraction, and semantic search—to systematically survey and classify all the documents in a collection. The impetus and initiatives of the field of “digital or computational history” are described in Siebold and Valleriani 2022 and Graham, Milligan, Weingart, and Martin 2022. The methods currently creating a great deal of interest among historians are based on joining machine learning methods, big-data analytics, and large language models (LLMs) in order to permit analysis and codification of the semantic content of documents. To what extent can emerging computational tools designed for management and analysis of large unstructured text and image databases be adapted to assist the historian in the task of assimilating, interpreting, and analyzing very large databases of historical documents and artifacts?

Pre-processing and information extraction

An avenue of research in computer science that supports analysis of large unstructured datasets containing texts and images is the field of information extraction (Adnan and Akbar 2019). Information extraction technology consists of algorithms developed to analyze patterns in text (and images or videos) to apply labels or tags to segments of the data. These are generally “big data” tools using machine learning to identify patterns in target documents or images. Adnan and Akbar put the goal of information extraction tools in these terms: “It takes collection of documents as input and generates different representations of relevant information satisfying different criteria. IE techniques efficiently analyze the text in free form by extracting most valuable and relevant information in a structured format” (Adnan and Akbar 2019: 6). In general terms, information extraction tools are expected to provide a structured basis for answers to questions like these: What is the document about? What persons or things are mentioned? What relationships are specified within the document? What events are named? The tools are often based on natural-language models that require training on large text datasets and sometimes make use of machine learning based on neural networks (Rithani et al. 2023). “The concept is to automatically extract characteristics from massive artificial neural networks and then use these features to inform choices” (Rithani et al. 2023: 14766).

A useful tool developed within the field of information extraction that has clear relevance for historians attempting to analyze large unstructured databases is named entity recognition and classification (Goyal, Gupta, and Kumar 2018). This is a group of text-analysis algorithms designed to identify meaningful information contained in a given document —for example, “person, organization, location, date/time, quantities, numbers” (Goyal et al. 2018: 22). The named entities may be specialized to a particular content area; for example, public health historians may wish to include disease and symptom names. These tools are used as a basis for pre-processing of a set of documents. The tool creates a meta-file for each document including the named entities and classes that it contains, along with other contextual information. For example, historians interested in the role that agriculture played in large periods of time may be interested in quickly identifying a selection of documents that refer to hunger, famine, or starvation. Goyal, Gupta, and Kumar carefully review the methods currently in use to identify named entities in a body of texts, including rule-based identification of named entities and machine-learning identification, with or without supervision. They emphasize that none of these methods is error-free, and false positives and false negatives continue to arise after training. This means that some lexical items in a document are either missed as referring to a named entity, or are incorrectly associated with a given named entity. Nonetheless, a historian can certainly use named-entity recognition and classification to provide a basis for important exploration and discovery in a large unstructured text database.

Keller, Shiu, and Yan (2024) provide a recent example of a machine-learning approach to automatic text analysis based on the most common large language model technique (“bidirectional encoder representations from transformers” (BERT)). They use GUWEN-BERT, a BERT model pre-trained on classical Chinese characters. They evaluate the power and accuracy of this tool in analyzing the Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty to identify events of social unrest. The document archive is vast, encompassing more than 1,200 volumes of records from the sixth century to the end of the Qing Dynasty. Their research task is to identify episodes of social unrest, and then to classify these episodes into three categories—peasant unrest, militia unrest, and secret-society unrest (Keller et al. 2024: 4). This process of event identification and classification then permitted the researchers to seek out correlates of unrest, including fluctuations in grain prices. A useful example applying the same technology is provided by Liu, Wang, and Bol (2023), demonstrating largescale extraction of biographical information from a large collection of local gazetteers. Machine recognition of hand-written Chinese literary characters and translation of sentences and phrases in classical Chinese have made great progress in the past twenty years; Liu, Jaeger, and Nakagawa 2004, Leung and Leung 2010. This capability represents a major step forward in the ability of Chinese and Asian-language historians to make extensive use of large databases of historical documents such as the Veritable Records archives.

RAG, GraphRAG, and vector-similarity search

An important tool that has been of interest to historians exploring digital tools is retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as a complement to LLM text generation systems. This area of research attempts to provide a basis for joining LLM query engines to specialized databases so that responses to queries will be based on data contained in the associated database. RAG tools are sometimes celebrated as solving two persistent problems arising in the application of natural-language generative chat functions based on large language models: the lack of auditability and the generation of fictitious responses (hallucinations) by the generative chat program. Kim Martineau describes a RAG tool in these terms: “Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is an AI framework for improving the quality of LLM-generated responses by grounding the model on external sources of knowledge to supplement the LLM’s internal representation of information. RAG implementation in an LLM-based question-answer system has two main benefits: It ensures that the model has access to the most current, reliable facts, and that users have access to the model’s sources, ensuring that its claims can be checked for accuracy and ultimately trusted” (Martineau 2024). A RAG framework is intended to allow the introduction of real, documented data into a natural language query-and-response system, and it is designed to be auditable. RAG picks up where pre-processing tools discussed previously leave off. RAG tools permit the retriever tool to parse a given query into component questions, and then to retrieve relevant data from pre-existing databases of documents (Lewis et al. 2021; Zhao et al. 2024).

RAG tools have in turn been extended with two related innovations. Vector similarity search is a semantic search tool that represents a document as a vector of abstract terms (like those identified in the discussion above of named entity identification and classification) (Mohoney et al. 2023). This further simplifies the task of querying the database for documents that are “about” one or more entities or events. A second valuable analytical tool is GraphRAG, which permits the construction of a network graph of the links among the elements in a document collection. Introduced by research scientists at Microsoft in 2024, GraphRAG was designed to permit analysis of global features of a large unstructured data collection. (See Larson and Truitt 2024, Edge et al. 2024a, and Edge et al. 2024b for technical descriptions of GraphRAG capabilities.) GraphRAG combines the data provided by RAG tools and connects these to LLM generative response systems. GraphRAG thus integrates indexing, retrieval, and generation. The key output of GraphRAG analysis of a database of text documents is a knowledge graph showing relationships among the various documents based on the content vectors associated with each document. (Experienced historians who make use of RAG and GraphRAG tools note that scaling up from moderate to large databases is challenging and computationally demanding.)

Limitations of the tools for historians

These tools suggest research strategies for historians confronting very large digital collections of documents and images. They permit computational procedures that classify and index the materials in the data archive that permit the historian to quickly identify items that are relevant to particular research questions -- the occurrence of famine, civil strife, dynastic unrest, or the transmission of ideas. And they permit natural-language query of the target database that provides suggestive avenues of further investigation for the historian. Crucially, these tools provide the ability to "audit" the results of a query by returning to the specific documents on which a response is based. The problem of "hallucination" that is endemic to large-language models by themselves is substantially reduced by tying responses to specific items in the database. And the algorithms of vector search allow the AI agent to quickly pull together the documents and "chunks" of text that are most relevant to the query.

These applications present powerful new opportunities for historians to make extensive use of very large databases of texts, but they also pose novel questions for the philosophy of history. In particular, they require that historians and philosophers develop new standards and methods for validating the computational methods that are chosen for various research tasks presented by the availability of large text collections. This means that we need to examine the strengths and limitations of each of these methods of analysis. Crucially, the designers and researchers of these tools are quite explicit in acknowledging that the tools are subject to error: the problem of hallucination is not fully removed, the content database itself may be error-prone, there may be flaws and limitations inherent in the training database in use, and any errors created during the information-extraction stage will be carried forward into the results. It is therefore incumbent upon the historian who uses such tools to validate and evaluate the information provided by searches and natural language queries. Nothing in the design of these tools suggests that they are highly reliable; rather, they are best viewed as exploratory tools permitting the historian to look more deeply into the collection of documents than traditional methods would permit. It will be necessary for historians to think critically about the quality and limitations of the information they extract from these forms of big-data analysis of historical databases.

References

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Allen, Robert C., 2000. “Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300–1800,” European Review of Economic History, 3: 1–25.

Allen, Robert C., Tommy Bengtsson, and Martin Dribe (eds.), 2005. Living standards in the past: New perspectives on well-being in Asia and Europe, Oxford; New York: Oxford University.

Bol, Peter, 2006. “Creating the China Historical Geographic Information System,” in History in the Digital Age Symposium, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, video lecture. Bol 2006 available online.

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Stock ownership as system-wide exploitation?

2025-06-26T15:58:00.000-04:00

A prior post made an effort to gain greater analytical clarity concerning the unfairness involved in the separation between the “one percent” economy and the rest of us. In what ways is the wealth owned by the super-billionaires an “unfair” extraction from the rest of US society? How can we account for the very rapid accumulation of wealth in the hands of the richest 1 percent of US wealth holders since 1980? The answer seems to largely turn on the rapid expansion in wealth represented by the US stock market over that period, and the fact that a very small number of wealth holders captured the lion’s share of these gains. The following graph shows a five-fold increase in the value of the US equity market in part of that time, from about $12 trillion in 1998 to $52 trillion in 2024. The wealth owned by the top 1% of households increased at about the same rate, which implies that this class rode the wave to wealth right along with the stock market in those years. “Corporate equities and mutual fund shares” are the largest component by far of the wealth portfolios of the top .1% and 1%, as reflected in the second chart below, produced by the Federal Reserve.

Screenshot

It was shown in the earlier post that the growth of the super-billionaires’ share of the nation’s wealth cannot be explained in normal “business profit” terms. (For reference, the top twenty billionaires in the US own 2.8 trillion dollars of wealth; link.) Rather, the bulk of the wealth now held by individuals like Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, and Jeff Bezos represents the rapid appreciation of value in capital markets of the companies in which they have large ownership stakes. The companies themselves do not generate billions of dollars in dividends; rather, their total stock value has witnessed billions of dollars in gains over very short periods of time.

So why should we think this is in any way unfair? How is it exploitative? Is it not more like the fortunate visitor to “Antiques Road Show” who finds that the forgotten painting in the closet is in fact an early Picasso and is worth millions on the art market? This is good fortune for the owners of the canvas, but surely these facts don’t suggest “exploitation” of anyone else. Perhaps not in the case of the Antiques Road Show guest; but the majority owner of Amazon, Tesla, or Meta is in a different set of circumstances. Rather, the existence and continuing success of these companies depends on background conditions to which all sectors and components of the US economy contribute: a stable system of law and regulation, a robust education and research sector, a skilled workforce, an infrastructure of roads, ports, rail lines, fiber optic cables, and electricity providers. The value of US companies is at least in part a system effect: it is facilitated and constituted by a vast network of private and public stakeholders, all of whom contribute ultimately to the success of the company and the value it finds within the equity market. So the value of the US company is inseparable from the large and heterogeneous economic and political system in which it operates, and the increase in value over time of the US company reflects the continuing contribution expected by the investing public from the functioning of that system.

It will be said, of course, that the companies and their executives themselves contribute to the value that investors attribute to them: innovative products, good management systems, efficient decision-making, appropriate personnel practices, “entrepreneurship” and risk-taking. This is true. But it is also true that these contributions represent only a portion of the increase in value that the company experiences over time. The system effects described here represent an independent and important component of that substantial increase in value. So we might say that “system-created increase in value” is the uncompensated part of wealth creation in today’s economy. Companies pay little or nothing to cover the cost of these system-level inputs on which they depend; these are the inverse of “externalities”, in that they are benefits taken without compensation from the public (rather than harms imposed without compensation on the public). And these system-created increments in value constitute a very important part of the increase in value that they experience over time.

We might therefore look at “system-created increase in value” as the counterpart to “unpaid labor time” in the classic theory of exploitation. It is the source of wealth (profit) that the owners of wealth derive simply in virtue of their position in the property system and in their opportunity to benefit from the economic system upon which they depend. But now it does not derive from the “surplus value” contributed to profits by each worker, but rather from the synergies created by the socio-economic system as a whole.

It should also be noted that the ability of private companies to “extract” value from system-level inputs without compensation depends on their ability collectively to influence government policy. Therefore owners of private companies and stock wealth have strong incentives to shape the decision-making of elected officials, government policy makers, the fiscal system, and the regulatory process. This reinforces the arguments made by Thomas Volscho and Nathan Kelly in “The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008” (link). It follows, then, that achieving powerful influence on public policy and economic rule-making is not just a hobby for the oligarchy; it is an existential necessity.

This analysis of “system-input exploitation” has important consequences for distributive justice. If the whole of society contributes to the creation of the system-level properties that generate a significant fraction of the new wealth created in the past forty years, then surely fairness requires that all participants should receive some part of the gains. It would seem logical for the non-wealth-holding stakeholders — workers, farmers, and uncompensated contributors to social reproduction — to demand economic reforms that direct a fair share of that new wealth to the benefit of the whole population.

The previous post suggested one possible mechanism that would do this. The post discusses a hypothetical “public investment fund” that “would be automatically vested with ownership shares of businesses and corporations as they are created and grow, and that would function as a ‘wealth reserve’ for all citizens”. This would constitute a large and growing asset to be used for the benefit of the whole of society. In that discussion a distribution of gains resulting in public ownership of 1/3 of all capital was considered. Such a division would reduce (though not eliminate) the most extreme inequalities of wealth that currently exist, and would provide a financial basis for a more genuine “free community of equals” through the secure establishment of a high level of the resources most needed — healthcare, education and training, environmental protection, and provisioning of basic human needs for children, the disabled, the elderly, and the unemployed.

This idea of a public investment fund corresponding to the “systemic value creation” of the economy might go a long way towards the securing political values embodied in John Rawls’s concept of a “property-owning democracy” (link). Rawls argues that “the equal worth of liberty” is incompatible with a society in which political influence is proportional to wealth and where wealth is extremely unequally distributed. Wealth inequality of this magnitude means that the oligarch’s liberty and worth are magnified many times relative to the ordinary citizen’s situation. The creation of a substantial public investment fund representing the value created by our social, economic, and political system of cooperation would reduce the total proportion of the total value of the economy that the multi-billionaire class is able to expropriate. It would create real property entitlements for the great majority of society, and it would redress the current horrendous inequality of political influence that exists between the super-rich and the ordinary citizen.

A new form of exploitation

2025-06-22T17:33:00.000-04:00

Much thinking about economic justice for working people has been framed by the nineteenth-century concept of “capitalism”: owners of enterprises constitute a minority of the population; they hire workers who represent the majority of the population; wages and profits define the distribution of income throughout the whole population. This picture still works well enough for a range of economic activities in the advanced capitalist economies when it comes to manufacturing, agriculture, and service industries. According to recent tabulations by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (link), there were 158 million workers in wage and salary employment in 2023. Manufacturing represented 8.2%, retail and wholesale trade 13.7%, information 1.9%, financial services 5.8%, leisure and hospitality 10.5%, and federal and state government 14.4%. This adds up to 54.5% of the US labor force, and these workers and firms can be thought of in roughly the framework offered by the traditional idea of “capitalism”. Many of these workplaces are amenable to union representation (though relatively few are in fact unionized). But improving access to union rights and workplace consultation would significantly improve the conditions of life for this segment of the US population.

Marx’s view of the unfairness of capitalism, then, comes down to workplace exploitation — the capture of “surplus value” by the firm’s owner from the workers whom he or she employs. Profits derive solely from surplus value, so wealth accumulation is fundamentally limited by the size of an enterprise.

However, current realities seem to suggest that this classical Marxist account is no longer sufficient. To see this point it is crucial to look at the details of the distribution of wealth and income in the U.S. Consider the graph of median US income by quintile above in constant 2018 dollars. Since 1989 only the top quintile of household income has demonstrated significant growth (in a timeframe of more than thirty years); and the top 5% of households shows the greatest increase of any group. 80% of US households are barely better off today than they were in 1967; whereas the top 5% of households have increased their incomes by almost 250% in real terms. The bottom 80% range in household income from “poor”, the bottom 20% at an average household income of about $14,000, to the second quintile (60%-80%) of about $102,000. But virtually all of these households — 80% of all households — earn their livings through wage and salary income, in “capitalist” workplaces.

Further, only a very small fraction of these households are in a position to accumulate significant savings or investments. As the second graph shows, the bottom 50% of households have only 2.6% of all U.S. wealth, and the 50%-90% segment owns only another 30.8%. The top 0.1% owns 13.9% of all wealth, and the remainder of the top 1% owns 16.6%. That amounts to 30.5% of all wealth, held by 1% of households — and almost incomprehensible figure.

These two graphs have a very clear, unmistakable implication: that working people, including service workers, industrial workers, and most professionals have received a declining share of the economic product of the nation over the past 40 years. (Amazon warehouse workers fall in the 2nd-lowest quintile (poorest 21-40%).) Further, the vast majority of U.S. residents have only a tiny share of all property in the U.S. According to the Federal Reserve 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances, median household net worth in 2022 was $192,700, including private savings, retirement savings, and personal property and home value (link). And, of course, this implies that the median household net worth of the bottom 80% of the U.S. population is significantly lower.

It seems apparent, then, that capitalist exploitation is no longer the primary mechanism through which wealth is accumulated by the top 10%, 1%, and .1% of wealth holders. The top group gains income at a rapid rate and increases its share of the national wealth comparably; whereas the bottom 80% have almost stagnant incomes and negligible wealth. And this accumulation occurs almost entirely through rising value of the stock issued on behalf of private companies. The national economy generates all of this wealth; but the vast preponderance of the fruits of this production flow to the top 10% and 1% of wealth holders. This is a different kind of exploitation: not exploitation of a specific group of workers (employees of General Motors, for example); but exploitation of the whole of the U.S. economy for the benefit of a tiny minority of wealth holders.

Essentially it seems fair to say that the contemporary U.S. system involves two economies — one that includes 60%-80% of all people, and who depend on wages and salaried income to earn their livings; and a second economy that is itself steeply stratified, involving only the top 10%-20% of households. This second economy includes highly paid professionals, executives, and individuals who derive a substantial income from investments, financial assets, and other capital assets. The distribution of income and wealth in this second economy depends on ownership of capital (including human capital) of increasing value in a “knowledge” economy.

It appears, then, that the gross advancement of wealth inequalities in the past three decades has little to do with traditional “exploitation” – an unfavorable wage relationship between owners and workers. Instead, the sudden explosion of tech-oligarchy in the US seems to have to do with financial markets, the stock value of private companies, and the environment of business and tax policy in which they operate. The super-wealthy class in the US came into multi-billionaire status through the rapid acceleration of market value of companies like Amazon, Tesla, and Facebook/Meta. And this process reflected a macro-level mechanism that we might describe as “exploitation of the US economy as a whole” rather than “exploitation of a specified group of workers employed by these companies.

Thomas Volscho and Nathan Kelly provide a careful analysis of the dynamics of income inequality in the US economy over time in “The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008” (link). They note that there was considerable variation in the share of income flowing to the top one percent between 1900 and 2020, with a rapid rise beginning in about 1980. And they attribute much of this variation to facts about political power, public policy, and fiscal legislation. (This bundle of hypotheses is referred to as “Power Resources Theory”.) And a key finding in this literature is that the relative levels of political power and influence held by economic elites versus working people have a very large effect on the degree and direction of change in inequality at the top.

Consider the short history of Facebook. Mark Zuckerberg’s wealth increased from 2008 from $1.5 billion to $236 billion in 2025. The employee count of Facebook/Meta increased comparably during that period, from 85 employees in 2008 to 76,800 employees in 2025. But Zuckerberg’s wealth does not reflect the “surplus value” created by these workers, but rather the perceived value of the company in the eyes of private and institutional investors. And critically, it is difficult to imagine institutional changes within Facebook/Meta that would lead to greater overall societal equity simply by providing the company’s workers more input into the management of the company. The median income for a Facebook/Meta worker is $257K – hardly an exploitative wage. It is the rest of society that is disadvantaged by Zuckerberg’s $236 billion, not the direct employees. The same seems to be true for Tesla and the wealth accumulated by Elon Musk and for Amazon and the wealth of Jeff Bezos. Amazon’s business operations have many of the same features of domination and exploitation identified by Engels in Manchester; but these operations do not constitute the fundament of Bezos’s wealth except perhaps for the “performative” of a company single-mindedly devoted to efficiency and speed of operations.

The experience of the reforms of the welfare state after WWII shows that capitalist exploitation can be reformed through measures that improve the public provision of some crucial services (education, healthcare, retirement income, unemployment insurance); improve the ability of workers to represent themselves effectively in the workplace (legislation ensuring unionization rights); and improve conditions of health and safety in the workplace (OSHA protection). These reforms are “redistributive” in the sense that they depend on taxation of income and profits of private individuals and corporations to fund public provisioning. But can reforms like these address the inequalities — economic and political — created by the two economies described here? Can the oligarchy economy be reined in? It would seem that the answer is “no”.

So we are forced to ask, what kinds of fiscal and tax reforms could effectively rein in the wealth inequalities created at the very top of the wealth distribution? The annual wealth taxes proposed by progressive Democrats extend to taxes in the range of 1%. But this would represent a negligible reduction in the oligarch’s portfolio, and does essentially nothing to reduce the steepness of the distribution of wealth in America. A “confiscatory” tax of 33% would have a measurable effect by increasing available public funds for expenditure; but even reducing Elon Musk’s wealth from $368 billion to $245 billion – still results in a staggering inequality relative to 99% of US workers. And this still leaves the wealth-holder with a million-fold advantage in his/her political and media influence relative to almost all other US persons. (As mentioned above, the median net worth of all Americans is currently about $192,000. It is of course striking that three of America’s largest tech-oligarchs privately own a media company: Zuckerberg (Facebook), Musk (X/Twitter), and Bezos (the Washington Post).)

It appears, then, that standard “New Deal” or “welfarist” approaches to greater economic equality have no prospect for success whatsoever when it comes to reducing the overwhelming inequalities of wealth that exist between the two US economies described here. A graduated income tax works to moderate income inequalities (when it works at all); but the rapid accumulation of wealth represented by the emergence of the “tech-oligarchy” and the graph of wealth distribution above do not derive from income inequalities. The richest 1% did not primarily gain their wealth through annual savings from their high salaries; rather, they gained their wealth through stock ownership in companies whose value appreciated exponentially during the time of their ownership. And taxing the holders of wealth on the income generated by their holdings does not materially affect the distribution of wealth across the population and across generations.

Suppose we viewed a national economy as an interconnected and highly complex form of “joint production”, in which the efforts of all parties are instrumental in the creation of the new wealth and prosperity of the economy. And suppose we believe that this system should be organized as a “fair system of cooperation” in which all parties benefit in a fair way. Can the workings of capital markets and financial systems be incorporated into our institutions in ways that would give the working public (the 80%) a fair share of the products of cooperation? Could we imagine a fiscal mechanism that would provide the public with a “fair share” of the U.S. economy as a whole, including the growth of the value of private companies (Caterpillar, General Motors, Krogers, Facebook/Meta, Microsoft, …)?

For example, would it be possible to imagine a public investment agency along the lines of CalPERS that would be automatically vested with ownership shares of businesses and corporations as they are created and grow, and that would function as a “wealth reserve” for all citizens? Suppose the hypothetical “public investment corporation” eventually possessed assets worth about 1/3 of the total value of the US stock market. (The value of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange is currently $28.3 trillion, so we are imagining a public wealth fund of about $10 trillion.) On this model, private owners and shareholders would own 2/3 of the capitalized economy, and the public would own 1/3. Would such a system be feasible? Could such a system redress the insupportable economic and material inequalities that exist in our country? Could it redress the gross inequalities of influence and power that exist between a tiny class of oligarchs and the vast majority of democratic citizens? Could the shareholder voting rights that correspond to the public shares created in this way serve to alter corporate priorities?

It seems clear that the photo below taken from Donald Trump’s inauguration represents a horrendous flaw in contemporary democracy. The “tech oligarchs” turned out in force for the new administration, and a group of wholly committed political partisans stand behind them to enact policies in the United States that serve their interests. If this is the best that our democracy can currently offer working people, then we need to work much harder at finding political and economic solutions that can elicit broad support from ordinary citizens, workers, farmers, and Uber drivers to push forward a better agenda for democratic equity.

Republicanism and multicultural democracy

2025-05-24T15:04:00.004-04:00

Philip Pettit’s writings about republicanism offer a valuable and distinctive perspective on individual freedom and the nature of a good society. He develops those ideas most fully in Republicanism : a theory of freedom and government. Pettit’s core idea is that we should conceive of freedom as “non-domination” — that is, that an individual is free when he or she is not subject to the arbitrary power of other individuals, groups, or institutions. He emphasizes that non-domination is a more demanding concept of freedom than either “negative” or “positive” freedom as characterized by writers as diverse as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin, or Amartya Sen, because domination can occur even when crude coercion is absent. The threat of constraint or punishment for one’s “free” actions can make those actions and actors unfree, even if coercive means are never invoked. And most pertinently today, a structure of discrimination and negative stereotypes about members of a minority group can present barriers to the free and non-dominated choices and life trajectories of a despised minority — African-American men and women in the American South in the 1950s, Black South Africans during the post-apartheid period, women in a period of male domination and chauvinism, and Jewish men and women in pre-war Poland.

The other idea constitutive of republicanism is the view that the commonwealth, the civil society, or the republic have a value over and above the value of the individual activities of the citizens. Rousseau emphasizes this point in The Social Contract: entering into a unanimous and binding agreement with one’s fellow citizens is fundamentally transforming of each individual. Each is an expression and constituent of the “general will”, and the whole of the political collectivity is a moral presence for all the citizens. To be a citizen is to be civically motivated, to be concerned to bring about the good of the whole (and not solely one’s own particular good). And this civic membership is in turn constitutive of part of the value and satisfaction of the individual citizen. Citizens are morally invested in the wellbeing of their fellow citizens. This set of ideals, once again, is incompatible with a society that embodies persistent forms of social and legal domination of one group by another, because domination is incompatible with equality and dignity for all citizens.

The question of domination is central for Pettit. Here is how he explains this concept.

Domination, as I understand it here, is exemplified by the relationship of master to slave or master to servant. Such a relationship means, at the limit, that the dominating party can interfere on an arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the basis of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the person affected. The dominating party can practise interference, then, at will and with impunity: they do not have to seek anyone’s leave and they do not have to incur any scrutiny or penalty. Without going further into the analysis of domination or indeed interference—we turn to that task in the next chapter—a little reflection should make clear that domination and interference are intuitively different evils. (22)

It is worth noticing how this conception of non-domination converges with Rousseau’s concept of “a free community of equals”. It is fundamental to Rousseau’s concept of a proper “republic” that no citizen is superior to another, none has dominion over another in virtue of property, status, religious authority, or other extraneous characteristic. In a free community of equals, no citizen is enabled to dominate another. This view is celebrated in The Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality Among Men.

Pettit especially praises the theory of republicanism because it provides a basis for articulating “grievances” at a wide range of causes. Whereas the “non-interference” theory of liberty does not provide a basis for articulating a grievance about engrained social hierarchy (squire to tenant), the “non-domination” perspective permits this grievance and many others: patriarchy and male supremacy, racial discrimination, a group’s exercise of unequal economic power over another group, and the many other ways in which entrenched patterns of thought and power give one group influence over the affairs and wellbeing of another group (Republicanism, p. 134).

In particular, Pettit argues that republicanism offers a strong moral basis for articulating the values of a multicultural democracy and the equal dignity of the diverse participants in such a democracy. And he forthrightly defends the idea that a democracy based on “non-domination” will require substantial programmatic efforts at reducing and eliminating the sources of domination that exist among groups in the existing society. He puts his view this way:

The challenge raised by that complaint [by members of minority groups within society] is whether the modern state can be given a rationale and a form that will enable it to serve the interests of those in minority cultures equally with the interests of those in the mainstream. The point that I want to make here, in defence of republicanism, is that if the modern state is orientated around the promotion of freedom as nondomination, then it will have a reason and a capacity to cater for the claims of those in minority cultures. … The lesson of this observation is that so far as membership in a minority culture is likely to be a badge of vulnerability to domination, the members of that culture, and the state that assumes concern for their fortunes, must address the needs of the culture in general. It is not going to be enough to claim to be concerned with individuals in the culture, without any particular reference to what binds them together. (Republicanism, 144, 145)

It might be noted that this conception of a multicultural democracy is itself somewhat limiting. It emphasizes the importance of “counting every voice” within a democracy — certainly an important value. But it doesn’t emphasize explicitly the positive value created by a multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multicultural society and the forms of learning and enhanced fulfillment that are enabled by full and equal relationships with members of groups other than one’s own. At its best a multicultural democracy is more than a social and political setting in which different groups can live peacefully together; it is one in which the lives of all members of society are enriched and enabled by the thoughts, experiences, and values of members of other groups.

Let’s now see how these ideas about republicanism intersect with the rationale for organizational programs enhancing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI). In the past twenty years universities and businesses have introduced a variety of programs under this banner that are designed (in part anyway) to reduce and eliminate the barriers experienced for various groups in our society due to discrimination and negative stereotypes. Consider two specific examples: the well-known social phenomenon of “stereotype threat” (link) that Claude Steele and others have explored; and the persistent life disadvantages created for poor children and young adults by inadequate public schooling in urban centers (link).

Steele’s central finding as a social psychologist is that a widespread belief in society and in schools that the X group generally cannot perform as well as the Y group on a certain kind of task (a stereotype) causally brings about poor performance in members of the X group. Instead of the stereotype deriving from the facts, the facts of unequal performance derive from the stereotype. So what can be done? One possibility is to explicitly recognize the workings of this mechanism within schools, and to educate teachers about the harmful effects that follow from even veiled expressions of the stereotype. Suppose an engineering professor often begins the semester with a speech saying, “I see there are a few women students in the class. I know this will be a challenging class for you, and I want you to know that my teaching assistants and I are available to you to clarify things you don’t understand”. We may assume the professor’s intentions are good; but according to Steele’s research, the effects on some of the female students may be significant. So the professor would be well advised to learn to emphasize his or her availability in different terms, without reference to the gender of the students in the class. This suggests the value of programs in “hidden-bias” training for faculty and staff. And we might go a bit further: if the engineering college faculty is 90% male, the signal to female students seems to be that “engineering is not a profession for women”. So the college should make special efforts to recruit highly talented female faculty.

Now consider the second example: the barriers created for black and brown students who are heavily concentrated in urban neighborhoods with relatively less effective public schools, due to persistent residential segregation (link). How should selective universities address the fact that black and brown students from low-income families are persistently under-represented in their incoming classes? A program that has often been adopted is a university-funded supplementary instruction program for low-income districts in their state or region. The idea is that the university can help talented high school students close the attainment gap that exists between them and typical suburban high school students through intensive programs of this kind. This would have two positive effects: it would increase the preparation level of these low-income-neighborhood students so they are competitive for admission in selective universities; and it would potentially increase the confidence in a cohort of under-served students that the host university is indeed an attainable and attractive destination for them. These effects would increase the number of under-served students — black, brown, and white — who attend selective universities, and it would reduce the barrier that exists for residents of segregated neighborhoods and cities when it comes to college attendance. This would be one step in the direction of securing a more free and equal society, from the point of view of non-domination.

Now let’s return to “non-domination” and Pettit’s republicanism. These reparative policies are urgently needed, and many others as well, in order to eliminate the social barriers that have the effect of establishing relations of “domination” among specific groups in society. Moreover, policies and programs like these are not performed out of “charity” or noblesse oblige. Rather, measures like these are needed as a matter of reparative justice to all free and equal citizens — in the first case, in order to reduce the barriers created to female students’ ability to enter an engineering curriculum and to thrive in the profession; and in the second case, to begin to address the barriers to full educational development created by continuing racial segregation. In each case the policy is intelligently designed to reduce domination of one group in a democratic society by another group. And in this way the DEI policies currently under attack are specifically needed if we are to achieve the idea of a “free community of equals” in a multicultural and multi-racial society.

The micro and the social

2025-05-20T11:14:00.001-04:00

In his influential article "A definition of physicalism" (1993) Philip Pettit attempts to formulate a consistent and coherent account of physicalism as an ontology of the world.

I believe that we can define a possibly true, substantive doctrine which holds, roughly, that the empirical world 'contains just what a true complete physics would say it contains'. (213)

The resulting view is offered as an attempt to identify the "furniture of the empirical world". Can there be a corresponding theory of the "furniture of the empirical social world"?

His statement in the follow-on reply to criticisms of this essay in "Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws" (1994) is helpful.

“Physicalism – better, perhaps, microphysicalism – is the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily) everything non-microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities and is governed by microphysical laws; and this, in a sense which means that the non-microphysical facts supervene contingently on the microphysical” (1994: 253).

What is the analogy for the trivial fact, “no social structures without human beings embodying them”? Let's call the corresponding view “bare ontological dependence” (BOD). Here is a formulation of BOD constructed to be exactly parallel to Pettit's definition of microphysicalism:

“[Bare ontological dependence] … is the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily) everything [at the social level] is composed out of [existent human individuals with specified features of mentality, psychology, and cognitive capacity] and is governed by [psychological and neurophysiological] laws; and this, in a sense which means that the [social-level] facts supervene contingently on the [micro-individuals]”.

Is this a credible and defensible conception of the relation between individual human actors and "social entities"?

This formulation entails, apparently, that “the features of the social institution are constituted and governed by the micro-psychological characteristics of the individual actors who constitute it” and the social “supervenes” upon those micro-individuals. This in turn implies the supervenience maxim: “no difference at the social-structure level without some difference at the micro-individual level”. It also specifies a clear sense in which “micro-particles” have primacy over ordinary physical objects and "individuals" have primacy over "social entities"; their properties “fix” the behavior of the macro-objects. The corresponding statement for "bare ontological dependence is then that "actors" have primacy over ordinary "social" objects; their properties "fix" the behavior of the macro-social-objects.

Pettit's application of these formulae to the world of physics, chemistry, and planetary motion is reasonable enough. And part of the plausibility of the view in the case of physics is that the microphysical particles can be said to have properties that are fixed and independent from the macro-level ensembles that they constitute. However, this is not the case in the situation of "socially situated individuals" who constitute "ongoing social structures and practices". Rather, there are reciprocal causal relations up and down, or back and forth, across the levels that make the ideas of "constitution" and "fixing" no longer compelling. And this implies in turn that there are no trans-historical, universal "regularities" of human behavior that might constitute the bridge between individual actions and social entities.

Further, because of the contingency of some historical sequences (for example, the invention of monotheism or the discovery of the heavy plow), and given the path-dependency of some structural or institutional outcomes, there is no reason to expect that a common beginning point of unsocialized or pre-socialized individuals (a state of nature) would gradually develop, by perhaps unknown behavioral laws, into the establishment and articulation of specific social structures. And if we accept the point that it is sometimes the case that "different structures elicit different kinds of human mentality", then we are brought face to face with contingency all the way down: contingent structures and contingent social individuals.

So Pettit's line of thought in defining physicalism is quite implausible when applied to the social world. It is true that "the Ford Motor Company" could not exist if there were not actual human beings occupying roles within and outside the company. It is not true, however, that "the 'social' world is governed by forces or regularities that [empirical psychology] is best equipped to describe" (the analog to Pettit's statement about micro-particles). The mental characteristics and processes of the actors involved in a social entity or set of social arrangements are themselves in fact shaped by past social arrangements to which the actors have been exposed. So if the foundational body of empirical knowledge is "empirical psychology" (as JS Mill indeed believed) then we must reject the view.

One of Pettit's claims about the relation between microphysical things and macrophysical things is fundamentally a reassertion of the supervenience relation between levels: "No macrophysical difference without a microphysical one" (216). How does this proposition fare when applied to "macro-social entities" and "micro-individual states"? It corresponds to this assertion: "No macro-social difference without a micro-individual one". Unfortunately, this seems to be a trivial statement when applied to the social realm. Any two social states differ at the micro-level, for the most trivial of reasons: they are different states, with different individuals, and different individuals have different action-plans and beliefs. So whether S1 and S2 are "different" or "the same" in their macro-descriptions, it is trivially true that they will differ in their micro-composition. Consider these three facts: "The price of soybeans on the Chicago Board of Trade on May 1, 2025, is 1,060.50"; "The price of soybeans on the Chicago Board of Trade on May 1, 2024, is 1,000.00"; "The price of soybeans on the Chicago Board of Trade on May 1, 2023, is 1,060.50". Each sentence describes a structural fact: the circumstances of supply and demand on the specified day led to an equilibrium price as quoted. But none of the structural facts described here corresponds to a single set of individual actors doing the same things for similar reasons. The actors have changed, their motivations have changed, their habits have changed, and their styles of dress have changed. The pathways that led to the same structural equilibrium in 2025 and 2023 were no doubt different in multiple ways; and likewise, the actors and the pathways that led to different equilibria in 2025 and 2024 were different as well. Even if we were to perform a massive experiment in "experimental economics" and assemble 1,000 traders on May 1, 2023, and then again on May 1, 2025; control the information to which they are exposed in the preceding twelve hours; and ask them to buy and sell as they normally would, there will still remain idiosyncratic differences between the series of thoughts and actions undertaken on the two days. And the same will be true of the experiment when we model 2024 and 2025: there will inevitably be vast numbers of individual-level differences. So the supervenience condition is vacuous. There are always differences across cases at the micro-individual level.

It is pertinent to observe that some physical processes are path dependent as well, which means that the initial states of the micro-particles by themselves are not sufficient to "determine" the outcome. Rather, the outcome depends in part on the process of transition from one state to another. Suppose a physicist observes two vessels of pure water over a bunsen burner. One container is boiling vigorously, while the other, at the same observed temperature, is not boiling. The difference is that the first vessel was heated quickly while the second was heated slowly. The process made a difference in the outcome, even though the micro-constituents were indistinguishable. But this is the relevant point: there is a difference in the two states of containers of water, even though there is currently no difference in the states of the micro-particles.

Pettit considers a possibility that he considers to be inconsistent with his understanding of "physicalism":

Another [opponent of physicalism] will be the person, perhaps difficult to imagine accepts microphysical composition but thinks that the composition involved is not necessarily conservative: it allows, without further need of explanation, that two entities that are composed in the same way, and of the same materials, may yet differ intrinsically from one another. (217)

Pettit appears to think this is an absurd contention; how could these two macro-entities differ, without any difference in the composing microphysical parts?

Let's ask first what Pettit means by the phrase "composed in the same way". One natural reading is asynchronous and structural. A bar of iron may consist of precisely the same number of iron atoms, but the arrangement of the atoms is coherent in the first case and incoherent in the second arrangement. In that case the first iron bar has a property that the second bar lacks; it is "magnetic". And yet the two bars consist of exactly the same kind of microphysical parts. The solution in this case is that the arrangement of the parts makes a difference; when the iron atoms are coherently aligned, their magnetic fields aggregate to a macro-scale magnetic field.

The second possible meaning of "composed in the same way" is diachronic and historical. To be "composed in the same way" is to have undergone precisely the same set of processes of material transformation, heat transfer, application of pressure, etc. From the short explanation of path-dependent processes above, we know that differences in physical processes of material transformation can indeed lead to differences in macro-physical outcome for ensembles of precisely similar microphysical constituents; in the current case, one process leads to a magnetic bar of iron, while the second process leads to a non-magnetic bar.

Now return to the relation between individuals and social structures. Is it possible for two ensembles of individuals to be exactly similar in the current psychological characteristics of the individuals involved in the two cases but to nonetheless differ in some important way at the macro-social level? Much turns on how finely we expect to interpret "exactly similar" here. But suppose we assume an abstract conception of the individual's psychology along these lines: each individual wants a situation where he or she can satisfy as many preferences as possible, while avoiding catastrophic failures. And each individual has a set of "social emotions" that permit the emergence of social relationships based on trust and mutual solidarity. Now consider two thought experiments involving the emergence of a "wannabe" strong man dictator in the political system. In the first instance the potential dictator has the good fortune that his first efforts at taking power are generally unopposed because individuals recognize his intentions but find resistance to be too risky; as the dictator gains followers and successes this population becomes more passive; and after ten years the dictator is applauded and supported throughout much of the population. In the second instance the dictator has bad fortune. A few of his supporters are overly willing to use violence against dissidents and resisters, which stimulates a higher degree of alarm in ordinary citizens; a few of the ordinary citizens recognize the discontent present in others and form relations of trust. These "trust" circles expand over time and incidents of resistance become more frequent; the dictator and his supporters become more willing to turn to violent suppression; the dictator's violence tips more citizens into trust circles of their own; and after ten years the dictator's hold on power is precarious. His rallies are attended by his own militias and inner circle; but acts of resistance continue and proliferate.

The two scenarios begin and end with the same kinds of actors -- persons with their own interests and a capacity for forming social relationships. And yet the properties of the two regimes at the end of the experiment are quite different. This seems to correspond to the terms of Pettit's original reductio ad absurdum: different macro-arrangements constituted by the same kinds and arrangements of microparticles. What differentiates the two cases is the contingency, path dependence, and "triggering" of individual capacities that occurred during the processes involved in the two scenarios. In the first case, no events arose to trigger and encourage the emergence of trust networks; whereas in the second case, there were such events. The historical processes in the two cases were different, and the properties of the ensemble continued to evolve in different directions. The social capacities of the individuals were present in both scenarios, but they were only triggered in the second scenario.

What all of this suggests is fairly simple: the idea of "physicalism" as a fundamental model of ontology is not a suitable framework for thinking about social ontology. The individuals who "constitute" social arrangements are not analogous to the microparticles that Pettit considers; rather, they are actors whose states of agency are altered dynamically by events, processes, and structures that emerge historically, and the inherent contingency and path dependence of the social world guarantee that no version of foundationalism or individualism will suffice for social ontology.

Why "DEI"?

2025-04-29T17:12:00.000-04:00

The current war on DEI has proven to be unrelenting and highly destructive to the independence, academic freedom, and inclusiveness of American universities. And yet the values that gave rise to DEI initiatives throughout the country in the past two decades are deeply grounded in fundamental American values of equality, freedom, and community. How did we get to the place where DEI is regarded as extremist and alien?

First, some background. DEI is a slogan; it stands for Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. The fundamental idea is that the basic institutions of a multicultural and multiracial democracy should actively embody the facts of social and cultural diversity of the population; they should welcome all comers in a spirit of democratic equality; and they should actively strive to create environments that are genuinely welcoming to people from all aspects of American society. Unlike elitist institutions of the 1920s, universities should not be places where economic, religious, or racial elites have primacy, and people from other groups are only marginally welcome. Instead, an institution in a democratic society, including especially universities, should actively embrace the equality, dignity, and worth of all its participants.

Given the history of discrimination in our society -- discrimination based on religion, ethnic origin, gender, race, and other social or cultural characteristics -- any thoughtful observer will realize that full democratic equality requires more than slogans, more than banners, and more than "celebrations of global diversity". Democratic equality requires active work on the part of citizens, leaders, and institutional participants to remake the culture and systems of the institution in ways that deliberately turn back the impulse of discrimination and disparagement across identity groups. If Chicagoans have the view that down-staters are backward, conventional, and generally not very innovative, then banks, labor unions, and universities in Chicago are likely to reflect those assumptions without any special effort on the part of "hate groups" to bring this about. It reflects what we might call "cultural-assumptions discrimination". So special efforts would be required to change the mentality and culture of all the participants, to un-do the workings of these forms of "implicit bias". And if down-state urban school systems are typically underfunded and under-performing relative to their counterparts in the affluent Chicago suburbs, then down-state urban students are likely enough to be under-represented at "merit-based" elite institutions in Chicago. This would be an example of "structural discrimination". And it implies that "affirmative" efforts would be needed in order to give down-state urban students an equitable opportunity of access to the elite university.

And what about inclusion, welcome, and equal dignity and respect for the individuals and groups who wind up participating in the institution? If the biased assumptions that color the perceptions and expectations of Chicagoans and down-staters alike persist in the institutional environment of the elite university, then we may expect that consequential inequalities of respect, dignity, and worth will persist into the institutional environment as well. This will have the effect of reproducing locally the group separation and disparagement that exists in the broader society. Active efforts at the local level -- in the classroom, in the residence hall, in the eating club or Greek organization -- will be needed in order to change the way that eighteen-year-olds think about themselves and their classmates, without falling into the traps of orthodoxy, political correctness, or ineffectual scolding.

Is there any doubt that cultures of discrimination, disparagement, and bias continue to exist in American society? Of course not; the persistence of these attitudes and behaviors are all too evident, even when expressed in indirect and "socially acceptable" ways. So people who are committed to full democratic equality as a goal, even though not a current reality, are forced to face the question: what kinds of social messages, programming, and educational initiatives can be imagined that have a real effect on each individual's private culture of bias and acceptance? Doing nothing means allowing patterns of bias and discrimination to continue indefinitely; enacting a program of "mandatory hidden bias training" may seem to be too prescriptive for an institution that respects the autonomy and dignity of its participants. So neither action seems right.

This is the problem that commitments to DEI are trying to solve: to find avenues through which inter-group antagonisms and suspicions, usually based on ignorance, can be relaxed in favor of an acceptance of difference and an eagerness for learning from people different from oneself. And significantly, participants in DEI initiatives have often made use of careful empirical research in various disciplines of the social and behavioral sciences. We might describe this as a challenging project of social engineering. Or more appropriately, we might describe it as the work of establishing and securing a robust multicultural inclusive democracy. And we have plenty of examples of leaders who understood the importance and difficulty of this challenge, including Nelson Mandela, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barack Obama.

This goal is indeed worth struggling for, and its roots did not begin twenty years ago when the phrase "Diversity, Equity, Inclusion" came into use. Rather, its roots go back to some of the most morally perceptive theorists of democracy itself -- not chiefly the classical liberal theorists like Hobbes and Locke, for whom a democratic society is simply an instrument through which rationally self-interested citizens pursued their own interests in their own ways, but in the more substantive theories of philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It was Rousseau who formulated the idea that all citizens contribute equally to the "general will" and to the wellbeing and freedom of the whole of society; it was Rousseau whose views could be summed up in the phrase, "a free community of equals". And it was Rousseau who argued unflinchingly for the equal freedom, dignity, and worth of all human beings. This is what the slogan "Diversity, Equity, Inclusion" is all about and what its advocates are trying to achieve.