Archived U.S. Fleet Forces Command Blog (2009-2012)

Fair Winds and Following Seas, Shipmates

2012-09-05T09:59:00.000-04:00

Team,
This entry is my final post on the U.S. Fleet Forces Command blog. As many of you are aware, I will turn over command of U.S. Fleet Forces on 14 September 2012 to ADM Bill Gortney and then officially retire from the Navy.

Before I leave my current position I want to take a moment to say “thank you” to everyone who followed this blog and took the time to contribute to the discussion. Your feedback has been very useful to me over the past three years and I believe that we’ve made some very positive changes for our Sailors in the Fleet.

As for the future of this blog, I intend to leave it up (for reference), but it will be completely inactive and unmonitored. I’ll be updating the “About” page before I leave to reflect the blog’s new status.

I have one final recommendation for you and it has to do with suggested professional reading. In the Spring 2012 Naval War College Review are two exceptional articles well worth your time.

The first article is by Professor Mackubin Owens and is entitled “What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relations.” I am deeply concerned about the direction our civil-military relations have taken over the past few years and this superb article highlights many of the issues that have impacted those relations.

At the end of the day it’s all about trust – as Owens writes, “The state of post-9/11 American civil-military relations also points to the issue of trust—the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military leaders and the exchange of candid views and perspectives between the two parties as part of the decision-making process.” This is an important article on an incredibly important topic, please read it and reflect on it.

The second article I recommend to you is “A Remarkable Military Feat,” by Professor Donald Chisholm. The story of the amphibious withdrawal from Hungnam, Korea – a “planned, carefully staged massive redeployment of forces against enemy pressure” – is an extraordinary one with many lessons learned for the Naval force, particularly in the area of complex planning and C2 in a very dynamic environment. Everyone knows about Inchon – no one knows about Hungnam. We would all do well to learn what this successful operation has to teach us.

It has been a great honor and privilege to serve with you. I thank you for all you have done for our Sailors, our Navy and our nation and I wish you all fair winds and following seas.
All the best, JCHjr

This is Our Time

2012-08-16T10:30:00.000-04:00

Team,
When I started my tenure as a Flag Officer nearly twelve years ago (December 2000), it was a very different period for our Navy and our nation. USS COLE had been attacked two months prior (and would ultimately change the way our Navy trains and conducts ATFP), but we were still nine months away from one of the most significant events in our nation’s history – the 9/11 attacks.

The attacks on 9/11, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, required our Navy to rapidly adapt and bring new capabilities to a new fight in a new environment. Consequently, over the last decade we’ve developed new Irregular Warfare capabilities, reestablished our Riverine forces, and supported the land campaign in every way possible (including deploying our Sailors into combat ashore as Individual Augmentees alongside their Marine and Army counterparts). And we’ve done it all while executing our “conventional” missions (SSBN patrols, BMD, Carrier Ops, etc.) and developing the next generation of the Navy’s warships and aircraft. While our deployments and missions over the last decade have been heavily influenced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the fundamental purpose of our Navy – to project power and influence from the sea – and our Title X responsibilities have not changed.

As we begin to wind down from the war in Afghanistan and continue the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, we must be ready for a sustained, long-term global effort. This renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific does not absolve us of our responsibilities in other parts of the world and it certainly does not mean our enemies will stop trying to harm us simply because we have other work to do. Like it or not, the world is (and will continue to be) a volatile and violent place in which new threats to our national security emerge every day. And, like it or not, our Navy is the answer to these challenges. Whether it’s the violence in Syria that threatens the stability of the Eastern Med, Iran’s continued march toward developing nuclear weapons, or ensuring free and open access to the various choke points at sea that are absolutely critical for our nation’s commerce, our Navy is on station (24x7) and ready to protect our national interests.

And that’s why we must be ready. All of the initiatives on which we’ve worked so hard the past three years – raising the bar on our pre-deployment training for our CSGs, ARG-MEUs and independent deployers, revitalizing the Navy-Marine Corps relationship (and getting back to our core Naval roots!), reinvigorating and funding the programs to ensure our ships reach expected service life, increasing and improving waterfront training, and putting our Sailors back on ships – are absolutely critical for our Sailors and ships to meet the demands of our future. Because if history is any indication of the future, our Navy will be at the forefront of our nation's response to these challenges and it will be our Sailors and ships that will carry the might and mission of the United States forward. I believe we are indeed entering a uniquely Naval-oriented era.

While we certainly can’t predict where and when the next event will occur, we must be absolutely ready to respond because I can assure you we will be called. If you wear our uniform today, you must be ready mentally and physically, for this is our time…this is your time.
All the best, JCHjr

Surface Ship Material Readiness Improvements

2012-08-09T11:55:00.000-04:00

Team,
In July 2010 I testified to Congress that institutional risk to the Navy was moderate trending to significant. High operational tempo as a result of growing operational demand was consuming the Fleet at a higher than planned rate. Although there was no doubt that we were deploying units that were operationally ready, overall readiness trends were in the wrong direction, particularly in our surface force, putting at risk our ability to sustain operational readiness into the future.

Over the past three years, the Fleet and maintenance community have taken significant actions to reverse negative surface force readiness health trends, as documented in this memo. What we have accomplished is a good news story for our Navy and reflects CNO's very strong and enduring commitment to Fleet Wholeness. These negative trends (underfunding of surface ship maintenance and our manpower accounts), however, were twenty years in the making and will take constant pressure and daily attention from us over time to fully resolve. So, while we can say we’ve arrested the decline in surface force readiness, we cannot declare victory. And in January we face the strong possibility of Sequestration, either as currently enacted in law or in some other form.

In this environment, deploying ships/submarines/aircraft/equipment that perform to design specification with Sailors confident in their ability to accomplish all assigned missions means we MUST hold the line on time-tested, combat proven standards that govern how we operate, maintain, inspect, certify and command our units. We have already proven that resourced-based outcomes are detrimental to Fleet Wholeness and mission success. Achieving and sustaining Fleet Wholeness will require that we all apply constant pressure - up and down the chain-of-command - to achieve outcome-based resourcing.
All the best, JCHjr

Thoughts on Blogging

2012-08-03T11:04:00.000-04:00

Team,
It’s been a little over three years since I took command of Fleet Forces and started this blog. Throughout my tour, this blog has been an important way for me to share my thoughts and solicit feedback on various topics that I believed were important to the Fleet. I’ve learned about many issues of which I’m not sure I would have otherwise discovered, talked with and helped Sailors who needed additional information on certain topics or had experiences that required improvement to our policies and processes, and received a great deal of valuable feedback from readers who cared enough about the Fleet and our Sailors to sit down and type a meaningful response.

Throughout my time blogging, I’ve been very impressed by the hard work many of you in the “blogosphere” put into maintaining your blogs and producing quality content. And while we don’t always agree on our Navy’s “hot topics,” I want you to know that I’ve greatly enjoyed being an active member of this community and contributing to the discussion – whether on your blog or mine. With that said, I want to be clear that this is certainly not goodbye (not yet at least). I have a few more posts that I look forward to sharing over the next few weeks before I sign off for the last time. In the meantime, I want to share a few brief thoughts on blogging with those of you who are considering a blog as an additional way of communicating with your command/staff.

Understand the commitment
First and foremost, make sure you understand the level of commitment involved with posting frequently and following up on comments. We’ve all seen blogs that start with great promise and then quickly fade away because the owner did not fully understand or appreciate the level of commitment required. This blog has required a considerable amount of my time, but it has also been an extremely valuable tool for me (in my current position) and I’ve actually enjoyed every moment I’ve devoted to it.

Stay engaged
I believe this blog has been effective because of the meaningful two-way communication I established with my readers. There were quite a few times I was given the good, the bad and the ugly on this blog, but I wouldn’t have it any other way. Because of the open and honest dialogue, I’ve been able to help many of our Sailors understand and work through some of the more unique problems in our Navy (such as IA deployments). Quite frankly, I had hoped for more two-way dialogue directly from the Fleet, but I understand the many reasons for the reluctance of some to engage. It turns out my readership was an expanding group over time and I looked forward to reaching out to them even if I didn’t usually hear back from them.

There’s nothing wrong with starting a blog simply to transmit information to your people, but I personally believe a blog is most effective when you have an open and active dialog with your readers. But regardless of how you choose to run your blog, I strongly recommend that you never ask for feedback from your readers if you’re not willing to follow-up on the information you receive. There’s no quicker way to lose credibility with your Sailors.

Keep it in perspective
Finally, always remember that the blog is not about you, it’s about your command, your mission and your people. Whether you’re sharing your thoughts on a particular topic to ensure your intent is understood, highlighting the unique capabilities of a unit you recently visited, or soliciting feedback on a particular idea, the focus should always be on the command and the people and how you can help improve mission performance. Because at the end of the day, it’s our Sailors and our Civilian teammates who make our Navy great, and who accomplish the mission, day in and day out.
All the best, JCHjr

CAPT Carroll LeFon, USN (Ret) – Preliminary Information

2012-07-25T12:05:00.000-04:00

Team,
In an earlier post I told you I would update you when there was something to report on CAPT LeFon’s accident. As of right now, the NTSB investigation is still ongoing and we do not have an indication of when the final report will be released, but given the uncertain timeline (these investigations take time), I wanted to follow-up with you and post what we know as of right now and leave you with the link to the investigation so you can find the final report once it’s released. If the final report is released over the next month I’ll be sure to post an update here to let everyone know.
You can access the below information, and the final report once it’s released, by following this link.
All the best, JCHjr

NTSB Identification: DCA12PA049
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 06, 2012 in Fallon, NV
Aircraft: ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES F21-C2, registration: N404AX
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On March 6, 2012 at 0914 Pacific Standard Time, an Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Kfir F-21C2 single-seat turbojet fighter type aircraft, registration N404AX, operated by Airborne Tactical Advantage Company (ATAC) under contract to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) as a civil public aircraft operation, crashed upon landing at Naval Air Station Fallon, Fallon, Nevada. The sole occupant pilot aboard was killed, and the airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces and fire. The flight had departed Fallon at 0752 the same day, and attempted to return following an adversary training mission. The pilot initiated two Ground Control Approach (GCA) radar approaches to Fallon and then attempted to divert to Reno but was unable to land there as the field was reporting below minimum weather conditions. The pilot then turned back toward Fallon and stated to air traffic controllers that he was in a critical fuel state. The pilot descended and maneuvered first toward runway 31, then toward runway 13. The airplane struck the ground in an open field in the northwest corner of the airport property and impacted a concrete building on the field. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as snowing with northerly winds of 23 knots gusting to 34 knots, and visibility between one-half and one and one-half miles.

ATFP Tips Smartphone App

2012-07-19T11:25:00.000-04:00

Team,
As part of our increased focus on our Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP) mission over the past three years, Fleet Forces recently released a smartphone application that gives our Sailors (and any other user) the ability to anonymously report an illegal or suspicious activity directly from his or her handset.

Below are a few of the key features of this app:
• Users communicate directly with NCIS through a secure encrypted SSL socket connection
• No personally identified information is ever obtained or stored regarding the device
• Users anonymously report what they have observed or their suspicion
• Users can attach pictures
• Reports are sent to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) for investigation and action
• User remains anonymous while communicating back-and-forth with NCIS
• Users can reply with the word STOP to immediately break the connection
• Users can enter ‘free text’ and not be restricted to drop-down menu choices

The ATFP Tips application is free for everyone and can be downloaded and installed directly to your iPhone or Android. Once you have the app on your phone, you can map all your reports to NCIS by selecting the “Federal/Military” option and then clicking on “NCIS.” After you complete these steps, you’ll have all the reporting features I listed above.

As we’ve discussed in the past, effective ATFP requires participation from everyone (“if you see something, say something”). This app provides our Sailors with a simple, yet very effective way to actually make a difference at no cost to themselves but the time it takes to make the call.
All the best, JCHjr

Bold Alligator Update

2012-07-10T15:58:00.000-04:00

Team,
Last month I received the final out-brief of the Bold Alligator 2012 exercise we conducted with MARFORCOM this past February. Overall the exercise was a significant success for our Navy and Marine Corps - we now have a great deal of trends and relevant information to study and learn from before we conduct next year’s exercise.

As I reviewed the findings from the exercise, I was not at all surprised to see that many of our challenges center on command and control (C2) issues. Anyone who read the selections from my BA12 reading list learned about the C2 challenges that were prevalent throughout amphibious operations in WWII, the Korean War and the Falklands. In fact, effective C2 has been the dominant issue in just about every amphibious operation throughout history.

Accordingly, as we’ve now closed the doors on BA12 and have begun preparing for BA13, I want to share two articles with you that I believe capture some of the same issues we experienced during BA12 and thus will help significantly as you think through the planning for BA13.

The first paper, CWC Departing: Return of the Task Force Commander was written in 2009 by LCDR Shane Tanner, USN. In his paper, LCDR Tanner examines the Cold War origins of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) structure and discusses how this structure does not fit well in a littoral mindset, or for the call for flexible, tailorable, and scalable naval forces. LCDR Tanner provides an in-depth look at the CWC structure and very clearly articulates the issues as well as his recommendations. I’m classifying this paper as a “must-read” by anyone who is participating in Bold Alligator 2013, particularly at the strategic level.

The second paper, The Littoral Arena was written in 1995 by Rear Admiral Tedidia “Didi” Ya’ari, Israel Navy. In his article, Rear Admiral Ya’ari provides an excellent summary of the factors (such as shore threats, maneuverability, and signature management) that make operating in the littoral environment a challenge for naval forces. I also consider this paper a “must-read” for our BA13 Sailors and Marines.

I strongly encourage everyone to read these articles, share them with your shipmates, discuss them and think about in context of BA12 lessons learned and how we can apply these important lessons to the BA13 campaign plan. All the best, JCHjr

F/A-18D Mishap Investigation

2012-07-03T07:59:00.000-04:00

Team,
The mishap investigation for the F/A-18D crash in Virginia Beach this past April has been completed and released. The investigation determined the pilots followed proper emergency procedures and cleared the aircrew of any dereliction of duties or misconduct. I’m proud of our replacement pilot and his Weapon Systems Officer who were flying the F/A-18D that day – they reacted to the emergency with the professionalism and courage that is the standard within Naval Aviation.

I’m posting a link to the investigation below for anyone who is interested in reading a detailed and thorough analysis of what happened from take-off until the plane crashed.

For those of you who would prefer a broad overview of the findings, you can read the letter I wrote below which is being run in today’s Virginian-Pilot.
All the best, JCHjr

Link to the mishap investigation: http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/Pages/foiareadroom.aspx

Link to the Virginian-Pilot article you see below: http://hamptonroads.com/2012/07/lessons-hornet-crash

Lessons from the Hornet crash

By John C. Harvey
The Virginian-Pilot ©
July 3, 2012

As the Navy concludes its investigation into the cause of the crash of one of our Oceana-based F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets into the Mayfair Mews apartment complex in April, I want to share what we have learned and again thank the citizens of Virginia Beach for their heroic response.

While we are very fortunate that no one was killed or seriously injured, I want to acknowledge the significant impact this incident has had on the residents of Mayfair Mews, particularly those who lost their homes and personal belongings. The Navy will continue to do everything within our power to ensure these residents have the support they need.

I also wish to acknowledge the work of the Virginia Beach Fire Department, led by Chief Steven Cover, the Virginia Beach Police Department, led by Chief James Cervera, the many extremely skilled emergency personnel and the very brave citizens who rushed into burning buildings to rescue fellow residents, moved our downed air crew to safety and worked together as a team, alongside our sailors, to battle the blazes that had engulfed several of the buildings.

The teamwork and strong relationship between the Navy and Virginia Beach were on full display during this incident and witnessed by the entire nation.

With that relationship in mind, I can tell you we have done our due diligence to find the how, why and what behind this crash and prevent something like it from happening again. Many dedicated professionals and aviation experts have devoted considerable time and effort to conduct a thorough investigation.

We have a high level of confidence that we know what happened. Although we were unable to identify a smoking gun, we did find a substantial body of evidence to support the findings.

The results show that the aircraft suffered two unrelated, nearly simultaneous, catastrophic engine malfunctions. The first malfunction occurred in the right engine during takeoff when the pilot received warnings in the cockpit that the engine had stalled.

The pilot followed established procedures by taking both engines out of afterburner and then placing the right engine in an "idle" position. The pilot attempted to compensate for the loss of thrust in the right engine by increasing throttle in the left engine, but the left engine failed to respond.

At this point, the aircraft was severely underpowered and began losing altitude. At approximately 100 feet altitude, the aircraft began to roll to the right, and the air crew was forced to eject.

The investigation determined the pilots followed established procedures, and it cleared the air crew of any dereliction of duties or misconduct. Our experts also have concluded the outcome would have very likely been the same for even our most experienced crew.

After we determined the extremely rare chain of events (simultaneous, but unrelated engine failures) that led to this crash, we began updating our emergency procedures and training air crews to effectively respond should they encounter a similar situation.

I thank the citizens of Virginia Beach for their support for our sailors and Navy. With up to 200,000 flight operations every year at NAS Oceana, our training here is absolutely critical to maintaining a powerful and global Navy.

Every day we fly these aircraft, we know that we are flying them over your homes and ours, your families and ours, schools, churches, day care centers and more. I assure you that your safety is our top priority.

You have my commitment that we will remain focused every day on ensuring that we have the best aircraft, operated by the most skilled air crew, conducting the safest flight operations possible.

The Ship is the Classroom

2012-06-27T12:48:00.000-04:00

Team,
RADM Dave Thomas, Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic (CNSL) and his team have established several waterfront initiatives over the past two years to deliver maintenance training directly to our Sailors on the deckplates. These various assist teams, mini-camps, and Maintenance and Operator Shipboard Training (MOST) initiatives provide valuable training for our Sailors on their equipment, in their spaces. Since every ship is unique, this style of ship-specific training avoids the broad “not exactly what you will see on your ship” course content often experienced by our Sailors in schoolhouse instruction. Instead, this training is truly hands-on, over-the-shoulder instruction that emphasizes standards and demonstrates “what right looks like.” The training embodied in “the ship is the classroom” delivers hull-specific instruction, instills pride of ownership, brings system experts from the technical communities to the waterfront, provides technical oversight to maintenance, and eliminates the need for some generic schoolhouse courses of instruction.

Below is a list along with a brief description of each initiative/team. I’ve seen a number of these teams in action on my ship visits and I believe these efforts are a very big step toward teaching our crews how to take ownership of their gear on their ships. If you have any questions or observations you’d like to share with me (the good and the bad!), leave me a comment here and I’ll do my best to find you an answer, or at a minimum ensure your feedback is passed to RADM Thomas and his team. All the best, JCHjr

Corrosion Control Assistance Team (CCAT)
• Train, document, and execute shipboard preservation; tool repair

Maintenance Assistance Teams
• Deck: boat and J-bar davits, sliding pad eyes, life lines, UNREP equipment
• Valve: main and secondary drainage valves and remote operators
• Auxiliary: AC&R, steering, anchor windlass, compressed air
• Gun: CIWS, MK 38 25mm
• Gas Turbine: Intake/update preservation, water wash, controls
• Electrical: Circuit breakers, power panels and motor controllers

Readiness Assistance Teams – “Find, fix, train, document.”
• Engineering and Combat Systems (ERAT / CSRAT)
     o Plant light-off and assessment preparation (e.g., hot and cold checks)
     o Builds competency, confidence and a culture of self-assessment
    o Improves PMS accomplishment and CSMP management o Technical documentation validation (OSS, tech manual, PMS)
• INSURV (IRAT)
     o INSURV and TYCOM MCI preparation; SOE tailoring and execution
     o Builds competency, confidence and a culture of self-assessment
     o Technical documentation (OSS, tech manual, PMS) and CSMP validation

Mini-camps - NAVSEA ISEA SME hands-on, shipboard training on troubled systems
• Deck (8 complete)
• Oil Pollution Abatement (4 complete)
• Helo Hangar Door (scheduled for August 2012)
• Controllable Pitch Propeller (planned)
• Compressed Air (planned)
• Lube Oil System (planned)

Advanced Warfare Training – IAMD (current) and ASW (planned) shipboard training
• Phase 1: Self-assessment and Groom Training (SAGT) on multiple sub-systems
     o System alignment, trend analysis, and maintenance execution
• Phase 2: operator and maintainer training
     o Battle Orders, kill chain and DTE proficiency
• Phase 3: CIC watch team training o Battle Orders/OPTASK, core tactics, comms, mission planning

Deck Self-assessment and Groom Team (D-SAGT) (PMS-317 sponsored training)
• Initially focused on LPD-17 Class ships
• Phase I: NSTM, PMS, PQS review + assessments of 21 deck systems
• Phase II: classroom and hands-on training of each system
• Delivers ‘turn-key’ training products for each system

CNSL Material Standards Assessment Program (MSAP)
• PMS execution, Zone Inspection compliance, program management

“Character” by VADM John M. Richardson

2012-06-20T10:19:00.002-04:00

Team, VADM Richardson just posted the following post on his COMSUBFOR blog. Although he wrote it with the Submarine Force in mind, I believe his message is dead-on and applies to all of us as well. Give it a read and let us know what you think. All the best, JCHjr

Originally posted by VADM John M. Richardson, Commander, Submarine Force: http://comsubfor-usn.blogspot.com/2012/06/character.html

Character
It’s been a long time since I last added to this blog. So long, in fact, that I considered just shutting it down! It seems that there is no greater sin in the blogosphere than to be dormant. It’s not as if we have been quiet. Since making the last post, I have given 20 or so speeches, written an article for the U.S. Naval Institute’s PROCEEDINGS magazine (the magazine that contains our Navy’s intellectual dialogue, and one I HIGHLY recommend), and have made several trips around the Force. So now that I’m back, I thought that I’d share some thoughts I’ve had since I last posted.

I’ve been talking to the Submarine Force about two things:

Building depth – training and mentoring our future submarine force
The importance of Character in what we do

I’d like to discuss Character in this post and come back to ‘building depth’ in a later post.

Our character – our moral and ethical quality - is hard-wired to the success of our mission as a Navy, and particularly as naval leaders. From my standpoint, we need to pay particular attention to this in the submarine Force. Let me explain…

Our submarine force offers an important, unique contribution to our navy and our nation: we have a significant hard and soft kill payload that can go to sea and stay undetected for months at a time. We can and do go anywhere in the world and operate independently without logistic support or communications – truly self-sustaining. We are independent and invisible, providing our nation’s decision-makers with a wide range of options; most notably, a non-provacative platform that can quietly inform diplomacy one day, and then enforce it the next. Invisibility and independence is our advantage and it’s critical to our mission.

But our advantage comes with responsibility. In order to maintain the trust and confidence of our leaders and Sailors, we must constantly be assessing, correcting, and improving ourselves. We must get underway, and left largely to our own devices, return stronger than when we left.

Invisibility and character have a long relationship, and it hasn’t always been a healthy one. Being out of sight can uniquely challenge one’s character. This is not a new idea. In the Second Book of the Republic, written around 400 BC, Plato describes the challenge of the Ring of Gyges – a ring that will make its wearer invisible. From The Republic:

Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men.

Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. — Plato's Republic, 360b-d (Jowett trans.)

Plato surmised that we are moral because we must be – and that left unchecked by society’s eye, we’d devolve to a state of low morality, of low character. Beyond Plato and several examples in mythology (think Gollum in Tolkein’s Lord of the Rings), there is plenty of evidence to support this proposition. One only need consider the more recent examples of the Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971 or the abuses of Abu Ghraib prison in 2004-2006, both of which had elements of “invisibility,” to find examples of the degeneration of character that can occur when you think no one is looking. In short, Plato may have been on to something.

The Navy has been interested in the study of character, and its relation to being out of sight, for a long time – in fact the Stanford Prison Experiment mentioned above was funded by the Office of Naval Research. It makes sense – ships are on their own, out of sight – exhibiting some of the same elements that can lead to the sort of trouble that Plato talked about almost 2500 years ago. Even within the ships themselves there are opportunities for this “out of sight” behavior. Submarines even more so. If we think about instances of hazing, they often occur in areas of the ship that have been allowed to become remote – out of the normal ship’s circulation and not visited often enough by supervision. They become “sanctuaries” for outrageous behavior. One important ingredient for eliminating hazing and other outrageous and undesirable behavior is to eliminate these out of the way, “invisible” sanctuaries.

Polls routinely show that the military usually ranks at or near the top of any list of institutions when it comes to the confidence of our citizens. That’s proper and just – they desperately believe that those defending this country, those willing to go into harm’s way for us and for other nations, are our most honorable. When we military leaders fall short in character, it shakes the foundation of the standard against which all others are measured - it’s front page news, and that should be no surprise. It’s a violation of the trust placed in us to take care of the sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers that America sends to our care.

Any claim to leadership we have is founded on the trust and confidence that our Sailors, and the American People, have in us. It’s only possible to have that foundation if our leadership has strong character – strong moral courage. We KNOW what’s right, and we have the strength to DO what’s right. And furthermore, we have the responsibility – it’s our charge of command – to develop strong character in our subordinates, to build depth in our Navy now and into the future.

We’re not perfect. In the Submarine Force we’ve had some high-visibility lapses in character. You’ve read about them: the cheating incident on USS MEMPHIS, the fraternization between the Chief of the Boat and a female midshipman on USS NEBRASKA, an incident of hazing on USS FLORIDA, and the financial misconduct of some Supply Officers in Kings Bay. In each case, once discovered, these incidents were thoroughly investigated, and appropriate people were held accountable. This is our approach and we’ll continue to address these cases swiftly and decisively.

The discussion on these cases has been vigorous in the media and the blogosphere. I frequently take questions about these incidents when I travel – people want to know how this can possibly happen. To so many, it just doesn’t check…it’s so out of whack with their expectations, and feels so personal and close to home. A violation by one seems to be a violation against all. Again, we can’t be surprised by these feelings or the questions that come with them. Indeed we owe an explanation and we must participate in these discussions. Most of the substance of the media reports comes from the report of our own investigations that we release in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. And if we learn legitimate new information from these discussions in the media, we explore each new revelation until we have as complete a picture as possible.

Together with the rest of the Navy, Submarine Force leadership will continue to stress the importance of character in our force, and in particular our leaders. There is currently a vigorous and growing discussion of this throughout the force – that’s exactly how it should be. We need to take every opportunity to make character – our moral and ethical quality – not something exclusively academic but something we talk about directly every day. It should be part of our conversations in wardrooms and chief’s quarters. It should be discussed up front at our operational briefs – the importance of keeping our integrity intact. In this way, we make every evolution we do a leadership laboratory, a source of strength.

The Submarine Force is one of our nation’s true stealth forces. We get much of our strength from being invisible for long periods of time. To do this successfully, we must recognize the challenge that this poses and take every opportunity to make each other morally and ethically stronger – to strengthen the bond of trust and confidence we have within our Force and with our nation. Our best people – our Sailors – deserve nothing less.

Semper Procinctum
VADM John M. Richardson
Commander, Submarine Force

USS PONCE (AFSB-I)

2012-06-18T14:19:00.000-04:00

Team,
Earlier this month USS PONCE (AFSB-I) got underway on a historic deployment as our first-ever Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB). The timeline of this deployment is remarkable when you consider that just six months ago she finished her “final” operational deployment and was on schedule to be decommissioned. From the moment we received the order to execute, our shipyard workers and staffs at MSC, NAVSEA, and CNSL (and later, the PONCE crew) worked around the clock to complete the maintenance and refurbishments necessary for her new missions. We went from zero-to-complete in just three months – a remarkable feat for an unplanned and very significant overhaul of a 42-year old ship.

Having recently commemorated (and written about) the Battle of Midway, I am reminded of the herculean effort from the Pearl Harbor shipyard workers to get the USS YORKSTOWN (CV 5) turned around after the Battle of Coral Sea and back into the fight at Midway. YORKTOWN was hit hard at Coral Sea and initial estimates were that it would take three months to return her to service…ADM Nimitz needed her back in the fight in just three days. Our Naval engineers and shipyard workers at Pearl Harbor worked around the clock to make the necessary repairs and three days later she got underway from Pearl Harbor just in time to join Task Force 16 in the Battle of Midway – the turning point of the war in the Pacific.

Just like the men and women at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in 1942, our PONCE teams worked together to overcome many significant challenges (technical and bureaucratic) to fix her and send her back to the fight on a very tight timeline. I could not be more pleased with the hard work and commitment we received from all involved. PONCE and her crew will soon arrive on station, ready for tasking. All the best, JCHjr

D-Day, 6 June 1944 – A Lesson in Accountability

2012-06-06T10:17:00.000-04:00

The Allied invasion of Europe over the beaches of Normandy occurred 68 years ago today.

This epic military undertaking, vast in its scope and extraordinary in its impact on World War II’s European campaign, has many lessons for us today. But no lesson is more salient, or perhaps more important, than the lesson the leader of the Allied forces, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower USA, gave us the day before he launched the D-Day invasion.

Better than anyone, GEN Eisenhower knew the many things that could, and probably would, go wrong on D-Day. While the Allied preparations were extremely thorough and over two years in the making, he knew that in war there was no such thing as a sure thing and that the risks inherent in every aspect of this operation were immense.

And General Eisenhower also knew that he was accountable for the outcome of the invasion. He had approved the plan, overseen the preparations and given the order to execute (“OK…we’ll go!”). In the dark of night, while he waited alone after giving the historic order that set the air and naval armadas irrevocably in motion on their mission, GEN Eisenhower penned the following note:

“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt, it is mine alone.”

To read this note, so long after the events that prompted Eisenhower to write it, is to receive a powerful lesson in what remains the absolute bedrock of the Naval profession – the concept of accountability in command and the willing and unquestioning acceptance of that accountability by those in command.

This concept of accountability can prove to be a burden too great for some to bear, but, far more often than not, the assumption of accountability, accompanied by the true understanding of what that accountability means, proves to be not a burden, but the sure foundation for success in command. For from that accountability flows the authority and responsibility required to command.

GEN Eisenhower showed us he understood accountability when he wrote his note on 5 June 1944. Every day, those of us who are so privileged to command in our Navy, at every level, have the opportunity to demonstrate that same understanding. Accountability in command is our greatest strength – the sure foundation for all we do. All the best, JCHjr

The Battle of Midway – 70 Years

2012-06-01T15:13:00.000-04:00

Team,
June 4th marks the 70th anniversary of the start of the Battle of Midway – a significant victory for our Navy which ultimately marked one of the significant turning points of the war in the Pacific.

The Battle of Midway is not just a story about ships and aircraft; the real story is about the people who fought, the pilots who flew the planes and the Sailors who manned the ships. And it was our Sailors’ ability to make tough decisions in the midst of tremendous uncertainty and profound risk that would give us victory at Midway. Virtually every decision in this great battle would prove to be absolutely critical to the outcome.

The Spruance Decision
On the morning of 4 June, then LT Howard P. Ady, Jr., while flying a patrol in his PBY-5A, first spotted a single aircraft on a course to Midway. His first report on the enemy early that morning (one word: “Aircraft”) was soon followed by more detailed reports:

0534 “Enemy Carriers”
0540 “ED 180 sight 320”
0552 “Two carriers and main body of ships, carriers in front, course 135, speed 25”

ADM Spruance was closely following these reports and had begun steaming toward the Japanese Fleet to reduce the distance required for an attack. The Japanese aircraft were returning to their carriers after their strikes on Midway. Spruance initially planned to launch planes from the carriers ENTERPRISE and HORNET at 0900 from a range of less than 100 miles, but realized that if he could get his air wings airborne quickly enough, his planes would be in a position to strike the Japanese carriers while their aircraft were still exposed on deck.

Accordingly, Spruance ordered an all-out attack and started launching aircraft at 0700 – a full two hours early – and at maximum range from the enemy. The decision to go “all in” and strike early came with significant risk but would, without a doubt, prove to be the single most important decision of the entire battle (and one of the most important decisions of the war). Had the Japanese been given time to refuel and rearm their aircraft, and keep their carriers on the move, the outcome of the battle could have certainly been much different.

The “McCluskey Moment”
Our attack on the Japanese Fleet did not start off well. 15 TBD Devastators – an obsolete aircraft at this point in the war – from HORNET’s Torpedo Squadron EIGHT (VT-8) were the first to reach the Japanese Fleet. VT-8 attempted to attack the carrier SORYU (shortly after 0915), but didn’t stand a chance against the superior Japanese ZERO fighter plane; it was over before it even began. Every plane from VT-8 was quickly shot down and only one crewman survived – Ensign George Gay. Moreover, not one torpedo hit its mark and our initial attack had tragically failed.

Next to attack were 14 TBD Devastators from ENTERPRISE’s Torpedo Squadron SIX (VT-6). The aircraft set their sights on the Japanese carrier KAGA, but in the end lost ten aircraft and didn’t score a single hit on the ship.

Our next wave of attack came from Torpedo Squadron THREE (VT-3) of the YORKTOWN. VT-3 was the only torpedo squadron to attack with a fighter squadron – six F4-F Wildcats from Fighter Squadron THREE. The fighter cover wasn’t enough to protect the torpedo squadron and in the end, only two of the Devastators returned.

At this point, 41 of our TBD Devastators from three different squadrons had engaged the enemy and only six returned. Worse, we had not hit a single Japanese ship.

Before proceeding further, at this point, we have to pause and pay special tribute to the courage and heroism of the pilots and aircrew of the three torpedo squadrons making the initial attacks on the Japanese Fleet. These men flew into overwhelming opposition, low and slow on their torpedo drop runs, knowing their chance of survival was virtually nil. Every single pilot pressed home their attacks. Their example of devotion to duty, steadfastness and courage has never been surpassed.

But the tide would soon change. LCDR Clarence Wade McCluskey, Air Group Commander of ENTERPRISE, was leading the carrier’s 32 SBD Dauntless dive bombers to the location where he expected to find the Japanese Fleet. Upon reaching the position and finding nothing but empty ocean, McCluskey was at a critical decision point (the “McCluskey Moment”!). He had burned more than half of his fuel searching for the Japanese Fleet and knew that if he continued on, it would certainly be a one-way trip for his group of dive-bombers. But he also knew that there was very little time left before the Japanese scout planes would find our ships and effectively eliminate the element of surprise on which Spruance had so heavily gambled.

McCluskey made the decision to continue searching for the Japanese carriers. A few minutes later, just as two of his dive-bombers had run out of fuel and were forced to ditch in the ocean, he spotted the wake of a ship that turned out to be the destroyer ARASHII. ARASHII had engaged USS NAUTILUS with depth charges and was heading back to the Japanese carrier force. McCluskey, dangerously low on fuel, had a hunch and made the decision to follow the destroyer. A few minutes later he found the Japanese Fleet.

McCluskey quickly divided his dive-bombers into two groups and ordered VB-6 to attack the carrier AKAGI and VS-6 the carrier KAGA. The dive-bombers dove on their targets and hit after hit sealed the fate of the two flat tops. At the same time, dive-bombers from YORKTOWN’s VB-3 were wreaking complete havoc on the carrier SORYU. In just under six minutes, three of the four Japanese carriers at Midway were destroyed and the course of the war in the Pacific was dramatically altered.

There were many important decisions made during the Battle of Midway that contributed to the outcome of the battle (and ultimately the war in the Pacific). Each and every one of our Sailors – from ADM Spruance down to the crew in the bowels of YORKTOWN fighting to save their ship – had to make immediate decisions (their own “McCluskey Moment”) that carried significant consequences.

As we commemorate this significant battle and honor the memory of those who fought, we must never forget that it was our Sailors, who through great courage and tenacity, took on a much larger force – a well-trained, well-equipped and combat-experienced Japanese Battle Fleet – and won a remarkable victory against great odds.

When all is said and done, at Midway, Guadalcanal, Leyte Gulf and Okinawa and countless other desperate actions fought in World War II and wherever our Navy has fought since then, it’s always about our Sailors and how they stood tall at the moment of truth.
All the best, JCHjr

War of 1812 – Norfolk

2012-05-30T13:46:00.001-04:00

Team,
With the Norfolk War of 1812 commemoration right around the corner, I wanted to take a moment to encourage each and every one of you in Hampton Roads to come out next week, see your Navy and our Sailors, and enjoy the many activities and events scheduled throughout the week. The events begin this Friday with the start of the Patriotic Festival in Virginia Beach where the Blue Angels will be performing (June 1, 2 and 3).

In addition, the city of Norfolk and this year’s Harborfest will be hosting OpSail 2012 Virginia from June 6-12 as part of the commemoration. There will be three different Parade of Sails, all which will feature our Navy and Coast Guard ships as well as international Navy ships and Tall Ships from around the world. There will be quite a few family events taking place along the Norfolk waterfront during the week, including public tours of our ships, so I encourage you to come out and take full advantage of all the activities. The following links provide the full details on all the events occurring throughout the region.

http://www.vbgov.com/visitors/special-events/Pages/patriotic-festival.aspx
http://www.norfolk.gov/harborfest/
http://www.opsail2012virginia.com/events-schedule/norfolk
http://www.ourflagwasstillthere.org/events/norfolk-va.html
http://www.ourflagwasstillthere.org/events/norfolk-va/places-a-resources.html

In addition to giving you an update on the Norfolk War of 1812 events, I want to provide you with a copy of an article I recently wrote for The Virginian-Pilot. Give it a read and let me know what you think.
All the best, JCHjr

A strong, ready Navy for 200 years

The Virginian-Pilot
© May 6, 2012
By John C. Harvey Jr.
WHEN Congress declared war on Great Britain in June 1812, the odds were overwhelmingly against our nation and its fledgling Navy. It was a period of great uncertainty.
Often referred to as the Second War of Independence, the stakes in the War of 1812 were just as high as in our initial conflict with Great Britain and the consequences of losing no less severe.
At that time, the Royal Navy was significantly bigger and more capable than our small Navy. The battle-hardened British officers and sailors had spent their entire careers fighting at sea, primarily against the French, while our Navy had largely assumed a defensive posture in the post-revolutionary period leading to the war.
In many ways, at the outset, our will to fight was much greater than our ability to win.
In May 1812, the secretary of the Navy wrote Commodore John Rodgers seeking a plan to "enable our little navy to annoy in the utmost extent, the trade of Great Britain" while minimizing its exposure to Britain's immense naval force.
Rodgers wrote back with a proposal that he acknowledged might seem crazy - after all, our Navy had a dozen ships; the Royal Navy, 500. The U.S. should take its small force and divide into even smaller groups, he advised - send its lightest vessels to the West Indies to harass merchant ships there, a few frigates and sloops of war to attack the East Indies trade, and a few more frigates to take the fight to the coasts of Britain itself.
Far from being doubtful of success, Rodgers wrote that if his plan were adopted, "barring unforeseen accidents, such as ought not to be expected, I may with propriety pledge myself to make the commerce of that arrogant nation feel its effects to the very quick."
Despite the odds, our undersized Navy went to war with the few ships it had and, through a series of pivotal battles, shocked the Royal Navy with its innovative naval tactics and expert seamanship.
Decisive victories by Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry on Lake Erie and Commodore Thomas Macdonough on Lake Champlain ultimately prevented a British invasion of the United States from the north that would have almost certainly resulted in our defeat. Although the war eventually ended in stalemate, there was no longer any doubt that a strong Navy was essential to our nation's security and economic prosperity.
Today, the U.S. Navy is the largest and most powerful maritime fighting force in the world, capable of operating at sea longer and farther than any other.
Although the world has changed significantly, our nation relies on freedom of the seas today just as we did in 1812.
Considering that 70 percent of the world is covered by oceans, 80 percent of the world's population live near the ocean, and 90 percent of all international trade travels on the oceans, the importance of maintaining a strong and ready Navy becomes crystal clear.
Our Navy and nation have spent the past decade at war in Afghanistan and Iraq while coping with the recent effects of a deep economic recession.
Although the potential threat to our national survival was arguably much greater in the years leading to the War of 1812, the decisions we make today about our security are no less critical, and the role of the people in influencing those decisions is no less important.
The citizens of this nation will decide, just as they did 200 years ago, what kind of Navy they need now and in the future.
Our Navy has partnered with many cities, communities and organizations to commemorate the War of 1812. This commemoration allows us to highlight another time when our nation faced a difficult challenge but came together as one and ultimately prevailed.
In addition to celebrating the many traditions and customs from the War of 1812, these events provide the opportunity for citizens to see up close their significant investment in their Navy.
I encourage everyone from Hampton Roads to participate in the many local events commemorating the War of 1812. From ship tours to air shows to museum programs, there will be something for everyone. Most importantly, there will be many opportunities to meet and talk with your Navy's sailors.
With this region's rich maritime heritage, the citizens of Hampton Roads know well the value of the Navy to our nation. The people of this region, like all Americans, have invested in a Navy that is both global and powerful. The return on that investment is unmatched.
All should have the opportunity to see those investments and meet the finest young men and women on the planet - U.S. Navy sailors.

Keeping the Fleet at the Center

2012-05-24T15:16:00.000-04:00

Team,
I recently read a book by Bob Lutz, the Vice Chairman for Product Development at General Motors (GM) from 2001 to 2010, called “Car Guys vs. Bean Counters: The Battle for the Soul of American Business.” In his book, Lutz describes the state of affairs he found when he arrived at GM in 2001. At that point, he was a veteran of the car business, having worked in the industry for nearly 40 years and experiencing firsthand GM’s domination of the market during the 60’s and 70’s.

But upon his return to GM, Lutz found that the design teams had moved away from an organization focused on product excellence and the end user – the customer – and instead transformed into a company driven by complex business processes, executive boards and working groups focused on eliminating “waste,” “streamlining” operations, and achieving “efficiencies.” As a result, GM produced generations of automobiles that met all the technical and fiscal internal targets yet fell far short of the mark in sales – what really counted.

I believe many of the lessons Lutz discusses in his book are very applicable to those we have experienced in the Fleet in recent years. When I look at some of the big issues we’ve encountered over the past three years with programs such as LPD-17, Aegis 7.1.2, VTUAV (Fire Scout), and the many software programs (e.g. R-Admin) installed on our ships, it is apparent to me that we were not doing our jobs with a focus on the end user, our Sailors. In these instances, the desire/need to deliver the program or system became paramount; we did not adhere to our acquisition standards and failed to deliver whole programs built on foundations of technical excellence. Then we accepted these flawed programs into the Fleet without regard to the impact on our Sailors.

One reason I established the Fleet Integration Program (FIP) (as I discussed here) was to prevent this behavior and ensure we deliver platforms and systems that meet our standards, the standards our Sailors need (and expect) us to meet so that they can accomplish their missions.

As I wrote in my post last week, we have entered a period in which the resources we have now and can expect in the future will no longer support the behaviors of the past. The likelihood of decreasing budgets and increasing demand for Naval forces leave us with no margin for delivering poorly designed, poorly delivered or unnecessarily burdensome programs to the Fleet. We must keep the Fleet and our Sailors at the center of the programs, systems and platforms we deliver and ensure operational effectiveness is the bottom line of our efforts, not simply increased efficiencies. All the best, JCHjr

Our Reality

2012-05-17T15:32:00.000-04:00

Team,

When I took command of Fleet Forces in July 2009, one of my first actions was to conduct an All-Hands call with my staff to inform them that we were entering a period of great challenge and sustained uncertainty. I told them I believed we were headed for permanent whitewater; that is, an environment in which our overall defense budget would very likely decrease, while our costs to own and operate the Fleet would likely continue to increase.

When you consider the environment we’re in today – our decreasing defense budget, looming sequestration cuts and increasing demand for our forces around the world – I believe we have indeed entered that permanent whitewater. And we’re in it at a time when we have an unprecedented percentage of the Fleet routinely forward deployed in a variety of “hot spots” around the world. While we have no idea yet when this whitewater will end (I believe we’re just getting started), we can be sure the demand for our forward-deployed Navy will not slacken one bit.

Now, I’ve served through several of these fiscal “downturns” over the course of my 39 year career. I was commissioned in 1973 during a particularly turbulent time for our nation. The public discontent with the war in Vietnam was very high (and taking its toll on our Navy), our nation was sharply divided on just about every national issue, we were on the cusp of a recession that would affect our nation (and our Navy) for the rest of the decade and the defense budget had dropped by about 25% over the previous five years. In many ways, it was a perfect storm of fiscal and social chaos. We faced similar challenges in the immediate post-Cold War period of the 1990s when our defense budgets steadily declined for nearly a decade (the “peace” dividend) and our Navy took a “procurement holiday,” the impact of which we are still feeling today.

Each of these down cycles and turbulent periods posed their own unique set of challenges to our Navy, but they provide us with lessons that we can apply to our own situation today. I want to share with you some of the important lessons I learned during those times that I believe apply to everyone in the Fleet today, regardless of where you are in the chain-of-command or your community warfare specialty.

First, this is our reality and we must accept it. This whitewater and all the churn that comes with it is not going away anytime soon. The world is not going to settle down so we can take a “training time-out” and figure out how we’re going to deal with our new fiscal and operational environment. And we don’t have the option (nor do we want it!) of simply packing up and walking away when the times are tough. Now is the time to be thinking about how we’re going to adapt to an increasingly austere future in an increasingly volatile world. If we continue to operate under the “business as usual” mindset, we will fail. I can assure you that whatever our future looks like, it will not simply be business as usual.

Second, we must make the tough decisions that the times demand of us and own the consequences of those decisions. Fewer resources brings competing priorities. I wrote here over two years ago that in an environment with declining resources, there are things that we inevitably will not be able to do (ref: do less, but not less well). While our overall operational demand shows no sign of slowing down, fiscal discipline demands that we prioritize requirements and make the reuired decisions about how we will meet our missions. This area is not one in which we can simply stick our heads in the sand and hope for the best. Hope is never an acceptable strategy in our line of work. Hoping for a result means you’ve lost control of the situation or your ability to influence the outcome. We live with the consequences of our decisions, not our hopes.

Third, take ownership of your responsibilities. If you see a problem, be part of the solution. I talked earlier this year about BMC Pici and how he and his team took ownership of Corrosion Control on USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. BMC Pici had engaged the entire ship and created an environment in which every member of the crew was responsible for some aspect of corrosion control and prevention, just like every member of the crew is expected to have fundamental DC skills. And when given the opportunity, he took a chance and told me he needed paint floats because there weren’t any available (a problem RADM Dave Thomas and I promptly fixed). BMC Pici took ownership of his responsibilities and did what he felt he needed to do in order to ensure his team had the tools they needed to do their jobs – just like I want every Sailor in the Fleet to take ownership of their program, division, department, and command.

Finally, don’t lose sight of why we’re here. My job and commitment to our Sailors is to give them the tools, training and time they need to deploy confident in their ability to carry out their assigned missions. If you work at Fleet Forces, then your job should contribute in some way to this mission (i.e. providing Forces ready for tasking). We’ve reached a point where we all need to take a hard look at the many tasks we do each day and ask ourselves how it contributes to our mission. And we need to make the decisions (see previous paragraph) to stop spending resources on endless churn that has no clear benefit to our Sailors or our mission. We’re here to ensure our Sailors have what they need to get the job done. Period.

Many of the challenges we face every day are not exclusive to rank. Whether you’re a Flag Officer commanding a strike group or a Fire Controlman manning a weapons console in a DDG, your feedback on how we address our challenges is important. That’s why I’ve maintained this blog and fostered an open discussion up and down the chain-of-command for the three years I’ve been in command of Fleet Forces. At the end of the day, the onus is on us to take ownership of the Fleet and ensure we remain the Ready, Responsive, and Relevant force our nation needs. All the best, JCHjr

USCGC BERNARD C. WEBBER (WPC 1101)

2012-05-09T15:13:00.000-04:00

Team,

While in FT Lauderdale a few weeks ago for Fleet Week, I had the privilege to visit USCGC BERNARD C. WEBBER (WPC 1101) and spend some time onboard with her crew. BERNARD C. WEBBER is the first of the Coast Guard's new Sentinel-class cutters, a true 21st century patrol boat class that brings a significant increase in capability. She is 154 feet long, capable of speeds of 28 plus knots, armed with one stabilized, remotely-operated 25mm chain gun and four crew-served .50 caliber machine guns, holds up to 24 crew and can independently deploy up to five days. The increase in size, speed and crew capability gives this class of ship a significant advantage over her predecessor, the 110-foot Island-class cutter.

BERNARD C. WEBBER will be the Coast Guard workhorse for the critical missions of port, waterway and coastal area security, illegal migrant and contraband interdiction, search and rescue, and national-defense operations (to name just a few). The design and engineering of this ship is truly first-class. Her new and improved C4ISR systems are fully interoperable with existing Coast Guard assets, as well as DoD and Homeland Security systems, enabling her to better support a full range of missions. In addition to the modernized communications systems, she features a cutter boat stern ramp which can launch and recover a 7.9 meter cutter smallboat used for its many operations.

I’m very excited for the significant capability BERNARD C. WEBBER brings to the fight for the Coast Guard and our nation and look forward to seeing more of her at future events. Thanks again to the crew of BERNARD C. WEBBER for hosting me. It was a privilege to spend the afternoon with you and a great honor to break my flag on your ship. All the best, JCHjr

Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (NMOC)

2012-05-03T09:25:00.000-04:00

Team,
A few weeks back I visited the Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command (NMOC) at Stennis Space Center in Mississippi. NMOC is responsible for providing critical environmental information to our naval and joint operating forces. Although the meteorology and oceanography programs are probably the most well-known, Naval Oceanography also includes the study and practice of Bathymetry, Hydrography, Geophysics, and Astrometry & precise time. I had the opportunity to visit several of the NMOC departments and received thorough overviews of their missions and how they tie into every day operations across our Navy and the DoD.

Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) Expeditionary and Special Warfare Support Group
My visit started off with a tour of the Naval Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) Expeditionary and Special Warfare Support Group where I observed how our analysts exploit a wide variety of Navy and National sensors and data to provide tailored, fused information to support operations. The discussions and demonstrations were very technical (just how I like it!) and included: techniques to process satellite imagery to derive bathymetry and identify surf zone hazards to navigation; specialized software to display model output with satellite image overlay to identify safe lanes of ingress/egress and potential mission windows for operations; demonstration of stereo imagery analysis of littoral and riverine environments; demonstration of River Drifter data and analysis; and multi-scale analysis of Navy oceanographic models to identify seasonal monsoonal effects that have direct impact on coastal and nearshore currents and operations.

Naval Oceanography ASW Center (NOAC)
My next visit was with the NOAC’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Reach Back Cell (ASW RBC) where the NOAC-NAVO team walked with me through the watch stations and described how their work supports real-world ASW operations and prosecutions. The NAVO Oceanographers on duty gave me a great demonstration of how satellite and local oceanographic observations are used as inputs to the oceanographic prediction systems. They also demonstrated how they build tactical assessment products for Fleet users. While in the NOAC, I also met with the Naval Oceanographic ASW Team (NOAT) members assigned to deploy with COMDESRON TWO EIGHT (EISENHOWER Strike Group). The team showed me how they use the NITES IV portable computer system and all the remote expertise from the ASW Reachback Cell to support the Strike Group ASW Commander (SGASWC) afloat. While I was impressed by the entire NAOC team, I want to specifically recognize the ingenuity of AG1 Bryan Sebring who created a set of automation tools that dramatically speeds up building RBC analysis briefs that are sent to Fleet operators. His set of tools reduces a two-hour build process down to a few minutes; a significant savings in manpower and elimination of repetitive labor.

NAVOCEANO Navigation Department
After the NOAC, I visited the NAVOCEANO Navigation Department where I met with the Navy surveyors and analysts who collect and process the bottom survey data that updates maritime charts for the Navy and DOD. I was given a very thorough, end-to-end review of the survey processes and the ships and technologies used in survey operations. During this visit I met with LTJG Dan Beals of the Fleet Survey Team (FST) who showed me a beach landing product he and his team had recently completed for a future exercise in Saudi Arabia.

Naval Oceanography Mine Warfare Center (NOMWC)
My final visit of the day was to the NOMWC Data Fusion Cell (DFC). The DFC conducts post-mission analysis and change-detection on acoustic data collected by mine countermeasures forces. This group fuses data from all the various MCM sensor systems to extract tactical and environmental information. They can compare new sensor data to previously collected data which allows them to better identify possible threat objects on the bottom. This, in turn, provides the mine countermeasures commander a fused contact picture that greatly aids in reducing overall clearance timelines. As you can imagine, the work they do is particularly important to our ability to operate in potentially hostile waters around the world. Overall, I found my visit to be extremely useful and full of details on how NMOC executes their missions and supports our Sailors every day. I was very impressed with the quality and intelligence of the Sailors and Civilians working at NMOC. This command is not a real large group, but they have a tremendous impact on just about every mission we execute today. Thanks again to the staff at NMOC for taking the time to show me how you get it done for the Fleet!
All the best, JCHjr

SAILOR 2.1

2012-04-23T16:07:00.000-04:00

Team,
Earlier this month RADM Patrick Brady, Commander, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (COMSPAWAR) and his team provided me with an update on the SPAWAR Acquisition Integrated Logistics Online Repository (SAILOR) 2.1. SAILOR 2.1 is a self-help website for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems that provides the Fleet with the capability to complete training, troubleshoot software and equipment, and receive technical documentation and support online.

SAILOR 2.1 is particularly useful for our Information Systems Technicians (IT) and Electronics Technicians (ET), who use the "one-stop" nature of the website to display and download technical manuals and troubleshoot shipboard software and hardware systems. The website also gives our underway Sailors the ability to communicate about issues and exchange information with the Global Distance Support Center and the C4I help desk through various blogs and technical forums, which typically decreases troubleshooting and repair times.

One of the most impressive features of SAILOR 2.1 is the new "tech tube," (similar to You Tube) which our Sailors can use to view "how to" videos (produced by C4I In Service Engineering Agents at SPAWAR) of solutions to some of the most common issues experienced in the Fleet. These step-by-step video tutorials are available on demand 24/7 by anyone who has a SAILOR 2.1 account.

Based upon surveys, SAILOR 2.1 has received very positive feedback from our Sailors for the capabilities it brings to the Fleet and its ability to operate much quicker and more responsively than the previous version. In 2011, the site was used over 50,000 times by over 250 ships to download technical and logistics information concerning onboard networks and communication systems. I am personally impressed with SAILOR 2.1’s capabilities and believe it has great potential; however, I’m interested in what our Fleet Sailors think.

If you are a C4I professional who has not yet taken advantage of this tool, sign up for an account today (https://sailor.nmci.navy.mil), take a look around the site, and let me know what you think. I’ll make sure your feedback is passed to our support team at SPAWAR.
All the best, JCHjr

Old Lessons Re-learned

2012-04-16T18:14:00.000-04:00

Team,
I recently had the opportunity to re-read one of my favorite leadership books – Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat. The book was written by James R. McDonough and chronicles his experience in Vietnam when he commanded an infantry platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

This book is powerfully written and retains its hold on me even through multiple re-readings. I’d like to share one passage in particular with you:

“War is the management of violence,” claimed the contemporary social scientists and military strategists as we hacked our way through the struggle in Vietnam. For us, violence was killing; there was no management involved. People were either dead, or they were not. I could not “manage” my platoon up a hill. I had to lead them up there. I had a mission to accomplish and I had men to keep alive, as many as I could.

I had to do more than keep them alive. I had to preserve their human dignity. I was making them kill, forcing them to commit the most uncivilized of acts, but at the same time I had to keep them civilized. That was my duty as their leader. They were good men, but they were facing death, and men facing death can forgive themselves many things. War gives the appearance of condoning almost everything, but men must live with their actions for a long time afterward. A leader has to help them understand there are lines they must not cross. He is their link to normalcy, to order, to humanity. If the leader loses his own sense of propriety, or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen.

McDonough describes the extreme leadership experience – tactical command of troops in daily combat. But two lessons he drew from that experience apply broadly and are well worth remembering.

1. “I could not ‘manage’ my platoon up a hill. I had to lead them up there.”

We must never forget our ultimate responsibility is for leading Sailors, not managing them. You manage things; you lead people. Whether you’re a division officer on your first ship or a Flag officer on your last tour, your duty is to lead Sailors to accomplish your assigned missions. And the leadership of our Sailors is an all-encompassing experience that requires you, if you want to do it well, to be “all-in.” Your commitment must be commensurate with your responsibility. Making that commitment, living that commitment, is the true reward of leadership – it is the inner joy of our profession, our reason for being.

2. “A leader has to help them understand there are lines they must not cross…; if the leader loses his own sense of propriety or shrinks from his duty, anything will be allowed. And anything can happen.”

Some wonder if our standard for our leaders is too high, that we expect too much. How can we possibly expect less?

McDonough recognized very early that his standard became his platoon’s standard and if he either would not or could not meet the standard, it would spell disaster for his platoon.

The performance and behavior standards we set for our leaders are the standards we must maintain in our Navy. They are the standards that maintain the discipline of a fighting force under great stress. They are our standards and we must embrace them, live them and hold ourselves accountable to them. Maintaining leadership standards means we are maintaining unit standards and maintaining unit standards means we are disciplined, focused and ready for whatever comes our way.

Team Coming Together

2012-04-10T17:12:00.000-04:00

Team,
As many of you are certainly aware by now, one of our F/A-18D Hornets suffered a catastrophic mechanical malfunction shortly after takeoff last Friday afternoon and crashed into the Mayfair Mews apartment complex in Virginia Beach, Va. Both pilots – a fleet replacement pilot in training and an experienced instructor – safely ejected seconds before the crash.

While we are very fortunate that no one was killed or seriously wounded, dozens of residents have been displaced and lost many, if not all, of their personal belongings. These residents have suffered a great deal through no fault of their own, and we are doing everything in our power to ensure they receive the care and attention they need recover from this mishap. Navy representatives have been on site and meeting with Mayfair Mews residents every day since the crash to ensure the residents have the means to obtain essential needs (shelter, clothing, food, etc) and file for appropriate compensation.

We are currently conducting a full investigation into the mishap and will gather all the facts to determine exactly what occurred and why. As more information is developed and made available I’ll certainly post it here.

I want to take a moment now to recognize the heroic efforts of the Virginia Beach community, from the First Responders who quickly secured the area and fought the fire, to the Virginia Beach citizens who happened to be in the area at the moment of the crash and instinctively sprang into action.

These citizens showed us the true meaning of courage and citizenship, as they rushed into burning buildings to rescue their fellow residents, moved our downed aircrew to safety, and pulled together as a team to reposition hoses and help the firefighters and first responders battle the blazes that had engulfed several of the buildings. Their extraordinary courage showed in a moment when the stakes couldn’t have been higher.

I have talked with Mayor Sessoms several times since the crash on Friday to express my deep appreciation to the city and citizens of Virginia Beach. I simply can’t thank you all enough for what you did for our Navy and the community – you showed us all what “citizenship” truly means. Thank you for your friendship and strong support to our Navy.
All the best, JCHjr

Sexual Assault Awareness Month

2012-04-09T16:00:00.002-04:00

Team,
This month has been designated Sexual Assault Awareness Month (SAAM) across our Navy and the theme is “Hurts One, Affects All. Prevention of Sexual Assault is Everyone’s Duty.” In support of this theme, the Fleet is holding weekly training sessions throughout the month focused on four topics: “Hurts One,” “Affects All,” “Prevention is Everyone’s Duty,” and “We Will Not Tolerate Sexual Assault.”

This issue is a very tough one for our Navy - it strikes at the core of who we are and what we believe. One of my fundamental beliefs is that we must honor and respect those around us and treat others as we would want to be treated. A violation of this respect is a violation of the individual dignity we possess as human beings. We all know sexual assault is wrong - and a clear violation of individual dignity - yet it is still happening within our ranks. Eliminating sexual assault in our Navy starts with changing our culture.

Now, I have visited many Fleet units and have great confidence that my deckplate leaders understand the seriousness of this issue and the impact it has on our commands and our Navy, but we have got to do better. Training is an important step in this process, but the training must be relevant and effective. We’re certainly not going to make progress by simply reading from Power Point slides and pounding the table harder. Our Sailors already know the difference between right and wrong, but we must ensure they understand the reality of sexual assault.

We need to actively engage with our Sailors and walk them through the realistic scenarios in which they find themselves on a weekly basis and talk candidly with them about the consequences of their decisions. We must also reinforce a strong esprit de corps in our units (we look out for our own!) – every member of a unit is a Shipmate and should be treated with the dignity they deserve. We must bring the strength of the unit to bear as a significant deterrent to any improper behavior and emphatically drive home a zero tolerance attitude toward this behavior just as we did in our campaign against drugs – not on my watch, not on my ship, not in my Navy!

Pro-active leadership is required to make this month’s efforts effective and ensure the message is heard and understood at all levels. But this effort cannot (and will not!) stop with just one month’s worth of focus.

And while we aren’t going to fix this problem overnight, with a strong and steady commitment from All Hands in the Fleet, I strongly believe we will make significant progress toward our goal of eliminating sexual assault in our Navy.
All the best, JCHjr

Click here to review a few slides about our SAPR vision and assessment.

P-8A Poseidon

2012-04-06T08:39:00.000-04:00

Team,
Last month, the Fleet received delivery of our first P-8A Poseidon – our Navy’s newest multi-mission maritime aircraft. The P-8A will eventually replace our P-3C Orion aircraft, which has been in service in the Fleet since 1962 (50 years!).

I had the opportunity this week to participate in a training flight in the P-8A and observe its operational capabilities as well as the significant knowledge and skill it takes to serve as a crew member.
My flight started in the cockpit jump seat, where I observed the pre-flight checks and take-off. Once we were safely airborne and on-station, I transitioned back to the mission area of the aircraft to load sonobuoys in the rotary launchers. Like our P-3C, the P-8A uses sonobuoys to detect and localize a submarine. Once the sonobuoys were loaded, I cycled through each of the mission crew stations to observe and learn about their specific roles in executing the many P-8A missions. After using the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Inverse SAR (ISAR) to view surface contacts, I moved to the Tactical Coordinator (TACCO) station. Now, this is the part of the flight in which I saw firsthand the tremendous capabilities of this aircraft. While sitting as the TACCO, my “tutor” and I developed a buoy tactics pattern that would be used to track a sub-surfaced target (and potential threat) in the water. We then displayed the pattern to the flight deck where the pilots flew the pattern and the launcher system automatically dispensed the buoys from the aircraft into the water. Once the buoys were in place, I transitioned to the acoustic station to see the data we were receiving (from the buoys) and begin tracking the target. Using that data, we were able to simulate an attack on the target and complete the kill chain.

The P-8A is not simply an improved P-3C; it’s an entirely different and far more capable platform. From the airframe (based on the Boeing 737), to the advanced mission systems, to the payload capacity, everything about this aircraft reflects tremendous capability improvements in every mission area. You can count me among the many who are eager to get more P-8As into the Fleet so our Sailors can begin learning and unleashing the true potential this great aircraft brings to the fight.

Of course, at the heart of every platform are the Sailors who bring it to life. Thanks again to the Patrol Squadron THIRTY (VP-30) team for a very beneficial demonstration and training flight. It’s now up to all of you at the “Pro’s Nest” to make sure our Sailors are trained and ready to operate the P-8A for our Navy. You have a very important mission ahead of you, but I am certain you are absolutely ready to go. All the best, JCHjr

Navy Entomology Center of Excellence (NECE)

2012-04-04T10:25:00.001-04:00

The Sailors of NECE JAX – a terrific group!

Team,

Last Thursday I had the opportunity to visit the Navy Entomology Center of Excellence (NECE) in Jacksonville, Florida. NECE is a command under the Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center (located in Portsmouth, Va) that provides technical services and expert training in reducing the risk of diseases transmitted by insects and other arthropods.

Now, insect repellent is not typically the first thought that comes to mind when we think about Force readiness, but it is indeed a very important part of protecting our Sailors and Service members who are deployed around the world. Infectious diseases, such as malaria, are not a new challenge for us. Malaria caused more casualties among U.S. Service members in the South Pacific during World War II than the enemy. In 2003 we had to evacuate 43 Marines from Liberia due to malaria (a significant impact to readiness) and we recently lost one of our Seabees who contracted the disease while deployed to Liberia. While we’ve certainly made significant progress over the years discovering new practices that improve our ability to prevent those diseases, transmission can be deadly and thus remains a very serious concern for our deployed Sailors and Service members.

Highlights of my visit include an overview of the reference insect collection used to educate our deploying IAs and Sailors on specific insect threats; the testing and evaluation shop where I had the opportunity to see (and use!) the equipment our Sailors use for pest control; the laboratory and the small wind-tunnel used for aerosol tests (among other things); and the NECE insectary which contains some very “interesting” bugs, including the Madagascar Hissing Cockroach.

Receiving an overview of the thermal fogger
(used to control mosquitoes) from
Engineman First Class Raul Pomales.

Given my role as the Executive Agent for Individual Augmentees (IAs), I was particularly interested in learning about how we are preparing our Sailors to deploy to regions of the world endemic for malaria and other tropical diseases. In addition to learning more about the various protective measures we employ today (e.g., advanced methods for treating uniforms with repellent, bed nets, and applying and using DEET) I learned that our Entomologists deploy all over the world right alongside our other Sailors to provide the expertise necessary to help our Forces adapt to and operate in austere conditions. In fact, our Entomologists have supported combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; Humanitarian Assistance operations such as CONTINUING PROMISE and PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP; Disaster Relief operations such as Unified Assistance in the Philippines, Indonesia and East Timor (to minimize the risk of vector-borne disease to U.S. personnel); and currently support our President’s Malaria Initiative.

Watching CDR Eric Hoffman, NECE OIC,

handle a Madagascar Hissing Cockroach.

I was further impressed to learn that when our Sailors were confronted with shortages of fuel for the insecticide sprayers being used in Afghanistan and Iraq, our NECE Sailors, in search of an innovative solution, located a small business that had designed a unique backpack sprayer powered by compressed air. NECE worked with the company to customize the design to meet our operational needs, thoroughly test and rapidly field the much-needed device to our Sailors. Having the proper insecticide support in theater has a significant impact on our readiness (remember the 43 Marines I mentioned above). Innovative solutions, such as the compressed air backpack sprayer, do not always have to come with an expensive price tag and long acquisition cycle.

My visit to NECE was very useful and I was very impressed by the knowledge and professionalism of our NECE Sailors. And although our entomology mission may not be well-known throughout the Navy, this small group of dedicated Sailors has a very big mission that has a global impact for our Navy. All the best, JCHjr

Fleet Introduction Program (FIP)

2012-03-29T12:09:00.000-04:00

Team,
In July 2010, I released my Transitioning New Capabilities to the Fleet SERIAL to establish the Fleet Introduction Program (FIP) (within my N8). The FIP ensures that new and modernized platforms and critical systems being delivered to our Sailors meet the standards we require and immediately contribute to our Navy's mission.

Now that we’ve had some run-time with the program, I want to share a few observations.

Teamwork is key
As with any mission in our Navy, success requires teamwork. Each member of the FIP team has an instrumental role in the acquisition process to ensure there are no gaps between Fleet requirements (what we need) and program execution (what we’re getting). The support of our Resource Sponsors, Program Managers, Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and our colleagues at Commander, Operational Test & Evaluation Force (COTF) has been absolutely critical to our success with this program.

Rapid fielding vs. wholeness
The speed at which we can effectively bring a program from concept to operational employment is a critical part of adapting to the unexpected and countering emerging threats. While I understand and support the need to transition some platforms and systems to the Fleet quickly, we must ensure that we fully understand the risks we incur by compressing the established (and extensive) requirements and acquisition processes. The (often) legitimate need to deliver systems quickly can never, repeat never, be license to compromise our duty to our Sailors to provide the training, doctrine, technical documentation, spare parts, etc., they need to effectively operate and maintain those systems.

When we fail to ensure systems arrive in the Fleet whole, we place mission success at risk. It is this behavior that we have vigorously sought to change through the FIP and other efforts (such as the Fleet FAM). Although it is very important that we are capable of rapidly responding to emergent and urgent needs, we must not only do things quickly…we must do things right.

DOTMLPF wholeness at IOC
In my SERIAL and subsequent guidance to my commanders, I made it very clear that the manpower, training and support systems required by our Sailors to sustain the operational readiness of our programs through expected service life must be in place and properly functioning before we accept delivery in the Fleet (i.e., at Initial Operating Capability (IOC)). I consider the DOTMLPF wholeness of our programs a firm Fleet requirement and part of the essential foundation for operational readiness. Everything we do in the Fleet relies upon being whole. It is for this reason that operational wholeness is the sole focus of the FIP.

Although there is still much work to do (there always is), I believe we’ve made significant progress using the FIP to engage with our teammates (RSs, PEOs, PMs, etc) and improve the products being delivered to our Sailors today. All the best, JCHjr