Monday was D-Day for Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012.  A good article from CBS News about the event, also at AFP.   Some cogent analysis of the significance of the exercise:

After a decade dominated by ground wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the drill dubbed Bold Alligator is “the largest amphibious exercise conducted by the fleet in the last 10 years,” said Admiral John Harvey, head of US Fleet Forces Command.

The American military, mindful that Marines have spent most of their time in the deserts of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan since 2001, said the goal was “to revitalize, refine, and strengthen fundamental amphibious capabilities and reinforce the Navy and Marine Corps role as ‘fighters from the sea.’”

The lack of practice at a craft that is immensely complex (amphibious assault) and requires extensive planning and rehearsal has been a concern of the Marine Corps for most of the past decade.  Many junior Officers and SNCOs have never been afloat, let alone had anything to do with amphibious operations.  Landing plans, serial assignment tables, scheduled, on-call, and unscheduled waves are terms unfamiliar to most.    Fire support planning in amphibious operations, challenging in the best of circumstances, must now be done in an environment of austere Naval surface fires.

The BOLD ALLIGATOR exercises, and the war games that reinforce them (EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR, etc.) will introduce those younger Marines to the art of projecting power ashore from the sea.   Shortfalls in capabilities and capacity will be identified, new methods developed to leverage modern platforms, and assumptions either validated or proven incorrect.   The bugaboo of every amphibious operation, the command relationship between CATF/CLF, will be examined anew.

The addition of our French allies in this exercise is crucial, as the interoperability of international forces in a coalition operation is always a challenge.  Lessons on doctrine, equipment requirements and capabilities, as well as the personal command relationships between seniors, make for more lethal and efficient combat forces.

The landings in North Carolina and Virginia are not being conducted in a vacuum, either:

The threat of mines, anti-ship missiles and small boats in coastal waters conjure up Iran’s naval forces, but the commanders overseeing the drill, Admiral Harvey and Marine Lieutenant General Dennis Hejlik, say the scenario is not based on any particular country.

When asked by reporters last week, Harvey acknowledged that the exercise scenario was “certainly informed by recent history” and that it was “applicable” to the Strait of Hormuz, as well as other areas.

Harvey also said the exercise incorporated lessons from the 2006 Lebanon conflict, when Iran-backed Hezbollah forces hit an Israeli navy corvette with an anti-ship missile.

This event was important enough to have CNO Admiral Greenert in attendance, and highlights a significant shift in the Navy’s views regarding its role in the amphibious power projection mission.   While always publicly supporting the Navy-Marine Corps team, the unofficial position of the Navy toward this mission  seemed decidedly luke-warm and was at odds with the Marine Corps over requirements and resources.  This is good news for Naval forces whose focus will be the western Pacific.  One can bet a paycheck that the USN and USMC will be scribbling furiously, taking copious notes.   Lessons will be learned, training will be invaluable.

And best of all, an entirely new generation of Marines will be introduced to the smell of paint, exhaust fumes, crude oil, salt water spray, and vomit that are indelibly etched on every Marine who has climbed down the cargo net, ridden the tuna boats off the well deck through the surf, or splashed ashore from the LCUs.  The more things change, the more they remain the same.

The disbelief and outrage expressed at the veto votes of both Russia and the People’s Republic of China over the UN Resolution regarding Syria leads one to believe that our State Department believed a contrary position on R2P did not credibly exist.  Au contraire, points out STRATFOR in this morning’s Geopolitical Diary.   STRATFOR posits that perhaps a couple of widely held assumptions are not quite as universal as we had believed.  To both the Russians and Chinese, the preservation of human life, and prevention of crimes against innocent civilians or mass killings, still needs to be weighed against the spreading influence of potential geopolitical, military, and economic rivals.   Responsibility to Protect, R2P, was for the West in reality E2I, excuse to intervene:

The Russian and Chinese view was that this doctrine opened the door to unlimited interventions not in response to mass murder, but in order to prevent mass murder. From the Chinese and Russian perspective, this would allow intervention based on fears. Fears can be feigned and anyone can assert the threat of mass murder and war crimes. Therefore, the Libyan precedent seemed to be a doctrine that justified intervention based on suspicion of intent. Or, to put it more bluntly, the Russian and Chinese view was that the intervention in Libya was designed to achieve political and economic goals, and the threat of impending mass murder was simply the justification.

China and Russia viewed the Syrian resolution as a preface to more aggressive resolutions also based on the doctrine of preventing atrocities much greater than those already committed. They felt that this would set a permanent principle of international law that they opposed. Their opposition was based on the perception that this was merely a justification for interventions against regimes of which the West disapproved.

Also, an America stretched thinner than its shrinking military resources can reasonably secure works to the advantage of both Russia and China.  Not only that, but freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz or elsewhere is not necessarily a universal desire, especially when that freedom means possible interdiction or interruption of vital energy supplies.

Iran is in the process of establishing a sphere of influence in which Syria plays a strategic role. If al Assad survives, his regime will be heavily dependent on Iran. Neither China nor Russia would be particularly troubled by this. Certainly, Russia does not want to see an excessively powerful Iran, but it would welcome any dynamic that would tie American power down in a long-term duel with Iran. Creating a regional balance of power would divert U.S. power in directions that would provide Russia with freedom for maneuver.

The same can be said of China, with the additional proviso that the Chinese do not want to see anything interfere with their energy trade with Iran. So there were two issues for China. First, China did not want a precedent set that might allow an American intervention in Iran. Second, China, like Russia, welcomed the diversion of American power from the South China Sea, where it had been planning to shift forces.

None of this should surprise us.  Unfortunately, China and Russia continue to play realpolitik at a time when the US foreign policy team seems unwilling to admit that such power politics even exist.  Russia’s dispatch of a Naval flotilla (which included an aircraft carrier) last month to the Syrian port of Tartous was a message strongly sent to both NATO and the United States.   The Russian vessels comprised an “influence squadron” if ever there was one.   The clear signal to NATO, the members of which share the continent with Russia, was a not-so-subtle “HANDS OFF”.   With Russian resurgence a distinct possibility amongst a largely disarmed Europe, and Russian control of the natural gas valves that supply the key NATO economies, the message will be heeded.  For the United States, that message, and the message of China’s and Russia’s veto, is slightly more ominous:

What we have now seen is that China and Russia recognize the battlefield and for now are prepared to side with Iran against the United States, a move that makes clear sense from a balance of power perspective.

Perspective.  Spelled out very well by STRATFOR.

By the way, how is that Thousand Ship Navy looking these days?

According to the 15th edition of the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, Nigeria’s Navy includes two frigates, two Erin’mi-class patrol combatants, two operations patrol craft, three non-operational fast patrol boats, fifteen 25-foot boats, and some auxiliary ships. Last month, the Nigerian Navy acquired the former U.S. Coast Guard Cutter CHASE.

Whether the country assesses its assets are insufficient to deal with the threat or another reason, the Nigerian government has awarded a ten-year contract worth USD$130 million for maritime security. The awardee, Global West Vessel Special Nigeria Limited (GWVSL) will provide platforms for tracking ships and cargo, enforcing regulatory compliance, and surveillance of the Nigerian Maritime Domain. The firm is run by Government Tompolo, a former senior MEND militant.

The background of the awardee aside, the contract is opposed by some in Nigeria who believe that maritime security should rest with the Navy and Coast Guard.

This raises two issues: 1) if any state is unable to secure its waters or its commercial assets, who fills the maritime gap, and 2) if PSCs – or, rather, maritime security companies – fill that need, how should they be vetted?

The past few years have boosted the maritime security industry due in no small part to instability and piracy in the Horn of Africa and the need for shipping companies to hire more armed guards. More companies and countries have gradually, albeit reluctantly, recognized that armed riders may be a necessary addition to the cooperative efforts of state navies. (The Philippines just became the latest country to permit its flagged ships to use maritime security.)

I first interviewed Dominic Mee, CEO of Protection Vessels International, two years ago about maritime security companies offering escort vessels. “We would welcome more regulation…this would help the reputation of the industry.” Just last week, the Security Association for the Maritime Industry  (SAMI) announced that its International Accreditation Program will include a three-stage process of due diligence that includes: financial and legal checks, physical verification, and checks on deployed operations (source: MarineInsight.com 4 February 2012). Such efforts might improve, as Mee said, the reputation of the industry and, more importantly, accountability.

Lieutenant Commander Berube is the co-editor of the recently published “Maritime Private Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century.” These views are his own and not those of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Here’s a link to a 17 minute presentation that explains much.

Peter van Uhm: Why I chose a gun

As the old Strategic Air Command motto had it: “Peace is our profession”

Admiral Harvey also commented on the history at the Naval Academy, a place where all midshipmen, wrapped up in getting to the next class or event, will simply walk past some of the most remarkable items in our naval history – the cannons and monuments, the flags taken in battle, the portraits in Memorial Hall and elsewhere. In the course of everyday activities, “we lose the meaning of those faces in paintings, those names on a plaque.”

Last night’s soon-to-be SWOs selected ships named after some of the best known naval figures – Barry, Decatur, Farragut, Porter, Gridley, etc.

But where was Stewart who has one of those portraits in Memorial Hall?

Commissioned as a Lieutenant in 1798, Charles Stewart served as the fourth lieutenant aboard Barry’s USS United States. Twelve days before his twenty-second birthday, he was given command of USS Experiment during the Quasi War; one of his officers was David Porter, father of Civil War Admiral David Dixon Porter. In 1803, he was given command of the brig USS Syren and engaged against Tripolitans during the Barbary War.

At the beginning of the War of 1812, President James Madison’s Cabinet favored sending the small U.S. fleet to the protected harbor of New York. James Fenimore Cooper in his History of the Navy suggests that it was Stewart and Captain William Bainbridge who, confident of the American ships and sailors, made a personal appeal to the Madison to send the fleet to sea.

After briefly commanding USS Argus on a short cruise, Stewart was given USS Constellation and defended Norfolk against Admiral Sir John Warren’s superior British squadron. On 22 June 1813, Stewart relieved Bainbridge as commander of USS Constitution. Perhaps it was an apocryphal story, but shortly after his wedding, his wife asked him to bring her a frigate – he said he’d bring back two. In what was termed the ship’s “finest fight”, Stewart and Constitution defeated HMS Cyane and HMS Levant on 20 February, 1815.

Between 1817 and 1824 he would command the ship of the line USS Franklin and a squadron – first in the Mediterranean and then in the Pacific. Although there were no battles during this period by which to further distinguish his career, Stewart’s role as a leader would have ramifications for two generations. Among his junior officers were names well known in naval history –Charles Wilkes, Uriah Levy, Robert Stockton, Mexican-American squadron Commodores David Conner and John Sloat, and Civil War squadron Commodores Louis Goldsborough, Samuel du Pont, Admiral Farragut and – on the Confederate side – Admiral Franklin Buchanan.

Stewart would hold brief commands of the USS Pennsylvania (from the shipyard to her Norfolk, the only time she sailed) and the USS Independence as the Home Squadron. He retired as Commander of the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 31 December 1860, sixty-two years after he was first commissioned. Two years later, he was promoted to Rear Admiral on the retired list in 1862.

In 1855, he would defend the Navy when he wrote to the House and Senate about “a country I revere, to a Navy I love.” He asked what constituted an officer: “It is not alone the service it implies; nor is it alone the authority or title it bestows; and less than these is it the pay assigned by law. He appreciates his rank, because it is a defined and firm position among brave, honorable, and useful men, voluntarily dedicated to the defence and glory of the country.”

Only been three ships have been named after Stewart: a Bainbridge-class destroyer (DD-13) commissioned in 1902, a Clemson-class destroyer (DD-224) commissioned in 1902, and the Edsall-class destroyer escort (DE-238) commissioned in 1943 and struck in 1972.

It’s been forty years since the name of this naval hero has graced a U.S. warship. It’s time for another USS Stewart.

Lieutenant Commander Claude Berube’s first book was “A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution (Potomac Books Inc., 2005). The views expressed are his own and not those of the Naval Academy or Department of the Navy.

On Monday, General Mattis, Commander, U.S. Central Command, spoke to the Brigade of Midshipmen on leadership.

He began his speech by noting his surprise that anyone would invite him to speak publically after the wrong audience caught wind of some of his previous comments. I admired his ability to laugh at himself. He described how humor had helped him overcome some very non-humorous combat situations, calling humor “a bulletproof vest for the heart.”

In his speech, he constantly stressed integrity and resoluteness, labeling those qualities as the main difference between a man and a boy. Fighting an insurgency requires service-members to hold true to their morals when interacting with the local population. Gen. Mattis described one incident where an Iraqi working on a U.S. base in Fallujah was given two grenades by local insurgents. This Iraqi would be paid $300 for each grenade that went off in the compound. The Iraqi did not throw the grenades. Afterwards, he explained to the Marines that the day before, a young Marine stopped some local thugs from beating him up. Gen. Mattis used this example to illustrate how the morally right decision in combat saves lives.

The general also emphasized that units succeed or fail based on the unit’s leadership. His comments about the first time stepping out in front of your platoon or division resonated with the soon-to-graduate first-class midshipmen.

One civilian asked Gen. Mattis how he felt about the increasing civilian-military disconnect. He demonstrated the military’s improved relationship with the civilian world by contrasting the present relationship with the relationship in 1972, the year he became a Marine. Back then, the military leadership didn’t trust the civilian world, and vice-versa. Today, during Congressional hearings, Congressmen always thank military officers for their service, even though they may criticize those military officers during their testimonies.

He kept a surprisingly optimistic outlook on the proposed budget cuts. President Obama’s strategic shift towards the Pacific coupled with the $457 billion defense cuts means the Marines will downsize. Gen. Mattis said that while the Marines might do less, they will continue to maintain their high standards in training and in combat. I hope the latter part will be true of all the services.

Stars and Stripes is reporting that USS Essex (LHD-2), flagship of ESG-7, will not be participating in Cobra Gold.   Seems, she is broken.   That’s twice, inside of a year.   BEFORE the coming Defense cuts.

Following the optimistic tone of the USNI/AFCEA West 2012 speakers and panels, VADM Burke, DCNO for Readiness, provides a somewhat less upbeat analysis:

Vice Adm. William Burke, deputy chief of naval operations for fleet readiness and logistics, told the committee that the Navy has “a limited supply of forces.”

“When you have these additional deployments, you sometimes impact the maintenance, or you impact the training, which will impact the maintenance,” he said. “So what we have is one event cascading into another, so we don’t get either of them quite right.”

While a TF 76 spokesman attributes the problem to “wear and tear”, and declares the 21-year old Essex “no spring chicken”, the true cause of the problems are systemic and not mechanical.  To wit, Lt Anthony Falvo from 7th Fleet:

Lt. Anthony Falvo, 7th Fleet spokesman, said the Essex may have been impacted by missing maintenance.

“Pacific Fleet ships adhere to rigorous maintenance standards and maintenance periodicities per the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual and other Navy directives,” Falvo wrote in an email to Stars and Stripes. “On any given day we have roughly 40% of our ships underway and we are meeting the requirements of the combatant commanders.”

Ya think?  The absurdly shortsighted experiment with “optimal manning”, the deferring of maintenance because OPTEMPO is too high for the numbers of ships in commission, the idea that we can DO MORE WITH LESS, those are the problems.  Wear and tear?  It becomes a problem without proper maintenance of subcomponents and systems.  “No spring chicken”?   Remind me how old the Austins were?

Over on Nate Hughes’ excellent post is some significant discussion about the economics of maintaining a Navy and getting the most for the taxpayers’ treasure.   This ain’t it.   Some in the Navy or associated with it will tell you that the most “cost effective” course is to decommission and dispose of ships like Essex, even though they will not be replaced one-for-one.   This lays bare the absurdity of that notion.  The most cost effective course is to properly maintain the vessels in commission, and if capable vessels for their mission, keep them in commission to the end of their expected service lives, or even longer if viable.

Under Secretary Work, tell us again about the National Military Strategy that won’t stretch our shrinking resources past the breaking point?

h/t XBRADTC

“This is pretty cool. I was recently briefed on the results of our first try at a new way for us to innovate. We held an “event” in San Diego that brought together 27 of our best and brightest Junior Officers, Sonarmen and Fire Control Technicians to participate in what will be the first of many workshops. Submarine Development Squadron TWELVE (DEVRON 12) allied with Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Applied Physics Laboratory and the Submarine Advanced Development Team at NAVSEA, making this a “first of its kind” for the Submarine Force and maybe the Navy.”

After my last blog, this seems a pretty good story to follow up with.  It’s all together far too easy to have the perspective that ‘everything’s wrong.’ What’s more is that it is way too easy to only point to things that seem wrong — Only pointing to ‘what’s wrong’ does not lead to innovation. 

ADM Harvey’s strategic messaging has lately had a heavy dose of how our history demonstrates that we can meet the challenges of today.  This example from VADM Richardson is emblematic of that fact.  I’ll let  Admiral Richardson’s post speak for itself.  But, I think the names of those involved in the TANG Workshop deserve to be mentioned here. 

FT1 Don Moreno – USS Bremerton
LTJG John Dubiel – USS Bremerton
FT1 Rich Gunter – USS Charlotte
STS2 Charles Augustine – USS City of Corpus Christi
LTJG Jason Frederick – USS City of Corpus Christi
FT3 Jordan Larry – USS City of Corpus Christi
LT Dan Kohnen – USS Columbus
LTJG Dan Justice – USS Florida
FT1 John Keagle – USS Florida
STS1 Randy Kelly – USS Florida
STS2 Don Grubbe – USS Houston
LTJG Stephen Emerson – USS Houston
FT2 Thaddeus Siongco – USS Houston
LT David Camp – USS Key West
FT3 Glen Elam – USS Key West
STS1 Robert Sarvis – USS Key West
LT Tim Manke – USS New Hampshire
STS1 J.P. Whitney – USS Norfolk
FT1 Brent Caraway – USS San Francisco
LT Eric Dridge – USS San Francisco
STS1 Rich Hering – USS San Francisco
STS2 Chris Remiesiewicz – USS Virginia
FT1 Brandolf Schlieper – USS Virginia
LT Arlo Swallow – USS West Virginia
FT1 Ben Lang – USS West Virginia
STS1 Gabe Brazell – USS West Virginia
STS2 Jake Malone – SLC Det. San Diego

The IDEO Coaching Team:

Peter Macdonald
Dave Blakely
Dan Soltzberg
David Haygood

I think the best quote to use as a starting point is here;

The Pentagon’s new budget proposals, unveiled Thursday, included money to turn a freighter hull into a full-time floating base that could be moved around the world for military operations or humanitarian missions.

But the fiscal year does not begin until October and, to meet a standing request from American military commanders in the Middle East, Pentagon and Navy officials decided to convert the Ponce to serve as a floating base in the meantime.

“This is a longstanding request that, with the opportunity now before us, we are fulfilling,” said Capt. John Kirby, the Pentagon spokesman.

… Navy officials acknowledged that they were moving with unusual haste to complete the conversion and send the mothership to the region by early summer.

Longstanding. Yes. The request is:

… the staging base would allow commandos, helicopters, speedboats and even aircraft with a short-takeoff capability to operate in regions where the United States does not have access to installations on land.

While its value as a staging base for combat operations would be a priority, it also could be moved near an area suffering from natural disaster, to provide full logistics for the military to carry out relief missions for a region left without power, food or potable water.

Let that soak in. Read it again. Ponder – hasn’t this been a requirement for at least my lifespan? Haven’t we had such things before? Yes. Don’t we have a lot of platforms easily converted to do such things? Yes. Does it require a big deck to do it? No. Do we have ships already configured as such – yes. Why has it taken so long ……

To simplify things – let’s not even look at piracy for now and what the PONCE could bring to that game. In the broader sense, we have been at war with a non-state terrorist group, its affiliates and supporters for over a decade. This is a war that relies to an exceptional extent on Special Operations Forces. This we know.

As a navy at war, what have we “restructured” to support this outside deployment schedules, itty-bits in NECC, NSW, and certain “special” programs? Look back at the infrastructure that supported special operations in Vietnam and the very short turn around time they had from requirement to shadows pierside. This is not new. This is not radical. This does not require a technological breakthrough.  Hey – maybe, ahem, that is/was the problem.

An “Afloat Forward Staging Base” or “mothership” is not a new concept. It is not sexy (to the non-professional), it doesn’t go real fast, but it does do something – it supports the warfighter and his ability to project power ashore and at sea. It multiplies the effect of smaller, more nimble forces to do their job with endurance and a greater sense of autonomy. MIW – sure. NSW – no problem … etc … but why PONCE now – why late – and why USS now?

Ships matter – ships that have enough “white space” to put in to them what you need, take them where they need to go, and have the endurance to stay long enough to make a difference. Not the too-clever-by-half mission module concept – but the inherent utility of “being there” with room to enable others – and to do so with nuance. The multi-purpose amphib, which the PONCE is – is more than simply an amphib – it has always been so – and will be again.

All the above leads to a simple question: through all the “fat” years in a decade of war with plenty of discussions of the need and utility of a “mothership” to meet the needs of this type of war, we did little. Now that we find ourselves in a shrinking budget, why do we panic like, grab the duct tape, bailing wire, and vice grips and rush out to the pier to coax the old girl to give just some more?

Are we that broken that with all our technology, communications, and armadas of Admirals – we find ourselves with this decision point? Are our priorities so out of whack – our processes so blinkered – our leadership so hidebound – that we find ourselves with this lash-up?

Don’t get me wrong – I fully support, encourage, and praise the modification and deployment of PONCE and present/planned follow on AFSB. Many happy returns – but really. This is how we do it?

“This is a longstanding request that, with the opportunity now before us, we are fulfilling … Navy officials acknowledged that they were moving with unusual haste to complete the conversion and send the mothership to the region by early summer.

It’s not like there weren’t other opportunities to do this to other ships over the last decade.

The interesting story would be – inside the “longstanding” timeline – who held back this decision, why, and what are they doing now? What was holding it back – and what finally broke the seal to let it go forward?

I know, call it an accountability review.

Once we do that – then we can have fun discussion about long range plans for the concept WRT active duty/reserve/CIVMAR/USS/USNS etc. There will be a long range plan right? We wouldn’t want to have someone else re-invent this later on will we? We do understand that this is a capability that will be needed for a long time – right? We are planning for the ability to have this “effect” in place longer than one ship’s deployment … right?

Maybe, I don’t want to be an officer.  More so, maybe I shouldn’t be one.  You guys seem to make it hard on yourselves to ask questions – to read, think and write.  Enlisted types, when we do a version of ‘read, think and write’ we either are innocuous or irrelevant because of our rank, or are surprising (and thus welcomed) because of no one expecting us to think ‘big thoughts.’  But, whatever the case, us thinking aloud isn’t something that can cause officers to react.  I’d dare say that it is almost safer for us enlisted types to think out loud because of our status in the military hierarchy.

In thinking back across the modicum of experience I have, I can only find one example of where someone (an officer) reacted negatively to me asking questions.  It was a CAPT who was riding the SAN ANTONIO for one reason, or another.  We were on the smoke deck, and I was attempting to talk to him about my Mobile Sea Base idea I had for the SAN (anyone read the news lately? I totally called this back in 2007).  I don’t think the CAPT was as much bothered by my asking questions, as he just wanted from freakin’ peace and quiet while he smoked his cigar on the smoke deck.  Whatever his motivations, it’s the only time I can recall ever being concerned about asking questions.

As many of you know, the Naval Institute invited me to the West ’12 Conference this year.  One of the panels I attended was titled “Junior Warfighters: What Issues Keep Them Awake at Night?”  the panel was comprised of O-3s and an O-4.  I asked them questions, and the discussion turned to writing and publishing their thoughts.  The answers I received were far outside of my perspective, and did not settle well with me.  I couldn’t understand why they were telling me of their concerns for repercussions from their writing.  They aren’t the first officers I’ve heard voice such a concern – quite the opposite actually.  I have heard others say as such so often, that I’ve started to wonder if it was actually an excuse for not writing.

I watched the video made from the panel this morning, I asked if they had tried to get published, if they thought that publishing under a pen name would improve the discourse or be helpful in any way.  But, again, the answers I was given were too far outside my perspective.  I was told that it is important for a person to stand behind their words and thus not use a pen name.  In addition to their concern for repercussions from publishing,  the two perspectives caused a certain dissonance for me, I couldn’t get my mind around it.  But, in talking about it on facebook, I think I’ve begun to understand.

No one reads, thinks and writes in a vacuum.  I’ve often wondered (as have many others) why it is that the young seem to be the greatest source of innovation in the World.  But, in coming to understand the answers I received at West I’ve also come to understand that a significant part of why the young innovate so much is that we do read, think and write in a vacuum in a greater sense than those older than us.  We generally have fewer responsibilities – maybe a spouse, possibly no children, limited (if any) command authority.  It seems to me to be one of the sublimely ironic absurdities of life that we give authority to those who have the experience to support keen discretion and wise decision making.  But that to inherently have such qualities, one must have first lived a life, learned the resulting lessons and there-by limited their ability to fully engage in innovative discourse.

What this realization has lead me to is to wonder what this means for me.  I’m a single guy, no kids, and no command authority; yet when I write these blogs, and talk publicly, I have a tacit sense of what I can and cannot say – I have tact.  But, should I have less tact, in a sense?  I don’t mean that I think that I should be bluntly provocative or that I should be writing the intellectual version of tabloids in my writing.  But, that I should be even more bold to say some things, and even say things I know that others wish to say, but can’t due to other responsibilities their life choices have resulted in.  Just as it tends to be the most junior personnel who have to scrub down a ship after a CBRN attack, shouldn’t it be the junior person who writes the words that cause senior personnel pause?  After all, I am ultimately only responsible to myself.  I do not have to worry about my words grossly affecting anyone else I could be responsible for.  If the guy with kids to take care of can’t do it; the officer who would be judged more critically than I would can’t do it, or anyone with significant responsibilities can’t do it.  But, somebody HAS to do it.   Who better than someone like me?

I didn’t invoke John Boyd during the panel, though his ghost was probably cursing up a storm if it were present.  But, Boyd’s example is replete with what it takes to fully engage in the discourse.  Robert Croam’s biography doesn’t ignore the type of father or husband Boyd was – Boyd sacrificed a lot to be who he was.  I cannot expect anyone (not even myself) to make the hard decisions he made.

Which only leaves me with the thought that we need a new dichotomy across the age axis in our Navy.  We have the enlisted-officer dichotomy in the Navy that serves us extremely well.  We should also formalize the age dichotomy so that our junior personnel can take advantage of their lack of responsibilities and station, so that they can think, read and write the things we need to stay innovative and ahead of any competitor.