USNI Blog https://blog.usni.org Let us Dare to Read, Think, Speak, Write - and BLOG Wed, 31 Jan 2024 16:41:17 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.3 https://blog.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/usni-emblem-4c-54c72966v1_site_icon-32x32.png USNI Blog https://blog.usni.org 32 32 52492248 Announcement https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/12/21/annoucement https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/12/21/annoucement#respond Thu, 21 Dec 2023 17:38:14 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32351 The Naval Institute Blog is on hold at the moment. Our plan is to move it to the Proceedings site and rename it “Proceedings Blog” in 2024. More information to follow soon!

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/12/21/annoucement/feed 0 32351 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/13/32328 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/13/32328#respond Thu, 13 Apr 2023 14:13:54 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32328 The second day of the conference began with a panel discussing polarization trends in different regions of the world. Panelists included Commander Rachel Gosnell, U.S. Navy, a Foreign Area Officer serving in the U.S. European Command and speechwriter for the 30th Chief of Naval Operation; Dr. Amitav Acharya, the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.; and Dr. Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. The panelists provided a diverse look into contemporary polarization through their expertise on Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, respectively. The panel itself analyzed regional polarization trends, especially in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the rising power of China on the global stage. Key takeaways included Russia’s reliance on long term costs to break the unity of NATO support, the non-alignment of Southeast Asian states in order to preserve peace in the region, and renewed diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a result of power imbalances since the Iraq War. Following the panel, the delegates broke out into the second of three roundtable discussions. These discussions continued dialogue on the roots and implications of modern polarization, with some focusing on free speech, the Israel-Palestine question, and growing potential for polarization in the Arctic region. After their discussion, delegates enjoyed a luncheon in Dahlgren Hall and tours of the Yard, where they continued to enjoy each other’s company and continue to facilitate powerful discussion. The day culminated in the Honorable Stanley Legro Keynote Address given by Dr. Qamar-ul Huda and a breakout into roundtables to draw conclusions for this second day. The Honorable Stanley Legro Address is named after the late Honorable Stanley Legro, a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Marine Corps artillery officer, Assistant Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and generous supporter of NAFAC. Dr. Qamar-ul Huda is the Michael E. Paul Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Affairs at the United States Naval Academy and co-founder of the Center for Global Policy, and previously served as a Senior Policy Advisor for Secretary of State John Kerry’s Office of Policy Planning. His expertise in conflict resolution and countering extremism provided insights into three major themes that can be linked to polarization: globalization, shifting power dynamics, and the popularization of polarization politics. He points out that the United States used to be proactive in securing agreements with other countries over basic human rights. Recently, thanks in large part to the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership without limits,” the United States chooses to work with strongmen leaders who can cooperate with national security goals easier over democratically elected leaders who are committed to human rights. He concludes that the destructive effects of polarization are mainly driven by contemporary norms of democratic backsliding and tribalism that are not identified and fought against enough. The following roundtable discussions tackled not only questions of democratic backsliding and shifting power imbalances in the Middle East and the Arctic but considered the conflict between universal acceptance of cultures and the belief in certain universal human rights, the use of disinformation to secure the regimes of strongmen leaders, and populism as a seductively “easy way forward” for rising nationalist leaders.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/13/32328/feed 0 32328 NAFAC History and Current Theme (Day 1) https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/12/nafac-history-and-current-theme-day-1 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/12/nafac-history-and-current-theme-day-1#respond Wed, 12 Apr 2023 13:16:26 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32323 Entering the 63rd year of the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference (NAFAC), the Naval Academy once again welcomes delegates from more than 30 different countries and more than 50 military and civilian institutions worldwide. In doing so, midshipmen, cadets, civilians, and delegates from abroad can hold stimulating and thought-provoking discussion regarding geopolitics, international affairs, and ultimately the formulation of new policies. NAFAC has hosted a plethora of international leaders, military flag/general officers, and foreign relations specialists to include President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of States Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice, General John Allen, U.S. Marine Corps, and this year’s Forrestal Lecture speaker: President Iván Duque of Colombia. This year’s conference theme is “Democracies Divided: The Proliferation of Polarization” and takes place from 11–13 April. The contemporary world order is plagued by polarization both domestic and international. From hate speech and disinformation campaigns on social media to a growing loss of confidence in the European Union, the catalysts of polarization are global. Combined with the rise of revisionist powers and an increasing trend toward authoritarianism, the liberal world order has continually faced pressures to reaffirm its commitment to international cooperation and remain steadfast in the face of attacks on states’ sovereignties. As polarization continues to erode trust between states and within our own communities, its consequences present unique challenges in the 21st century. In the face of a continental European war, growing tensions in the Arctic and Pacific, and the rise of nationalist movements worldwide, maintaining the status quo requires cooperation and the ability of international organizations to reaffirm their commitments of safeguarding democratic ideals worldwide. This year’s conference aims to consider polarization domestically, regionally, and across international organizations to find sustainable and democratic methods of combating polarization and sustaining our current partnerships abroad. Tuesday, 11 April 2023 The conference opened with remarks by the Conference Director, Midshipman First Class Jordan Hummel, followed by an opening statement from the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Vice Admiral Sean S. Buck, welcoming our delegates to Annapolis and speaking to the importance of this year’s theme regarding current and future global affairs. Directly following these remarks was the Lieutenant Commander J. J. Connell Opening Keynote Address given by Admiral Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Navy (Ret.), a former Rhodes Scholar; Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and Director of National Intelligence. Admiral Blair framed his address by describing the growing rivalries not only between democratic and authoritarian regimes, but also between various democracies. Admiral Blair spoke about how the world order has changed since the end of the Cold War, focusing particularly on the rise of two primary coalitions with different views of what world governments and norms should look like. Arguably the most important takeaway from Admiral Blair’s address was the notion that despite polarization between them, democracies must stay strong in their values to combat the attempted shift towards an authoritarian-dominated international system. Following Admiral Blair’s address, the delegates broke out into roundtable discussions—the heart of the conference. This year’s roundtable topics span a wide range of pressing international concerns, including populism, free speech in the cyber domain, and the rise of digital media as a method of political socialization. Some roundtables analyzed the effects of middle powers and their resistance to aligning with either coalition, demonstrating the potential for large-scale restructuring of international norms in the near future. Furthermore, the other roundtables discussed various definitions of polarization and the different avenues through which populations and countries can become divided. After the delegates enjoyed a meal in King Hall, the Naval Academy’s main dining hall, the conference moved into a panel that delved further into the roots of contemporary polarization. Panelists included Professor Nolan McCarty, the Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs and Vice Dean for Strategic Initiatives at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, the Honorable Michelle Giuda, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and Professor Jeffrey Kosseff, an associate professor of cybersecurity law in the United States Naval Academy’s Cyber Science Department. This panel focused on the roots of the polarization that plagues current democracies. Ms. Giuda discussed the level to which true polarization exists not within governments and populations, but within media and between democracies and authoritarian regimes. Dr. McCarty offered insights on the relationship between economic inequality and domestic political polarization. Finally, Dr. Kosseff addressed the pros and cons of global interconnectedness via the cyber domain regarding polarization and global unity. The concluding event of Day 1 was the Forrestal Lecture given by the former President of Colombia, Iván Duque. President Duque led Colombia through COVID-19 and the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis and worked to bring together people polarized by drugs, disease, immigration, and illiberal actors like China and Russia. His perspective provided insight into how he managed these issues which are increasingly salient in American society as well. President Duque’s address poignantly paired a discussion of leadership and his own experiences combating the effects of polarization to communicate the necessity of safeguarding democratic principles, even in the face of unpopularity. In summary, President Duque presented several insights into the real-world consequences of political polarization while teaching Midshipmen and delegates in attendance valuable lessons in leadership as they develop into future leaders of the military and global political order.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/04/12/nafac-history-and-current-theme-day-1/feed 0 32323 Arnheiter Syndrome https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/13/arnheiter-syndrome https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/13/arnheiter-syndrome#respond Mon, 13 Feb 2023 19:04:14 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32312 . . . the captain would demonstrate once again that if you make a hoax look and sound plausible enough, a lot of people will believe you. You must know how to play upon fears and prejudices, to exploit motives and limitations. Arnheiter was adept at this. The captain took naturally to fraud because his mind had difficulty distinguishing reality from delusion and right from wrong. The deliberate lie blurred into the unconscious fantasy. —Neil Sheehan, The Arnheiter Affair The Maritime Strategy had given the Navy a new lease on life. Morale was soaring. Recruitment was up and personnel were reenlisting in droves . . . naval officers in the fleet began to feel proud again, as if they were in a Navy filled with the spirit of Bull Halsey. —Gregory Vistica, Fall From Glory Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter commanded the USS Vance (DE-387) from 22 December 1965 to 31 March 1966. The Vance, a destroyer escort with long years of service in the Pacific, was rescued from oblivion by dint of the Vietnam War. Instead of being stricken and reduced to molten metal, the World War II and Cold War stalwart—“the watchdog of the Pacific”—was kept afloat on look-out duty, assigned to Market Time patrol off the coast of South Vietnam. Market Time, a close-in blockade of the coastline, was designed to interdict the waterborne routes of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. While the Brown Water Navy established a beachhead upriver, taking the brunt of Navy casualties, and the Blue Water Navy raided the North Vietnamese coast from its permanent gyre at Yankee Station, Operation Sea Dragon, the blue-brown fleet of Market Time cutters and escorts, did yeoman service inspecting commerce the 1,200-mile length of the dragon-shaped littoral. Ferreting out supplies meant for the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army was a decidedly unheroic job. Malodorous fishermen were caught up in the dragnet, catch and release, and the sampans that plied these waters had been there for millennia. Gunrunning was a non-lethal activity. A day in the life of a Market Time vessel was one routine inspection after the next—no firefights, no derring-do, no melodrama in the least. Tedium was the real foe. Those looking for a Navy Cross or Silver Star were advised to go upriver, where the guns that slipped through the blockade could be found in the hands of the ambush pros. Market Time was a comparative siesta. Pacific. Until, that is, the Vance showed up under the command of Lieutenant Commander Arnheiter, hellbent for action at 15 knots (top speed), blasting Hellcats Reveille over the waters and showing it meant business, the Special Fire Team hunkered behind sandbags on the weather deck, the mini swift-boat, sixteen feet of shark’s teeth lethality, boldly showing the colors, the whaleboat (sans shark teeth) likewise armed with a 30 caliber machine gun and an outsized Old Glory. Spoiling for a fight, bring it on, the new squared-away Vance reentered Vietnamese waters a testament to the bravado of the pistolero who thought nothing of blasting away at sea snakes from the bridge wing, the photo-op (“Mister Merkle to the bridge, provide”) ever ready to capture the brave captain in martial profile. Marcus Time The 99 days of Marcus Time read like a fever dream in a Saigon safe house. Or something the ace Navy propagandist and fiction writer Aleksandr I. Zhdanov (he was responsible for Shadow of Peril, the original Red October, about a Soviet submarine commander who defects after penetrating New York harbor) lifted whole cloth from the pages of The Caine Mutiny. A marplot let loose on the high seas. Except the ship’s log shows that the imperious one did take command of the Vance at Pearl, and after a purloin of the O Club silver at Guam brought the ship to Vietnam, where he promptly established its reputation as the laughingstock of the Pacific. Shooting at sand berms and almost colliding with a cliff face were among the many exploits that brought the Vance to the mirthful attention of the destroyer captains whose fire-support missions were interrupted while the Vance—unbidden but eager to contribute—came up on their bows, fouling the fire control azimuth. This was no laughing matter though for those stuck aboard with “Mad Marcus,” as the other logbook documenting his folie de grandeur called him. Arnheiter, who had been rescued by Vietnam from oblivion and given a command after all despite Bureau of Naval Personnel misgivings, was determined to make the most of his opportunity, which for him meant valor under fire and a Silver Star at least. He would show those who had given him abysmal fitness reports. He would take the Vance upriver so to speak, damn the torpor of Market Time procedure and protocol. There was a war out there and he was going to be in the thick of it, even if meant he had to bend the rules of engagement to buffo and beyond. He bent the rules so much—even putting himself up for that Silver Star—as to expedite his downfall. The reprimands came tout l’azimuth. The Vietnamese flat-out refused to assist the Vance. Morale aboard ship was abysmal enough to have wives complaining to Congressmen. After a chaplain’s report and the Silver Star counterfeit (the recommendation most certainly did not come from the Executive Officer and the Operations Officer), the squadron commander had had enough. Arnheiter was summarily relieved, and a consequent six-day hearing at Subic concluded that “he had exercised bad judgment and lack of integrity in so many important matters.” Vainglorious to the bitter end, Arnheiter did not give up the ship without a four-year fight. That the “Vance Mutiny” was responsible for his ignominy was gospel truth, so help him, Lord Nelson (his role model), and he convinced a lot of senior officers of conservative bent that he was done in by a “Berkeley campus type of Vietnik/beatnik.” “They wanted to physically thwart me from seeking out and destroying the enemy,” he claimed. “They were afraid for their own damn skins.” His combatant mission now was to have a Board of Inquiry clear his name and restore his command, and for court martials of the mutineers and those senior officers conspiring to cover-up the mutiny. A figure eight of perfidy. The war Arnheiter sought so avidly turned out to be the one with the Navy itself, and he waged it with words, words, words, cranked out in the same building the Caen Mutiny trial scenes were filmed, so many as to make the Vance as notorious as the Caen itself. The Arnheiter Affair The Arnheiter Affair, Neil Sheehan’s book about the intrepid voyage of the Vance and the verbal firefight that ensued after Arnheiter was relieved, is a minor classic, arguably the best book about the Navy in Vietnam. Before the John Paul Vann of A Bright Shining Lie, there was the Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter of a bright shining press release. Sheehan, then a Pentagon reporter for the New York Times, first encountered the cashiered wordsmith on Capitol Hill at an informal hearing chaired by a backbencher and featuring two days of lambasting the Navy Department. Leading the parade of brass on his behalf was the captain-designate of the USS New Jersey (BB-62), the Navy’s showcase battleship, pulled out of retirement and being readied for Vietnam. What the august captain said that day raised the ire of the Chief of Naval Operations. Lamenting the affront to Naval Tradition, the captain managed to fall on his sword, for he too was summarily relieved of his prize command. Sheehan, who started out sympathetic to the Arnheiter cause, soon reversed course the closer he got to the emollient naval officer. He had seen his gung-ho type in gong-show Vietnam. Still, the story fascinated him, and the more he delved, the more he knew he had lucked into a story that tested the structural integrity of the Navy. In 1968, Sheehan published his findings in the longest piece in the Times Magazine history, and he brought out his book in 1971 to considerable acclaim. Which, of course, was met with a libel suit. Arnheiter, who never got that Board Of Inquiry—let alone a court martial of the Vance Mutiny—had to make do with a fusillade of civil suits, all dismissed save the one which stopped the presses of the book. The story could be said to have begun again in 1995, when Gregory Vistica published Fall From Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy, an account of the fever dream that was the Reagan Navy. Vistica, an investigative reporter in the Sheehan mold, had made the Navy his beat while at the San Diego Union-Tribune, and what he saw of the Sea Service gave him mal-de-mer. Officers in the mold of Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter were posing for photo-ops in full pomp-and-circumstance regalia, their bellicose rhetoric—the offensive outrance, bastion-busting in the Barents Sea—speeding them up the O Club pecking-order, package check mandatory, to command of a robocruiser and the good life on Admiral Row, stewards to polish the silver service, medals all around for the zealous warfighters. Marcus Time was back, bigger and better than ever. He knew he would stand tall again the day he was relieved: “I’ve been in fights before . . . and I’ve always won them by making sure everything was wired in advance. I’ll win this one too. You watch.” The Navy too suffered an institutional breakdown during the Vietnam War, but the full extent of the damage—Admiral Elmo Zumwalt performing heroic damage-control in the 70s—was not apparent until the 1980s and the second coming of Victory At Sea. The breakout from Vietnam Syndrome—from the morale-sucking gyre at Yankee Station—meant the 600 ships of the Reagan Navy could do 31 knots, Hellcats Reveille all right, hellbent for action, meaning business, fifteen carrier groups taking it to the Soviet Union. The New Jersey was back in action. So too was the fighting spirit of Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter. Too bad he had to review his Fleet from afar, in mufti. Fever Dreams Package-check revisionism has become gospel in the sea service. According to the authorized version, the Reagan Navy almost single-handedly forced the Soviet Union to cry Uncle Sam. Thanks to the inspired leadership of its visionary SecNav, no guts no glory, the Navy rallied from its post-Vietnam identity crisis to stand tall again, to go on the offensive armed with a grand strategy of hell or high water. Invest the home waters of the USSR, back it into a corner. The Hollywood ending to the Cold War owes much to the force majeure of the Maritime Strategy. The investment in the Reagan Navy paid huge dividends. It unnerved the Soviets and ushered them into the dustbin of history. The triumphant saga of the Reagan Navy is the gold standard of false narratives. The nuclear-powered reenactment of Victory At Sea was a sideshow at best when it came to ending the Cold War. Good thing Reagan did an about-face, went dovish when he did, and met Gorbachev more than halfway. Bellicosity was suddenly out of official favor. Nancy Reagan and George Schultz saw to that. In fact, the Fleet could not get past Cap Weinberger, who dispatched the TR wanna-be and scuttled the Six Hundred Ship fleet. Bastion-busting reversed course this side of the GIUK Gap and came home to roost. Goodbye Strategic Homeporting as well. The United States was desperate for a victory in the 80s and the Reagan Navy delivered one, created out of bold lies and half-truths and delusions of grandeur—never mind that the Fleet was reeling from one scandal and debacle to the next. That was Sea Service reality, cover it up, but the triumphant saga showcased gung-ho histrionics, swords and swagger, pomp and ceremony. The photo ops Navy. Top Gun showboating. A Navy out of the Arnheiter playbook. He may as well have penned the Maritime Strategy himself. Lessons and Legacy From Vietnam Syndrome to Arnheiter Syndrome in one swashbuckling leap of groupthink, a lot of people bought the bellicose fiction in the 1980s and a lot of people swear by it to this day. Indeed, it comes in handy as a cudgel to flog America’s Navy as too woke (“Berkeley type . . . beatnik”) and too timorous (“afraid for their own damn skins”). As the semi-official memory of the US Navy in the 1980s—the ultimate sea story—it also functions as a 21st century how-to manual, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) being precisely the Imax threat the Soviet Navy was made out to be. Jumping the gun. If only. If only. If only we had six hundred ships and war fighters like Ace Lyons we could take care of business in the South China Sea. Taiwan would not be in danger. The PLAN would think twice about taking on the U.S. Navy. If only that memory were not a fantasy. The fever dream that was the Reagan Navy lives on as a tribute to itself. Look how tough and focused we were. The Soviet Navy never stood more formidable than in the optics of naval war planners. By contrast, America’s Navy never looks more forlorn. Not focused and not tough. Social justice warriors have no place in the Fleet. The raft of grievances vetted by Task Force One has undermined cohesion and discipline. If only the Reagan Navy was back in all its squared-away glory, showing the PLAN who commands the seas. Corruption made and unmade the Reagan Navy. Gregory Vistica’s book cites chapter and verse. Neil Sheehan’s book gives us a case study of a war fighter before his time. That both books should be anathema to the Navy—Sheehan’s remains on the index of forbidden books—is hardly surprising. Vistica delivers a mortal blow to sacred memory while Sheehan anticipates the folie de grandeur of the Reagan Navy. Two together can see the Big Picture, to paraphrase Homer. Neil Sheehan and Gregory Vistica have taken the measure of the Sea Service in these essential books, which read in tandem tell the story of the Navy in Vietnam. And—come full circle—tell the story about the FON Fleet of today. Both books remain on active duty, for as the ongoing saga of Fat Leonard teaches us, it ain’t over till the fat man sings.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/13/arnheiter-syndrome/feed 0 32312 On Midrats 5 February 2023 – Episode 647: American Realism in the Russo-Ukrainian War with Rebeccah Heinrichs https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/05/on-midrats-5-february-2023-episode-647-american-realism-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-with-rebeccah-heinrichs https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/05/on-midrats-5-february-2023-episode-647-american-realism-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-with-rebeccah-heinrichs#comments Sun, 05 Feb 2023 15:43:14 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32285

Please join us at 5pm (EST) on 5 February 2023 for Midrats Episode 647: American Realism in the Russo-Ukrainian War with Rebeccah Heinrichs

  • What path best enhances American security and prosperity, along with her allies, when it comes to the Russo-Ukrainian War?
  • Are American’s interests best promoted by more support of Ukraine’s ongoing fight for her independence, or by backing away to let things take their natural course?
  • Isolationists, realists, and idealists are all trying to make their case as to where to go next as the war moves in to its second year.
  • What are their arguments, and for those who say they promote a “Realist” policy – how do they define Realism?
  • Our guest for the full hour to discuss this and related issues she raised in her latest article in National Review, “Who are the Real ‘Realists’ on Ukraine?” will be Rebeccah Heinrichs, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.    

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/02/05/on-midrats-5-february-2023-episode-647-american-realism-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war-with-rebeccah-heinrichs/feed 1 32285 What’s Your Legacy? https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/31/whats-your-legacy https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/31/whats-your-legacy#respond Tue, 31 Jan 2023 19:54:45 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32299 A few years ago, while participating in the annual chief petty officer (CPO) rite of passage, I had one of the most extraordinary experiences of my life.

Delivering Training – A candid shot presenting on the topic of “Deckplate Leadership.” The photo was taken on the pier near the former USS Barry (DD-933) at the time, she was a museum ship at the Washington Navy Yard, D.C. In May 2016, the Barry was towed to Philadelphia for scrapping. Photo courtesy of the author.

For those unfamiliar with Navy tradition, a ‘selectee’ is a first-class petty officer (E-6), who will be promoted to Chief (E-7) but has not yet been ‘admitted’ into hallowed environs of the CPO mess. This four to six-week initiation process is much like pledging a fraternity, only on steroids. And while certainly fun, even for the selectees, all the intense activities are designed to instill qualities of deckplate leadership, effective communication, and a deep sense of trust in the CPO Mess.

BUC (SCW) Jeffery Davenport – One of the selectees during the initiation receiving some “up close and personal” instruction from the BMC. Photo courtesy of the author.

The Naval Air Station Patuxent River CPO mess had invited me to assist in training their selectees during a two-day tour of Washington, DC. I met the group on the ex-USS Barry (DD-933). After the evening meal on the Barry’s mess decks, we all retired to the fantail for some entertainment provided by the selectees. It was then that I came face-to-face with four sailors I had personally recruited during my final tour of duty as a Navy recruiter. To put this into perspective, there were 24 selectees and some 15 ‘genuine’ CPOs onboard the Barry that day. Even with my limited math, that means 10 percent of those deckplate leaders made the decision to join the Navy because of my recruiting efforts.

The four CPOs referenced in the article and myself in the in the Rear Admiral William A. Moffett building atrium at NAS Pax River. Photo courtesy of the author.

On that relic of the Cold War, I was privileged to witness the living legacy of my Navy career. Here were four consummate professionals at the very top of their profession, all part of the khaki corps that dates back to 1893; talk about an ah-ha moment. When describing my feelings about the experience to a friend of mine, I worried that it appeared I was bragging. She offered that I wasn’t so much proud of myself—rather, I sounded like a proud father. And indeed, that is exactly what I was and still am—another ah-ha moment. However, what was most significant about this extraordinary event was the realization of the number of lives these four chiefs will influence in the years ahead.

  • How many sailors will follow them into the mess?
  • How many junior officers will become admirals because of their leadership?

So, what’s your legacy?

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/31/whats-your-legacy/feed 0 32299 On Midrats 29 January 2023 Episode 646: The People’s Liberation Army Navy in 2023, with Toshi Yoshihara https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/29/on-midrats-29-january-2023-episode-646-the-peoples-liberation-army-navy-in-2023-with-toshi-yoshihara https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/29/on-midrats-29-january-2023-episode-646-the-peoples-liberation-army-navy-in-2023-with-toshi-yoshihara#respond Sun, 29 Jan 2023 16:10:47 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32268  

Please join us at 5pm on 29 January 2023 for Midrats Episode 646: The People’s Liberation Army Navy in 2023, with Toshi Yoshihara

  • From a navy of peasants to professionals on par with any Western navy; from coastal patrol to global reach, the slow and steady growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) crept up on some policy makers in the last decade, but as the PLAN eclipses the United States Navy in numbers and is accelerating their industrial capacity and capabilities, the decades of the American uncontested dominance at sea is no longer granted.
  • Returning to Midrats to discuss this and the larger trends he raises in his new book,Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, will be Dr. Toshi Yoshihara.
  • Toshi Yoshihara is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). He was previously the inaugural John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.
  • In addition to his latest book Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy, he co-authored, with James R. Holmes, the second edition of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy. He currently teaches a graduate course on seapower in the Indo-Pacific at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/29/on-midrats-29-january-2023-episode-646-the-peoples-liberation-army-navy-in-2023-with-toshi-yoshihara/feed 0 32268 On Midrats 22 January 2023 Episode 645: The Navy’s New Mission with Bryan McGrath https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/21/on-midrats-22-january-2023-episode-645-the-navys-new-mission-with-bryan-mcgrath https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/21/on-midrats-22-january-2023-episode-645-the-navys-new-mission-with-bryan-mcgrath#respond Sat, 21 Jan 2023 14:08:42 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32248

Please join us at 5pm EST, 22 January 2023 for Midrats Episode 645: The Navy’s New Mission with Bryan McGrath

  • Officially the Navy may have a “new mission” but it is just putting in to law what has been in existence since the first Stone Age man outfitted his fishing canoe as a war canoe.
  • In a modern society, words mean things and even what is self-evident must on occasion be put in writing.
  • What is “Title 10?” That is what tells our Navy what it’s mission is.
  • We now have new Title 10 language, in Section 8062(a):
  • “The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped for the peacetime promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States and prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the duties described in the preceding sentence except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.”
  • What’s different?
  • As our guest stated earlier this summer:
  • “…the peacetime value of the Navy is no longer negotiable, it cannot be minimized, or at least it cannot as easily be minimized. As I said earlier, this is NOT an increase in the Navy’s mission set, it is a codification of the Navy’s mission set. The Navy has been promoting the national security interests and prosperity of the United States in peacetime since its inception, but only now (if passed) will the law actually reflect this.”
  • Don’t miss this Sunday’s Midrats where almost exactly 13 years since his first appearance, Bryan McGrath, Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC. returns for the full hour to discuss this and more.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Justin McTaggart)

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/21/on-midrats-22-january-2023-episode-645-the-navys-new-mission-with-bryan-mcgrath/feed 0 32248 Vulture’s Row #46 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/20/vultures-row-46 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/20/vultures-row-46#respond Fri, 20 Jan 2023 21:27:35 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32263

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/20/vultures-row-46/feed 0 32263 Force the Americans to End Their War of Independence on Any Terms—Now! https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/17/force-the-americans-to-end-their-war-of-independence-on-any-terms-now https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/17/force-the-americans-to-end-their-war-of-independence-on-any-terms-now#respond Tue, 17 Jan 2023 14:06:30 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32251 Ukraine now appears to be winning its war against Russian aggression—an event that may someday be remembered as Ukraine’s victory in its belated war of independence. However, prominent voices are calling for an immediate, negotiated end to the war to avoid “provocation” of Russia or further economic disruption. There have been facile demands for Ukraine to accede to whatever peace terms Russia may accept, even if that would leave millions under brutal Russian occupation, give Russia a springboard for future attacks, and preclude Ukraine from being able to make sovereign decisions about future EU or NATO membership. One way of viewing these demands is through the lens of history. Below, consider an alternative voice during the American War of Independence, in which a fictional nobleman from the little-known, backwards central European kingdom of Ecalpon calls for the Americans to temper their desire for independence.  An open letter by a nobleman of the kingdom of Ecalpon, 1780 There can be no question of the bravery of those American rebels who have boldly sought to overthrow the mighty British Empire. However, their courageous choices have come at a considerable cost to others, as well as themselves. Europe’s trade flows have been disrupted by a war that now involves several other nations, with France, Spain, and the Netherlands now supporting the rebels. The infernal rising prices that we have witnessed in recent months are due to the restrictions on trade that this war has inflicted upon all parties. Even trade involving neutral nations has been affected, as the combatants try to prevent one another from trading with anyone, interdicting merchant ships. The Americans have even impertinently sent privateers to prey upon shipping in the British Isles, as though they have no compunction about inflicting their faraway conflict on others. Moreover, there is a considerable chance that this war will escalate. The last major European war began in the backwoods of North America (with an incident instigated by Colonel George Washington), then spread to involve substantial fighting in continental Europe and beyond. The American war places such pressure on beleaguered Britain that it may choose to incite conflict on our continent, wreaking havoc among the German states. We must take great measures to ensure that Britain is not further provoked, nor that it feels itself to be “cornered” with no good strategic options. The Americans’ continual irritation of Great Britain, by their refusal to come to terms, could lead Britain to angrily lash out at nations that it perceives as being supportive of the rebels, or even as being insufficiently supportive of Britain. Just as the Royal Navy utterly destroyed the American town of Falmouth at the beginning of this war, it could devastate coastal cities in Europe. Coastlines and even riverbanks could be subjected to amphibious assaults, with British forces ravaging our towns and farms. If we continue to poke the bulldog, it will bite fiercely, and it will not let go. As for America, it is a faraway country of which we know nothing. Much as our hearts may cheer on these latter-day Davids who battle Goliath, their interests must be subordinated to those of European nations. Though the Americans have been subjected to countless iniquities, they must be compelled to come to reasonable terms with their monarch as quickly as possible. Perhaps their country can be partitioned, with Britain retaining control of New York and parts of the southern colonies. King George III and his government could be convinced to swear solemn oaths that they would not use these territories either to subvert the government of independent America or to launch its reconquest. Regardless of Britain’s past treatment of the colonists, it would surely abide by a treaty that guaranteed the future integrity and independence of American territory in return for an enduring peace, and would not use a peaceful interim merely to rearm and seek vengeance. There would be ample treaty provisions to manage border arrangements, and no nation—certainly not Britain—would dare to renounce a duly signed treaty ensuring tranquility and peaceful trade among nations. Alternatively, the two sides could be reconciled, with the American colonies accepting an autonomous status within the British Empire. Any responsible government would be sure to honor pledges that gave its territories autonomy for decades, or even indefinitely. Maintaining such autonomy would be in Britain’s interest, as well. Its empire would benefit from the growing prosperity of America, including copious trade with it, while avoiding nearly all the costs of governing that land. It would take a very foolish government to unilaterally abrogate such a pledge, which would also undermine its diplomatic standing with all other nations. To conclude, the Americans have achieved considerable successes against the British Empire, and could, in time, win control over the entirety of their country. However, we in Europe are quite literally paying a price: the costs of some items continue to rise inexorably, when they are available at all. The risk of the conflict escalating beyond its current bounds continues to haunt us. For these reasons, every type of available pressure must be applied to compel the Americans to accept a compromise with their British overlords, regardless of the cruelties that have been inflicted during and before this war. The time has come to demand an end to the conflict, irrespective of the number of Americans who are dying for their country or enduring occupation by foreign forces and rough mercenaries. Our interests require it.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/17/force-the-americans-to-end-their-war-of-independence-on-any-terms-now/feed 0 32251 Vulture’s Row #45 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/13/vultures-row-45 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/13/vultures-row-45#respond Fri, 13 Jan 2023 17:19:31 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32255

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/13/vultures-row-45/feed 0 32255 Navy Pay Issues https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/09/navy-pay-issues https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/09/navy-pay-issues#respond Mon, 09 Jan 2023 14:28:38 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32244 It’s 2022, and for the second year in a row, the Navy is late on my bonus payment. This isn’t even the first pay issue I’ve had this year. I took the five-year early-commit bonus back in 2020, and October is my anniversary month. I received my first bonus direct deposited in my account in October 2020. Between COVID-19-related delays, staff teleworking, and any number of other issues, October 2021 came and went without a bonus payment. The detailer is listed in the contract as the first point of contact, so I emailed them at the bureau. I wasn’t overly concerned, so I included a joke about a “jelly-of-the-month club” as my bonus for the year. I thought it was a pretty good joke, with all due respect to Chevy Chase. The bonus finally arrived in April 2022, six months late. Between May and June, a DFAS error reset flight pay for hundreds of Naval officers who had hit their administrative milestones, and—once again—my paycheck was light. The same issue in July made me wonder more about what was happening, but then someone pointed out that MyNavyHR had a note about how this was a known issue, and it was being addressed. The correct flight pay with back pay was deposited with my second July paycheck. Okay, maybe it’s all fixed. Nope, the August paycheck was light, too. I contacted the Bureau again, a different desk, and was assured that this issue, while maybe connected to the previous issue, would be corrected by September. At the same time, my squadron Admin shop initiated a Salesforce trouble ticket through Wing Admin. The ticket was closed within 20 minutes of opening it with a “nothing we can do, that’s someone else’s issue,” or words to that effect. At this point, no bonus appeared in October 2022, and there is a banner at the top of the Aviation Bonus page on MyNavyHR, dated 28 APR 2022, that directs that they are not to be contacted until the bonus payment is over 45 days late. I guess this means that I would not be able to make any inquiries until we are into the holiday leave period in December, likely with similar results to the Salesforce ticket. I would not dream of skipping work for 45 days, and if I did, someone would probably contact me during that time even if I put a banner up on my website saying not to. Lest you think this is just a lonely complaining session from one officer, I have a colleague who was finally able to pin on O-4 around a year late, due to COVID-19-related delays and supply-chain issues and has yet to receive twelve months of back pay, or another colleague who has a recent corrected pay mistake from 18 years ago! This doesn’t even cover my buddy who retired last summer and now spends most of his free time trying to help the pay system take back some money he was mistakenly given before they garnish his wages for his “indebtedness” to the Navy. Imagine if I walked into your kitchen, dropped thousands of dollars on the floor, walked out without saying anything, ignored your calls, or closed out all your trouble tickets within minutes, then tried to garnish your wages thorough an involuntary allotment for your indebtedness to me. I joined the Navy during the War on Terror with a healthy dose of patriotism, and even though I know the Navy will never love me back, I still love what I do and being a part of this organization. It is disheartening to see these issues crop up over and over again, and I’m doing all right financially. I’ll make it work. The sailors the Navy is supposed to be working for are surely struggling worse than I, and that should bother our leaders enough to make immediate changes, not just quick ones. The longer pay issues exist, the more talent will slip out the door to organizations that actually pay their people on time. On-time pay should not be a discriminator between military service or civilian employment. This is embarrassing. Furthermore, bonuses and backpay paid in the next calendar year could have implications for service members’ taxes, pushing them into a higher tax bracket and increasing their tax burden through no fault of their own. With inflation hitting 40-year highs, missing pay only makes a difficult environment more stressful. If you didn’t get a pay increase this year that tracks with inflation, you took a pay cut—if you get paid on time at all.  

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/09/navy-pay-issues/feed 0 32244 On Midrats 8 January 2023 Episode 644: 13th Anniversary Show https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/07/on-midrats-8-january-2023-episode-644-13th-anniversary-show https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/07/on-midrats-8-january-2023-episode-644-13th-anniversary-show#respond Sun, 08 Jan 2023 02:17:27 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32234

Please join us at 5pm on 8 January 2023 for Midrats Episode 644: 13th Anniversary Show

  • When we started Midrats, President Obama hadn’t even been President for a year, I only left active duty 4-months ago, Russia was mostly forgotten about except for Secretary of State Clinton famous “Reset/Overload,” anyone worried about China was considered an alarmist, and no one really knew what a “podcast” was except for a very small group of to-online weirdos.
  • One day our friend Claude Berube convinced the two of us and the late Raymond Pritchett that people might be interested in hearing us chat about those things that we find interesting.
  • That was 13-years ago – and Midrats is still going strong
  • Come join us for the full hour as we take a quick review of the status on the conversation in the national security arena, the big lessons of 2022, and what we plan on keeping an eye on in 2023.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2023/01/07/on-midrats-8-january-2023-episode-644-13th-anniversary-show/feed 0 32234 Vulture’s Row #44 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/23/vultures-row-44 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/23/vultures-row-44#respond Fri, 23 Dec 2022 17:00:15 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32236

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/23/vultures-row-44/feed 0 32236 On Midrats 18 December 2022 – Episode 643: Cyber Lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/17/on-midrats-18-december-2022-episode-643-cyber-lessons-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/17/on-midrats-18-december-2022-episode-643-cyber-lessons-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war#respond Sat, 17 Dec 2022 17:41:07 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32225

Please join us at 4pm EST for Midrats Episode 643: Cyber Lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War

  • There is still a lot of fighting to be done in the Russo-Ukrainian War, but important lessons can already be drawn from the first 10-months of conflict.
  • One of the most hyped “new” domains of war the last three decades has been what is generally referred to as “cyber.” Its growth in interest and buzz paralleled the decline and neglect of a more traditional form of modern war, Electronic Warfare.
  • This Sunday we’re going to do a deep dive in what we are seeing, what we thought we should have seen but haven’t, and how this should inform present support and future policy in the area of cyber.
  • Our guest for the full hour this Sunday from 4-5pm Eastern will be Shashank Joshi, Defence editor at The Economist.
  • If you are looking for a read-ahead, “The Digital Front” in the December 3rd edition of The Economist would be a good start.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/17/on-midrats-18-december-2022-episode-643-cyber-lessons-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war/feed 0 32225 Vulture’s Row #43 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/16/vultures-row-43 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/16/vultures-row-43#respond Fri, 16 Dec 2022 20:14:07 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32229

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/16/vultures-row-43/feed 0 32229 On Midrats 11 December 2022 – Episode 642: A Week of Maritime Good Tidings? https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/11/on-midrats-11-december-2022-episode-642-a-week-of-maritime-good-tidings https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/11/on-midrats-11-december-2022-episode-642-a-week-of-maritime-good-tidings#respond Sun, 11 Dec 2022 18:04:58 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32220

Please join us at 5pm (EST) on 11 December 2022 for Midrats Episode 642: A Week of Maritime Good Tidings?

  • From the NDAA to some rather positive words from the SECNAV on some of our favorite maritime areas of concern, so far December has produced a few positives to think about – if you don’t think too much about the Army-Navy game on Saturday…
  • This week’s Midrats free for all will start here and then we’ll work our way around the national security landscape.
  • As always, open topic, open phones … so come join us for the conversation.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/11/on-midrats-11-december-2022-episode-642-a-week-of-maritime-good-tidings/feed 0 32220 On Midrats 4 December 2022 – Episode 641: December Maritime Free For All https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/03/on-midrats-4-december-2022-episode-641-december-maritime-free-for-all https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/03/on-midrats-4-december-2022-episode-641-december-maritime-free-for-all#respond Sat, 03 Dec 2022 13:14:35 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32164

Please join us at 5pm EST for Midrats Episode 641: December Maritime Free For All

  • Now that you’re in that time where you’re trying to make that transition from Thanksgiving to Christmas & New Years saturation … give your stomach and mind a break and join EagleOne and Sal for a maritime and national security free for all this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern.
  • As is usual with our free for all format, the studio line is open for you to call in and the chat room will be running for your questions, observations … or even topics you wish we’d discuss but it seems we never get around to.
  • In the course of the hour we’ll try to at least touch on this week’s warship chicken in San Diego, why everyone should care about secure undersea infrastructure, and take another look at how the logistics failures by the Russians ashore informs planning for logistics planning for a major Pacific war at sea.
  • Come join us!

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/12/03/on-midrats-4-december-2022-episode-641-december-maritime-free-for-all/feed 0 32164 A Pixel of Truth? AI Art and Unlimited Possibilities https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/22/a-pixel-of-truth-ai-art-and-unlimited-possibilities https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/22/a-pixel-of-truth-ai-art-and-unlimited-possibilities#respond Tue, 22 Nov 2022 15:32:35 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32166

“A picture is worth a thousand words.” —Fred R. Banard

  Banard’s adage is still true, but it deserves a coda: Today, a picture can be made with only five words.  Enter DALL-E 2. A portmanteau of the artist Salvador Dali and the Pixar character WALL-E, DALL-E 2 is OpenAI’s powerful text to image generator. Type anything you want to see, say, “An astronaut poolside in the style of vector art,” or “A military airplane flying over water during sunset with a ship behind, polaroid,” and within seconds you have four versions of the thing you are trying to visualize. You can then download any of the four images or ask for variations on specific one, and within seconds more pictures arrive.

“A military airplane flying over water during sunset with a ship behind, polaroid,” Created by DALLE-2.

And let’s be clear, it’s not searching the internet for your description. This isn’t Google on steroids. No. The program is making an image of something or someone that doesn’t exist—in seconds. DALLE-2 has been trained on hundreds of millions of images and artistic styles, and when prompted, it weaves together pixels to create a new picture. After signing up on the waiting list a few weeks ago, I recently gained access to DALL-E 2. And like thousands of other users, I’m amazed at its capability. It’s also scary. Text to image generators can create violent images, propaganda, sexually explicit content, and other not so nice things. DALL-E 2, however, has filters that stop you from seeing “A photo of a president ice skating in their underwear.” No. That won’t fly. As OpenAI says, your prompts must be “G Rated.” But DALL-E 2 is not the only text to image generator. There are other options that are either in beta or coming to market. Some, like Midjourney, will compete with DALL-E 2 in output quality, while other produce less than desired results. Also, their terms of service might differ, with some text to image generators allowing prompts of realistic, real-world people or mature material. I’ll walk through some prompts to show you the capability of the program. For this audience, the pictures I created used prompts that have a naval theme. Still, you are only limited by your imagination and the program’s terms of service as to the types of prompts you write for the algorithm to make and the images it spits out. And at the end, I’ll finish with some thoughts on the good, the bad, and how we might think about this capability going forward.

AI Art, Styles, and Prompts

For a text to image AI, a simple ask for a picture doesn’t always produce the best results. In fact, it rarely does. The key to getting what you want out of these programs is understand how to ask—that is, how to write prompts for the images you want to see. Thankfully, OpenAI published a prompt book that shows the prompts you can ask to see. The list is huge: you can ask for pictures in the style of oil paintings, watercolor, vector art, stained glass, cartoons, line art, pixel art, photo realism, charcoal, abstract art, and much more. It can copy the style of a particular artist. It can even emulate the color and look of a particular movie. DALLE 2 shines when asked to create pictures in the style of oil paintings. Whaling villages, aircraft carriers, portraits, war at sea — I tried them all. In the styles of Van Gogh, Rembrandt, Dali, Velázquez, DaVinci, Klimt, and Picasso. Admirers of these artists will spot the differences between the artists and the AI in the brush strokes and lighting and composition. DALLE isn’t perfect; these pictures approximate the style of the artist. Still, the effects are impressive. Let’s begin. An oil portrait of a sailor in the style of Rembrandt:   An oil painting of an aircraft carrier in the style of DaVinci:   What about an aircraft carrier in the style of DaVinci’s notebooks: Or, “Admiral Horatio Nelson as a muppet, in the style of Pablo Picasso, Blue Period, cubism”: “An oil painting of a whaling village, piers, ships, sailors walking around, in the style of Rembrandt, wide landscape”: Now, what about an oil painting of a naval war in the style of Gustav Klimt? (You could have told me it was a painting of the night action in the Solomon Islands campaign and I would have believed you. Here it’s Klimt’s color palette that DALLE gets hold of.) DALLE 2 can also easily create pictures showing facial expressions. Here’s “an oil portrait of a young sailor with a grin and looking off to the right, amused, in the style of Salvador Dali.” And with a little Photoshop knowledge, you can download and shrink the original image to create blank canvas space, upload it to DALLE, and then prompt the AI to expand the image focusing on the background, thus making an entire piece of artwork:

“An oil portrait of a young sailor with a grin and looking off to the right, amused, with an ocean and ship in the background, in the style of Salvador Dali,” created by DALLE-2.

Other styles, stained glass and watercolor, for instance, also did well. (Indeed, the stained glass image of the two sailors fighting in the foreground with the ship’s masts in the background is phenomenal.) An F-18 taking off in the style of watercolor: It can easily handle a touch of silliness. In this case, let’s create a painting of a sailor playing poker with a rabbit.   Or what about some “sailors on a dance floor at a hooka party in the style of VanGogh.”

Photo Realism

Let’s turn to photo realism. DALLE 2 can create photo realistic images of varying quality. The key for the algorithm is the user needs to specifiy elements of the picture, to include the photo’s camera settings (e.g., focal length, aperture, and even lens maker) and the overall feel of the image you are trying to create (e.g., moody, sunrise, dramatic light). These prompts will help you create some of the best photo realistic images. An F-18 taking off at sunrise? Sure.    

“An F-18 taking off from a runway, wide angle, dramatic back lighting, Sigma 85mm, f2.8, sunrise.”

What about the inside of a warship? Let’s add some smoke and computer screens..  

“An image of the inside of a warship, full of smoke, computer screens, moody, Sigma 18mm, f8.0.”

Ok, what about black and white? Easy.  

“An image of the inside of a warship, full of smoke, computer screens, black and white, Sigma 18mm, f8.0,” created by DALLE 2

Now, let’s take out the smoke and add a water bottle on a table:

“An image of the inside of a warship, computer screens, moody, water bottle on a table, Sigma 18mm, f8.0.”

 

Not All Perfect

DALLE-2 struggles in a few areas. It can’t spell. It can’t make accurate maps. And while it’s great at making logos, it can’t create the text that accompanies those graphics. It also has trouble making a “clean” picture of a human. By “clean” what I mean is that the composition of pixels creates asymmetric images. As you can see from the three daguerreotype pictures that were used as the cover photo for this post, if you look closely, there’s something wrong with their eyes. Still, I decided to tone down the prompt asking for a “big grin” to see if that would return an image that looked better. It did. The style of daguerreotype (slower shutter speeds with objects out of focus, the sword in this case) could easily lead someone to believe that these two men existed once upon a time. Their eyes are in focus just enough, symmetrical just enough, to lead you to believe that any imperfections are simply the accumulation of time and wear on that image in someone’s box of keepsakes.   I did try one last thing. I tried to put some missiles on the littoral combat ship. Seriously. I did. But, sadly, that didn’t work.

(I don’t know what this is, but it doesn’t have any missiles.) Created by Dalle 2

 

Final Thoughts

Text to image generators will get better. I suspect we’ll see publications and artists and others use them for many things. Thumbnails for articles, concept art design to inspire others, and sadly but predictably—nefarious purposes ranging from propaganda to online bullying. Some pictures are meant to inform, some persuade, some entertain, while others help us remember the past or tell a story. The ability to do any of these things without the help of a professional graphic artist and within seconds, will change our world. How big or how small remains to be seen. This summer, the publishing world hit a few firsts with text to image AIs creating the covers of The Economist and Cosmopolitan magazine (the Cosmo cover doesn’t seem like their brand, but OK, whatever). And the Atlantic magazine used a text to image generator to create an illustration for one of their pieces on the Alex Jones trial. So its here. To close, can you imagine a “synthwave style of a waraship with sun reflection on the sea with a combat ship on the water, digital art” as a cover photo for Proceedings . . . I can.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/22/a-pixel-of-truth-ai-art-and-unlimited-possibilities/feed 0 32166 On Midrats 20 November 2022 – Episode 640: Pre-Thanksgiving Maritime and Natsec Feast https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/20/on-midrats-20-november-2022-episode-640-pre-thanksgiving-maritime-and-natsec-feast https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/20/on-midrats-20-november-2022-episode-640-pre-thanksgiving-maritime-and-natsec-feast#respond Sun, 20 Nov 2022 16:03:30 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32157 Please join us at 5pm ET on 20 November 2022 for Midrats Episode 640: Pre-Thanksgiving Maritime and Natsec Feast

  • What do you need to know to make sure you have all the right talking points around the Thanksgiving table?
  • If someone brings up the Navy, China, Ukraine, inflation, or supply chain issues – well, we know Midrats regulars are already up to speed – but now’s your opportunity to make sure all your talking points are up to date!
  • No guests, no set agenda, just open phones, open minds, and open chat room for those who are with us live.
  • Don’t be stuck talking about twitter or Taylor Swift this Thanksgiving!

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/20/on-midrats-20-november-2022-episode-640-pre-thanksgiving-maritime-and-natsec-feast/feed 0 32157 Wartime Procedural Compliance: Plan to Cut Corners https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/14/wartime-procedural-compliance-plan-to-cut-corners https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/14/wartime-procedural-compliance-plan-to-cut-corners#respond Mon, 14 Nov 2022 15:24:37 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32147

Art by author.

Imagine you are the commanding officer (CO) of a guided-missile destroyer in a war with a peer competitor. For months, your crew has spent more time in General Quarters than any other condition. You are exhausted, and your remaining mental bandwidth is focused on fighting the ship. Despite the wartime stress, routine tasks still need to be completed around the ship. The engineers need to transfer fuel and repair the reverse osmosis system, the fire controlmen need to repair a console in the combat information center, and the gunner’s mates need to tag out the vertical launching system to replace a circuit card assembly. To save time and keep sailors and equipment in the fight, special requests are coming to you left and right. Every department is requesting waivers to minimize maintenance requirements or alter procedures to make work more efficient. Most of these waivers make sense—the warfighting benefit outweighs the increased risk to personnel and equipment. Inevitably, some of the requests are bad ideas and filtering them out taxes the mental bandwidth needed to fight the ship. You wish these issues had been resolved before you left port. I argue that now is the time to think through wartime procedural compliance and administrative requirements. War Bill Rightfully, the peacetime Navy prioritizes safety of personnel and equipment when operating equipment or conducting maintenance and repairs. However, during the next naval conflict, when torpedoes and anti-ship ballistic missiles threaten to sink ships, COs will order sailors to cut personnel- and equipment-safety corners to keep the ship in the fight. That will happen. But hastily cutting corners will surely cause unintended casualties. To mitigate wartime mistakes, the Navy should help stressed and sleep-deprived wartime COs decide which corners to cut by creating a War Bill today. What would a War Bill look like? In some respects, it would be akin to the Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine used on surface ships. When a ship enters a maritime warzone, the CO would be able to authorize predetermined wartime procedural and administrative deviations with a signature and a 1 Main Circuit announcement. These deviations would prioritize the ship’s readiness to fight over the safety of individual sailors and equipment. Deviations could be authorized for the entire ship or be limited to specific programs or work centers. For preventative maintenance, wartime deviations could be made to maintenance schedules, procedures, and administrative requirements. To adapt the maintenance schedule, the CO could authorize the maintenance and material management coordinator to trigger wartime preventative maintenance schedule (PMS) in Sked. A global trigger is already used in Sked to switch a ship’s PMS schedule between in port and underway; a similar trigger could be added to switch between wartime and peacetime PMS. In wartime, the periodicity of non-vital PMS requirements would be extended, or in some cases, PMS would even be postponed until the maintenance and material management coordinator returned Sked to a peacetime status. Wartime maintenance that could not be postponed would have a wartime PMS card that cuts out non-vital steps and repetitive non-vital notes and warnings. Non-vital PMS admin, like Force Revisions and Spot Checks, would be postponed until the ship returned to a peacetime status. Shipboard safety programs, like Tagout, Fall Prevention, or HAZMAT, would also have wartime deviations. These deviations would authorize sailors to take greater risks to complete vital maintenance and repairs quickly, while minimizing the time spent hanging tags or checking out equipment. Often, an entire system does not need to be tagged out. Instead, in some cases, after a brief phone call to deconflict with the central control station, sailors could quickly isolate and repair a component of a system without even hanging tags. When working aloft, there are many cases when a sailor could safely go aloft in specific zones without setting aloft, securing equipment, or checking out a harness. In the HAZMAT program, some of the materials that are considered HAZMAT are not very hazardous; many can be found under a typical kitchen sink or in a household garage. Regulations requiring sailors to check out and promptly return anti-freeze or grease to the HAZMAT locker might make sense in peacetime, but they are needlessly burdensome in war. A War Bill would reduce HAZMAT regulations and allow work centers to keep some HAZMAT indefinitely. Although the goal of a War Bill would be to streamline procedures and minimize requirements, there would inevitably be cases when procedural requirements would need to become more burdensome in a warzone. Some reporting requirements will increase. For some critical systems, perhaps more permissions and safety requirements will be imposed during wartime, not less. Situations like that likely exist, and again, now is the time to think through those cases. The above examples are far from exhaustive; readers can surely think of other burdensome requirements that should be modified in wartime. I leave it to subject matter experts to work out the details of a War Bill. Wartime Mindset In a fight, the CO does not have time to meticulously wave safety protocols. The CO needs an easy way to alleviate procedural burdens upon entering a warzone and then restore standard peacetime requirements upon exiting the warzone. A War Bill can help make that happen. Of course, by cutting safety corners, wartime procedures assume more risk. We need to accept that. In a 2018 Proceedings article, Jonathan Panter wrote that, “Today’s surface warfare officers are in a peacetime mindset . . . the community has forgotten that it represents the maritime combat arms branch of the joint service.” With the war in Ukraine, global tensions are rising, and we cannot afford to have a peacetime mindset in the Surface Navy. To adopt a wartime mindset, we need to change how we view risk. In doing so, we need to plan to accept more risk to individual sailors and equipment to keep the ship in the fight. Wider Implications The War Bill explored here is focused on wartime procedural deviations for surface ships. However, the concept can and should be expanded to the Navy as a whole. What administrative red tape can we cut in a war? What maintenance and training requirements can be reduced? What inspections can be postponed? On a broad scale, we need to think through what requirements we can streamline the moment the first shots are fired.  

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/14/wartime-procedural-compliance-plan-to-cut-corners/feed 0 32147 On Midrats 13 November 2022- Episode 639: Elections Have Consequences https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/12/on-midrats-13-november-2022-episode-639-elections-have-consequences https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/12/on-midrats-13-november-2022-episode-639-elections-have-consequences#respond Sat, 12 Nov 2022 15:15:40 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32119

Please join us at 5pm EST on 13 November 2022 for Midrats Episode 639: Elections Have Consequences

  • Every election cycle provides a preview of what advocates for national defense and sea power will have on their side – or not on their side – in the next Congress.
  • New people arrive, experienced people leave, and priorities, agendas, and advocacy will shift change with them.
  • What can we expect in the next Congress based on changes we see and those national security issues waxing or waning in the mind of legislators and their counterparts in the Executive Branch?
  • Politics matter.
  • Our guests for the full hour to discuss the implications of this years election in the national security arena, will be Claude Berube and Derek (Dirk) Maurer.
  • Claude Berube, PhD, is the author of “On Wide Seas: The US Navy in the Jacksonian Era” and several other books. He has worked on Capitol Hill, in the defense industry, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. A Commander in the US Navy Reserve, he is currently assigned to a unit with Navy Warfare Development Center. Since 2005 he has taught in the Political Science and History Departments at the US Naval Academy.
  • Dirk Maurer served as the Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Defense Continuity and Mission Assurance and as DASD for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. At the beginning of the Trump administration, he was responsible for overseeing the confirmation of all Senate-confirmed personnel and worked confirmations on the Presidential Transition team. He was DASD for Defense Support and Civil Authorities during the George W. Bush administration
  • Mr. Maurer has served on multiple Senate committees and in the personal offices of three Senators. He retired from the Marine Corps Reserve after twenty years. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/12/on-midrats-13-november-2022-episode-639-elections-have-consequences/feed 0 32119 The Coast Guard Must Take Action to Send Women Afloat https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/10/the-coast-guard-must-take-action-to-send-women-afloat https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/10/the-coast-guard-must-take-action-to-send-women-afloat#respond Thu, 10 Nov 2022 15:43:32 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32144 The U.S. Coast Guard is many great things, but equitable in afloat assignments is not one of them. When I began at the Coast Guard Academy (CGA), going afloat was number one on my list of things I most definitely did not want to do. However, that all changed when I got my summer assignment: 11 weeks on board a National Security Cutter (NSC). I will not lie; I was nervous, anxious, and excited all at once. Normally, third class cadets spend five weeks at a small boat station and then the rest of the summer on the USCGC Eagle (WIX-327) with 130 of their classmates. I, along with a select few of other young women, spent our summer experiencing the “real” Coast Guard. Despite my apprehension in the beginning, I finished the summer with a love for the sea, and planning on an operations-afloat career. While I thoroughly enjoyed my summer afloat, the Coast Guard is struggling with female retention afloat, has identified the wrong root cause for this problem, and has placed corrective emphasis and focus in the wrong locations. Going Afloat Some cadets, including myself, argue that the best part of CGA is the company chiefs. The company chiefs are our closest connection to the enlisted side of the Coast Guard and are there to advise, humble, and train us. It was my company chief that first suggested I go afloat for my summer assignment. He wanted me to see the “real” Coast Guard, not the day-to-day politics of CGA. By the time I was finishing up my fourth-class year, I was disheartened by my CGA experience and very much questioning if this was the kind of Coast Guard I wanted to serve in. While on the NSC, I found my passion in the Navigation (NAV) Division. For hours, I would sit down in the NAV room helping prepare paper charts. When my time was not spent charting, I was excited to follow the engineers around, learning the ins and outs of the NSC. I felt like I could contribute to something bigger than myself. Simply put, my contributions to the NAV division made me feel proud. Once underway, I found a certain thrill with being on the bridge. It was like nothing I had ever experienced before. When they set Special Sea Detail, I would run up to the bridge to stand in the corner for hours, just observing. Once they realized I was there, they would ask me to help call out the buoys that passed or the ship’s relation to the day boards, providing me another opportunity to demonstrate the skills I learned from CGA. The bridge would almost hum with excitement . . . or maybe with fear from the junior officers tasked with navigating the ship for the first time. Fellow cadets and select crew members thought I was crazy when I would stay up there for hours each day; however, I felt like I was seeing the world for the very first time. I vividly remember our transit to Hawaii. I was assigned mess cook duty when we had a quick break. We all went out to the fantail right as the sun was rising over the horizon. There were no ships for miles, just us and the magnificent ocean. I stood there taking in the beauty of it all, the inky waves crashing up onto the hull of the ship. The sea was dark, beautiful, powerful, and I knew I had to remember that moment. I took a video. Granted, nothing could do the ocean justice, but when I start to feel lost or disheartened at CGA, I watch that video to remind myself of why I attend CGA. It sounds cliché, but as I push through another semester of grueling academics, I think back to that time and vividly remember how alive I felt. Hands on Experience My experience this summer was invaluable, and I still discuss the lessons I learned in my leadership journal with my mentors, my company officer, and company chief. However, I was one of four third-class females that got the chance to spend 11 weeks on a cutter; only three female third-class cadets got to spend six weeks on the cutter.1 Overall, that is seven future female officers that experienced the fleet early on. In stark contrast, there were 53 male third-class cadets that went to a cutter during the 2021 summer training period.2 Of the 245 cadets in the class of 2024, 98 are female and 147 are male.3 Females make up 40 percent of the Class of 2024, yet only 7 percent of us got to experience the fleet on a cutter—a striking difference to the 36 percent of males in the Class of 2024 going afloat on a cutter.4 The difference between 7 percent and 36 percent is not only a great disparity but a clear lack of equity between male and female cadets. Ongoing Barriers There are barriers in place that have been found to prevent female officers and enlisted from pursuing certain career paths. The 2019 Women’s Retention Survey clearly explained that the Coast Guard struggled to retain women and found that “for those who wanted to pursue afloat careers, they described female berthing restrictions limiting their assignment options and opportunities for sea time.” Unfortunately, this issue limits opportunities of female cadets compared to their male peers. However, CGA has the resources to combat this growing issue. While there are many complex circumstances that go into the summer assignments, CGA can make more progressive choices regarding the newer cutters. USCGC Waesche (WMSL-751) had seven male cadets sharing one berthing. Could that berthing not have been all female cadets? When faced with these challenging scenarios, the Coast Guard must find the answer to them in innovative ways. While more berthing options are being built in our newer ships (Offshore Patrol Cutters), CGA must make it a priority to send female cadets to ships that have the possibility of having them as other older cutters do not (i.e., select Medium Endurance Cutters). A common argument from senior officers is that there is not enough interest from female cadet in going afloat during the summer; I vehemently disagree. I had multiple peers reach out and ask to take my spot on board the NSC. One classmate of mine said, “There are so many platforms that I am interested in but then I find out that they have limited or little to no berthing space for women and it makes me upset because I am putting in the same amount of work as my male classmates but get less opportunities in the fleet.”5 Her sentiment is felt by many female cadets in the Class of 2024. Currently, 91 of them will get their first opportunity to explore different platforms first-class summer. This is only a few short months before first-class cadets are required to submit their Ensign Billet list. Another classmate of mine expressed frustration to not receive the same opportunity as our male peers during summer training. Now, she feels that she has “to make a less informed decision when it comes to choosing [her] future career path than many of [her] male classmates who were able to go on one or multiple platforms last summer.”6 The females in the Class of 2024 must make the difficult decision of what billet to pursue for their first tour afloat with less experience and time underway as our male peers. Opportunities for Growth The CGA leads the way compared to other service academies in the number of women in each class. However, given the large discrepancy in the number of summer assignments, it is clear that CGA struggles with diversity stewardship. CGA senior leadership work hard to ensure diversity but are unable to get everyone to graduation equally. As more women are recruited, CGA does not have the adequate resources and training to provide a space for them to grow. Also, CGA lacks opportunities for that growth and is missing an incredible chance to diversify the fleet. Third-class summer is the perfect opportunity to spark interest with future female leaders of our service. Having positive experiences afloat makes female cadets more willing to persevere through the rough patches at CGA. I am a prime example of this. This mentality can and should be applied to retaining women afloat. If we can spark the love for the sea and afloat life now and provide opportunities to experience different platforms, the Coast Guard can increase its diversity within the ranks of the afloat community and officer corps. The Coast Guard has young women willing and motivated to go afloat yet is inadvertently placing barriers upon their future careers. Looking Forward Third-class summer is vital to future career selection in the Coast Guard. Without having gone afloat on an NSC, I would not be at CGA today. Seeing the world from the bridge helped me identify the reason why I joined and solidified the leadership lessons I learned as they guide me through my 200-week leadership journey. If this is not addressed now, our service risks losing the diversity and relevance the Coast Guard has so desperately worked to attain. To the senior leaders at CGA and in the Coast Guard: Make it a priority to send female cadets afloat for summer assignments and provide cadets with opportunities to experience different underway platforms. The focus should be on providing prospective female officers with earlier exposure to the afloat community starting at CGA with cadets like me. Not enough female cadets experience adequate time on board cutters early on in their careers; if female cadets did, the Coast Guard would see an increase in the number that go and—more importantly—stay afloat. To the female cadets who may be wary going to a major cutter for their summer assignment: the 11 weeks on board a NSC was the greatest decision I made, and I encourage you to do the same. The Coast Guard strives to be “Ready, Responsive, and Relevant;” however, without inspiring the young women at CGA and providing equal opportunities to experience life afloat, our service will be nowhere near “relevant” and merely another case study in history of organizational inequality.

  1. LT Zachary Wells, USCG, “Class of 2024 3c Summer Slate (v6),” 16 April 2021.
  2. Wells, “Class of 2024 3c Summer Slate.”
  3. USCGA Admissions, “Fall Enrollment Gender Makeup,” 17 October 2021.
  4. LT Zachary Wells, USCG, “Class of 2024 3c Summer Slate (v6),” 16 April 2021.
  5. Cadet Third Class Allison Osborn, USCG, interview with the author, New London, Connecticut, 23 January 2022.
  6. Cadet Third Class Madison Garrigus, USCG, interview with the author, New London, Connecticut, 24 January 2022.
]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/10/the-coast-guard-must-take-action-to-send-women-afloat/feed 0 32144 The Silence That Kills: An Open Conversation on Suicide Prevention https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/07/the-silence-that-kills-an-open-conversation-on-suicide-prevention https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/07/the-silence-that-kills-an-open-conversation-on-suicide-prevention#respond Mon, 07 Nov 2022 14:03:09 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32135 It was just a regular day. I remember putting the key in and twisting the doorknob as I made my way into the kitchen. My roommate was sitting on the couch when I first saw him, quietly staring at his phone. The words that came out of him were just saddening: “It happened again, another one.” I replied with a question: Are you okay? I knew what my roommate meant. It was frustrating and hard to wrap my head around it. He is currently stationed in the now infamous USS George Washington (CVN-73). The national news coverage made the problem more visible. Suicide continues to grow not just in the military, but nationwide. A Growing Problem Although we have learned about the cycle of life since elementary school, the death of a family member, close friend, or coworker continues to leave an empty space. The impact on morale can be visible not just in the emotional sense, but sometimes you feel those close to the deceased when they walk by you—as if air itself has an altered texture. In 2020, we lost 78 of our shipmates. In 2021, we lost 69 more—including both active and reserve. According to MyNavyHR, the count is at 56 sailors as of August 2022. This is where the question begins and the reality hits. What are we going to do to change this? How effective is suicide prevention training? And how can we prevent this? Each year, the Navy provides repeated training regarding suicide prevention. I have seen shipmates disappointed over the fact that suicide prevention is taking time from their work center. The main objective becomes signing the 3500-training muster sheet, accrediting them for the training received. Can anyone blame them? If you see it once, you already know what you are about to see again. After several suicides of sailors that have participated in the training for several years—and even those who have given the training—perhaps a different approach is needed. We need space for younger sailors and senior enlisted sailors to give each other an uninterrupted and honest reality check. An Open Dialog Changing this starts by being open to dialog. We must be aware of the following facts: Suicides happen, sometimes it is unexpected, and it is not your fault if you lose someone you care about. While some people who commit suicide have identifiable mental health problems, like depression or addiction, others do not. Patrick J. Skerrett, former executive editor of Harvard Health mentions, “Many people who commit suicide do so without letting on they are thinking about it or planning it.” He also comments, “The decision to commit suicide might be made just minutes or hours before the act.” Due to the nature of our jobs, sailors work with levels of high stress, unpredicted hours, and at a fast pace, which makes it hard to notice if someone is struggling. To think that we can stop this from happening completely is unfeasible. However, sailors can reduce the numbers by being willing to act and help shipmates during times of depression, stress, and even personal matters by guiding them to the right professionals. Ongoing Issues Mental health issues needs to be addressed in the military. We must take into consideration the environment, background, past trauma, and emotional isolation that service members have suffered. Also, sailors need to be able to talk openly and know that their career cannot be derailed for being brave enough to speak up. One issue is that it takes months for sailors to get counseling sessions due to long waiting lists. As part of the armed forces, we need to reach out to the families that are affected as well as the shipmates or coworkers to get them counseling because their battle is still going even after their loss. Losing someone to suicide triggers confusion, pain, and anguish. The emotional toll and anger can make us believe we were not there for those that needed us. The truth of the matter is no one is prepared to lose someone so suddenly. What can we say about the USS George Washington (CVN-73)? Is it just a sad reminder of what happens when we act too late, or fail to act at all? How can we connect with each other to break the taboo of mental health? Sometimes, just the words “mental health” already have a negative connotation. Accountability The subject is already sensitive. Therefore, we have a conundrum; we must make the ethical decision of not being a bystander and intervene. Helping in someone’s day to day life does not mean that you are overstepping. It is better than dealing with the consequences from failing to act. Sometimes, a simple gesture may be the difference between an individual not seeing a way out of their personal struggle. Sometimes, having someone to talk to may prevent them from becoming another statistic. Being assertive and asking the right questions sounds like a cliché, but how many of the fallen and their families wish there was someone to reach out to them? Consider these simple questions: Have you thought about hurting yourself? Have you been thinking about suicide? Asking these questions can make a difference and save a life. Accountability is not just for the upper chain of command. I can attest those lines of communication are neither as clear nor as direct as they need to be in the service. Honestly, suicide is not something sailors talk about while drinking a cup of coffee and holding a bagel first thing in the morning. However, sailors should count on each other, and forget the boundaries and those conversations that may seem off-limits. Looking Forward We need direct action, not just a form that proves we have completed a training evolution. Depression in the armed services has always existed and continues to prevail. The “suck it up, buttercup” mentality needs to die. That is why we have each other; sailors do not have to carry the weight alone. Sailors also need better access to counseling. This can be done by implementing counselor visits to the commands and ships, even if it is virtual sessions. From time to time, it may feel like the commands offer a painfully slow response after the fact which creates a feeling of divide, resentment, and the feeling that the lower-level sailors are ignored and easily replaceable. Accountability goes top to bottom and bottom to top. Communication must be open and the enlisted side which I am part of cannot and must not be afraid to discuss what is happening in their surroundings. Seeking help does not make you weak. Physiological, emotional, and untreated trauma are certain issues that need to be faced by everyone. That is where the commands take part in helping and guiding our shipmates into the right direction, and leadership has the duty and moreover the obligation of looking after their people. It was said by Malcolm S. Forbes that, “You can easily judge the character of a man by how he treats those who can do nothing for him.”1 We are the United States Navy. We work, train, fight, repeat day by day. Leadership knows that we are worth taking care of; this is how the world’s greatest Navy stays on top. It is under the guidance of the officer to steer the ship, but it is the enlisted that keeps it afloat. So, listen to the sailors. Let them know their importance and never take for granted their health—not just physical but mental.

  1. Malcolm S. Forbes, The Sayings of Chairman Malcolm: The Capitalist’s Handbook (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1986).

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/07/the-silence-that-kills-an-open-conversation-on-suicide-prevention/feed 0 32135 A Review of the Surgeon General’s Professional Reading List: Part 1 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/01/a-review-of-the-surgeon-generals-professional-reading-list-part-1 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/01/a-review-of-the-surgeon-generals-professional-reading-list-part-1#respond Tue, 01 Nov 2022 14:55:23 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32129 For as long as I could remember, I had been a book nerd. Reading was always the easiest way for me to relax and recharge. That changed dramatically in 2008 when I started medical school. Suddenly, any extracurricular hobby was a guilt-inducing distraction from studying. So, I dutifully set aside my hobby and “read more about my patients” for the next several years. I then had the privilege of hearing the “Warrior Monk” himself, General James Mattis, speak during my utilization tour in Guantanamo Bay. After his speech, the first question from the audience was, “What are you reading, sir?” I was shocked, thinking, “This man is the Secretary of Defense! He doesn’t have time to read!” Of course, I later learned that General Mattis is rumored to have a 7,000 volume personal library and wrote in his memoir, “If you haven’t read hundreds of books, you are functionally illiterate, and you will be incompetent, because your personal experiences alone aren’t broad enough to sustain you.”1 That gave me license to casually pick-up books again, guilt-free. However, my reading selections were admittedly haphazard. Fast-forward to 2022: I am a busy family man and third-year neonatology fellow, seemingly always either post-call, pre-call, or on inpatient service. I was intrigued by the Surgeon General’s Professional Reading List after learning about it on Captain Joel Schofer’s Career Planning Blog, but could not imagine having the time to undertake it myself. Then my wife (an English Literature professor by training and voracious reader herself) showed me the Department of Defense MWR Libraries. Nearly every title on the Surgeon General’s list is available there as an audiobook! While I would miss out on the tactile joy of holding these books while reading them, I figured that I could make better use of my P.T. and commuting time by simultaneously listening to the selections. Rear Admiral Bruce Gillingham has made it clear that this list is not meant to be viewed as “homework,” but rather as a jumping-off point for each sailor’s reading journey. The Surgeon General’s Professional Reading List is divided into four subgroups, organized by Navy Medicine’s priorities: People, Platforms, Performance, and Power. Over the first six months of 2022, I completed the eighteen “People” and “Platforms” titles and will focus on those in this entry. For the sake of the busy sailor/clinician, I have adopted a different organizational structure: (1) Must Read Now; (2) Becoming Better People and Leaders; (3) Learning from Our Past; (4) Steaming to Assist; and (5) Preparing for the Future. Must Read Now—Achilles in Vietnam, Caste, How Doctors Think, Leadership in Turbulent Times Using direct quotes from patients, former VA psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam conceptualizes PTSD as a moral injury and emphasizes that control of combat stress is a command responsibility. By highlighting parallels between the experiences of Vietnam and Trojan War veterans, it posits a framework for the prevention of combat stress. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Isabel Wilkerson’s landmark work, Caste: The Origins of Our Discontent, describes the eight foundational pillars by which slavery has established a social and economic caste system in the United States, and challenges readers to break down those pillars through connection and understanding. How Doctors Think by Dr. Jerome Groopman warns medical professionals of pitfalls like diagnostic uncertainty, logic errors, and confirmation bias in delivering safe, reliable care—lessons particularly important in the remote and austere settings where military medicine operates. Finally, for fans of history, Doris Kearns Goodwin’s book Leadership: In Turbulent Times explores the lives of Abraham Lincoln, Franklin and Teddy Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson, allowing readers to understand their early leadership potential, see that potential tempered by deep mental and physical health crises, and then thrive during times of great national struggle. These four books challenge the total makeup of a military medical leader and collectively distill the overall spirit of the “People” and “Platform” selections; if you only have time for a few, read these books. Becoming Better People and Leaders—Athena Rising, First Break All the Rules, Make Your Bed, The Road to Character The concept of the “Eulogy Self,” as opposed to the “Résumé Self” is raised in David Brooks’ The Road to Character and lays the groundwork for the other books in this section. Though I would love to see the topic undertaken by a female author, Captains (ret) Brad Johnson and David Smith’s Athena Rising: How and Why Men Should Mentor Women boldly puts forth a call to action in asymmetrically advocating for women in our organizations. True, ascribing to the “10 Rules for Success” from retired Admiral William McRaven’s Make Your Bed: Little Things That Can Change Your Life…And Maybe The World, or seeking answers to the “12 Questions of Employee Engagement” from Gallup’s First, Break All the Rules: What the World’s Greatest Managers Do Differently will undoubtedly support the Résumé Self. More important, however, is how fully incorporating lessons learned along the way, combined with nurturing underrepresented groups, will foster the Eulogy Self and simultaneously make our future teams stronger. Learning From Our Past—The Golden Thirteen, Indianapolis, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors “This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival cannot be expected. We will do what damage we can.”2 These were the words of Lieutenant Commander Robert Copeland to his crew at the outset of the Battle off Samar as described in James Hornfischer’s The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy’s Finest Hour. Together with Lynn Vincent and Sara Vladic’s Indianapolis and Paul Stillwell’s The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers, these World War II-era books herald the stunning bravery and dauntless spirit of Americans in the face of adversity. They also tell the stories of challenges in organizational leadership and the risk of excluding our best and brightest from the fight on the basis of race. Whether against a near-peer foe or the everyday work of defense, these are the stories we must take with us as we prepare for what lies ahead. Steaming to Assist—Odysseus in America, The Odyssey of Sergeant Jack Brennan, Redeployment These three books remind us of the overwhelming challenges in returning from war while recovering from the invisible injuries it inflicts. These injuries are predictable, insomuch as they are fictionalized in Homer’s Odyssey, then again nearly 3,000 years later in Phil Klay’s Redeployment and Bryan Doerries’ The Odyssey of Sergeant Jack Brennan. However, Dr. Shay’s follow-up to Achilles in Vietnam, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming, argues that policies supporting unit cohesion, ethical leadership, and adequate training (the Prevention Tripod) can limit those injuries in future conflict. Preparing for the Future—2034, Ghost Fleet, On Call in Hell, Out of the Crucible While they may seem like “Learning from our Past” entries, Dr. Richard Jadick’s On Call in Hell: A Doctor’s Iraq Story and Dr. Arthur Kellermann and Dr. Eric Elster’s Out of the Crucible: How the U.S. Military Transformed Combat Casualty Care in Iraq and Afghanistan are really stories of how to rapidly adapt and deploy new care delivery frameworks using first-hand experience, data sharing, and joint cooperation. In 2034: A Novel of the Next War, Admiral James Stavridis, USN (ret), and Elliot Ackerman imagine what a future multi-domain (air, land, sea, space, cyber) conflict with a near-peer rival might look like. In Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, P. W. Singer and August Cole do the same. (Note: 2034 begins with the hero facing a Med Board!) Regardless of the specifics of the recent or future conflict, the heroes of these stories are individuals who innovate, collaborate, and lead. We will do well to keep these lessons in mind as we go about healing and defending our nation in the 21st century and beyond. I have enjoyed the first half of the Surgeon General’s Professional Reading List and preparing this review. I look forward to highlighting the “Performance” and “Power” selections in a future entry. Happy reading!

  1. James Mattis and Bing West, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (New York: Random House, 2021).
  2. James D. Hornfischer, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy’s Finest Hour (New York: Bantam Dell, 2004).
]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/11/01/a-review-of-the-surgeon-generals-professional-reading-list-part-1/feed 0 32129 On Midrats 23 October 2022 -Episode 638: The Case for a 600 Ship Navy: Now More than Ever with Joseph Sims https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/22/on-midrats-23-october-2022-episode-638-the-case-for-a-600-ship-navy-now-more-than-ever-with-joseph-sims https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/22/on-midrats-23-october-2022-episode-638-the-case-for-a-600-ship-navy-now-more-than-ever-with-joseph-sims#respond Sat, 22 Oct 2022 16:43:53 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32116
Please join us at 5pm EDT on 23 October 2022 for Midrats Episode 638: The Case for a 600 Ship Navy: Now More than Ever with Joseph Sims
  • When was the last time the US Navy made the case for a significantly larger navy to defend its interests on the high seas?
  • Yep, back when Ole Sal was a Midshipman and EagleOne was as close to his service in Vietnam than Sal was to his service in Afghanistan – the 1980s.
  • What lessons can we take from that relatively successful intellectual, political, and personal struggle to grow our Navy?
  • Using his recent article in Naval History Magazine, Lessons from the 600-Ship Navy, as a starting point for our conversation, our guest for the full hour will be Lieutenant Joseph Sims, USN.
  • Lieutenant Sims is a Surface Warfare Officer and 2018 graduate of the US Naval Academy where he majored in history and completed four years on the varsity tennis team. He completed his first division officer tour on USS LASSEN (DDG-82), where he served as the gunnery officer and electronic warfare officer and completed deployment to 5th Fleet with the Truman Strike Group in 2019-2020 as well as deployment to 4th Fleet in 2020. Following completion of the Advanced Division Officer Course and Prospective Engineering Officer Course in Newport, RI, he reported to USS ANTIETAM (CG-54) in August of 2021 as the Main Propulsion Assistant.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/22/on-midrats-23-october-2022-episode-638-the-case-for-a-600-ship-navy-now-more-than-ever-with-joseph-sims/feed 0 32116 Better Program Management for the Navy https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/21/better-program-management-for-the-navy https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/21/better-program-management-for-the-navy#respond Fri, 21 Oct 2022 15:27:06 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31897 Navy ship programs face significant challenges in managing costs, quality, and delivery. However, current software tools fail to effectively manage all the data generated during program stages, which guarantees that the program will not reach its milestones. Today, the Navy has software on hand that can effectively manage their program data from concept to delivery. Definitions Model-Based Product Support (MBPS) is the result of SEA 06L, now PEO-MLB, selecting a commercial off-the-shelf application suite to create, collaborate, manage requirements and specifications, reporting, track and manage problems, and analytics. In commercial industries, MBPS is called Product Lifecycle Management (PLM). PLM is a strategic business approach that integrates people, data, processes, and business systems. It provides a product information backbone for companies and extended enterprise and manages the entire lifecycle of a “product” from its inception through the engineering, design, manufacture, maintenance, and disposal. In this case, the product = the ship. PLM is not a static software application suite; it evolves based on users’ needs. PLM enables users to:

  • Find information fast, using a single data source
  • Trust that information with revision and security control
  • Comprehend information using intuitive 2D/3D visualization
  • Understand the context with rich information relationships
  • Know when and what to do with improved schedule and workflow automation
  • Quickly track and solve program issues
  • Make data visible to others, enabling automatic notification, and reporting

Data from PLM systems link directly to Enterprise Resource Management systems (ERP). PLM data represents the “digital ship,” while data in ERP represents data for the actual physical ship. When organizations combine PLM and ERP to feed and share data, there are considerable time and cost savings for requirement development and management, trade studies, change management, reporting, reduced data entry—not to mention completely enabling transformation to the Digital Twin/Digital Thread. Naval Implications Embracing MBPS early in a ship program would enable the Navy to effectively manage their efforts in developing and implementing an Integrated Product Environment to perform their tasks more effectively, reducing critical program risks. Additionally, users would continue to use existing Navy software applications such as the Navy Data Acquisition Requirements Tool and software applications such as Microsoft Project and DOORS to feed data to MBPS, enabling a single source of trust to manage the data. Using PLM means program staff reduce up to 85 percent of time searching for and verifying information and managing change orders. Users would also save up to 40–50 percent of their time managing requirements and conducting program reviews. System-Wide Change Recent ship program performance has shown that the Navy cannot accept business as usual. As President Eisenhower said in April 1953: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.” Naval Information Warfare Systems Command must do a better job managing ship programs, ensuring the Navy gets the ships they are asking for in a more cost-effective and timely manner. One of the original strategic intents for the MBPS was to enable program staff to have an integrated decision-making environment in the early stages of a program. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), PEO-Ships, and wider leadership must embrace MBPS and understand how team conduct daily tasks. From there, NAVSEA leadership must:

  • Generate a sense of urgency to adopt MBPS in PMS organizations
  • Develop a vision/strategy
  • Communicate the vision of MBPS clearly and often
  • Remove obstacles
  • Establish a small team to guide MBPS adoption in PMS organizations
  • Plan for and create short-term wins
  • Avoid premature declarations of victory
  • Embed changes in Navy culture

These steps will guarantee the successful rapid deployment of MBPS in PMS organizations to help ensure program success. With NAVSEA leadership, adopting MBPS into a PMS organization would take 90 days with minimal impact on operations.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/21/better-program-management-for-the-navy/feed 0 31897 Beyond Checking a Box: Incorporating History into Naval Diversity and Inclusion https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/19/beyond-checking-a-box-incorporating-history-into-naval-diversity-and-inclusion https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/19/beyond-checking-a-box-incorporating-history-into-naval-diversity-and-inclusion#respond Wed, 19 Oct 2022 16:40:47 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32104 Ask someone in the Navy what a T-AO is, and odds are they will respond with “Tactical Action Officer.” They are right on the money but fail to recognize the other important meaning of T-AO, with the distinct tac separating the first and second letter. T-AOs are a class of supply ship, the Navy’s oilers that come alongside a warship during an underway replenishment. Operated by Military Sealift Command and staffed by civilians, T-AOs are an enigma. We can think of them as the Navy’s own Mary Poppins—they help us in our time of need, seemingly out of nowhere, then vanish to assist someone else. So in 2016, when then-Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the Navy would name its second John Lewis-class T-AO after Harvey Milk, perhaps it did not generate as much buzz as other up-and-coming ship announcements. T-AOs are poorly understood within the Navy, just like the significance of Harvey Milk. What’s in a Name? Elected to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1977, Milk rose to prominence in the 1980s as one of America’s first openly gay public figures. The Navy has recognized other leaders with nontraditional identities in the same way. DDG-107’s namesake is Vice Admiral Samuel L. Gravely, the first African American officer to command a Navy ship. DDG-70 pays homage to Rear Admiral Grace Hopper, a female flag officer famous for her computer programming ingenuity. Indeed, as time marches on and social norms progress, the honorees of ships have become increasingly diverse. Going Further with Diversity and Inclusion Diversity and inclusion initiatives are well-intentioned. They remind us that it is a sailor’s merit—and not her race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, gender, or political stance—that makes her worthy of promotion and opportunity. They also teach us that for a person to thrive in the workplace, he must feel safe and not discriminated against. The problem is that with overuse, any language loses its potency. “Diversity and inclusion” have become such tired buzzwords that many in the sea services have stopped listening. Rather than hold a genuine understanding of diversity and inclusion’s importance, some pay lip service to the popular idea out of fear of what might happen if they do not (i.e., cancel culture). At the officer level, the Navy needs to divorce itself from surface-level diversity and inclusion training. The solution lies in lengthening diversity narratives to include history. More specifically, when conducting D&I education, the Navy should answer the question “How did we get here in the first place?” This is best done by using examples of diverse individuals within military history and connecting them to the service’s past and present personnel policies. In this process, the Navy’s storytellers bring their audience to terms with armed forces’ dark, discriminatory years, while emphasizing the service’s progress in uplifting diverse personnel and the heroic agents of change who fought along the way. The result: A bridge between the armed forces’ (and American society at large’s) prejudicial past and today’s commendable D&I initiatives, satisfying the question, “Why is diversity important? Why should we care?” Lieutenant Harvey Milk Take the social studies lesson that exists in Harvey Milk. When mulling over namesakes for T-AO-206, the Secretary of the Navy did not pick a random gay man who was in the public spotlight five decades ago. From 1951–55, Lieutenant Harvey Milk served in the Navy onboard the USS Kittiwake (ASR-13), where he specialized as a dive officer. He may have been a squared-away shipmate, passionate about the naval service and a devoted leader, but none of that mattered. After four years, Lieutenant Milk received an other-than-honorable discharge for being homosexual. In 1977, he pivoted to a different area of public service and was elected to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. Sadly, Milk’s tenure lasted just one year—he was assassinated in 1978. Milk’s story is a microcosm for a larger discrimination issue that plagued the armed forces for decades- the zero-tolerance policy for LGBTQ service members. In 1992, the General Accounting Office (now known as the Government Accountability Office) reported that the Pentagon spent approximately $27 million annually discharging gay and lesbian troops out of a misguided belief that homosexuality inherently undermined good order and discipline within the military. The Department of Defense (DoD) was not alone in this impression. American society has long portrayed queer people as particularly unable to control their romantic urges, more so than their straight counterparts. That underpinned the DoD’s rationale for the multimillion-dollar discharge project—whereas straight service members would rarely (if ever) sleep around with one another, thus compromising the chain-of-command and a professional work environment, LGBTQ service members were destined to do just that. Queer soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were dismissed as liabilities for decades, regardless of their demonstrated competence and dedication. Recognizing Harvey Milk with T-AO-206 was reparation paid to not only Milk’s living kin (his nephew Stuart Milk was at the ship’s christening in San Diego), but to the service’s entire LGBTQ community. When the champagne bottle was smashed against the hull, what Milk’s nephew and LGBTQ onlookers heard the Navy say was, “We’re sorry that we didn’t let Lieutenant Milk do his job because of his sexual orientation. We’re sorry that he couldn’t rise through the ranks because of who he loved. We’re sorry that we wrote him (and everyone else like him) off based on one deeply personal quality alone. We’re really trying to do better.” Looking Forward This story arc can be replicated with almost every diverse category in the armed forces. The Honorable Lloyd Austin’s ascension to Secretary of Defense matters because in 1925, official USMA policy generalized African American service members as a group “from which we cannot expect to draw leadership material.” In pre-civil rights America, this reflected societal misconceptions concerning an entire group of loyal citizens’ intelligence and capability. The consequences of these attitudes and policies cannot be understated—African American service members’ ability to fulfill their military potential was limited because of it. The anonymous first woman to graduate from Naval Special Warfare school matters because as recently as 2015, every woman was barred from applying for direct ground combat positions even if she was physically capable. Again, this ties into a wider American history of relegating women to behind-the-scenes support. One could go on with more examples ad infinitum. In what forum would these diversity discussions take place? First, a one-credit hour D&I seminar should be a part of every officer’s education. It should be positioned as an U.S. military history course, and not as a half-hearted mandatory training PowerPoint. To that end, the exact course name matters a lot—it is what each student will base their first impression on. It has already been established that while “diversity and inclusion” is an important concept, the wording itself is predictable, weak and does not capture attention. Instead, the name should have connotations of strength and fortitude while simultaneously reflecting the topic of diversity and inclusion. A soft pitch: “The Evolution of Manpower: Changing Faces in Military Leadership.” Instruction-wise, it should be taught differently from an average history course. There should not be just one textbook that the curriculum revolves around. Students should consume a plethora of media: Books, articles, film, series, and podcasts. Some valuable learning materials could include Racial Beachhead: Diversity and Democracy in a Military Town by Carol Lynn McKibben, Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America by Nathaniel Frank, the History Channel documentary Honor Deferred (2006), and Serving in Silence: The Colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer Story (1995), just to name a few. No professor can be expected to speak on every critical topic. Although the course would have a primary instructor for grading and accountability purposes, it should be conference-style where guest speaker subject-matter experts are brought in (or video-called in) as much as possible. There is no dearth of qualified people in this realm: Representatives from the National Naval Officers Association, whose mission is “to enhance Sea Service operational readiness by supporting, recruiting, professional development and retention in an effort to achieve a diverse officer corps that reflects the demographics of our Nation,” scholars from the Naval History and Heritage Command, think-tank researchers, civilian sociologists, diverse leaders currently serving, and many more. Stories Across the Sea Service and Beyond Lastly, the course content need not be confined to the Navy. As stated in the previous cases of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Retired Colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer, there are diversity lessons in all areas of the military worth telling. Discriminatory policies usually spanned the entire DoD. By the same token, diverse figures’ stories of triumph are scattered throughout all military communities. In the team sport that is the U.S. armed forces, a win for one is a win for all—let us highlight D&I victories in all our sister branches. In August 2020, Midshipman 1st Class Sydney Barber became the first African American female brigade commander at the United States Naval Academy. During an interview on NPR’s All Things Considered, Barber proudly claimed, “I get to walk here and be at the Naval Academy and be someone’s wildest dream,” alluding to the reality that African American female leadership at the Naval Academy had been all but impossible for generations past. Somewhere across the country, another midshipman attended her ROTC unit’s annual Dining Out with a female companion by her side. She slept easy that night knowing that her commanding officer would not investigate her choice to bring a same-sex date to the event. Even thirty years earlier, such a decision could have disenrolled her from ROTC and killed her chances at becoming an officer. Today, both women and thousands of others can soar to great heights and hope to attain the upper echelons of naval leadership, all because of D&I initiatives. Their contributions to the Navy are not just checking the diversity box. They are fulfilling the aspirations of historically marginalized pioneers who fought tirelessly for a more equitable Navy. Let the long line of the armed forces’ diversity advocates never be forgotten. Let their history be taught.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/19/beyond-checking-a-box-incorporating-history-into-naval-diversity-and-inclusion/feed 0 32104 On Midrats 16 October 2022 – Episode 637: Can You be Realistic About the Real World – with Emma Ashford https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/16/on-midrats-16-october-2022-episode-637-can-you-be-realistic-about-the-real-world-with-emma-ashford https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/16/on-midrats-16-october-2022-episode-637-can-you-be-realistic-about-the-real-world-with-emma-ashford#respond Sun, 16 Oct 2022 13:02:28 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32075

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 16 October 2022 for Midrats Episode 637: Can You be Realistic About the Real World – with Emma Ashford

  • A nation’s foreign policy is driven by more than just the whims and desires of the Chief Executive. Through government, academia, institutions, and individuals of influence there are a variety of different schools of thought on what should underpin the decision making process.
  • Well known general descriptors of these schools include “interventionist,” “isolationist,” “internationalist,” and even well known sub-species of the major schools who are known by the actions they wish to take – usually that involve the use of military power – “Responsibility to Protect,” to “Nation Building” to the old saw from over a century ago, “Make the World Safe for Democracy.”
  • One long-standing school that has gained attention and influence after the experiences of the last two decades from Afghanistan to Ukraine is, “Realism.”
  • What is the history of a “realist foreign policy,” its advocates, its intellectual foundations, and what does it have to offer the United States today?
  • Our returning guest for the full hour is Emma Ashford.
  • Emma is a Senior Fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. She is also a nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point, and an adjunct assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.
  • Her first book, Oil, the State, and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates, was published by Georgetown University Press in 2022.
  • She was previously with the Atlantic Council’s New American Engagement Initiative, and the Cato Institute. She holds a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/16/on-midrats-16-october-2022-episode-637-can-you-be-realistic-about-the-real-world-with-emma-ashford/feed 0 32075 Improving Safety with Upgraded ODU Caps https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/13/improving-safety-with-upgraded-odu-caps https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/13/improving-safety-with-upgraded-odu-caps#respond Thu, 13 Oct 2022 13:42:19 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32089 I have witnessed many injuries and mishaps throughout my five-year career in the Coast Guard. Many were easily avoidable, and many came from carelessness or not following rules. But one category of injury seemed both frequent, and not often a result of excessive negligence: head injuries. Sailors frequently hit their heads, whether on a rack, overhead pipe, low overhead watertight entry, or innumerous other objects on a ship. This is especially common in the early morning or late at night when sailors are tired, when there is the least amount of lighting, or when there are heavy seas. Usually, this leads to nothing more than a bruise, but occasionally injuries are more severe. I have witnessed many sailors unable become to work—or even sent home—while underway due to head injuries. Head injuries are a well-known and accepted occurrence onboard ships and cutters, and there are many steps taken to mitigate the chance of them occurring, such as warning signs and padding on many potential obstructions. However, there are an endless number of potential places a head injury could occur, and it is not feasible to pad or guard all potential surfaces. What if, in addition to padding on the most high-risk overheads, sailors also carried around their own layer of personal protective equipment (PPE) on their everyday uniform? If the standard operational dress uniform cover had a thin layer of soft foam-like material build into the cap, then it would offer some protection against head injuries. That small amount of protection would not affect the look nor utility of the operational dress uniform (ODU) cover and would offer padding and light protection against head injuries when worn. This thin barrier would reduce the severity of light and heavy head impacts, and greatly reduce the risk of head splitting, which can occur even with a light impact upon a sharp corner or edge. A simple upgrade to the ODU cap could provide an extra layer of protection to the entire workforce, reducing the risk of head injuries and potential hospitalizations underway, and therefore improving mission effectiveness. As a side point, a red LED light built into the brim of the cap would also be a great addition the ODU cap. Lost lights and traversing with insufficient lighting is also a frequent cause of underway injuries. Having an LED light readily available as part of the cap would be a great safety addition, as well as incredibly useful for sailors in general. It is important to avoid injuries whenever possible, and while correcting and refining operational procedures is important, I believe there are also many commonsense ways to increase safety and encourage safe practices. For example, a very readily available light for dark places, or some light padding for the head.  

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/13/improving-safety-with-upgraded-odu-caps/feed 0 32089 Book Review: How to be an AntiRacist by Ibram X. Kendi https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/05/book-review-how-to-be-an-antiracist-by-ibram-x-kendi https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/05/book-review-how-to-be-an-antiracist-by-ibram-x-kendi#respond Wed, 05 Oct 2022 14:02:26 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32084 If you want someone to do something, a good way to make it happen is to tell them not to do it. This is essentially what happened when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) removed How to Be an Antiracist by Ibram X. Kendi from his reading list last year. I was actually quite proud of CNO Admiral Micheal Gilday when he defended his decision to add it in the first place against a group of senators who called him “woke”: “Sir, I’m not a theorist; I’m the Chief of Naval Operations,” Gilday responded. “What I can tell you is, factually, based on a substantial amount of time talking to sailors in the fleet, there’s racism in the Navy, just like there’s racism in our country. And the way we’re going to get after it is to be honest about it, not to sweep it under the rug, and to talk about it—and that’s what we’re doing. And that’s one of the reasons that book is on the list.” Bravo, CNO. Then he quietly removed the book without comment; as they say in Germany, Schade (too bad). Anyway, I decided read the book and decide for myself. This well-written book accomplished what few others have done; it made me think. (It also made me ask if those who railed against it had actually read it). A well-researched and readable story of one man’s journey to wrestle with his own history and that of America, arriving at conclusions that were new to me and sometimes required me to make little drawings and diagrams to sort out concepts and understand his points. Kendi makes readers uncomfortable by looking at racism in a very pragmatic way. Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “The ultimate tragedy is not the oppression and cruelty by the bad people, but the silence over that by the good people.” This concept is built upon by Kendi when he challenges us to choose between “racist and anti-racist” and asserts that “there is no middle ground.” This hit home for me personally; for most of my life I would have called myself a “non-racist” and felt pretty good about it. Not so fast, says Kendi, “choose one side or embrace the other.” This seems to make some folks uncomfortable (which I think was the point!). But why is this different for racism than, say, rape? Most of us would say we are anti-rape; it would not suffice that we are non-rapists. As my friend Keith Green has stared “You can’t have racism without racists, just as you can’t have rape without rapists.” This reinforces Kendi’s point that to understand the issues you have to look not just at policy, but at individual people. His perspective—that of a Black man growing up poor in the city—is very different from mine. But isn’t that the point of reading? Racism has victims; if one is a victim of a crime, is it “playing the victim card” to say so? Why should racism be different? In the end, as President George Bush stated in his speech on terrorism, “You are either for us or against us.” There is no middle ground. Kendi does make me wince when he calls out “white people” as a monolithic group, but he turns the same scrutiny on Black people, even himself, acknowledging that racism is not just a “white thing,” and that it can be transitory—one can be racist one day and antiracist the next. He points out an unpopular truth: When our founding fathers wrote that “all men are created equal,” they left out a key word—white. But that is what they meant. To call that out is not “un-American” as or “Critical Race Theory” the book’s critics may assert; it is reality—and history. One could expand this idea to other areas such as sexism. Are we against it, or for it? A female officer I know relayed a story where one male shipmate called her a “bi***” in the company of another man—who simply walked away. Did the second individual later congratulate himself for being “non-sexist”? Or does his silence make him complicit, and thus sexist? I think I know what Kendi would say! Even if you ignore the rest of the book, the following point makes the read worth the time investment:

“In the end, the word “race” is totally out of place in this conversation . . . the only true “race” is the Human Race. This book is ultimately about the basic struggle we are all in, the struggle to be fully human and to see that others are fully Human.”

Right or not, I do not lose sleep over what books are—or are not—on the CNO’s reading list. In fact, the very idea of someone else telling me not to read something is an anathema. But I am glad the controversy brought it to my attention; reading Kendi’s book made me think about old concepts in a new way and taught me a new vernacular to as well as a new way to approach my fellow humans—and I am better for it. Read it and decide for yourself!

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/10/05/book-review-how-to-be-an-antiracist-by-ibram-x-kendi/feed 0 32084 Hidden in Plain Sight: The Enlisted Mental Health Crisis https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/27/hidden-in-plain-sight-the-enlisted-mental-health-crisis https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/27/hidden-in-plain-sight-the-enlisted-mental-health-crisis#respond Tue, 27 Sep 2022 19:39:35 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32078 Our enlisted workforce faces a mental health crisis, dealing with issues that are out of our control, but directly impact our ability to thrive both on and off the job. They include the ever-increasing cost of living without equally rising pay/allowances, an inflated housing market, sub-par medical care, and mission related stressors. From my years of enlisted service, I know that the greatest risks during operational missions have been when my head simply is not in the game. Mental health suffers when the pressures from bills, credit card debt, poor housing options, and lack of quality medical care begin to add up. Decision-making and mission readiness is at its poorest when mental health degrades, increasing risk potential and skyrocketing the probability for job-related injuries. Inflation and Increased Cost of Living Enlisted wages are not appropriately compensating for inflation and a rapidly increasing cost of living. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “the Consumer Price Index rose 7.9 percent from February 2021 to February 2022, following a 12-month increase of 7.5 percent in January 2022. Food prices increased 7.9 percent for the year ended February 2022, the largest 12-month advance since July 1981. Energy prices rose 25.6 percent from February 2021 to February 2022, while prices for all items less food and energy rose 6.4 percent.” Coupled with the fact that military base pay only increased 2.7 percent in 2022, and the stage has been set for increased stress in your average enlisted-supported home, with junior petty officers especially vulnerable. Housing When the mission is achieved and liberty is granted, our enlisted workforce deserves to return home to safe, adequate housing. This is becoming increasingly difficult to find, propelled by a global pandemic that has seen an immense increase in housing prices. In fact, “over the last 12 months, the Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price index has risen by 18.6 percent” and “asking rental prices, as measured by the Zillow Observed Rental Index (ZORI), initially fell during the pandemic but have since recovered and now exceed their pre-pandemic trend.” Overall, the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) must increase nationwide. Disturbingly, there are units and certain pay grades where BAH has actually decreased. It cannot be understated how disparaging this issue is to the mental health of active duty enlisted sailors. Even in areas with the option for military housing, these communities largely are woefully inadequate. Whether due to age of the structures or understaffing of housing maintenance personnel, most military housing is in a sad state of disrepair, impairing a service member’s ability to de-stress and mentally unwind at home. Mental Healthcare There is a long-running joke regarding military health care that anything and everything can be cured with an 800-mg Motrin and a light duty chit. As an enlisted service member living this very witticism, I am unable to see this as a laughing matter; I would contend that every ailment is fine until it is not. The very fact that our service members prefer to suffer in silence rather than subject themselves to the current military medical regime is a gripping indicator to just how poorly the system performs. The United States military serves as the global paragon upon which all others are compared; any inclination of a service member’s mental health struggles is seen as a failure of personal resilience and akin to dereliction of duty. This manifests deep within the psyche of our enlisted service men and women, dispelling any desire to seek help when it is needed most. This leads to a failure of mission capability at best and, at worst, can result in that service member taking his or her own life. According to an article from the United Service Organizations, “In 2021, research found that 30,177 active-duty personnel and veterans who served in the military after 9/11 have died by suicide—compared to the 7,057 service members killed in combat in those same 20 years. That is, military suicide rates are four times higher than deaths that occurred during military operations.” This cannot be overlooked any longer. The negative way mental healthcare is viewed must be radically reformed to put service members first. Yearly Appropriations Furthermore, our enlisted workforce also must contend with the yearly threat of a lapse of appropriations. It is beyond challenging to maintain peak operational focus with a looming threat of zero budget with which to operate. I have personally felt the pressure when the question remains: “Will I even be paid?” Congress must be held responsible to perform one of the most straightforward tasks required of them: authorize a Defense and Homeland Security budget and pay our military, the absolute backbone of our freedoms. Considering the overwhelming array of challenges facing our enlisted today, now is the time for drastic course correction. As such, my passion, vow, purpose, and leadership philosophy will always be “People First.” No longer can the mental health crisis subjugating the enlisted remain in a shadow realm: evident to all, yet corrected by none. Remarkably, “Enlisted personnel make up about 82 percent of the Armed Forces and carry out military operations.” There can be no mission success without a healthy enlisted labor force.  

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/27/hidden-in-plain-sight-the-enlisted-mental-health-crisis/feed 0 32078 On Midrats 25 September 2022 – Episode 636: AUKUS at 1-year, with Alessio Patalano https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/25/on-midrats-25-september-2022-episode-636-aukus-at-1-year-with-alessio-patalano https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/25/on-midrats-25-september-2022-episode-636-aukus-at-1-year-with-alessio-patalano#respond Sun, 25 Sep 2022 14:42:22 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32061

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 25 September 2022 for Midrats Episode 636: AUKUS at 1-year, with Alessio Patalano

  • In September of last year, the national security story was the announcement of AUKUS – trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Though the Russo-Ukrainian War quickly took it from headlines, it is still moving forward – and in ways you may not expect.
  • These three Anglosphere nations have a long cultural, diplomatic, economic, and military history together – so many of the building blocks are already there to make something impressive.
  • Using his recent article in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute as a starting off point, our guest for the full hour returning to Midrats this Sunday will be Dr. Alessio Patalano.
  • Alessio is Professor of War & Strategy in East Asia and Director of the King’s Japan Programme at the Centre for Grand Strategy at the Department of War Studies (DWS), King’s College London (KCL). Prof Patalano is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society (FRHistS), Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan, a Visiting Professor at the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College (JMCSC) and a Senior Fellow at the highly influential think tanks Policy Exchange and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). In 2022, he also became fellow at the Royal Navy Centre for Strategic Studies, and Sir Herbert Richmond Fellow in Maritime Strategy at the Council on Geostrategy.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/25/on-midrats-25-september-2022-episode-636-aukus-at-1-year-with-alessio-patalano/feed 0 32061 Commitment to Excellence and the Fair Treatment of All https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/19/commitment-to-excellence-and-the-fair-treatment-of-all https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/19/commitment-to-excellence-and-the-fair-treatment-of-all#respond Mon, 19 Sep 2022 15:54:55 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32055 “I am committed to excellence and the fair treatment of all.” That is the last line of the Sailor’s Creed. The word creed is from the Latin word credo which means “I believe.” The Sailor’s Creed is supposed to articulate what we believe as sailors. We are sailors first. We are not our racial, gender, or ethnic classification. We are sailors. Too many within the ranks hold onto their individual identities and tribes outside of the Navy. Even within the Navy, too many base their identity around their rating, community, and rank. There is not one cohesive sailor identity. The issue of diversity and inclusion does not lie in a lack of programs and policies. The issue is those seeking to undermine diversity and inclusion efforts by holding onto to their outdated belief systems. We have too many within the ranks who know the textbook answers to give when it comes to diversity and inclusion, but whose actions are completely contrary. To paraphrase the Bible, they have the appearance of supporting diversity and inclusion but deny its power.1 Too many times throughout my career I have attended diversity trainings taught and attended by those who attend merely to fulfill the requirement, not because they agree with the subject matter. Often, I hear comments such as, “No one really cares about this stuff” or “I can listen with a closed mind.” It reminds me of the infamous Marshawn Lynch interview at Super Bowl Media Day in 2015 where he repeatedly answered every question with, “I’m just here so I won’t get fined.” Too many within the ranks have that same mentality when it comes to diversity and inclusion, they are there because they have to be; not because they want to be. They sign the roster and go on about their lives. Nothing has changed. There are also those who will learn the information taught within the course just to use the program’s language to undermine it. Therefore, the real battle is not with a lack of adequate programs and initiatives. The problem we are fighting is firmly held internalized belief systems. The question is, how do we combat the subculture that is seeking to undermine diversity efforts? The Sailor’s Creed The answer lies in the Sailor’s Creed. According to the Naval History and Heritage Command:

The Sailor’s Creed governs virtually all aspects of a sailor’s existence while in the Navy. It is a staple of Navy culture, often recited like a pledge of allegiance, reminding all service members of whom they are, and why they serve.

The Blue Ribbon Recruit Training Panel wrote the Sailor’s Creed in 1993 under the direction of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso. Also, in 1993 under the direction of Admiral Kelso, the Navy changed its core values from “Professionalism, Integrity, and Tradition” to “Honor, Courage, and Commitment.” The year 1993 was pivotal for the U.S. Navy. It may have had something to do with the changes happening in the United States at the time. President Bill Clinton had just assumed office ushering a time of sweeping social change in the country. Under his administration, Janet Reno became the first female Attorney General of the United States. The high-profile trial of the officers who beat Rodney King was underway. Also, “Don’t ask, Don’t Tell” was announced, which allowed gays and lesbians to serve without discrimination, though not openly. Perhaps Admiral Kelso recognized that with the nation’s changes, the Navy needed to change as well. Or the changes may have been in response to events that preceded the Clinton years; events that happened between 5–8 September at the Las Vegas Hilton in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the 35th Annual Tailhook Association Symposium in 1991. At this event, “U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers and defense contractors committed sexual harassment and sexual assault.” This scandal brought great shame to the United States Navy. Tailhook was a symptom of a larger problem. A culture existed in which this behavior was permissible, if not expected. But what the participants failed to realize is while their internal culture had not changed, the times surely had. We were in the information age. Cameras were more readily available. It was the genesis of modern-day social media. The world’s scrutiny fell on the Navy. A change needed to happen. The Navy needed a new belief system; hence, the Sailor’s Creed and new core values. According to retired Master Chief Petty Officer John Hagan:

We gathered to discuss a proposal to modify our published core values to achieve one set of core values for the naval services for use by sailors and Marines. At that time in 1992, the Navy’s official banner words were Tradition, Integrity, and Professionalism; the Marine Corps’ were Honor, Courage, and Commitment. A few tentative remarks were made before General Walter Boomer, then the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, said, emphatically but without a trace of arrogance, “Marine Corps values are honor, courage, and commitment. Marines learn them in boot camp. They identify with them and remember them. We like them; they are working for us; and we are not going to change them!” There was no similar defense of the Navy’s banner core values, and, in truth, the words were never well known among sailors. The words were not working for us. Mostly they were gathering dust in some lofty places where sailors rarely ventured. There really was no reason to object to adopting new words to inspire and guide the sailor.’”

The Marines understand the power of a cohesive identity. Future Marines receive indoctrination from the very beginning of what it means to be a Marine with reinforcement throughout their career. Marines know their history and are proud of it. It does not matter if they are ground, air, or logistics, they are ALL MARINES! You earn the title through blood, sweat, and tears. Once earned, you can proudly wear it for life unless you bring shame to it. We are missing that in the Navy. A Cohesive identity To have a cohesive identity, we must all be willing to relinquish our old beliefs and embrace our identities as sailors. I admit, this is difficult. As a step toward that goal, I created and taught a program on my ship called “Dignity and Respect.” The course starts with an activity where I have the sailors put playing cards on their foreheads. Without looking at the cards they line themselves up from the highest to the lowest card. They cannot look at the card on their heads or talk to one another. They must line themselves up based on non-verbal communication. At the end when I ask the sailors on the high end (often mostly men) what made them think they were supposed to be on that end, they often say people bowed to and looked up to them. Some would say, “I just felt like I should be on this end.” When I asked those on the lower end why they put themselves there (mostly women and people of color), they often said because people would not look at them or scoffed at them. Afterward, I have them remove the cards from their foreheads, look at them and then realign themselves. The sailors are surprised. Some who had placed themselves on the low end had high cards and some who placed themselves on the high end had middle or low cards. This exercise teaches perception and nonverbal communication. Every day, we communicate verbally and nonverbally in and out of the Navy. We treat others how we perceive them. We then go into a discussion about how our home environments shaped our thinking. Sometimes we play a modified version of “Heads Up” where we put a topic on a person’s head and have the group shout out stereotypes until the person figures out the topic. For example, the topic could be “Southerners.” The answers range from sweet tea and “bless your heart” to slow talkers and cotton. From there we discuss how the media and our environments shape stereotypes and how stereotypes can be simultaneously true and untrue. After establishing how our environments have shaped our thinking we then go into the sexual assault and harassment portion of the course which the command Equal Opportunity Officer teaches. We kick this portion off with the “Tea and Consent” video. From there, we help the sailors to understand why certain comments and actions that may be permissible in some contexts are not permissible in the Navy. The command Psychological Technician then discusses the psychological impact of harassment and discrimination on individuals. Finally, we conclude the course with the story of the six blind men and the elephant. Each man touches a portion of the elephant then attempts to describe the elephant based on the portion they touched. They each have a different description of the elephant based on the piece they touched. They are all right and they are all wrong. So, it goes with life. We each have a portion of the information, but not the entire perspective. But when we put our perspectives together, we get the fuller picture. I intentionally keep the groups small to better facilitate discussion. I noticed through teaching this course, this was the first time many of the sailors confronted their belief systems, regardless of rank or time in service. Of course, there will always be those who will continue to hold fast to their contrarian beliefs. Their hearts will remain hardened to all efforts to be inclusive. When raised to believe you are superior and are now learning that the very people you believe are inferior are equal and capable of surpassing you in areas you excelled in, that will create an identity crisis. When confronted with this reality there are different responses: Some become enlightened and embrace change. These tend to be the younger sailors. Others withdraw because it is too overwhelming to reconcile their beliefs with this new reality and they exit the services. Then there are those who become hostile and will do everything to resist change. Publicly these duplicitous individuals will say the right things while their actions will be completely contrary. They will feign ignorance of their wrongdoing regardless of training. This is a character issue, and no amount of education can change this person. “Neither is new wine put into old wineskins . . .”2 The only antidote to a hardened heart is accountability. We must not allow individuals to exploit the gray areas. Our leaders should not feel comfortable saying, “I can listen with a closed mind” or “No one really cares about this stuff.” We must make those who practice discrimination as uncomfortable as we do those who violate any other law within the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Too often, minorities in leadership positions are set up for failure because of a lack of support. Often, it is the teams who are supposed to support them who are the ones undermining them. And then when that leader fails, the commentary is [insert a minority group] are not ready to hold these positions. The truth is, they were set up to fail before they even got to the position. They are scapegoats. It is quite Machiavellian. The mental exhaustion caused by discrimination is enough to bring some to the brink of madness. Microaggressions are real and proliferating within the ranks. No wonder so many sailors are unwilling to reenlist, failing to adapt, or resigning their commission. The mental gymnastics and lack of support are too exhausting. We need accountability for those undermining the mission or we will continue to battle this internal war of attrition. I am committed to excellence and the fair treatment of all. Either we believe these words, or all discussions and trainings about inclusion and diversity are perfunctory gestures and we are all “just here so we won’t get fined.”

  1. 2 Timothy 3:5 (NIV).
  2. Luke 5:37 (NIV).

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/19/commitment-to-excellence-and-the-fair-treatment-of-all/feed 0 32055 On Midrats 18 September 2022 – Episode 635: Mid-September Melee https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/17/on-midrats-18-september-2022-episode-635-mid-september-melee https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/17/on-midrats-18-september-2022-episode-635-mid-september-melee#respond Sat, 17 Sep 2022 12:31:36 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32039

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 18 September 2022 for Midrats Episode 635: Mid-September Melee

  • Labor Day is behind us, school is in session, and winter is coming. That can mean only one thing – it’s time for a Midrats mid-month melee!
  • For the full hour this Sunday, EagleOne and Sal will take a bit from the headlines, a tad from the history books, and whatever shows up in the chat room or the studio line.
  • From DC to Ukraine, to the other side of the International Date Line, we’ll try to squeeze it in.
  • We’ll distribute your defense, integrate your lethality … whatever it takes.
  • As with every melee, if it is interesting and in the maritime or national security arena – we’ll take it on.
  • Open chat, open phones, open topic – come join us!

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/17/on-midrats-18-september-2022-episode-635-mid-september-melee/feed 0 32039 Given China’s A2/AD Capabilities, How Would the United States Defend Taiwan? https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/16/given-chinas-a2ad-capabilities-how-would-the-united-states-defend-taiwan https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/16/given-chinas-a2ad-capabilities-how-would-the-united-states-defend-taiwan#respond Fri, 16 Sep 2022 12:41:25 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32050 Taiwan has had nearly 72 years to prepare its defense. However, today we see a Taiwan that is inadequately prepared to defend itself, cannot unify around a common defense strategy, and whose population is growing increasingly complacent and unconcerned with the prospect of an invasion from China. To effectively defend Taiwan from a military standpoint, the United States must be willing to defend Taiwan from outside of Taiwan. In other words, the defense of Taiwan from an invasion from China need not be confined to the main island of Taiwan, nor the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, expectations held by the United States should be that an invasion of Taiwan by China will look nothing like the previous four Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55, 1958, 1995–96, 2022), which were generally limited, and instead be prepared for a conflict of a much larger-scale and intensity. An Island-Hopping Campaign While aiding Taiwan through foreign military sales, security assistance, and security cooperation programs could gradually improve the situation on the ground in a long-term strategy, it still would do little to negate the significant antiaccess/aerial denial (A2/AD) threat and positional advantage that China has in comparison to the United States. The United States does not have the luxury of time to implement strategies that may or may not obtain results in a decade or more. Therefore, the United States should expand the scope of the Taiwan defense problem beyond what could best be termed as a modern-day attempt at re-fighting a World War II style island-hopping-campaign, and instead look for opportunities to exploit gaps in other locations bordering China. This could draw China’s military resources and capabilities away from its Eastern Theater Command and disrupt China’s ability to commit the entirety of its resources to a Taiwan invasion campaign. However, to do so, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPaCom) would have to be able to effectively fight with up to three or more Joint Task Forces (JTF) against the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) simultaneously. Force China to Fight on Multiple Geographic Fronts Today, it appears that each of the service components have pledged to fight in all-domains or multi-domains through the salesmanship of their new employment concepts, employment models, and force designs. Fighting and maneuvering on an enemy in a close conventional fight is now seemingly considered unacceptable by today’s standards, when other methods could be employed through information warfare, electronic warfare, cyber, or space—and with much more stand-off. Consequently, the days of large-scale land warfare are largely considered to be too reckless and generally unacceptable with modern technological advancements. Irrespective of the validity of these assertions or the opinions held by the larger academic community, whatever happened to the age-old problem of an adversary having to fight on multiple geographic fronts simultaneously? Surely, this problem remains as relevant today as it did in previous military conflicts. A2/AD has not rendered the challenge of fighting on multiple geographic fronts to be irrelevant—especially when the battlespace is further complicated by operations in five-dimensions. China Cannot Defend Everywhere, with Everything Aside from all the A2/AD threat rings and weapon engagement zones that line maps of the U.S. IndoPaCom area of responsibility, the fact is, China cannot defend everywhere with everything that it has in its A2/AD arsenal. A2/AD is largely dependent on the ability of weapon systems and sensors to be mutually supporting, integrated, and effectively command and controlled. The loss of an A2/AD asset, or reallocation of an A2/AD asset to deal with another threat, could be the broken link in the chain. As stated in the adage, “He who defends everything defends nothing,” China may have the capability to defend out to the First or Second Island Chain, but that does not necessarily mean that it will, when presented with other dilemmas. Yet, there is this overwhelming fixation from the Joint Force, with fighting in the First and Second Island Chain, as if we are re-fighting the Pacific Campaign of World War II, with the twist of having to fight off DF-21s and H-6 bombers. This seems like a tremendous waste of energy and resources when the Joint Force could focus on closing with and destroying the PLA from other avenues of approach—ones that could be more consequential and decisive. Force China to Deal with a Bigger Problem The onus is on the United States to have a sense of urgency to further complicate China’s military decision-making. The United States must be willing to expand the defense of Taiwan from outside of the maritime domain and beyond meager defense of an island. In essence, force China to deal with having to defend against the threat of a counter-invasion on its own mainland territory through penetrating raids from nearby countries. After all, China may be a large country (slightly smaller than the United States), but it is also bordered by 14 countries, some of which continue to have territorial disputes and historical grievances. If the United States were to secure basing in bordering countries and reposition troops and capabilities to them, this would raise the stakes for China, change their focus from a “few scattered rocks in the Pacific,” to mainland territorial defense and internal security concerns.1 It could also convince the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, that they have overextended themselves and will not be able to consolidate gains. To use a sport analogy, the United States needs to avoid staring at the ball and getting drawn into the middle, just like it needs to avoid getting overly focused on the island of Taiwan, when there are opportunities elsewhere on China’s periphery. In other words, forget the shiny object and look for other ways around. As one U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel likes to say, “Mark and bypass” could be the better option. Conventional and Unconventional A2/AD When examining A2/AD, one of the foremost findings is that there are varying definitions and concerns associated with A2/AD across the whole-of-government for U.S. national security. A2/AD can be broadly categorized into conventional A2/AD and unconventional A2/AD. Conventional A2/AD comprises of a layered defense-in-depth with early warning capabilities, sensors, and shooters. Common characteristics/attributes that make up Conventional A2/AD are China’s large inventory and disposition of short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles, coastal defense cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, integrated air defense capabilities, and strategic/long-range bombers, among many other mid-to-long range threat capabilities. When examining conventional A2/AD, it is critical that we look at it from multiple dimensions and include subsurface threats, cyber, and space-based capabilities. In contrast, for unconventional A2/AD, China may be using clandestine networks to secure a strategic naval port through debt-trap tactics, gain placement/access to a country’s critical infrastructure through bribery and infiltration of its government institutions or private-sector, or employ similar tactics to what has been observed during the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests with respect to cyber and legal warfare. Some service components are even equating Unconventional A2/AD with an even more ambiguous term—gray zone warfare. However, for the play of the problem, this essay focuses on the conventional A2/AD threat, when considering how would the United States defend Taiwan. Avoid Predictability China is counting on the United States lacking the political will and moral strength to risk escalation of the conflict into a third world war (and perhaps a nuclear war) and preys on those fears daily. China does this by deviating from the baseline norms of military interactions and attempts to erase those lines and draw new ones to its advantage.2 China knows that we take comfort in preserving a range of low-risk options, that we would rather not go it alone, but with support from allies, and that we prefer to limit our escalation in military response and to keep the fight on the low-end of the spectrum of conflict. That is because this is what we have been taught to do—across all our Professional Military Education. Fighting China will require Commanders and Staffs that are risk-takers and will make very tough decisions—that may escalate the conflict, instead of containing it and keeping it on the low-intensity side. What Defending Taiwan May Require Potentially, U.S. IndoPaCom would have to organize three-to-four JTFs to focus on fighting the PLA. These JTFs could be broken down accordingly: JTF-East (via the Japan-corridor), JTF-Central (via the Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam – Corridor), JTF-West (via the India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh—corridor), and JTF-North (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia –corridor). Of note, these JTFs may have to conduct forcible entry operations in countries that are not supportive/will not permit U.S. military operations due to the nature of the crisis, diplomatic, economic, or military pressure from China. Burma and Cambodia would likely be the most resistant. Additionally, the assumption is that JTF-East and JTF-Central will be U.S. Navy/Marine Corps-centric, while JTF-West and JTF-North are U.S. Army/Air Force-centric. One of the significant findings in this concept is that the U.S. Army lacks the access, pre-positioning, and force presence required to sufficiently put pressure on mainland China’s Southern, Western, and Northern border. Also, this concept revealed that agreements would have to be made with nations involved to secure access, such as the JTF-North Corridor’s proximity to Russia.

JTF Construct for Defense of Taiwan (Google Maps)

Implications for the Sea Services Three of the JTFs depicted in Figure 1 require robust Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) capabilities. It is estimated that at least Three Amphibious Ready Groups-Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG-MEU) and three Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) would be required to support both JTF-East/JTF Central and JTF-West simultaneously. This does not include at least one ARG-MEU and one CSG in reserve (in theater). The CSGs and ARG-MEUs would conduct their operations between Sea of Japan, East China Sea, Philippine Sea (JTF-East), South China Sea, Gulf of Thailand, Andaman Sea (JTF-Central), and Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean (JTF-West). Looking Forward To effectively defend Taiwan, from a military standpoint, the United States must be willing to defend Taiwan from outside of Taiwan. This means that U.S. IndoPaCom may have to break away from predictable behavior and escalate the conflict, instead of containing it and keeping it on the low-intensity side. To deter China from committing the entirety of its resources to a Taiwan invasion campaign, the United States must force China to deal with the bigger problem of having to defend against the threat of a counter-invasion on its own mainland territory through penetrating raids from nearby countries. These raids would likely be conducted by multiple JTFs, operating simultaneously, and supported by no less than three ARG-MEUs and three CSGs. Additionally, these JTFs may have to conduct forcible entry operations in countries that are not supportive within their assigned corridors. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps will need to collaborate and establish more synergy to operate effectively during the land campaign. Furthermore, the U.S. Army needs to assume a larger role of taking the burden off the U.S. Navy by gaining access, pre-positioning, and establishing force presence in the JTF-Central, JTF-West, and JTF-North corridors – on-land and near strategic crossing points into mainland China.

  1. Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in an Age of Durable Disorder (New York: William Morrow, 2019).
  2. McFate, The New Rules of War.

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/16/given-chinas-a2ad-capabilities-how-would-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/feed 0 32050 60 Years Later, Courage and Triumph in JFK’s ‘We Choose to Go to the Moon’ Speech https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/12/60-years-later-courage-and-triumph-in-jfks-we-choose-to-go-to-the-moon-speech https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/12/60-years-later-courage-and-triumph-in-jfks-we-choose-to-go-to-the-moon-speech#respond Mon, 12 Sep 2022 17:48:31 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32044

“Not because they are easy, but because they are hard…” –President John F. Kennedy, 12 September 1962, Rice University, Houston, Texas

“Half that of the temperature of the Sun,” is how President John F. Kennedy described the heat on that Texas summer morning. Sixty years ago today, 40,000 people including Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Mercury astronauts, and students baked in the bowl of Rice University’s football stadium listening to the words of that young Yankee from Camelot. President Kennedy was in Houston touring the new Manned Spacecraft Center and to rally support for the nation’s space efforts. While hard to believe today with the cherished legacy of the Apollo program, Kennedy’s space policy was very unpopular. A Gallup poll of Americans published 2 June 1961 reported 58 percent of those surveyed responded “No” when asked if they supported spending billions of dollars on sending a man to the moon. After falling behind the Soviet Union and its successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 and flight of Yuri Gagarin in April of 1961, Kennedy formally challenged the country to exactly that expensive goal. Before the end of the decade, the United States should commit itself to “landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth.” Much like today, the country in the early 1960s struggled through social, economic, and technological disruption. Though wealth and social class were becoming more democratized, the modernizing world also deepened the racial divide of the nation. In a time when neighborhoods were burning and many living on the brink of poverty, the call to invest today’s equivalent of roughly $500 billion in a government space project was out of touch. The media christened the term “moondoggle.” Even former President Dwight Eisenhower called Kennedy’s moonshot “nuts”—controversial statements for a former President. Kennedy had to sell space to a skeptical public. People are agreeable to ideas that directly benefit them. That is simple human nature. We want everything . . . now . . . and done for us. Those are the projects we get behind. Unfortunately, the magical Information Age we enjoy today, the real prize of the space race, would not be realized for another generation. Human nature also encourages politicians to embellish the benefits of their ideas. Being popular is far easier than leading. But Kennedy and his speechwriter Ted Sorenson took a different approach with a simple belief—human nature is not what we actually want from ourselves. Indulging in our instincts leads to conflict, suffering, and regression – something the country deeply understood less than two decades from the end of World War Two. Instead Kennedy built his presidency on the principle, “ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country,” imploring us to elevate ourselves from humans to citizens. As great as his 1961 inaugural “ask what you can do for your country” address is, it is, in this writer’s opinion, a distant second to his September 1962 speech at Rice University.

“We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard.”

With his conviction, Kennedy projected the confidence of courageous explorers into midcentury Americans. Courage gives people agency in their lives and allows us to live up to our best selves. JFK knew in 1962 that is what the country needed. Courage does not simply materialize from talk. The President emphasized in his Boston Trans-Atlantic accent “hard . . .” letting that single syllable ring just a little louder in our minds. But what was hardship to this President? Jack Kennedy, the wealthy Harvard educated son of the Ambassador to the United Kingdom, was after all one of the most privileged men in the country.

 “We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people.”

It is no coincidence in this speech that Kennedy, a naval officer, repeatedly used the imagery of the sea when describing the new frontier of Space. The Sea is hard. It is cold, bleak, and unforgiving. Less than twenty years prior from his Rice University speech while patrolling the waters of the Solomon Island in the South Pacific, Lieutenant (j.g.) Kennedy’s command, the 80ft motor torpedo boat PT-109, was rammed and sunk by the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer Amagiri in the early morning hours of 2 August 1943. The collision instantly killed two of i 109’s 13 men, TM2 Andrew Kirksey and MM2 Harold Marney.

The officers and men of PT-109, 1943. Credit; U.S. Navy

LTJG Kennedy and his surviving crew were adrift in the darkness, wounded, and burned clinging to the wrecked hulk of their ship. The light of the rising sun would only expose their location and bring more trouble. Kennedy decided the best course was to swim to a little uninhabited island four miles away. The order could have led to the exhausted crew’s drowning. But he knew the men of PT-109 had to make this journey. The swim against the current took five hours. Kennedy towed badly injured MM1 Patrick McMahon by clinching his teeth on the belt of the sailor’s life jacket. When the party finally reached the beach of Plum Pudding Island, the lieutenant fell in the surf and heaved the saltwater from his gut. While delivered from their wreckage, the crew was still in enemy waters. Kennedy set out that evening on a solo swim into the passage with the hope of hailing a sister torpedo boat. His crew pleaded for him to abandon the plan. But he stripped to his skivvies and trekked across a coral reef jutting into the strait. Instead of a soft light to illuminate the horizon, the new moon only fed a black void. There was “some” light. The pull of his stroke disturbed the tiny fireflies of the ocean energizing a phosphorescent wake—blurring the edge of the sea into the stars above. After hours of treading water Kennedy lost his bearings. He began to drift away—carried only to his wits’ end. Miraculously, the current circled him back to the reef the next day returning him to his men. That would be the first of several more risky swims to find help. The courage and endurance of the crew of PT-109 paid off when they made contact with allied scouts on a nearby island. This set in motion a rescue plan by Kennedy’s squadron who previously held a memorial service in their lost shipmates’ honor. Six days after their engagement with the Japanese destroyer and subsisting on coconuts, the 11 survivors of PT-109 made it back to their home base. President Kennedy was far from the idealized character both publicly and in his private life. Even his actions as the commanding officer of PT-109 are not above criticism. He had fears and weaknesses. He was a human being. But his courage and patriotism, tested under intense hardship during the war, was unimpeachable.

“…all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties, and both must be enterprised and overcome with answerable courage.”

A President’s courage was just one drop in the fuel tank to get America’s rocket to the moon. There were the obvious sacrifices of astronauts and test pilots pushing the limit of how high and fast we fly. And hundreds of thousands of engineers and scientists pushed the limits of their personal lives forgoing family time in service of this objective. But the burden placed on the average American cannot be overlooked. The collective cost of projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo was incomparable to any federal program before and arguably since. Despite reservations of costs and relevance to their day-to-day priorities, the public voted in the five national elections from 1958 to 1966 their support for the moonshot. From 1961 to 1967, federal government tax revenues grew by an astounding 60 percent and NASA’s budget by more than 600 percent. NASA in 1966 accounted for 4.4 percent of the total federal budget. For context, as a percentage of federal spending in 2021, that would be equivalent to either half of the Pentagon’s entire budget, nine times NASA’s current budget, or more than the interest expense on the national debt. Taxpayers paid those costs.

 “… our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this effort, to solve these mysteries, to solve them for the good of all men, and to become the world’s leading space-faring nation.”

The fruits of the moonshot, while science fiction in 1962, touch every aspect of our contemporary lives. How we travel, how we do business, all kinds of life-saving medical technology, and perhaps most profoundly—how we socialize with others have been disrupted by the research of getting a man to the moon. And those are just the self-centric examples, to say nothing of our larger knowledge of our planet, solar system, universe, and time. As great as these benefits of the space program have been, perhaps the most valuable is how the achievement of a seemingly impossible challenge makes us realize our potential. Spaceflight still makes us feel that way. Right now there are thousands of young space companies competing in this new commercial marketplace. Each is working on their own moonshot. While the new space economy is extremely disruptive and will only be more so, there are less risky ways to make money than bolting a product on top of thousands of tons of explosives then blasting it into orbit. Profit alone does not compel people to fly. But they do. There is no other more moving experience than seeing a flying machine you designed and built sitting downrange ignite its engines in a flash of light then seconds later have your core shaken by the Earth and the air from the boom of the rocket as it ascends into the sky. Sixty years later, we’re in another space race. It’s just as consequential. And this is what still drives us. In a cynical 1962 editorial The New York Times mocked Kennedy by arguing that a Harvard University could be reproduced for every state and then some for the cost of the moonshot. Seven years later, The New York Times dedicated 18 pages in a single edition to the Apollo 11 landing—including a page of poems. Leadership and great triumphs take courage. Sixty years ago President Kennedy said to accomplish this challenge, “we must be bold.” He was proven right.

Earthrise, from Apollo 8 on 26 December 1968. Credit: NASA

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/12/60-years-later-courage-and-triumph-in-jfks-we-choose-to-go-to-the-moon-speech/feed 0 32044 On Midrats 11 September 2022 – Episode 634: Looking West to the Taiwan Strait, with Dean Cheng https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/11/on-midrats-10-september-2022-episode-634-looking-west-to-the-taiwan-strait-with-dean-cheng https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/11/on-midrats-10-september-2022-episode-634-looking-west-to-the-taiwan-strait-with-dean-cheng#respond Sun, 11 Sep 2022 11:15:14 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32014

Please join us at 1200 on 11 September 2022 for Midrats Episode 634: Looking West to the Taiwan Strait, with Dean Cheng

  • The People’s Liberation Army Navy has her capital ships underway and under construction. The Japanese Navy continues her plans to grow in a way not seen in a century, and the lessons on the other side of the Eurasian landmass in Ukraine are shuffling long held assumptions concerning food, fuel, demographics, and economics.
  • We’re going to cover this and more with returning guest Dean Cheng.
  • Dean is the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese political and security affairs at the Asia Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation. He specializes in Chinese military and foreign policy, and has written extensively on Chinese military doctrine, technological implications of its space program, and “dual use” issues associated with China’s industrial and scientific infrastructure. He is the author of “Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations.”
  • Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he was a senior analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research and development center, and a senior analyst with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC, now Leidos), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security. He has testified before Congress, spoken at the (American) National Defense University, US Air Force Academy, and the National Space Symposium, and been published in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/11/on-midrats-10-september-2022-episode-634-looking-west-to-the-taiwan-strait-with-dean-cheng/feed 0 32014 Small Teams, Large Impact https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/09/small-teams-large-impact https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/09/small-teams-large-impact#respond Fri, 09 Sep 2022 18:39:32 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32034 Off the coast of South America, a helicopter embarked upon a U.S. Navy destroyer spots a semi-submersible— a vessel capable of holding several tons of drugs helping to fund transnational criminal organizations. Absent a boarding team with the legal authority to intervene, they can only take photographs and report what they had seen. Elsewhere, a similar vessel encounters a Chinese fishing vessel suspected of human trafficking. Hoping to avoid capture, the Chinese crew communicates that they are armed and will actively fight off any attempted boarding. Lacking the requisite level of boarding team, the vessel backs off until such a team can arrive. In contested waters, a cutter undergoes attempted cyberattacks from supposed fishing vessels. Lacking cyber experts, the vessel continues on, oblivious of the attack and any compromised data. These potential events are troubling. However, the Coast Guard has been able to address these types of scenarios with much success in the past using small, focused teams. While these teams have had tremendous impact, they are relatively scarce in numbers. To fully realize this capability, the Coast Guard must invest in small, deployable groups, comprised of certain skillsets that can fill niche roles at a moment’s notice. Coast Guard Use of Small Teams For decades, the Coast Guard has utilized small teams with a focused purpose either on their own, or as part of a team comprised of other military services, government agencies, and even other nations. For example, Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) or Advanced Interdiction Teams (AITs)—entities with a heightened skillset including the capability to conduct non-compliant and opposed boardings. Their efforts routinely result in the interdiction of multiple tons of drugs, weapons bound for terrorists, and often terrorists themselves. The International Mobile Training Branch (MTB), responsible for providing instruction in various areas aimed at increasing partner nation abilities, is another example. The MTB can trace its roots to the Drug Interdiction Assistance Team who took the fight to the source, embedding with host nations, burning down cocaine fields, and getting in firefights with the cartels.1 Members of the Redeployment Assistance and Inspection Detachment traveled throughout the Middle East during the Iraq war, dodging mortars and IEDs to ensure the containers used to get equipment to and from the front lines were mission ready. These are but some of the many examples of teams the Coast Guard has used throughout its history. But despite these successes, the Coast Guard has not applied a large-scale version of this concept to other mission areas. Current Shortfalls Following a disaster, the Coast Guard often responds by surging resources to a location to help. However, individual units must give up personnel to respond. Assuming robust staffing levels, the impact is sometimes minimal. Often, however, the unit is stretched thin meeting existing demand and the absence of these service members leaves some units struggling. Under the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard must be available for the needs of the Department. As members of the military, Coasties are easier to move around administratively compared to other agencies. For example, medical personnel are a tremendous resource aiding the nation in addressing migrants, refugees, or disaster victims. Unfortunately, the absence of these service members from their home clinic can derail the home unit’s medical care—which is often minimally outfitted. As assets increase in technological complexity, cyber teams have begun providing assessments for cutters before a deployment to identify vulnerabilities and shore up any weaknesses that could be exploited. A similar capability is performed by Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) throughout ports to analyze weaknesses and identify leads on cyberattacks throughout the Maritime Transportation System (MTS). While a critical capability, these teams are few and far between. Bolstering the numbers throughout Coast Guard Cyber Command will aid in not only meeting the Coast Guard’s regulatory responsibilities but will ensure the cyber readiness of all assets. Despite their high op tempo and proven results, Tactical Law Enforcement Teams—the units which individual LEDETS belong to—can still only fulfill a portion of the demand. AITs, a form of an Adaptive Force Package (AFP) from the Maritime Security Response Teams, have seen increasing demand as well. However, the specialized capabilities of units like these are relatively limited across the services and the Coast Guard has struggled to fully staff all the billets at these units. Growing these units will enable the Coast Guard to field more AFPs and provide more capacity, which can be leveraged for the attainment of national strategic goals. Potential Types of Teams While the Coast Guard may be chronically understaffed, the answer is not to pass up opportunities for work. The Coast Guard should not turn down reasonable requests, but instead find ways to capitalize on these initiatives. That said, they can no longer pull from the bench to meet these needs as the bench has all too often run out. Instead, the Coast Guard should be proactive in cultivating groups of highly trained, rapidly deployable personnel to seize opportunities while leveraging large Congressional support to ensure sufficient personnel numbers to fulfill demand. Medical personnel. Consider the medical personnel aiding in events such as Allies Welcome or natural disasters. In daily life, these members conduct routine clinic business. Upon deployment, they are no longer assessing common complaints, but are expected to respond to trauma and can literally be the difference between life and death. Sourcing these individuals from a dedicated deployable unit would not only ensure service members are experienced but also that their absence will not cause undue burden on their traditional patients. Cyber security. CPTs are not only vital in assessing vulnerabilities of critical port infrastructure but can exploit attempted attacks to learn about aggressors. Given the MTS’s sheer size and how quicky technology advances, a robust number of these teams are essential to effectively countering cyber threats. Additionally, these teams also can focus internally. While the Coast Guard must fully certify its cyber teams to conduct defensive and offensive assessments of Coast Guard, Defense Department, and other agency assets, it should not stop there. Consider the example of the vessel unknowingly subjected to a cyberattack. An embedded team of cyber-specialists could serve as a sort of cyber damage control team, defending against and countering the attack while triaging impacted systems. Although this capability sometimes exists organically, its effectiveness is dependent upon the skills and equipment onboard, which can often be lacking. AFPs. Take the vessel suspected of human trafficking from the introduction. From both a physical and policy-based standpoint, an opposed-capable boarding team integrated with explosive ordnance disposal technicians can secure the vessel and contain the threat. From there, cyber or intel members can conduct site specific exploitation, a process involving the exploitation of items such as documents, electronics, and information that can support case prosecution and aid in the fight against transnational crime. IUU. Amongst an international hyper focus on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU), a practice estimated to cost the global economy over $50 billion annually and thoroughly intertwined with human rights violations, the Coast Guard has found itself at the forefront of this battle. In addition to the expertise required to assess compliance with traditional fisheries laws, IUU enforcement combines a complex international framework that guides how any one nation conducts a fisheries boarding and how results of that effort are handled. Add the aggressive and illegal behaviors of those such as the Chinese fishing fleet, which is often intertwined with its maritime militia, and the need for an AFP comprised of fisheries experts, intelligence personnel, and even state department or similar entities becomes clear. Counterargument Despite historic funding and tremendous shipbuilding investments, the Coast Guard lacks the personnel to fully outfit every unit and meet every demand. Thus, the Coast Guard should leverage Congressional support to bolster these numbers. Assuming success, an argument could be made that this small team concept is irrelevant because the fully manned and equipped Coast Guard would be capable of performing its tasking on its own. However, this fails to maximize the impact the Coast Guard can provide and is outdated and counter to the current military and political environment. As Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated, the “U.S. military isn’t meant to stand apart, but to buttress U.S. diplomacy and advance a foreign policy that employs all of our instruments of national power.” Further, global demand for the Coast Guard continues to skyrocket as emphasized by the previous Commandant, Admiral Karl L. Schultz. Even when fully manned and equipped, there are only so many Coast Guard assets to go around. If the United States wants to address a given concern such as IUU, the Coast Guard can send resources to the extent that it does not detract from other requirements. Meanwhile, vessels of opportunity—such as U.S. Navy vessels—patrol past multitudes of target vessels in areas the Coast Guard could not place assets. Absent an AFP with legal authority, the United States has missed an opportunity to project influence. Now substitute the vessel of opportunity with a small nation vulnerable to the actions of China. Without U.S. support, the nation may reluctantly work with China—which utilizes predatory practices to destabilize nations and create dependence upon China. Beyond this pointed example, one can reference the many documents emphasizing our country does not need or want a Coast Guard focused only upon itself. Goldwater-Nichols, the Tri-Service Strategy, and existing joint operations are but some of many examples of the nation’s focus on integration and the benefits it brings the nation, warfighter, and our allies. The utilization of small, integrated teams only smooths this effort and allows the various sea services to complement each other’s capabilities. A Path Forward The Coast Guard has long prided itself on adaptability. Whether conducting law enforcement, sanctions enforcement, regulatory oversight, or military action, small, highly specialized teams provide robust and timely solutions to Coast Guard Operational and Combatant Commanders. As adversaries continue operating within the gray zone, walking a fine line between provocation and war, we can no longer apply cookie cutter solutions across the board. Our adversaries seek to avoid the heavy hand of the U.S. military and are eager to exploit America’s often rigid distinction between war and peacetime. Instead, we must learn to be comfortable operating throughout the competition continuum and heed Sun Tzu’s advice to “win the war before it is fought.”2 Fortunately, the Coast Guard thrives in the gray zone. Its unique authorities and global reputation for modeling rules-based order stand in stark contrast to our adversaries and provide an easy avenue for international support, the importance of which has been severely reinforced in the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Failing to fully utilize the Coast Guard is a disservice to the American people and reduces tools available to strategic planners. While the Coast Guard’s infamous racing stripe has become a powerful statement and is synonymous with results, the reality is that the Coast Guard, even stretched thin, cannot put hard assets everywhere they are needed. Far more attainable, however, are collections and variations of AFPs or other focused teams.

  1. Matthew Mitchell, Not Your Father’s Coast Guard: The Untold Story of U.S. Coast Guard Special Forces (Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2010).
  2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/09/small-teams-large-impact/feed 0 32034 United By Service, But Not By Citizenship https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/07/united-by-service-but-not-by-citizenship https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/07/united-by-service-but-not-by-citizenship#respond Wed, 07 Sep 2022 18:17:00 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32030 The United States is proud to say that its military is a true melting pot of not only colors, cultures, and sexual orientations, but also nationalities. The U.S. military has been molded by more than just Americans; today, it is built by those born outside of U.S. borders as well. Throughout the years, the United States has brought together those who believed in more than just their own lands; those who believed in not just their own freedom, but also those of the people they fought for. With time, however, policies have changed, and those who used to join the U.S. military for the perk of becoming an immediate citizen now face with a multitude of struggles. Service During Peace and Wartime Since the Revolutionary War, the United States has accepted those willing to abandon their own lands to serve in both war and peace. America has promised those airmen, Marines, sailors, and soldiers a safe haven paid through their sweat and blood on the battlefield. However, those who wish to serve Uncle Sam are now at the mercy of bureaucratic management. In 1947, the Military Bases Agreement allowed for the creation of a U.S. military bases in the Philippines, resulting in the total of 35,000 Filipinos enlisting between 1952 and 1991. That tradeoff was fair, considering the Filipino people have opened their borders to one of the greatest powers in the world; the least that could be done to pay off such a great debt was to accept their people into the U.S. military. Next, thanks to the Lodge Act of 1950, non-citizen Eastern Europeans were allowed to join the armed forced between 1950 and 1959. To this day, about 5,000 green card holders enlist each year. Since 11 September 2001, over 109,150 members of the United States military have been granted citizenship through their service. At the Mercy of Bureaucratic Management In 2021 alone, 8,800 men and women joined the American military and were granted citizenship due to their sacrifice for a country that was not theirs; not at the time, at least. Of those, 76 percent were men, and only 24 percent were women. There is no telling how many of them could have joined at a higher rank—including as officers. Although many already hold degrees, non-citizens are not allowed to become officers in the armed forces. Those holding a doctorate in Peru, for example, must climb the ranks as ordinary E-3s. Permanent citizens who have at least a bachelor’s degree are omitted for the officers’ programs due to their citizenship status. The expedited process of acquiring such status is granted only if their current commanding officer signs off on their documentation. Those whose green card is nearing its expiration date, however, do not get such treatment due to the elongated process of getting the commanding officer to not only see the paperwork, but also to be gracious enough to sign it. They are not bound by any law to do so. The Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) Recruitment Program made it possible for green card holders to be able to acquire their citizenship after finishing Basic Training. However, the program was suspended in 2017 due to a sudden influx of candidates, leaving those who had joined on a soon to expire green card serve in limbo. Those who had pledged to serve a country that was not their own could no longer rely on the promise of becoming one of that very country’s people. Thankfully, there are still expedited means for service members to become citizens, but these are not guaranteed and depend on the capriciousness of the commanding officer of the installation the service member is applying from. If not so inclined, a commanding officer may decline a service member’s application to become a citizen. Excuses along the lines of “not enough time on installation” may be thrown around, making it impossible for those attending mandatory schooling for their rate to reach their citizenship goal. For example, if a service member joined the one of the forces four months prior to their green card expiring, and they stayed anywhere longer than three months of that time in Basic Training, the commanding officer may deem them unfit to become a citizen—not due to their legal or moral standards, but simply because they do not see it necessary to pull the service member out of class for the biometrics or interview which would grant them citizenship. On the other hand, the commanding officer may grant the enlisted service member a way to attend such appointments, which in turn would push them back in their training and leave them vulnerable to being set back in training—thus making them forfeit their rate altogether, a rate that was not chosen by the service member in the first place but rather due to their lack of choice. Although the United States has outstretched its hand in the past to help those willing to sacrifice their lives in the fight for the American freedom, today it is much less keen on accepting individuals not born on its soil. From cutting programs that would reward non-citizens for joining the U.S. military to restricting job opportunities within the service, the U.S military has fallen deep into the complacency of accepting green card holders without any merit for doing so. Once a great nation with an initiative to enlist as many as 35,000 non-citizens from a single country in the span of 39 years, the United States has put many obstacles for those willing to serve it. A doctor across the border is today’s E-3, struggling to make ends meet while wielding great knowledge. A service member with a bachelor’s degree fights their way through ranks with those who have just finished high school. A commanding officer does not think that a particular enlisted service member is worthy of receiving citizenship simply due to their short stay at a training facility. Noncitizens join the United States military every day, yet they are not guaranteed what they have fought to cease. Bureaucracy may have its merits, but it has no place in the discussion of whether a United States enlisted service member should be allowed a permanent stay on the soil they have pledged to give their lives away for.  

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/07/united-by-service-but-not-by-citizenship/feed 0 32030 The Fracture Toughness of Leadership https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/02/the-fracture-toughness-of-leadership https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/02/the-fracture-toughness-of-leadership#respond Fri, 02 Sep 2022 19:53:28 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32018 On 16 January 1943, the SS Schenectady returned from her sea trials to Portland, Oregon, when she violently cracked in half while moored to the dock. The crack was so sudden and so loud, it was heard from almost a mile away. The construction of the Schenectady had started six months prior as part of the industrial buildup to provide transport ships for World War II, one of 2,710 Liberty ships built in a four-year period during the war. What caused a brand-new ship to catastrophically fail in calm weather while stationary and what does that event have to do with leadership? The culprit of the mishap was brittle fracture which occurs when metal breaks without any appreciable deformation. The metal snaps without warning, just as the Schenectady did nearly 80 years ago. Brittle fractures are materials with low-fracture toughness, preexisting flaws, and under stress. The conditions that cause brittle fracture can be a useful model for leaders to help them recognize not only in themselves, but also those they lead when confronted with various challenges. Toughness When thinking about steel, the primary material used to build the Schenectady, weakness is not the first thing that comes to mind. There is a reason steel is used by the shipping industry—because of its strength and resiliency in any condition. But the properties of steel are not fixed. The strength of steel can change with time and temperature. Exposure to the elements or corrosion can reduce the fracture toughness of steel. As temperature increases, steel becomes less brittle. Once the material is above a certain temperature, the steel is impervious to brittle fracture but can still fail due to fatigue. Just like steel, an individual’s level of toughness can change over time. Past experiences, both good and bad, can affect the level of toughness. Some people have a natural instinct for toughness, mentally and or physically. For others, it is a skill they practice and nurture. By learning from past events, a person can increase toughness. Conversely, an individual’s toughness decreases if they let a past mistake drive their actions or decisions because it dominates and clouds their thinking. Flaws A flaw is just a crack. It could be a visible crack, but most of the time, flaws are cracks undetectable to the naked eye. The crack could have been created during processing, or it could occur later during the service of the material. Bending a material repeatedly, also known as cycling, can cause cracks. Cycling can even result in failure with many small but repeated variations or a single large bend. This is apparent to anyone who has ever unfolded a paperclip and broke it in half. The paperclip will snap in two with one good solid bend, or a couple smaller back and forth iterations. If a material can bend a large amount, or repeatedly without damage, it is flexible. Flexibility is the opposite of brittleness and can be useful. Similarly, it is useful for an individual, especially emotional flexibility as a leader. Passion and emotions are good, but they also can create “cracks” in an individual’s “foundation” or exacerbate their preexisting cracks. Life as a leader can involve emotional highs and lows, sometimes within a short time frame, creating more stress. Failure to control the magnitude of emotional variations, individuals will suffer the same fate as the paper clip. Instead, damping the highs and lows may allow a person to sustain for a longer time, but still can introduce enough of a crack for brittle fracture to be a concern. Stress Stress is the final component required for brittle fracture. The danger of brittle fracture is the lack of known or measurable amount of stress required before failure. It happens suddenly, unexpectedly, and, most likely, catastrophically. Engineers mitigate brittle fracture by operating at temperatures in which the material is no longer brittle (i.e., changes the fracture toughness.) However, material can still fail because of fatigue caused by stress. Stress is the common factor in either case. But where a material’s brittle fracture can be mitigated by temperature, the same cannot be said for a person’s brittle fracture. This is not a surprising revelation. Everyone experiences stress, and people experience it in different ways. For one person, a stress event can increase their toughness and teach them something about themselves. The same event could break another person or cause them to give up. Brittle Fracture and Leadership Prevention of brittle fracture requires a removal of one of the three requirements; low fracture toughness, a flaw (or crack), or stress. Leaders and individuals can do this by working on their mental, physical, and spiritual health and well-being. Understanding oneself can improve internal fracture toughness or repair cracks. It also can help early recognition of the beginnings of a crack or a reduction in fracture toughness. Conversely, leaders should remove individuals from stress causing situations to protect them if they suspect that a brittle fracture is imminent. My appreciation for emotional flexibility and brittle fracture occurred while I was commanding officer of a Super Hornet squadron on deployment in the western Pacific. Even though I had 16 years of experience flying the Super Hornet, none of the operational squadrons I had served with had ever lost an aircraft. Heading into command, my lack of experience with mishaps was a self-identified weakness in my fracture toughness. On returning from a flight, I was filling out post-flight paperwork when our ready room received a phone call regarding lost communications with one of our aircraft. As I had rehearsed a number of times in my head, I did not overreact to the information and exited quietly from the ready room to determine what was happening. As more information rolled in over the next 20 minutes it became apparent we had lost one of our aircraft and the fate of the two aircrew was unknown. The following half-hour was the most agonizing 30 minutes of my career. As I walked back to the ready room to inform the squadron and set the mishap plan in action, I was in tears. With the fate of my two junior officers still unknown, I collected myself prior to opening the door, and with a mentality I had again prepared myself for, I got the squadron moving to deal with the mishap. Soon after initiating the mishap plan, we gained communication with our aircrew confirming they were both alive and safe in their life rafts. The search-and-rescue helicopter was already on its way and soon pulled them out of water. I was waiting on the flight deck when both aircrew walked off the helicopter relatively unscathed. With emotions running high, I gave them both a huge hug, which was, conversely, one of best moments of my entire career. I experienced an enormous low and enormous high within a short period. I was the paperclip being bent rapidly and to the extreme. The next several hours were a blur as I moved around the aircraft carrier talking to the squadron while periodically stopping by medical to check on the condition of the two aircrew. As the adrenaline rush of the ejection wore off, the magnitude of stress and reality of the situation became more apparent to both of them. Simultaneously, I felt my own stress level increase as I was trying to understand the emotions I started to recognize. I had a low-fracture toughness for a mishap. I had cracks developing from the emotional swings I had undergone and the stress level of the event continued to increase. Reaching my own brittle fracture was impending. Just as I was concerned and kept an eye on our flight crew, I was fortunate a flight surgeon was concerned and kept an eye on me. After the mishap, he pulled me aside in medical and sat me down for a couple of minutes to give myself a pause. He did not know what my brittle fracture limit was—no one can know it ahead of time—but he did know me well enough to recognize that I was exceeding a level of stress to be operational in the situation. And for that I am thankful to Doc Stuhlo. By pulling me into his office, Doc prevented me from reaching my point of brittle fracture. We talked about what had happened, and other lesser topics. Having a couple minutes to sit down and breathe, allowed my stress level to lower and self-assess my fracture toughness and internal cracks. I was able to step away from the event for a moment and process what I needed to do. Viewing emotional stress through the lens of brittle fracture can be a useful model. Humans may be made of flesh and bone, but our toughness and ability to handle stress is an internal, immeasurable item. Leaders must understand that about themselves and those for whom they are responsible to prevent situations that may lead to emotional brittle fracture. Brittle fracture is not the end of the line. The Schenectady, as well as several other Liberty ships that suffered a brittle-fracture failure, was repaired, and she served admirably as an oiler for the remainder of World War II. But their mission was delayed and took monumental effort to repair. Better to prevent brittle fracture from occurring to be ready for the task at hand.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/09/02/the-fracture-toughness-of-leadership/feed 0 32018 Family Matters: Leadership and Forging Bonds of Trust in the Sea Services https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/31/family-matters-leadership-and-forging-bonds-of-trust-in-the-sea-services https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/31/family-matters-leadership-and-forging-bonds-of-trust-in-the-sea-services#respond Wed, 31 Aug 2022 13:49:32 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32021 Serving the nation at sea is a dangerous business. Mariners are constantly at the mercy of the weather and the elements, and the inside of a warship is no safe haven. Sailors stand watch and even sleep next to highly pressurized piping, dangerous machinery, and heavy ordnance. An improperly operated valve or a sloppy maintenance procedure could be the difference between a good night’s sleep and extreme danger. Add to all this the perils and horrors of combat and the dangers of the naval profession are plain to see. Only the skilled crew of mariners, who knows how to operate their ship safely and use their weapons effectively, will win the high-end fight and come home safe. Isolated from the rest of the world, a crew at sea has no one to rely on but each other. The only comfort amidst the danger is trust among shipmates. Without a profound understanding and respect for one another, that trust could never develop in a crew. As the maritime services contemplate the idea of facing the first combat action at sea in decades, only the crews that invest the time and energy to develop family ties will be able to operate safely, overcome the adversity of combat, and win. The Importance of Family Bonds Family ties and bonds of trust are part and parcel of the human experience. We were evolved to value social connections with others to deal with the danger of the prehistoric world. At the biological level, our brains produce oxytocin, which encourages us to develop bonds of trust and friendship with people close to us by making us feel comfortable and happy when we are around them.1 This extends to crews at sea. If humans feel they are part of a family grouping, they will develop the type of trust that allows them to face down danger and accomplish great things together. This is true for mariners who face a fiducial level of danger every day, and even more so for the teams that must serve in combat together. In combat, we put our lives in the hands of the people to our right and to our left. If that trust is absent—or worse, if members of the crew actively distrust one another—then fear and self-preservation take over. Without trust, even the best technology will be useless for overcoming the paralysis of fear and the inefficacy of self-centeredness within the crew. In the past, crews would socialize together off the ship quite often. That bonding experience gave them a sense of camaraderie and helped them to develop family ties that transferred to life onboard the ship. That is how past generations were able to fight and win wars at sea. Morale Degraded Young sailors are isolated from one another more than ever, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated the problem. This has resulted in an ongoing morale crisis. The active-duty military saw a statistical increase in the number of suicides between 2015 and 2020, with a 25 percent jump at the end of calendar year 2020. The past few years have seen high-profile media stories involving troubled sailors taking their own lives and the lives of others. As recent as 2018, military members who were surveyed—especially junior enlisted members of the Navy and Marine Corps—said they experienced recent serious psychological distress at higher rates than the overall U.S. population. Modern technology is driving part of this trend. In contrast to the sailors of the past who would frequently socialize together off duty, many today turn to social media for entertainment and a sense of escape from their demanding and stressful jobs. Ask any division officer: most will know all too well the type of sailor who uses most of his free time off the ship playing video games alone in the barracks. This is concerning, as excessive use of social media can degrade mental health by leading to feelings of anxiety, depression, and loneliness. In addition to technology-driven isolation, modern attitudes play a part. Today, many sailors view their work as “just a job” rather than a profession shared by a community called to serve a higher cause. As former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman puts it, Naval service has until recently been seen as an elite calling. Now many see it as just another trade. The bureaucracy has done away with officers’ and chiefs’ clubs, as well as bachelor officers’ quarters. Except for senior officers, no one wants to live on base. Sailors commute to work like any civilian and socialize as far as possible from senior officers. Naval service when not deployed is today little different from working in the Postal Service. Navy crews and their families were once tight-knit groups that lived together on base, socialized with one another when not at sea, and shared in the difficulties of deployment together. While many Navy communities do still share strong bonds, they are the exception rather than the rule. And while it would be wrong to reduce completely the cause of the Navy’s mental health problems to too much social media or a lack of community, something is clearly wrong that Navy leaders need to fix. The Task of the Maritime Leader Effective leadership will be the difference between the crews that pull together like families and those that do not. It is a matter of life and death, especially if crews are called to fight in combat soon. Therefore, effective leaders must focus on four things: 1) Knowing the people they lead; 2) Mentoring their people; 3) Fostering social ties; and 4) Getting care for their people. Leaders Know the People They Lead Leaders must get to know the people who make up their divisions, departments, and crews. They must make it their business to know thoroughly the personal details, struggles, hopes, and fears of their subordinates. “Get to know your people” sounds simple enough, but it becomes difficult when competing priorities vie for leaders’ time and attention. Excellent leaders actively strive to put interaction with subordinates at the top of their priority list. Only then do strong family bonds begin to develop between leaders and their subordinates. Leaders Mentor Their Sailors Taking the time to mentor sailors is imperative. Truly excellent leaders will nurture the people under them and guide their career progression. They will encourage their subordinates to seek out new training and qualification opportunities and will take on risk for themselves to devolve more responsibilities down to the lowest levels possible. Practicing mission command at the micro level by delegating authority is a form of mentorship, whereby a commander provides intent, allows subordinates to make decisions, and then provides feedback after the dust settles. It demonstrates presumption of good intent and thus builds bonds of trust from the bottom up. Leaders Foster Close-Knit Ties In an environment where sailors are becoming more isolated, maritime leaders must actively work to bring their crews together. Commands must be even more creative than ever at devising ways to socialize because of the need to maintain safe distancing to protect from COVID-19. Leaders should normalize socializing outside of work and duty, especially for crewmembers’ families. Some crews have had success with outdoor burger burns, sporting events, and other crew get-togethers to foster greater morale and esprit de corps. Midlevel leaders play a large role in off-ship socializing. Junior officers can work with their chiefs to organize division events on their own, to get young sailors out of their barracks room. This can mean risk for senior leaders, but they should encourage this, and teach junior leaders how to comport themselves appropriately with their subordinates. When being together outside of work becomes normalized and occurs regularly, the crew will feel less isolated from one another and develop the family bonds they will need to succeed at sea. Leaders Get Their Subordinates the Care They Need Finally, leaders must care for their subordinates like they care for members of their own families. This means that when sailors display warning signs of mental illness or distress, leaders must act with compassion and decisiveness to get help. It can be tempting to dismiss off-color mental health remarks as harmless, but leaders must take them seriously. Just as important, leaders must shut down any complaints about sailors who decides to take advantage of mental health services. They must work to create a culture where mental health care is encouraged by everyone. Leaders must therefore work hard to dispel myths and taboos by educating their crews on the benefits of mental health care. In the process of doing so, family bonds will develop because the crew knows their leaders care about them. When Crews Come Together Advantage At Sea states, “Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen remain our most important resource for prevailing in long-term competition.” We often say that our advantage over our adversaries is our people. We need to treat those people accordingly. To that end, we must recognize that building family ties and bonds of trust among crews is the highest responsibility of maritime leaders. Only crews that treat one another like they would treat their brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters will be the crews that fire on all cylinders and perform with excellence under stress and danger. Crewmembers who feel trusted and heard—who know their leaders take the time to get to know them, mentor them, and care for them—will rise to any occasion. These crews enjoy high morale and encourage each other to get help when it is needed. They protect and look out for one another on shore and act with great courage at sea—even in combat.

  1. Simon Sinek, Leaders Eat Last (London: Penguin Publishing Group, 2014), 104.

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/31/family-matters-leadership-and-forging-bonds-of-trust-in-the-sea-services/feed 0 32021 On Midrats 28 August 2022 – Episode 633: The Use and Misuse of Our Military Attachés https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/27/on-midrats-28-august-2022-episode-633-the-use-and-misuse-of-our-military-attaches https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/27/on-midrats-28-august-2022-episode-633-the-use-and-misuse-of-our-military-attaches#respond Sat, 27 Aug 2022 09:12:53 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31984

Please join us at 5 pm on 28 August 2022 for Midrats Episode 633: The Use and Misuse of our Military Attachés

  • Networks, local knowledge, human terrain, and even gossip. It does not matter if you are a tourist, a diplomat, or an invading army – if you come into a foreign nation you need local knowledge, a guide – someone who can not just tell you where the head is, but the important parts of the intangible nature of any culture that simply does not come from a briefing book.
  • And it needs to be someone you trust.
  • Likewise, as social animals, from the middle school lunchroom to the United Nations, we have our “in-group” and the “out-group.” Friendly, hostile, or aggressively neutral, out-group people are racked-n-stacked based upon their perceived threat or value.
  • Do they have power? Do they have access to power? Can they get information I need, or are they a reliable path to deliver information? Are they worthy of trust by me, and do they have the trust of their “in-group?”
  •  When it comes to bi-lateral military relations between nations, at least on paper one of the most important players is the military attaché.
  • This Sunday we will be looking at the United States’ military attaché ecosystem along the spectrum of how they should be used, how they are being used, and how we could better use them in the service of our nation’s interests.
  • Our guest for the full hour will be Colonel Raymond M. Powell, USAF former Air Attaché to Vietnam from 2013 to 2016, and the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché to Australia from 2017 to 2020.
  •  We will use his recent article at DefenseOne, DOD’s Diplomats Don’t Need More Rank, Just Less Disdain, as a starting point for our conversation.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/27/on-midrats-28-august-2022-episode-633-the-use-and-misuse-of-our-military-attaches/feed 0 31984 Let the Experts Be Experts: Leadership in a More Modern Navy https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/25/let-the-experts-be-experts-leadership-in-a-more-modern-navy https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/25/let-the-experts-be-experts-leadership-in-a-more-modern-navy#respond Thu, 25 Aug 2022 13:12:34 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32008 The role of the Navy officer can be a daunting one—no ifs, ands, or scuttlebutts about it. Whether new to the officer corps or to the Navy entirely, the absurdly large download of completely novel information can quickly leave even the most prepared ensigns (or so they thought!) reeling from a hard day’s work in which not only results are highly sought after, but learning is both paramount and measured. The mental game of having to ignore the good chance that you are the most experientially uneducated person in the room can be exhausting—but it is necessary to provide the clarity and confidence needed to accomplish the mission. Where junior officers sometimes get it wrong, however, is striving to have all the answers or be the most knowledgeable junior officer (JO) around the wardroom, ship, or flight line. Instead, what we should be doing (and what the best leaders on and above the deckplates are doing), is allowing the Navy to showcase its own investments. But how do we do this? Let the Experts Be Experts When we are too quick to point out the need to “lead from the front” and to “take charge,” we not only miss the opportunity to build more leaders, but also to see the full capabilities of our enlisted counterparts—the technical experts—first-hand in carrying out the more complex tasks their own jobs require of them. It is a wonderfully fulfilling thing to see your brand-new second-class petty officer come back to tell you “the bird’s back up” or “skipper’s in the air” after your only input into the matter was telling them to go do their thing. Yet, while we as junior officers are often just an intermediary when it comes to carrying out our CO’s vision or our XO’s strategies, it is humbling to be responsible for any level of mission success when you sometimes provide little more than the faith and confidence in the skills and expertise of the sailors around you. First thought that would come to mind after reading such a thing is the old adage of “Trust, But Verify,” and there is plenty value to that. However, as with most things, moderation is key. The chief who has never let you down before—he or she’s got it. The airman who is already on his or her third turnaround inspection of the day and called out several issues on the last jet—that signature should mean a lot to you. There are so many things we interact with daily that can pose a legitimate threat of loss of life or limb that we must exercise superior cunning and discretion in everything we do—including how we manage our people (and ourselves). A Practical Example This is especially true when it comes to leaders like us; the ones who wear the shiny things on our collars and the gold stripes on our sleeve cuffs. Good results come from striking that balance between stepping up as the brass of the group while allowing those under our charge to show us what they are made of. Well, they are made of a lot, and they are keenly aware of it. What I look back on as a fortunate example of this is my most recent deployment as the detachment maintenance officer of a triad of MH-60S helicopters on board the USS Bataan (LHD-5) and the 30 aviation maintainers assigned to me. When in charge of the readiness and operability of the lone Navy aviation assets on a ship filled with more Marines than sailors because of the Marine Expeditionary Unit on board, and more importantly when your aircraft are the designated search-and-rescue assets in the event of a man overboard or worse, you tend to take mission capability statuses a little more seriously. And when one of your three aircraft are hard down for a critical safety system, it dwells on you until that bird is up again and ready to get back in the fight. Aircraft 46, our “trouble child,” was completely non-mission capable because of a fire detector circuit breaker that would instantly pop the moment the helo went forward flight and that would continuously reset once back on the flight deck. With no ability to reset in the air, and without that circuit breaker remaining popped on deck, the fire detectors were inoperable. This made the aircraft unable to self-diagnose an engine fire in the event one sparked, and it was therefore deck bound until the discrepancy could be fixed. This went on for days, and then weeks . . . and without the ability to troubleshoot on deck, we were largely dead in the water absent a lucky break. Then finally, after weeks of only two thirds of our aircraft being flyable, that lucky break came—and now it was time for the even harder work. The circuit breaker stayed popped on landing, and we could finally simulate the gripe and troubleshoot on the ground. With a contested strait transit looming on the horizon, we had exactly zero time to waste when my cadre of avionics maintainers came to me and told me all they needed now was deck space, and time. I trusted them to do what they do, and to get the job done. In a compressed flight window, and conflicting requirements for the assortment of Marine aircraft oncboard that needed their own fly time and deck space, this is no short order especially when the MH-60S helicopter requires either a significant portion of the deck to itself because of downwash from other rotary aircraft or for its own blades to be folded and crutched. This quickly became a situation in which, if I could promise my chain of command three mission-capable aircraft by morning, I could give my sailors what they needed to make that happen. I let the experts be experts, and the returns were worth many times over the risk of the leap of faith it took to get them what they needed. I came through because they came through, and vice-versa. Looking to the Future In today’s realm of Navy leadership and the day-to-day dealings of its junior officers, there is now an enhanced need to acknowledge the expertise of our subordinates—especially when they are in no uncertain terms our technical superiors so much of the time. When a sailor is hitting those high marks, they are aware of it more now than ever. What was once a humble, almost willful ignorance of their own capabilities has been replaced by a daring and, at times, fiery conviction within these men and women to take on the next big challenge—to conquer the next mountain. We as JOs realize that we must seek to capture that raw talent, and to nurture it. If we can successfully employ this type of new and invigorated leadership, we should expect our lethality as a fighting force to grow vastly in the years and decades to come.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/25/let-the-experts-be-experts-leadership-in-a-more-modern-navy/feed 0 32008 Know Your Sh%t and Give a Sh%t https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/22/know-your-sht-and-give-a-sht https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/22/know-your-sht-and-give-a-sht#respond Mon, 22 Aug 2022 15:16:32 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=32000 “SIT UP STRAIGHT AND LOOK AT ME RIGHT NOW!” yelled Marine Corps drill instructor Gunnery Sergeant Dixon in her frog voice. With these words, Marine Corps senior drill instructors address each new series of recruits, followed by, “. . . a Marine is characterized as one who possesses the highest military virtues, who obeys orders, who strives constantly to be the best in everything he does.” Arguably, leadership and character are first instilled in Marines, sailors, and Coast Guardsmen at recruit training. It is here civilians are transformed into warfighters. Bootcamp’s culminating event, the Crucible, is the hearth in which the flames of leadership and character are tested and stoked, where honor, courage, and commitment are branded. Even when we are long gone from bootcamp, leadership and character prove themselves indispensable parts of our nature. As service members, we are trained to be the best. And we remain the best by accomplishing the mission––through competency and care. While serving as a series commander at Fourth Recruit Training Battalion in Parris Island, South Carolina, one of my mentors was Colonel Misty J. Posey, USMC, who often instilled the simplest yet most profound of command philosophies: “Know your sh%t, and give a sh%t.” As a Marine major, she designed a detailed pull-up plan that measurably improves physical fitness capabilities in military and civilian leaders alike. Colonel Posey lives and breathes this command philosophy. In thousands of books that have been written on leadership and character, I argue that competency and care—to “know your sh%t and give a sh%t”—are the two integral components that set us apart as the finest warriors in the Sea Services. Competency Inevitably, Marine lieutenants at the Basic School come upon the dreaded peer evaluation after weeks of initial combat training, hoping at all costs to avoid markings like “self-centered,” “arrogant,” “eccentric,” or perhaps among the worst descriptors, “incompetent.” What do competent servicemembers look like? In summation, they know their sh%t. Competent Coast Guardsmen, sailors, and Marines know their jobs, and possess a strong understanding of their roles and responsibilities as nested in their unit mission. These leaders understand from the bottom up that the ultimate endstate in their service is to defend our country along with its interests, whether by air, land, or sea. They embrace the full scope of the Marine Air Ground Task Force and naval environment in which we operate. They are both book smart and street smart—not only familiar with the orders and references that dictate particular assignments or missions, but also familiar with how to execute this in practice, and willing to learn what they do not know. They are experts in the field, whether the field of political science, technology, weapon systems, or combat engineering. The competent Navy logistics specialist both knows the functions of logistics, and knows how to get the porta potties on the deck, whether in garrison or forward deployed. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 7: Learning (MCDP-7) defines competence as, “having sufficient knowledge, judgement, and skills to perform a particular duty, job, or function.” Professional competence derived from learning one’s trade is mandatory to achieve the unit mission. The Coast Guard aviation maintenance technician, Navy corpsman, or Marine field artilleryman must know and be able to execute the necessary functions required of those respective jobs. Without the requisite skill or mastery of assigned duties, the mission simply cannot be carried out. If the F-18 jets can’t refuel at night because of a lack of know-how, the plane’s capability is degraded. In The Armed Forces Officer, the chapter on character is soon followed by a chapter on leadership, wherein the competency of military leaders is discussed: “Military subordinates expect their leaders to be competent in their trade. They trust their lives and blood will not be wasted in meaningless actions.”1 Competence, however, is also not mere or rote execution of an assignment. General James Mattis puts it simply: “The first is competence. Be brilliant in the basics. Don’t dabble in your job; you must master it.”2 Beyond the foundational level, Marines and sailors are developing experts, and expertise demands critical thinking. The unit’s Defense Travel System (DTS) representatives, whether the Organization Defense Travel Administrator (ODTA) or Approving Official (AO), are not groomed to simply review the authorization or voucher and hit “submit.” They master the trade by developing critical thinking to ensure that monthly reports are properly pulled, that any data points toward efficiency in mission accomplishment are observed, that, if needed, currency conversion is available to unit leaders, that points of contact for levels in the routing chain are accessible to the command. The DTS ODTA and AO can further gain a working knowledge of upcoming training events to know when travelers will submit authorizations or vouchers––to strategize and anticipate when to expect items in the working queue. One cannot achieve competency at his duties without practice, or without feedback. Often, our greatest learning occurs by mistakes and risks taken. We become experts by thinking critically and mastering the trade. Moreover, MCDP-7 concludes, “learning is purpose-driven to develop professional competence.” Measurable goals and objectives aid servicemembers along the path to true expertise, if you will, strategy. For this reason, professional military education is broken down by grade, where introductory items are first taught, to be built on throughout the servicemember’s career. Additionally, competent Coast Guardsmen are also not “know-it-alls.” Competent Marines and sailors know what they don’t know—and know what requisite knowledge, skill, ability, or resource is lacking in their team. We must humbly learn from each other. Not only do we study our defense systems and capabilities, but we also study the enemy, and the environment in which we are operating. Under the current Marine Corps fitness report evaluation system, there is a category for “proficiency”—what one might deem, the “level of competence.” Sections A through F are broken apart categorically by basic “competence” on the left, to “mastery” in the middle, and “true expert in the field” on the right. We are not striving for the minimum standard of competence. No, we are developing the very best—professionally competent experts. Care Still, competence in and of itself is not sufficient to accomplish assigned missions. We need the driving force behind the skill, the motivation when our efforts don’t first succeed. We need to “give a sh%t”—we need to care. In Phillip’s Lincoln on Leadership, the very first leadership principle he addresses that then-president Lincoln demonstrated, was to “get out of the office and circulate among the troops.”3 It becomes obvious to others what we care for. We care about where we spend our time, our resources, the hours that we can’t take back. We are spending it somewhere, on something, on someone. The question is, where? There are two things we must care about in the Sea Services: care about the mission, and care about our Coast Guardsmen, Marines, and sailors. Mission accomplishment comes first, but it is followed closely by troop welfare.4 To care about the unit mission, we must know our unit mission, and the missions with which higher and subordinate echelons are engaging. We must understand our ultimate objective, whether it is to provide security and screen for enemy movement at Gwadar Port, or if the mission is deterrence. It is imperative to understand our enemy, the operating environment, as well as our capabilities and limitations. Every piece of intelligence and information in the five paragraph order matters, directly informing our mission and impacting our servicemembers. The criticality of information is detailed in the newly published MCDP-8, Information. And ultimately, what we do as sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and Marines, is inherently risky. There are human lives entrusted to our care—the lives of America’s sons and daughters. Leaders of honorable character will care about the mission and about the troops. Marine leaders often hear the phrase, “Take care of the Marines, and they will take care of the mission.” Perhaps, caring for the troops is best evidenced by being present. What I mean by being present, is not merely showing up to the meeting. Being present is possessing an awareness of who and what is being engaged. Being present is having an understanding of the purpose of the meeting, which team members are involved, and how we need to work with one another to accomplish the mission. Leaders care by paying attention to the members on the team, noticing who just suffered an injury, divorce, or lost a loved one, and what particular needs the situation may dictate. If sailors are confused about a directive or task, care is demonstrated by taking the time to address the confusion and by communicating clearly. If Marines are lonely during the four-day holiday weekend, a leader cares by being present, by spending time with them, by showing them they are not alone. On the flip side, as leaders, we do not care for our Marines, sailors, and Coast Guardsmen by pretending we might be a medical professional or behavioral health professional, when we are not. Caring for the physical, mental, emotional, financial, and spiritual well-being of servicemembers usually requires a team of experts with available resources. Genuine care acknowledges the significance of each life issue. Further, appropriate care demands professional boundaries—ones that abide by our Uniform Code of Military Justice, but boundaries that are also not too rigid to lose empathy for the human in the uniform. Finally, leaders demonstrate care by leading like a gardener. Perhaps, a gardener is the last image you had in mind when considering a leader in the U.S. Sea Services. However, General Stanley McChrystal understood this point in full. In Team of Teams, he expounds, “Within our Task Force, as in a garden, the outcome was less dependent on the initial planting than on consistent maintenance. Watering, weeding, and protecting plants from rabbits and disease are essential for success. The gardener cannot actually ‘grow’ tomatoes, squash, or beans—she can only foster an environment in which the plants do so.”5 A gardener does not conduct the exact same regiment for every plant in the garden. Some plants require abundant sunlight, and some require more water. Other plants require more shade, and still others need frequent pruning. The point is that each member on the team is different, with a unique makeup, with differing needs, purposes, and functions—and of course, with a different family of origin that shaped them before they joined the service. A wise leader cares by learning the capabilities of each member, and knows how to foster an environment in which each can grow and produce the best results. This essay began at the drill field on Parris Island with an example from Colonel Posey, and it’s fitting to also end with her. Colonel Posey did not just get smart at pull-ups, write a plan, and pass it along nicely to others. No—far beyond this. She practiced them. She studied Marine Corps physical fitness requirements for both males and females, inside and out. She learned from Russian kettlebell experts, and trained in many varying forms, observing and analyzing what methods were most effective. She cares by being present—at free pull-up clinics, teaching others how they can accomplish their goals. She did not pass on an email and carry on with her day. She gave everyone who attended her training programs the tailored individual attention that was needed. She spent her own time and effort and energy, and became a force multiplier for the Marine Corps. Her character and passion for leading is evident both inside and outside the gym. Her influence is well-known throughout the Corps as a combat engineer, battalion commander, planner, mentor, and friend. So, the moral of the story is simple. Leaders are competent, and leaders care. Know your sh%t and give a sh%t.   1. U.S Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 51. 2. James N. Mattis and Francis J. West, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead (New York: Random House, 2021). 3. Donald T. Phillips, Lincoln on Leadership (New York: Warner Books, 1992). 4. U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 51. 5. Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (London: Penguin Business, 2015), 225.

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/22/know-your-sht-and-give-a-sht/feed 0 32000 Saturday 20 August at 1100 ET: Naval Historical Foundation 2nd Saturday Webinar: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/19/saturday-20-august-at-1100-et-naval-historical-foundation-2nd-saturday-webinar-nimitz-at-war-command-leadership-from-pearl-harbor-to-tokyo-bay https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/19/saturday-20-august-at-1100-et-naval-historical-foundation-2nd-saturday-webinar-nimitz-at-war-command-leadership-from-pearl-harbor-to-tokyo-bay#respond Fri, 19 Aug 2022 16:32:27 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31992
Please join the Naval Historical Foundation this Saturday, 20 August 2022, at 1100 EDT for our Second Saturday show for August 2022 where we will feature Dr. Craig Symonds in a personal interview with Executive Director Rear Admiral Sonny Masso USN (Ret), from the magnificent Jack Taylor Center located in the spaces of the U.S. Naval Institute in Annapolis, MD. Dr. Symonds will be introduced by Mr. Stephen Ryan, noted Washington D.C., attorney and former member of the staff of Senator John Glenn.

This wonderful book takes a bold look at Nimitz the leader, Nimitz the motivator, Nimitz the broker of sanity in an ocean of tough colleagues, a worthy opponent, sparse resources, and decisions that would define the world stage into the 20th Century and beyond.

Hear Nimitz commanders intent delivered to his commanders on the eve before the battle of Midway. “You will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy.” Watch as other examples of leadership are discussed in this one-hour pre-recorded session.

Register to receive a link to this event on the NHF YouTube channel and receive a reminder email an hour before the event.
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfLDUHnidiHi7c80Aua30di0_w5A8nc__CI2T6dFQcNHXa-rQ/viewform

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/19/saturday-20-august-at-1100-et-naval-historical-foundation-2nd-saturday-webinar-nimitz-at-war-command-leadership-from-pearl-harbor-to-tokyo-bay/feed 0 31992 Pornography Undermines Unit Readiness https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/18/pornography-undermines-unit-readiness https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/18/pornography-undermines-unit-readiness#respond Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:50:34 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31986 Pornography is perhaps the most prevalent and least talked about topic in society. It is often treated as a harmless personal activity that most people over the age of 13 have at least engaged in once, if they are not regular consumers. However, it is now becoming understood that pornography is chemically addictive in the same way as drugs, tobacco, gaming, and gambling. It changes the way people see, relate to, and interact with others by physically altering the brain’s chemistry. The cumulative effect is a degradation in the quality of intimate relationships, possible erosion of respect shown to other humans, and potential culmination in sexual harassment or assault (SH/A). Therefore, it is very likely to negatively affect unit cohesion. Yet, many service members readily engage in the consumption of pornography while enjoying near-universal cultural approval. Recently, a former captain in the Marine Corps was sentenced to 35 years confinement for a myriad of profoundly perverse acts that involved a teenage girl whose father was deployed, his own young child, and eventually an infant. His story began like most others, consuming fairly commonplace pornography for decades. As his tolerance grew, the result was catastrophic. While his case is an extreme one, the negative effects of pornography use exist on a spectrum and are detrimental to a force in readiness. With reporting of SA continuing to rise despite considerable effort to curtail it, General Berger concluded that “we still do not fully understand the scope and scale of the issue.”1 Today the Corps’ most used mechanisms to deal with SH/A are not proactive, but occur post-incident. The Marine Corps should acknowledge the harmful effects of pornography, design small unit training materials to educate the force, and promote treatment for destructive pornography use. A Personal Problem The use of pornography has been shown to cause increased social anxiety and decreased connection in relationships, which can culminate in domestic discord and instability. While pornography has existed for some time, the advent of the internet brought anonymous, practically unfettered access to sexually explicit materials in the form of text, images, videos, and even virtual reality to practically anyone who can operate a connected device. As a result, multiple studies have found the average age of people in the United States who are first exposed to pornography on the internet is about 13 years and trending downward.2 Because internet pornography use has been found to be addictive, the negative impacts of the habits formed during a pornography user’s early years are likely to confer to future relationships.3 The first problem is the negative feedback loop created when a consumer of pornography uses it to satisfy aspects of a sexual relationship which are best fulfilled with a committed partner. Continued pursuit of instant, virtual gratification comes at the expense of a real relationship and has been shown to be significantly associated to instances of loneliness and depression.4 Second, internet delivered pornography offers instant access to sexually explicit material that caters to every desire in ways that a healthy relationship cannot hope to compete with. After exposure to unlimited amounts of the most idealized sexual encounters, the reality of a partner who may not be as interested or objectively attractive can become a disappointment. A final harm of pornography use by one member of a relationship is that it is often held a secret from the other, either wholly or in part, causing disconnection when the secret is inevitably found out. As a result of these factors, internet pornography use has been shown to increase risk of infidelity (also connected to another critical problem: suicide) and decrease self-reports of satisfaction and intimacy in relationships both in and out of marriage.5 Such disruptions to personal and family readiness puts the goal of a better prepared force-in-readiness in jeopardy. A Social Problem Although they probably do not realize it, consumers of pornography are passively contributing to an industry which exploits the vulnerable in society at a significant scale. Human trafficking has been a focus of international criminal justice for some time, with 25 million people estimated to have been affected in 2020 worldwide. The United States averages several hundred trafficking convictions every year, about half of which involve sex-trafficking. The total size of the domestic problem is thought to be far worse than the Department of Justice’s conviction numbers suggest. In 2018, the United States was ranked as one of the worst places for human trafficking, with estimates on the number of those impacted ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands. In 2019, a single advocacy group identified 14,597 potential sex trafficking victims through its national trafficking hotline. While the connection between sex trafficking and pornography may not at first be apparent, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s definition of trafficking’s means as “force, fraud, or coercion” establishes a clear relationship between the two.12 All three of these elements are regularly used within the pornography industry, leading some experts to conclude that “most pornography is . . . made by slaves.”6 Many performers report that violence, substance addiction, public shaming, and threats of suspending income are regularly used as leverage to get and keep them working in the porn industry.7 These commonplace methods leave in their wake performers like Linda Marchiano, who testified that, “Virtually every time someone watches [a popular pornographic film], they are watching me being raped.”8 While there are performers who are not being exploited, or would not consider themselves so, it is impossible to tell whether supposed actors in pornographic media are trafficking victims or not. Given the high number of documented trafficking victims, the many more estimated undocumented victims, and the ambiguity surrounding the sources of pornographic material found online, it is highly likely that even the casual consumer has—knowingly or not—derived pleasure from a victim of sex trafficking. This should be a matter of much concern to ethical warriors who serve as the defenders of those in need. A Unit Cohesion Problem The psychology and physiology of pornography naturally leads to the dehumanization of the subject, usually women, and increased likelihood to commit violence. The central concepts for understanding these tendencies are neuroplasticity and supernormal stimulus. Neuroplasticity essentially means that the brain will re-configure itself to improve performance at whatever a person does or is exposed to repeatedly. Supernormal stimulus describes the phenomenon in which animals and humans prefer novel and fantastic versions of commonplace things when the two are presented at the same time. These concepts combined describe, at the neuronal-level, why the tendency in human consumptive behaviors such as eating and sex is to seek bigger rewards more efficiently and often. Life’s challenges of education, work, raising children, and many other stress-inducing and time-consuming activities set natural limits on basic behaviors such as eating and sexual activity. However, in the age of mass-produced food and pornography, the barriers to indulging in each have lowered to the point that many become harmfully addicted. In the marketing of food, this manifests in increasingly larger servings of soda and French fries at surprisingly low prices. For pornography, it insidiously results in the slow desensitization of a pornography consumer’s mind to increasingly degrading and violent themes. Over the last 40 years the content of pornography has evolved in a manner consistent with the addictive features of neuroplastic change and supernormal stimuli. Pictures of women in various states of undress in the 1940s have given way to common themes that feature sadomasochism, hate, vengeance, humiliation, coercion, and criminal behavior, all available in every variety imaginable.9 In 2010, psychologists analyzed 304 popular pornographic scenes and found that 88.2 percent contained physical aggression and 48.7 percent contained verbal aggression, overwhelmingly against women.10 When aggressed against, 95.1 percent of females responded either with expressions of pleasure or neutrality. Conversely, only 9.9 percent of scenes contained positive behavior such as kissing, laughing, caressing, or verbal compliments. Most troubling, similar research found that fewer than 5 percent of instances of aggression provoked a negative response from the victim, including flinching and requests to stop.11 Significant exposure to content which does not represent realistic human relationships increases the likelihood of degraded respect among genders at best, and increased likelihood of sexual violence at worst.12 This has been shown in a study where participants who were exposed to violent sexual films showed significantly less sympathy for a rape victim during a mock trial than did participants who did not view that kind of film.13 General David H. Berger described sexual assault as “the most troubling destructive behavior,” calling for additional steps be taken to counter it, such as education in areas such as unconscious bias.14 The increasing body of research linking pornography use to unacceptable behavior such as SH/A makes raising awareness of the negative effects of porn one such area for education. Acknowledgement and Education The Marine Corps can start by publicly acknowledging the dangers of porn and partnering with an organization that specializes in awareness training, such as Brain Heart World. Media that breaks the ice, provides an overview of the topic, and highlights the concerning facts should be developed as the first segment to awareness training. This could be provided to unit leaders at every level to set up a discussion, similar to the way that SH/A bystander awareness training was conducted in 2013. The second segment should have peer groups break off and conduct small unit discussions on the issues and introduce sources of help for those who desire them. Discussion guides would be developed to equip those peer group leaders with the necessary facts and thought-provoking questions to effectively lead those conversations. To tie into established themes, the discussion could be broken down according to Honor, Courage, and Commitment. Pornography can erode the honor and dignity shown to other humans both in and out of our ranks. Resisting the urge and peer pressure to consume pornography requires courage and self-discipline. Lastly, Marines must be committed to improving, not degrading, relationships with spouses, families, and fellow Marines, as well as defending the vulnerable in our society. The third segment should be focused on the slippery slope toward so-called “revenge porn” and consumption of media depicting the mistreatment of minors (article 117a, UCMJ) that regular pornography use can lead to. Unfortunately, Marines convicted by court martial for possession or production of child pornography and wrongful distribution of sexual images is commonplace. Marines must know the pervasiveness of the problem and that most perpetrators of sexual crimes are gradually desensitized starting with “normal” explicit material. Promoting Treatment An additional area for improvement is making Marines aware of the availability of treatment for pornography addiction. Although many providers are unfamiliar, Tricare covers addiction counseling services for abuse of all kinds of substances and behaviors, including pornography. One of our authors learned this by chance after a naval medicine provider told him there was nothing they could offer for counseling to quit pornography. An administrator at the naval hospital knew otherwise and connected him with a counseling center in the Camp Lejeune area which was covered by Tricare. Fleet Marine Force medical providers and Marine unit leaders must know that counseling is available to get help to Marines who wish to quit. The dangers of pornography consumption are clear and increasingly documented in psychology and neurology research. They can affect the personal, social, and professional lives of those who consume it, leading to degraded relationships, loss of personal happiness, and at worst, commission of crimes. It is hard, if not impossible, to quantify the negative impact to unit cohesion caused by degraded views of women depicted in pornography. Yet the psychological research indicates that it does, and likely in ways that do not necessarily manifest in documented SH/A. Furthermore, despite struggling to successfully stem the rising tide of SH/A incidents in the Marine Corps, pornography as a potential contributing factor has received little attention. The service must invest in raising Marine’s awareness of the negative aspects correlated to pornography and the help that is available for those who wish to quit. Doing so will improve the cohesiveness and readiness of the force.

  1. Gen David H. Berger, USA, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Washington D.C: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, July 2019), 21.
  2. Chyng Sun, et. al., “Pornography and The Male Sexual Script: An Analysis Of Consumption And Sexual Relations,” Archives Of Sexual Behavior (2016), 45, 983–994.
  3. Todd Love, et al., “Neuroscience of Internet Pornography Addiction: a Review and Update,” Behavioral Sciences, 5, 388–433, (2015); Sesen Negash, et al., “Trading Later Rewards for Current Pleasure: Pornography Consumption and Delay Discounting,” The Journal Of Sex Research (2015), 53(6), 698–700.
  4. Vincent C. Yoder, et. al., “Internet Pornography and Loneliness, an Association?” Sexual Addiction and Compulsivity (2007), 12, 1, 19–44; Eileen M. Alexy, et al., “Pornography Use as a Risk Marker for an Aggressive Pattern of Behavior Among Sexually Reactive Children and Adolescents,” Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association, (2009), 14, 6.
  5. Amanda Maddox, et al., “Viewing Sexually-Explicit Materials Alone or Together: Associations with Relationship Quality,” Archives of Sexual Behavior (2011), 40, 441–48.
  6. Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Pornography as Trafficking,” Michigan Journal for International Law (2005), 26, 4, 995.
  7. MacKinnon, “Pornography as Trafficking,”; Melissa Farley et al., “Prostitution and Trafficking in Nine Countries: An Update on Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Trauma Practice (2003), 2, ¾, 33–74.
  8. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, In Harm’s Way, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 65.
  9. Norman Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself (New York: Penguin, 2007), 76–8.
  10. Ana J. Bridges, et al., “Aggression and Sexual Behavior in Best-Selling Pornography Videos: A Content Analysis Update,” Violence Against Women (2010), 16, 10, 1065–1085.
  11. Ana J. Bridges, “Pornography’s Effects on Interpersonal Relationships,” in J. Stoner and D. Hughes (eds.), The Social Costs Of Pornography: A Collection Of Papers (Princeton, NJ: Witherspoon Institute), 57–68.
  12. Drew Kingston, et al., “Pornography Use and Sexual Aggression: The Impact of Frequency and Type of Pornography Use on Recidivism Among Sexual Offenders,” Aggressive Behavior (2008), 34, 341–51; Nicky Stanley, et al., “Pornography, Sexual Coercion, and Abuse and Sexting in Young People’s Intimate Relationships” Journal of Interpersonal Violence (2018), 33, 19, 2919–2944; Meagan J. Brem, et al., “Problematic Pornography Use and Physical and Sexual Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration Among Men in Batterer Intervention Programs,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence (2021), 36, 12; Eileen M. Alexy, et al., “Pornography Use as a Risk Marker for an Aggressive Pattern of Behavior Among Sexually Reactive Children and Adolescents,” Journal of the American Psychiatric Nurses Association (2009), 14, 6; Shawn Corne, et al., “Women’s Attitudes and Fantasies about Rape as a Function of Early Exposure to Pornography,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence (1992), 7, 4, 454–61.
  13. Ana J. Bridges, “Pornography’s Effects on Interpersonal Relationships,” in J. Stoner and D. Hughes (eds.) The Social Costs Of Pornography: A Collection Of Papers (Princeton, NJ: Witherspoon Institute), 57–68.
  14. Gen. David H. Berger, USA, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Washington D.C: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, July 2019), 21.

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/18/pornography-undermines-unit-readiness/feed 0 31986 On Midrats 14 August 2022 -Episode 632: The High Ground in the Western Pacific, with Bryan Clark https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/on-midrats-14-august-2022-episode-632-the-high-ground-in-the-western-pacific-with-bryan-clark https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/on-midrats-14-august-2022-episode-632-the-high-ground-in-the-western-pacific-with-bryan-clark#respond Sat, 13 Aug 2022 18:23:54 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31966

Please join us at 5pm EDT on 14 August 2022 for Midrats Episode 632: The High Ground in the Western Pacific, with Bryan Clark

  • All it takes is a quick look at a map or a quick read of history to understand that any conflict in the Western Pacific will be dominated by naval forces, logistics, control of the air, and the ability to sustain all three.
  • Extending our conversation on Midrats this summer about the challenge from China, this Sunday returning to Midrats will be our guest Bryan Clark, a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at Hudson Institute.
  • The starting point for our discussion will be the report he co-authored with Timothy Walton, Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade.
  • Before joining Hudson Institute, Bryan Clark was a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) where he led studies for the Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Defense Advanced Research Products Agency on new technologies and the future of warfare.
  • Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Mr. Clark was special assistant to the chief of naval operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations, and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2008, Mr. Clark was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore submarine operational and training assignments, including tours as chief engineer and operations officer at the Navy’s Nuclear Power Training Unit.

If you do miss the show live, you can pick up this episode and others and add Midrats to your podcast list simply by going to you use Apple Podcasts here. Or on Spreaker. Or on Spotify.  

 

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/on-midrats-14-august-2022-episode-632-the-high-ground-in-the-western-pacific-with-bryan-clark/feed 0 31966 Vulture’s Row #42 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/vultures-row-42 https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/vultures-row-42#respond Sat, 13 Aug 2022 13:21:19 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31975

]]> https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/13/vultures-row-42/feed 0 31975 Leading the Unmanned https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/10/leading-the-unmanned https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/08/10/leading-the-unmanned#respond Wed, 10 Aug 2022 19:07:41 +0000 https://blog.usni.org/?p=31971 Future wars will be fought not by infantry, but by robots. Drones, autonomous vehicles, and artificial intelligence systems are already an integrated part of the peacetime operations and could soon be the primary way wars are fought. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) will bury themselves in the mud outside a red force harbor and wait for a ship to drive by so they can attach themselves. Submarines will get accurate positional fixes from unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that spend their entire useful life in the water, acting as cube satellites for the surface of the ocean, connecting the seabed to space. Autonomous software bots will endlessly attack ship-to-satellite network connections, controlled by blue and red forces alike. Long-stay ocean gliders will spend months on slow patrols as maritime bell ringers, always on watch for the adversary. Ships will carry unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for over-the-horizon patrols, sending information through a system of USVs that double as charging stations and data-collection hubs for UUVs. Understanding the inevitability of the robotic frontier, Navy leaders must ask the question: How do we lead the unmanned?   The Navy established Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Squadron One (UUVRON) as an answer to that question. The idea was to build a squadron of UUVs that are deployable on any platform around the world. Research and development occurs alongside deployment workups. Creative projects frequently come to maturity at UUVRON through iterative research and development, the polar opposite of traditional submarine workup cycles. Sailors come up with new ideas and are given tools, such as machine learning, to make them a reality. A strong startup mentality persists at UUVRON because sailors find it fulfilling to work through hard, important problems that have not been solved yet. Leading the unmanned means providing technology and direction to the sailors who will solve the hard problem of unmanned system delivery, deployment, and recovery. 

“Infantry Wins Battles, Logistics Win Wars,” General John Pershing 

Deploying UUVs is a notoriously tricky logistics problem. Depending on the size, the robots are either launched by hand, pushed into the water on a cart, or lowered into the water using a crane. At sea, it is more difficult and a larger vessel is needed. UUVRON does not have large assets capable of forward deployment and uses vessels of opportunity from the fleet, necessitating coordination with organizations that do not routinely work with unmanned systems. Outside the UUV community, there is not much understanding of UUV mission capabilities. Time is spent explaining their tactical significance in the maritime battle space, building relationships with supporting commands that provide vessels. But even after considerable time and effort, reliable vessels are scarce and missions are infrequent. The problems UUVRON faces today with delivery, deployment, and recovery are the precursor to problems that will be faced by leaders in the unmanned fleet of tomorrow.   System delivery, although simple in concept, is a problem for UUVRON. Logistical issues often dog delivery efforts and shipping problems affect mission readiness. UUVs are built to be disassembled and shipped in pelican cases along with the lithium ion batteries that power the vehicles. The batteries are required to spend several weeks in customs as part of the overseas shipping process. Although desired by area commanders and unmanned leadership alike, just in time delivery is not a logistical reality for mission ready UUVs. Delays during shipping mean sailors spend time in theater waiting for vehicles to arrive before area familiarization can begin. Constraints on the delivery portion of unmanned operations can handicap a mission if leaders are not prepared.   Deployment of UUVs is the most involved portion of the process and the important to get right. Pier-side network connections are established. Power for charging, a lay-down area for vehicle preps, and forklifts for transport are required. Area experts assist with water space preparation. Pre-launch surveys and area familiarization are completed. Detailed weather and oceanographic analysis are done to prevent vehicle loss. Traffic patterns are closely considered to find safe routes. Timelines must be precise, taking into account any potential delays caused by environmental complexity. Contingency plans are made in case the recovery area is inaccessible. Missions are meticulously planned and all anticipated actions are programmed as autonomous behaviors for the UUV. Sea floor gradient, freshwater inlets, bottom composition, and many other constantly changing factors create a complex web of requirements that the team must overcome. Preparation is key to unmanned system deployment and vital to mission success.  Recovery starts the clock on the critical process of data management and analysis. High-volume information is collected rapidly, generating hundreds of gigabytes after only a few hours. Machine learning for acoustic imagery is in nascent stages necessitating human data review. Proper analysis takes days to accomplish, and weeks will pass before the information gets to decision makers. Real-time undersea battle space awareness is far from reality, but rapidly iterating and improving the recovery process tightens the timeline from intel to action.   Logistics is king in undersea robotics. Successes and failures are defined by the plan and its execution. Delivery, deployment, and recovery are the base principles of unmanned system success and deserve close attention from leaders. Taking lessons learned from these early operations is imperative for leaders who will integrate unmanned systems into the fleet. 

Unmanned Paradigm Shift 

The paradigm of naval warfare must shift as unmanned systems begin filling a larger role. Considering the personnel, their mentality, and the logistical requirements, it is clear that today’s Navy is not yet ready for the changing tides of warfare. Unmanned systems are blazing a trail to the front of the Navy’s peacetime and wartime strategy. Ship-centric planning is not compatible with unmanned asset allocation and in future ships will support systems that extend the reach far beyond their human counterparts. Every ship in the fleet can move and place nodes in an unmanned network of data gathering devices and leaders must be ready.  Like any good strategy, the unmanned paradigm shift starts with the people. Making an unmanned designator establishes a community of sailors that can build a knowledge base. Expertise rises and the unmanned community grows, expanding influence around the fleet. A rating brings recognition to the efforts that these sailors make every day and shows that they are valuable to the future of the Navy. A warfare designation and career path is needed for sailors and leaders alike to bring the community to relevance in the Navy. A high baseline of knowledge and leadership build the strong foundation for the next version of modern warfare.  Software engineers in Silicon Valley are not the only people who can create a disruptive environment. Given the tools and training, sailors are capable of innovating using machine-learning techniques to advance autonomous capability. Even without advanced degrees or venture funding, a startup mentality is prominent among the enlisted UUV community. In a startup, iterating and testing new ideas can yield valuable returns. UUVs are the perfect platform for trying new things that would otherwise be considered risky since unmanned systems are particularly forgiving. Instead of a nuclear reactor and a submarine full of people, UUVs have hard drives and cheap battery packs. A submarine is an unacceptable loss, but losing a UUV has much less severe consequences. Loss acceptability keeps the risk low while fostering a creative space for innovation. When it comes to the unmanned frontier, there is always a way and no reason to give up.  During World War II, assets were designed to take a beach head and push forward into enemy territory. Alongside development of mutually destructive arsenals, the United States maintained and built new ships to support a battalion of Marines and landing craft. Over time, fewer resources were allocated to that strategy as its relevancy faded, and money was spent on aircraft carriers and submarines. This is how it should be; remember, successful past strategies but shift focus forward. Aircraft carriers and submarines will begin to fade from the strategy, giving way to the unmanned paradigm. U.S. ships will bear the logistical burden of unmanned battle space preparation. These same ships will deliver offensive robotic systems during times of conflict. Battle space logistics, like what UUVRON takes on, will make or break tomorrow’s Navy.  Leadership in a changing world takes courage and honesty. Leaders will fail if they do not face the hard problems of tomorrow by properly preparing their people today. It is the responsibility Navy leaders to provide the resources, time, and direction to the sailors who put the service on their backs and heave the weight forward. It is the job of Navy leaders to foster an environment of innovation and put technology in the hands of sailors who can use it. It is time to let go of the warfare model of the past for success in the future. If Navy leaders can apply these principles, then leading the unmanned is a challenge the service will be ready to face. 

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