Veep Critique

Research at the Nixon and Reagan Libraries

2012-02-23T10:58:00.002-05:00

For Presidents Day, I contributed a post to The Text Message, a blog of the National Archives, about my recent experience doing archival research. The original post is here.

As a PhD candidate at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy I am researching the vice presidential role in national security affairs. While the vast majority of vice presidents played only a tiny role, this has changed dramatically in recent years. My particular area of interest is vice presidential influence – how and when does the vice president get to make policy? The relationship between the president and vice president is essential, as the vice president has no real independent authority.

On a recent family trip to LA, I thought it would be worthwhile to visit the archives at the Nixon and Reagan libraries.

Using the Archives
I know a great deal about vice presidents, but having never done archival research before, I put in calls to chat with the archivists and learn a little bit about what I was getting into. They were extremely helpful. There are extensive descriptions of the archival holdings online and the archivists urged me to identify what I was interested in, so that they could pull the boxes and have them waiting for me.

Picking what I wanted at the Nixon library was pretty easy. The vast majority of Nixon’s records are about his presidency. But I was interested in the Nixon vice presidency, so I identified a relatively small number of boxes relevant to my research.

The Reagan archives was a bit more of a challenge. Reagan was never the vice president and there were only a few boxes referring to his vice president George H. W. Bush. Fortunately – this is all still over the phone – Jennifer Mandel, my contact at the Reagan Library, came to my rescue.

First, she explained that if I wanted to see documents about Bush, I needed to visit his library. Then she gave me a short course on the nature of archival research. In essence, a researcher needs to come in with some fairly specific ideas of what they seek – otherwise they will simply wade through endless masses of paper. Since I am looking for instances in which vice presidents persuaded presidents to adopt policies, I needed to have a pretty good idea of what policies I was interested in and then start looking for the paper trail.

She was not discouraging me, only explaining the practicalities of my endeavor. It is further complicated because a great deal of modern interactions between the president and vice president are informal and not on paper.

However, I had previously written a paper about a working group on terrorism led by Vice President Bush (and studying terrorism is my day job, so I had an additional interest.) So we agreed that should be my focus.

A week later, at the archives, I settled down to actually do my research. It is most helpful to the archivists if the researcher has already submitted requests for particular boxes – but they will do their best to pull them in a timely manner. Facilitating public access to the documents is the critical mission for the archivists, and from what I saw they take it very seriously.

There was a form to fill out – no big deal – and some basic explanations. The archivist monitoring the research room must be able to see the researcher’s hands (documents have been tampered with and pilfered.) Also, documents should be handled carefully. In particular, the archivists need to do any staple removals. There are copy machines available, but through the miracle of technology, a celphone camera can serve as a scanner! There are plenty of smartphone apps that facilitate this – but a camera with just a few mega-pixels will provide a decent image.

Nixon as VP
At the Nixon Library, much of the correspondence was work-a-day material focusing on vice presidential appearances. Nixon is an interesting case, he played a more active role then previous vice presidents, serving as campaigner-in-chief so that Eisenhower could appear to be above the political fray. But this activity did not necessarily translate to influence for Nixon. Recent vice presidents have had offices in the White House. Nixon did not. Many letters from Eisenhower were requests for meetings. In more recent years, if the president wished to meet his vice president, he could just send an aide down the hall. But, at the same time, Nixon was not excluded from the process. He was a regular attendee at Cabinet and National Security Council meetings. In fact, during periods of illness, Eisenhower instructed Nixon to hold and chair these meetings in the President’s absence in order to reduce concerns about Eisenhower’s health and its impact on the functioning of the government.

There were also a number of letters in which Eisenhower warmly thanks Nixon for his efforts and contributions.

Still, it isn’t clear if this meant that Nixon had much influence. This particular memo seemed intriguing. I don’t know the back-story, but it looks like the kind of note a boss sends when he wants an issue dropped.

The picture that appears of Nixon’s vice presidency is that while he took on whatever tasks he was given ably, he was perhaps not in Eisenhower’s inner council of advisors.

VP Bush Combatting Terrorism
In contrast the documents for the George H. W. Bush Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism were voluminous and making sense of them is a real challenge. Still, there are interesting places where the internal bureaucratic machinations are exposed. One of the purposes of the Task Force was to help get the various government agencies concerned with terrorism working together. The hand-written notes attached to copies or on copies of the report give a real sense as to how that process worked.

Presidential Libraries
While visiting the archives, I had the added pleasure of at least a little time at the Presidential Libraries. They are both lovely. One of the highlights of the Reagan Library is Air Force One.

Reagan’s library is also located high in the hills overlooking Simi Valley. It is breathtakingly beautiful.

I was told that the sunsets there are spectacular, but I couldn’t stay. However, when I stepped outside of the Nixon Library the sun was setting. I stood for a time and contemplated the great question of Presidential studies: Is it the man, or is it the moment, or is it perhaps a bit of each?

Biden on OBL Raid: Influence Denied?

2012-02-02T23:25:00.002-05:00

In advising against the raid that successfully nabbed OBL, Biden may have given me a perfect case study of vice presidential influence. Or maybe not...

It is true that Biden advised against the raid and that the President did not take his advice and gave the “go” order. Some pundits have used this as an opportunity to argue (remind?) that Biden is always wrong. It isn’t clear if this interpretation is fair.

Reportedly, except for then DCI Panetta (who was strongly for) all of the other advisors were “51-49” on whether or not to do it. There were huge risks and huge benefits. Biden sees himself as a devil’s advocate or in-house truth teller who doesn’t have to curry favor. So he called it as he saw it. Reportedly Biden said, “We owe the man a direct answer. Mr. President, my suggestion is, don’t go. We have to do two more things to see if he’s there.”

Those two things are not known – but the specificity of the advice suggests that Biden was trying to be useful. The fact that ultimately his advice was not taken, doesn’t mean he did not play a valuable role in the President’s decision-making process.

It is also worth noting, that the raid could easily have gone bad. If that had been the case, then Biden would have looked like a genius. But as a good vice president he would have had to keep quiet about it.

With Biden and Cheney the US has had two straight VPs who did not harbor presidential ambitions. Previous VPs did seek the presidency. While they were careful not to show any policy divisions between themselves and the president – they would also not have done what Biden just did. Biden admitted to being wrong and at odds with the President, but in a way that built up the President.

Just as Biden ran the opposition play in the Afghanistan strategy review – not necessarily to succeed but to ensure the pro-surge crowd didn’t run the table – Biden is making an interesting use of his role and his freedom from a political future.

Wordling My Prospectus

2012-01-10T13:23:00.001-05:00

In my endless quest to generate content here, without actually writing anything, here is a the Wordle for my prospectus. I could just post my prospectus... but no.

Wordle allows you to take words out. So I removed the words "vice" and every form of "president" (including "presidential" and "presidency") since seeing those words show up a lot does not reveal much.

Speculation Alert: Romney's Veepstakes

2011-11-23T21:43:00.002-05:00

As obsessed as I am about the VP's relative increase in influence, the truth is a huge percentage of VP stories are reporters trying to fill space and - if they are lucky - make a story where there wasn't one. Now CNN pitches New Hampshire Senator Kelly Ayotte as a possible - Romney states she is one of 15 possibles.

While Romney is the putative front-runner and there is still plenty of smart money on him, he hasn't actually won anything yet.

Let's hit some overall trends. Ayotte is from Romney's region. Geographic balance isn't an absolute necessity (see Clinton-Gore, two southerners) but New England is not an electoral power-house. Ayotte was elected in 2010 - she is probably a lot more seasoned then Palin, but she is still relatively inexperienced. Although Romney was born into a political family, he hasn't spent any time in DC - so he is still an outsider. Plus he needs someone with rock-solid conservative credentials to shore up party suspicions that he is really a moderate.

So he needs a southern conservative with DC experience. There are any number of possibilities to fit that bill - Jon Kyl and Lamar Alexander leap to mind. (Marco Rubio does not.)

One interesting character who fits it perfectly is actually Newt Gingrich - but something tells me that he isn't terribly interested in the number two slot. Gingrich is a brilliant idea machine, but even if he were interested, would number two be a good fit?

Speaking of which, I answered the Politico Arena question of the day:

Will immigration stance hurt or help Newt Gingrich?

It is likely that Newt's stance on immigration will hurt him with "the base." Fortunately for him his major rival has a number of weaknesses with the base as well. Part of the problem is that this base has calcified into a set of impossibly rigid positions that no candidate can realistically satisfy.

However, this position will serve Newt well if he can make it to the general election as it highlights him as an independent thinker and it reflects a more humane side to a Republican Party that is looking increasingly mean-spirited.

Why Republicans love Coolidge

2011-11-11T16:20:00.003-05:00

An article in Slate explores the Republican fascination with Calvin Coolidge. The author discusses how Reagan's biggest moves seemed to be ripped from Silent Cal's play book. But the veneration of Coolidge reflects something more profound then policy preferences.

Renown Presidential Scholar Richard Neustadt wrote that the President has been transformed from a leader to a clerk. Neustadt wrote in 1959:

A striking feature of our recent past has been the transformation into routine practice of the actions we once treated as exceptional. A President may retain liberty, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, "to be as big a man as he can." But nowadays he cannot be as small as he might like....

In instance after instance the exception behavior of our earlier "strong" Presidents has now been set by the statute as a regular requirement. Theodore Roosevelt once assumed the steward's role in the emergency created by the great coal strike of 1902; the Railway Labor Act and the Taft-Hartley Act now make such interventions mandatory upon Presidents. The other Roosevelt once asserted personal responsibility for gauging and for guiding the American economy; the Employment Act binds his successors to that task. Wilson and FDR became chief spokesmen, leading actors, on a world stage at the heights of war; now UN membership, far-flung alliances, prescribe that role continuously in times termed "peace." ...And what has escaped statutory recognition has mostly been accreted into presidential common law, confirmed by custom, no less binding; the fireside chat and the press conference, for example, or the personally presented legislative programs, or personal campaigning in congressional elections.

In form all Presidents are leaders nowadays. In fact this guarantees no more than that they will be clerks. Everybody now expects the man inside the White House to do something about everything. Laws and customs now reflect widespread acceptance of him as the great initiator... A President today is an invaluable clerk. His services are in demand all over Washington....

Critical to this transformation was FDR and the massive expansion of the Federal government in response to the Great Depression and World War II. Coolidge (Republicans would prefer not to mention Hoover) was the last leader President and part of being a leader was the option not to take action. Consider a few choice Coolidge statements:

Four-fifths of all our troubles would disappear, if we would only sit down and keep still.

If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you.

Perhaps one of the most important accomplishments of my administration has been minding my own business.

They criticize me for harping on the obvious; if all the folks in the United States would do the few simple things they know they ought to do, most of our big problems would take care of themselves.

In venerating Coolidge, more than merely approving cutting taxes and other pro-business policies the Republicans are harking back to an era where little was expected of the President, the government's role was not all pervasive, but at the same time when action was needed it was decisive.

Also, while Coolidge was seen as pro-business, this attitude was heavily tempered by a belief in morality:

Industry, thrift and self-control are not sought because they create wealth, but because they create character.

It is only when men begin to worship that they begin to grow.

No person was ever honored for what he received. Honor has been the reward for what he gave.

Prosperity is only an instrument to be used, not a deity to be worshipped.

In Politico's Arena on the Perry Meltdown

2011-11-10T12:48:00.002-05:00

This morning, the Politico Arena question of the day was Can Rick Perry recover?

My answer, in a word: No! The full answer is below:

Perry's campaign was always a long-shot because, quite frankly, Texas has had its turn in the White House. Voters are inclined to give other states a chance.

It is often remarked that the primary system the United States has is no way to pick a president. It is unclear if this system shows who is fit to be president, but it is safe to say that at least it shows us who is not up to the job.

Perry, unable to recite his own talking points, has shown the voters which category he best fits.

Confluence of Veeps - Past & Present

2011-11-05T22:39:00.002-04:00

In 1975, in the wake of Watergate, Congress began investigating the CIA. President Ford, a former VP replaced the CIA director with George H.W. Bush (a future VP.) Also, to head off the congressional investigations he assigned his own VP, Nelson Rockefeller, to head a committee. Reportedly the White House chief of staff orchestrated these moves. In the case of Rockefeller he was trying to weigh Rocky down with committee work so he couldn't get anything done as the chair of the Domestic Policy Council. Rumsfeld had also brough Bush into the CIA to hurt his future political career - Rumsfeld harbored presidential ambitions of his own. Decades later Rumsfeld's machinations were remembered and his appointment to Defense was not a popular move amongst the Bushies.

But Rumsfeld had an important ally in the Bush 43 administration. His old deputy and successor at the Ford White House, future VP Dick Cheney.

I can think of several points where two past, future & present VPs worked together (any where the President had been VP for starters) but FOUR on one particular issue must be some sort of record.

VP Garret Hobart - hot or not?

2011-11-04T16:36:00.003-04:00

In my endless quest for vice presidential influence it is always a pleasure to learn something new and non-trivial!

Garrett Hobart, McKinley’s first vice president, mattered – his home (VPs had to arrange their own lodging until 1975) was called the “Little Cream White House” (which had once been McClellan’s HQ) and he was often referred to as “Assistant President.”

One newspaperman wrote:

For the first time in my recollection, and the last for that matter, the Vice President was recognized as somebody, as a part of the Administration, as a part of the body over which he presided.

Hobart had been the speaker of the New Jersey House, President of the New Jersey Senate, and was a wealthy attorney for the railroads. He was not McKinley’s choice for VP, but the Republican party needed New Jersey and he fit the bill (although he was caught between his desire to enjoy a private life and his ambition and sense of duty.)

What is fascinating (to me at least) are the sources of Hobart’s unique influence. He was by all accounts an engaging individual who gave prudent advice. His wife looked after McKinley’s wife, who was ill and found her duties has First Lady onerous. The Hobarts also entertained Washington, sparing the McKinley's that duty. Hobart also helped McKinley manage his investments. Was this personal connection sufficient to allow McKinley to break a decades-old institution of ignoring the VP? Does it also matter that Hobart, having never held national office, was not a political threat?

Simple Idea for Background Reading

2011-11-03T21:48:00.002-04:00

I wandered by the UMD library today and picked up The American Presidency: An Analytical Approach, by UMD prof Irwin Morris (who I don't know.)

Writing about the VP, I need a decent foundation on the study of the president and the presidency. There are endless volumes devoted to the topic. But Morris' book, which is designed as a good undergrad textbook, provides a strong overview of theories and the state of the field.

For background reading, an up to date textbook is a good idea - I wish I had thought of it a few years ago - would have saved me a lot of time trolling around in back issues of Presidential Studies Quarterly.

Implications of VPs as a punchline

2011-11-02T23:18:00.002-04:00

I like the funnies, and Frazz is a good one. But I was a little bummed to see them go for the easy laugh here. Sure memorizing vice presidents is pointless, but strictly speaking so is memorizing presidents, state capitols, mythological deities. Multiplication tables and poetry may, in fairness, make some sense. But on the off-chance one finds themselves in a profession that requires knowledge of the 50 state capitols (or the VPs like yours truly) pick it up in on-the-job-training.

My different selves are caught on this. The academic in me wants to right the wrong of VP inconsequence mostly to expand my own academic micro-niche. But the small government conservative says, it is a good thing that government officials are not taken too seriously - government should matter less, not more. But the policywonk in me has a deep respect for people who, as Teddy Roosevelt says "is in the arena." Full quote is here:It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.

Response to WaPo on VP Selection

2011-11-01T23:26:00.003-04:00

A few weeks ago The Washington Post Outlook section ran a lengthy article arguing that party conventions should select the vice president, rather then the presidential nominee. The key was that the office was too important to leave to presidential whim and the convention delegates would select stronger candidates more fit for the presidency.

I dashed off a letter to the editor disagreeing, but it was not printed. So, here goes:

Mr. Leahy's recent Outlook feature argued that party conventions should select the vice president. This idea appeals to political journalists because it would make conventions interesting. But it would not result in better vice presidents. The conventions selected some vice presidents of great ability such as Teddy Roosevelt, but also many non-entities and a few scoundrels (consider Aaron Burr or Schuyler Colfax.)

More importantly, the era of party selected vice presidents was characterized by poor relationships between the two nationally elected officials. Coolidge's Vice President Charles Dawes’ refusal to attend cabinet meetings illuminates this situation. Dawes (an outstanding figure who won the Nobel Peace Prize, was a WWI hero, and popular composer - but an utter failure as vice president), did not want to set a precedent of vice presidential attendance because, he wrote, the relationship between a President and his advisors “…is a confidential one, and the selection of a confidant belongs to him who would be injured by the abuse of confidence-however unintentional. Suppose, in the future, some President, with this precedent fixed, must face the alternative of inviting a loquacious publicity seeker into his private councils, or affronting him in the public eye by denying him what has come to be considered as his right-how embarrassing it would be!”

Presidents should continue to choose their running mates because a President that does not have complete confidence in the
vice president’s discretion and loyalty will exclude the vice president from the decision-making process. In the modern complex world the United States cannot afford an ill-informed vice president ascending to the nation’s highest office.

VeepStakes '12a - Mannes in Politico: Thumbs Down for Marco Rubio

2011-10-27T16:16:00.003-04:00

Although the GOP doesn't have a nominee yet, the 2012 veepstakes have begun. Politico's Arena asks if Marco Rubio is a viable VP candidate. The short answer is NO, the longer answer is:

Marco Rubio is not VP material yet and has probably missed his moment to be considered presidential material. Over the past 35 years Americans have preferred outsider, people with minimal Washington experience to be president (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush 43 and Obama.) These outsider candidates (including the one losing outsider - Dukakis) have picked experienced D.C.-insiders, often to explicitly balance their own lack of experience.

With the exception of Gingrich and Ron Paul, all of the current Republican candidates are outsiders who would probably select an experienced D.C.-hand as their running mate. Rubio, with less then a year in the Senate is hardly experienced.

Young, telegenic and charming Rubio might have had a chance for the presidency. A few years in the Senate doesn't eliminate the "outsider" label. Obama did not complete his term in the Senate before becoming president. But it may take years for the current controversy \around Rubio to fade in which case he will no longer be an outsider. But, like Biden who wrecked a presidential run with a minor controversy decades ago - Rubio could become a respected insider and become VP material around 2028.

THe Washington Post also takes a skeptical look at Rubio, noting that as a Cuban-American he does not resonate with the vast majority of Latino voters. Probably true, but I take a structural look. While candidates certainly choose based on politics, outsider candidates have had a strong record of picking experienced "presidential" running mates.

Cheney's Legacy

2011-08-26T07:02:00.003-04:00

Yesterday morning (while sitting at LAX waiting for a flight) I posted in Politico's Arena on the question: Will memoir improve Dick Cheney's image?

I haven't seen the memoir yet, just the excerpts discussed in The New York Times, but that doesn't stop a pundit for punditing...

Seriously, as a student of the vice presidency, I had to jump on this one. But, rather then comment on the specifics, I tried to place the memoir in historical perspective and relate it to the evolution of the office. My response was:

It is difficult to imagine Cheney's memoirs changing many minds in the short-term. He is a polarizing figure who is loved (occasionally) and hated (quite often.) In the long-run it is difficult to say what his legacy will be. Hopefully, the seeds of a new Middle East are emerging - but the region has an infinite ability to disappoint.

A fascinating aspect to this is the relevance of the vice presidential memoir. Long considered historical footnotes, vice presidential memoirs were minor niche publications. Calvin Coolidge's VP Charles Dawes kept a diary which is available online. Dawes was, prior to the vice presidency, an enormously accomplished man (Nobel laureate, best-selling song-writer, WWI general, and founder of the Budget Office). His memoirs only confirm the office as a constitutional appendix (Arthur Schlesinger's term.)

Nixon's memoir of his vice presidency, Six Crises, kept him in the public eye and helped propel him to the presidency. Still, the attention paid to Cheney's memoirs shows how the office has emerged as a major power center within administrations.

Additionally, since obtaining influence (in the Carter-Mondale administration) vice presidents have been very cautious about getting involved in the public aspects of policy fights. Cheney broke from this tradition as well and his writing a score-settling memoir - while understandable - indicates the vice presidency is evolving into just another presidential advisor.

Some additional notes, the figure of Charles Dawes is fascinating. His accomplishments were legion and his public service continued after the vice presidency. His diary of that period, perhaps the least accomplished in his incredible life emphasizes what a backwater the vice presidency was.

Part of this was self-inflicted, Dawes feuded with Coolidge. He refused to attend cabinet meetings and mismanaged the Presidents affairs at the Senate). He also attempted to actually run the Senate, and lectured Senators on the need to reform antiquated procedures. Students of Senate history will not be surprised to learn that this went poorly.
Still, Dawes was one of the most active, well-known, and popular vice presidents until recently. He was an active campaigner for Coolidge in 1924.

Dawes had some similarities to Cheney. He made a fortune in business (although Dawes did this before his public service) and like Cheney had held several key executive positions. Unlike Cheney, Dawes' first elected office was the vice presidency, whereas Cheney served in the House. But, unlike Cheney, Dawes eschewed any executive responsibility as VP. His refusal to attend cabinet meetings is particularly interesting. Coolidge had attended Harding cabinet meetings as VP and this was considered an enormous advancement in the vice president's status. But Dawes told Coolidge that he was happy to give the president advice and would personally like to attend the meetings, but felt it was a dangerous precedent. The cabinet consisted of the President's confidants, and it was possible that a future vice president who was not loyal to the president would betray this confidence.

It was also Dawes who, as Budget chief called the cabinet the president's natural enemy, because each department head was effectively a vice president of spending.

Much to think about there.

VP Brainstorms

2011-08-10T15:11:00.001-04:00

This is what I've been doing today.

I don't know if it gets me any closer to my proposal, but I like using different colored markers.

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPhone

NY Times reports Biden wins Iraq

2011-06-25T23:18:00.001-04:00

The New York Times reports that the drawdown in Afghanistan shows Biden's increased influence in the White House, it also mentions that Biden is a fierce advocate for the President's priorities (as though the VP has any choice).

Biden's influence is not news, there were some stronger bits of evidence, for example the Vice President's schedule which in a typical week shows numerous high-level meetings both with the President and key officials or, perhaps most significantly, the West Wing floor plan.

I still think what is striking about the policy process around Afghanistan is the way Biden played a public "devil's advocate" role when the traditional VP role has been to exercise influence quietly.

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

Gore: Another Edition of VP vs ex-VP

2011-06-23T23:18:00.001-04:00

Answering the Politico Arenaquestion Does Al Gore have a legitimate gripe with Obama? I wrote:

Al Gore is completely right and completely wrong at the same time. He is right that environmental issues have taken a back seat in the Obama administration. With multiple shooting wars, an economy in a continuing state of free-fall, and a hostile House little wonder that Obama is not devoting his time to the issue.

Ironically, Gore was an extremely influential VP in his day. His personal relationship with President Clinton was critical, but so was Gore's knowing which battles to fight. In the Clinton administration economic issues were front and center, everything else was secondary. As VP Gore did not push environmental issues when the president wasn't interested. As an elder statesman Gore is not constrained by political realities.

VP influence has relied on making sure there was limited public space between the views of our government's two principles. The VP has no bureaucratic power base of his own and Presidents don't need freelancers in the White House. But as an ex-VP, the only influence comes from reaching out to the public. One thing that is fascinating as that anyone cares what an ex-VP says. Throttlebottom would be amazed.

- Posted using BlogPress from my iPad

Agnew Reconsidered?

2011-05-31T21:12:00.003-04:00

Spiro Agnew is the epitome of the inconsequential VP, who systematically blew whatever opportunities he had to influence policy. Nixon, by some accounts couldn't stand his mere presence. But I am reading Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary - which is really a fun, amusing read. Unsurprising, since Moynihan was a fun, amusing politician.

Moynihan had worked in the Nixon White House, sort of a house intellectual who had seen the collapse of the New Deal Democrats, and had found an intellectual refuge amongst the Republicans. He had some interesting things to say to and about Agnew. He deplored Agnew's aggressive, inflammatory rhetoric - but he seemed to have a certain respect for the man. In this letter to Agnew he wrote:

I have told a dozen colleagues here at Harvard that as a judge of political horseflesh I do not know your equal in American politics today, which is not to say I agree with you about many things, but simply that your judgment about who to have to lunch to talk about the world is in my view pretty damn good. But there are not half a dozen other Republicns who are in any way so disposed and so equipped. You are alone. You have no troops. No one carries on your argument, no one elaborates it, no one initiates comparable and parallel arguments. No journal of any intellectual status is open to your point of view....

If you were to ask my advice it would be this. Cease attacking. Begin talking about the complex problems we must now face... You really can help in this, and I know you would want to do so.

Perhaps just a bit of flattery as Moyhnihan tries to persuade Agnew to tone down his rhetoric? Probably - almost certainly. But now look at this (very lengthy) memo to Ehrichman and Haldeman trying to get the White House to develop a conservative intellectual approach to governance:

....Here permit me a sympathetic word about the Vice President. He alone of administrative spokesmen has sought to take up some of the intellectual issues of the time and to argue the conservative case. But it has been a disaster for the President. Many things the Vice President says are true, at least I would think so. But there does not now exist a spectrum of opinion in which his views are seen to be located in a particular point, a bit to the left of this reasonable person, a bit to the left of that one. Opinion is so concentrated on the liberal left that Agnew's mildly conservative positions are easily portrayed as the voice of the Radical Right. The Vice President has greatly contributed to this by attacking individuals by name. It might be argued that some had it coming to them...but the main point is that the attacks enabled the opposition to the administration to ignore anything of substance he said, and to depict even his most reasoned statements as the frenzied precursors of Fascist Repression....

The Vice President has assembled an advisory group of writers and professors. I have a rough idea of the panel and I would not hesitate to state that for sheer intellectual distinction is head an shoulders above anything any Democratic candidate for President is likely to assemble for similar purposes....

So I am pretty sure that 90% of what Moynihan is writing is an attempt to get Agnew's famously divisive rhetoric toned down. That he throws a fair amount of flattery into the mix is no surprise in the realm of court politics. Moynihan was on to something here. He saw the intellectual collapse of the New Dealers and recognized that a conservative intellectual cadre was needed for the Republicans to displace the Democrats. (This happened, not so much later.) He also recognized that a political spokesman who could articulate complex ideas in simple, popular terms, was needed. (This also happened.) With a bit of seasoning, could Agnew have done it? Was Moynihan trying to both quiet the rhetoric but also initiate a program to "train" Agnew?

Agnew had only been governor of Maryland for two years when Nixon plucked him from relative obscurity and nominated him to the vice presidency. Had he served a bit longer in office, perhaps he would have had a better sense of how to conduct himself. Or, perhaps, Agnew was doing exactly what Nixon wanted as a lightning - that Nixon had no time or inclination for a conservative intellectual project. (He certainly had the brains - Alan Greenspan says Nixon and Clinton were the two smartest presidents he worked with.)

Tough to know - of course Agnew would have been a flawed vessel for any such ambition. He was, as Jimmy Breslin stated, "A magnificent thief," who had payments delivered to the Old Executive Office Building.

Essence of DSK: Do Leaders Matter?

2011-05-17T23:00:00.003-04:00

Following the DSK imbroglio, one related story is that during a period of international financial crises the IMF (a critical institution) is leaderless. Of course, they have a deep bench of technocrats to make the trains run on time. On the other hand the present multiple financial meltdowns may be so severe and fundamental that nothing the IMF does would really make a difference – there are grand historical forces at work.

I mention this because a fundamental tenet of bureaucratic politics is that individuals and their preferences matter. If there is a single aspect to that perspective rooted in data rather then anecdote it is the question of “who is in the room.” Does it matter that the IMF doesn’t have a person of top rank to sit in on meetings. There is, of course, a number two but will DSK’s top office effectively respond to the number two’s leadership style?

This could be boiled down to the perspectives offered in the poli-sci classic Essence of Decision.

Model 1 (Rational Actor) vs. Model 2 (Organizational Behavior): Does the IMF matter or are events being shaped by deeper forces?

Model 2 (Organizational Behavior) vs. Model 3 (Governmental Politics): Will the IMF pretty much do its thing regardless of its leadership, or does DSK’s personal influence matter?

Really, my whole point here is best summed up by a far wiser Frenchman then DSK. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:

I have come across men of letters who have written history without taking part in public affairs, and politicians who have concerned themselves with producing events without thinking about them. I have observed that the first are always inclined to find general causes whereas the second, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents, and that the wires they pull are the same as those that move the world. It is to be presumed that both are equally deceived.

Sidenote, DSK's behavior is one good argument for the VP - someone needs to be available to step into the breach when less appealing aspects of human nature cause top leaders to be unable to attend to their duties.

The Trouble with Czars

2011-04-11T22:28:00.002-04:00

In The Wall Street Journal today former Secretary of State, Treasury, Labor (and OMB chief) George Shultz decries the growth of White House staff at the expense of the cabinet.

The practice of appointing White House "czars" to rule over various issues or regions is not a new invention. But centralized management by the White House staff has been greatly increased in recent years.

Beyond constitutional questions, such White House advisers, counselors, staffers and czars are not accountable. They cannot be called to testify under oath, and when Congress asks them to come, they typically plead executive privilege.

The consequences, apart from the matter of legitimate governance, are all too often bad for the formation and execution of policy. The departments, not the White House, have the capacity to carry out policies and they are full of people, whether political appointees or career governmental employees, who have vast experience and much to contribute to the making of policy. When White House staffers try to formulate or execute policy, they can easily get off track in a way that would not happen in a regular department.

As secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan, I experienced this with great pain when White House people developed and ran an off-the-books program of arms sales to Iran. It erupted in the Iran-Contra scandal involving the unconstitutional transfer of funds not appropriated by Congress to the Contras, and with close to devastating consequences for the president.

Iran-Contra is a dramatic example, but the more general problem is the inability to take full advantage of available skills and expertise in policy making, and the difficulty in carrying out the functions of government nationally and internationally.

Shultz sees the impossible confirmation process as a primary culprit in this emphasis on White House-based decision-making. The inability to fill critical sub-cabinet ranks quickly makes it impossible for the president to get a firm rein on the bureaucracy. My advisor, Mac Destler, in his Presidents, Bureaucracies, and Foreign Policy discusses the President's need to create centers of strength at various levels throughout the bureaucracy. It is also fair to say that the record of White House czars is not a strong one.

There is other literature that suggests that there are regular patterns to Presidential centralization and dispersion of power. On key issues, the President puts the issue under the White House rubric until he has built the bureaucratic network he needs to further the issue. There is also the issue of scale. Presidents now appoint thousands when they take office. It isn't that these appointees are disloyal, but they probably don't know what the President wants and thus are liable to capture.

None of this is to say that Shultz's argument for easing the appointment process is not a good one - it is! His own record of success as a bureaucratic infighter is impressive (I hope he'll let me interview him when I get to that stage...)

One interesting note to the VP obsessed is that back in the mid-80s when the Reagan Administration couldn't figure out how to manage international terrorism Shultz apparently proposed VP Bush to head a Terrorism Task Force (I wrote a paper on it). Terrorism is THE inter-agency problem and a White House coordination effort was the only way to manage the process. But of course the VP is not a staffer, he (and one day she) is very much a public figure that is ultimately accountable.

Joe's Got no Action

2011-03-22T21:54:00.002-04:00

The swirl of world events is incredible. Throughout the Obama administration, VP Biden has been in the center of national security decision-making. He liaised with leaders in Iraq and Egypt at critical junctures. He delivered speeches in Moscow, Beirut and elsewhere. So where is he now?

No court politics here, a review of the Vice President's schedule shows he is in regular meetings with the President and key national security figures - Combatant Commanders, SecDef, and this morning he hosted a meeting with the Secretary of State. But Biden is not taking a public role in explaining administration policy. Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates are, why not?

The VP has NO formal powers (unless specifically delegated by the President.) In upper levels of government, according to the classic Bureaucratic Policies and Foreign Policies a key question is "who has the action?" That is which official in which agency can actually sign off on an initiative. The VP doesn't have it. SecDef and SecState have a formal role in war-fighting and diplomacy. Having the VP out front in place of the President is useful in many situations, but not when forces are actually deployed. It would be Constitutionally and politically problematic to have Biden take a leading role.

Moe on the VP: Chemistry in the West Wing

2011-03-11T15:35:00.004-05:00

Richard Moe, who had been Vice President Mondale's chief of staff, had an article in the Huffington Post about the rise of the modern vice presidency. A nice, brief overview from someone who actually knows the topic pretty well. Here is an excerpt:

Importantly, Biden gives every indication of being beyond personal ambition and solely dedicated instead to the president's agenda. Biden's predecessor, Dick Cheney, was beyond electoral ambition but not beyond personal ambition; he established a quasi-independent power center in the vice president's office that had an ideological agenda often at odds with the president's. There has not been a hint of self-promotion or free-lancing on Biden's part. He clearly understands that a vice president's influence does not depend on his visibility; just the opposite. It's no easy thing for a senator of 36 years who prizes his independence and prominence to give it all up for an office, however important, that is totally dependent on one person's discretion to delegate -- or withhold -- power. The trade-off, of course, has been the opportunity to affect policy and events in a way he never could otherwise.

Biden got off to a bit of a rocky start two years ago, but the verbal gaffes of that period have largely disappeared and the penchant for senatorial volubility has been restrained. Although they have very different life stories and personalities, he and the president have obviously developed a good personal chemistry and thus a good working relationship. It's a relationship that depends entirely on mutual trust and in the end both principals are the beneficiaries. But the country is the real beneficiary because it has a vice president whose office and abilities are being maximized for the public good, and because he will have the experience, information and skills to assume the presidency if, God forbid, he has to. Those are the two main criteria for a successful vice president in the modern era, and Biden meets them both. Thirty years ago I thought Mondale did too, but with Obama's help Biden has taken the office several levels beyond. If they keep it up, Joe Biden is on track to become the most consequential vice president in American history.

The line that caught my attention was that Obama and Biden have "good chemistry." What does that mean exactly, not simply that they like each other, although that is important. But politicians tend to be pretty likable, it is a basic characteristic of the profession. Politicians who are described as lacking charisma are still usually at least somewhat likable in person. I remember years ago at Fenway Park my friends were razzing a bullpen denizen. One of them, who is now a successful sportscaster observed, "You know, if he pitched for our college team we'd win a lot more games."

My point is that likability isn't the issue, the personal chemistry is much more than that. Nelson Rockefeller was immensely charming and remained friendly with Ford throughout the administration, yet he had limited influence. Distilling the elements of this chemistry is at the core of my thesis.

A few initial thoughts - first the VP has to actively seek to meet the President's needs. As Neustadt observed, the President as clerk has infinite demands on his time and energy. He does not need someone else giving him something to do. At the same time, the vice president is uniquely positioned to take things off the President's plate. The much derided "funeral duty" is actually an important one. The United States needs to send an appropriate representative, but flying around the world is is a huge drain on the president's time and energy. The same goes for rallying the base. With the President's confidence, these duties can be extended. As Stephen Hess wrote in a memo to Carter about expanding the VP's role:

...resist the temptation to give the vice president any assignments that the president would not assume himself if he had the time.

Rise of the Bidenites

2011-02-11T13:32:00.005-05:00

A central component of vice presidential influence is allies on the President's staff. Paul Light's most excellent Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House describes the importance of acquiring allies on the President's staff and of building warm relations between the vice president and president's staff. Mondale excelled at building alliances and placing allies in key positions. Also, because the Carter team was not familiar with the ways of Washington so that Mondale staffers had unprecedented opportunities to fill these gaps.

This has evolved since. While Bush and his team were somewhat suspected by the Reaganites, Bush worked hard to remove this image and - particularly significantly - his close friend Jim Baker was Reagan's chief of staff during the first term. Since Bush had his own team of experienced staffers, Quayle was challenged in building alliances and placing allies. Under Gore, the staffs had very close relationships and Gore was - by all accounts - a key player in the administration. Cheney's record in this regard may not have been as strong as is generally believed. The Bush staff was deeply loyal to Bush and had its suspicions of Cheney and his staffers. Formally, many Cheney staffers also held formal titles on the White House staff - a new development. Titles are important, but not everything. Probably the most important asset of Cheney's influence was (like Mondale's) a sense of what to do and how to do it.

Wall of Biden

In evaluating palace politics, it is important to look at the floorplan.

According to the Washington Post profile National Security Advisor Tom Donilon is very close to Biden. He advised Biden during the Robert Bork confirmation hearings in 1987 and during Biden's 1988 presidential bid. His brother is also a long-time Biden advisor and his wife is chief of staff to Jill Biden.

The new chief of staff, Bill Daley, spent countless hours on the road with Biden during his 1988 presidential campaign.

In effect, that entire wall of the West Wing is occupied by Bidenistas.

Plus, the new press secretary, Jay Carney, had been Biden's press secretary. Off-hand I cannot think of a vice presidential staffer being promoted to the equivalent position on the president's staff. More than half of the West Wing's office space is filled with individuals with close links to Biden. That is unprecedented vice presidential influence!

VP as Presidential Peer?

2011-01-21T16:17:00.001-05:00

Sometime ago I read Political Animal a fictionalized version of the Chuck Schumer - Alfonse D’Amato Senate race. The main character was a speechwriter and learned that his candidate (the novelized version of Schumer) knew about someone who'd been wrongly convicted for killing a police officer. Even though the campaign opposed it, the main character issued a press release announcing the candidate’s support for a re-investigation. The main character was fired and the candidate, when telling him off, said that he would still convert this to victory but that he was the one who was going to have to attend police benefit dinners and take the heat for this.

Reportedly, Lyndon Johnson once said about the Kennedyite intellectuals, “I wish some of these guys had just once had to run for dog catcher.” Ultimately, politicians have to win elections and do the kinds of things that win elections and take the public heat for their decisions.
A Senator has 99 colleagues who “get” what he or she has to deal with and interacts with them daily. A President has no one. There are long-time friends and advisors but they usually don’t have much direct electoral experience. As close as they may be to the President they are not, as William Kennedy wrote in his novel Roscoe describing the boss of the Albany Democratic machine, “…the main man, the man who forked the lightning, the boss.”

Supposedly, at a lower level, Karl Rove got into trouble on that front. He approached the Republican Congressional leadership as an equal. But in Congress there is a line between members and staff, and Rove was staff.

The Vice President is the one person in the White House who really has comparable experience. They have probably run several major campaigns themselves and went through a national campaign with the President. But unlike the staffers (who certainly share the crazy hours and frustrations) only the candidates have been subject to unbelievable scrutiny where reporters hungry to make a story carefully monitor every word while enduring endless speeches, handshaking, and questions from voters.

Rarely are the White House staffers individuals with national level electoral experience. Howard Baker, Reagan’s last chief of staff and a former Senate Majority Leader, is an exception. But he was pulled in under exceptional circumstances when the Reagan presidency was imploding. The VP is the only person around who might “get” both the substantive and personal aspects of what the President needs to do. In short, are VPs positioned to be a unique type of advisor and sounding board?

VP & Foreign Policy: A Brief Literature Review

2010-12-14T10:31:00.001-05:00

Believe it or not there are already two scholarly books about the vice presidency and foreign affairs! Naturally I have read them both with great interest. First there is Paul Kengor’s Wreath Layer or Policy Player? The Vice President’s Role in Foreign Policy which was published in 2000 and was originally Kengor’s PhD dissertation. The second, and more recent book, is Jack Lechelt’s The Vice Presidency in Foreign Policy: From Mondale to Cheney, which was published in 2009. My initial reaction, since I am studying the same topic, was that neither was the definitive work on the topic – that is the book I will be writing. On a second read, I came away with a great deal more respect for what the authors accomplished and that the books provided some guidance about how to approach my own dissertation. Both of them are also chock full of key details and useful footnotes that make my own research much easier.

Wreath Layer or Policy Player?
In his dissertation Kengor explores two critical questions:

1. How the vice president fits into the president’s foreign-policy framework
2. Recommendations on how or whether the vice president can be used to enhance White House foreign policy

Overshadowing these specific questions is that of presidential training. Kengor notes that one important factor in the increased foreign policy role of the vice president was the rocky succession by Truman after FDR died. Not only did Truman not know about the atom bomb project, he was also unfamiliar with FDR’s negotiations with Stalin about post-war Europe and had not even met the Secretary of State. Because of that instance, there have been many recommendations for expanding the vice president’s role in foreign policy. Kengor notes that while there is merit to these recommendations, they should be carefully considered. One of the big selling points for an expanded vice presidential role is that the VP does not have an institutional affiliation – but Kengor notes that they do have political ambitions and that their actions can be shaped with an eye to their own future candidacies.

To examine his questions Kengor does a series of case studies on vice presidents who played an active foreign policy role. One of the real virtues of Kengor’s work (that I did not appreciate on my first read but became clearer as I face the challenge of identifying a question that can actually be answered) is that it is grounded in observable phenomena with reasonably clear metrics. Kengor has a simple schema with six levels of vice presidential activity:

1. Access to paperwork relating to foreign affairs and sitting on the NSC
2. Serving as a foreign policy spokesman
3. Traveling abroad as an emissary to meet foreign officials, make policy announcements, and/or serving as a liaison with congress
4. A vice presidential national security staff
5. Negotiating with foreign leaders on behalf of the administration
6. Chairing or participating in a key foreign policy committee

Kengor only does case studies on VPs who are at level five or more (Nixon, Mondale, Bush, Quayle and Gore – Cheney hadn’t been vice president yet.) In the case studies, Kengor examines the VP’s place in the administration’s foreign policy process and then discusses various vice presidential actions in the national security realm. Kengor notes that he made it a point to emphasize negative results from vice presidential engagement. Identifying positive or negative outcomes from a political event is a dicey business. But it appears that the metric is whether the administration got what it wanted out of the event. For example in 1983 VP Bush traveled to Europe to push for the deployment of Pershing missiles, which was running into domestic opposition in the potential host countries. By all accounts – both in the general press and from administration figures - Bush did a fine job, bolstering deployment supporters and responding to critics. On the other hand in 1986, Bush went to Saudi Arabia to encourage the Saudis to keep oil prices low, which was devastating the Soviet economy. Instead Bush told them the US needed price stability, the opposite message the Saudis had been getting from Reagan and his senior cabinet officers. Kengor hypothesizes that low oil prices were hurting the oil industry and the states where it is based and that Bush wanted their support for his own upcoming Presidential run. There are similar examples in other vice presidencies (a Mondale statement in South Africa derailed the administration’s Africa policy – but may have helped Mondale with civil rights groups in the US.) This is an important observation, that while a VP may be free of institutional interests, he is not free of political ones that may run counter to the President’s wishes. It is worth noting that in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, Gore may have acquired a loyalty to Russia policy, which was somewhat institutionalized under the GCC.

Kengor states that VPs at the end of their career may be better able to serve the President objectively and not seek to protect their future political careers. Since the publication of Kengor’s book the United States has seen two VPs who saw that position as the apex of their career – Cheney and Biden. In some respects Kengor’s observation seems correct – Cheney and Biden’s service (for better or worse) appears to be entirely focused on serving their President. However, under Cheney the recognition that this would be the VPs only opportunity to make policy at this level may have led to a highly public activist role that created rifts and tensions in its own right. Although it was not a foreign policy issue, there may have been a hint of this in Nelson Rockefeller’s difficult tenure in the vice presidency under Ford. Rockefeller hoped to “run” domestic policy. He was sidelined by Ford’s chiefs of staff – Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney.

In his conclusions, Kengor addresses 20 policy recommendations on the vice president’s national security role. Nine of the recommendations (including serving as a member of the NSC, receiving all presidential papers, having a West Wing office and a regular private meeting with the President) are seen as musts for a vice president to be in the loop on foreign policy. Another six recommendations (including serving as a general advisor or congressional liaison, chairing a short-term task force, or serving as emissary or foreign policy spokesman) are viewed as potentially feasible depending on the President’s preferences. Finally, five proposals including having the VP head an executive-level department or chair a major interagency committee are rejected because they could place the VP in the midst of turf battles and because if the VP is unsuccessful the president could be placed in the very awkward position of removing him (or her – although presumably future female vice presidents will be models of competence.) These are excellent points about the vice presidential role.

Kengor does not discuss in much depth the drivers for the increased vice presidential role. He mentions the National Security Act of 1947 and the increasing responsibilities placed on presidents since WWII. But those explanations seem inadequate. Although Nixon was given a greater role than any previous VP, the position then entered 15 years of marginalization. Nelson Rockefeller, who was appointed by Ford to shore up the legitimacy of his own unelected presidency, resurrected the vice presidency (although he focused on domestic policy). This expanded role was further increased under the Carter-Mondale administration. If Carter had not been willing to break the mold of vice presidencies by making Mondale a full partner it is not inevitable that the vice presidency would have fundamentally changed. Carter’s own election was the product of Watergate and the resignations of Nixon and Agnew. That being said, this issue may have been beyond the scope of questions Kengor sought to address.

Another area Kengor does not discuss in much detail is the vice president as an advisor. He describes some vice presidents as offering advice, both privately and in NSC meetings, but there is no discussion of the impact of VP advice. Under what circumstances were the VP’s preferred options accepted or rejected? This is not a shortcoming, rather an observation that will be discussed in greater detail below.

The Vice President in Foreign Policy
Lechelt’s book was not, apparently, his PhD thesis. It covers similar ground, although it does not include Nixon and does include Cheney. His major finding is the “semi-institutionalization” of the VP’s policy role. Paul Light in Vice-Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House describes the institutional expansion of the VP’s office including its own budget and dedicated personnel. Without these changes the VP simply does not have the resources to play an effective role. (Ford, as a condition for accepting the vice presidency, demanded his own typing pool – because he knew that otherwise his work would be at the bottom of the White House job queue.) However, Lechelt discuses the expanded prestige of the position – regular private meetings with the President were instituted under Carter but have became SOP. This has fostered a defacto expectation that the VP act as a policy player. Lechelt cites Joel Goldstein’s The Modern American Vice Presidency which notes that once one President gives his VP this access, it is hard for the next President to revoke it. I would expand on that observation – in picking a vice president the president is effectively telling the American people that they would pick this individual above all others to be president in their place. This is an important statement and to follow that up by not including the VP in policy deliberations would effectively send the message that president did not take their VP selection seriously and call the President’s judgment into question.

Lechelt finds that it is likely that VPs will continue to be substantial policy players. In this, Lechelt’s case study of the Quayle vice presidency is crucial. Lechelt takes note of the insider-outsider paradigm and explains that Quayle was serving an insider President who was well-versed in foreign affairs and had strong relationships with his top advisors (particularly Jim Baker the Secretary of State but also NSA Brent Scowcroft.) Nonetheless, while Quayle did not play the role played by Mondale, Gore, or Cheney he was in the mix. Bush’s key advisors were known as the “Big Eight” and Quayle may have been last on the list – but he was on the list. He was not in the innermost circle of advisors, but he did play a role and even persuaded Bush 41 to adopt his position on missile defense. A reduced role compared to his immediate predecessors and successors – but a vast role in comparison to 90% of the vice presidents who had gone before him.

It is beyond the timeframe of Lechelt’s work, but Biden’s active role in the Obama administration highlights this argument in the other direction. For Obama’s supporters the Cheney vice presidency was an awful situation that had led to bad policy and skirted the edges of constitutionality. Biden effectively promised he would not be another Cheney. Yet – he was quickly given prominent roles and has been the administration’s fireman on a range of issues including disputes in the intel community, coalition building in Iraq, and pushing START through the Senate. He has also played a leading role as an advisor – particularly on the issue of the Afghan surge. Biden’s role may be less then Cheney’s but it is obviously substantial (apparently more than Quayle’s and probably comparable to Gore and Mondale.) This indicates that, as Lechelt argues, the VP remains well positioned to play a leading policy role.

Both Kengor and Lechelt spend a fair amount of time analyzing that which can be observed clearly – vice presidential travel (for example.) This brings up an interesting point about future vice presidential roles. In an essay included in At the President’s Side: The Vice Presidency in the Twentieth Century the great Richard Neustadt observes the president effectively controls the vice president’s schedule. Even if the two officials get along, the President might find the most effective use of his VP on the road – fundraising, speaking, and meeting officials. Reducing the VP’s role would have to be done with subtlety – but it could be done.

This leaves open my question of what does the VP bring to the table that makes having him (or her) worth keeping around the White House? Perhaps the question I am interested in is the VP as senior advisor. Unfortunately this is difficult to test. Paul Light tracked cases where the VP advocated a policy and it was adopted. This approach has a number of disadvantages – one of which is Light only had two VPs in office for about 5 years (Mondale and Rockefeller.) I would have to gather data on 30 more years of vice presidents! I don’t have that kind of time if I want to finish my thesis before I retire. Also, advice isn’t always up or down on policy. VPs can have other kinds of impact – such as how an issue is portrayed or on key appointments. One metaphor that comes to mind is the VP as back-up QB. Besides being ready to take the field at any moment, can the back-up QB serve as a peer advisor to the QB and offer unique counsel. The VP is usually the only other senior politician in the White House – the only other figure who has had to actually run the political races and make the big policy calls. Can someone who shares that perspective be inimitably useful to the President?

Reviewing "Presidential Leadership in Political Time"

2010-12-06T16:59:00.004-05:00

Stephen Skowronek’s Presidential Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal is an important book in the presidential studies canon and I am glad that I encountered it early in my reading.

This series on VeepCritique is an effort to warm-up as I prepare to work on my dissertation proposal. I will be reviewing most of the books I was assigned for my specialized reading exam. With each book there will be a series of basic questions:

1. What is the book’s fundamental question and argument?
2. What is the book’s methodology and analytical framework (and what can I learn from it)?
3. Is the book’s argument compelling?
4. What does the book offer my thesis, what can I take from it?

Skowronek’s 1993 book, The Politics Presidents Make won the Richard E. Neustadt Prize for research on the presidency. Presidential Leadership in Political Time revisits the his initial argument about a decade and a half (and a pair of consequential presidencies) later.

He begins by summarizes to dominant arguments about the presidency. The first is that of Richard Neustadt in Presidential Power (to be reviewed later in this series). Neustadt and his progressive generation (Neustadt came of age under FDR, worked in the Truman White House, and advised JFK) saw the presidency as an engine for reform. His book examined the limitations on the president and but how with careful strategy the President can maximize his (and one day her) effectiveness. The focus is on the personal attributes and cleverness of the president. A pair of lousy presidencies (LBJ and Nixon) led to the rise of the antithesis, Arthur Schlesinger’s “Imperial Presidency” in which an out of control presidency is the center of the nation’s biggest problem. Jimmy Carter’s term did little to inspire confidence in the future of the Presidency. Where Neustadt highlighted the president’s skill – Schlesinger worried about the impact of the president’s neuroses. But then came Reagan and also Clinton who managed to serve two terms each, leave office relatively popular, and manage some substantial accomplishments. Skowronek believes another paradigm is in order:

The outstanding question of our third look is whether these stories fit larger patterns in the politics of leadership, whether it is possible to observe across the broad history of leadership efforts something more systematic about the political impact of presidential action in time and over time.

Skowronek describes the presidency as a fundamental force of upheaval and change. The president has enormous power. The challenge is in Presidential authority – does the President have a warrant for his actions that legitimates them? When Presidents lose that warrant, their allies are discouraged and their foes are energized.

The great struggle for Presidents is to define their actions in terms of a broader purpose that is coherent and consonant with the values of their supporters. So far, this does not sound out of joint with Neustadt’s description of Presidential reputation or prestige.

But, Skowronek explains that the most important factor in a president’s efforts to legitimate his actions will be the actions of the president before him and that this relies on broader political cycles. There are four types of presidents:

Politics of disjunction: This is the period when a long-standing political order is no longer capable of addressing the challenges facing the country. These leaders are caught between the demands of their supporters and their need to take actions their supporters oppose. The most recent example is Jimmy Carter; others include Hoover, Franklin Pierce, and John Quincy Adams. Not a distinguished list, but Skowronek argues it has less to do with their limitations then the reality that they were governing in impossible times. They could not satisfy the demands of their supporters, leaving them isolated and vulnerable to electoral defeat.

Politics of reconstruction: This is for the presidents who establish new political orders. After the politics of disjunction reveals the old order as incapable of governing any longer, a new order, which overturns the old order’s commitments, takes power. These presidents have enormous freedom to establish a new order, make new commitments, and exercise the enormous power of the presidency. Reagan was the most recent example, rejecting the values and programs of the New Deal coalition and establishing a new order. Other examples include FDR, Lincoln, Andrew Jackson, Thomas Jefferson, and of course Washington. This would seem like a Presidential all-star team, but Skowronek states that they enjoyed an advantageous time in the sequence in which the collapse of a long-standing coalition allowed them relative freedom to use the full powers of their office to pursue their goals.

Politics of articulation: After the new order is established, follow-on presidents face a different set of challenges. They are charged with continuing the vision of their great predecessor – but there is discord among factions of the governing coalition over what that vision entails. Ultimately their decisions end up alienating substantial components of their support base. There are two prominent sub-groups. The first is the President who follows the coalition founder and is often seen as unable to stand in their predecessor’s footsteps (think Van Buren, Truman, and Bush 41). The later followers often vigorously attempt to renew the founder’s vision. Examples of this group include Polk, Teddy Roosevelt, LBJ, and Bush 43. This latter group has a disproportionate likelihood of engaging in wars of choice or other forms of international muscle flexing. There is usually one faction in the coalition with an expansive view of America in the world that the president needs to appease. These are the Presidents most likely to serve only one-term or to choose not to run for re-election. Since the establishment of a consistent two-party system (in the 1820s) only three won both of their Presidential elections (Grant, McKinley, and Bush 43.)

Politics of pre-emption: While there is a dominant order linked to one party, occasionally the other party elects a president (Andrew Johnson, Cleveland, Wilson, Eisenhower, Nixon, Clinton, and Obama). These presidents usually distance themselves from the past failed order of their party – Clinton, claiming to chart a third way and avoiding the designation as a liberal. These presidents are less hemmed in by ideology and readily adopt policies from the dominant order. These presidents are frequently tarred as dishonest or tricky by their political opponents because of their ideological inconsistency (and consequent effective freedom to govern). Impeachment and other confrontations with the legislature appear more likely under these Presidents (Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton for example.) However many of them have served two terms. But, just as Clinton sought a “legacy,” many of this type of President try to find an over-arching issue with which to define their Presidency.

As for methodology, I have no idea how this argument works. I probably should have read his original book, The Politics Presidents Make, but it seems intuitively strong. The patterns appear to hold up. Impeachments and wars of choice are not, as Skowronek says, randomly distributed.

How does this help me for my thesis?

Notes: There have been 44 presidents, but this list excludes Presidents who served a very short time (such as William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor, along with Gerald Ford who was an anomaly.) The modern vice presidency began with Mondale, since then every vice president has played a significant role. Quayle however is not considered a significant policy player, although objectively he was more involved then the vast majority of vice presidents that preceded him. Of the modern vice presidents he played the least significant role. Vice Presidents who played substantial roles prior to Mondale include Martin Van Buren, Henry A. Wallace, and Richard Nixon. Rockefeller played a substantial role, but is not included since the Ford presidency is an anomaly.

The n here is far too small for any statistical significance, but do any patterns appear?

Reconstructive and pre-emptive presidents would appear most likely to make use of their vice presidents, while the presidencies in periods of disjunction and articulation (is there some irony that the two Bushes had presidencies of articulation?) appear least likely to give their VPs opportunities. But, pre-emptive Presidents include Nixon who actually despised Agnew (despite Nixon’s own opportunities as VP under Eisenhower.) Meanwhile Presidents in periods of disjunction include Jimmy Carter, who initiated the modern vice presidency with Mondale. Presidents in periods of articulation include Bush 43, who gave his vice president the most expansive policy role of any VP.

The item most relevant from Skowronek’s schema is that Reconstructive presidents appear most likely to give their VPs a policy role. The great monadnock of the pre-modern vice presidency was Martin Van Buren, who had been Andrew Jackson’s top political operative and was a member of Jackson’s kitchen cabinet. The next significant VP (with the limited exception of John Nance Garner who did some lobbying for FDR, before turning against him) was Henry A. Wallace who ran a 3000-person agency for a bit over a year – for FDR. This does reflect an important point – these presidents were powerful enough that they could select their VPs, rather than having the party force someone onto the ticket to satisfy the opposing wing. Most VPs were clear rivals to the President and kept far away from the White House.

Outsider Presidents refers to Presidents who are not DC insiders. Carter highlighted the phenomenon (although Eisenhower before him wasn’t a career DC politician). Except for Bush 41, every President from Carter on has been an outsider. I’ve written on this before, but there is a strong correlation between outsider Presidents and Vice Presidential influence and opportunity. However, for my purposes, there doesn’t appear to be any particular correlation between types of presidency and insider/outsider status.

I’m not sure if Skowronek’s thesis has much direct impact on my work – but it raises profound questions. The first is whether my thesis is worth doing at all. Skowronek argues that structural factors define presidencies. Bureaucratic politics would argue that the machinations of individuals matters a great deal in shaping outcomes. Fundamentally, my thesis is routed in Neustadt: Presidents need to look like they know what they are doing to be effective and VPs can be helpful, both as advisors and messengers. Clever use of a vice president can be a force multiplier for the president.

Even if Skowronek’s specific argument does not hold, what of the importance of structural factors in shaping a Presidency? For starters, “It’s the economy, stupid.” If the economy tanks just before an election a President will probably lose, whereas if the economy does well the President is likely to be popular. Presidents can do some things to affect the economy, but they are far from all-powerful. I am reminded of Voltaire’s line, “Medicine is the art of humoring the patient while nature cures the disease.”

Under those circumstances, is there any purpose in studying the presidency, if the outcome of the game is shaped by broader, structural factors?

My “gut” response is that it is impossible to ignore the vast power of the presidency itself. Even very weak presidents can often get what they want – and this goes doubly in national security policy where the President has a dominant role. Jimmy Carter, a politically weak and unskilled President, still obtained Senate approval on the Panama Canal Treaty. There was no major constituency supporting this treaty domestically and if anything it was politically unpopular. It was a real foreign policy achievement (regardless of its merits – we are studying process here.) However, Carter later admitted that he didn’t do much of anything else while working on this. How did the President decide to focus on this issue, and what was not achieved because of this focus. Bush 43, at the lowest ebb of his Presidency still had the unquestioned authority to order the troop surge into Iraq.

There are numerous examples of costly Presidential failures as well. Maybe American politics made the Vietnam war inevitable under LBJ – but Bay of Pigs was not. Nixon did not have to have Watergate and a stronger policy process could have prevented Iran-Contra (although Reagan’s political strength saved him from impeachment.) Bush 43, of course, could have reacted competently to Katrina – there is no question he had the authority, he had a poor process in which the issue was lost in the shuffle. I recently reviewed a fine book on non-kinetic counter-terror measures that the US should deploy. I observed that there was nothing preventing the Bush administration from deploying many of them except that its decision-making process was dominated by the conduct of the war in Iraq and by immediate counter-terror measures.

It is extremely difficult to accept that argument that presidential choice and intervention is without significance. Yes, the US economy boomed in the 1990s and Clinton was well positioned to achieve push NAFTA forward. Nonetheless, his skill in doing so contributed to the boom, as did his careful management of relations with Russia. Only Nixon could go to China – but there was nothing inevitable about the trip. It still required political vision to conceive of it and political acumen to carry it off without

Bigger picture, northern victory in the Civil War and US victory in WWII seem inevitable – particularly due to the massive economic advantages the US possessed. But were they truly? Could a President less capable then Lincoln have held the Union together? What if Grant had been killed at Vickburg and Lincoln continued to be saddled with inept generals. Theoretically the southern army still would have been worn down even if it won every single battle. But would the north have tolerated another two years of bloody fighting?

Not every President is Lincoln, but every President has a fair amount off autonomy and can get a substantial portion of what he wants. He can’t have all of it. Supposedly FDR said of Lincoln, “He was the saddest man there ever was. He wanted it all and couldn’t have it. No one can.” Even the greats face limits. At the same time, even the weakest Presidents (the Carters and Hoovers) can achieve some useful things if they so choose.

The question is how to choose and maximize these opportunities? Put another way, can .275 hitter, buy careful study and diligence improve his batting eye and hit .285 (alternately can .300 hitter who is lazy and unfocused only end up hitting .290)?

This brings up an important point that Neustadt and Skowronek seem to have in common. Presidents need to control the narrative. Reagan and Lincoln, among others, were great storytellers. Neustadt discusses it in terms of reputation and prestige. Skowronek notes that Reagan and Lincoln seemed like such effective communicators because the politics of their times in effect made us ready to listen. Nixon and Clinton were both effective pre-emptive Presidents – one was an exceptional communicator and one was not. The most important thing for a Presidential legacy is to seem to know what you are doing and this is achieved by controlling the narrative. Real world events can limit this – if the economy bottoms out or there is a military defeat, it is awfully tough to “spin.”

What About Vice Presidents?
Much of what I have written questions the extent to which specific Presidents are masters of their destiny. If the President’s own skill determines very little then vice presidential activity matters less. Can Vice Presidents help expand (or reduce) the areas where Presidents can successfully exercise their authority (either by giving the President advice or by serving as a messenger to the bureaucracy, the public, or foreign governments)? If it is all structural, then probably not. But, at least on the margins it must make some difference – for better or for worse.