Verification, Implementation and Compliance

Iran and the Board of Governors

2011-11-17T10:27:00.001Z

Cross-posted from the VERTIC blog.

By Hugh Chalmers, Andreas Persbo and Sonya Pillay.

When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meet this week, the 35 member-state representatives will have some important decisions to make. Last Tuesday’s IAEA report on Iran has yet again stirred intense debate over the nature of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and the appropriate policy responses. While certain states may advocate particular responses to the disclosures contained in this document, ultimately the appropriate multilateral response will come through the Board of Governors. In the light cast by the clear and detailed case against Iran contained within the Director General’s report, what could or should the Board of Governors do?

Thankfully, both the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council are well practiced at responding to revelations concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. Over the last eight years, the Board has adopted ten resolutions in relation to safeguards in Iran. Over the past five, the UN Security Council has similarly adopted six resolutions on Iran, including demands to halt enrichment and reprocessing activities, and extensive economic sanctions. This latest report demonstrates however that the IAEA still has “serious concerns regarding the possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is clear that the multilateral approach up to now has neither arrested the development of Iran’s enrichment activities, nor prompted Iran to bridge the daunting gap in confidence between itself and the IAEA.

It is therefore worth considering whether last Tuesday’s report contains new, reliable and compelling information which could form the basis of a new strategy from the IAEA Board of Governors.

Old information in a new box?
For the Board of Governors, some aspects of the new report will make for familiar reading. In particular, the pages which cover the results of recent IAEA safeguards inspection activities at declared facilities in Iran. Physical inventory verification (PIV) and design information questionnaire (DIQ) verification activities, which are the bread-and-butter of Agency verification activities, give no indication of undeclared nuclear activities. This is not surprising, given that the safeguards system is not designed to reveal evidence of covert nuclear weapons programmes. In respect to nuclear materials, however, the system works fine. The Director-General summarises that the Agency “continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material”. From this perspective, Agency safeguards have successfully verified one fundamental aspect of declared Iranian activity; their correctness.

However, it is unable to provide “credible assurance” that these declarations are complete. Again, this makes for familiar reading. Iran has previously omitted important nuclear-related materials and activities from its declarations (see GOV/2003/75). However, the Agency has yet to acquire sufficient information from Iran, through either existing safeguards agreements or ad-hoc arrangements, to allay fears that Iran still hides aspects of its nuclear programme.

While Iran withholds information, the Agency has acquired information from a number of other sources which only heightens their concerns. This information indicates that Iran has indeed been attempting to develop undeclared pathways to nuclear material production and use, and that these activities may even be militarily related. Further information regarding non-nuclear activities such as missile R&D, explosive testing and neutron source development has catalysed international fears that Iran has been, and could still be, pursuing nuclear weapons.

Although these fears are also familiar to the Board of Governors, the manner in which they are communicated in the new report will seem completely unfamiliar. For the first time, the accumulated information on the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme has been clearly and systematically laid out in a 15-page Annex to the report.

The majority of the detail contained within this annex has been accumulated by the Agency over a period of time from a number of different sources, and does not necessarily represent new information.

For instance, information relating to the manufacturing of undeclared uranium metals, the testing of high explosive lenses and the re-design of missile re-entry vehicles was provided to the Agency by a member state in 2005. Ten other member states have also provided the Agency with further intelligence regarding suspicious procurement activities. Aspects of this multi-source, shared intelligence have since made their way into open sources.

It is rather ironic that Iran itself has played a part in providing suspicious information to the IAEA. Between 2003 and 2006, Iran was forced to acknowledged that it had had contact with intermediaries of a clandestine nuclear supply network, and that this network had supplied procedures for producing uranium metals and enriched uranium metal hemispheres. Iran subsequently claimed that these procedures were supplied unsolicited. Finally, the Agency itself has collected evidence through open sources, satellite imagery, interviews and importantly through the safeguards activities it conducts in Iran.

Information validation in question?
Having drawn from such a variety of sources, the Agency goes to some length to describe how they concluded that the accumulated information is credible. The report states that the body of evidence has been “carefully and critically examined” and meetings have been held with states who have shared intelligence ascertain the reliability of sources. According to the Agency, despite comprising a large volume of information gleaned from a variety of sources, the evidence is “consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organisations involved, and time frames”. It is clear that considerable effort has been made to assess not only the reliability of the sources, but also the consistency of the information.

This does not necessarily mean that the information presented is infallible or undisputed. Indeed, although Iran has acknowledged certain elements of the information, and claims to have successfully addressed the Agency’s concerns, Tehran rejects the more incriminating aspects as either forgeries or fabrications. The inclusion of a large amount of information from member states to some extent prevents these accusations from being entirely rebuffed. The IAEA itself has only been able to directly examine small portions of the original sources, and Iran has not been able to examine any. Theoretically, the consistency that seems key to the Agency’s assessment of credibility is simple to achieve if sources are either forged or fabricated.

Unfortunately, while Iran continues to withhold information requested by the Agency, and without the extra verification tools provided by the Additional Protocol, the Agency has few other information sources available. When one considers their nuclear mandate, the Agency’s access to, and use of, information relating to non-nuclear activities also becomes debatable. In particular, activities such as the development of detonators, the testing of explosive initiators, and the design of missile re-entry vehicles are not strictly nuclear-related. Here the Agency points out that although these activities do not relate directly to nuclear materials, there are few plausible explanations which do not ultimately lead to the development of a nuclear weapon.

This leaves the Agency in a bit of a bind. The information that they can collect through safeguards agreements and other Agency activities may be contemporary and simple to assess, but without full Iranian disclosure it can also be innocuous. Information acquired from member states may be potent, but when assessing the source is challenging, drawing conclusions from this information alone is risky. Finally, it is debatable whether or not the Agency has the authority to investigate activities that are not strictly related to nuclear activities.

Given the Agency’s limited ability to collect fresh information, it is not surprising that the report does not draw conclusions as to the present state of Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, as Mark Hibbs has noted in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, the Agency stops short of accusing Tehran of “masterminding” a secret nuclear programme. The Agency is certainly aware that establishing the credibility of their information is highly important, and it has gone to great lengths to achieve this. In fact, they reportedly went as far as calling telephone numbers written on some of the documents. The numbers checked out. While accusations of fraud and fabrication will likely remain, the onus is now more than ever on Tehran to provide more information to defend their case.

Information authenticity in an age of deception
During the Second World War, the Soviet Union successfully deployed, some would say mastered, the operational art of military deception. One of their main conclusions were that successful strategic deception depended entirely on the thoroughness of preparations on the tactical level. Both movement security, but above all communications discipline, had to be stringently enforced. But it was more than that. David Glantz argues in his book ‘Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War’ that the Germans had themselves to blame for falling for the Soviet tricks. The German High Command based their decisions on prejudice about the strength and competence of their enemy, in part due to bad pre-war estimates of Soviet strength.

In this case, however, the body of IAEA evidence points to a number of troubling conclusions. First, that the Iranian government established their nuclear program with a weapons purpose in mind. Second, that most of the weapons work may have stopped because the programme was exposed. And third, that some of the weapons work may be on-going. While all of this has been said before, the technical annex puts it all in a rather uncompromising new light.

The gravity of these conclusions are such that decisions on war and peace may hang in the balance. Such matters should, as the Germans found out during the Second World War, not be decided on prejudice and flawed intelligence. More intelligence is needed, and the Board of Governors has a critically important role to play.

In past resolutions on Iran’s nuclear programme, the Board has urged the Iranian government to comply with its own resolutions on the matter, as well as those issued by the UN Security Council. In addition, the Board has urged Iran to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. To this end, they have asked the government to cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing such access and information that the Agency requests to resolve these issues. The Board has also asked Iran, perhaps too politely, to fully implement its Additional Protocol, and adhere to other technical instruments that would turn up the flow of safeguards information. These calls are important, and should be reiterated.

In addition, however, the role of the IAEA Secretariat needs to be clarified. In our own view, the Board ought to give its secretariat a clear mandate to investigate weaponization issues. This includes looking into how Iranian nuclear research relates to the development of high explosives, as well as the relationship with potential means of delivery. It also includes fully engaging with other organizations, for instance the CTBTO, on matters such as indicators of nuclear test site preparations.

The (temporary) fall of the safeguards resolution

2011-09-28T12:59:00.001+01:00

Cross posted from the VERTIC blog.

As some may have noticed, last week’s IAEA General Conference ended without member states being able to agree on a safeguards resolution. Reuters put the blame on some member states, quoting two Western envoys. This story was picked up by Global Security Newswire on 27 September. While there is some truth to the story, it doesn’t pick up on all the complexities of the debate.

I followed the safeguards discussion for at least three years, during a time when there was no problem for non-governmental delegates to attend. In fact, I remember being pulled into the room by a colleague from an important Western state who said, “all the action is in this room, and the rest of the conference is boring”.

It was a quiet time, not many non-governmental organizations were roaming the hallways, and the only non-IAEA colleague I can remember was Mark Hibbs, who then worked at Platts Nuclear Fuels. For the last two years, however, I have been too busy with bilateral meetings and those other matters that take up a director’s time. Since then, I have lost touch with the people in that room (for they were always the same crowd) and their mission to come up with the perfect formula.

Now, I understand the Secretariat, pushed by a few member states, has become much stricter in controlling access to this room. This is unfortunate, since it allows for subjectively biased information to appear unchallenged in the open domain. In addition, some of our younger colleagues have also been ejected rudely from the rooms in a way that, if these young friends have recollected correctly, has reflected badly on the Secretariat. Indeed, less discontent – not more – is needed in the hallways of the M-building. And while I hope that this is not a continuing trend, my intuition tells me attitudes will become worse before they become better.

But let’s go back to the safeguards resolution. Over the years, the main struggle has principally been between states who wish to reflect and promote the development of a stronger safeguards standard, and those who want to block collective support of this. Indeed, earlier in the week, there was even a tendency by a minority to resist the idea of “information driven safeguards”. There is also resistance against any language that hints that the Additional Protocol may become the new safeguards standard. That intrusiveness is not welcomed, nor thought needed, by all states. This division was reflected in the safeguards resolution.

Indeed, the debate may be at its fiercest in this little room at the General Conference, but the shockwaves can be felt beyond its walls, for instance throughout the NPT Review Conference cycle. Anyone examining the final document of last year’s conference will find scars of this disagreement running throughout. The discussions in Austria are not new, and the outcome, frankly, not that surprising.

So, disarmament language may have been one source of discontent this year, but it is not the main battle ground, and I dare say that it will not be for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the objection to including disarmament language, and I remember such language being suggested more than two years ago, is mostly procedural. The safeguards resolution ought to deal with safeguards matters, the argument goes. Other roles of the IAEA should be dealt with through other means. True, there is a minority of nuclear weapon states that may resist the inclusion on substantial grounds (and I think we know who they are), but their views have never been fully articulated. There are also those that believe that nuclear disarmament indeed falls under the Agency’s safeguards mandate. After all, the IAEA Statute refers to “safeguarded worldwide disarmament”. Also, the mandate in Article III.A.5 does not exclude an Agency role in safeguarding weapons usable material. On the contrary, it seem to foresee it.

Personally, though, I agree with the first view. Over the years, the word safeguards have come to mean instruments deployed mostly in non-nuclear weapon states. Its usage has been strongly associated with non-proliferation. Altering the meaning now is bound to lead to resistance, and perhaps confusion.

In addition, the safeguards resolution is already too clumsy, too long, too vague, and too meaningless to matter that much. After a long preamble, one would expect to find some exciting operative language. Alas, the resolution simply continues with more preamble language, making the entire document one long tiring list of ideals, soft welcoming statements, with one or two twists embedded for show. As the years have passed, revisions have been added to revisions, suggestions interbred with suggestions, and confusion squared with confusion. I stopped reading it some time ago and I’m not surprised that some Agency officials just shrugged at its absence this year.

Some will see this is a great setback. Others, to paraphrase a close colleague in Vienna, will simply see this as an accurate reflection of the state of affairs and the divergence of views in the house. I see this is a great opportunity.

It would be wise for those who care deeply about the Agency to use the coming year to rework the resolution into a text that is cleaner and more reflective of state views. Most delegates in the safeguards resolution working group are passionate supporters of the Agency, and its role. It would also be sensible by those same delegates to think of ways in which the debate on the Agency’s role in broader verification is allowed to flow freely throughout the corridors of its General Conference.

Verification conference

2011-07-19T16:56:00.000+01:00

Richard Burge, the Chief Executive of Wilton Park, has posted a small piece on the verification conference that our respective outfits held back in June. We only convened for three days, but it was a quite intensive experience nevertheless.

I can only agree with Richard’s conclusion below, that ‘If the means of conducting verification are not integral to the construction of a treaty, and if the measurements are not agreed before the treaty is signed, then at worst failure or at best ineffectiveness is the likely end result’.

Verification provisions do not need to be fool-proof. Even relatively modest detection probabilities can serve as a deterrent for states contemplating bending the rules. However, that’s just part of the equation. The verification regime itself provides the treaty with focus and a sense of commonality. Without such regimes, treaty implementation may drift as political attention wanders off.

I am personally looking forward to working with Richard and his very capable team in the years to come.

Below cross-posted from the FCO's Wilton Park Blog.

An absence of trust; the peril of ignoring the verification of treaties

Richard Burge, Chief Executive, writes:

This may come as a bit of a shock, but you simply cannot rely on some nations to do what they agree to in international treaties or what they promise at global conventions. So we need to check. Apart from the fact that nations may feel slighted if their word is not taken on trust, surely this is a simple exercise. As we have found out at Wilton Park, verification is complicated. We have also realised that without effective and scientifically robust verification, confidence in treaties can be compromised or undermined. This is true for obligations that derive from socially-based treaties as much as those from a science-base. It is disarmament, especially that associated with weapons of mass destruction where most experience has been gained in what sort of verification works and how your prepare for it.

At a recent conference, we brought together “verifiers” (a modern profession but you wonder if Chaucer had been able to have written The Verifiers Tale, would we be further along this path) who worked across the range of treaties where verification is essential; biological weapons, whale conservationists, carbon emission specialists, political economists, and auditors. The commonality of their skills, their techniques and their problems were astonishing.

But what struck me most, as an inexpert observer, was a single dominant and common factor. If the means of conducting verification are not integral to the construction of a treaty, and if the measurements are not agreed before the treaty is signed, then at worst failure or at best ineffectiveness is the likely end result. Alas, in the political rush to agree treaties in order to stop an on-coming disaster or to forestall an impending conflict, we often leave the verification process to be resolved at a later date. And when that later date is reached, those who did not want the treaty in the first place or for whom the failure to deliver treaty obligations is a matter of nation convenience, can finally have their way.

The Syria Probe

2011-05-26T14:51:00.001+01:00

Cross-posted from VERTIC's blog.

Director-General Amano has recently given an interview stating that Syria may indeed have built a nuclear reactor. In an interview with Reuters, he has at a minimum said that he has ‘information that indicates that this is the case’. Some speculated that this means the Secretariat is preparing to have the country reported to the UN Security Council. The Agency’s recently released report on the country (GOV/2011/30), however, is ambiguous.

Most in the non-proliferation community know the story by now. Israel bombed a site in September 2007. Suspicions soon arose that the site might have hosted a graphite-moderated natural-uranium fuelled reactor. Eventually, The International Atomic Energy Agency, which at first did not comment on the event, was allowed to look into the matter in June 2008. This was long after the Syrian authorities—in literal cover-up—had demolished the ruins, removed all debris, sent it off or buried it and scraped away some soil to top it all off.

The Agency’s inspectors, strolling around the site in the hot Syrian summer, took samples from an area just outside the cleared site. The results were telling: particles of anthropogenic (processed) natural uranium, graphite, and stainless steel. The presence of this material strongly suggested the vanished site had been a reactor, and possibly that fuel was present. The latter is uncertain, as Syria has no known fuel fabrication plant, but possible. Israeli officials, speaking to VERTIC on condition of anonymity, have all stressed the reactor was close to operational status, and have suggested that fuel was ready to be loaded into the reactor. The Syrians have claimed the natural uranium comes from Israeli munitions.

The IAEA has tried to engage with the Syrian government. Letters have been exchanged but the country’s authorities have not been forthcoming. The government has stonewalled any requests about, among other matters, technical documentation related to the construction of the building.

Syria’s attempt to cover up has complicated on-site inspections. However, the overhead imagery, released several years ago, and supplemented by authenticated ground images of the site, together forms a convincing body of evidence. This body has been convincing enough for many to argue that the burden of proof now lies with the Syrian government.

The latest IAEA report now firmly puts the onus on the Syrians. A careful analysis of overhead imagery, a technical analysis of the water piping arrangement supporting the building as well as an assessment of electrical supplies, all points, in the IAEA’s assessment, to the building being a clandestinely built reactor.

As for the uranium, the IAEA ‘has not been able to determine the origin of the particles’. Many suggestions have been offered, including the supply of fresh fuel from North Korea. But so far, few convincing hypothesises has been brought to the table. The existence of an undeclared fuel manufacturing plant cannot be ruled out.

On balance, the IAEA infers the reactor was ‘very likely’ a nuclear reactor, and so should have been declared to the Agency under articles 42 and 43 of Syria’s safeguards agreement.

The problem with very likely violations
The language in the Director-General’s report puts the Board of Governors in a difficult place. The report does not contain any firm recommendations—it does not even firmly state that the Secretariat finds itself unable to verify that all nuclear material in the country remains in peaceful use. Instead, the secretariat simple notes the ‘very likely’ former presence of a clandestine nuclear facility in one of its member states. Governors wishing to argue for stronger measures against Syria will find them faced with a predictable counter-argument. A violation has not been confirmed, after all, it is simply likely. ‘And by the way’, the opposing side might argue, ‘the report contains nothing on whether nuclear material has been diverted’. Most governors will probably scratch their heads, thinking the report does not add much to the state of knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, about Syria’s nuclear programme.

It is now up to the Board to assess the Director-General’s report and decide what to do with it. In my mind, there are three choices: call a special inspection, refer the case direct to the UN Security Council, or do nothing.

Calling the inspection…

Some have been calling on the IAEA to call for a special inspection in Syria, which undoubtably would raise the diplomatic stakes (see Special Inspections, 4 March 2011).

For sure, calling a special inspection, or referring Syria to the Security Council in some other manner, would be problematic for the country, which is already facing unilateral sanctions by the United States. However, it is doubtful that the inspection call would be dealt with at once by the ministries in Damascus. The government is in all likelihood focussed on the domestic situation, which has been decaying steadily over the last few months. And even if it were not, it is not likely to play along with the request. It would first try to stall it for as long as it could. It would then either do as North Korea, break off any attempts to enforce the inspection, or engage in a piecemeal fashion, as it has already.

On the other hand, modern on-site inspection techniques (especially so environmental sampling) has yielded impressive detection rates. Syria would need to be convinced that the inspection team will not find any rouge particles, mislaid documentation, or errant memory sticks loaded with North Korean designs anywhere.

…going straight to the Council…

Going straight to the Council is theoretically possible. It may also be the preferred choice for many governments seeking to increase the pressure on Damascus. Syria’s actions against its own people have made most states open to the direct action route. However, it is not without its difficulties. Some would argue that it makes no sense to go to the Council as long as the Secretariat still has authority to continue the probe. They would also reiterate that no violation has been proved, simply a likely one. Others are likely to challenge the Secretariat’s conclusions on technical grounds.

Syria still has regional friends, who would not want to see the country censored in an international forum. The question is how many friends it may have left. As the repression of the Syrian people intensifies, the country is finding itself increasingly isolated, and increasingly vulnerable. For sure, being censured by the United Nations as a country that seeks weapons of mass destruction, on top of one that violates fundamental human rights, will not be in Damascus best interests. As well as piling up the international pressure, and perhaps even fuelling domestic dissent, it will make the task to recover the country’s lost standing difficult. It may be that the Board would want to exploit this window of vulnerability. The threat of stepped up diplomatic censure may force Damascus to play along with the inspection process, at least for a while.

…or doing nothing.

The final alternative would be to decide to be undecided. This is likely if the Board debate becomes exceptionally fractured and divisive. The so-called Vienna spirit has been badly damaged in later years, and attempts to rebuild it have been lackluster at best. Some governors might feel that Syria isn’t worth the row—even if the site was a nuclear reactor, and that is ‘very likely’ after all, it doesn’t pose much of a threat anymore. So why bother?

The problem, however, is not what we know, but what we don’t know. While we know that the Syrian reactor has vanished from the face of the Earth, we do not have any further understanding on what else might hide in the Syrian desert. This might be one compelling reason to act.

Another reason is more diffuse, and relates to the credibility of the non-proliferation regime as a whole. If no action is taken, it would be argued, Syria’s actions will show that it is possible to openly flout the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to turn its back to the safeguards regime, without reaction. And this, some would argue, is not a good signal to send to other potential seekers of the Bomb.

Centrifuge disclosure illustrates value of Additional Protocol

2011-05-04T19:04:00.001+01:00

Our intern Mikael Shirazi has written an excellent piece on a recently disclosed Iranian centrifuge manufacturing facility and the case for the Additional Protocol which this gives raise to. It very nicely illustrates how the IAEA’s knowledge of the full fuel cycle deteriorates with time.

Copied and pasted from the VERTIC website:

The recently-disclosed existence an Iranian manufacturing facility involved in the production of centrifuge components for uranium enrichment serves as a useful illustration of the verification problems associated with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme. Whilst not a breach of its duties under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the revelation does not build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear program and illustrates the value of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol in allaying proliferation concerns.

TABA
At a 7 April press conference in Washington, DC, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) exposed the role of the TABA plant in producing centrifuge parts for Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment programme. According to the NCRI, TABA manufactures ‘casing, magnets, molecular pumps, composite tubes, bellows, and centrifuge bases’ primarily for the current generation of machines—but also for emerging next-generation centrifuges.

The NCRI further claimed that the plant had been operating for almost five years and had already produced parts for over 100,000 centrifuge machines—though a number of analysts appear sceptical of this high figure. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi responded soon afterwards by confirming the existence of the site and its involvement in centrifuge production, but he denied that any attempts had been made to deliberately disguise its use. ‘It is in no way secret’, he said. ‘There are plenty of factories in the country that manufacture equipment needed by the Bushehr power plant and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’.

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Tehran's envoy to the IAEA, also refuted any allegations of concealment, pointing out that no provisions in the NPT’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) requires such manufacturing installations to be monitored and that ‘the NPT merely requires inspection of centrifuge machines.’ Despite these protestations, doubts concerning Iran’s commitment to openness on these issues continue. According to the satellite images provided by the NCRI (as the only evidence for their claims), TABA is located in a nondescript industrial park roughly 80 miles from Tehran and has few distinguishing features. The facility’s generic name—a Farsi abbreviation of ‘Towlid Abzar Boreshi Iran’, meaning ‘Iran Cutting Tools Company’—also gives little away. Such a lack of distinguishing features raises concerns about the ease with which these facilities may be set up covertly, subsequently diverting sensitive equipment to other secret nuclear sites in pursuit of a clandestine weapons program. Which begs the question: how much about Iran’s centrifuge production capabilities is actually known?

Centrifuge manufacturing in Iran
Most information that is publicly available on the uranium enrichment programme was gathered between November 2004 and February 2006, when Iran agreed to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol on a voluntary basis, granting far more intrusive access than was provided by its CSA (to which it has since reverted). This information, in turn, was dated to the period before late 2003, at which point the nuclear programme was suspended for three years after the revelation of its existence internationally. (TABA was reportedly established after February 2006—that is, after Iran turned its back on its Additional Protocol.)

According to a report by proliferation expert David Albright, based on the IAEA investigations, the two central organisations involved were Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), which was primarily in charge of development and testing, and the Defence Industries Organization (DIO), which was primarily in charge of manufacturing and assembly.

The AEOI conducted most of its testing operations before 2002 through a company named Kalaye Electric, originally a clock factory which it acquired in the 1990s. It is believed since 2002 to be producing component parts. Much like TABA, a generic name (which translates as ‘Electric Goods Company’) and nondescript facilities in an industrial park obscured its purpose. Kalaye was the primary tester and developer of the current ‘P-1’ generation of centrifuges, and is now also believed to be working on more advanced designs. Farayand Technique, a subsidiary of Kalaye, conducted quality control activities for centrifuge parts such as rotors, and made and assembled parts of the centrifuge’s bottom bearing. Another subsidiary, Pars Trash (originally an automobile part factory), manufactured the thick aluminium tubes which encase centrifuge machines.

Since 2002, centrifuge development, testing and assembly operations have been directed from the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, which also houses Iran’s primary uranium enrichment site. The DIO conducted its manufacturing operations mostly via 7th of Tir Industries, a well-guarded complex in Esfahan which was also involved in missile production. Here, around 20 important rotating centrifuge parts were produced, including the bellows critical to the Iranian P-1 design. Another DIO contractor, Khorasan Metallurgy Industries and its subsidiary Kaveh Cutting Tools Complex, made simpler stationary P-1 components such as its scoops and molecular pumps. The DIO-affiliated Sanam Electronic Industry Group was another facility involved in centrifuge production in an unspecified capacity. An unnamed father-and-son workshop in Tehran also made the P-1 motor, a relatively simple part comparable to that of a vacuum cleaner. In addition to Albright’s list, two other institutions have been mentioned in this regard.

In August 2006, after Iran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol, the NCRI claimed another company had been set up identified by the acronym TSA—or ‘Iran Centrifuge Technology Company’ in English. TSA had apparently absorbed the staff and facilities of Farayand Technique and Pars Trash, and is currently on the British WMD End-Use Control Export List. Another company, Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co., was sanctioned in Annex III of UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008) for being ‘involved in the production of centrifuge components’, though in what capacity is not elaborated by the resolution. The Annex likewise included Khorasan Metallurgy and Sanam Electronic. A prior resolution, number 1737 (2006), also included the AEOI, DIO, Kalaye Electric, Farayand Technique, Pars Trash and 7th of Tir in its sanctions regime.

Deteriorating understanding
We can now add to this list the TABA facility as a known production centre—but it is unlikely that this discovery alone will be particularly helpful in understanding Iran’s centrifuge production capacity. The information sketched out above shows how, prior to 2003, this capacity consisted of a network of very small-to-medium sized facilities spread across Tehran and other cities. Such a system allows for the diversification and dispersal of facilities, making detection (and, perhaps not incidentally, destruction) more difficult. It may be that such a network still exists today, with TABA as only one cog in the machine. Furthermore, the above list was out of date even as Albright compiled it in 2008. The interrelationship between these entities is now unclear (as is whether they still function at all), and the possible existence of TSA and other companies exemplifies the difficulty of gathering reliable information on an industry where relatively small workshops in unremarkable buildings can play an important part in the manufacturing process. Names can be changed, and equipment can be transported and set up relatively quickly.

Though it is not publicly known what further information has been gathered by foreign intelligence agencies, it would seem that International Atomic Energy Agency’s understanding of Iran’s centrifuge production complex is relatively poor, and deteriorating as time passes from Iran’s termination of its adherence to the Additional Protocol. This lack of knowledge offers the Iranian authorities the possibility—should they so choose—of secretly sending centrifuges to a hidden enrichment installation to produce weapons grade fissile material. It is a possibility that unsettles many governments, and recent announcements of the development of more efficient centrifuge designs will do nothing whatsoever to assuage their concerns.

The IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, which some reports suggest are able to enrich uranium at up to five times the rate of the P-1, appear to have moved to an advanced testing phase at the PFEP. If they enter into mass production, this could mean fewer centrifuges would be needed at a smaller secret site to produce fissile material, or they could shorten the time in which this can be accomplished.

Establishing a sound understanding of the Iranian centrifuge production would help to build international confidence in the ostensibly peaceful nature of its nuclear program, by ensuring that all equipment produced is used appropriately. Iran has correctly indicated that under the current verification regime—a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement signed with the IAEA in 1974—there is no strict obligation to declare centrifuge production facilities. The 1974 agreement largely focuses on nuclear material accountancy, and guarantees IAEA access only to those facilities through which such material passes. This includes reactors, conversion plants, fabrication plants, reprocessing plants, isotope separation plants, separate storage installations, or any location where significant amounts of nuclear material is customarily used—but there are no requirements regarding centrifuge production facilities.

By contrast, the information detailed above was almost entirely gathered via the provisions in the Additional Protocol, which Iran has signed but not ratified and to which it temporarily adhered between November 2004 and February 2006. The Model Additional Protocol specifies in Article 2.a.(iv) that the participating state must provide the IAEA with a description of the scale of operations involved in centrifuge production. According to Annex I, this means the manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges. This is further detailed in Annex II, which describes the various components that function with centrifuges: for example, rotor assemblies, rotor tubes, bellows, baffles, top and bottom caps, magnetic suspension bearings, molecular pumps, motor stators, centrifuge housings, and scoops, among others. The Additional Protocol therefore constitutes a much more robust mechanism with regards to those verification difficulties currently experienced in Iran, and its restoration would be the most reliable way to shed light on the issue.

BWC Verification: This is not the time to forget the gap

2011-03-25T12:32:00.000Z

As some may have noticed, VERTIC has submitted a short piece on the the BWPP website. That's an abridged version of a longer article, which I'm reproducing here in full:

Verification and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Verification remains a missing component for a sturdy international prohibition on the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. This year, the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will hold their seventh review conference. In the lead-up to this event, key state parties may want to review their positions on whether and, if so, how this treaty could be verified.

Beyond doubt, it will be challenging to build a fool-proof verification regime. But at least the nature of the challenge is well defined. The two main questions contained in the mandate of the Ad-Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) remain valid. A verification system should be able to answer:

Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes; and
Whether a State Party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. (BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8).

It is possible to verify some aspects of compliance with a greater degree of assurance than others. For instance, verifying that a state has used a biological agent may be more difficult to verify than that a state is not stockpiling such agents. Several known verification problems persist: how can you attribute the use of a biological agent to a state? How can you ensure that the state has accurately and truthfully declared all its stocks of biological agents? These questions are not unique to biological weapons.

The primary function of a verification system is to detect instances of non-compliance. However, the system also serves other important roles: the risk of detection may deter a state from engaging in non-compliant behaviour. Indeed, experience has shown that even very low detection probabilities (in many cases less than five per cent) may act as a deterrent, if verification activities are carried out regularly. It is also important to keep in mind that the verification regime may help build confidence that the other parties are behaving in a compliant fashion.

The BWC came about after a 1969 initiative of the United Kingdom to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Their submission proposed to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Convention by putting in place a comprehensive ban on all microbiological warfare. However, reservations by the Cold War superpowers (about intrusion) resulted in the Convention being brought into force without a formal verification architecture. Article XII established that there would be a single review conference after five years. However, the practice of five-yearly review conferences has endured.

Evolving the BWC through these conferences has provided a novel response to the particular difficulties of trying to realise the objectives of the Convention. The creation of ‘functional substitutes’ to a full system of verification has led to an emphasis on, in particular, voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) that aim to increase transparency among state parties about their activities.

However, compliance concerns in the beginning of the 1990s revitalised interest in a robust verification system. As noted above, the 1991 Review Conference set up the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) (see BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8). The group met five times over two years, during which time they came up with 21 verification measures. These were grouped into two broad categories: on and off-site measures, and broadly addressed the following fields:

Information monitoring. Among other measures, this would include surveying academic literature, as well as involving surveillance on state parties legislation. It would also involve sharing data on outbreaks and outbreak control measures.
Data exchange. Often a key part of any verification regime, the data exchange would involve declarations on agents, facilities, equipment, programmes, transfers, import-export of agents, equipment, know-how, technology, personnel, and manufacturing. Obviously, some of these declarations would be more sensitive than others, and perhaps difficult to carry out in practice (here declarations on personnel and know-how stand out).
Remote sensing. Here, the group examined a whole range of measures including surveillance by satellite, by aircraft, and by equipment on the ground.
Inspections. On the ground visits by inspectors is often another key aspect of any verification regime. Here, the group looked at activities such as sampling and identification, observation and auditing.
Exchange visits. These types of visits are sometimes placed in the broader confidence-building category. It involves having scientists, industry personnel, engineers and equipment experts visiting each others facilities, often informally.
Continuous monitoring. Here, the group examined ideas such as automatic sampling and the use of close-circuit-television. But it also examined ideas such as posting inspectors on the ground, outside relevant facilities.

The final report of VEREX was broadly positive on verification, noting that ‘some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention’. It also remarked that ‘appropriate and effective verification could reinforce the Convention’. However, the group took a broad-brush approach to its study, examining individual components of a verification system, without making any real attempt to put them all together.

Nevertheless, negotiations began to establish a protocol to the BWC which would include language on verification measures. However, these negotiations collapsed in 2001 after the US withdrew from the general process as it stood. The reasons for this decision, as discussed later in this text, continue to provide key pointers for any future attempts to build a verification regime.

The sixth and most recent review conference in 2006 achieved a consensual agreement on a Final Declaration. This was the first such declaration in a decade. It put increased emphasis on national implementation and the comprehensive scope of the BWC. There was also agreement to set up an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and promote universality of the BWC. Nevertheless, verification was not directly addressed at the conference.

An intersessional work programme for 2007-2010 was adopted to renew the process that had been initiated in 2003. These meetings have moved the BWC discussions away from a traditional diplomatic approach to a more inclusive, multi-stakeholder one. This has encouraged some to view this as an opportunity for renewed focus on the verification issue (McLeish and Feakes, 2008).

However, this may still not be an opportune time to revisit verification discussions. According to most of the literature, getting agreement on verification for the BWC still faces three main hurdles:
Many of the materials and technology concerned are ‘dual use’, which means that they can be used for both civilian and military purposes. For instance, botulinum toxin has both proper medicinal uses but also has potential as a biological weapon.

The availability of suitable materials and equipment for biological weapons production makes verification difficult. Hospitals, universities, and other suitably equipped laboratories may all have the material and equipment to produce banned items.

Attribution of an act of non-compliance with the BWC is complicated by the ease with which unlawful activities can be hidden. There is no need to stockpile weapons. Biological facilities may be ‘cleaned up’ easily or disguised into seemingly peaceful centres of activity. Advances in biological science and technology are fast and often unpredictable making it tough for both law enforcement and policy-making officials to keep pace.

At present, any effort to arrive at a system of verifiable compliance as part of the BWC must be realistic about the current US position on the topic. As Ellen Tauscher announced in 2009: ‘The Obama Administration will not seek to revive negotiations on a verification protocol to the Convention. We have carefully reviewed previous efforts to develop a verification protocol and have determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security’ (Tauscher, 2009).

Tauscher’s comment reflects the view that monitoring compliance through a verification protocol may be difficult without excessive intrusion that would risk commercial and national secrets and interests. The US may also feel that a verification regime would undermine defensive programmes in their research against offensive biological weapons. However, a closer investigation of this assumption may be called for---especially against a backdrop of recent research that suggests that existing US regulations already impede research (Dias, 2010).

In addition, some nations may continue to question the range and extent of export controls as part of any system of verification. The VEREX final report pointed out that ‘agreed lists, which are difficult to construct at this stage, are a prerequisite to the implementation of many potential verification measures’ (VEREX, 1993).

The BWC may also be strengthened through recognition in other treaties and texts, and by shoring up already existing mechanisms. For instance:

Negotiations to include biological weapons as a crime under the Rome Statute have been restricted by the many sensitivities surrounding nuclear weapons. A new amendment to the Rome Statute that would clearly outlaw the use of biological weapons and strengthen, although not universalise, the BWC and thereby encourage greater attention to be paid to the continuing absence of a credible verification regime (Allen, 2011).
The UN Secretary General investigatory powers could be strengthened further. The UN Secretary General is the only one with the authority to launch an international investigation in response to claims of biological weapons use. An investigation can be undertaken following a request by a UN member state, the General Assembly, the Security Council or on the Secretary General’s own initiative. There are ways through which this tool can be further developed (Findlay and Woodward, 2004).

Until political issues are resolved, however, a modular approach to strengthening the treaty should be undertaken. This involves addressing distinct areas of weakness within the treaty---including through the continued exploration of verification measures. According to Nicholas Sims, the key priorities for the Seventh Review Conference would be to:

Renew the mandate of the ISU for a further five years;
Enhance ISU funding;
Plan the establishment of a Standing Secretariat;
Formalise a BTWC Annual Meeting;
Create a Scientific Advisory Panel;
Establish a Legal Advisory Panel;
Clearly Identify National Contacts (Sims, 2009).

However, while the convention is shored up in this gradual but steady manner, it would be a disservice to the BWC membership to outright dismiss verification considerations. The debate may have prematurely moved from the technical to the political. The verification debate is not forgotten, but it is often not seen as a suitable, or politically sensible, time to raise the issue anew. Clearly, a verification system can be conceptualized, and discussed. However, despite the work done by VEREX and other groups, the issue does not seem to be well understood. The verification debate today appears to be based on opinion. The word ‘verification’ carries with it an unjustified stigma.

Verification of the BWC has come to be seen by some as something impossible, almost unachievable. Those on that side of the debate argue that compliance cannot be verified with absolute certainty. Therefore, any system put in place only serves to lull the member states into a false sense of security. However, the same can be said about almost every verification regime in place today. Consider the debate in the Conference on Disarmament on whether a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) can be verified. Here, some argue that any verification regime will be too costly and too intrusive to be appetizing. They add seasoning to their argument by remarking that the system, indeed any system, also cannot verify compliance conclusively. Yet, this group of thinkers often also supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system---without reflecting that this system will in all likelihood form the basis for any FMCT verification regime.

Certain aspects of verification may not, in fact, be impossible. Critically examining what the verification requirements would be for development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use would be useful (essentially revisiting the mandate of the VEREX group). The BWC membership may not necessarily need to construct a protocol that adequately addresses all items and activities contained in the main prohibition. Instead, the verification system could rephrase the verification objective in another, functionally subordinate document. Again, inspiration could be drawn from the nuclear safeguards system. It ought to be recalled that no organization is verifying compliance with Article I of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, the International Atomic Energy Organization verifies compliance with their own safeguards agreements. As noted above, few query the usefulness of this---seemingly imperfect---system.

The time to discuss verification may not be here yet. But the issue should not be forgotten. Without a government debate on the matter, it remains with organizations such as the BioWeapons Prevention Project, to keep the discussion alive.

Special Inspections

2011-03-04T21:13:00.001Z

Last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Syria was widely anticipated. The country has been under suspicions of non-compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for some time. The background is well-known. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force suddenly and without warning bombed a facility in the middle of the Syrian desert. The Syrian and Israeli governments then remained surprisingly tight-lipped about the strike. The Israelis did not want to implicate an ally whose airspace they used for the strike. The Syrians seemingly only wanted to hush up the affair as quickly as possible.

For its part, the IAEA, faced with very little open-source information on the site itself and two member states who didn’t want to talk about it, did nothing to investigate the matter further. Meanwhile, the Syrians got busy clearing up the site. As the IAEA notes in its latest report: ‘by the end of October 2007, large scale clearing and levelling operations had taken place at the site which had removed or obscured the remains of the destroyed building’ (GOV/2011/8). The ‘destroyed building’ in question was widely suspected to be an uncompleted graphite-moderated natural-uranium fuelled reactor---supplied by the North Korean government no less.

It was June 2008 before the IAEA first visited the site and took samples. Later analysis showed ‘particles of anthropogenic natural uranium’ nearby, indicating the processing of uranium. It could have been natural uranium fuel---or it could have been something else. The Syrians themselves said that the Israeli Air Force used the uranium in their munitions. The IAEA is not entirely convinced by this explanation.

Since then, the Agency has repeatedly requested access to information, material, equipment and locations in Syria. Their overtures, however, have been met by silence. And this silence has led some to forcefully call for a ‘special inspection’ to be deployed into Syria. On 26 February 2009, for instance, James Acton, Mark Fitzpatrick and Pierre Goldschmidt wrote that:

‘Syria is the textbook definition of a case in which a special inspection is merited. If the IAEA fails to ask for one, it will hand future states suspected of non-compliance an extraordinarily powerful precedent to use in opposing a special inspection request. IAEA officials regularly complain about their lack of legal authority—and rightly so. But, in this instance, they will have only themselves to blame if they let the authority that they do have atrophy’ (Carnegie Endowment, Proliferation Analysis, February 2009).

Over the past year, there were few references in the media about the the need to invoke this tool. Lately, however, it would seem like diplomatic pressure is increasing on the IAEA. Indeed, in the run-up to next week’s meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, several observers have speculated that the Director-General would call for a special inspection in the country. This did not happen, as the Director-General’s recently issued report shows, and rumours are now circulating that several IAEA Governors will refrain from pushing the issue at next week’s meeting.

Special inspections
The special inspection tool itself has been around for a while. It features in the facility-specific safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/66) as well as the comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) obligatory for all non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT.

There are two principal routes to getting a special inspection agreed. First, the state itself can submit a special report, which then will have to be verified by a special inspection. Second, the IAEA may consider that information made available to it by the state (including explanations from the state as well as information gathered through routine inspections) is not adequate for it to fulfill its responsibilities under its comprehensive safeguards agreement. In the latter case, the IAEA should, in other words, have some indication that not all relevant nuclear material, or relevant facilities, in the country has been declared.

Two special inspections have been invoked to date. The first, on the invitation by the Romanian government aimed to clear up misunderstandings surrounding the country’s large nuclear fuel cycle. The second was invoked against North Korea, after information had come to light that indicated that the country had not been entirely forthcoming in its initial declaration. The IAEA so has some experience in invoking special inspections using both of the two principal routes.

Consultation is key
The special inspection tool is subject to any consultations between the IAEA and the inspected state. The Board of Governors, when deciding on the last special inspection in 1992 (North Korea, even though the inspection in question was blocked by the government in Pyongyang), reaffirmed the Agency’s right to carry out these inspections at undeclared locations. However, the agreement itself clearly stipulates that such access should be obtained in agreement with the inspected state party. If the state doesn’t agree with the Agency, paragraph 18 of INFCIRC/153 clearly lays out the procedure:

‘The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked’. (Paragraph 18).

It is very likely, at that point, that the state will not heed the Board’s call. The Board then has the option to report this fact to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. It would also notify all IAEA member states that it has been unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful use.

The techniques deployed during a special inspection are similar to those of routine inspections. The IAEA has a right to:

Examine records;
Make independent measurements of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards under the agreement;
Verify the functioning and calibration of equipment;
And use other objective measures which has been demonstrated to be technically feasible.

Calling an inspection: what to gain, what to loose?
The problem with the special inspection is that it is likely to go unheeded unless the state itself requests it (through submitting a special report). There is only one case, of course, to base this conclusion on, and that is North Korea. It still makes sense to assume that this is the likely outcome. If the state is hiding something, it will have little incentive to invite inspectors to view the very secrets it wishes to protect. It could attempt to control the special inspection, by having an elaborate deception strategy in place. If the IAEA, for instance, requests access to installations which are irrelevant, the state could even afford this access. After the fact, it can broadcast to the world that it has done everything that the IAEA have asked for---and that the Agency found nothing. But the risk is, of course, that the IAEA will know what it is looking for. And once the precedence of giving access has been set, it is very difficult to backtrack.

So, in most cases where an inspection is called against the will of the inspected state, it is likely to go straight to the Board of Governors for further action. Unless the state is under intense international pressure, a special inspection request is therefore likely to shut down the inspection effort before it has even started. This, naturally, doesn’t progress the investigation at all. A special inspection should, from that perspective, only be called if there is a reasonable chance that the state will accommodate it.

From another perspective, however, it may be desirable to call the inspection anyway. If the Director-General of the IAEA feels that there is very little room for further progress in inspections whatsoever, he may feel inclined to draw the line under the effort by invoking the inspection tool. This would, after all, signal that the Agency is close to drawing a conclusion that it can no longer certify that all materials remain in peaceful use. The special inspection request represents ‘the final offer’ from the Agency, after which the issue will be raised with the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. This threat could, possibly, act as an incentive for the stalling state to cooperate with inspectors.

IHS Jane's Intelligence Review

2011-01-21T20:31:00.001Z

Those of you who have an account with IHS may log on to their site and get access to my article on the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I decided to spend some evenings in December, just before Wilton Park, to get some thoughts down on paper. I wouldn’t call it my finest work, but it does highlight the significance of the treaty, and progress made towards its implementation.

There is one part of the article that I’m very pleased with, though. Last summer, David Cliff and Hugh Chalmers wrote a chapter on what happens inside a nuclear weapon at the time of detonation for our report Verified Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future. It became very controversial and subject to much discussion at the review seminar. Certain reviewers felt that it contained too much information, and that it shouldn’t be released to the public. We were surprised by that, since it contained nothing that cannot be found in the open domain, as most of the rest of the report.

After some internal discussion, we decided that it was probably the forceful language and the colorful description that spooked some of our guests.

I got inspired by that, so I wrote up a description, supported by a range of Excel spreadsheets, that describes what happens deep underground when one of these things goes off. It really shouldn’t have made it past the IHS editorial team (it’s not news after all), but someone involved in the review process told me that they simply liked it too much to cut it.

It is not easy to imagine how incredibly violent and immensely powerful a nuclear explosion is. I did my best.

The article will come out in the February print edition.

Wilton Park 2010

2010-12-17T16:15:00.000Z

Cross posted from the VERTIC Blog.

The annual Wilton Park conference on arms control and disarmament is always well attended. Those arriving late may find themselves without a chair. This happened to me this year, as I missed the first two days due to a series of meetings in London. However, I found the first meeting that I was able to attend very stimulating, despite having to stand up for parts of it. Truth be told, as I was standing close to a radiator on a cold day, I didn’t mind that much.

The meeting discussed how to bring about a conference on the long-proposed weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. Such a conference was promised by parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the eight review conference of the treaty, held earlier this year in New York. Then, the nuclear-weapon states promised to fully engage and support this conference.

One question discussed at Wilton Park was what, if anything, is in it for the Israeli government. ‘Israel’s strategic situation has changed’, one participant argued, ‘and it is more difficult now’ than some 15 years ago. Much of the technical groundwork has already been laid by the International Atomic Energy Agency, another participant argued, and will be transmitted to the United Nations, which is tasked at coordinating the conference, when requested and ‘together with a bill for services rendered’.

The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) was also intensively discussed, especially together with an idea that has recently been gaining traction: that the treaty should be negotiated outside of the Conference on Disarmament (the ‘CD’). What this treaty should do is subject to considerable debate. Some argue that it should cap the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, but leave accumulated stockpiles aside. Others argue that the treaty is meaningless unless it imposes some quantitative controls on existing stocks. The CD, a diplomatic conference charged with negotiating multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, has been stalled over this debate for over a decade. This has led to intense frustration, and now calls for moving negotiations to another, smaller forum.

The question at hand is whether or not this would achieve anything, and whose objectives such a move would best serve. If the intention with the proposed treaty is simply to formalize the already existing production moratorium amongst the nuclear-weapon states, this may be a good development. The majority of the P-5, as this grouping of states is sometimes called, shares the view that the treaty should look at future production, and leave the past alone. However, one of the P-5 members is reluctant to accept this as it orients itself not only in relation to the other nuclear-weapon states, but also to the other three states standing outside the NPT. The worst case scenario would be for treaty negotiations to be moved outside the CD, only to have them stall again. This could both wreck the CD, and at the same time destroy prospects for meaningful negotiations on the FMCT.

The meeting also discussed prospects for further strides towards multilateral disarmament. The goodwill generated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference seems to have faded somewhat, as the start of the session illustrated. An attempt by one nuclear-weapon state participant to explain his country’s position backfired, as others began to accuse him of attempting to revise, or downplay, the outcome of the conference. ‘You don’t need to tell me what the conference documents means’, one non-nuclear-weapon state participant forcefully argued. ‘I was there too, remember?’

In a similar way, many participants privately expressed the opinion that the debate on how to verify multilateral arms reductions felt flat and uninspired. I would not agree with that. The presentations by David Chambers and Joe Pilat were considered and thoughtful, as well as cautiously optimistic. Mr Chamber’s call for more states to get involved in multilateral disarmament verification R&D was welcomed. On behalf of VERTIC, I thanked the Atomic Weapons Establishment for our past cooperative research on the UK-Norway Initiative, which has been very fruitful.

Overall, I use Wilton Park as a way of gauging the health of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And while it is too early to tell for sure, I sense a slight retrenchment of the positions of some of the nuclear-weapon states on disarmament issues. A representative of a prominently-engaged non-nuclear-weapon state once told me over dinner in New York that the successful outcome to the NPT Review Conference had in fact been a ‘failure in disguise’. I believe that it is too early to make pronouncements of that kind. The coming years will show whether the nuclear-weapon states are serious about implementing their ‘serious political commitments’, as one ambassador put it, ‘in an accountable fashion’.

Disarmament Forum: Arms control verification

2010-10-19T14:24:00.000+01:00

This issue of Disarmament Forum takes a look at the verification of arms control agreements. How do states parties to international treaties verify compliance with their obligations? Beginning with an exploration of the crucial role science and technology—as well as scientists—play in ensuring effective verification, articles go on to examine specific regimes, including conventional arms embargoes and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Our contributors also discuss how potential future agreements on outer space and a nuclear weapons convention could be verified, as well as the growing role of civil society in ensuring compliance with international arms control agreements.

The chapter on civil society verification was written by your's truly.

Download it here (PDF, 76pp).

New VERTIC items (and a CTBTO course)

2010-10-12T17:27:00.000+01:00

We've posted some more news on our website:

We are, of course, very grateful to both organizations for the opportunity to visit. The CTBTO course looks really exciting, and I feel slightly disappointed that I cannot attend in person. Anyone who wants to learn more about the treaty and its verification regime should attend. Course components include:

Lecture 1: Political Significance of the CTBT
Lecture 2: History of Nuclear Testing
Lecture 3: Negotiating History of the CTBT: Understanding the Treaty
Lecture 4: The Contribution of the CTBT to International Peace and Security
Lecture 5: Nexus between NWFZs and the CTBT
Lecture 6: Promotion of Entry into Force & Universality
Lecture 7: Legal and National Implementation Measures
Lecture 8: The Role and Functions of the Preparatory Commission, Program & Budget and ADM Issues
Lecture 9: The Importance of Multilateral Verification for Arms Control and Disarmament
Lecture 10: Overview and Technologies of the International Monitoring System
Lecture 11: Overview of the International Data Centre
Lecture 12: The 2006 and 2009 DPRK Nuclear Tests
Lecture 14: Overview of CTBT On-Site Inspections
Lecture 15: OSI Integrated Field Exercise 2008
Lecture 16: Creating Knowledge through Partnerships, Training, and Information/Communication Technologies

This covers most of would you would want to know. So if you are interested, please apply direct to the CTBTO. Fill out this application form. Forms can be then be faxed and marked to the attention of Kevin Murray (+43 (1) 260 30 5960) or emailed (kevin.murray [at] ctbto.org).

Lasers and gamma-rays

2010-10-11T11:55:00.000+01:00

Relatively recently, Oak Ridge National Laboratory published a conference paper on how to combine measurements from a three-dimensional laser scanning system and a gamma-ray imaging system. The paper bears the unflattering title ‘Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded-Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging Systems for International Safeguards Applications’ and was presented to the INMM 51st Annual Meeting in Baltimore earlier this year.

Using lasers to verify design information has been the hot topic in the safeguards community for some time. The Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, has been doing some interesting work on this for many years now (see, for instance, 'Laser Technologies for On-Site Surveillance', IAEA-SM-367/06).

Scene change recognition will allow the inspectors to see whether piping or ducts have been modified or added. This is independently important. However, by adding gamma-ray imaging the inspectors will also be able to see whether nuclear material is or has been present in those pipes.

The results look very promising. It will be interesting to see this work carry forward. The project team now intends to couple images in real time. They also want to make this system, already portable, more efficient. Finally, they intend to conduct measurements in a real facility.

To operationalize it will likely take many years. But it's nevertheless good to see that science and technology already starts to provide the safeguards solutions of tomorrow.

UNODA Yearbook

2010-10-05T10:44:00.000+01:00

Yesterday, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs released volume 34 of the Disarmament Yearbook. The introduction is positive. "An improved political atmosphere and renewed momentum to achieve progress towards a nuclear-weapon free world prevailed in 2009", it argues, "leading to important advances, though not without some setbacks, on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues".

The book goes through diplomatic activities in the General Assembly, and action elsewhere, in support for disarmament in 2009.

Verification gets 74 mentions in the document (counting the table of contents of course) and safeguards 90 mentions. The proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, or fissile material treaty as it is interchangeably referred to in the text, also gets a fair share of attention.

New IAEA handbook on nuclear law

2010-10-04T16:55:00.001+01:00

The IAEA has recently released the second volume of its Handbook on Nuclear Law. This edition looks carefully at implementing legislation, and very usefully provides example language that states may want to use when drafting their laws. The Director-General, in the foreword to the report, writes that “many Member States receiving IAEA legislative assistance have suggested that it would be valuable to develop model texts of legislative provisions covering the key elements needed in a national nuclear law”. Importantly, he also notes that the handbook “provide only a starting point and basic outline of necessary provisions that will need to be shaped to be consistent with each State’s national approach to legislative drafting, cultural and social norms, economic structure, and the nature of its nuclear programme”.

This latter point is very important. Sometimes, states tend to rush for the easy solution, grabbing model language and just pushing it into their laws. This is often the case in resource-strapped countries without many regulated activities. This may work for a while, but may come back to bite the legislator years later, as the country gears up to build, say, a domestic nuclear fuel cycle.

Model legislation is nevertheless very important. It aims to structure thought, and to ensure that all aspects of international law get implemented properly.

The IAEA handbook has been under development for many years. I was very pleased to see it finally come out. As the old Swedish saying goes, “he who waits for something good never waits for too long”.

Trust & Verify No. 130

2010-10-01T20:32:00.001+01:00

It is time for another edition of Trust & Verify and its available here.

Individual articles are uploaded to Trust & Verify Online. These are:

Lead articles:

Hartwig Spitzer, Open Skies review
Justin Alger, Nuclear Revival: taking stock, managing concerns

Verification watch:

David Cliff, US and Russia request IAEA monitoring of plutonium disposition
Yasemin Balci, Alleged chemical weapons use by Turkey
Kara Allen, Russia unable to complete chemical weapons disarmament by 2012 deadline
Kara Allen, BWC MX discusses cooperation in cases of alleged biological weapons use
David Cliff, US nominates OPCW representative
David Cliff, IAEA reports on Iran's nuclear activities
Laurent Rathborn, European Parliament approves legislation on illegal timber

Science and technology scan:

Laurent Rathborn, First CTBT noble gas detector certified
Laurent Rathborn, LiDAR shows increasing usefulness in forest monitoring

News and events:

IAEA GC kicks off

2010-09-21T16:22:00.000+01:00

On Monday 20 September, officials from International Atomic Energy Agency member states convened in Vienna for the 54th General Conference of the international body. The annual meeting is tasked with approving the Agency’s programme of work and its budget and deciding on other matters brought before it by the Board of Governors, director-general or member states. Discussions within the conference reflect national positions on a variety of issues related to nuclear technology including nuclear verification, safety and security of nuclear materials and international technical cooperation on nuclear issues.

During the opening session, the Agency’s director-general, Yukia Amano, delivered a statement outlining the Agency’s work over the ten months since his entry into office in December last year and future challenges for agency. Mr Amano emphasised the importance of pursuing the Agency’s mandate in a ‘balanced manner.’ He said he is trying to change the widespread perception of the agency as exclusively a ‘nuclear watchdog’ only concerned with nuclear inspections and verification. As he put it, this ‘does not do justice to our extensive activities in other areas’ such as nuclear energy and technical cooperation.

In his speech, the director-general celebrated the fact that the Agency’s Additional Protocols are now in force in 102 countries. He emphasised the important role the Additional Protocols play as an ‘essential tool’ for the Agency to be able to credibly verify not only the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared material and activities. Mr Amano also announced the establishment of a new office of Safeguards and Analytical Services within the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. He also said that Construction of the Clean Laboratory at the Agency’s laboratory complex in Siebensdorf got underway in January, he said further.

With regard to the implementation of Agency safeguards, particularly with reference to Iran and Syria, the director-general stated that his approach from the beginning has been that safeguards agreements between member states and the Agency, and other relevant obligations, should be ‘implemented fully.’ He described the nuclear programme of North Korea, unsafeguarded since 2002, as a matter of ‘serious concern.’

On the proposed nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, Mr Amano reported that there has been no ‘convergence of views’ among regional states on convening a forum on the relevance of the experience of other NWFZs for establishing such a zone in the Middle East. He reported that no progress has yet been achieved. On another related resolution adopted at the General Conference last year regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities, Mr Amano noted that he has sought the views of all member states, received 44 replies, and held consultations with representatives of concerned members – especially those in the region.
A noteworthy point in Amano’s speech related to a potential role for the agency in the verification of nuclear disarmament. The last time the Agency played an active role in that regards was during the trilateral initiative between 1996-2002 when the technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States were investigated. In his speech, Mr Amano emphasised that ‘credible verification systems are vital for nuclear disarmament efforts.’ He also saw an important contribution to the Agency to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. He mentioned that the Agency recently received a joint letter from the Russian minister for foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, and the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, ‘requesting IAEA assistance to independently verify implementation of their agreement on the disposition of plutonium no longer required for defence purposes.’

In addition to the Director General, several states took the floor to give their national statements. Significantly, both Iran and the US were among states addressing the General Conference on the first day. Iran’s statement, delivered by Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Iran Atomic Organization, included strong criticism of the IAEA for its recent report on the country’s nuclear programme, which it said was not based on ‘impartiality and fairness’. And as a result, said Mr Salehi, the Agency had left itself ‘no room but to reflect the notion of political influence exerted by certain powers in the decision-making trends of this unique international technical body.’ The statement is not the first time Iran has accused the Agency of bowing to political interference since the report in question – which again raised concerns over the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme – was released on 6 September. Last week, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, argued in a letter to the Agency that the report appeared to have been influenced by ‘outside pressures’.

In terms of ‘outside pressures,’ the US no doubt figures highly in Iranian calculations. As the US Secretary of Energy, Stephen Chu, declared in his remarks to the hall here yesterday: ‘Iran’s intransigence represents a challenge to the rules that all countries must adhere to...Iran must do what it has so far failed to do – meet its obligations and ensure the rest of the world of the peaceful nature of its intentions.’ There is a ‘broad and growing international consensus,’ Mr Chu said, ‘that will hold Iran accountable if it continues its defiance.’ On Iran and Syria, ‘we encourage the Agency to make full use of existing authorities’, said Mr Chu – a gently worded call for a special inspection it would seem, an access right that the IAEA has so far been hesitant to invoke in either case. The latest IAEA report on Syria, where an Israeli air strike in 2007 destroyed what is widely thought to have been a fledgling nuclear reactor, warned that evidence at the site was degrading with the passage of time.

On the safeguards system more broadly, the IAEA is ‘facing a growing imbalance between workload and resources’, said Mr Chu. And in line with President Obama’s campaign pledge to double the Agency’s budget, noted that the US supports a ‘significant increase’ in IAEA regular funding.

Characteristically, the US also re-stressed the value of the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) as a tool for enhancing its verification abilities. Introduced in 1997 as an optional supplement to the NPT-mandated safeguards agreements (after the inadequacy of those agreements came to light in the wake of the Gulf War), APs are now in force in 102 as mentioned earlier. Opinions on the AP, particularly on the degree to which it should be seen as a requirement for NPT parties, differ widely however. In remarks that echo those of the Non-Aligned Movement at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York, Iran (which resists implementation of the AP), stressed here yesterday that it is ‘utterly important to differentiate between the safeguards commitment of member states and the confidence-building measures made on a voluntary basis.’

Telegraph story on Iran

2010-09-07T12:44:00.000+01:00

Damien McElroy writes in today's Telegraph that VERTIC's noted that one can make one nuclear weapon out of 20 kilograms of 19.7 per cent enriched uranium hexaflouride gas. That's not quite the case. In fact, you would need closer to 180 kilograms of 19.7 per cent enriched gas to achieve one significant quantity of weapons grade uranium metal.

What is true, however, is that most separative work has already been invested into the medium-enriched product. It is relatively simple to further enrich medium enriched material into weapons grade.

It is also an overstatement to write that VERTIC has 'privileged access' to the IAEA. We have no more access to the IAEA than any other accredited organization, and are not privy to any restricted documentation.

VERTIC releases report on Verifying Warhead Dismantlement

2010-09-02T15:59:00.000+01:00

London (1 September 2010): VERTIC today releases Verified Warhead Dismantlement: Past, present, future.

The report is the Centre’s independent account of the so-called UK-Norway Initiative: a three-year project to investigate the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. The UK-Norway Initiative was the first time a non-nuclear-weapon state has partnered with a nuclear-weapon one to examine these issues. As such, the initiative broke important new ground, and set what may yet become a strong precedent for future work. VERTIC has been involved as an independent observer to the Initiative from the project’s earliest beginnings in 2007.

VERTIC’s report seeks to place the UK-Norway Initiative in the wider historical context of past dismantlement exercises and studies—and in so doing draw out the commonalities and differences between those and what the UK and Norway have achieved. ‘Remarkably,’ said Andreas Persbo, VERTIC’s Executive Director and one of the reports three co-authors, ‘the UK-Norway Initiative represents only the second time full-scale simulated dismantlement exercises of this kind have been held, the first being in 1960s America, and the only such undertaking of a bilateral nature.’

Nonetheless, after a close examination of past initiatives, VERTIC has found that a number of the conclusions reached following the UK-Norway Initiative’s two mock inspection visits last year mirror past findings in striking fashion. ‘All inspection exercises have one thing in common,’ says the report: ‘they all aim to find a balance between the inspector’s need for access and the inspected party’s need to maintain confidentiality.’ The trade-off between inspector confidence and the need for a host party to protect classified information represents a running theme throughout the report.

The Anglo-Norwegian effort was conducted firmly within the technical realm. The programme—which proceeded on two fronts: ‘information barrier’ technology and managed access methodologies—was ‘driven by the goal of finding verification solutions, not verification problems,’ said Mr Persbo. Indeed, one of the principal conclusions of the Initiative was that properly managed collaboration between a nuclear and a non-nuclear-weapon state in the field of dismantlement verification can be done without fear of compromising sensitive or proliferative information.

‘Scientific collaboration between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states in this regard is both an achievable and a sensible goal,’ says the report. ‘On the one hand, it allows those in the laboratory of the nuclear-weapon state to escape the intellectual confines of their classified environment. And on the other, it allows those among the non-nuclear-weapon states of the world to grasp the many intellectual and practical problems that face those in the weapons camp. On the outside, it allows the public to gain some idea of the many scientific, technical and procedural steps, and obstacles, that lie ahead.’

There will come a time when dismantlement processes will lack sufficient credibility unless signed off by one or a number of non-nuclear-weapon states. As Lord Browne, who wrote the preface to the report, said while UK secretary of defence in 2008, ‘it is of paramount importance that verification techniques are developed which enable us all—nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states—to have confidence that when a state says it has fully and irrevocably dismantled a nuclear warhead, we all can be assured it is telling the truth.’

Despite a number of outstanding technical issues highlighted by the Initiative over the course of the last three years, the UK and Norway have together taken a small but important step toward the realisation of the nuclear disarmament agenda, in addition to making a timely standalone contribution to the current state of knowledge. VERTIC has been a proud partner.

Download Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, present, future (PDF, 502kb)

CTBT: Prospects for Entry into Force

2010-07-16T12:15:00.000+01:00

VERTIC has now released the fourth and penultimate paper in its series on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its verification regime. This paper, on ‘Prospects for Entry Into Force’, is written by Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation and founder of the highly-regarded Arms Control Wonk online blog.

The paper takes each of the nine remaining ‘Annex II’ hold-outs—whose ratifications are essential for the CTBT to come into force—in turn, assessing the likelihood of their full assent to the treaty in the coming months and years. Overall, the paper strikes a hopeful tone, noting that even the ‘hard cases’ of India, Pakistan and North Korea are not lost causes. On the latter, and arguably the hardest case of all, Mr Lewis notes that a breakthrough in US-North Korean relations could ‘rapidly result’ in North Korean ratification.

With regard to the three Middle Eastern Annex II states whose ratifications remain outstanding (Egypt, Iran and Israel), prospects for ratification are ‘inexorably entwined with the complexities and nuances of their regional security situations,’ says Mr Lewis. But, he suggests, movement forward on the long-proposed Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone at the recent review conference of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty sets an ‘encouraging precedent.’

To finish his paper, Mr Lewis argues that, pending full entry into force, CTBT parties might look to begin to apply the treaty on a provisional basis. ‘States parties could agree to an operational protocol that outlines the treaty’s provisional application,’ he proposes. ‘And while it would be no substitute for actual entry into force of the treaty, such a protocol would enable the CTBTO to function more fully in the intervening period and help bolster the steadily growing norm against the detonation of nuclear devices.’

The paper is available to download here (PDF 180kb)

Illegal logging

2010-07-15T14:53:00.002+01:00

Not so much to do with arms control verification. However, this is a neat little project that Larry Macfaul, my senior researcher in charge of the environment programme, has rolled out today:

Today, Chatham House launched its report 'Illegal Logging and Related Trade: Indicators of the Global Response'. VERTIC senior researcher Larry Macfaul co-wrote the report with Chatham House associate fellow Sam Lawson. The report is the most thorough assessment so far of the global fight against illegal logging. According to the report, "Illegal Logging and Related Trade: Indicators of the Global Response", total global production of illegal timber has fallen by 22 per cent since 2002.

The report covers all aspects of he timber trade. It studied five producer countries, two processing countries and five consumer countries. Despite the decline in illegaly harvested timer, illegal logging remains a serious problem. "If laid end to end the illegal logs would encircle the globe more than ten times over," said Larry MacFaul.

Speaking at the launch event, held at the Royal Society in London, Mr. Stephen O'Brien, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (DFID), said that deforestation still occurs at an 'alarming rate'. The solution, he argued, involves putting in place safeguards in producing countries, but also to change consumer behaviour in importing countries. He highlighted the finding of the report that 'every pound invested in combatting illegal logging results in six pounds of increased revenue'.

His speech was followed by a presentation by Sam Lawson, highlighting the major findings of the report. The launch also featured observations by H.E. Yuri Octavian Thamrin, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Samuel Nguiffo, Secretary General of the Centre pour l'Environnement et le Développement (CED) and Andris Piebalgs, Development Commissioner at the European Commission.

Andreas Persbo, VERTIC's Executive Director, said 'Yet again, VERTIC, this time working with Chatham House, has produced groundbreaking work. And while this report shows a remarkable decrease in illegal logging worldwide, much more work remains to be done. While the first task is to ensure that all use of the world's forests are legal, the real challenge ahead is to devise a fair system that encourages and rewards their sustainable use. My thanks to Chatham House, Sam Lawson and Duncan Brack in particular, for involving VERTIC in this important study'.

Executive summary (PDF, 390kb).

Full report (PDF, 3.48mb)

Source: www.vertic.org

Illegal logging worldwide is a major problem. The bigger problem, looming in the background, is sustainability. Samuel Nguiffo, speaking at today's launch, said that 'we shouldn't congratulate ourselves too much for ensuring that companies follow the law'. Ensuring legality, he argued, was like moving up from the basement to the first floor of a multi-story building. The real challenge is to try to move from the first floor upwards.

By that as it may, illegally sourced timber still constitute a not insignificant part of our markets. It is in everyone's interest to curb it, especially since, to paraphrase Sam Lawson, every dollar invested in curbing illegal logging means six dollars gained in increased revenue (or corresponding carbon savings).

Trust & Verify 129

2010-07-02T13:54:00.000+01:00

We're back to using proper design software. But that doesn't mean that putting together the edition was easy. At about 7pm, one lead article had to be removed from the edition, as we couldn't reach the author. Towards the end of the session (at about 11.15pm), the office was too warm to stay in. One staffer had already left the building, saying that he had to be somewhere else as he stormed out. The rest of us were about to faint when the editor picked up the phone to "sort out some minor clarifications" close to midnight. But we made it just before midnight, and so kept to the 1 July 2010 deadline. Today, most of us look too tired. With one week to go until we release the UK-Norway Initiative Report to the first round of reviewers, however, there is simply no time to rest.

It's a good edition. Hugh Chalmers assesses the state of climate change verification after Copenhagen while David Cliff looks back at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It also contains verification watch, verification quotes, science and technology scan, staff news and a note from myself. My favourite item is the note on using modern gaming software to simulate arms control inspections: Call of Duty 4 meets Olli Heinonen.

Heinonen's departure from the IAEA came somewhat as a surprise to us here. But as he announced his resignation on press day, he didn't make it into the edition. I will write an official letter to him in the days to come, thanking him for his contribution to verification, and his support for VERTIC.

In the meanwhile, enjoy the edition.

Available for download (PDF, 388kb)

VERTIC Occasional Paper 3: Russia, Ratification and the CTBT's entry into force

2010-06-25T13:13:00.001+01:00

I'm pleased to announce the release of Occasional Paper No. 3, on the role Russia can play in facilitating CTBT ratification worldwide. It's written by Victor Slipchencko, a friend of VERTIC and seasoned CTBT negotiator. This is the third in a series of five papers on the CTBT, produced under a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ploughshares Fund.

Enjoy the read, and your weekend.

VERTIC a ‘great partner’ in efforts to strengthen the CWC

2010-06-07T09:52:00.000+01:00

The Director-General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter, gave his farewell speech to a group of diplomats and officials at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” on 3 June.

In an exchange with the British ambassador, H.E. Mr Paul Arkwright, Pfirter agreed that VERTIC is a ‘great partner’ with the OPCW in its efforts to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention. VERTIC welcomes this public acknowledgement of the importance of engagement by international disarmament organisations with civil society actors, and their contributions to ensuring that the world is safer from the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Under its National Implementing Measures Programme, VERTIC works with States on improving their legislative frameworks for implementation of the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons treaties. Such assistance has, amongst other things,included hosting a high-level delegation in London to draft legislation for the implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions in that country’s official language.

NIM Programme staff are Angela Woodward, Programme Director; Scott Spence, Senior Legal Officer; and Rocio Escauriaza Leal, Legal Officer.

Crossposted from: VERTIC What's New.

VERTIC Executive Director published in UNIDIR book

2010-06-07T09:50:00.000+01:00

In May, UNIDIR released its book 'A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues' (PDF, 2.09Mb). The book features contributions from authours such as the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Anette Shaper, Harold A. Feiveson, Bruno Pellaud and the International Atomic Energy Agency

In his chapter, Mr. Persbo argued that, 'few weapon states would consider a treaty that encompasses reductions in stocks. Rather, the idea is to formalize the 20-year-old fissile material production moratoria already in effect among the P-5 and to introduce a legally binding moratorium in South Asia and the Middle East'.

He also held that, 'Given the large uncertainties in historical production in some weapon states, it will be near impossible to establish baseline inventories of nuclear material. There will not be any meaningful way, consequently, to monitor changes in state inventories of fissile material. This means that a fullscope verification regime will yield few benefits on the margin'.

Discussing the so-called focussed approach, he argued that 'this low-assurance verification scheme will by no means be foolproof, but given the object and purpose of an FMCT, it may be viewed as sufficient'.

VERTIC promotes effective and efficient verification schemes. It's views on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is still under review. The chapter is therefore written in Mr. Persbo's personal capacity.

(Crossposted from VERTIC What's New)

UK-Norway Initiative gets Review Conference mention

2010-06-03T11:25:00.003+01:00

Cross-posted from the VERTIC website.

On 28 May 2010, the NPT review conference agreed on a final document. This was the first consensus in ten years. The conference 'welcomed efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities', in recognition that technical cooperation can, and in fact does, strengthen progress towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. In this context, it noted 'the cooperation between Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in establishing a system for nuclear warhead dismantlement verification'.

VERTIC has been involved in this effort as an non-governmental observer since 2007.

'Achieving consensus at the conference was a great step forward', said Andreas Persbo, VERTIC's Executive Director. 'And I am glad that VERTIC could play a small part in laying the groundwork for a successful outcome'.

'We're also pleased that the document supports the Additional Protocol as the enhanced verification standard', said Mr Persbo, 'and also that the conference welcomes the IAEA's development of an information driven safeguards system. This will enable the Agency to continue its work on setting up safeguards that can give assurance that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful use. It will also build regime that gives assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities'.

VERTIC were in New York during three weeks. Hassan ElBahtimy, VERTIC researcher, who followed the conference closely, said ' in addition, agreeing on an action plan that would chart the way towards the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution is a significant achievement. It is important to note that the conference recongized the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the resolution.'

The action plans now needs to be implemented, and VERTIC is looking forward to playing its part in achiving further progress in 2015.

VERTIC's work on the NPT review cycle has been funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the Joseph-Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Radiological Protection Authority and the UK Ministry of Defence.