Vox Veritatis

This Blog Has Moved

2011-12-10T16:50:00.001-06:00

This blog has moved to www.vox-veritatis.com. Please modify your bookmarks, links, and feeds accordingly.

This blog will stay up for reference purposes (as long as Google allows), but I'm not planning to add any new content. In addition, I'm planning to go through the archives, and revise and migrate a number of posts from this blog over to the new one. Insofar as I migrate a post over to the new blog, I will add a link to the post on this blog that points to the revised content there.

As a final note, I'd like to thank my readers for bearing with me through long droughts of new postings. Inasmuch as you have found this blog to be edifying, I hope and pray that you will find the new site to be so all the more.

Levels of Context and Conflicting Propositional Attitudes

2011-07-12T00:30:00.002-05:00

When we analyze any given situation, we often react in multiple, conflicting ways. For instance, we may rejoice in the fact that an evil tyrant or terrorist has been put to death. After all, the death of such individuals entails the cessation of the evils and hardships that they were intent on bringing upon others, and that is something to rejoice about. Yet, at the same time, we cannot rejoice fully, because we know that such people are created in the image of God, and because of that, death is an unnatural thing, to be approached seriously and reverently. As a result, we react ambivalently to some extent. We may openly celebrate the triumph of good and the downfall of evil, but yet there is a nagging reminder that death is not a good thing, and a serious matter to be addressed reverently, not flippantly. How are we to make sense of this seeming contradiction within ourselves?

Now consider God, who on the one hand "does not take pleasure in the death of the wicked" (Ez. 33:11), yet on the other hand boldly proclaims that He is "The One forming light and creating darkness, Causing well-being and creating calamity; I am the LORD who does all these" (Is. 45:7). The calamities of which God speaks certainly include the death of the wicked. But the problem is even further confounded when we see that "our God is in the heavens; He does whatever He pleases" (Psa. 115:3). Ergo, God is pleased to bring calamity, which includes the death of the wicked. Ergo, God takes pleasure in the death of the wicked. This conclusion certainly does not seem right, but what are we to do with the logic? How are we to make sense of this seeming contradiction?

In this post, I argue that what appear, at a surface level, to be conflicting propositional attitudes concerning the same proposition are actually different propositional attitudes about different propositions that stand in a subsumption relation to one another. This understanding allows us to resolve apparent theological contradictions of the above kind, and helps us to make sense of our own ambivalent reactions to various situations.

Levels of Context and Propositional Attitudes

A propositional attitude is a relational mental state connecting a person to a proposition. Examples include what a person believes concerning a proposition, and what a person feels (or emotes) concerning a proposition. So, for example, God being pleased to create the world is a propositional attitude relating God's emotion of pleasure to the proposition of His creation of the world.

It is important to note that two propositions may be related, with respect to abstraction, but not be the same proposition. As an illustration, consider the propositions expressed by the following two statements:

P1: God creates man.
P2: God creates something.

The propositions expressed by these two statements are related, but they are not the same. The statement of P1 asserts something specific, while the statement of P2 asserts something more general. It could be the case that the "something" God creates per P2 is man, which God creates per P1. Given the meaning of the two statements, it is logically possible that both refer to the same act of creation. However, given the meaning of the two statements, it is not necessary that they refer to the same act of creation. The statement of P2 could very well refer to the creation of water, squirrels, or any number of other things. Because the statement of P2 can refer to the same act of creation as the statement of P1, as well as a number of other acts of creation, P2 subsumes P1. Put another way, a proposition X subsumes a proposition Y if and only if X is more general than Y - that is, all of the possible worlds in which Y holds true are also possible worlds in which X holds true. Two propositions stand in a subsumption relation if and only if one subsumes the other. Also, let X properly subsume Y if and only if the possible worlds in which Y holds true are a proper subset of the possible worlds in which X holds true. Two propositions stand in a proper subsumption relation if and only if one properly subsumes the other.

The apparent theological contradictions described above, as well as our own ambivalence towards some things, can be explained in terms of propositional attitudes towards two different propositions that stand in a subsumption relation. Consider, for example, the proposition expressed by the statement "A man kills another man" (K1). What are the appropriate propositional attitudes towards this proposition? On the one hand, it is impossible to make any sound moral judgment, since we don't have enough information to conclude whether or not this killing is sinful, or morally justified. However, we do know that since man is created in the image of God, death is an unnatural, horrible thing. Thus, even though we cannot make a sound moral judgment on this proposition, we ought to still express horror at the idea that a human being, created in God's image, is in the process of dying.

Now, consider this proposition, which is subsumed by K1: "A police officer kills an armed hostage-taking bank robber" (K2). Having that extra information changes things. Now, we can make a sound moral judgment on the matter: the man doing the killing (the police officer) is a hero, risking his own life to save the life of the person taken hostage. Not only is this a morally justifiable act, it is a morally commendable act.

Now suppose that a hypothetical person who always maintains appropriate propositional attitudes encounters K2, say by reading a newspaper, or watching the news. What would be his reaction? On the one hand, such a person would be glad for the life of the hostage that was saved, and would admire the heroism of the police officer displayed in saving the life of the hostage. He would take joy in the fact that tragedy was averted, and that justice and righteousness won the day. On the other hand, thinking about K2 also brings K1 to mind. Such a person then remembers that the hostage-taker was a human being as well, one who probably had friends and loved ones who will grieve over his death. Such is the horror of death, as a judgment for sin upon a fallen world. Thinking about K1 brings a measure of solemnity to the occasion. As a result, the person experiences ambivalence: joy for the triumph of justice and righteousness, tempered to some degree by solemnity at the horror of death, even for one whose death at the hands of another was morally justified.

What should be noted, however, is that the conflicting propositional attitudes (joy and solemnity) are not towards the same proposition, but towards two different propositions. However, because K1 subsumes K2, and inasmuch as thinking about K2 also brings K1 to mind, then one will experience ambivalence in thinking about K2, because the propositional attitudes regarding both propositions will be present.

Formulating things in another manner, K1 and K2 are at two different levels of context. As K1 is more general, it contains less information, and is at a "lower" level of context (because there is less contextual information contained within the proposition). As K2 is more specific, it contains more information, and is at a "higher" level of context (because there is more contextual information contained within the proposition). Now, when the one analyzes a proposition at a high level of context, the mind often simultaneously analyzes subsuming propositions at lower levels of context. Inasmuch as these more general propositions induce propositional attitudes that conflict with the propositional attitude induced by the high-level proposition, the individual will experience ambivalence, simply as a result of the simultaneous presence of two conflicting propositional attitudes. The two propositions are not the same, but they are related by subsumption, and because of this, it seems like the two conflicting propositional attitudes concern the same proposition. Hence the source of apparent contradiction in our own minds.

Apparent Theological Contradictions Resolved

Given this framework, the apparent theological contradictions discussed above can be readily resolved. Consider first the proposition, taken from Ez. 33:11, that

1: God does not take pleasure in the death of the wicked.

It should be noted that 1 is quite general. It doesn't contain any contextual information about the deaths of specific wicked individuals, or the circumstances of their deaths. Next, consider the proposition, taken from Is. 45:7, that

2: God brings calamity in certain contexts.

Now, the calamity that God brings often befalls the wicked, resulting in their death. Hence,

3: The calamity God brings results in the death of the wicked.

Next, consider the proposition, taken from Psa. 115:3, that

4: God does whatever He pleases.

It follows from 2 and 4 that

5: God is pleased to bring calamity in certain contexts.

From 3 and 5 it follows that

6: God is pleased, in certain contexts, to bring calamity that results in the death of the wicked.

Now, to arrive at a contradiction, one would also need the following proposition:

7: God is pleased in the death of the wicked.

However, there is no reason why 7 follows from 6. Remember that 1 is a general proposition, as is 7. However, 6 is more specific proposition, at a higher level of context. There are certain contexts in which, calamity being brought as a righteous and just punishment for sin, is a thing that is pleasing to God. Proposition 6 does not state that God is pleased in calamity, in and of itself, but that God is pleased in calamity being brought in certain contexts, which include the vindication of His holiness and righteousness.

To elucidate this point, consider the following two propositions:

E1: Some wicked men die.
E2: Some wicked men die in a calamity that God brings about in the context of vindicating His holiness and righteousness.

E1 subsumes E2. Yet, there is no reason why God's propositional attitude concerning E1 and E2 should be the same. Indeed, Scripturally, they are not. God propositional attitude regarding the lower-level proposition E1 is that of displeasure (per Ez. 33:11). However, God is pleased with the totality of what He brings to pass, in the context where everything is considered (per Ps. 115:3). Hence, God's propositional attitude towards the higher-level proposition E2 is one of approval.

Hence, when the different levels of context are taken into consideration, such apparent theological difficulties are easily resolved. From both these Scriptures and the examples of human ambivalence above follows the principle of the Non-Entailment of the Equivalence of Propositional Attitudes Induced by Subsumptive Propositions (NEEPAISP):

NEEPAISP: If two propositions p and q stand in a proper subsumption relation, it does not follow that the propositional attitudes induced by p are the same as the appropriate propositional attitudes induced by q.

Conclusion

When analysis of propositional attitudes is performed at a shallow level, one is likely to see contradictions in assertions concerning those propositional attitudes. So is the case with God, of whom contradiction is not uncommonly charged on the basis of such shallow analysis. Unfortunately for critics who employ such shallow analysis, lack of depth is not a ground of rational justification. When we take the time to analyze things to the level of exactitude of whom the Lord of Glory is worthy, we will find such claims of incoherence specious and the coherence of Scriptural truth affirmed.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Infant Baptism and the Great Commission

2011-07-10T00:30:00.001-05:00

Some supporters of paedobaptism argue that the New Testament is silent on the issue of whether or not infants should be baptized. As a result, they turn to Covenant Theology to argue for the practice of paedobaptism. The issue of the veracity of Covenant Theology aside, the New Testament is not silent on the issue of whether or not infants should be baptized. While it is true that the NT does not address the issue directly, the issue is addressed indirectly, in the Great Commission, where one can only conclude that baptism is to be given to professing believers only.

The Great Commission

In the Great Commission, we have Jesus' commands to His disciples regarding how they were to take the Gospel to the nations of the World:

All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. (Matt. 28:18-20)

Though the Great Commission was given initially to Jesus' disciples, it applies to us today as well. Verses 19-20 contain Christ's command concerning the disciple-making process, including the directive to teach new disciples to obey the commands that Christ has given. Ergo, the Great Commission applies to us, and we are to teach those we disciple to obey it as well.

The Great Commission is the defining mission statement for what we are to be about doing in the work of advancing the Kingdom of God through the proclamation of the Gospel. There are three parts to the command of the commission:

The nations are to be made Christ's disciples,
Those that are so discipled are to be baptized, and
Those that are so discipled and baptized are to be taught to obey everything that Christ has commanded.

This progression makes natural sense. A disciple is a student, one who would follow a teacher, learn his teaching, and put it into practice. Being a disciple is fundamentally possessing the mindset of following the teacher. A new disciple may know very little of the teacher's teaching, but by virtue of the fact that he is a disciple, he will seek to learn the teaching by following the teacher. So it is with evangelism - before one can follow Christ and learn to obey all that He has commanded, one must first repent of one's sins, and in faith turn unto Christ as Savior and Lord. The act of submitting to Christ as Lord is the essence of becoming a disciple - devoting oneself to Christ, in order to learn from Him and live as He directs.

All who become such disciples are to be baptized. This also makes sense, as the newfound disciple, through baptism, is publicly identifying with his Teacher, his Lord. After becoming a disciple of Christ, one is to be publicly identified as a disciple of Christ.

After being baptized, the new disciple is then to be taught to obey all that Christ has commanded. By learning to obey Christ's commands, the disciple becomes in practice what he is to begin with in principle: one who follows and seeks to obey the Lord Jesus Christ.

Finally, after becoming a disciple, being publicly identified as a disciple, and learning how to live as a disciple, the disciple then obeys a command he has learned, the Great Commission, and becomes himself a maker of disciples. That is the genius of the Great Commission, of God's plan and purpose to advance His Kingdom on earth through the proclamation of the Gospel.

Baptism for Disciples

The Great Commission is the only passage in Scripture where we, as followers of Christ in this present age, are given a command regarding baptism. And what is the command given here? Baptize one's children so that they may possess the covenant sign? Baptize one's children so that in this they might be saved? Not at all! Rather, the only command given to the Church concerning baptism commands us to baptize those that have become disciples of Christ. That is the totality of Christ's instruction to the Church concerning baptism - we are to baptize those that repent of their sins and turn in faith to follow Christ.

Now, can an infant be a disciple of Christ? Given that a disciple is one who learns from another, an essential requirement of a disciple of Christ is the ability to learn Christ's teachings. But the mind of an infant is undeveloped, and incapable of learning the teachings of Christ. Therefore, an infant cannot be a disciple of Christ. As we are only to baptize disciples of Christ, infants are not to be baptized.

Conclusion

If we read Scripture for what it says, and not for what it is made to say upon the imposition of alien presuppositions, we will find that Scripture does indeed address the topic of who is to be baptized, and that infants, whose minds are so undeveloped that they cannot be disciples of Christ, are not appropriate subjects of the ordinance of baptism. May we ever seek to follow Christ and understand His Word, so that we may be ever more faithful disciples of Him.

Soli Deo Gloria!

God, Calvinism, and the Burning Building Analogy

2011-07-08T00:30:00.003-05:00

Critics of Calvinism often take issue with how with how the love of God is defined under Calvinism. Instead of recognizing God's freedom to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and compassion on whom He will have compassion (Rom. 9:15), they insist that a loving God must feel compelled to save every individual human being possible, and actively attempt to do so. As I have previously demonstrated, this line of thought is logically untenable, resulting in an irreconcilable dilemma for the critic of Calvinism. Rather that address the idea that a loving God must feel compelled to save every individual human being possible, in this post I address a common argument used to support this claim: the Burning Building Analogy. I demonstrate that the analogy is not applicable to the God of the Bible, and as such carries no probative force against the Biblical Doctrines of Grace.

The Burning Building Analogy

The analogy in question goes something like this: suppose you are walking down the street, and you see a building on fire. Suppose that you hear cries for help coming from within, and realize that you have an opportunity to save the person trapped within the burning building. What would you do? What would you expect a "loving" person to do in such a situation? Would you not expect a loving person to go in and attempt to save the person trapped within the building? So then, it supposedly follows, for God to be loving, He would also have to do as much as He possibly could to save every sinner from the fires of hell. Such an analogy is persuasive to some, as it evokes powerful emotions connected with life and death, and brings to mind a strong sense of moral duty to attempt to save the lives of would-be victims of tragedy. The similarity of imagery between the fires of a burning building and the fires of hell probably doesn't hurt, either. Yet, for all of its emotional weight, such an analogy carries no probative force against Calvinism, and the way that the love of God is defined within that system.

The Purpose of the Analogy

It is important to note that the analogy plays a very specific role in a critique of Calvinism. The Calvinist posits a formulation of the love of God that is both Scripturally and logically consistent. Unfortunately, such a notion of the love of God offends the emotional sensibilities of the critic of Calvinism, its Scriptural and logical consistency notwithstanding. As a result, this analogy is brought in, to attempt to demonstrate that while the Calvinistic formulation of the love of God might seem to be correct from a logical point of view, it simply can't be correct if we allow ourselves to be honest with what we all know that love entails. This analogy attempts to demonstrate that what we all intuitively know love to entail is not what is entailed by the Calvinistic formulation. Ergo, the Calvinistic formulation is incorrect, and this is (supposedly) known not necessarily by any exegetical or logical argument, but by an appeal to what we all intuitively know love to be.

Unfortunately, an argument by analogy carries no probative force if the analogy employed is not applicable to the object of the argument. In this case, if it can be shown that the situation of a man coming upon a burning building and the situation of God dealing with hell-bound sinners are sufficiently disanalogous, then there is no reason why what is true of a loving person in one situation should be what is true of a loving person in the other.

But even more so, the burden of proof is upon the one using this analogy to demonstrate that the two situations are sufficiently analogous. To do otherwise is to do injustice to the transcendence of God. God is categorically different from His creation, and while there are certain commonalities between God and man, there are significant differences in those commonalities. For instance, both God and man possess knowledge. However, man's knowledge is finite and learned mediately through a sequence of temporal steps, while God's knowledge is infinite, and known eternally and immediately. God and man are sufficiently different, because of God's transcendence, that it does not suffice to simply say "X is true for man, therefore X is true for God." Rather, given God's transcendence, the burden of proof lies upon the one claiming such a relation to demonstrate that the relation does indeed hold. Unfortunately, those employing the Burning Building Analogy are usually not wont to demonstrate that God and man are sufficiently analogous in a certain way such that what is true about the love of man is also true about the love of God. As such demonstration is not forthcoming, the Calvinist has no reason to accept that the Burning Building Analogy carries any probative force against his theological system.

The Analogy Disanalogous

While it is unfortunate that attempts to justify the applicability of the Burning Building Analogy are often not forthcoming from the critics of Calvinism, this is not surprising given that the analogy can be demonstrated to be disanalogous on a number of levels. First, and perhaps most fundamental, is that in the analogy, the person being rescued is an "innocent victim" of tragedy, while with God, all hell-bound sinners have been justly condemned of having sinned against God, and hell is their proper and just punishment. To clear up any potential misconceptions, the phrase "innocent victim" simply denotes the fact that the victim is in peril for his life, but not as the result of a governmental judicial punishment. In this sense, any person killed in an accident or natural tragedy is an "innocent victim," while the murderer hanged at high noon is not. But with God, there are no "innocent victims" when it comes to hell. There is none righteous, no not one (Rom 3:10). All have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God (Rom 3:23). To make the analogy properly analogous, one would have to formulate it terms of a person coming upon the legal execution of a murderer. Say, for instance, a hapless bystander finding himself about to witness the execution of Ted Bundy. Would one claim that such a bystander would be unloving if he did not try to break Bundy out of prison and save his life? Or would such action be unloving to all of the families of the victims of his crimes, who are witnessing justice being served in his execution? To formulate the analogy correctly, one has to take out the "innocent victim" of a building fire, and insert in his place the just and lawful execution of the most vile criminal one can imagine. Then one might be starting to get somewhere.

Second, the relation of the rescuer to the victim is disanalogous to the relation of God to the condemned sinner. In the analogy, the rescuer has no relation to the victim, except that of a fellow human being. Yet, the relation of God to the sinner is not that of a stranger, but as the party offended by the sinner. More than that, God is the judge who has condemned the sinner, and executioner carrying out the sentence. So, to make the analogy more properly analogous, one has to take out the indifferent stranger coming upon an innocent victim, and replace that with a perfectly just judge condemning a murderer to death (the most vile criminal you can imagine), and then preparing to carry out that sentence. Now, it might be the case that in our revised analogy, the judge might be a very loving family man. Good and kind to his wife and children. A good and faithful provider, who would do anything to protect them and ensure their welfare. Now imagine this man about to execute Jeffrey Dahmer for his horrific crimes. Would we call such a person unloving for not attempting to save Dahmer for the death penalty he had coming to him? Or would we call him a pillar of righteousness and goodness in the community, a champion of justice and peace? Wouldn't we say that it is perfectly consistent for such a man to be loving person, and yet still carry out a just sentence of execution? Using the critic's principle of inference - if this is true for man, then why is it not also true for God? Why is it that when we formulate this analogy in a more properly analogous manner, it supports the Calvinistic notion of the love of God? Why is it that the analogy only serves the critic of Calvinism when it is formulated in a terribly disanalogous manner?

Third, the analogy suffers from the Creator/creation distinction. In the analogy, a man rescues another man. However, the application of the analogy is to God rescuing a man. Given the transcendence of God, and thus the categorical difference between God and man, it would be a more proper inference if God were to rescue another god (though no others exist, of course - Is. 45:5-6), just as one man rescues another man. The analogy would be more proper if beings of like kind rescued one another, instead of one being of one kind rescuing another being of a transcendentally different kind. This is not necessarily fatal to the analogy, but as discussed above, the burden of proof is upon the one utilizing the analogy to demonstrate that the analogy properly accounts for the distinctions between the Creator and His creation.

The Analogy Reversed

Perhaps most striking is the fact that God allows thousands of people to die in building fires every year. The critic of Calvinism attempts to claim that God would not be loving for not attempting save sinners from hell-fire, because a human being would not be loving for not attempting to save another human being from a building fire. But if the analogy holds from building fires to hell-fire, how much more does it hold from building fires to building fires! If a man is unloving for not attempting to save another man from a building fire, would not God also be unloving from not attempting to save human beings from the building fires in which they die every day? If the love of man and the love of God are so similar, why wouldn't this be the case? And it is not as if rescue from an earthly fire depends upon a free will "decision for Christ," as the critic of Calvinism is wont to claim that rescue from hell-fire depends upon. Rather, God could simply put out the fire, teleport the person to a safe location, supernaturally protect them à la Dan. 3:25, or any number of other things in order to save that person from a horrible flaming death. But if God is loving, and if being a loving person entails saving others from building fires, then why doesn't God save people from building fires? The critic of Calvinism can attempt (unsuccessfully) to circumvent the issue with respect to hell-fire, and claim that God can't force a free will decision upon a human being, and is thus unable to save those who do not wish to be saved. But is the critic of Calvinism really willing to say that God is unable to save people from building fires? If the critic answers that God is unable, the one is left to wonder what philosophical gymnastics will we witness in order to try to explain how this is not a denial of omnipotence. And if God is able to save people from building fires, then how is He loving in allowing them to perish, if the love of man and the love of God is truly analogous? Is the critic of Calvinism willing to be consistent and own up to the implications of his own analogy, and admit that God is unloving for allowing people to perish in building fires?

The critic might attempt to salvage the analogy by claiming that earthly death (by fire or any other means) is a just penalty for sin. However, hell-fire is also a just penalty for sin. But the whole purpose of the analogy is to defeat the idea that God can be loving, and yet execute the just eternal punishment for sin without attempting to save those so justly punished. But if the analogy applies to eternal punishment, then it most certainly also applies to temporal punishment. If God must attempt to save people from punishment for sin in order to be loving, then inasmuch as physical death by building fire is a punishment for sin, then God must attempt to save people from this punishment. Inasmuch as He does not do so, then He is an unloving God on the critic's theological system, a being whose actions are indistinguishable from indifference, cruelty, and hatred.

Hence, the absurdity, futility, and impropriety of submitting the love of God to the Burning Building Analogy.

Conclusion

The Burning Building Analogy is not uncommonly used by critics of Calvinism to argue that Calvinistic notion of the love of God is untenable. However, upon rigorous examination, it is the Burning Building Analogy itself that is untenable. Not only is the analogy inapplicable to the God of the Bible, but when it is formulated in a way that is more applicable, it supports the Calvinistic notion of God's love. Even more so, if the analogy is taken to its logical conclusion, one must conclude that God is unloving for failing to spare people from building fires. May we move away from faulty patterns of reasoning and submit our minds to the truth of God's Word.

Soli Deo Gloria!

The Myth of "Bodily Autonomy"

2011-07-06T00:30:00.002-05:00

It is not uncommon for adherents of the pro-choice platform to claim that anti-abortion laws force women to give birth, and thus violate their bodily autonomy. Some even go so far as to claim such violations of bodily autonomy are equivalent to slavery, just as slavery in the antebellum South violated the bodily autonomy of those so enslaved. However, such claims are specious, as they rest upon an absurd notion of "bodily autonomy."

The notion of "bodily autonomy" conveys the idea of having the right to do whatever one wants with one's own body. As a consequence, no one has the right to impose conditions upon what a person can or cannot do with one's own body. There is a certain extent to which this idea is correct. Inasmuch as man is endowed with inalienable rights to life and liberty, there is a certain extent to which the autonomy of the individual is to be honored by others.

However, such autonomy is not absolute, as there are definite moral restrictions upon what a person may and may not do with his or her own body. Consider an example where one man uses his body to kill another man. God's moral law, as well as the laws of human societies, prohibit the use of one's body for the purposes of unjustifiably killing another human being. Thus, no human being possesses absolute bodily autonomy. Even more so, whatever autonomy a human being does possess is not inherent, but endowed by God. Thus, it is absurd to chafe at a certain moral regulation (such as the prohibition of murder) as a restriction of one's "autonomy," when it is the same God that made the moral proscription who has also given man his basic human rights in the first place.

In the end analysis, absolute bodily autonomy is equivalent to anarchy - the absence of laws. Inasmuch as there is a law that restricts people from doing things like stealing, assaulting, and murdering, then people in that society do not have absolute "bodily autonomy," since there are things that they can physically do with their bodies that are prohibited by law. If a law that "strips a woman of bodily autonomy" (in the absolute sense, as is generally intended in pro-choice rhetoric) is equivalent to slavery, then anything short of anarchy is equivalent to slavery. Laws prohibiting theft are "slavery." Laws prohibiting murder are "slavery."

A law that prohibits abortion is simply a law that prohibits murder. An act of murdering an unborn human being is no different in its moral essence than the act of murdering one's spouse. A law prohibiting a woman from hiring a doctor to unjustifiably kill her unborn child is no different, in essence, from a law prohibiting a woman from hiring a hit man to murder her husband. If laws of the former kind rob her of "bodily autonomy," then so do laws of the latter kind.

The Love of God and the Salvation of All Men

2011-07-04T00:30:00.008-05:00

Christian critics of Calvinism often take issue with how the love of God is defined under Calvinism. Instead of recognizing God's freedom to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and compassion on whom He will have compassion (Rom. 9:15), they insist that a loving God must feel compelled to save every individual human being possible, and actively attempt to do so. In this post, I demonstrate that such a notion is logically and Scripturally untenable, resulting in an irreconcilable dilemma for the Christian critic of Calvinism.

The Dilemma

If the love of God entails an active desire to save every individual human being, then the following dilemma obtains:

1. God loves all men such that He actively desires to save all men.
2. If God loves all men such that He actively desires to save all men, then He would save all men if able to do so.
3. God is omnipotent.
4. If God is omnipotent, then He would be able to save all men, if He knew how to do so.
5. God is omniscient.
6. If God is omniscient, then He would know all possible measures for saving all men.
7. God knows all possible measures for saving all men (5 and 6).
8. God would be able to save all men, if He knew how to do so (3 and 4).
9. God is able to save all men (7 and 8).
10. God would save all men if able to do so (1 and 2).
11. God will save all men (9 and 10).
12. Not all men will be saved (Rev. 14:9-11, 20:11-15, Lk. 16:19-31).
13. Therefore, one or more of the premises (1-6) are false (11 contradicts 12).

The Calvinist easily avoids this dilemma by denying (1). There is a sense in which God loves all men, but that results in providential blessings (Matt. 5:44-45), not election unto salvation. Rather, the electing love is an exclusive love, likened unto the love of a husband for his wife (Eph. 5:25). The love of God is a complex doctrine, and should not be treated in such a shallow manner as is often done in critiques of Calvinism. I recommend D.A. Carson's The Difficult Doctrine of the Love of God for further reading on the subject.

The Dilemma Defended

One way to circumvent the dilemma is to deny (6). Open Theism, for instance, posits that it is impossible to know the outcomes of the choices of free agents, and thus God does not know this information. It is not that such knowledge is available, and God does not possess it, but that such knowledge is logically impossible, much like a 'square circle' is a logical impossibility. Such an approach is unbiblical, however, as the Bible clearly states that God knows (and determines) one's future actions (Ps. 139:3-4,16).

Another, more popular, method of circumventing the dilemma is to deny (4). Much like Open Theism, this line of thought posits that it is impossible for a world to be actualized in which all men freely choose Christ. Much like the infamous square circle, a world in which all men freely choose to be reconciled to God is impossible to bring about. Such a notion is related to the idea of transworld depravity - that it is impossible for God to create a world in which men possess libertarian freedom, and in which they do not eventually choose to sin against Him. Beneath both notions is the idea that the actions of free agents cannot be determined, and that there is no way to bring about a world in which all of the free agents do exactly what one would desire them to do.

There are a number of problems with this type of approach to the relation of God to the freedom of man. First, these ideas are the result of putting speculative philosophy above exegetical theology. The Calvinist reads the Scriptures, and sees that while man is free, God is sovereign over the free actions of men, decreeing all that comes to pass. He then goes and produces a compatibilist philosophy that makes sense of what the Scriptures assert - a philosophical framework for understanding the assertions of Scripture. Those who posit transworld depravity and related notions have the process completely backwards - they begin by committing themselves to a philosophical notion of human freedom, and then proceed to fit them to the Procrustean bed that they have constructed. There is nothing in Scripture that even begins to suggest transworld depravity (and related notions), and nothing that is elucidated by such a notion. Such ideas are purely a product of an irrational commitment to the idea of libertarian freedom.

Secondly, however, the blessed state of the saints in heaven refutes the notion of transworld depravity. The saints in heaven presumably have free will. Yet, for all eternity (an infinite amount of time), they will choose not to sin against God. Rather, they will choose to obey God an infinite amount of times, and never choose to disobey Him, even though given infinite opportunities to do so. Given this, why could not have God created a world like this in the first place, in which people never chose to sin? Some might say that the saints in heaven do not have free will. Yet, many of the same people who posit transworld depravity (and related notions) state the libertarian freedom is an essential attribute of humanity. Without freedom, man ceases to be man. If the saints in heaven do not have free will, then what are they? Paul depicts the resurrection body as an upgrade, a vast improvement over the mortal body (1 Cor. 15:42-44). The idea of a glorified humanity does not square at all with humanity becoming subhuman, through the loss of free will.

Others might say that the saints in heaven only choose to obey because they themselves have disobeyed God, and having experienced the unpleasant consequences of such disobedience, will never do so again. In this, the glorified saint is much like a child who burns his hand on a hot stove and learns very quickly not to repeat his mistake. However, such a line of thought supports a compatibilist notion of freedom, not a libertarian notion. Under compatibilist freedom, desires and beliefs determine one's choices, so it makes sense that a desire to avoid pain plus a belief that touching a hot stove will bring about pain will result in a decision not to touch a hot stove. Under libertarian freedom, however, the actions of an agent are not determined by anything, so there is no reason why unpleasant experiences should have any effect at all upon what a person chooses to do in the future. Even more so, why are not all actions simply arbitrary, if libertarian freedom is true?

Even more damaging to the idea of transworld depravity (and related notions) is the case of those human beings that die as a result of miscarriage. Many who champion libertarian freedom would also support the idea that God saves those who die prior to birth. Yet, those who die prior to birth have not had the opportunity to make conscious decisions to obey or disobey God. Rom. 9:11-12 states that there was a time before their birth in which Jacob and Esau, though in the womb of Rebekah, had done nothing either good or bad. What about those who die in such a state, having done nothing either good or bad? Suppose that God saves such and brings them to heaven. According to the doctrine of transworld depravity, they would eventually choose to disobey God and lose their blessed estate in glory. Yet, Scripture does not support a notion of anyone that God saves falling away, especially not after death. So why could God not have created all men in an estate like these miscarried children, who never personally commit an act of sin against God, but enjoy eternal blessedness in His presence, always choosing to obey Him, even given an infinite number of opportunities to disobey? If God loves all men as the critic of Calvinism claims, it seems that God should rather have created all men never to sin against Him in the first place, like these miscarried children. But why did He not do this? Creating everyone in such an estate would be a means of "saving" them - preventing them from experiencing eternal torment in hell. If God is loving, as the critic of Calvinism asserts, then He should have created everyone in such an estate such as they would never have sinned against Him.

The eternal sinless blessedness of the saints in heaven (especially miscarried children) is a defeater for transworld depravity and related notions. If the saints in heaven freely choose to obey God, then God could have created a world in which everyone freely chooses to obey Him - either to not sin in the first place, or to accept His "free offer of salvation" to all men (as the critic of Calvinism would put it). To escape this difficulty, the critic of Calvinism must deny what the Scriptures assert about the saints in heaven, thus revealing the unbiblical nature of his theological system.

Third, a world in which everyone chooses to repent and believe the Gospel is conceivable. So why cannot God bring it about? A square circle is inconceivable as a result of its logical impossibility. However, if something is conceivable, then there is a possible world in which that thing exists. If God is omnipotent, then why is He unable to bring about this possible world, in which all men repent and turn unto Him? If He is indeed able to do this, then His unwillingness to bring such a world about refutes the notion that God loves all men such that He actively desires their salvation.

Fourth, why does salvation have to be by choice in the first place? Those who champion libertarian free will also make much ado about the fact that we must make our own personal decision to love God, and come to Him. Yet, there is nothing in salvation that inherently requires the free will choice of the sinner. Consider again the case of the saved miscarried child who dies before "having done anything either good or bad." Such a child did not make any choice so as to turn to God for salvation. If he had, that would have been something "good" that he had done prior to death. But as it is, he died prior to "having done anything either good or bad." If, as the champion of libertarian free will would likely assert, God can save this human being without him having made a "decision for Christ," why cannot God save all men without them having made a "decision for Christ"? Now, under normal circumstances, God has decided to justify on the basis of faith, and this is not here under dispute. "Whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (Jn. 3:18). The issue is that faith is not inherently necessary to salvation, else God could not save those who die in miscarriage, who die before "having done anything either good or bad." So, if faith is not inherently necessary to salvation, why did God not simply refrain from adding this requirement, and decide save everyone regardless of faith? Once again, we have here a possible means of salvation for all, which God has decided not to implement. Once again, this refutes the idea that God loves all men such that He actively desires their salvation.

Fifth, supposing ad arguendo that libertarian freedom and transworld depravity (and related notions) are correct, the question still remains as to why God decided to create certain human beings in the first place, when He knew that they would sin and be condemned to an eternity of torment in hell. It would certainly seem to be more loving for God to simply not create a sinner who would reject Him, than to create a sinner that would reject Him and be eternally condemned. So why did God not do this? Why did He not simply create only those people that He knew would turn to Him and be saved? Once again, God has within His disposal the means of "saving" sinners from hell - by not creating them in the first place, He ensures that they will never experience an eternity of conscious torment. Rather, taking the critic of Calvinism on his own terms, it seems very unloving for God to create a person that He knows will spend eternity in hell, when He simply could have not created him in the first place.

As a result, it follows that for one to remain in a biblical theology with biblical implications, one must reject the idea that libertarian free will and transworld depravity (and related notions) render (4) untrue.

Conclusion

The critic charges Calvinism with failing to measure up where the love of God is concerned, for not stating that God loves all men so as to actively desire their salvation. Yet, it is the critic's theology that fails to pass muster when examined in the light of Scripture and logical inference. May we learn to subject our philosophy to Scripture, rather than Scripture to our philosophy, and in so doing glorify God by proclaiming His system of truth.

Soli Deo Gloria!

The Danger of "Radical Discipleship"

2011-05-17T00:30:00.002-05:00

Nominal Christianity is a major problem for the American church, being a feel-good religion whose focus is on the comfort of the practitioner rather than the glory of God. Nominal churches dot the American landscape, and in providing a form of Christianity without the power of the Gospel, they are havens for false converts, and factories of false conversion. As such, nominal Christianity is deadweight, a hindrance to the Church universal. A number of authors have spoken out against nominal Christianity over the years, and addressing this problem is a good thing. Unfortunately, some have gone too far in their rebuke of nominal Christianity, advocating forms of "radical discipleship." With strong words, these teachers boldly condemn the nominal Christianity prevalent today, and present a form of self-denial that is unfamiliar to many in America. Yet, as I will argue here, such an emphasis often simply trades one form of self-centeredness for another. While nominal Christianity is self-centered, focused on one's individual comfort, "radical discipleship" is also self-centered, focused on the level of one's "radical" commitment to Christ, as opposed to being focused on Christ Himself.

False Christ-Centeredness

The problem with nominal Christianity is self-centeredness - an emphasis on self and comfort, with only lip service paid to Christ. In nominal Christianity, Christ is a means to an end - He is a provider of fire insurance against Hell. He is a means of respectability within the (nominally Christian) community. He is a license to live however one wants without having to suffer eternal consequences for one's deeds. For everything that is said, self comes first, even if one's actions are externally couched in pious and Christ-serving language.

Now, suppose that you are a Christian who has come out of nominal Christianity. You are rightly incensed about the sinfulness of that religion, and are rightly motivated to speak out against it, and rebuke those who adhere to it. Suppose that you are a pastor, or a teacher, or one who has some influence over a body of believers. What would be your strategy for tackling the problem of nominal Christianity?

One approach might be to attack the accumulation of worldly possessions. After all, most nominal Christians seem more concerned with earthly possessions than with Christ. So you decide to extoll the practice of selling what you have to give to the poor, or leaving everything behind to go overseas. You emphasize self-denial, where self-denial (for you) involves parting with all unnecessary earthly goods. You lade your congregation with guilt over the unnecessary possessions that they own, and encourage them to become radical by focusing on ministry instead.

Another (complementary) approach might be to attack recreation, entertainment, and leisure time. After all, most nominal Christians seem more concerned with earthly pleasures than with Christ. So you decide to extoll the practice of giving up entertainment and recreational activities, and devoting one's leisure time to other ministerial pursuits. You emphasize self-denial, where self-denial (for you) involves parting with all unnecessary pleasurable activities. You lade your congregation with guilt over how they waste their time, and encourage them to become radical by focusing on ministry instead.

Perhaps another (complementary) approach might be to attack the lack of "radical" commitment to Christ. After all, most nominal Christians do not seem to have any deeper-than-surface-level commitment to Christ. So you decide to extol the practice of making radical and extreme commitments, and getting out of one's "comfort zone." You emphasize self-denial, where self-denial (for you) involves "stretching oneself" though making radical commitments. You lade your congregation with guilt over how uncommitted they are, and encourage them to become radical by instead strongly committing themselves to ministerial activities.

Now, these strategies might seem to work. If you are successful, they will be laden down with guilt for how poor of Christians they see themselves to be. And feeling guilty, they will be motivated to change - to do anything to get rid of the guilt that you have laid upon them. And how lucky for them, but that you have a solution for their problem - a penance whereby they may absolve their consciences of guilt. The solution is simply more: give more, sacrifice more, do more, commit to more. More, more, more. And the more they do, the more the realize that they cannot possibly do enough. And this will bring them into more guilt, from which they will be motivated to do even more of what you have set before them.

Before you know it, you have a congregation of hard-working, ministry-minded individuals who are making great sacrifices to (putatively) advance the kingdom of God. You've done a good thing right? You've cured them of their nominal Christianity, right? Or have you merely traded one form of self-centeredness for another? In reacting against nominal Christianity, have you brought your congregation to Christ, or have you simply converted them to another foul perversion of the truth? I would contend that such a congregation, while no longer nominally Christian, is no more "Christian" than before, for the simple fact that guilt-motivated, works-emphasizing legalistic Christianity is no more Christian than pleasure-motivated, comfort-emphasizing nominal Christianity.

True Christ-Centeredness

A man who is motivated by guilt is not Christ-centered. He is still self-centered, because all of his actions spring from a desire to alleviate himself of the guilty feelings that he is experiencing. Just as a man who fundamentally pursues the satisfaction of earthly pleasures is self-centered, so also is the man who fundamentally pursues the alleviation of guilt. It is a tragedy that many people go from nominal Christianity to legalistic Christianity, thinking they have found something of spiritual value, when in reality they are no closer to the heart of Christ than before. The same Jesus who said "Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me" (Lk. 9:23) also said “Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and you will find rest for your souls. For my yoke is easy and my burden is light” (Matt. 11:28-30). If, in seeking to deny yourself and take up your cross, you finds yourself weary and heavy-laden, you have missed what it means to deny yourself, take up your cross, and follow Christ.

The problem with "radical discipleship" is that it primarily emphasizes the act of being radical - radical commitment, radical use of time, radical use of possessions. But the focus of Christianity is not the act of being radical - the focus of Christianity is Christ. The word "radical" literally means "of or going to the root or origin." If Christ is the root, or center, of Christianity, then radical Christianity is a focus on Christ. If "radical discipleship" is a focus on the act of being radical, then "radical discipleship" is really "radical radicalism," and as such has nothing to do with Christianity. Christianity simply provides a context in which to be "radical."

Christianity is Christ-worship, ascribing worth to Christ. But "radical discipleship" is self-worship, ascribing worth to oneself, conditioned upon how radical one has been in the use of one's time, one's possessions, and how radically one has committed oneself to ministerial activities. But in looking to oneself, one will never find oneself worthy - there will always be more things that could have been done, things that could have been done better, and ways in which one could have been even more radical. If one focuses on how radical one is, one will never find oneself radical enough. And that will simply create more guilt. And since the solution to guilt is being radical, that will only perpetuate the process of trying to be radical for Christ. This is no different than any other system of legalism, where righteousness and acceptability before God come on the basis of performance and works.

But Christ is different. He does not say "come after you have done," but rather "come, and then do." Christ, through His active and passive obedience, has made us completely acceptable to the Father. Not only are our sins forgiven, but Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, as if we had lived the righteous life of Christ Himself. As such, we are accepted by God not on the basis of our performance, but on the basis of Christ's performance. Thus, we can rest in Christ, for Christ is our absolution - we do not absolve ourselves of guilt through the penance of good works. Rather, Christ's sacrifice makes us clean (Heb. 10:10) and cleanses our conscience - something that performing the works of the law could never do (Rom. 3:20, Heb. 10:2). By trusting in Him, whose sacrifice once for all cleanses us from all sin, we have all that we need to be forgiven, and our have our consciences cleared.

The work of Christ enables us to have rest, for no longer are we under the condemnation of the law (Rom. 8:1). Rather, we have been justified through faith, and God's verdict of righteousness can never be overturned (Rom. 8:32-39). So what does this mean for us, in practice? What it means is that when our hearts are set free and given rest from guilt and condemnation, we are free to worship and serve Christ out of love and gratitude. It is only when our hearts are at peace in Christ that we can do good works - that is, good deeds with the proper motivation. And the proper motivation is not to gain God's acceptance, but out of love and gratitude to please Him who has already accepted us. This means that the Christian is free from guilt over not measuring up to someone else's standard for what a Christian should be doing with his life. For "The spiritual person judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one" (1 Cor. 2:15), and "None of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself. For if we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord. So then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s" (Rom. 14:7-8). It is before Christ that each of us stands or falls (Rom. 14:4), not the pious proponent of "radical discipleship" who peddles his wares of guilt and legalism.

The Christ-centered disciple is focused on Christ in a simple and trusting manner (i.e. childlike - Mk. 10:15), seeking to know Him more fully, and follow where He leads. The self-centered "radical" disciple, on the other hand, has a morbid obsession with how "radical" he is (usually fueled by a guilt complex), and seeks to find ways to be "radical enough" to both satisfy the demands of his radical-discipleship community, and his own self-imposed standard of what Jesus expects of him as a "radical disciple." If a Christ-centered disciple is called to go overseas, he packs his bags and goes, for this is what his Lord requires. There is no pomp and circumstance, no self-congratulatory thoughts on how radical he is being for doing this. Rather, he simply sees himself as doing what His Lord has called Him to do. And more often than not, if this is what Christ has called him to do, it is what he has a heart-felt desire to do anyway. In all of this, he follows the command of Christ, who said "So you also, when you have done everything you were told to do, should say, ‘We are unworthy servants; we have only done our duty’” (Lk. 17:10). On the other hand, the "radical disciple" goes overseas out of guilt, and a desire to measure up to the standards and expectations of "radical discipleship." He may endure hardship and persecution. He may speak strong words about the kingdom of God, and the necessity of repentance and self-denial. Yet, he is not unlike the Pharisee, to whom Christ said "You travel over land and sea to win a single convert, and when you have succeeded, you make them twice as much a child of hell as you are" (Matt 23:15).

Similarly, when the Christ-centered disciple is called to stay stateside and live a normal life, he does so, and serves God faithfully where he is. He does not seek to do less than what Christ requires, but at the same time, he is not concerned with doing more (such as going overseas). Like the disciple who faithfully goes overseas, the disciple who stays home is simply "doing his duty." On the other hand, the "radical disciple" who stays home feels guilty about it, for the simple reason that living a normal life is not nearly as radical as going overseas, or selling all of one's possessions, or doing something of the like. He spends his days feeling guilty about not doing enough with his life, always seeking ways to atone for his lack of radical commitment. Such a disciple makes a great church member, being there every time the door is open, participating in all of the events, and doing whatever is requested of him by the church leadership. But whether such a disciple makes a good follower of Christ is another question altogether.

The Antidote to Nominal Christianity

So, if not guilt-driven legalism, what is the solution to nominal Christianity? What is the pastor or teacher to do change the hearts of the congregation? The answer is simple: preach the Word. Proclaim the Good News. Proclaim and exalt the grace of God. Exalt Christ, and proclaim His excellencies. Feed the flock with the knowledge of God, for in this is the substance of eternal life (Jn. 17:3).

"But," the "radical" proponent might object, "how is this supposed to cure people of nominal Christianity?" Where is the pressure to get out of the easy chair and "put one's hand to the plow"? The simple answer is that such is not the emphasis of the message, for the simple reason that the motivation for good works should come ultimately from Christ, and not from men. This comes down to the difference between human wisdom and divine wisdom. Human wisdom says "put the people under a burden of guilt, for guilt is an effective motivator." Divine wisdom, on the other hand, says "Bring people to Christ, and let Christ change them, and provide them with proper motivation." Divine wisdom glorifies God because it keeps the pastor from getting the glory for the change in the hearts of the congregation. The proponent of "radical discipleship" can rightfully say "Look at what I have accomplished!" The true pastor of the flock, however, cannot take credit for whatever positive change God brings about, for he is merely the instrument though which God works to press His Word home to the hearts of His people, and effect change in them.

The cure to nominal Christianity, then, is Christianity. That is, the preaching and exposition of the whole counsel of God. In hearing and taking the Word of God to heart, one comes to know God. And in coming to know God, one develops a love for God. And in developing a love for God, one begins to do that which God would have one to do. If one loves God, obeying His commands is not a burden (1 Jn. 5:3), and if one knows God, one will listen for His voice and follow where He leads.

That is the solution, as simple as it is. Christ is the heart of Christianity. To have true Christianity, Christ must be exalted and placed at the center. The whole counsel of God must be proclaimed. If, on the other hand, "radical discipleship" is exalted and placed at the center, one will have Radicalism, not Christianity. When people focus primarily on how "radical" their walk with Christ is, they cease to follow Him, turning instead a standard of works-righteousness that they have set up for themselves.

May we see the things that are preached and taught for what they are, and never tire of contending for the "faith that was once for all delivered to the saints" (Jude 3).

Soli Deo Gloria!

The Equivocal Use of "Ability" and the Coherence of Calvinism

2011-05-14T13:00:00.005-05:00

It is often claimed that Calvinism is incoherent. As a compatibilist position, Calvinism affirms on, the one hand, the free will of man. On the other hand, it affirms the sovereignty of God over all things, including the will of man. The combination of these two positions, it is often claimed, is incoherent. For, as the critic would argue, a free choice requires the ability to do otherwise, and sovereign predestination requires that an individual choose precisely as predestined by God. Ergo, Calvinism is irrational. Such a line of criticism is as specious as it is popular, and as I will argue here, carries no force against Calvinism, properly defined.

The Modal Confusion

The root of this specious criticism, I believe, lies in a failure to distinguish between different modalities. For example, an certain event may be inevitable, though it is possible that other alternatives could have been made inevitable as well. Prophecy is a case in point. It is inevitable that Christ will return, because He has decided to do so at some point in the future. This is God's purpose, and He has promised to bring it to pass, ergo it cannot but come to pass. However, it is possible that in the beginning, God could have decided to bring about a different plan of action. God could have decided to simply destroy the earth and everything in it, without an actual return of Christ at the end of the age. Hence, an alternate future is possible, in the sense that God could have decided on a different plan, though now that God has decided on the plan that He has revealed to us in Scripture, an alternate outcome is not possible. Notice that there are two different modalities in play here - the first respecting what is possible, with respect to God deciding what to do with history, and the second respecting what is possible, now that God has decided what to do with history. And this doesn't even get into other modalities, respecting such things as logical possibility, physical possibility, metaphysical possibility, epistemic possibility, etc.

The above example illustrates that there are not simply one concept of possibility and one concept of necessity, but a multitude of such concepts. The failure to distinguish between the precise senses in which words such as "possibility," "necessity," "ability," and "inevitability" are used is a fertile ground for equivocation and fallacious thought. Such is the case with criticisms of Calvinism along these lines.

A Simple and Intuitive Solution

The critic of Calvinism can be answered by noting that when we speak of what a person has the "ability" to do, we do so in two different modalities, depending upon the context. The first modality concerns what is is possible for a person to do, considered as an agent with a certain set of faculties. The second modality concerns what it is possible for a person to do, considered as a person - an agent with a certain set of faculties, in addition to a set of personal likes, dislikes, beliefs, propensities, etc. - all of the things that distinguish us from one another in the immaterial aspect. When we speak of a person having the ability to do otherwise, we are expressing a proposition in the first modality. When we speak of a person being unable to do something (such as come to Christ, do other than what God has decreed, etc.), we are expressing a proposition in the second modality. Hence to conflate the two and claim an incoherence on the part of Calvinism is equivocal, and thus irrational.

The usage of the two modalities can be easily illustrated. Consider, for example, that a convicted murderer is about to be executed, and suppose that two people are discussing the merits of the death penalty. Suppose that the murderer was a young man when he committed the crime. One person might express disapproval at the death penalty, reasoning that the person should have a second chance at life. After all, he might say, we all make bad decisions when we are young, and aren't thinking very clearly. We have a lot to learn in life, he might say, and a person's life should not be taken away for a mistake made in one's youth. The other person might respond that the person did not have to commit murder. He had a free choice in the matter, and could have done otherwise. But now that he has committed the act, his life is justly required of him (cf. Gen. 9:6).

In this example, the second person is expressing a proposition in the first modality. The murder did not have to commit murder. Considering him as an agent with a certain set of faculties, no one is arguing that he was physically or metaphysically constrained in some way as to only have one choice before him. A paraplegic cannot walk - that is an action which he does not possess the faculties to perform. In the same way, to say, in this modality, that a person "doesn't have a choice to do otherwise" is to say that in the same way that a paralyzed man cannot walk, so also this individual does not possess the faculties being able to choose differently. Of course, such a proposition is absurd. No one who commits murder is physically or metaphysically constrained such that killing another human being was the only thing they could have possibly done. Inasmuch as one raises one's arm to point a gun, one could also simply remain still. The faculties of action are such that both alternatives are available. Hence, the criminal is responsible for his crime. On the other hand, suppose that an evil villain snuck into a man's apartment one night and implanted a chip in his brain, such that he could control all of the man's physical movements remotely. If such a controlled man were to fire a gun at someone, resulting in their death, would such a person be considered guilty of murder (given that all the facts of the case are known)? Or would the responsibility lie solely with the villain, given that the man with the chip in his head had no control over his bodily actions?

So, when we talk about responsibility for one's actions, or having the ability to do otherwise, we are speaking with respect to the faculties that a person possesses, and nothing more. We are not referring to that person's likes, dislikes, beliefs, propensities, etc. We are merely seeing them as an agent with some number of faculties available to them, and stating that they are responsible for which faculties are exercised. There is no notion of why or how a particular person decides to exercise various faculties (and indeed, one also has the faculty of exercising other faculties), but only that those faculties are available to the person in a given context. In the first modality, then, inasmuch as a person has the faculties at his disposal for doing more than one thing, such a person has the freedom to do otherwise than whatever he decided to do at that moment. There is nothing that constrained him exercising his faculties in a different manner, if he had chosen to do so. Indeed, at this level of abstraction, there is no constraint upon the faculty-exercising faculty (i.e. the will) to keep him from making a different choice. Hence, the freedom to do otherwise.

However, people do not act at random. For every action that is made, there is a reason why it is made. Our choices are determined by something in us, else they are not our choices. This is where the second modality comes into play, for it concerns those things that determine our usage of our faculties. A good model for this determination is the principle of maximum expected utility - that is, one makes the choice to do that which one believes will produce the most likely result of the highest utility. Two different people placed in the same situation might make different decisions. If given a choice between chicken or steak, some will choose the bird, others the cow. For some, liking the taste of chicken results in a higher valuation of chicken than beef. For others, the opposite is true. Still, for others who are vegetarian, all meats have a negative valuation - they are to be avoided if at all possible. Our different likes and dislikes inform our actions and define what is of highest (or lowest) utility to us. In addition, our beliefs and epistemic propensities also effect how likely we judge different outcomes to be. A steak-lover (who is not suicidal) who saw someone inject poison into the steak would not choose to eat, judging that the expected utility of eating the steak is highly negative (he would expect to die if he ate), whereas a steak-lover ignorant to this act might go ahead and eat the poisoned food, judging that the expected utility is highly positive (getting to eat his favorite food, believing that it will only nourish him). It is easy to see how our beliefs, propensities, and preferences determine what we will and will not do in a given situation.

Now, as an example of the usage of the second modality, suppose that a person you know very well is accused of a crime that is completely out of character for that person. Suppose further that the case is completely circumstantial, with no direct evidence of culpability. It is (epistemically) possible that the person committed the crime, but to make sense of this, you would have to conclude that the person was either not in his right mind, or had some omnious "dark side" that you knew nothing about. Suppose, for the sake of this example, that you knew the person's character completely, and thus knew that they had no hidden "dark side," and suppose that you had good reason to believe that the person was in his right mind at the time that the crime was committed. What would be your response to the accusations? Would you be saying "well, he had a free choice, so he could have done it"? Or would you be pleading his innocence, saying "there is no way he could have done this!"? Many people respond in the latter manner when hearing that someone they know well is accused of doing something that is out of character for them. But why do they respond this way? Are they asserting that the person in question had no free will, and was somehow constrained, such that he could not have possibly done what he is accused of? Or are they asserting that the person's character, which they innately and intuitively know determines that person's actions (even if they will not admit it), would not have enabled him to do such a thing? Obviously, the latter is true of statements of this kind.

In the same way, when we say that a sinner is unable to come to Christ (as also Jesus says, cf. Jn. 6:44), we are expressing a proposition in the second modality, not the first. We are not saying that a sinner does not possess the necessary faculties to come to Christ, such as the ability to repent (i.e. change one's mind) and believe. With respect to the first modality, the sinner has a choice to repent of his sins and believe the Gospel. He has the faculties to perform these actions, if he would only exercise them. However, with respect to the second modality, he is unable to do so, because turning from sin to Christ is an action with a highly negative expected utility. As a person's beliefs, preferences, and propensities determines one's actions, so for the unconverted sinner, there will always be other alternatives of higher expected utility than that of coming to Christ. This is why regeneration is necessary - in changing our heart, God gives us a different set of preferences and propensities, such that turning to him is of higher expected utility than the alternative.

Similarly, when we say that a person cannot but fulfill God's decree, this does not say anything about the means by which God brings about the occurrence of the things He has decreed. His decree is a unified whole, so the decisions we make are in perfect concert with the beliefs, preferences, and propensities that God has given us, as well as the situations in which we find ourselves, that lead those beliefs, preferences, and propensities, applied to our current situation, to result in a particular choice of action on our part.

Conclusion

Calvinism is often criticized as incoherent because it entails both a free choice as well as God's total sovereignty. Yet, such criticism is often the result of modal confusion, and an inability (or refusal) to see distinctions between the different modalities that we use everyday. When speaking about responsibility for one's actions, we naturally speak in the first modality. When speaking about what a person would or would not do in a given situation, we naturally speak in the second modality. We naturally use these two modalities everyday, but yet, when it comes to Calvinism, the critic artificially restricts the notions of freedom and necessity to one modality only. Such a restriction is unnecessary and irrational, and serves to keep many from seeing the coherence of the system of truth found in the Word of God.

Soli Deo Gloria!

More from Eric Kincade

2011-05-11T01:20:00.003-05:00

Eric has responded to my previous post in the comments section. Unfortunately, he has decided against answering the points and arguments that I have brought up, and instead resorted to mischaracterizing my response, and asking a series of further questions which are (putatively) designed to shake the Christian out of his faith-based stupor.

Academic gobbledygook
To the owner of the “Vox Veritatis” blog. Why respond to me with academic gobbledygook and hide behind 50 cent words?

To restate or ergo qua dim sum
Stated another way. When you say my arguments are “error, error” or when you say that my arguments are ergo qua dim sum multiplied by the modular equivalence of epistemological positivism over the square root of ontological metaphysics, how does this prove my arguments are valueless—to the average reader?

Eric is making it out as if my previous post was meaningless nonsense obscured by sesquipedalianism. I suppose that strategy has some appeal - rather than undertake the incredibly arduous task of actually dealing with another person's arguments, simply claim that they are "academic gobbledygook" and leave it at that. It's hard to tell if Eric is simply being lazy, or if he is intentionally mischaracterizing my previous post.

Writing in layman’s terms
Why don’t you simply write to me in layman’s terms? How are your philosophical red light warnings concerning my comments helping the average believer to understand what you are talking about?

Eric apparently has a very low view of the "average believer." None of the terminology I used is esoteric. All of the terms can be easily queried using a dictionary, Wikipedia, or a Google search. Never mind that if a reader has a question regarding the post, he/she is free (and encouraged) to leave a comment or send me an email about it.

Eric has it backwards - rather than being obfuscatory, using precise terminology allows one's point to be expressed concisely and unambiguously. This allows the heart of the matter to be addressed much more easily than it can be while mucking around with terminology poorly-suited for the topic at hand.

Your response to me is that I am in error because on page 3,849 in your Philosophy 101 text book, it says I’m wrong.

Another blatant mischaracterization. Once again, it's hard to tell if Eric is simply being lazy, or intentionally mischaracterizing my previous post.

The ultimate snob
Who’s really the snob? The people who don’t believe there’s any evidence for a “God” or those who claim they know a “God” personally?

It's hard to see how snobbery is relevant to the topic at hand...unless Eric is referring to my mention of Chronological Snobbery in the previous post, which far different from simply "being a snob."

But this question is also reversible. Who's really the snob? The people who take God at His Word, or those who use the faculties of communication that He provides in order to deny His existence? The latter is not unlike a child receiving a megaphone for Christmas from his parents, and then using it to loudly insult them in front of the whole neighborhood.

On divine revelation
Your plea is that divine revelation makes your religion, the only true religion—and all other religions are false.

Yet another mischaracterization. I nowhere said that divine revelation makes Christianity true. Divine revelation (and hence the truth claims of Christianity) is true because its propositional content corresponds with reality.

Since any religious follower—based on belief alone—can make the claim of receiving divine revelation as the absolute truth, how can any religion be true?

Eric is confusing ontology with epistemology. It may be the case that out of a large number of alternatives, one is true, even if it is not discernible which of the alternatives is true. But given that God has made His existence obvious to all, and that all know Him (Rom. 1:18-21), humanity is not stuck in the epistemological quagmire that Eric portrays.

On invisible friends
Why should I believe in your invisible celestial friend over the next guy’s invisible celestial friend? And another question: Why is it necessary for an adult to have an invisible celestial friend?

Invisible friends? Really? Does Eric want to have a serious interaction, or does he simply want to insult Christians by claiming their beliefs are childish? Does he really expect Christians to take him seriously when he compares the great and majestic I AM to the figment of a child's imagination?

Show yourself
If your “God” was able to create the entire universe and can do anything he wants—why not make himself into a physical form that we could see without burning out our retinas? And why doesn’t God have a website?

And so continue the vapid questions. If God does not conform to Eric's expectations, God must obviously not exist.

Such a question also reveals an ignorance (or willful mischaracterization) of Scripture, which records appearances of the pre-Incarnate Christ (e.g. Gen. 18, Dan. 3), as well as the Incarnation of Christ Himself.

Given that God has made Himself known to all (Rom. 1:21), and they still do not believe, there is no reason why Eric would change His mind if God ever deigned to conform to his petty demands.

Religions love promises of later
Why do religions love the promises of later. Just believe, because after you die, you’ll live forever. When? Later. Christ is coming back. When? Later. We will see “God.” When? Later. You do believe in my promises of “later,” don’t you?

This is yet another category error: simply because something is promised in the future does not mean that it will not come to pass. And it is not as if God has come up short on His promises - there is also fulfilled prophecy, which Eric has chosen to ignore.

You can’t prove that God does not exist.
Christians typically tell me, “You can’t prove God does not exist, so there, you, you… atheist.” Okay, since that’s the case, Christians can’t prove that Zeus does not exist. For that matter, Christians can’t prove that an infinite amount of gods do not exist.

Yes, it is true that the atheist cannot prove that God doesn't exist. More than that, the atheist, on atheism, cannot prove anything. Denying the existence of God entails irrationality, because without God, proof of anything is impossible.

However, it is not true that the Christian cannot prove the non-existence of other gods, for Is. 45:5-6 states this outright.

“God” of the gaps
I don’t think the religious believe in “God.” I submit the religious believe in the “God of the Gaps,” that is, the “God” who fills in the gaps found in science.

Yet another assertion in search of an argument.

How did this all begin? What’s our purpose? What happens when I die? Science does not know. Oops! A gap in science! Not to worry, “God” (of the gaps) did it and that’s all I need to know to be satisfied. And I hope you are satisfied because I’m satisfied.

Yet another category error. Eric is confusing knowing-that with knowing-how. The former does not entail the latter, nor vice versa. I believe that the ancient Egyptians quarried, moved, and raised some massive obelisks, though we don't have a good idea of how this was done. I guess I must believe in the Egyptians-of-the-gaps.

This, of course, is in addition to the mistaken belief that the scope of science concerns knowledge of things other than the natural world (a topic which I addressed in the previous post, and to which there has been no response).

How healthy is it for people in modern society to believe our scientific laws can be broken at will, by the testimony of Bronze Age and Iron Age religious texts?

How healthy is it for skeptics to persist in Chronological Snobbery, even after they have been informed of the fallacious nature of such thinking?

Either “God” made man or many men made many gods. I submit that ancient primitive men wrote the Bible in the culture and science of their day, trying to explain the world around them and they got it horribly wrong. All religions are man-made. Sin is a man-made concept.

And, we're back to Bulverism. More assertions in search of arguments.

Wishful thinking and self-delusion—not good for you.

Fallacious thinking and willful suppression of your knowledge of God - definitely not good for you. I urge you to repent of your sin and believe the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ.

"There's no evidence for that!"

2011-05-10T00:30:00.003-05:00

A common argument raised against the veracity of some historical propositions is that there is no evidence for them. For example, I have recently seen someone argue that, contrary to popular belief, Nero did not persecute Christians by burning them alive and using them as torches, because there is no evidence for this. Of course, one only needs to turn to Tacitus' Annals (XV.44) to refute this particular claim. As bad as this particular argument is, it is a good example of a general type of claim that is often made regarding purported historical events.

It is important to note that a claim of the form "there is no evidence for X" is really a claim, made a particular person, that he is not aware of any evidence for X. It may very well be the case that evidence for X exists and is possessed by others, but that the person making the claim is unaware of it. Thus, it is fallacious for a person lacking omniscience to go beyond this and claim, absolutely, that no evidence for X exists.

However, since the significance of this kind of claim depends upon the knowledge of the one making it, it is important to consider who exactly is making the claim. A scholar who has studied all of the relevant extant sources is to be trusted more than the average person on the street (or online, as the case may be). The simple reason is that the scholar has knowledge of the sources which would provide evidence for such a claim, and if those sources did provide evidence, the scholar would likely be aware of it. Of course it's possible that the scholar could miss something, or knowingly and falsely claim that there is no evidence out of a personal bias of some sort. But as a general principle, a person with the knowledge of the sources which would provide evidence for X is to be trusted more highly than the average person, when claiming that there is no evidence for X. The average person likely has little or no knowledge of the sources involved, and thus is likely unqualified to make such a claim. In addition, a scholar speaking outside of his area of expertise is to be trusted less than a scholar speaking inside of his area of expertise, for the simple reason, once again, that the scholar speaking outside of his area of expertise has likely not studied all of the relevant sources.

Regardless of who is making a claim of this type, it is important to answer the following questions in order to evaluate the claim:

Have all of the relevant sources that could provide evidence been evaluated?
How thoroughly have the relevant sources been evaluated?
Have the relevant sources been evaluated in an honest, objective manner?
Even if the above are answered satisfactorily, how likely is it that the person doing the evaluation has unintentionally made an error of omission or judgement?
Have others who have met the above criteria also come to the same conclusion?

The rationale behind the last question is that the likelihood that an honest mistake has been made decreases as more people who approach the problem properly come to the same conclusion.

It is also important to note what this type of claim entails. If there really is no extant evidence for X, it does not mean that X did not occur, but rather that we are not justified in believing that X occurred. Someone may fabricate a story about a historical figure for which there is no corroborating evidence, and by dumb luck, such a story might happen be true. However, one would not be justified in believing such a story, even if true, if there was no historical evidence to support it. However, it is fallacious to go beyond this and claim that the lack of evidence for a proposition entails the falsity of that proposition.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between "secular" and "sacred" historical evidence. Critics of the Christian faith sometimes argue that belief in many of the historical claims of Scripture is unjustified, because there is no corroborating historical evidence for them. However, such an argument presumes that secular sources are more authoritative than Scripture, and as a result, that Scripture is not to be trusted unless it is validated by corroboration with secular sources. As Christians, however, Scripture is our highest epistemic authority, as it is the revelation of God Himself. Does it make more sense that the words of sinful, ignorant, error-prone men should be validated by comparison to the words of the truthful, omniscient God, or that the words of the omniscient, truthful God should be validated by comparison to the words of ignorant, sinful men? Historical corroboration of Scriptural claims is useful in the sense that it serves to further confirm the faith we already possess, and to refute those who claim that Scripture is not historically reliable. However, the claim that external corroboration is necessary for justified belief in the historical propositions of Scripture is absurd given the Christian worldview. It is important to keep this in mind, because a number of events recorded in Scripture do not have mention or corroboration in secular sources. However, to argue that the Christian should not accept these claims because they have no secular corroboration is to place the words of men in authority above the Word of God, and is thus a type of external critique. And because it is an external critique, such arguments have no probative force against Biblical Christianity.

Soli Deo Gloria!

A Proof of Irresistible Grace in Propositional Logic from Two Verses in the Gospel of John

2011-05-08T00:15:00.002-05:00

Note: this content is available in a better format here.

In this paper, I present a proof of the doctrine of Irresistible Grace, using deductions in propositional logic made from the propositional content of John 6:44 and 14:6. In addition, I show that if the Arminian understanding of John 12:32 is correct, then such an understanding, in addition to the logical consequences of John 6:44, entails universalism.

A Proof of Irresistible Grace in Propositional Logic from Two Verses in the Gospel of John

Christianity and the Abolition of Slavery

2011-05-07T14:15:00.003-05:00

Some skeptics, with apparently nothing better to do, seem to enjoy challenging the idea that Christianity was the driving ideological force behind the abolition of slavery. Such skeptics are wont to claim that Biblical Christianity is actually a pro-slavery religion, and that the driving ideological force behind abolition was actually the Enlightenment, and its embodiment in influential American figures such as Jefferson and Paine. My aim in this post is not to provide an etiological analysis of the abolitionist movement, but rather to refute the claim that Christianity could not have been the driving force behind the movement, because it is a pro-slavery religion. Far from being a pro-slavery religion, Biblical Christianity is perfectly consistent with the abolition of slavery through legal and peaceful means.

Some Considerations

Anti-Christians often key in on a few verses here and there, and try to show that the Bible supports slavery. Ergo, they conclude, Biblical Christianity is a pro-slavery religion. Such a conclusion (like most skeptical conclusions regarding Christianity) is drawn in an overly-hasty manner, and does not consider the differences between different kinds of possible slavery and servitude, and exactly which kinds are being addressed in the various verses of Scripture. In addition, such a conclusion also fails to consider all of the following factors.

(Note: In the following, I define "slavery" to refer to so-called "chattel slavery," as formerly practiced in Rome and the United States, which as an institution consists of the following components, in whole, or in part: 1) The master-slave relationship entails ownership of the slave, 2) the period of slavery is indefinite, 3) slavery is generational, such that one can be born into slavery, and 4) the slave is not considered to be fully-human or have the basic human rights accorded to free men in society. )

1. Slavery, as a societal institution, is not morally prohibited in Scripture. This point is rather obvious, and it is the main point of the skeptic as well. The OT law allowed for a certain form of servitude. In addition, neither Jesus nor the apostles explicitly condemn the Roman institution of slavery. It is particularly striking that Paul never commands Christian masters to free their slaves. Rather, he commands them to treat their slaves justly and fairly (Col. 4:1), and to do good to them (Eph. 6:9). If slavery was morally prohibited, then Paul is commanding them to perform an immoral act (slaveholding) in a specific way, which is absurd. Such a command would not be unlike saying "When you commit murder, be sure to do it in a quick and painless fashion." The command to do X in a manner Y presumes that X is morally permitted to begin with - otherwise it makes no sense for a righteous and holy God to issue such a command if X is morally prohibited.

2. Slavery is not a good thing. A thing that is not good, in and of itself, may be morally permitted. Moral permission does not entail goodness in the thing permitted. So it is with slavery. Even though slavery, as a societal institution, is a bad thing in and of itself, it is not morally prohibited. Human beings were originally created to live free and walk with God, exercising dominion over the earth (Gen. 1:28). Man is given dominion over the earth, and all of its creatures, but not over man. Slavery, in which man has ownership of (or dominion over) another is a perversion of God's original design, and as such, it is not a good thing.

In this way, slavery is similar to divorce. Divorce is not a good thing, as it violates God's original design for marriage of one man and one woman, together for life (Gen. 2:24, Matt. 19:6). Yet, under some conditions, divorce is morally permitted. But simply because divorce is permitted under some circumstances, it doesn't mean that we should go around seeking divorces. And it certainly doesn't make Biblical Christianity a pro-divorce religion. In the same way, simply because slavery, as a societal institution, is permitted, it doesn't mean that Biblical Christianity is a pro-slavery religion. Just as Biblical Christianity allows for divorce in practice but discourages it in principle, so also Biblical Christianity allows for slavery in practice, but discourages it in principle.

3. We are to seek that which is good. As Christians, we should seek to do good in every situation (cf. 1 Th. 5:15, Rom. 12:21, etc.). Using the above example of divorce - divorce is permitted in some circumstances, but reconciliation and the preservation of the marriage is better - it is a good thing. It is not morally wrong to obtain a divorce under the allowed conditions, but it is better, if possible, to reconcile and keep the marriage together.

So also with slavery, we are to seek the good of our fellow man. The institution of slavery is demeaning to our fellow man, and as shown above, contrary to God's original design. We are to seek good, but we are not to do evil in seeking good (Rom. 12:21, Am. 5:14-15). Hence, there are no calls in Scripture for the armed uprising of slaves to throw off the bonds off their oppression. Rather, by the preaching of the Gospel and living in obedience to the commands of Christ, slavery was to be gradually dissolved, through society coming to see the superiority of a society without slavery. We are to seek that which is good, but through legal and peaceful means. Hence, Paul tells slaves to gain their freedom if the opportunity presents itself (1 Cor. 7:21), since freedom is a good thing, but not to worry about it otherwise. It is for freedom that Christ set us free (Gal. 5:1). This applies first and foremost to sin, but is true of society as well. Freedom is good, and where freedom can be procured, either for oneself, or for another, such is a good that one is Biblically-consistent to seek. Hence, the abolition of slavery through legal and peaceful means is consistent with Biblical Christianity.

4. All men are equal before God. All men are equal in the sight of God, because God is not a respecter of persons (Ac. 10:34). At the final judgement, all men stand before God on equal footing - there is no partiality or inequality (Rev. 20:11-15). In addition, we are all equal in Christ, as "there is neither slave nor free" but "we are all one in Christ Jesus" (Gal. 3:28).

Now, if all men are equal in the sight of God, why would we not seek to abolish societal institutions which demean the rights and dignity of others? If men are seen as equal in rights and dignity in God's sight, then it is better that on earth they also be seen as equal in rights and dignity. Hence, once again, the equality of men in rights and dignity (which is not had under slavery) is a good which the Christian is Biblically-motivated to seek.

5. Not all men are necessarily equal under societal institutions. Some skeptics seek to refute point 4. above by appealing to verses such as Ex. 21:21, to show that God Himself sees an inequality between slaves and their owners. However, such a claim commits a category error, in not recognizing the difference between seeing men, with respect to themselves, and men, with respect to how they are related in a specific societal institution. With respect to the institution of slavery, a slave is most definitely not equal to his master in rights and dignity. However, considered in and of themselves, away from societal institutions, all men are equal in rights and dignity. Verses such as Ex. 21:21 simply show that, within the societal institution of servitude, men are not equal. But this does not mean that the persons, considered in and of themselves, are unequal.

This dichotomy is not dissimilar to the situation in which a criminal, such as a convicted murderer, is saved while sitting on death row. Such a person is forgiven in the sight of God for his sins, but is still responsible to society for his crimes. The fact that he has been saved doesn't suddenly exempt him from the just punishment that he awaits. The simple reason is that what is true of a man, in and of himself, with respect to God, is not necessarily what is true of a man, with respect to society. This is the case with respect to forgiveness for offenses. It is also the case with respect to equality and the institution of slavery.

6. Man-stealing is a heinous sin. The institution of slavery should not be confused with the practice of man-stealing - kidnapping persons with the intent of selling them into slavery. According to 1 Tim. 1:10, this activity is sinful, and one of the activities which the law was laid down for the purpose of restraining. If this Biblical principle had been followed, the institution of American slavery, which relied upon the importation of unlawfully-enslaved men from Africa, would never had begun in the first place.

Conclusion

This is far from a conclusive analysis of the issue of the Bible and slavery, but it lays out some Biblical principles demonstrating the Biblically-consistent nature of a movement that seeks to abolish slavery through peaceful and legal means. And as such, it serves as a refutation for the skeptic who claims that the abolition of slavery is something that is inconsistent with Biblical Christianity.

The Coherence of Divine Revelation

2011-05-07T00:30:00.000-05:00

The coherence of divine revelation is a fundamental tenet of Biblical Christianity. Not only does it follow from Scripture, but it is the basis for the analogy of faith - the hermeneutical principle that Scripture interprets Scripture. In this post, I argue that the coherence of divine revelation is a logical consequence of Scripture, and that the analogy of faith is a logical consequence of the coherence of divine revelation.

Coherence a Consequence of Scripture

Hebrews 6:18 states that it is "impossible for God to lie." A lie is a deliberate of knowledgeable falsehood. A falsehood is simply a false statement, and it is possible to utter a falsehood without telling a lie. However, to knowingly utter a falsehood is to tell a lie. It follows, then, that it is impossible for God to knowingly utter a falsehood to man.

God is omniscient, and as 1 Jn. 3:20 states, "He knows all things." Thus, if God were to utter a falsehood, He would know that He were doing so. Thus, for God to utter a falsehood is to knowingly utter a falsehood, and thus to lie. Therefore, it follows that God cannot utter a falsehood to man.

Now, if two propositions are contradictory, only one of them can be true; out of two contradictory propositions, at least one is false. It follows then that if God affirms two contradictory propositions to man, that He has affirmed a falsehood to man. Since God is omniscient, affirming a falsehood to man, for God, is equivalent to lying to man. Since God cannot lie, it follows that He cannot affirm two contradictory propositions.

Thus, it follows from Scripture that God's revelation is non-contradictory, and thus coherent.

The Analogy of Faith a Consequence of Coherence

The so-called "analogy of faith" is the doctrine that Scripture interprets Scripture. The Westminster Confession of Faith communicates this idea when it states that:

The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly. (I.IX)

The idea is that some verses are clear, expressing only one linguistically-possible proposition. Other verses are less clear, and may express two or more different linguistically-possible propositions. The principle of the analogy of faith is that it is improper to take a possible meaning of an unclear verse (without demonstrating that particular proposition to be the intended meaning) and use it to twist the only meaning of a clear verse. Rather, when one encounters a verse that can possibly express more than one proposition, one is to compare those possible propositions to the propositions expressed by verses that can only express one proposition. It a possible meaning of an unclear verse contradicts the meaning of a clear verse, then that possible meaning is to be rejected.

In verses that are clear, we know what God is saying without any recourse to inference from other verses. If we truly believe in the coherence of Scripture, and if we care about the honor and glory of God (as one who does not lie, and thus does not contradict Himself), then we will take care not to portray Him as either affirming contradictory propositions, or asserting a proposition in a verse that is grammatically impossible. The principle of the analogy of faith is simply the natural and logical procedure for arriving at the truth of what God has revealed, while avoiding dishonoring Him in the aforementioned ways.

May we keep the veracity and coherence of God's Word in mind as we study it, and thereby honor Him and come to a more mature understanding of what He has revealed to us.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Bulverism, Chronological Snobbery, and a Whole Lot of Category Errors

2011-05-04T23:15:00.003-05:00

ERIC SAID:

I suggested that in ancient times, religion was created to explain the nature of the world around us in the culture and lack of science of the day, during the Bronze Age and Iron Age.

Ancient people had questions, such as: Why are we here? Why do we die? What happens when we die? Why do we get sick? Why do some people live long lives and others don’t? When people get injured, why is there incredible pain? Why do bad things happen to people? Why does nature (natural disasters) kill people?

This is an exercise is Bulverism: providing an explanation for why a person accepts a false proposition, without first demonstrating its falsity. Eric assumes that Christianity is false, and attempts to explain it away, without first offering any demonstration of the falsity of Christianity.

When people today claim that any ancient mythology or pseudoscience (Such as all religions, vodou, astrology, psychics, and etc.) explain the nature of how our world works, in the scientific age, I submit that these institutions are simply attacking our reason, rationality and reality.

The phrase "the nature of how our world works" is equivocal. If Eric is referring to the physical laws of nature, then Christianity, qua Christianity, does not purport to offer an explanation. The Christian worldview makes the scientific enterprise possible and meaningful, but the religion proper of Christianity does not concern the details of physical laws of nature. On the other hand, metaphysics is more fundamental than physics, and Christianity, qua Christianity, does have a number of things to say about the ultimate nature of reality. However, such things are not empirically discernible, and are beyond the realm of science. Indeed, the very possibility and meaningfulness of the scientific enterprise is not something that can be discovered or justified using the scientific method. Eric seems very confident in science as the means for discovering truth - yet science can say nothing about the use of science as a means for discovering truth.

Even more so, in denigrating Christianity, Eric denigrates the one thing that can make the scientific enterprise a meaningful and profitable venture. The God of Christianity provides a proper basis for meaning, rationality, communication, logical inference, etc. If God does not exist, and nature is all that there is, then a man's thoughts are simply the result of a chemical reaction in his brain. There is no reason to assert that such a chemical reaction produces a proposition (itself an incoherent concept, given naturalism) that corresponds to reality. There is no reason to assert that the chemical reactions in the brain of one person correspond in any meaningful way to the chemical reactions in the brain of another. There is no evidence for any of these things. On naturalism, two people having a debate on religion is essentially indistinguishable from two shaken soda cans fizzing on a table. Yet, in spite of these limitations, Eric has the audacity to claim that Christianity attacks "our reason, rationality and reality," when in reality, his worldview, when taken on its own terms, has no reason, rationality, or grasp on reality. In attacking the one worldview which can provide an account of reason and rationality, Eric is not unlike a man who argues against the existence of air while using his voice, or one who climbs into a tree and proceeds to saw off the limb he is sitting on.

If “God” gave you a brain, why doesn’t God want you use to use your brain to think about the validity of the Biblical truth claims? What possible harm could result to a person who is honestly thinking about whether their religion is true or not?

The issue is not the evaluation of truth claims. The truth claims of Christianity can be evaluated for coherence rather easily. The issue is whether or not it is reasonable to step outside of the worldview that can ground rationality, and question its reasonableness from a position of irrationality. Such a course of action is absurd and self-defeating.

Please convince me that sin is a valid concept which governs our lives? Christians typically respond to me like this, “Well the Bible says sin is real and that’s that.” My question back to you is, “Why should I believe an ancient writer who knew very little about the nature of our world we live in?”

My question is, why do people today still believe in the writings of ancient primitive men who knew very little about the way the world works? Now that we are in the Scientific Age and know much more about how the world works, why do people refuse to believe in validity of scientific evidence, experimentation and theories as we know them today?

Here we have Eric engaging in yet another logical fallacy, this time Chronological Snobbery. People who lived in the past were ignorant about some things, ergo they must have been ignorant about everything. Of course, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander - I wonder what Eric would think of the fact that, 2000 years from now, a more "enlightened" individual not so different from himself would probably consider his views to be nothing but rubbish, for the simple fact that he lived in the 21st century.

However, such a view ignores the Christian view of Scripture, as the Bible is divine revelation, and thus not the product of human ignorance. So, noting the time period of the human author and the state of knowledge at that period is irrelevant to the veracity of Scriptural truth-claims.

In addition, such a view also commits a category error. Knowledge of metaphysics and knowledge of physics are two different things, and the possession of one implies nothing about the possession of the other. So, even though the ancients may have been more ignorant concerning the laws of nature, this has no bearing on their state of knowledge concerning metaphysical truths.

Scientific theories as based on facts meaning scientific theories are true, that is, with the current facts as we know them.

One can coherently say that a scientific theory has not been falsified. One can coherently say that a scientific theory is consistent with all observed phenomena. However, it is no more rational to claim that a particular scientific theory is true than it is rational to claim that it is true all swans are white, because we have only seen white swans. The result of any inductive inference (such as are all of the conclusions of science) is indefinitely open to uncertainty, as the truth of the premises do not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Moreover, if past scientific theories were true simply because they were consistent with known facts in the past, and are untrue now because they are inconsistent with facts known now, then truth must change over time - an absurd and incoherent concept.

The same is true with the Theory of Evolution. Evolution is a fact.

Another equivocation. It is true that evolution is an observable phenomenon. It is another matter altogether as to whether the different kinds of organisms that exist owe their origin to an evolutionary process, as opposed to divine design and creation.

When discussing religion, I think one of the key questions we all need to ask ourselves is this: Do I want to know the true nature of the world, at all costs?

Science says, if we don’t know, let’s find out. Science says, if we can't figure it out, we are okay with this. We are okay with not knowing all the answers.

Once again, Eric is committing a category error. Science can produce probable theories of phenomena within the physical world, but it cannot say anything about the "nature" of the world (i.e. metaphysics). The very fact that science is limited to methodological naturalism rules out the discovery of anything outside of nature by its use. And this includes the "true nature of the world," which is metaphysical.

Science allows for criticism and revision. What does religion say? We know. (And we don’t like criticism or revision.) See the difference?

Eric is acting as if Christianity and science are mutually contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Rather, divine revelation (as the basis of Christianity) provides us with knowledge of God and ultimate truths. Scientific inquiry provides us with working, probable theories about the natural world that we make use of in our everyday lives. Revision is proper in an epistemic enterprise where one is reasoning inductively from evidence. Revision is improper in an epistemic enterprise where one is reasoning deductively from authoritative revelation. To compare these two as if they were somehow equivalent is to, once again, commit a category error.

Topic 1: The Myth Of Original Sin.

Religion says that eating the apple from the tree of knowledge is humanity's greatest downfall. Why would anyone want to believe in a religion or belief system which devalues our humanity? What is humanity's greatest single asset? Our curiosity and quest for knowledge. Our quest for knowledge is not a liability.

Another category error: what a person would desire to do in a given situation has no bearing on what that person would be obligated to do in that situation. What a person desires to be true has no bearing on what is actually the case. Divine revelation is truth, and a person is obligated to believe and obey the word of God.

This also presumes that God's command not to eat of the tree somehow devalued humanity. Even if that was granted, ad arguendo, would it not be a much greater devaluation for humanity to fall, be affected by sin, and suffer judgement as a result? But there is no reason to grant that denying Adam and Eve the right to gain experiential knowledge of evil was in any way a devaluation of their humanity. Unmarred by sin, they could have gained far more knowledge far more quickly, and far less fallaciously, than we can today. Because of the noetic effects of sin, we are limited in our knowledge-gaining capacities, and far more vulnerable to accepting fallacious conclusions. Eric has it backwards - if Adam and Eve had not eaten of the tree, they could have participated much more fully in their "quest for knowledge" than we are able to now, because of the consequences of their sin. Never mind that Adam and Eve also walked with God, enabling them to learn any number of things from the omniscient Creator, simply by asking. Having such a source of knowledge at their disposal, it is nothing short of absurd to claim that putting the experiential knowledge of evil off limits was somehow a limitation to the growth of human knowledge.

The tree of good and evil. Knowing there is right and wrong, morals and immoral ways of doing things is not a bad thing, it's a good thing. We have to know right from wrong to live a healthy life and have a healthy society.

Yet another category error. Not having experiential knowledge of evil does not entail not possessing morals so as to not have a healthy life or a healthy society. Adam and Eve had God's commands, and knew them to be obligatory. Had they followed them, they would have lived righteous, healthy lives, and would have formed a healthy society.

Rather, Eric has it backwards. It was their disobedience in seeking the experiential knowledge of evil that led to the fall of the human race, its captivity to sin, and all of its consequences that we see today (such as broken lives and societies).

Topic 2: Scapgoating.

Many ancient cultures practiced scapegoating and human sacrifice. Why would the Biblical God copy scapegoating and sacrificial rituals from past religions and cultures? Why didn’t God make new rituals for Christianity and make it a completely unique religion?

Yet another assertion in search of an argument. Who is Eric to claim that the pagan religions did not borrow from God, instead of vice versa? Was he there? Or is he simply trying to make his opinions normative without proper warrant?

God can make up any rule he wants, right? Of course!

Apparently, Eric is unfamiliar with 2 Tim. 2:13, which states that God cannot deny Himself. God cannot violate His nature.

Why not simply forgive everyone of their sin?

For someone who "used to accept" the teachings of Christianity, Eric seems woefully unfamiliar with some of the most basic doctrines, such as the holiness of God.

Why make sin?

Who says that God "made" sin? Is Eric going to deal with Christianity, or content himself with setting fire to straw men?

God is perfect, he needs nothing. Why do we have to pray? Why would a perfect God be offended if you do not believe?

Yet another category error. Absence of need has nothing to do with what God commands, or why He commands it. Absence of need has nothing to do with holiness, and God's righteous response to sin.

“Is it moral to believe that your sins can be forgiven by the punishment of another person? Is it ethical to believe this? I submit that the doctrine of vicarious redemption by human sacrifice is utterly immoral. A positively immoral doctrine that abolishes the concept of personal responsibility on which all ethics and morality must depend.” –Christopher Hitchens

After launching a battery of rather otiose questions, Eric concludes with a quote from Christopher Hitchens. Apparently, all of this is supposed to carry probative force against Christianity. Or something like that.

Hitchens' quote is fraught with problems, not the least of which is the absurdity of claiming belief in a Christian doctrine to be immoral, when Hitchens' atheism provides no rational or coherent ground for making moral judgements. There's also the canard that vicarious atonement removes personal responsibility (a falsehood that the Apostle Paul also contended with - cf. Rom. 6:1). Beyond this, Hitchens' quote is simply emotionally-charged pulpit-pounding - yet another assertion in search of an argument.

Some Changes to the Blog

2011-05-03T00:30:00.001-05:00

As you may have noticed, the address of this blog has changed to blog.vox-veritatis.com. Since the blog is hosted on Blogger, the old URL still works as well, though Blogger redirects to the new URL.

As the new domain name suggests, I'm in the process of setting up a new site, at www.vox-veritatis.com. My intention is to use the site to host articles and other resources that would be awkward or impossible to host on Blogger. I intend to keep this blog here at Blogger, for now, and continue blogging, as the Lord permits. It is my intention to populate the new site with materials that serve to edify believers and build up the Body of Christ, especially in response to doctrinal falsehoods and attacks against the Faith once for all delivered to the saints.

Soli Deo Gloria!

New PDF Version of the Ehrman Review

2011-04-29T14:30:00.004-05:00

Note: this content is available in a better format here.

I've put together a new PDF version of the review and theodicy that Rhology and I posted back in January.

The new version, written in LaTeX, is much more pleasant on the eyes, and more suitable for distribution.

God's Problem: Review and Solution

God and the Paradox of the Stone, Part III

2011-02-07T18:00:00.002-06:00

Continuing from the previous post, I argue that the so-called "Paradox of the Stone" is really an instance of a larger class of paradoxes regarding immutable created objects. I then argue that all such paradoxes have a resolution in the impossibility of immutable created objects, given the notions developed in the previous post.

Immutable Created Objects

The Paradox of the Stone revolves around a hypothetical stone that cannot be lifted. As argued previously, the argument should really concern a stone whose property of height cannot be changed. However, there is no reason to restrict this paradox to a stone and its height. What about a stone so heavy, that it can't be moved (horizontally)? Or a speeding bullet with so much kinetic energy that it can't be stopped? One could also talk about other attributes, such a color, though those are less intuitively paradoxical. How about rose so strongly and deeply red, that it's color can't be changed?

The Paradox of the Stone is simply an instance of a broader category of paradoxes concerning immutable created objects (ICOs). To define an ICO, I first define an object that is immutable with respect to a property P:

An object x is immutable with respect to P if, after x is brought into existence, Px cannot cease to be true.

Let an ICO then be defined as follows:

An object is an immutable created object if and only if 1) the object was brought into existence by God, and 2) the object is immutable with respect to one or more non-essential properties.

Weight and height are two non-essential properties of stones. A stone that weighs 5 kg is as much of a stone as one weighing 1 kg. A stone positioned at 1 m above sea level is as much of a stone as one positioned at 50 m above sea level. The whole issue, then, comes down to whether or not it is coherent to say that a stone can be immutable with respect to height, or more generally, if it is coherent to say that a created object can be immutable with respect to any non-essential property.

At first glance, it does indeed seem incoherent to say that an object created by God can be immutable with respect to any non-essential property. After all, God sustains the existence of every object that He creates. Thus, by God's relation to the created cosmos as creator and sustainer, every created object can be released into non-existence if God were to stop sustaining its existence. But if God can take an object from existence to non-existence, then such an object is not an ICO. Consider the following deduction:

1. Let x denote an ICO, which immutable with respect to some non-essential property P.
2. Suppose that God were to bring x into existence.
3. In such a case, Px could not cease to be true.
4. By capability 2, God can make x cease to exist.
5. If x ceases to exist, then Px ceases to be true.
6. Suppose further that God makes x cease to exist.
7. In such a case, Px ceases to be true.
8. In such a case, (7) contradicts (3).

The natural conclusion of such a deduction is to claim that the ICO is an incoherent concept. After all, if God can sustain the existence of an object, then He can take it out of existence, at which point its properties would cease to hold. Whence then is the notion of an ICO? Even more so, if God can create sustain an object, as it is, then a fortiori, He can change its properties to some other value. After all, what is harder - to create an object ex nihilo with a certain set of properties and sustain its existence having those properties, or to change a particular non-essential property of some such object? Or in context, which is more difficult - to create and sustain a stone with a certain weight and at a certain height, or simply to change its height? Thus, the only rational option is to conclude that the ICO is an incoherent concept on the Christian worldview. And if it is incoherent, then all arguments that make use of such a concept carry no probative force against Biblical Christianity.

However, for the sake of a thorough analysis, the general form of a paradox employing the ICO will be given, and a formal rebuttal to all such arguments will follow. The general form of an ICO-paradox is as follows:

1. Let x denote an ICO, which is immutable with respect to some non-essential property P.
2. Omnipotence entails the ability to bring any object into existence.
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to change the non-essential properties of any created object.
4. If an omnipotent being is able to bring x into existence, then such a being will be unable to change the non-essential properties of x, such that Px is no longer true (from (1)).
5. Therefore, in this case, an omnipotent being has the ability to bring an object into existence, the non-essential properties of which he cannot change (from (2) and (4)).
6. Therefore, if a being can bring x into existence, such a being is not omnipotent, because one of the necessary consequences of omnipotence (3) is violated by the existence of such an object.
7. If a being is unable to bring x into existence, such a being is not omnipotent, because one of the necessary consequences of omnipotence (2) is violated by the inability to bring such an object into existence.
8. Either object x can be brought into existence by a given being, or it cannot be brought into existence by that being.
9. In either case, the being in question is not omnipotent.
10. Therefore, an omnipotent being is impossible.

To get the Paradox of the Stone, simply let x denote a stone, and let Px denote "x is at some height."

The Paradox Resolved

ICO-paradoxes fail to provide a sound internal critique of Christianity, because premise (2) is not a proposition of the Christian worldview. This can be seen clearly with reference to the relation of God to the created cosmos. This is demonstrated by the following argument:

1. By capability 3, God has the ability to change the non-essential properties of any object, subject to LCC.
2. By capability 1, God has the ability to bring any hypothetical object into existence, subject to LCC.
3. Suppose, from (2), that God can bring x into existence, where x is any ICO, immutable with respect to a non-essential property P.
4. From (3), God cannot change x's properties, such that Px is not true.
5. (4) contradicts (1).
6. But by LCC, God cannot bring x into existence, since such would result in a state of affairs (5) that is logically contradictory.
7. Therefore, God cannot bring an ICO into existence.
8. By the definition of omnipotence, an omnipotent being can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.
9. The existence of an ICO induces a logically impossible state of affairs (from (6)).
10. From (8) and (9), the inability to create an ICO is logically compatible with the existence of an omnipotent being.
11. God is omnipotent.
12. Therefore, God's inability to bring an ICO into existence (7) is logically compatible with His omnipotence (10).

Thus, in order to be a sound internal critique, premise (2) of the general ICO-paradox should be changed to the following, to represent a proposition of the Christian worldview:

2′. Omnipotence entails the ability to bring any object into existence, the creation of which would not induce a logically impossible state of affairs.

From this, all ICO-paradoxes are resolved in the following manner:

1. Let x denote an ICO, which is immutable with respect to some property P.
2′. Omnipotence entails the ability to bring any object into existence, the creation of which would not induce a logically impossible state of affairs.
3. The existence of an ICO induces a logically impossible state of affairs (from the previous argument, (9)).
4. From (1) and (3), the existence of x induces a logically impossible state of affairs.
5. The existence of an omnipotent being is logically compatible with the inability to create an ICO (from the previous argument, (10); note also that (2′) doesn't apply, since x induces a logically impossible state of affairs).
6. From (5), the existence of an omnipotent being is logically compatible with the inability to create x.

Hence, the ICO-paradox disappears. With the disappearance of the ICO-paradox in general, specific paradoxes, like the "Paradox of the Stone," also disappear. With their disappearance, so also disappears this particular objection to the existence of an omnipotent being, and thus the more specific objection to the existence of God.

Conclusion

Up examination, the so-called "Paradox of the Stone" fails to carry any probative force against the existence of God, on the Christian worldview. On the contrary, the paradox is an instance of a more general class of paradoxes concerning immutable created objects. Far from providing a counterexample to omnipotence, immutable created objects serve to illustrate the logical and meaningful nature of omnipotence, in excluding logically impossible states of affairs.

Soli Deo Gloria!

God and the Paradox of the Stone, Part II

2011-02-05T01:00:00.006-06:00

Continuing from the previous post, I discuss the omnipotence of God and His relation to the created cosmos, in the context of a critique of the so-called "Paradox of the Stone."

Scripture and the Omnipotence of God

The omnipotence of God is plainly asserted in Scripture. This is seen in Matt. 19:26, which states:

But Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

In context, Jesus is talking about the salvation of the rich, in general, and the rich young ruler, in particular. To before, in v. 24, Jesus had said that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the kingdom of God." The disciples responded by asking who could be saved (v. 25). The answer that no man cannot save himself, but God can save any man - the salvation of even the most hardened sinner is possible for God.

Another strong assertion of omnipotence is made in Lk. 1:37, which says that "nothing will be impossible with God." In context, the angel Gabriel has appeared to Mary, and told her that she will be the mother of Christ. Mary asks how being a mother is possible, given that she is a virgin (v. 34). Gabriel responds by stating that the conception will not occur by natural means, but by supernatural means (v. 35). Moreover, to encourage Mary in God's ability to do the physically impossible, Gabriel relates how Elizabeth has also conceived a child in old age. The reason that both of things things can happen is that nothing is impossible with God (v. 37).

The meaning in both of these verses is that things which would otherwise be impossible for other beings are possible for God. Man cannot save himself. But God can save him. Virgins cannot conceive. But, through God, this is possible. The notion of impossibility here is not absolute and logical, but rather regards what is impossible for man, or practically impossible. Consider that while man cannot save himself, man can be saved. There is nothing that is logically impossible about a man being saved. What is impossible is for a man, by his own efforts or agency, to bring himself into the Kingdom of God. The impossibility that Jesus speaks of is not logical impossibility, but what is impossible for man. Likewise, when the angel Gabriel proclaims that nothing will be impossible with God, he is not speaking of logical impossibility, but of things that are practically impossible - impossible by physical means. Thus, these verses should not be taken as asserting that God can do things that are logically impossible, such as creating a square circle, or making 2+2 equal 5. Such a broad notion of possibility is not in view, and this can be seen in that the things which are specifically stated as possible for God, but impossible otherwise, are not themselves logically impossible. A rich man coming into the Kingdom, or a virgin conceiving a child, are not logical impossibilities. Rather, they are practical impossibilities. Thus, in asserting God's omnipotence, Scripture is not asserting a nonsensical notion (that God can do what is logically impossible), but rather that God can do what is impossible for man, or things that, while being logically impossible, are practically impossible.

A Stipulative Definition of Omnipotence

The word omnipotence, etymologically, has the meaning of "possessing all power." It is this sense that I believe captures the meaning of the word as it is used in theological discourse. Of course, if one possesses all power, it begs the question as to what "power" is. I define power as a relation between an agent, a state of affairs, and means that can be utilized to bring about that state of affairs. More precisely,

An agent A possesses power, with respect to some state of affairs X, iff A possesses the means to bring X about.

Colloquially, an agent A "has the power to do X" if A is able to bring X about. This accords with how we naturally think of power. A politically-powerful person has the clout to motivate people to action and make certain things happen. A monetarily-powerful person has the power to command labor (through monetary means), and thus bring certain things about. Even when speaking of energy sources, "power" is an appropriate term, as it speaks of providing the means by which a particular machine or device can operate and perform its designed function.

With this notion of power, omnipotence can be defined as follows:

An agent A is omnipotent iff for every logically possible state of affairs X, A possesses the power to bring X about.

This accords well with the common understanding of omnipotence as "all-powerful." There are many logically possible states of affairs that are impossible for men to bring about. For example, man cannot create ex nihilo, but God has this ability. Man cannot change his heart from rebellion against God to submission to His Word (cf. Rom. 8:7), but God can do this. Every possible thing, God can do - even (and especially) things impossible for man.

It should be noted that the definition of omnipotence concerns every logically possible state of affairs. Thus, an omnipotent being need not possess the means to bring about a logically impossible state of affairs. Moreover, if a state of affairs is impossible, then there are no means by which it can be brought about. Such means do not exist. Therefore, an omnipotent being cannot possess means to bring about states of affairs that are impossible, for it is logically impossible for any being to possess something that does not exist. Furthermore, to say that it is within a being's power to do the logically impossible is meaningless, since such a proposition has no truth conditions under which it could be true. Thus, to require of omnipotence the ability to do the logically impossible is to render the concept itself meaningless.

A Stipulative Notion of God's Relation to the Created Cosmos, as Creator and Sustainer

In order to discuss God's relation to the created cosmos in an analytical manner, I propose the following schema:

There is a set of hypothetical objects, denoted H. These are things that God could bring into existence.

There is a set of actual objects, denoted A. These are things that God has brought into existence. It follows that A is a subset of H.

For each object, there is a set of properties or predicates that are true of that object. For some object x, Px denotes that the property P is true of x. For example Px might mean "x is red" if P denotes the property of "redness."

Given this schema, one can define (a subset of) God's capabilities with respect to the created cosmos accordingly:

God can make any hypothetical object actual. That is, He can bring a now-hypothetical object into existence at some point in the future.

God can make any actual object hypothetical. That is, He can take a now-actual object out of existence at some point in the future.

God can change the properties of any object. That is, He can take an object for which Px is now true, and make things such that Px is not true in the future.

The above capabilities are defined subject to the constraint that any state of affairs resulting from the exercise of any of these capabilities be logically consistent. Let this be called the Logical Consistency Constraint, or LCC.

This schema and list of capabilities are not arbitrary, but follow from a Biblical theology. Consider that God alone has independent existence - it is He alone of which it can be said "He is that He is," or in the first-person, "I AM THAT I AM" (Ex. 3:14). Everything that has been created exists in dependence upon Him - He has brought all created things into existence, and He sustains that which exists. As Col 1:16-17 states, "in him [Christ] all things were created...He is before all things, and in him all things hold together." Furthermore, Heb. 1:3 states that Christ "upholds all things by the word of His power." It should be noted that the word for "upholds" is the Greek pherwn, which is an active participial form of the verb pherw. Thus, Christ's upholding of creation is not something that is passive, as if the universe, being created, is simply there and that's it. God takes an active role in sustaining that which He has created.

LCC also follows from Scripture. Christ, through whom everything was made that has been made (Jn. 1:3), is the Logos (Jn. 1:1), not the Chaos. The word logos has a range of meaning, such as word, an idea, a discourse, and not least of all, reason and logic. However, the principle of logical order underlies all of these meanings. To suggest that the Logos could bring into existence a logically contradictory state of affairs is not only logically absurd, but also Biblically absurd.

Now consider the following:

God has brought into existence things that did previously not exist. Hence, capability (1) above.

If God were to cease sustaining that which He sustains, it would cease to exist. God has the capability to cease sustaining that which exists (else, it would not be said that Christ actively upholds that which exists - something that is done actively can be ceased through cessation of that activity). Hence, capability (2) above.

If God has brought into existence that which exists, He has also designed those things to be as they are. Furthermore, the sustaining of that which has been created involves sustaining things as they are - that is, the preservation of object properties. But that which is actively preserved can be changed or cease to be preserved. Hence, capability (3) above.

To Be Continued...

In the next and final post, I will argue that the "unliftable stone" is a member of a more general class of immutable created objects. I will then argue that the paradox has a simple resolution, given the different notions developed in this series.

God and the Paradox of the Stone, Part I

2011-02-03T01:00:00.001-06:00

In this post series, I will examine an old argument for the impossibility of an omnipotent being. Since the God of the Bible is omnipotent, if omnipotence is impossible, then God is impossible. The argument in its common form centers around a stone that is too heavy for God to lift. In this series, I argument, and show that it carries no probative force against Biblical Christianity.

The Paradox of the Stone

The so-called "Paradox of the Stone" is an argument that purports to demonstrate the impossibility of an omnipotent being. The classical argument is as follows:

1) Suppose there is a stone that is so heavy, it cannot be lifted by any being.
2) Can an omnipotent being bring such a stone into existence?
---If so, he cannot lift it, which rules out omnipotence.
---If not, he is not omnipotent either, by virtue of not being able to create such a stone.
3) Therefore, an omnipotent being is impossible.

As presented, the argument seems forceful enough. However, to enable a more detailed analysis of the argument, I will present a more rigorous version, as follows:

1. Let X denote a stone that cannot be lifted (by any being).
2. Omnipotence entails the ability to bring any object into existence.
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to change the non-essential properties of any created object.
4. If an omnipotent being is able to bring X into existence, then such a being will be unable to change its height (from (1)).
5. Therefore, in this case, an omnipotent being has the ability to bring an object into existence, the non-essential properties of which he cannot change (from (2) and (4)).
6. Therefore, if a being can bring X into existence, such a being is not omnipotent, because one of the necessary consequences of omnipotence (3) is violated by the existence of such an object.
7. If a being is unable to bring X into existence, such a being is not omnipotent, because one of the necessary consequences of omnipotence (2) is violated by the inability to bring such an object into existence.
8. Either object X can be brought into existence by a given being, or it cannot be brought into existence by that being.
9. In either case, the being in question is not omnipotent.
10. Therefore, an omnipotent being is impossible.

Premises (2) and (3) intuitively seem to capture the common notion of omnipotence. The rest of the argument follows from the way things are defined in premises (1)-(3).

From this, one can then argue that God is impossible:

1. God is omnipotent.
2. An omnipotent being is impossible (from the Paradox of the Stone).
3. Therefore, God is impossible.

The arguments presented above are formally valid. The issue is whether or not they comprise a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity. It is this issue with which the rest of the post is concerned.

The FAIL

This arguments fail to comprise a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity. Premise (2) of the impossibility argument is not a proposition of the Christian worldview. Ergo, the argument fails to carry any probative force against Biblical Christianity. On the contrary, the Biblical worldview asserts the following:

1. The Bible says that God is omnipotent.
2. The Bible says that God exists.
3. Therefore, an omnipotent being exists.
4. Therefore, an omnipotent being is possible.

The Christian worldview rejects the impossibility of an omnipotent being. But if the impossibility of an omnipotent being is accepted on the basis of the paradox of the stone, then the Christian must assert that something is wrong with that argument as well. As I will argue later, the Christian need not be committed to premise (2) - that an omnipotent being necessarily has the ability to bring any object into existence. Rather, the Christian need only be committed to the ability of an omnipotent being to bring objects into existence that do not induce logically impossible states of affairs. If the Christian has no reason to accept premise (2), then the Christian has no reason to accept the conclusion - that an omnipotent being is impossible. Rather, the rejection of that conclusion is warranted from what Scripture says about God.

Some Initial Problems with the Paradox

Before going into a detailed analysis of the paradox, however, an initial critique can be made of its coherence. It is questionable how meaningful it is to talk about God "lifting stones." The act of lifting is an embodied act, usually consisting of using one's arms to physically raise an object off of the ground. But God is not embodied. So the notion of lifting, per se, does not apply to Him, as it applies to embodied creatures.

Furthermore, the notion of weight is meaningless when applied to God's action of moving something. If God were to move an object directly (say to make my computer monitor hover a foot above my desk), He would not do so through physical means. That is, He would not use some physical appendage (or instrument worked by a physical appendage) to exert a force on my monitor, greater than its weight, until it reaches a height of 1 foot above my desk, and then continue to exert a force equal to its weight, so that it can remain at that height. Rather, God could simply will for the monitor to be positioned 1 foot above my desk, and that would be the end of things. Weight is only significant if one is interacting with a physical object using physical means. If one is not using physical means, then an object's weight is independent of those means. God does not create or sustain directly through physical means. Therefore, to speak of something being "too heavy" for God to lift is meaningless, since 1) God would not "lift" an object if He were to move it upwards, and 2) the means by which God would move the object are independent of its weight.

Now, an incoherent argument cannot carry any probative force. Thus, if the above paradox is to carry any probative force against Christianity, premise (1) must not speak incoherently of God's agency. The only way to do this and keep the notion of the stone being "unliftable" is to change the premise to speak of modifying the height of the object, such as:

1′. Let X denote a stone, the height of which cannot be modified (by any being).

But it does not seem coherent to talk about a stone, the height of which God cannot change. After all, if God can work in the world directly, solely by virtue of the exercise of his will, and thus without the use of any physical processes, then how is it that God could not modify the height of any particular stone? After all, weight is not an issue, as God's means of direct interaction with the world are independent of the weight of physical objects. Thus, if the paradox does not speak about God's agency incoherently in premise (1), then the paradox becomes incoherent in that same premise by how it speaks of God's capabilities with respect to created objects. Thus, on an initial analysis, the paradox cannot be coherently stated on Christian principles. And if it cannot be coherently stated on Christian principles, then it cannot carry any probative force as an internal critique of the Christian worldview.

However, to more fully analyze the issue, a more detailed, Biblically-consistent notion of omnipotence will be given, as well as a description of what it means for God to be the creator and sustainer of the cosmos. With these notions in hand, the paradox will be resolved in detail in the final post of this series.

To Be Continued...

In the next post, I will discuss what it means for God to be omnipotent, as well as the creator and sustainer of the created cosmos.

Mary as "The Mother of God"

2011-01-29T01:00:00.004-06:00

The assertion that Mary is the "mother of God" is common throughout Christianity. In this post, I demonstrate that such an assertion is confused and ungrammatical at best, unorthodox and heretical at worst. I argue that if we love God and our fellow believers, we should abandon its use in favor of an expression that is more grammatically and theologically sound.

The Expression In a Literal Sense

The expression under discussion is "Mary is the mother of God." The question is in what sense the term "God" is to be taken. In common, ordinary speech, when someone says "X is the mother of Y," both X and Y are intended as beings. For instance, one might say that "This woman is the mother of that child." In this case, the terms "this woman" and "that child" denote human beings. Alterantively, one might say "this dog is the mother of that puppy," in which case the terms "this dog" and "that puppy" refer to beings, though not persons. The phrase can also be used in a metaphorical sense, such as if one says that a woman is the mother of an idea, or a movement, or an organization. However, when used in its literal sense, the phrase "X is the mother of Y" refers to two beings, one of which stands in a motherhood relation to the other.

So, taking the phrase in its literal sense, when one says "Mary is the mother of God," one is asserting that the being denoted by the term "Mary" stands in a motherhood relation to the being denoted by the term "God." But such would be an unorthodox and heretical assertion, as it would make God a created (or partially-created) being, formed in the womb of Mary, rather than the Creator, who formed Mary's womb. Following this view, one would also have to say that Mary gave birth to the Trinity when Mary gave birth to Jesus, if Mary is the mother of God, in the literal sense. Therefore, no self-respecting Christian can take the expression in its literal sense.

The Expression In a Not-So-Strictly Literal Sense

One might say that of course, Mary is not the mother of God. But Jesus is God, and Mary is the mother of Jesus. So, in a sense, Mary is the mother of God! In response, I would simply note that such a hypothetical interlocutor is playing games with words. When one hears it stated that "Mary is the mother of God" for the first time, one does not stand up and say "Yes, I know exactly what you are talking about! You are saying that Mary is the mother of Jesus, who possesses deity!" Such an unnatural understanding is only inculcated through theological tradition. The natural understanding of such a phrase is to take it as asserting that Mary is actually the mother of God Himself (in His triunity and all). So, if Mary is the mother of Jesus, then why not simply use this attribution, instead of the far more problematic and ungrammatical assertion that she is the "mother of God"?

This not-so-strictly literal sense of the expression also has its own problems. The argument for the expression goes like this:

Jesus is God.

Mary is the mother of Jesus.

Therefore, Mary is the mother of God.

The issue is how premise (1) is to be interpreted. It can be either taken as a statement of identity (asserting that the referents of the terms "Jesus" and "God" are identical), or as a statement of predication (attributing deity of Jesus). As I have argued here, premise (1) can only be taken in the latter sense (predication), if one wishes to remain Biblical and coherent. Also, as I have demonstrated here, taking premise (1) in the former sense (identity) leads to a number of unorthodox absurdities.

However, this argument is only valid if premise (1) is taken as a statement of identity. This can be seen in the following formalized derivation:

Jesus = God

MotherOf(Mary, Jesus)

MotherOf(Mary, God) (Substitution of Identicals)

In the above argument, MotherOf(X,Y) should be taken as an assertion of a motherhood relation between X and Y - that is, that "X is the mother of Y." One can get to to (3) from (1) and (2) by the principle of the indiscernability of identicals. That is, if two terms denote the same entity, then everything predicated of the first is predicable of the second, and vice versa. Thus, if x and y are identical, and some property P is predicated of x, then P is also predicable of y.

However, this raises a problem for one wishing to maintain a Biblical and orthodox theology. The problem is that the terms "Jesus" and "God" are not identical. Triunity is predicable of God, but not of Jesus. Humanity is predicable of Jesus, but not of God. As previously stated, a number of absurdities that follow from taking "Jesus" and "God" to be identical terms are listed here.

Furthermore, if "Jesus is God" means that Jesus is identical to God, then there is no reason that "The Father is God" or "The Holy Spirit is God" should not also be taken the same way. But this further compounds the problem, as identity is a transitive relation. If x is identical to y, and y is identical to z, then x is identical to z. Identity is also symmetric. If x is identical to y, then y is identical to x. Thus, if "X is God" is to be taken as a statement of identity, Modalism is the result:

Jesus = God

The Father = God

The Holy Spirit = God

God = The Father (Symmetry of Identity - 2)

Jesus = The Father (Transitivity of Identity - 1,4)

The Holy Spirit = The Father (Transitivity of Identity - 3,4)

God = Jesus (Symmetry of Identity - 1)

The Holy Spirit = Jesus (Transitivity of Identity - 3,7)

This is exactly what Modalism entails - that the three persons of the Trinity are really just modes or manifestations of a single being. Thus, the three personages are logically identical, since they denote the same central being. Hence, taking "Jesus is God" in the sense of identity - the sense which purports to make sense of saying that "Mary is the mother of God", commits one to a modalistic view of the Trinity.

Of course, if "The Father is God" and "The Holy Spirit is God" are taken as statements of identity, then the following absurdities also follow:

The Father = God

God = The Father (Symmetry of Identity - 1)

MotherOf(Mary, God)

MotherOf(Mary, The Father) (Substitution of Identicals - 2,3)

The Holy Spirit = God

God = The Holy Spirit (Symmetry of Identity - 1)

MotherOf(Mary, God)

MotherOf(Mary, The Holy Spirit) (Substitution of Identicals - 2,3)

However, I know of no one who holds that "Mary is the mother of God" who would also hold that "Mary is the mother of the Father" or that "Mary is the mother of the Holy Spirit."

So, if one wishes to say that "Mary is the mother of God" by virtue of the fact that Mary is the mother of Jesus, then one must accept a principle that entails Modalism, as well as a host of un-Biblical and unorthodox theological absurdities.

The Proper Sense of the Expression

The proper interpretation of "Jesus is God" is as a predication of deity, such as saying that "Jesus possesses deity." Thus, the proper way to take the attribution "Mary is the mother of God" is to take it as stating that "Mary is the mother of a person that has deity." This is Biblical, but it is ungrammatical. As I have argued here, the word "God" can function as predication of deity when used with the copula "is." However, this is only the case with the verb "to be." For other verbs, which denote relations between objects, the object itself is meant if it is placed as the object of such a verb. There is no other expression in English where one says "X is the mother of Y" and the being denoted by Y is not really meant, but rather another being Z is meant, for which Y serves to predicate some property of Z. But this is exactly what happens when one says "Mary is the mother of God" in a Biblical sense if "God" is being used as a predicate - one is saying that God is not really meant, but rather some other entity, Jesus, (nowhere else mentioned in the expression) is meant, and that the term "God" acutally functions as a predicate (and not a term), to predicate deity of Jesus. Another, less absurd option is that the term "God" does not actually denote God, but rather God the Son. Jesus is identical to God the Son, so this is an orthodox interpretation. But even this is still ungrammatical, as the literal interpretation of "Mary is the mother of God" asserts Mary as the mother of God, the triune being, not a particular person of that triune being.

But one may ask - if there is an orthodox sense in which the statement can be taken, then why make such a big deal about it? Why not simply do as others have done for thousands of years and use the phrase for what Christians take it to mean, even if that sense is not what language dictates it to mean? I would argue that there are three reasons to avoid the use of this expression, in order of increasing significance.

First, the utility of grammatical simplicity militates against the use of this expression, as there are grammatically clearer expressions that can used instead. There is no need to to use unnecessarily ungrammatical language simply for the sake of tradition.

Second, using this expression leads to natural confusion. When a child or new believer hears this phrase for the first time, their natural reaction is not to immediately understand what Christians mean by the phrase. Rather, confusion and cognitive dissonance emerges, from trying to reconcile what language dictates the phrase should mean and what the Bible says one should believe about Jesus and Mary. The theological road is hard enough, and there are many pitfalls along the way. There is no reason to make things harder for those learning the doctrines of the faith, in continuing to use this expression. There is no benefit to using this expression over other clearer expressions that assert its intended meaning. So why then would anyone advocate the continued use of this expression, given the confusion it can create?

Third, this expression can be used as a starting point for equivocations in the meaning of the phrase "Jesus is God" that can lead one into unorthodox doctrines. For example, one who holds to monophysitism may wish to assert that Jesus' body is divine. Such a person may argue that "Jesus is God, whatever is of God is divine, so therefore Jesus' body is divine." Such an argument relies upon taking the phrase "Jesus is God" to be a statement of identity, and this is often taken from the argument commonly used to support the assertion that Mary is the "mother of God." Such a person may equivocate, using the phrase "Jesus is God" to assert identity in one context, and take it to predicate deity in another. Such a person may be unaware of his equivocation, simply believing that the sense in which "Jesus is God" is taken is appropriate, because it is used in the same way to justify the assertion that Mary is the "mother of God." Many such fallacious and unorthodox inferences could be avoided if the expression were taken out of use. Given the potential doctrinal confusion and error that can result from the use of this expression, why continue to use it?

I argue that, if for no other reason than for the love of our fellow believers, we should seek to avoid the use of the expression "Mary is the mother of God" in lieu of a grammatically clearer expression. Moreover, if we wish to honor God without our thoughts, then we should seek to express them clearly and plainly, saying what we mean, not purposefully obfuscating our intended meaning in ungrammatical expressions, if such can be avoided.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the expression "Mary is the mother of God" is problematic. If one accepts this expression in a literal, grammatical sense, then one is rationally committed to believing that God was formed in the womb of Mary around 4 BC. If one accepts the expression because one also accepts "Jesus is God" as a statement of identity, then one is rationally committed to Modalism and a whole host of other unorthodox absurdities. If one accepts the expression in an orthodox sense, and supports its use in that manner, then one is advocating an ungrammatical expression that is a potential source of confusion and error. Just because something is ensconced in our theological tradition does not mean that it cannot be improved upon. May we always seek that which is of sound mind, edifies the Church, and glorifies our Lord.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Drange and the Impossible Immaterial Person

2011-01-27T01:00:00.000-06:00

In this post, I consider the eighth of eleven arguments presented by Theodore Drange that purport to demonstrate the impossibility of God, from His possession of supposedly incompatible properties. This specific argument claims that it is impossible for a person (or personal being) to be immaterial, and therefore that God cannot exist.

The Argument

The argument, as presented by Drange, is as follows:

(1) If God exists, then he is nonphysical.
(2) If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).
(3) A person (or personal being) needs to be physical.
(4) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).

This argument is formally valid. The issue is whether or not it is a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity. It is this issue with which the rest of the post is concerned.

The FAIL

This argument fails to be a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity, because premise (3) is not a proposition of the Christian worldview. Ergo, the argument fails to carry any probative force against Biblical Christianity.

Premise (3) is not a proposition of the Christian worldview because the Christian has no reason, on Biblical principles, to accept it. On the contrary, he has Biblical reason to reject it. An argument for this is as follows:

1. The Bible says God is spirit.
2. Spirit is immaterial.
3. The Bible attributes personhood to God.
4. Therefore, personhood is logically compatible with being immaterial.

The conclusion of this argument refutes premise (3), which states that embodiment is a necessary condition of personhood. The justification that Drange presents for premise (3) is an appeal to rational intuition - that it isn't understood how an immaterial person can act or do things. However, such a justification carries no weight in the Christian worldview, as it elevates rational intuition above the authority of Scripture. If Scripture states X, we are rationally (and morally) obligated to accept X, even if it isn't entirely clear how X is the case. We should remember that "It is not entirely clear how X is true" is a much different claim than "It is entirely clear that X is false." To accept claims of the first kind over the clear witness of Scripture is to elevate one's own ignorance to a position of authority over the Word of God. If the critic wants to claim that an immaterial person is actually impossible, and not merely inconceivable (for the critic), then the critic needs to show that the existence of an immaterial person is logically impossible, given all that Scripture says about persons.

The Immaterial Personal God

Scripture asserts that God is spirit (Jn. 4:24). The word for spirit is the Greek pneuma, which in this context refers to an immaterial (spiritual) being, not perceivable by the senses (gloss #6 in Friberg's Lexicon). Moreover the Bible in numerous places attributes the activities of a person to God, such as acting (e.g., Gen. 1-2), and engaging in interpersonal communication (e.g. Gen. 1:26, 2:16, 3:8-22). My purpose is not to exhaust the scriptural witness on this matter, but merely to note that the above argument is sound, given the Christian worldview. And if it is sound, then the Christian not only has no reason to believe that a person (or personal being) needs to be physical, but also has a rational (and moral) obligation to believe otherwise.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Drange's argument fails to demonstrate that the God of Biblical Christianity does not exist, because on the Biblical worldview, personhood is logically compatible with being immaterial.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Review of Bart Ehrman on the Bible and Suffering

2011-01-25T01:00:00.005-06:00

Note: this content is available in a better format here.

"Where is God now?" inquires Dr. Bart Ehrman in his 2008 book, God's Problem. The subtitle goes on to state, "How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question - Why We Suffer." The further one delves into the book, however, the more one will discover that this claim is substantially inaccurate. A better title more accurately reflecting the book's content and thought would be: "My Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Why We Suffer to My Personal Satisfaction."

In the document linked below, Rhology and I review Dr Bart Ehrman's God's Problem and provide a Biblically-consistent answer to "our most important question" - why we suffer.

God's Problem: Review and Solution

Drange and the Impossible Perfect Creator, Part II

2011-01-23T01:00:00.005-06:00

Continuing from the previous post, I now consider the second of 11 arguments given by Theodore Drange in a previously published article. This argument also purports that a perfect creator is impossible, but argues in a different manner, asserting that a perfect creator cannot create an imperfect world.

The Argument

The argument, as presented by Drange, is as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. If a being is perfect, then whatever he creates must be perfect.
4. But the universe is not perfect.
5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

This argument is formally valid. The issue is whether or not it is a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity. It is this issue with which the rest of the post is concerned.

The FAIL

This argument fails to be a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity, because premise (3) is not a proposition of the Christian worldview. Ergo, the argument fails to carry any probative force against Biblical Christianity.

As I have argued previously, it is not sufficient to simply assume a notion of perfection, apply it to God, and argue that on that basis, God does not exist. Rather, one must use the Biblical notion of perfection, which is elucidated in part through deductions of the following form:

1) The Bible says God is perfect.
2) The Bible ascribes X of God.
3) Therefore, X is logically compatible with perfection (or the existence of a perfect being).

In this context, the argument is as follows:

1) The Bible says God is perfect.
2) The Bible states that God has created the universe, which is now marred by sin (and thus imperfect).
3) Therefore, creating a universe that is now marred by sin (and thus imperfect) is logically compatible with perfection (or the existence of a perfect being).

Given that the creation of a world that is now marred by sin is logically compatible with the existence of a perfect creator, the argument can be discussed in more detail.

The Imperfection of the Universe

Premise (4) of the argument seems obvious. If perfection is seen as maximal excellence, then that which is subjected to decay as a consequence of sin (cf. Rom. 8:20-21) cannot be perfect, because it is more excellent not to be subject to decay. Thus, it is Scripturally consistent to accept premise (4).

The issue then is with premise (3). But premise (3) is grammatically ambiguous - does Drange mean to imply that a perfect being can only create something that is perfect when it is created, or that a perfect being can only create something that remains perfect throughout the entirety of its existence? In the end, such a point isn't significant to the refutation of the argument, because Scripture asserts the logical compatibility of the existence of a perfect creator, God, with the existence of this universe, which He has created.

One might ask if the universe was created perfect to begin with. The answer to such a question requires the knowledge of the standards of perfection that apply to created universes, and such standards have not been revealed in Scripture. The Bible asserts that what God created, before the introduction of sin, was "very good" (Gen. 1:31). But something that is not perfect can still be "very good." Furthermore, men and angels, part of the created cosmos, had the ability to sin and bring suffering and decay into the world. One might argue that something that can possibly become corrupted cannot be perfect, as something which is necessarily incorruptible is more excellent than something that, while currently uncorrupted, is potentially corruptible.

Such questions, however, are ultimately moot in this context, because Scripture does not assert that the created cosmos was perfect. It only says that it was created "very good." And, as previously stated, Scripture states that God is perfect, that God has created everything that has come into existence, and that the world is corrupted by sin. If one wants to give a sound internal critique of Christianity, one must demonstrate the logical incompatibility of those three propositions, on Christian principles.

What a Perfect Creator Could Create

The issue of the initial perfection or imperfection of the created cosmos aside, Drange's argument is not a sound internal critique of Christianity, as the Christian has no reason to accept premise (3). If God has, in fact, created something imperfect, then such a fact would refute the proposition outright. If, on the other hand, God has never created anything imperfect, that would still not commit the Christian to accepting premise (3), as the Bible says nothing to eliminate the logical possibility of God creating something imperfect.

But all of this begs the question as to what a perfect creator is in the first place. I would posit that a creator is a being that has the ability to take a design and produce a finished product that exemplifies that design. The degree to which the created product corresponds to the intended design is the measure of "how well" the creator performed the act of creation. The act of creation concerns the relation of design to finished product, and is independent of any specific design or finished product itself. Thus, in measuring the excellence of a creator, the only feature to bring into consideration is the conformity of the finished product to the intended design, and nothing more. Put another way, a hypothetical creator has the ability to convert some number of possible designs into finished products. In judging how good of a creator such a being is, one would not evaluate the design of the finished product, but rather how well the finished product matches the intended design. To critique the design of the product is to critique the designer, who may not necessarily be the creator. To critique the creator, qua creation, is to evaluate how well the created product matches the intended design. Thus, a perfect creator can perfectly create an imperfect product, if the intended design itself specifies an imperfect product. To create a perfect product when an imperfect product is intended in the design, is to be an imperfect creator in this sense.

So, is God a perfect creator in this sense? Scripture states that God does whatever He pleases (Ps. 115:3), and this would not be true if He is unable to bring about exactly what He intends to bring about. Put another way, if God did not bring about (finished product) exactly what He intended to bring about (design), then it would not be true that God does whatever He pleases - rather, He would be doing something other than what He was wanting to do. Thus, God is a perfect creator, as in whatever He does, the finished product or result matches the intended design. One should note that this concept of "creation" is slightly oversimplified, as a sophisticated theological system would draw a distinction in God's activities between creation proper, and providence. In the sense used in this analysis, "creation" covers both concepts, as it simply refers to using the means at one's disposal to bring about a product or result that matches an intended design.

One might also evaluate perfection in terms of different designs that a creator could actualize into finished products. For example, one artisan might only be able to make pots, and not glassware, while another artisan makes tumblers, but cannot make pottery. Thus, one might draw a distinction between the quality of creation, in what a being can create (that is, how well the finished product matches the intended design), and the capability of the creator, in the number of things that he can create. In the latter sense, God is maximally excellent (and thus perfect), as nothing logically possible is beyond His ability to bring about.

So, if God is to be faulted for bringing this universe into existence, it is not for any imperfection in His creative capabilities, as what has come to pass is exactly what He has decreed (designed). Rather, if God is to be criticized, at this point, it can only be as an imperfect designer. That is, one might claim that God is an imperfect designer because He has designed a world that is imperfect, even though, as a perfect creator, He has brought to pass exactly what He intended to bring to pass. But is a designer imperfect if he has the ability to design something that is itself imperfect? Intuitively, it seems that a designer that has the ability to design both excellent and average things is more excellent than a designer that can only design excellent things. Put another way, if two designers can design all things of maximal excellence, and one can also design things of lesser excellence, then the designer that can design more things is more excellent than the designer that can only design fewer things. Applying this principle to God, it follows that He would not be a perfect designer if He were incapable of designing something of less than maximal excellence (that is, something that is imperfect). But as it is, God can design both the perfect and the imperfect, and as such, is a maximally excellent (perfect) designer.

Such an attribution is consistent with Scripture, as God, likened to a potter, claims both the right and the ability to create items of various degrees of excellence: "does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for common use?" (Rom. 9:21). The idea is that just as a potter can use some clay to create a beautiful vase, and other clay to create a bedpan, so also God can, through election and reprobation, choose a group of undeserving sinners to inherit life, while leaving the rest to carry on in their willful rebellion against Him. Though the metaphor is used in the context of discussion election and reprobation, the principle is valid in a more general context - God is able to make whatever He wants, be it something for honorable use or common, be it excellent or plain, perfect or imperfect. Even more so, designing and creating such a variety of things demonstrates His maximal excellence (perfection) as a designer and creator. Since the Bible claims that God is perfect, and that God can design/create things that are imperfect, it follows that God's existence as a perfect creator-designer is logically compatible with the creation of this world.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Drange's argument fails to demonstrate that the God of Biblical Christianity does not exist, because perfection, as exemplified by God, is logically compatible with having created a world that is now corrupted by sin (and thus imperfect). Furthermore, if a plausible, Biblically-consistent notion of perfection is adopted, it follows that being capable of creating something imperfect is more excellent than being incapable of creating such a thing. Thus, not only is creating something which is imperfect consistent with perfection, but God's creation of this world is an exemplification of His perfection.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Drange and the Impossible Perfect Creator, Part I

2011-01-21T01:00:00.009-06:00

In a journal article published over 12 years ago (available here), Theodore Drange offers an overview of 11 arguments that purport to demonstrate the impossibility of God. The arguments take the form of an incompatible attribute disproof - that is, that God has two or more attributes that are logically incompatible, therefore God does not exist. In this post, I will address the first argument given in the paper, which concludes that God is impossible, from the impossibility of a perfect creator.

The Argument

The argument, as presented by Drange, is as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. A perfect being can have no needs or wants.
4. If any being created the universe, then he must have had some need or want.
5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).

This argument is formally valid. The issue is whether or not it is a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity. It is this issue with which the rest of the post is concerned.

The FAIL

This argument fails to be a sound internal critique of Biblical Christianity, because premise (3) is not a proposition of the Christian worldview. Ergo, the argument fails to carry any probative force against Biblical Christianity.

As I have argued previously, it is not sufficient to simply assume a notion of perfection, apply it to God, and argue that on that basis, God does not exist. Rather, one must use the Biblical notion of perfection, which is elucidated in part through deductions of the following form:

1) The Bible says God is perfect.
2) The Bible ascribes X of God.
3) Therefore, X is logically compatible with perfection (or the existence of a perfect being).

In this context, the argument is as follows:

1) The Bible says God is perfect.
2) The Bible states that God has desires.
3) Therefore, having desires is logically compatible with perfection (or the existence of a perfect being).

Although this sums up the general failure of the argument, a few more things can be said.

God, Needs, and Desires

The Bible clearly states that God has no needs. In his address to the Areopagus, Paul declared that "the God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and does not live in temples built by human hands. And he is not served by human hands, as if he needed anything. Rather, he himself gives everyone life and breath and everything else" (Ac. 17:24-25). The idea is that God does not have any needs. On the contrary, everything comes from Him. He is the supplier of the needs of all other creatures, and as such He is self-sufficient, having no need of anything outside Himself.

On the other hand, the Bible does state that God desires various things. For example 1 Tim. 2:4 states that God desires all men (or all kinds of men) to be saved. Ps. 51:6 states that God desires integrity - "truth in the innermost being."

It is not my purpose to exhaust the Scriptural witness on this matter, but rather to simply point out that according to Scripture, 1) God has no needs, and 2) God does desire some things.

A Stipulative Notion of Perfection

For the sake of argument, a Biblically-consistent notion of perfection can be stipulated. Let a being be perfect with respect to some attribute if and only if (iff) that being is maximally excellent with respect to that attribute. By this notion, a being might be perfect with respect to some attributes, but imperfect with respect to others. For instance, a hypothetical person might be perfectly good, but ignorant of many things, and thus not perfect with respect to knowledge.

Furthermore, let a being X be perfect iff for every attribute A of X, X is perfect with respect to A. However, by this definition, there might be a number of different beings that are perfect, each having different sets of attributes. For instance, there might be a perfect lizard (which does not arguably have either moral goodness or badness) and a perfect man (who has moral goodness).

Finally, let a being be maximally perfect iff it is perfect and its set of attributes is maximally excellent. This allows for certain combinations of attributes to be compared according to their collective excellence. For instance, Christians would generally claim that God is maximally perfect, even though there are some perfections He does not possess. For instance, God is not a perfect gymnast, a perfect quarterback, and so on, because He is not embodied, and such perfections require embodiment. One might argue that any aspect of embodiment cannot be a true perfection, but such is inconsistent with how we use language and think of everyday things. I can certainly imagine some aspects what (I think) a perfect athlete would be like, even if one does not exist. But such a point is ultimately moot. Whether aspects of embodiment are perfections or not, such things can be excluded from the set(s) of maximally excellent attributes that specify what is true of a maximally perfect being.

To finish this stipulative notion of perfection, it remains to be stated what it means for a being to be maximally excellent with respect to an attribute. To resolve this issue, I propose the following schema:

For an attribute A, there is a set SA of values that attribute can obtain for any entity that possesses that attribute.

For each attribute A, there is a function MA that maps the elements of SA to ℝ (that is, the set of real numbers). MA can be thought of as a measurement of how excellent a particular attribute value is.

Let MaxA be the greatest value in ℝ to which MA maps one or more elements in SA.

An entity X is maximally excellent with respect to an attribute A if A(X) (the value of A that obtains for X) is identical to MaxA. Note that in practice, MA need not be explicitly defined. It suffices in this context to simply state what it means for an entity to be maximally excellent with respect to an attribute, even if this is not explicitly spelled out with respect to the actual attributes a specific entity might possess.

Maximal perfection is seen in that God's set of attributes is a maximally excellent set. Furthermore, whatever values of God's attributes obtain for Him, those values are maximally excellent (as defined by the respective MA's). That is, for every attribute A that God possesses, MaxA = MA(A(God)). This is simply a more formal way of stating what I have argued previously - namely, that God exemplifies perfection, and that to learn what perfection entails is to learn what and who God is. Thus, a being X is perfect with respect to an attribute A if God has attribute A, and MA(A(X)) = MaxA, which is identical to MA(A(God)).

Perfection, Needs, and Desires

Given the above stipulative notion of perfection, one can ask whether or not perfection is consistent with having needs, and then whether or not it is consistent with having desires.

I define a need here as something that is a necessary condition for the particular existence of some being. For example, food, air, and water are needs for human beings. Without such things, we will die. Note that when a human being dies, that person does not cease to exist - yet, death is a cessation of embodied existence. Hence the need for food, air, and water.

Can a perfect being have needs? God is perfect, and as shown above, God has no needs. Furthermore, it seems intuitive (and is Biblically consistent) that it is more excellent to exist independent of anything, than to be dependent upon something. Thus, with respect to whether or not one exists independently of anything, to have needs is to depend upon one or more things for one's particular existence, and thus is to fall short of perfection with respect to that attribute.

What about desires? Are desires compatible with a perfect being? As shown above, God has desires, so thus they are compatible with a perfect being. Furthermore, desires are not needs. One may desire something (such as a new widescreen TV) that one does not need. Conversely, one may not desire something that one does need. For instance, someone who is anorexic needs to eat food, but does not desire to eat.

Intuitively, desires are different than needs. Needs have to do with what is necessary for one to continue to exist a certain way, while desires are an expression of a personality - what a person desires is an expression of who that person is. A person without desires is but a shadow of what a person could be. A person without desires has no drive to do anything, much less to glorify God through the use of the capabilities given him. A person without desires would have no drive to create anything beautiful or excellent, or to do anything good. Intuitively, then, it is more excellent to be capable of having desires than to be incapable of this.

God would not be God if He did not seek His own glory. It is because God seeks His own glory (that is, He has a desire to express His nature and attributes) that we exist, and that the excellence and beauty and everything that is good and pleasing in this world exists. If God had no desires, there would be nothing in existence but God. But if God had no desires, He would not seek His own glory, and thus would not be God. Thus, God must have desires, and since He is perfect, it is more excellent to be capable of having desires than to be incapable of this.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Drange's argument fails to demonstrate that the God of Biblical Christianity does not exist, because perfection, as exemplified by God, is logically compatible with having desires. Furthermore, if a plausible, Biblically-consistent notion of perfection is adopted, it follows that a being incapable of having desires is imperfect, being less excellent than a being capable of having desires. Thus, not only is having desires consistent with perfection, but God's desires are an exemplification of that perfection.

Soli Deo Gloria!

God and Conceptions of Perfection

2011-01-20T02:30:00.001-06:00

A number of arguments against the existence of God involve the idea of God as a perfect being. In such arguments, a perfect being is claimed to be logically incoherent, or logically incompatible with some other things that exist. In this post, I seek to address all such arguments in a general manner by discussing the concept of perfection in general, and which specific conceptions of perfection can be appropriately applied to the God of the Bible.

What is the Proper Conception of Perfection?

Christians claim that God is perfect. Even Jesus Himself said that the Father is perfect (Matt. 5:48). So it is no surprise that the matter of God's perfection is, in general, beyond dispute among Christians. The important question is what one means by claiming that God is perfect. What exactly does perfection entail?

The Greek word for perfection used in Matt. 5:48 is teleios. The adjective can mean "perfect," as it is translated in Matt. 5:48, though it can also mean "complete" or "finished." The idea is that given some goal or ideal, an object is teleios if it matches that goal or ideal. So if God is teleios, what is the goal or ideal to which He obtains? Since nothing exists apart from God, there cannot be a standard, external to Himself, that He can be appropriately compared to. God is the standard for God. Thus, for God to be teleios is for God to be God. We see what it means for God to be perfect by seeing what and who God is. This does not mean that more general principles of perfection cannot be inferred from God's exemplification of perfection. What it does mean is that any general notion of perfection cannot be legitimately inferred and accepted independently of what Scripture reveals about God.

In the context of Matt. 5:48, we should note that Jesus is speaking of moral perfection, when He says "You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." The context is love for enemies. Just as God provides temporal blessings for His enemies (unrepentant sinners unreconciled to Him), so also we should do good to our enemies as well. The idea is that we should be like our heavenly Father. In a similar vein, Peter exhorts us to holiness, saying "but as he who called you is holy, you also be holy in all your conduct, since it is written, 'You shall be holy, for I am holy'" (1 Pe. 1:15-16). Jesus is not saying that we should possess all of God's perfections, for this would be impossible for man. But rather, with respect to righteousness, we should seek moral perfection, and to be morally perfect is to have a mind conformed to God's will - to desire what He desires and act accordingly. Thus, God exemplifies moral perfection, and we are to seek such perfection.

It is common, however, to define perfection apart from Scripture. This is done by using one's rational intuition to determine what a perfect being would or would not be like. There is nothing necessarily wrong with making use of rational intuition to speculate about the nature of perfection. Indeed, without the use of rational intuition, much of philosophy, as we know it, would not exist. A problem arises, however, when rational intuition is elevated in authority above Scripture. All propositions gained through rational intuition must conform to Scripture - otherwise, no matter how correct they may seem, they are to be rejected. Our minds have been corrupted by sin, and as such, we are not to be surprised that some of the things that seem intuitively correct to us are wrong. To think differently is to elevate one's own mind in authority above God, and to judge His word in light of what "seems right" to oneself. We should remember that "there is a way that seems right to a man, but its end is the way to death" (Prov. 14:12).

It is important to keep the proper place of rational intuition in mind, because arguments against the existence of God, using the idea of a perfect being, go something like this:

1. Perfection is entails Y (as defined by some philosopher).
2. Y is logically self-contradictory or logically incompatible with something else that exists.
3. God is perfect.
4. Therefore, Y is true of God.
5. Any thing to which something logically self-contradictory is attributed, or to which is attributed something that is logically incompatible with something else that exists, cannot itself exist.
6. Therefore, God does not exist.

Such an argument is logically valid. The question, however, is why we should accept some such notion of perfection Y as correct. It may be true that in some philosopher's conception of things, God does not exist. However, the issue concerning Christians is not the conception of any particular philosopher, but the conception of God communicated in Scripture. The difference is between that of an external and internal critique. What matters is not that some external criterion rules out God's existence, but whether or not what Scripture says about God is internally incoherent, thereby ruling out God's existence itself. In this vein, then, if one wants to disprove the existence of God using arguments structured around the perfection of God, then one must use the Scriptural notion of perfection. To do otherwise is to either give an external critique, or commit the Straw Man fallacy.

The Biblical Conception in Practice

However, one might object that Scripture does not anywhere state exactly what it means to be perfect. While such an objection makes an astute observation, it does not relieve the critic of his responsibility to interact honestly with Biblical Christianity. There are a number of key concepts in Biblical Christianity that are not given dictionary definitions in Scripture. Holiness, justification, and sanctification are just a few such key terms. The absence of a Scriptural dictionary definition does not mean, however, that such terms are nebulous and undefined. Their sense can be determined through a historical study of their meaning, and by observing what is said of them in various passages. The notion of perfection is no different. Even though a dictionary definition is not given in Scripture, the Biblical conception of perfection can be gathered from the pages of Scripture by anyone willing to look.

If one presumes the authority of Scripture, then one can get a good idea of what perfection is by noting what the Bible says about God. Consider the following arguments:

1. God is perfect.
2. God is good.
3. Therefore, goodness is consistent with perfection.

1. God is perfect in all of his attributes.
2. God is good.
3. Therefore, God is perfectly good.

If one wants to know what perfect goodness is, one only need look at God for an exemplification.

1. God is perfect.
2. God is active.
3. Therefore, activity is consistent with perfection.

This is contrary to the notion that a perfect being cannot act, as action would imply an imperfection.

1. God's actions exemplify perfection.
2. God is loving.
3. Therefore, God's love is an example of perfect love.

Many other arguments could be made along these lines. The main issue is that the Bible claims that God is perfect, and claims various other things about God. Thus, whatever perfection is, it is consistent with what is true of God - all that the Bible claims about Him. Therefore, if the critic wants to argue that the God of the Bible is not perfect, the critic must demonstrate that no logically coherent notion of perfection can account for all that the Bible claims about God. It does not suffice simply to claim God is not perfect on this or that notion of perfection. Rather, one must demonstrate that the God of the Bible cannot be perfect - that is, that there is no logically coherent definition of perfection that accounts for all that the Bible claims about Him.

What this means for arguments against God's existence is as follows. If for some conception of perfection X:

1. X entails Y,
2. Y, if true of God, makes His existence logically impossible, and
3. The Bible does not specifically attribute Y to God,

then X is not the Biblical notion of perfection, and an argument that relies upon X to prove God's non-existence is either an external critique, or attacks a straw man. So, for instance, if a particular conception of perfection entails that a perfect being cannot have desires, such a conception is not Biblical, because the Bible speaks of God desiring various things. So, arguments relying upon such a conception (such as that God cannot be perfect, and thus does not exist, because He has desires) carry no force against Biblical Christianity.

Conclusion

A number of arguments against the existence of God make use of notions of perfection that are not Biblical. Thus, such arguments fail to carry any force against Biblical Christianity. If a critic wishes to prove the non-existence of God using an argument based on perfection, such a critic must use the Biblical notion of perfection. If a critic wishes to prove that God is not perfect, such a critic must show that no coherent conception of perfection can be applied to God, based upon what the Bible reveals about Him. Anything short of this fails to carry probative force against Biblical Christianity.

Soli Deo Gloria!