Predictably, we’re likely going to see the addition of another big bureaucracy in reaction to a crisis partially caused by a poorly structured banking system and toothless enforcement of existing regulations. The answer to the sloppiness of bureaucratic regulators is, apparently, another layer of bureaucratic regulators. Regulatory reform will not be effective if its architects incorrectly diagnose how the system blew up under the existing system of oversight.

The popular narrative is that that the financial crisis was a failure of the free market, but this narrative glosses over the fact that banking is far, far from a free market. Those who describe the banking business as a wild, woolly free market simply do not understand how banks operate — especially how, with government subsidies and backstops giving them the confidence to make insane loans, banks had grown large enough to blow up the entire global economy.

Last year was less of a failure of free markets than it was the failure of the “shadow” banking system built on a weak foundation: bankers’ lack of connection with the risks they underwrote, government guarantees and tax incentives for mortgages, and misapplication of statistics to exotic fixed income securities, to name just a few things. The shadow banking system could not have grown as large and dangerous as it did without banks’ subsidies from taxpayers and the Fed’s manipulation of the price of money. The Fed’s interest rate targeting creates illusions about default and liquidity risks and distorts the natural relationship between savings and capital investment.

The banking system shares much in common with the federal government, especially in their common isolation from the discipline of the free market; Free market discipline refers to the fact that if you make mistakes, your customers will let you know about it by leaving, and if you don’t reform and improve your product or service, you’re out of business. By promoting competition, free market discipline imposed on business has done more for “the little guy” than any government handout by spurring advances in productivity and living standards.

The banking system hasn’t been subject to free market discipline for decades, and it’s still not. Case in point: Bank bondholders and shareholders were bailed out — at taxpayer expense — from the consequences of their poor lending and investing decisions.

Unlike most businesses, banks don’t earn their profits by serving customers, but mostly by extracting huge economic rents from savers and borrowers. Otherwise, the financial system couldn’t have grown to be such a large percentage of GDP.

Banks are supposed to be intermediaries between savers and borrowers, allocating credit in a manner at prices (interest rates) in line with default risk. But they largely failed in this role. Most banks — especially the “too big to fail” banks — did a horrifically poor job of pricing credit risk at the peak of the credit bubble. Credit spreads were ultra low in early 2007, when it was one of the riskiest times in history to be making loans.

How did the banking system make such colossal errors in judgment about credit risk? I described a few critical weaknesses in the banking system in a September 2007 Whiskey & Gunpowder article (see link here). It wasn’t rocket science to figure out how interest rates were sending a distorted signal about credit risk; all you needed to do was follow the new credit back to its ultimate source and ask the right questions about the connections (or lack thereof) between saver and borrower. One would think thousands upon thousands of federal banking regulators — and those responsible for designing our financial regulations — would have the resources at their disposal to identify the structural weaknesses in our financial system.

Unfortunately, instead of providing a road map to designing a system that connects savers with borrowers in a more sane, responsible manner, it looks like the proposed banking reforms will give us more of the same. Such economic power concentrated in the hands of banks not subject to enough free market discipline is a problem, and the real economy will likely suffer from it.

Regards,
Dan Amoss

June 23, 2009

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Banking, the Federal Government and the Free Market

Dozens of stocks come to mind that were sold down to insanely cheap levels as hedge funds scrambled for cash. That scramble is probably not over, so we may be in for more turbulence. Plenty of stocks come to mind that are still trading too high relative to their earnings potential. We’ll be looking to bet against those in 2009. Plus, many companies will not make it out of 2009 without going through bankruptcy. I expect to find a few more “short to zero” stocks — like Fleetwood Enterprises (NYSE: FLTW) — in 2009. We sold Fleetwood short in March at $4.43 and covered in October at 27 cents, for a 94% gain.

When asked by family and friends over the holidays what I think about the 2008 stock market and economy, my response has been, “I expected a nasty bear market in 2008, but the carnage since September took me by surprise. The economy will remain weak, but I think the worst of the widespread market carnage is behind us. Future damage should be concentrated in sectors with horrible fundamentals. Thankfully, 2009 should be a year when fundamental analysis should start to matter once more.”

This will be a welcome development, because 2008 was a year when the following strategy worked best:

1) Sell short any stock or ETF, without bothering to do any fundamental research
2) Invest the proceeds in Treasury bonds, preferably with as much margin as possible
3) Repeat Steps 1 and 2, over and over.

Clearly, this “deflation trade” strategy is not sustainable over longer time frames — not in an era of worldwide paper money standards. In fact, I’d expect that such a shotgun-based investment strategy of short S&P 500/long Treasuries could lead to big losses in 2009.

I think the key to approaching 2009 markets will be to view everything form the perspective of the Treasury and the Fed. Everyone knows that the real economy stinks and that America is overly indebted. But I doubt everyone realizes just how extreme Treasury/Fed will be in using the deficit and the paper money system to stop the Great Depression II scenario. Theses tactics will be inflationary at some point.

The U.S. banking system became destabilized because its core collateral – houses and mortgage-backed securities – collapsed in 2008. While the authorities may not be able to re-inflate old bubbles in these assets, I’m betting they can employ cheap Treasury financing to cushion the decline. This involves refinancing homeowners out of toxic mortgages into conventional mortgages. They’ll also find some way to deal with the problem of negative home equity, even if it involves highly inflationary tactics like Treasury assuming losses from principal reductions via Fannie and Freddie. And even if foreigners balk at absorbing new Treasuries, the Fed will monetize them – i.e., buy them itself. Again, these tactics would be highly inflationary.

So let me enumerate a few predictions for the New Year:

1) It’s far too easy and popular to be bearish on everything but Treasury bonds, so odds favor a sharp rally in early 2009 — a rally in the S&P 500, led by stocks with the most sustainable fundamentals, including energy, commodities, and infrastructure. Stocks with weak fundamentals may participate, but quickly roll over as economic reality sets in. Many will go to $0 in bankruptcy.

2) The SEC will suspend mark-to-market accounting, or at least modify it to allow more management discretion in marking values of securities. The era of wholesale shorting of financial stocks is likely over. A massive wave of refinancing is also a backdoor way to recapitalize the banking system; perhaps the most efficient way to increase the value of exotic mortgage-backed securities, (and bank capital) is for many of the mortgages backing these securities to “prepay” upon refinancing. Bankers will re-emerge from their bunkers and look to make new loans to creditworthy borrowers, since a sub-1% cost of funds courtesy of the Fed is too low to ignore.

3) Oil will rebound to $80 per barrel on lower than expected production, despite weak demand. If demand rebounds, oil could go to $120.

4) Gold will rally beyond $1,200 on weakness in the U.S. dollar, unprecedented Treasury bond issuance, and tepid foreign demand for U.S. dollar assets. Weaker foreign demand for Treasury bonds will prompt the Fed to step in as buyer of last resort and monetize debt. In its December policy statement, the Fed signaled that if foreign lenders look to sell Treasuries, it would step in as a buyer to keep rates low. If this happens, more savers and bond fund managers will look to invest in inflation hedges like gold and energy.

5) Many more hedge funds will fold in 2009, but this is good for the long-term health of the market. Most of the new funds should not have been started because they just went “long” everything on margin. Their closure will result in a more efficient – and less volatile – market.

6) 2009 will be a “stock picker’s” market. Nothing worked consistently in 2008 other than indiscriminate shorting of stocks and buying of Treasuries. The worst of the wholesale liquidation of stocks is likely over, so 2009 will offer lots of opportunities to buy and sell short individual stocks using fundamental analysis.

That’s the good news…So let’s end on that note.

Regards,
Dan Amoss

January 12, 2009

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Stock Strategies: Random Predictions for 2009

Yet their demise hurts anyone trying to manage an investment portfolio in a prudent manner — similar to how Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers permanently stained the entire investment banking industry. It’s a case of a few bad apples spoiling the whole barrel. Unfortunately, it remains to be seen how regulators and politicians will punish every investor, including those who have acted prudently.

For example, I just read a publicly released copy of a letter dated Oct. 2, sent from the U.S. Congress to Harbinger Capital Partners. It asks Phil Falcone of Harbinger Capital to reveal practically everything that’s confidential about his funds and to testify before a committee. Let’s hope U.S. regulators don’t take action to drive even more investment talent overseas, because we need them here to help keep our markets efficient.

It amazes me how long this environment of panic has lasted. Last Thursday was one of the most violent days I’ve ever experienced in the markets, including the bursting of the tech bubble, and the turmoil continues this week. Quality companies in the oil services, coal, steel, and agriculture sectors were liquidated in violent fashion — many of them down 20% in a day and 50% over the past month. These are real companies performing vital functions necessary to keep the lights on and food on shelves, not speculative Internet stocks.

The list of victims includes companies that are very likely to deliver good earnings over the next few years. The list includes several of the stocks I’ve recommended in past issues of Strategic Investment, and still follow closely. If you’re a long investor, there are some screaming bargains out there — unless, of course, half of the world’s population stops using food, electricity, and oil. I doubt that will happen in a world of unfettered deficits and central banks, but anything’s possible. I’ll have more to say about this in an upcoming issue of Strategic Investment.

For immediate ideas, I strongly recommend considering the long list of bargains that my colleague Chris Mayer has recommended in Capital & Crisis and Mayer’s Special Situations. It’s mind-boggling how cheap some of them have become. Chris is an excellent stock picker. He goes to great lengths to find safe, cheap investments.

Government Inflation vs. Private Deflation

The money managers that survive this environment will probably look to own some of the dirt-cheap stocks in the energy, commodity, and agriculture sectors, rather than expensive stocks that thrived on spending from home equity loans. Once this credit market panic subsides, I expect we’ll see this shift in sector focus. Fund managers will have to start distinguishing between earnings that resulted from fake, bubble-induced consumption, and earnings that resulted from real, sustainable demand. I’m looking forward to earnings season, when analysts and fund managers can finally get some guidance about which companies’ earnings will hold up best during this recession.

Even the best fund managers and stock pickers in the world — several of them listed in this Bloomberg article — are down for the year. A few of these managers saw the credit crisis coming, and made nice profits shorting financial stocks. But the SEC’s totally arbitrary rule changes in recent weeks have created an environment that’s very difficult to navigate.

The SEC’s short selling ban has not changed much, other than taking efficiency and liquidity out of the market. For example, Allied Capital was on the “do not short” list. Yet it crashed earlier this week upon announcing the bankruptcy of Ciena Capital. That was a case of long investors all trying to squeeze out of a narrow door of liquidity.  It was not a “short attack.”

Uncertainty about the banking system is causing this panic in the credit markets. Innocent bystanders are suffering from the fallout from this credit bubble.

For example, I’ve read several accounts of hedge funds whose assets are stuck in the black hole that is Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet. I’m not referring to people who own Lehman bonds, I’m referring to funds that had custodial agreements with Lehman. Custodial agreements are supposed to ensure that Lehman could only execute trades for the pool of assets under its custody — not take actual possession of the assets.

It seems that in the days and hours before declaring bankruptcy, Lehman moved certain assets — many of which it did not own — to its subsidiaries all around the globe. Now, hedge funds with no perceived credit exposure to Lehman are joining the line of creditors, fighting to get their clients’ assets back in bankruptcy court.

This total destruction of confidence in counterparty risk is the reason why credit is drying up. So what has the Federal Reserve been doing as the lender of last resort?

It has nearly doubled the size of its balance sheet in the past few weeks. The Oct. 3 issue of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer describes:

“After a flat-footed start, [the Fed] had shown its ability to degrade its balance sheet by selling off its Treasuries and acquiring dubious mortgages. But it had not really put its back into dollar debasement. The sum total of its earning assets, i.e., Reserve Bank credit, was rising at year-over-year rates of just 3% to 4%. Where was the push to print up enough dollar bills to smother the debt crisis of 2007-8 — assuming the problem was susceptible to smothering through money printing?

“Mystery solved: Reserve Bank credit is suddenly flying. It surged by $203.6 billion, to $1.135 trillion, in the banking week ended Sept. 24. And if Merrill Lynch’s guess is on the mark, it has soared to $1.730 trillion in only the past few days, a near doubling since May 2007 [emphasis added], when the latent crisis became manifest.”

After the panic subsides, the Fed will rein in much of this new money. Right now, banks are “stuffing it under the mattress,” so to speak. Banks and individuals are crowding into the perceived safety of Treasury bonds. That’s why consumer prices aren’t immediately rising; private market credit is contracting as fast as the Fed’s balance sheet is expanding. The Fed will always lend when no one else is willing to do so. “The U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost,” said Fed Chairman Bernanke in November 2002. This means that there will always be paper money available to lend. However, the U.S. dollar is getting debased on an unprecedented scale.

The printing press may be the only way to prevent a self-sustaining credit panic, but it doesn’t come without a price; it lowers the U.S. dollar’s stature even further in the eyes of our foreign creditors.

I’m betting that government inflation will defeat private market deflation. However, when the dust settles, I expect the Treasury and Fed to have its own set of negotiations with foreign creditors. The obligations they are assuming and monetizing are simply too enormous without inciting a potential panic among our generous foreign creditors. Maybe we’ll see a Bretton Woods-type agreement in 2009 — one where the U.S. dollar is devalued by 50% against certain foreign currencies overnight.

Best regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
October 9, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Strong Resource Companies Will Survive… The Dollar May Not

“Give me control of a nation’s money and I care not who makes her laws.”

— Mayer Amschel Rothschild

Let’s observe a moment of silence to mourn the slow demise of capitalism in the U.S.

Our government is now overtly manipulating the stock market. We have “crossed the Rubicon.” We can no longer pretend to be a free market capitalist country while also maintaining confidence in the U.S. dollar as reserve currency. After this panic subsides, the investing environment will be very different.

Make no mistake about it: The last two weeks will go down as one of the most pivotal periods in financial history. The financial landscape has changed so dramatically that few have had a chance to catch their breath. I’ve spent the entire last week reading and thinking through the free market’s ultimate response to this unprecedented, rapidly changing situation.

Last week, the SEC announced a temporary ban on new short sales in 799 specific financial stocks. Short selling is one of the most important weapons in an investor’s cache. It allows the market to react to foul play and sloppy corporate leadership. This is an even more important tool to use against poorly run small caps. That’s why this ban is so significant.

Before I go on, let’s first clear something up: This new ban doesn’t mean that existing short positions must be covered. But many are clearly closing short positions to limit risk anyway. The SEC might well have sparked a panic liquidation in other areas of the market, as hedge fund managers liquidate long positions to offset losses on short positions. As I write, the market is well off its highs just one hour into Friday’s trading day. Odds are good that the SEC will realize that its decision only sucked a huge amount of liquidity out of the stock market and reverse its decision to something more sensible, like reinstating the uptick rule.

While on the subject of the SEC’s new short selling rule, allow me to state the obvious: Short sellers did not bring down the investment banks. Once the investment bank executives made the decision to operate their balance sheets like Long-Term Capital Management on steroids, the writing was on the wall. They relied far too much on “quant” models, rather than good old-fashioned common sense.

Rather than target the individuals who had been warning about this situation for years, why doesn’t the SEC investigate the proprietary trades of the banks’ trading desks? I’d expect it would find evidence that the investment banks were short selling each other’s stocks at the same time that they were cutting each other’s lines of credit. In the autopsy of Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet, we have discovered that Lehman management wildly overvalued its toxic assets. Why wasn’t this taken as evidence that the lack of transparency at investment banks is at the root of last week’s crisis?

The SEC’s decision to ban short sales of financial stocks is throwing sand into the markets’ gears. Like most government action, it pays lip service to consequences. Convertible bond traders use short selling to hedge equity risk. After this ban, the price of convertible bonds will probably fall.

Hedge fund managers use short sales to offset the risk in holding long positions. After this ban, fund managers will have to use other means to cut risk, which include selling off huge chunks of their long positions.

Finally, at market bottoms, short sellers provide demand for stocks when they buy to close out short positions. Without this buying pressure, the market could possibly go “no bid” at crucial periods when long investors want to get out at any price.

The SEC would really benefit the market if it cleaned up the system of trade clearing. “Naked short selling” occurs when brokers take orders for short sales and don’t locate the shares to borrow. If a broker cannot locate them, then it shouldn’t tell the short seller that it is able to execute the order. Since the broker doesn’t want to lose the short seller’s business, it probably executes short sales of “hard to borrow” stocks anyway and hopes it can locate the shares in time for settlement.

“Quant funds” — the ones that use computers to trade millions of shares every minute — are lucrative brokerage clients. These funds are most likely to be the ones unknowingly requesting “naked” short sales. The orders come in so fast that it’s hard for the broker to say no, we cannot locate those shares to borrow.

In my view, the SEC can solve the problem of naked short selling with better enforcement of existing rules. Brokers should not be allowed to execute orders to short shares that they have little chance of borrowing. It’s vital that we restore liquidity to our stock market, rather than implement poorly thought-out decisions made overnight.

Best regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
September 23, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Government Regulation of Short Sellers

A few days ago, Ospraie Management, a large manager of commodity hedge funds announced the closure of its largest funds. It will return capital to shareholders in stages. Ospraie’s funds had been performing well for years, until some wrong-footed trades in natural gas and copper futures led to deep losses in July and August.

Ospraie had a big presence in commodity futures, so its heavy selling has clearly intensified the recent price declines. Rapid price declines have fueled speculation that the commodity bull market is over. I very much doubt that it’s over, because in most cases, commodity supplies are too tight to meet strong, long-term demand from a growing world population — a population governed by politicians who can create both deficits and unlimited amounts of paper money. Governments and central banks will not sit idly by and allow a debt liquidation to destroy the banking system.

On the supply side of the equation, which most headline writers and pundits totally ignore, some commodity producers are shutting down projects that cannot produce at a profit. In a few commodity markets, prices are falling below the cost of production!

The fundamentals of supply and demand will matter again once current fears ebb. They always do. Energy and commodities have solid long-term fundamentals that rest on a foundation of human need. By contrast, financial companies are still facing ugly fundamentals, like plunging collateral values, rising defaults, and capital shortages.

Central banks will prevent the worst-case scenario of uncontrollable, self-reinforcing defaults. But their money-printing efforts will not bring about a re-inflation of the housing and credit bubbles. We probably won’t see another credit bubble for at least a decade. Once the fall in housing and mortgage securities slows down, excess liquidity created by central banks will find its way back into inflation hedges like gold and oil, potentially creating a future bubble in commodity-oriented investments.

As for the rest of 2008, my research leads me to the following most likely outcome: The stock market remains weak until the Federal Reserve totally abandons its “inflation fighting” stance. The Fed may even cut rates further as unemployment rises. At that point, commodity-oriented stocks will probably regain their position of leadership.

The recent decline in commodity prices allows the Fed to conjure up another “deflation” scare. This would provide cover to slash rates and inject reserves more aggressively into the banking system. Then, the U.S. dollar would resume its descent, while gold and commodities would resume their ascent.

The Fed’s current inflation campaign has been very modest thus far. Rather than expand its balance sheet and flood the banking system with liquidity, it has concentrated on swapping U.S. Treasuries for dodgy mortgage securities.

Central bankers on the other side of the Atlantic, though, seem to care more about what’s backing their currency. The European Central Bank just announced that it’s going to limit its role as a dumping ground for impaired mortgage securities. The Financial Times explains:

“[ECB President Jean-Claude] Trichet announced a series of measures to increase the cost of using asset-backed securities to obtain ECB funds and to exclude some such deals when underlying mortgages or other loans are not denominated in euros. The announcement follows comments by ECB council member Yves Mersch last month. He said there were still cases where ‘you see dangers of gaming the system.’

“This year, it emerged Macquarie Bank had constructed a deal backed by Australian car loans that could be used at the ECB and Lehman Brothers had formed a huge collateralized loan obligation of risky buyout debt to use at the central bank.

“Mr. Trichet said the ‘general character’ of its broad-based operations remained unaffected. ‘We’re not changing it, we’re refining it,’ he said.

“Only a ’small fraction’ of collateral would be affected. Banks’ ability to take part in its financing operations would be unimpaired, the ECB president said.

I see the ECB’s decision as a tactic to convince savers and investors that the euro will not be forever backed by securities of dubious quality. But European politics may eventually overwhelm the ECB’s fairly disciplined monetary record. Voters will demand easy money.

In the U.S., fiscal and monetary policy will likely be influenced more and more by big investors and foreign creditors. Bill Gross, manager of a huge bond portfolio, is concerned about the potential for “financial tsunamis” and “debt liquidations.” He thinks that the Treasury Department (i.e., taxpayers) has not done enough to stop the bleeding in mortgage securities. In his latest “Economic Outlook,” Gross describes how institutional mortgage buyers may sit on their hands until the Treasury Dept. initiates a new, huge bailout.

Whether taxpayers like it or not, Gross’ plea for a new bailout will probably be answered. The leverage in the banking system has grown beyond the point of no return. There’s no way the Fed and Treasury would allow a spiraling liquidation of debts. One way or another, mortgage losses will be partially “socialized.” Most of the burden will fall on savers because over the next decade, more paper money will be created than would otherwise have been created.

Think of paper money as a shock absorber for losses in the financial system. In times of crisis, central banks try to calm fears about bank runs. They spread losses from bad loans around to everyone who holds paper money. This game can keep going until the holders of that paper money lose confidence in its function as a store of value.

But don’t interpret a new bailout plan for mortgage investors as a sign that the financial stock bear market is over. It’s not — at least not for banks holding the worst credit exposures. Over time, these institutions will have to confess losses; take write-downs; and raise new, dilutive capital. Many will be taken over by the FDIC, which wipes out shareholders.

During times like these, investors do well to remember that the commodity sector never requires a “lending facility” from the Fed or a bailout plan for the Treasury.

Regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
September 17, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Buying Commodities on the Dips

“You know, you saw subprime go first, and then, on a slight lag, you saw home equity, and now in the lag, you’re seeing prime go. And it’s exactly the same loss factors. But remember, the components of where we are in the states…[are] very different. And we started doing more jumbos in ‘07, so a lot of that is — part of that is ‘07 vintage, which I think I told you at the time we were going to do and grow our balance sheet and gain share. And we were wrong. You know, we, obviously, wish we hadn’t done it.

“So when you adjust for all of those things — vintages, CLTV, stated income, where it’s done — that’s what we’re seeing. You know, it’s very early in the loss curves…

“Prime looks terrible, and we’re sorry.”

— J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon

The recent financial stock rally has all the signs of panicked short covering, rather than typical buying. Consider how the depository institutions most likely to eventually join IndyMac in federal custody — including Washington Mutual, Downey, and Huntington Bancshares — are rallying the most. So many shares had been sold short that a violent rally was inevitable.

Eventually, though, this rally should prompt two things:

1. Mutual funds selling financial stocks into strength. We’ve finally seen a shift in psychology away from buying financials on the dips. Many managers are preparing for an extended bear market in the sector.

2. Banks with capital shortfalls will announce secondary stock offerings. This will lower the cost of new capital, because higher stock prices allow the banks to issue fewer shares to raise a fixed amount of capital.

The SEC is implementing rules that will make it a bit harder to sell short stocks that are difficult to borrow.

I think “naked” short selling (shorting a stock when your broker has not yet located shares to short) must be stopped. This practice gives legitimate short selling a bad name.

Stock should be located and borrowed before it is sold short, not the other way around. If your broker cannot locate shares to short, you should move on to another idea, or use put options.

But the hysteria about “rumors” bringing down financial companies has gone too far, I think. This is the defense of CEOs who are looking to blame someone for their own incompetence — incompetence that put their firms in a vulnerable position in the first place. Short sellers did not conspire to force Wall Street firms to enter the business of securitizing dodgy debts. Firms like Bear Stearns ruined their own companies with the poor strategic decisions they made. The free flow of opinions is vital for the health of the stock market. One should be very suspicious about executives who try to suppress any negative opinions about the value of their stock. Allied Capital comes to mind.

You can read about Allied’s crusade against David Einhorn in his excellent book, Fooling Some of the People All of the Time.

Allied is still a good short idea looking out beyond a year because it’s running out of attractive assets to sell and finding it harder and harder to issue new equity.

Short sellers need to do their own fundamental research and form their own opinions. Only fools buy or sell short stocks based solely on rumors. Legitimate short sellers are very beneficial for the market. They provide liquidity at market bottoms by buying to cover their positions, and they are often the first to discover and put an end to accounting frauds and stock promotion schemes that siphon capital away from legitimate businesses.

Timing is important in the banking business. Also, as in investing, it pays to be a smart contrarian. Ideally, banks should make as many loans as possible once the economy bottoms. In an improving economy, borrowers can more easily pay down debts.

Loans made with disciplined underwriting guidelines ahead of an economic boom can be both safe and profitable.

On the other hand, aggressively expanding a loan book at the peak of a credit cycle and an economic cycle can lead to disaster.

Once credit cycles turn, loan portfolios, or loan books, become sources of risk, rather than profit. Look at the experience of Countrywide, which just got acquired by Bank of America for a fraction of is peak value. It blew itself up by aggressively expanding its mortgage loan book at the peak of the credit cycle — which happened to coincide with the biggest housing bubble in history.

Regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
August 21, 2008

P.S.: You want to form your own opinion of a company and ignore herd behavior and rumors. But sometimes that can be difficult. Aren’t we all getting our information from the same places? Well it doesn’t have to be that way. Some people are getting their information straight from the source. They’re called “100-F” documents and they tell you exactly what a stock is going to do.

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Short Selling

Since then, banks and brokerage stocks were punished. Energy and material stocks have soared-thanks to the Fed’s inflation campaign. Fed officials have taken their ability to devalue the U.S. dollar to new heights. What collateral backs today’s dollar? Mostly mortgage securities that nobody wants — as if Treasury bond collateral weren’t bad enough.

Despite the latest “reports,” current trends still have room to run. Just consider Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those shareholders could be effectively wiped out by endless equity offerings as early as next year. The mountain of debt holders and bond insurance policyholders comes first.

Now, it’s possible that the federal government could issue hundreds of billions in new Treasuries to officially guarantee Fannie’s and Freddie’s liabilities. If no one lines up to buy these bonds, the Fed could monetize them. Such a scenario could herald a return to double-digit long-term interest rates and a collapse in confidence in paper money - demanding a new monetary system. We live in interesting times. Billionaire currency speculator George Soros thinks we’ve just entered the ugly side of a “super bubble.”

I wrote about George Soros’ investing framework in the August 2007 Strategic Investment. Here’s the excerpt on Soros:

The growth of securitization has truly altered the global economy…

One negative consequence is that financial markets are starting to shape the destiny of the real economy, not the other way around. Storied currency speculator George Soros was one of the first to speak publicly about the phenomenon of markets shaping economies. He calls it the theory of “reflexivity” and described it when testifying in front of Congress in 1994:

“The generally accepted theory is that financial markets tend toward equilibrium and, on the whole, discount the future correctly. I operate using a different theory, according to which financial markets cannot possibly discount the future correctly, because they do not merely discount the future; they help to shape it.”

Here’s reflexivity at work: As a company’s stock grows more coveted by wild-eyed speculators, its cost of capital gets lower and lower as its stock skyrockets; the higher its stock price, the more capital a company can raise in a secondary stock offering by issuing a set amount of shares. So its ability to reinvest capital and grow — its future — is shaped by the whims of speculators.

A second consequence of the securitization revolution: The further a lender is separated from a borrower, the more potential there is for fraud on the part of the borrower and underestimation of risk on the part of the lender.

Now, before you dismiss Soros as a Big Government “world improver,” keep in mind that he took the right side of every major financial crisis since World War II. The man clearly understands how markets can boom and bust, especially when greed and fear overwhelm rationality.

To see how Soros views the current crisis, I picked up his latest book, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means. In the first half, Soros laments that reflexivity is not taken seriously in university economics departments. In the second half, he argues that the current crisis marks the end of a decades-long expansion of U.S. dollar-based credit. Soros dubs the period from the early 1980s-2007 a “super bubble.” He makes a convincing case:

Credit conditions have been relaxed to such an extent that I wonder how they could be relaxed any further. This is certainly true as far as the U.S. consumer is concerned. Credit terms for mortgages, auto loans, and credit cards have reached their maximum extension… It may also be true for commercial credit, particularly for leveraged buyouts and commercial real estate.

Only one thing is off the mark: Soros’ prescription for more government regulation.

Nowhere in his book will you find an explanation of how the global paper money system practically guaranteed the formation of his “super bubble.” This super bubble would not have been possible under an international gold standard. The international gold standard of the late 1800s fostered a time of incredible growth and wealth creation in a stable price environment. It wasn’t perfect.

It had periodic depressions. But it was far better than what we’re looking at: Government’s inflationary policy responses to problems created by its policy of perpetual bailouts.

Don’t forget that every paper currency in history eventually fell to its intrinsic value: zero. The dollar is no different, although it has taken longer than most others. For decades, foreign governments have aggressively bought dollars, propping up their value, hoping, thus, to insure long-term economic stability. Instead, this action is heavily responsible for the runaway inflation we’re seeing all over the world.

Soros seems to believe that the real economy cannot grow unless credit is growing. This ignores the fact that credit growth does not create economic growth. It merely assists growth. Over the long term, the economy grows as the capacity to produce goods and services grows. No credit necessary.

But we must invest in the environment we face, not the one that we wish were in place. The government response to the ugly side of Soros’ reflexivity will seriously impair confidence in paper money.

Look for gold, energy, and other natural resources to keep performing. Avoid financials, real estate, and consumer discretionary stocks.

Regards,
Dan Amoss
August 5, 2008

P.S.: While the Fed works to try and stave off massive inflation for the current time period, history shows us that all fiat currencies are bound to fail. When this happens, it will be extremely difficult for our financial system to recover. This is a very serious and increasingly looming threat to our economic way of life. But that’s not even the biggest problem we’re currently facing.

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Financial Market Speculation

Most of Wall Street’s moneymaking machines have shut down. Mortgage-securitization activity has gone kaput, while IPO and M&A activities are sputtering. Even worse, Billions of dollars of future write-downs and losses are still buried inside Wall Street’s balance sheets.

Lehman Brothers (LEH: NYSE) appears to be among the most vulnerable of all the investment banks. The stock has rallied hard since the Bear Stearns rescue. Because its business model closely resembles that of Bear Stearns, Wall Street thought Lehman was next. And it might have been, if not for the Fed.

The Fed instituted a lending facility allowing the investment banks to temporarily swap the ugliest “alphabet soup” assets for Treasuries. These alphabet soup assets — mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized loan obligations (CLO), and others — had been smothering the brokers to the point that Bear Stearns was hours from declaring bankruptcy.

In the hopeful words of Lehman Brothers CEO, Dick Fuld, the Federal Reserve’s lending facility “takes the liquidity issue for the entire industry off the table.” Sure, the Fed’s actions may have forestalled a modern-day “bank run” on Wall Street. But the Fed has not solved the bigger, longer-term crisis.

The Fed’s new facility allows Lehman to temporarily swap its garbage assets for Treasuries. What it doesn’t do is protect Lehman shareholders from losses on these securities. Lehman shareholders will be the first to absorb these losses. Shareholders are in the most junior position in every company’s capital structure. So the more leverage — or debt — a company employs, the quicker shareholders get wiped out when assets sour.

As the chart below shows, Lehman’s equity (in red) supports just a tiny sliver of Lehman’s towering liabilities. Lehman’s gross leverage ratio amounts to about 32 times equity. This means Lehman’s assets can fall only about 3% in value before equity is wiped out:

Lehman is scrambling to reduce leverage and raise capital by selling illiquid assets into a weak secondary market. Unfortunately, illiquid mortgage-backed securities aren’t a particularly hot item these days. There are few buyers for such assets — even at steep discounts.

According to Bernstein Research, Lehman’s “troubled” residential and commercial mortgage assets amount to nearly three times its tangible equity. That’s danger level for Lehman shareholders. And the danger is growing…

Lehman management has not been terribly forthcoming about reporting quarterly losses and write-downs. Brad Hintz from Bernstein Research hinted that fuzzy math produced Lehman’s “strong” March earnings report: “We believe the quality of these earnings was weak, as the firm benefited from a lower tax rate and enjoyed a $600 million mark-to-market gain on its liabilities.”

That’s a polite understatement. Believe it or not, accounting rules allow investment banks to book a profit when the value of the bonds they have issued FALL. Follow along with this crazy logic if you can: Because the holders of Lehman’s bonds became fearful that Lehman would declare bankruptcy, the bondholders dumped the bonds at very low prices. Therefore, because Lehman’s bond prices tumbled, Lehman could, theoretically, buy back the bonds at prices much lower than the stated value of those bonds on Lehman’s balance sheet. As a result, this bizarre accounting rule concludes, Lehman can book a “profit” on the difference between the issue price of its bonds and the depressed market prices. Taken to an extreme, Lehman could probably post one if its most profitable quarters ever, just by declaring bankruptcy!

Obviously, falling bond prices indicate financial stress, and certainly do not produce sustainable, high-quality earnings. Such “earnings” do not generate cash or create any value of shareholders whatsoever.

Net-net, Lehman is still facing the likelihood of losing tens of billions of dollars over the course of the next few years. As losses pile up, Lehman will have to raise capital. That means flooding the market with LEH shares. Lehman may have to issue hundreds of millions of new shares at a discount to rebuild its capital shortfall, severely diluting the existing shareholders.

David Einhorn, an accomplished hedge fund manager, recently explained why he’s still selling short Lehman shares. In a speech at the April 8 Grant’s conference, he said that Lehman may have to boost its capital by as much as $30 to $70 billion. If Einhorn’s guesstimate is anywhere close to the mark, Lehman’s shareholders are in for a very rough ride.

The worst might be over for the financial sector, just like so many investors seem to believe. But a lot of bad stuff is still rolling our way. For the rest of 2008, therefore, investors might want to take their cue from Credit Suisse CEO Brady Dougan when he said, “The number of times people have seen the light at the end of the tunnel, it turned out to be a train coming down the tracks.”

Regards,
Dan Amoss
May 28, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Financial Bank Bear Market

John Maynard Keynes, an early 20th century economist, was the most influential advocate of government influence in the economy. Thanks to him, an entire generation of voters thinks the president “manages” the economy. Keynes’ followers, who populate the halls of government and academia, think the government needs to act when the free market “fails.” They propose government solutions to problems like “liquidity traps” and “insufficient demand.”

These alleged problems became so feared that the U.S. government decided it was necessary to move the dollar to a completely paper, faith-based system — despite historical evidence that every paper money system fails. The Federal Reserve has cemented its role as price fixer for short-term interest rates. It fuels speculative bubbles when the economy slows, and denies all responsibility when bubbles burst. The cycle then repeats.

The New Deal was Keynes’ idea. The era of colossal government — the New Deal — began as a popular reaction to the Great Depression. The Depression started when an inflation-fueled bubble popped, and worsened in the mid-1930s, when the government taxed capital away from entrepreneurs and reinvested it into “make work” programs.

This is one of many examples in which government power grew at the expense of the more efficient free market. These ideas, and the proposed solutions to them, distort the free market’s investment cycles and have gotten the U.S. to the point where it simply cannot function without asset inflation.

Today, the government proposes solutions to problems caused by government interference. Specifically, it and the Fed are throwing more money and credit at a problem that was caused by their own past initiatives to stimulate money and credit. Even a mere recession has become politically unacceptable.

China’s Success Hinges on Its Support for Free Markets

Keynesian economists tend to deny the free market the respect it deserves. It has had an amazing track record in recent centuries. Despite the destructive influences of nutty paper money schemes, deficits, taxation, regulation, and wars, most countries have progressed from subsistence farming to modern living standards at a stunning pace.

The free market rests on a foundation of mutual trust, price signals, profits, free trade, and property rights. It’s important for government to respect this foundation. Communist governments simply destroy it and, predictably, get chaos and poverty. Even in some capitalist countries, popular support for this foundation is shaky.

The Chinese, still Communist in name, but hardly in action, have gained some respect for the foundation of free markets. Their leaders are executing policies that promote better living standards, and they are using free market principles to achieve it. As a result, they prosper. But prosperity doesn’t advance without occasional setbacks. China is dealing with one right now: A shortage of above-ground coal.

In China’s highly publicized winter storm delays, we see an example of how slower economic growth can lead to higher consumer price inflation. Most economists would have you believe that growth causes inflation, when in reality, it’s the opposite. Real economic growth increases the supply of goods and services. So consumer prices would fall if the money supply were held constant. The Wall Street Journal recently reported:

The coal shortage has rippled through other commodity markets, hurting China’s output of steel, copper, zinc, and aluminum as electricity is being diverted for domestic industry and household heat and electricity. China’s largest copper producer, Jiangxi Copper Co., shut down some plants, contributing to higher U.S. copper futures:

Even though the Chinese government supports free markets to achieve its political goals, it still distorts investment cycles with monetary inflation and regulation. Its manufacturing capacity has grown beyond its power grid capacity. This slows real economic growth, which is cutting the supply and raising the price of copper in the U.S. futures market.

Chinese monetary policy, like that in the U.S., ensures that money supply can grow limitlessly at zero cost. No wonder prices for nearly everything are going up. Central banks have pushed inflationary policies beyond all reasonable limits. A recent issue of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer explains why this could be the top financial market story in 2008:

In the dollar and its institutions, there is a deep-seated contradiction. The Fed is America’s central bank, but the dollar is the world’s currency. More than a billion people work and save and spend in the non-American portion of the U.S. dollar bloc. It seems fair to guess that more than a few of them are fed up, if not with the distant institution that sets an interest rate, then with an inflation problem over which they seem to be powerless.

One of the top financial stories for 2008 just might be the dawning of this unwelcome truth on the average American central banker, bondholder, and consumer. Recently, The New York Times, in a dispatch from Shanghai, speculated that China was now exporting inflation, not deflation, and that, on account of this sea change, the American CPI would presently begin to tick higher.

The onset of recession would likely push back the return of what economists will eventually learn to call the “21st century secular inflation” (mark my words). A friend of mine muses that the dramatic re-pricing of ultra-cheap oil transformed the markets and economies of the 1970s. So, too, he speculates, will the dramatic re-pricing of ultra-cheap Asian labor deliver a seismic jolt to the markets and economies of the present day. If so, the dollar, no less than the euro, is likely to suffer impairment against the kind of assets that central banks just can’t print.

If you’re a regular reader of Whiskey & Gunpowder, you probably agree that individuals make better spending and investing decisions than governments. Yet Keynesian plans to “fix” the economy — whether through regulation or inflation — remain uncomfortably popular. The conditions are set for a dramatic consumer price inflation reawakening — if not in 2008, then over the next decade. Long-term bonds are priced to provide negative real after-tax returns over the next decade. Invest accordingly.

Regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
March 19, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

How Paper Money Distorts Investment Cycles

This development has placed consumers in the driver’s seat when it comes to choosing a loan. Since banks have few tools to differentiate their money from their competitors’ money, they usually compete by offering the lowest possible interest rate.

At the right price, or interest rate, nearly anyone can get a loan for nearly anything these days. The Internet offers endless information from every imaginable bank, credit union or auto finance company.

The value of interest rate information is hard to define. We can safely assume it’s not very valuable when it’s freely available from multiple sources, and dozens of media channels clamor to offer the same information — in return for a small commission from bankers.

This business model is fairly simple. It’s the business model of Bankrate, Inc. (RATE: NASDAQ). Just like AutoTrader.com funnels car-shopping traffic to car dealers for a fee, Bankrate directs Web traffic to mortgage brokers and bankers for a fee. This is how Bankrate makes its money. It generates sales leads for bankers in exchange for “per click” fees.

Considering that Bankrate does little more than publish interest rate data, why should its stock sell for so many times its earnings? Could such a Web site have a lasting competitive advantage? Why couldn’t sites with far larger audiences — like MSN Money, Yahoo Finance or Google Finance — chip away at Bankrate’s core high-margin business?

More importantly, since Bankrate’s customer base is in the midst of a nasty downturn, is it reasonable for the 17 analysts covering RATE to expect 150% earnings growth in 2007 and 20% earnings growth in 2008? I don’t think it is.

Bankrate exhibits several traits of what you want to look for in a short sale:

1. An expensive stock price
2. A contracting customer base
3. A history of making value-destroying acquisitions
4. Aggressive accounting
5. A very generous stock option program.

An Expensive Stock

Bankrate is a pricey stock. Given its stratospheric valuation, the market expects Bankrate to deliver blistering sales growth as far as the eye can see. Keep in mind that making a profit on the short side of Bankrate stock isn’t a bet that business will fall apart overnight; a successful short sale only requires the market to lower its expectation of Bankrate’s growth potential just a bit.

In my view, the market is paying way too much for this business, given the numerous threats to Bankrate’s rapid growth story. Googling the word “mortgage” turns up a very long list of Web sites offering quotes, with Bankrate in the middle. LendingTree, E-Loan, Quicken Loans and even ABN AMRO and Wells Fargo are listed above Bankrate’s site.

It’s hard for Bankrate to make the case to its core advertisers that most of the leads it delivers to them aren’t simply generated in a random fashion. So I don’t buy management’s case that it can gradually raise prices for its leads over time. Bankrate will remain at the mercy of whatever its big bank customers are willing to pay per “click lead.” Also, the more Bankrate tries to raise prices, the more competition it will invite.

As Internet users grow more sophisticated over time, it’s reasonable to expect that loan shoppers will search more and more Web sites for quotes. The growth of shopping for loans online benefits the consumers of loan information far more than it ever will the producers of this information.

A Series of Value-Destroying Acquisitions

Acquisitions often serve as a convenient distraction when a high-growth business starts to slow down. In December 2005, Bankrate paid $10 million in cash to acquire FastFind and $30 million in cash to acquire Mortgage Market Information Services and Interest.com. These acquisitions added mostly “goodwill” to Bankrate’s balance sheet, yet have been quite disappointing. Goodwill is the difference between the total purchase price and the acquired company’s book value.

Despite having high hopes for FastFind, management is struggling to integrate it, discovering just how tough it is to compete in the “qualified leads” business. Companies like LendingTree and LowerMyBills.com dominate this business.

Bankrate now has $135 million in cash on its balance sheet, and management intends to use it to fund future acquisitions. Given its track record of spending cash on value-destroying acquisitions like FastFind, this should not be viewed as a positive.

It’s important to note that the Bankrate did not generate this cash from its business operations; rather, a $90 million chunk has been sitting on Bankrate’s balance sheet earning interest since the company raised it in a May 2006 secondary stock offering — an offering in which insiders took the opportunity to sell $16 million worth of stock.

This is hardly a vote of confidence in the strategy of raising cash to fund acquisitions. Why did insiders sell $16 million worth of stock if they really expected this pile of cash to be put to work in a value-creating manner? Shouldn’t they have held onto these shares if the opportunities they talk about are so wonderful?

When a company uses its expensive stock as acquisition currency, it’s easy to create acquired growth, especially when organic growth (growth in the existing business) slows down. Investors shouldn’t be fooled into thinking that these two types of growth are the same.

Aggressive Accounting

Not only have acquisitions been disappointing and masked decelerating organic growth, but the sheer size of them in relation to Bankrate’s business allowed management plenty of leeway to adjust various accounts in financial statements.

Perhaps the most glaring sign of poor earnings quality is depicted in the following chart. Up until the most recent quarter ending in June, accounts receivable (A/R) had been growing significantly faster than sales for a long time.

This is a classic sign that earnings have been getting a boost from aggressive accounting practices. Without getting into the details, it indicates some combination of the following:

1. Bankrate’s customers may be demanding better payment terms.
2. Customers may be delinquent in paying Bankrate for services rendered (i.e., defunct mortgage brokers like New Century could stiff Bankrate in bankruptcy court).
3. Bankrate’s revenue recognition practices may be too aggressive.

None of this would be good for shareholders.

A Generous Stock Option Program

One share of Bankrate stock is a claim on the cash per share that the company ultimately generates. Thanks to an egregious stock options program, the number of shares outstanding is expanding rapidly, so the cash flow per share faces a major head wind.

To help illustrate this effect, think of a pie sliced into 100 pieces. One share represents one slice of pie. Now imagine that next year’s pie is sliced into 107 pieces. One share still represents one slice of pie, but this slice is noticeably smaller than last year’s slice. Each year, more and more slices are made, so the slices become smaller and smaller.

Bankrate’s cash flow is sliced up and served to more and more shareholders each year. The company has issued options to its executives at an average annual rate of 7% of outstanding shares over the past three years. As a company controlled by the board and management, this policy is likely to continue. It’s obvious that executives are enriching themselves at the expense of shareholders, because net income must grow 7% per year just to keep earnings per share growth at 0%.

These are all clues of a stock that is on its way down. Keep an eye out for companies like this and you will be sure to spot many more short options. You’ll need to do your research, but symptoms of a good short rarely ever lie.

Regards,
Dan Amoss, CFA
January 18, 2008

This article was originally featured on Whiskey and Gunpowder

Shorting Bankrate