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What Is the EU Deforestation Regulation? 8 Key Questions, Answered

sarah.brown@wri.org — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 17:43:00 +0000

What Is the EU Deforestation Regulation? 8 Key Questions, Answered sarah.brown@wri.org Thu, 03/05/2026 - 12:43

The world is losing 18 soccer fields of tropical primary every minute; much of it is the result of clearing for farms, pastures and tree plantations.

As a major buyer of commodities largely responsible for fueling deforestation — such as palm oil, cocoa, coffee, soy, cattle and timber — the European Union has both a responsibility and an opportunity to help shift global markets toward more sustainable supply chains. The landmark EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), adopted in 2023, requires businesses to demonstrate that the products they sell or export to the EU do not come from land that was recently deforested or degraded.

The EUDR is a key step in fighting back against deforestation and supporting national forest protection policies. Yet despite its promise, the regulation has faced delays and pushback, threatening its timely implementation.

Just weeks before the EUDR was to go into force on Dec. 30, 2025, the European Parliament voted to delay application until Dec. 30, 2026 for large corporations and until June 30, 2027 for small businesses. Along with the delay, new amendments weakened the regulation by simplifying requirements for certain businesses to show proof of deforestation-free products; and remove printed products, such as books and publications, from the regulation’s scope.

At a time when forests are increasingly under threat, it’s more urgent than ever to understand the regulation and ensure its full implementation. Here, we dive deeply into the legislation's details and potential impacts.

What Is the EUDR?

The EUDR is a landmark law that came into force in June 2023. Its goal is to ensure that certain products sold in or exported to the EU do not come from land that was deforested or degraded after Dec. 31, 2020. The regulation is designed to prevent EU consumer demand from driving further forest loss or damage, while also reducing the region’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and global biodiversity decline.

The EUDR covers timber and six key agricultural commodities: cattle, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soy, as well as products made from them such as beef, furniture and chocolate (printed products such as books and newspapers were removed from the scope of the regulation in December 2025). To be sold in or exported from the EU market, these products must meet the following three conditions:

Products are deforestation-free.
Products are produced in compliance with the relevant laws of the country of origin.
Products are covered by a due diligence statement, showing that the company has checked the origin and ensured the products meet EUDR requirements.

This means businesses must demonstrate that any EUDR-covered commodities were not produced on land that was deforested nor did they contribute to forest degradation after the Dec. 31, 2020 cutoff date. Although the regulation is legally in place, companies are not required to start complying until Dec. 30, 2026 for large corporations and June 30, 2027 for small enterprises.

Why Is the EUDR Important?

The EUDR offers a major opportunity for the EU to reduce its role in global deforestation and biodiversity loss, as well as help create deforestation-free supply chains. It supports the commitment made by the 144 countries that signed the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration in 2021 to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030. It can also serve as a model for other major consumer markets looking to lower their environmental footprints.

Since 2014, the EU has been the second-largest importer of goods linked to tropical deforestation after China. In 2017 alone, it accounted for 16% of global deforestation tied to international trade — equal to 203,000 hectares of forest.

More recently, in 2024, the EU was among the world’s top five importers of five of the six agricultural commodities covered by the EUDR (cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber and soy) and the largest importer of cocoa beans and coffee worldwide. Agricultural production is the dominant driver of tree cover loss in countries that export the most to the EU, accounting for 73% to 95% of total loss between 2001 to 2024. Among all the agricultural products the EU buys, beef, cocoa and palm oil were linked to the most deforestation in the countries they came from. In fact, out of 160 agricultural commodities imported by the EU, just six — beef, palm oil, soy, cocoa, coffee and rubber, as covered by the EUDR — made up 58% of the estimated forest loss tied to EU imports.

By reducing the EU’s forest-loss footprint and tackling deforestation risks in its supply chains, the EUDR could help reverse deforestation worldwide. In 2024, a record 6.7 million hectares of primary tropical forests were lost — nearly double the 2023 rate and equivalent of losing 18 soccer fields of forest every minute. While wildfires captured global attention, some of the increase was due to agricultural conversion and logging.

What Challenges and Setbacks Has the EUDR Faced?

The rollout of the EUDR has faced repeated delays. In December 2024, the EU postponed the start of EUDR compliance by 12 months to give companies more time to prepare. By September 2025, the EU Commission signaled another potential one-year delay, citing problems with the EUDR platform companies must use to submit due diligence statements.

The EU Commission later proposed simplifying requirements for micro and small primary operators, as well as downstream businesses, delaying the application date for those companies.

Then, on Dec. 17, the European Parliament formally approved a one-year delay: Large companies would not be held accountable until a Dec. 30, 2026 start date, while small companies with less than 50 employees and earning less than 10 million euros ($11.7 million) in sales would not need to comply until June 30, 2027.

Challenges also came from new proposals which called on the EU Commission to revise its benchmarking classification system designed to help EU businesses and enforcement authorities conduct due diligence and enforce compliance. The risk levels indicate the percentage of checks on shipments, with greater scrutiny given to higher-risk countries.

Some EU member state representatives have suggested adding a “no-risk” category to exempt certain countries from due diligence requirements; another suggestion proposed removing the system altogether. But changes like these could create loopholes and ultimately weaken the regulation’s effectiveness. The European Parliament already rejected a similar idea in 2024 for that very reason.

The EUDR was initially agreed upon following a lengthy negotiation between EU institutions and member states, as well as impact assessments and extensive consultations. Derailing its implementation penalizes producer countries and companies that have already invested in compliance, and it would create confusion and uncertainty in the EU market. The regulation may not be perfect, but it’s a necessary step toward deforestation-free supply chains. Many companies have already shown that EUDR compliance is possible, and several have urged the EU to uphold the legal text and stick to implementation timeline.

Since adoption, the EUDR has faced criticism from both inside and outside the EU. Most concerns focus on cost and complexity of compliance, as well as fairness, particularly for smallholder farmers. In response, the European Commission, EU member states and other development institutions have ramped up investment in EUDR preparedness by issuing resources and guidance, with a particular emphasis on preventing smallholder exclusion from the EU market.

What Counts as Deforestation and Degradation Under the EUDR?

The regulation's definition of a forest largely follows the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which defines it as land larger than 0.5 hectares with trees taller than 5 meters and a canopy cover of at least 10% that is not primarily used for farming or urban development.

Under the EUDR, deforestation refers to clearing forest to make way for agriculture. The key factor is the conversion of land that was forest in 2020 into farmland — such as pastures or soy plantations. It’s a complete land-use change: the forest is no longer a forest.

If that forest is cleared — whether by people or natural events like fire — and then converted into farmland, such as pastures for raising cattle or fields for soy or palm oil, it is considered deforestation.
However, if a forest is cleared, for example by fire (whether from human activity or natural causes) and is not used to produce any of the six EUDR-covered agricultural commodities, it is not considered deforestation under the regulations.
Forests used for wood production are not considered deforestation unless they’re also used for agriculture, for example, cattle grazing under the tree canopy.

The EUDR also covers degradation. Land that was forest in 2020 can be used for wood production and remain classified as a forest, even if it’s temporarily unstocked, according to EUDR definitions. A forest used for wood production is not considered degraded unless there's a specific structural change, such as:

Converting primary forest (native, untouched forest) into other wooded land (trees have 5%-10% canopy cover) or into plantation or planted forest.
Converting naturally regenerating forest (which has largely grown back on its own) into other wooded land used or plantation forest.

Who Does the EUDR Affect?

The EUDR affects any company that imports, produces or exports specific products, and their derivatives, to or from the EU market. This includes operators (those placing products on the market or exporting them from the market) and traders (those distributing and selling products).

It applies to companies based in the EU and internationally, and to businesses of all sizes, from micro and small enterprises to large corporations. However, larger businesses face stricter reporting requirements than smaller ones.

The EUDR spans multiple sectors, from food and beverage (such as companies sourcing cocoa and coffee) to fashion (leather goods, for example) to the health care industry (products such as latex gloves).

How Are Countries and Companies Preparing for the EUDR?

Under the EUDR, companies must prove that products linked to deforestation or degradation after Dec. 31, 2020, are not entering the EU market. This requires a due diligence process: collecting supply chain information (including geolocation), assessing the risk of deforestation and taking steps to eliminate any identified risk before the product can be put on the market.

Country-level efforts

Many producer countries are already taking concrete steps to prepare for the EUDR, from adopting national plans to developing traceability systems and improving data transparency. For example, Indonesia, Ghana and Vietnam are investing in government-led efforts to make information available to companies that must comply with the regulation. Delaying enforcement or altering the regulation’s scope could undermine these leading producer countries.

Vietnam stands out as a strong example of how the EUDR is reinforcing national policies to combat deforestation. As a top exporter of rubber and coffee, the country has shifted its focus from illegal logging to broader deforestation risks in agriculture since the regulation’s introduction. In 2023, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development adopted a national action plan prioritizing sustainable agricultural transformation. The following year, it launched a traceability system for coffee farms, piloting geospatial verification (such as satellite images) in key producing provinces. Developed through public-private collaboration, the system cross-references land-use maps and registration data to ensure EUDR compliance. Plans are also underway to expand it to rubber and cocoa.

Vietnam’s progress shows how the regulation can act as a catalyst for stronger policy alignment between global market demands and local sustainability goals.

EU member states are also preparing by using satellite and aerial earth observation data, such as forest maps from 2020 (the EUDR cutoff year) to detect deforestation, alongside other monitoring solutions and tools.

Private-sector efforts

Companies across supply chains are ramping up EUDR preparations, sparking a wave of innovation in monitoring and traceability. Many are developing satellite-based systems to verify deforestation-free sourcing, training smallholder farmers to meet EUDR requirements and partnering with governments and civil society organizations to improve data sharing and risk assessment.

For example, Unilever and Meridia are working together to map smallholder farmers in Indonesia, making it possible to trace palm oil from plantation to mill. The Global Platform for Sustainable Natural Rubber has created a system to help companies follow sustainability practices and demonstrate EUDR compliance. Open-source platforms like WRI’s Global Forest Watch are also supporting companies in verifying supply chains.

These kind of efforts shows how the EUDR is already driving unprecedented action — transforming compliance from a burden into an opportunity to build more responsible and transparent supply chains. The challenge now is scaling these solutions across all commodities and regions.

What's Next for the EUDR?

In addition to the one-year postponement and the adoption of a set of measures simplifying the regulation in December 2025, the amendments agreed on between the European Commission, Council and Parliament also task the Commission with delivering a simplification review by April 30, 2026.

The review will ultimately make suggestions for reducing any administrative burdens set by the EUDR. The Commission has stated that the review will not include any proposed changes to the EUDR’s legal text.

Instead, the Commission is updating, expanding and amending the existing resources to support the regulation’s implementation. This includes continuous updates to the Guidance document, the Frequently Asked Questions and the information about how the EUDR affects different supply chains.

The Commission is also currently updating the EUDR platform companies use to submit their due diligence statements through mid-April to reflect the changes in the December amendments and organizing trainings for the system.

What’s the Path to Full EUDR Implementation?

The EUDR represents a major milestone in the fight against commodity-driven deforestation.

The EU must reject attempts to further weaken the regulation’s core requirements — most urgently by not agreeing to further reductions of scope or obligations. Its effectiveness depends on maintaining its ambition without dilution or delay. Backtracking at this stage undermines the EUDR’s credibility and sends the wrong signal to global markets.

At the same time, the EU should also step up efforts to provide businesses with practical training and support to help them develop the skills needed for compliance, especially for small businesses that may otherwise struggle to meet requirements.

The European Parliament and Council must also give businesses and investors clear guidance — and avoid adding uncertainty with further changes to the law. The EUDR is not only a necessary response to the crisis of forest loss, but also a vital tool to support and complement producer country efforts to halt deforestation by 2030.

Editor's Note: This piece was originally published on July 8, 2025. It's been updated multiple times to reflect new policy developments, most recently on March 5, 2026.

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What Do Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World’s Top Emitters? It’s Complicated

shannon.paton@wri.org — Wed, 04 Mar 2026 15:00:00 +0000

What Do Ambitious Climate Commitments Look Like for the World’s Top Emitters? It’s Complicated shannon.paton@… Wed, 03/04/2026 - 10:00

It’s been 10 years since 194 countries adopted the Paris Agreement on climate change. And while many have made strides forward, their collective efforts still fall far short of what’s needed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F) and avoid increasingly dangerous climate impacts.

In 2025, countries were on the hook to submit new national climate plans, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs). The expectation was that, collectively, these new plans would help put the world on course for no more than 1.5 degrees C of warming by 2100. The Paris Agreement requires that each successive NDC reflects a country’s “highest possible ambition,” as well as its “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” As of early February 2026, 133 countries had submitted updated NDCs, representing 75% of global emissions.

According to the UN’s latest assessment, full implementation of the newest climate commitments would lead to warming of 2.3-2.5 degrees C (4.1-4.5 degrees F) by the end of the century — still well off track to meet the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. Policies that countries have adopted to actually follow through on their commitments lag even further behind. These current policies put the world on course for 2.8 degrees C (5 degrees F) of warming, with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions projected to hold steady at roughly 58 metric gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2030 before declining slightly to 54 GtCO2e in 2035.

It's clear that, together, these new NDCs don't go far enough. But a critical question remains: What would ambitious targets look like for the world's highest emitting countries?

That’s where things get more complicated...

5 Approaches for Setting National Emissions-Reduction Targets for 2030 and 2035

Divvying up the responsibility of achieving any global goal to individual countries is a complex, value-laden process. For example, should countries that can achieve the largest and cheapest emissions reductions set the most ambitious targets? Or should wealthy nations that have historically emitted the most GHGs shoulder the greatest responsibilities?

Various corners of the climate community tackle these questions differently, using a range of methods to develop near-term national benchmarks. These perspectives can yield distinct — and for some countries, contradictory — results.

To illustrate what ambition looks like under different lenses for six major emitters, we compiled 2030 and 2035 national benchmarks derived from five of the most widely used approaches and compared them to targets in these countries’ most recent NDCs. They include:

1) 1.5°C-Aligned, Least-Cost Pathways: Modeled scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C at the lowest possible cost — such as those featured in reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — are among the most common sources for establishing national benchmarks. While some global climate models can now generate least-cost pathways for major emitters, others still lack country-level data. They instead simulate global or regional scenarios that must be downscaled to the national level.

A Deeper Look at 1.5°C-Aligned, Least-Cost Pathways

In addition to maximizing cost-effectiveness globally, one of the main benefits of deriving national benchmarks from 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost scenarios is that they can account for important interactions across sectors (such as how decarbonizing power generation alongside scaling up electric vehicles can reduce transport emissions) and countries (for example, how supportive policies adopted in one major economy can help reduce the cost of zero-carbon technologies more broadly and, in doing so, accelerate adoption in other nations).

But these scenarios have also faced criticisms that extend beyond their treatment of equity and fairness. More specifically, some 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways feature large-scale carbon removal from bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation/reforestation that could harm biodiversity, food security and human rights.

So, while we present 2030 and 2035 benchmarks from least-cost pathways that hold warming to 1.5 degrees C from the IPCC scenario database, we filter out those that rely on unsustainable levels of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation to achieve this temperature goal, following criteria developed by Climate Analytics and used for global, sectoral benchmarking in the State of Climate Action series. Ideally, other approaches that rely on these least-cost pathways as a starting point for national benchmarking — namely 1.5 degrees-C-aligned, fair-share perspectives — would employ similar filters.

2) 1.5°C-Aligned, Fair-Share Pathways: A well-cited critique of relying solely on least-cost pathways to establish national benchmarks is that they ignore equity and fairness. Not only do inequalities in incomes, energy use and GHG emissions among countries persist in IPCC scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, but because they prioritize economic efficiency, these least-cost pathways can also assign some developing countries disproportionate responsibility for reducing GHG emissions, relative to their contributions to the climate crisis. Fair-share perspectives attempt to address such limitations — for instance, by considering historical responsibility for total emissions, economic capacity and equality in per capita emissions — when determining each country’s contribution to limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C.

But even defining equity and fairness across different fair-share approaches remains hotly contested, and such perspectives do not necessarily consider feasibility. Some countries’ fair-share contributions, for example, require GHG emissions to reach net zero or net negative by 2030, but such steep declines strain the bounds of feasibility even under the most favorable political conditions. In these select cases, approaches may allow for countries to compensate for what they cannot reduce domestically by financing emissions reductions beyond their borders.

3) National Modeled Pathways to Net Zero: Still other methods avoid global pathways entirely and instead rely on country-specific modeling. These scenarios focus not on determining an individual nation’s contribution to the global goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C, but rather on achieving that country’s pledge to reach net-zero emissions. They show how steeply emissions need to decline in 2030 and 2035 to stay on track to reach net zero — typically around mid-century for most countries.

4) Linear Trajectories to Net Zero: A related but simpler approach gaining traction among some governments is a “linear or steeper” trajectory to net zero. Essentially, if countries drew a straight line to their net-zero target — for example, 0 GtCO2e in 2050 — then their 2030 and 2035 targets should either be on this line or below it, reflecting a constant decline in GtCO2e each year. But the devil is in the details, as the starting point governments select may significantly impact the steepness of the line; the steeper the line, the more ambitious the national benchmarks will be.

5) Bottom-Up, Feasibility-Focused Modeling: This method relies on country-specific modeling to determine what level of mitigation is feasible within a given nation, irrespective of a global limit on warming or that country’s commitment to reach net zero. Often relying on more granular, country-specific data, these studies primarily estimate GHG emissions reductions that could be achieved if a government instituted a carbon price, championed a specific policy portfolio or deployed a particular suite of zero-carbon technologies. Some of these modeling efforts also quantify mitigation that is possible if a country pursues a “just transition” or achieves national development priorities, alongside efforts to mitigate climate change. These scenarios may end up charting pathways to net-zero emissions or show that deep GHG emissions cuts in line with 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways are feasible, but these end goals are not inputs to the modeling.

This list of methods is not exhaustive. For example, we excluded a carbon budgeting approach due to a lack of national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035. But like 1.5 degree C-aligned, fair-share pathways, this method aims to more equitably distribute responsibility for achieving the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal by allocating the global carbon budget to countries according to their relative shares of the world’s population.

What Do Ambitious 2030 and 2035 Emissions-Reduction Targets Look Like for 6 of the World’s Biggest Emitters?

Together, China, the United States, India, the European Union, Brazil and Indonesia currently emit more than half of the world’s GHGs each year. Their near-term climate ambition, then, plays an outsized role in determining whether the world can reduce emissions enough to hold global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees C.

Relying on the five approaches above, we assessed just how ambitious these major emitters’ 2030 and 2035 mitigation targets are, as well as what strong 2030 and 2035 targets could look like.

The headline is that while most major emitters have set near-term targets that would be considered ambitious under at least one perspective, none feature targets for 2030 and 2035 that are sufficiently ambitious across each of the five approaches assessed. What’s more, all six NDCs fall well short of what’s needed to keep the 1.5 degrees C limit within reach.

Brazil

Among the first countries to submit a new NDC in November 2024, Brazil committed to reduce GHG emissions 59%-67% by 2035, relative to 2005. While President Lula’s government did not strengthen the country’s 2030 target that aims to lower GHG emissions 53% from 2005 levels, it did reiterate Brazil’s pledge to reach climate neutrality by 2050. If achieved, these targets would cause GHG emissions to fall from 2.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 1.2 GtCO2e by 2030, 0.84-1.0 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050.

Brazil’s target for 2030 is considered ambitious under only two of the five approaches, while its target for 2035 is fully aligned with just one. More specifically, linear trajectories to net zero show that the country’s GHG emissions drop to 1.1-1.5 GtCO2e by 2030 and 0.85-1.1 GtCO2e by 2035 — equivalent to cuts of 43%-56% and 57%-67% from 2005 levels, respectively. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling affirm that near-term reductions of this magnitude are possible.

Aligning Brazil’s NDC with 1.5 degrees C, however, would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to 1.5 degrees C show the country’s GHG emissions dropping 84%-93% by 2035, relative to 2005, while a fair-share approach developed by Observatório do Clima calls for similarly steep declines, with GHG emissions decreasing 93% from 2005 levels by the same year. In real terms, this means that GHG emissions would fall to just 0.17-0.42 GtCO2e by 2035.

Although Brazil has already submitted its new NDC, there are still opportunities for President Lula’s administration to deepen mitigation efforts over the next decade. For example, the government has yet to publish a long-term strategy, which could help guide implementation.

China

China overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter in the early 2000s, with annual GHG emissions climbing from roughly 7.1 GtCO2e in 2005 to 13.2 GtCO2e in 2023. In its previous NDC, the Chinese government committed to peaking CO2 emissions before 2030; reducing the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of GDP produced (also known as “carbon intensity”) by at least 65% from 2005 levels by 2030; and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.

China’s newest NDC commits to decreasing GHG emissions 7%-10% from peak levels by 2035, marking the first time the country has explicitly pledged to reduce its total, economywide emissions. Yet the lack of detail in China’s NDCs, as well as some ambiguity in the scope of the country’s net-zero target, makes it challenging to translate these commitments into absolute emissions levels. One recent analysis from Climate Watch suggests that China’s GHG emissions would reach roughly 13.4 GtCO2e in 2030 and 12.6-13.0 GtCO2e in 2035 if the government achieves both its near-term targets.

China’s 2030 target falls short on ambition across all approaches. These lenses, however, differ in the magnitude of cuts required by the end of this decade. For example, 1.5 degree C-aligned, least-cost pathways show steep declines down to 4.9-5.9 GtCO2e, while country-specific modeling to net zero suggests a smaller decrease, to roughly 11 GtCO2e. But across all perspectives, GHG emissions fall below the 13.4 GtCO2e implied by China’s 2030 target.

China’s 2035 target is also insufficient across all approaches. Fair share-based perspectives suggest relatively modest declines in GHG emissions, to 7.3-12 GtCO2e. (Note that these figures exclude emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), which acts as a net sink and accounts for -5% of China’s total net emissions.) Both modelled and linear pathways to net zero also fall within this range. Yet other approaches imply much deeper cuts. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, for example, indicates that China could reduce its GHG emissions to 4.8-8.9 Gt CO2e by 2035, while 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways project emissions falling lower still, to just 3.8-4.6 GtCO2e in the same year.

Emitting roughly a quarter of the world’s GHGs, China’s ambition on climate change significantly impacts the world’s ability to confront this global crisis. The earlier China reaches peak emissions, the more time it will have to reduce emissions and meet — or even exceed — the more ambitious end of its 2035 target. There is reason for cautious optimism: China has a history of overdelivering on its targets.

European Union

The EU’s most recent NDC commits its 27 members to reduce their collective GHG emissions 66.25%-72.5% from 1990 levels by 2035. This builds on the bloc’s previous commitments to reduce GHG emissions at least 55% from 1990 levels by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. While not yet formally adopted into law, the European Parliament and Council have also reached a provisional agreement to set an EU target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions 90% by 2040, relative to 1990 levels. Achieving these NDC targets would lower the EU’s GHG emissions from 3.1 GtCO2e today to 2.1 GtCO2e by 2030, 1.3-1.6 GtCO2e by 2035, and 0 GtCO2e by 2050.

The EU’s target for 2030 aligns with just two approaches. Linear trajectories to net zero show the region’s GHG emissions falling to 1.5-2.2 GtCO2e by the end of this decade, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling suggesting that the upper bound of this range is possible. But to help limit warming to 1.5 degrees C, the EU would need to strengthen its near-term ambition. More specifically, least-cost pathways aligned with this temperature goal project GHG emissions declining to 1.9-2.0 GtCO2e — equivalent to a 57%-60% reduction from 1990 levels. A fair-share-based contribution from the EU would require still greater ambition. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) drop to near or below zero, representing at least a 91% reduction from 1990 levels. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the region’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.29 GtCO2e per year since 1990.

The more ambitious end of the EU’s 2035 target range is consistent with three out of four approaches assessed, while the less ambitious end is aligned with only one. Bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling suggests that cutting emissions 69% from 1990 levels is possible by 2035, while linear trajectories to the EU’s net-zero pledge entail GHG emissions falling 64%-75% — declines that are both relatively consistent with the region’s 2035 target. But only the most ambitious end of the EU’s target range is aligned with least-cost pathways to 1.5 degrees C, which show emissions dropping 71%-80% relative to 1990. Fair share pathways that keep this Paris Agreement goal within reach call for an even steeper decline in the EU’s GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) — by more than 100%.

India

India’s GHG emissions have yet to peak, rising in recent years from about 2.0 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.4 GtCO2e in 2021. India’s most recent NDC from 2022 commits to reducing the amount of emissions released per unit of GDP produced (also known as emissions intensity) by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030, as well as reaffirms its pledge to reach net-zero emissions by 2070. The government, however, has yet to clarify whether these targets refer to all GHGs or just to CO2, and this lack of clarity complicates efforts to assess the country’s ambition. But assuming that India’s pledge to reduce emissions intensity covers all GHGs, recent analysis featured on Climate Watch suggests that achieving this near-term target would further increase emissions to 4.7 GtCO2e by 2030.

While all approaches allow India’s GHG emissions some room to increase through 2030, its current target aligns with only two of them. Country-specific modeling efforts that estimate feasible GHG emissions reductions under different policy portfolios, for example, show India’s emissions reaching between 3.4-5.1 GtCO2e in 2030, while national modeling to net zero similarly project GHG emissions rising to 4.8 GtCO2e by the end of this decade. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, fair-share approaches — which are particularly salient in the context of India’s relatively small historical contribution to the climate crisis, low per capita emissions and development challenges — show somewhat smaller increases in GHG emissions to 3.7-4.0 GtCO2e by 2030 (excluding emissions from LULUCF, which act as a net sink and accounts for just -1% of India’s total net emissions).

While approaches diverge on whether India’s emissions can continue rising through 2035, all agree that GHG emissions cannot grow substantially beyond levels implied by the government’s 2030 target. On one end of the spectrum, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways model GHG emissions declining to 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035, while on the other, country-specific modeling to net zero indicates that GHG emissions roughly stabilize at their projected 2030 value of 4.8 GtCO2e in 2035. Fair-share approaches similarly find that GHG emissions remain relatively steady at 3.7-4.1 GtCO2e in 2035. But bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling project a more mixed bag of GHG emissions rising and falling between 2030 and 2035 across different scenarios.

Indonesia

Indonesia’s latest NDC from 2022 commits to lowering GHG emissions almost 32% by 2030, relative to a business-as-usual scenario (its “unconditional” target). With additional climate finance from international funders, the government could achieve more aggressive cuts of just over 43% (its “conditional target”). These targets translate to absolute GHG emissions of 2 GtCO2e (unconditional) or 1.6 GtCO2e (conditional) in 2030, as compared to the approximately 1.4 GtCO2e emitted today. The Indonesian government has also previously pledged to peak GHG emissions by 2030 and reach net zero by 2060.

Indonesia’s 2030 targets fall short of all but one of the approaches. Indeed, 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways show GHG emissions declining to 0.80-0.88 GtCO2e by 2030, while bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling call for cuts of a similar, albeit smaller magnitude. Only country-specific modeling to net zero by 2060 shows GHG emissions rising from current levels to reach 1.6-2.8 GtCO2e by 2030 — a range that encompasses both the country’s conditional and unconditional targets.

Submitting a new NDC this year offers Indonesia an opportunity not only to strengthen its current target for 2030, but also to set a new, ambitious target for 2035. National modeling to net zero by 2060 generally show GHG emissions peaking in 2030 before declining to between 1.3-2.4 GtCO2e in 2035, while linear trajectories to this same pledge show slightly deeper cuts from Indonesia’s 2030 targets to 1.0-1.6 GtCO2e. 1.5 degrees C-aligned, least-cost pathways chart even more ambitious declines to 0.61-0.78 GtCO2e in 2035, with bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling affirming that cuts of this magnitude could technically be achieved.

United States

Just prior to leaving office, the Biden administration published the United States’ new NDC. It commits the world’s second-largest emitter to reducing GHG emissions 61%-66% from 2005 levels by 2035, as well as reaffirms the country’s previous pledge to cut emissions 50%-52% from 2005 levels by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. In real terms, this NDC promises that GHG emissions will fall from 6.6 GtCO2e in 2005 to 3.2-3.3 GtCO2e by 2030, 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 and 0 GtCO2e by 2050.

But with the change in administration and President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the federal government is already beginning to roll back climate action, as well as adopt tariffs that are disrupting efforts to combat the climate crisis. Still, civil society groups and many state governments have rallied around this new NDC and have committed to still make progress toward these targets.

U.S. targets for 2030 and 2035 are fully consistent with three of the five approaches. Lowering GHG emissions to 2.2-2.6 GtCO2e by 2035 falls within the range estimated by bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, pathways to net zero, and linear trajectories to net zero. These same trends hold for the U.S.’ existing target for 2030.

But aligning the U.S. targets with a 1.5 degrees-C future would require deeper cuts. Least-cost pathways to this temperature limit, for example, call for GHG emissions to fall to 2.4-3.1 GtCO2e by 2030 and 1.6-2.3 GtCO2e by 2035. Only the most ambitious bound of the U.S. target for 2035 falls within this range. Fair-share perspectives posit that the U.S. — as the world’s wealthiest country, a nation with relatively high per capita emissions and the largest cumulative emitter of GHGs since the pre-industrial era — has an imperative to go further still. Under this lens, GHG emissions (excluding those from LULUCF) fall at least 87% by 2030 and 99% by 2035, relative to 2005. These trends roughly hold even when accounting for the country’s land sink, which has sequestered an average 0.90 GtCO2e per year since 2005. Since such steep declines would prove enormously difficult to achieve domestically, the United States could still deliver a fair-share contribution to 1.5 degrees C by providing additional finance to support emissions reductions and carbon removals beyond its borders.

Major Emitters Must Meet and Beat Their NDCs

The Paris Agreement is clear: NDCs should reflect countries’ “highest possible ambition,” with each round putting forward stronger targets than the last. But as this analysis confirms, there are still large gaps between major emitters’ near-term targets and what’s urgently needed to keep the 1.5 degree C limit within reach. Some countries’ 2030 and 2035 targets also fall short of the ambition required to achieve their own net-zero pledges.

Greater ambition from all countries — and especially these major emitters — is paramount. In a moment of global economic uncertainty, the need for ambitious climate action that also targets both inclusive economic prosperity and long-term stability is stronger than ever. Major emitters must meet this moment by immediately accelerating implementation of their NDCs to achieve their targets early — and, wherever possible, surpass them. There are few alternatives if we are serious about keeping the Paris Agreement goal within reach and protecting humanity from increasingly catastrophic climate impacts.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in April 2025. It was updated in March 2026 to include analysis of new NDCs submitted by major emitters. WRI is currently in the process of analyzing Indonesia's new NDC and will update this article accordingly.

About the Data

Brazil

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modeled pathways to Brazil’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario by Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and from the two ‘Just Transition’ scenarios from the Climate and Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to net zero, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from its 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from Observatório do Clima (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Brazil’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019.

China

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modeled pathways to China’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Carbon Neutrality’ scenario by the Energy Policy Simulator and the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘GHG Net Zero’ scenario. For linear trajectories to China’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from China’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. Because China’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Climate Mitigation’ and ‘Towards Sustainability’ scenarios by Lu et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019.

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Climate Watch, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015.

European Union

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the minimum and maximum values of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change’s filtered pathways. Regional modeled pathways to the EU’s net-zero pledge were not available. For linear trajectories to the EU’s net-zero pledge, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the EU’s 1990 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019.

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, regional benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the EU’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015.

India

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modeled pathways to India’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Enhanced NDC’ scenario by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative. For linear trajectories to India’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing a straight line from India’s 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2070. Because India’s emissions have yet to peak, authors did not draw a straight line from the most recent year of historical data. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Long-term Decarbonization’ and ‘NDC-SDG Linkages’ scenarios by the Energy Policy Simulator, GEM India’s ‘Net Zero’ scenario and the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Climate Watch in 2019.

Indonesia

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modeled pathways to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘DDS Low’ and ‘DDS High’ scenarios by the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative and the ‘NZ2060’ scenario by the Low Carbon Development Initiative (2021). For linear trajectories to Indonesia’s net-zero pledge, a national benchmark for 2035 is derived by drawing straight lines from the country’s 2030 NDC targets and stated peak value in 2030 to net-zero GHG emissions in 2060. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report in 2019.

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from Indonesia’s First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015.

United States

For 1.5°C-aligned, least-cost pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from AR6 IPCC C1 scenarios, which were filtered to avoid unsustainable global deployment of BECCS and afforestation/reforestation following methods developed by Climate Analytics. For national modeled pathways to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Central’ scenario by Jones et al. (2024), the ‘Net Zero’ scenario by Jenkins et al. (2024), the Deep Decarbonization Pathways initiative’s ‘Deep Decarbonization’ scenario and the Energy Policy Simulator’s ‘NDC’ scenario. For linear trajectories to the U.S.’ net-zero pledge, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived by drawing straight lines from the U.S.’ 2005 baseline, 2022 emissions level, and 2030 NDC target to net-zero GHG emissions in 2050. For bottom-up, feasibility-focused modeling, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the ‘Higher Ambition’ and ‘Higher Ambition+’ scenarios by Iyer et al. (2025), the ‘Enhanced Ambition’ scenario by Zhao et al. (2024) and from the ‘High Ambition’ scenario by Cui et al. (2024). Due to significant differences in historical data across these sources, authors normalized data across all sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report in 2021.

For 1.5°C-aligned, fair-share pathways, national benchmarks for 2030 and 2035 are derived from the Climate Action Tracker’s ‘Effort Sharing’ scenario, as well as two scenarios from the Climate Equity Reference Project that feature a middle-of-the-road fair-share pathway and a more progressive fair-share pathway. Because these pathways exclude GHG emissions from LULUCF, authors normalized data across both sources to historical data from the U.S.’ First Biennial Transparency Report, excluding GHG emissions from LULUCF, in 2015.

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Beijing Expands Green Transportation, Cuts Emissions Through Digital Transit Platform

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 22:00:59 +0000

Beijing Expands Green Transportation, Cuts Emissions Through Digital Transit Platform wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 17:00

WRI co-designed Beijing’s “Mobility-as-a-Service” digital platform, helping shift millions of commuters toward low-carbon travel and inspire similar apps in other cities.

The Challenge

As one of the largest cities in the world, Beijing faces complex traffic challenges. Roads are congested. Emissions are rising. Access to reliable and affordable transportation is hugely uneven. Meanwhile, growing private car use has reduced public transportation ridership while increasing air pollution.

One potential fix is making public transit more accessible and easier to use.

WRI’s Role

WRI partnered with the Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport, the Beijing Transport Institute, universities and private mobility operators to rethink how residents move through the city. The team convened government agencies, technology platforms and service providers to codesign a single, user-friendly app that integrates schedule, ticket information and payments for buses, the metro and shared bikes. It’s known as the “Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS)” system.

WRI started by conducting large-scale surveys and user testing to identify barriers and understand the needs of commuters, including vulnerable groups such as older adults and people with disabilities. WRI co-developed the MaaS system’s governance architecture and data-sharing rules, as well as the MaaS Impact Assessment Framework, which combines carbon reduction, user behavior and equity metrics to track benefits over time. WRI also helped embed carbon incentives into the platform, allowing users to earn rewards like public transport discounts, shopping coupons or charity donations when they select green transport modes.

The Outcome

Beijing launched China’s first citywide MaaS digital platform in 2019. It enables seamless trip planning across different types of transportation, allowing users to pay for everything in one place and offering rewards for choosing green travel options like buses, the metro and shared bikes.

Between 2019 and 2025, the program helped reduce emissions by more than 1 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, equivalent to taking up to 500,000 passenger cars off the road each year.

In 2025, the platform reached 30 million active users, who took 5.5 million daily “green” trips using shared bikes, buses or the metro, a 45% increase since 2019. The platform also enrolled 6 million registered users into the carbon-reduction incentive program, which rewards people who use green transit with things like coupons and discounted bus and metro rides.

Beijing’s system is now informing similar efforts in five additional Chinese cities, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Suzhou and Mengzi. Partnerships with the MaaS Alliance in Europe and Volvo Research and Educational Foundation’s Living Labs are expanding the model’s potential impact in other parts of the world.

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US Cities and Towns Take Innovative Approach to Renewable Energy

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:41:00 +0000

US Cities and Towns Take Innovative Approach to Renewable Energy wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:41

The WRI U.S. Polsky Energy Center supported cities, counties and local institutions in two U.S. states in purchasing clean energy. In Massachusetts, a consortium of 11 local institutions spurred development of 408 megawatt (MW) of new renewables, while in Pennsylvania, a new 22 MW solar array will be installed to power nearby cities and towns.

The Challenge

Local governments across the United States are setting and making progress toward clean energy goals. Yet many — especially smaller cities and towns — face challenges in accessing renewable electricity for their operations. Constrained budgets, staffing and expertise are one barrier; restrictive state policies and limited utility offerings are another.

One strategy to overcome these issues is buyer-led aggregated procurement. Through this approach, two or more local governments (or other stakeholders, such as public institutions, non-profits, corporations or schools) aggregate their buying power and jointly purchase renewable electricity, leading to larger deals and better prices. While this model is becoming more common, small towns and cities still struggle to get started.

WRI’s Role

The WRI U.S. Polsky Energy Center partnered with RMI to run the City Renewables Accelerator, which delivered intensive boot camps, cohort programming, one-on-one coaching and technical assistance on renewable energy procurement for more than 300 local governments. As part of this project, the Center and RMI team ran two cohorts on aggregated large-scale offsite renewables procurement, providing 14 regional buyers’ groups with technical assistance. We also developed an Aggregated Procurement Guidance Toolkit to help buyers navigate the complexities of clean energy contracting. The team conducted regional analyses, recruited participants and tailored the program design to meet specific needs.

The Outcome

U.S. cities and local institutions in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania signed contracts for a combined 430 MW of new renewable energy.

In Massachusetts, a consortium of 11 public and private buyers signed two virtual power purchase agreements that will generate an amount of clean power equivalent to powering 130,000 U.S. homes annually over 15 years. By financing the construction of new renewable energy projects in Texas and North Dakota, the deal will support approximately 750 construction jobs and generate an estimated $64 million in local tax revenue and $100 million in long-term income for landowners who host the projects. The group of buyers includes the city of Cambridge, along with two universities, a hospital center and a public radio station. This is the second-ever virtual power purchase agreement signed by a U.S. local government.

In Central Pennsylvania, 10 public entities — including towns, a school district and a water authority — signed a physical power purchase agreement for a 22 MW solar system on leased farmland. The array is expected to save the Centre County Council of Governments $144,000 in energy bills over 15 years.

Together, these deals will reduce emissions and set a model for local clean energy adoption.

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Flood-Prone Tamil Nadu, India Builds Climate-Resilient Villages

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:58 +0000

Flood-Prone Tamil Nadu, India Builds Climate-Resilient Villages wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

WRI India co-designed and piloted a Climate Resilient Village model that brought solar streetlights, recycling programs and other climate solutions to 11 districts in southern India.

The Challenge

In Tamil Nadu, India’s southernmost state, rural coastal communities face increasing threats from climate change. Extreme heat has become a regular occurrence. So have frequent droughts, intense cyclones, flooding and coastal erosion. Those with limited access to clean water, sanitation and steady jobs have been disproportionally impacted.

WRI’s Role

WRI India partnered with the Tamil Nadu government to help design, research and implement the Climate Resilient Villages program, which helps communities adapt to the impacts of climate change.

We began by identifying key vulnerabilities and solutions through community assessments, stakeholder consultations, climate data analysis, LiDAR (light detection and ranging) mapping, drone surveys and more. The team developed feasibility reports, technical designs and cost estimates for flood- and drought-proofing measures, renewable energy, waste management and other solutions. WRI India also identified opportunities to work with government funding and established monitoring systems.

Serving as a critical bridge between communities, local governments, technical experts and the private sector, WRI India helped shape the Climate Resilient Villages program, which was then scaled across 11 districts.

The Outcome

The Climate Resilient Villages program has become a replicable, locally led model for climate adaptation. So far, it has helped nearly 2.7 million people across 11 districts in Tamil Nadu become more resilient to floods, droughts and escalating impacts.

Some of the solutions implemented include solar panel installations on public buildings, installing a water purification system at a local school, restoring a canal to reduce flooding, using electric boats for mangrove touring, and increasing green areas and trees to absorb stormwater. Women and historically marginalized groups gained jobs in solid waste management and plastic and glass recycling. Some work to create hatcheries for endangered species such as olive ridley turtles. The model also helped reduce emissions and ensure reliable power supply during storms and other disasters.

The government of Tamil Nadu has now integrated some of these solutions into its climate, green, wetlands and coastal restoration programs. This has ultimately helped to strengthen community resilience, protect ecosystems and inform the state’s broader climate adaptation strategy.

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China’s Supply Chain Businesses Secure Groundbreaking Renewable Power Deal

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:56 +0000

China’s Supply Chain Businesses Secure Groundbreaking Renewable Power Deal wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

WRI China convened supply chain businesses of global brands such as Apple, Decathlon and Lenovo to purchase affordable clean energy at unprecedented scale.

The Challenge

Decarbonizing China’s industrial supply chains remains difficult because so many businesses — particularly those in textiles, electronics and food — rely heavily on coal-fired power. Small and medium suppliers dominate these sectors and struggle to access affordable renewable energy. In manufacturing-heavy provinces such as Jiangsu and Guangdong, a minimal renewable energy supply has made prices too expensive.

Meanwhile, large multinational companies have also increased pressure on their suppliers to meet corporate emissions-reduction targets. Affordable clean energy is therefore critical for smaller supply chain businesses to remain competitive.

WRI’s Role

WRI China convened small and medium-sized businesses to pursue “aggregated renewable energy procurement,” allowing suppliers to jointly purchase renewable energy at more affordable rates.

The team organized eight closed-door meetings that fostered collaboration among brand owners, suppliers and developers supporting major brands such as Apple, Lenovo and Decathlon. WRI China also engaged a third-party law firm to create secure conditions for information-sharing and contract management. Together, we provided tailored policy and risk-mitigation insights, along with market guidance and international benchmarking aligned with global standards.

WRI China encouraged suppliers to pool their demand and negotiate collectively with energy developers. They ultimately unlocked affordable renewable electricity while ensuring alignment with the GHG Protocol, Science-Based Target Initiative and China’s evolving renewable energy policies.

The Outcome

Suppliers for Apple, Lenovo and Decathlon collectively procured 1.6 terawatt-hours of renewable electricity in 2025 across 14 Chinese provinces. That’s equivalent to powering 500,000 average households for an entire year. The deal was the largest cross-sector aggregated renewable energy procurement in China.

Approximately 200 suppliers gained access to competitively priced, high-quality clean energy that meets international standards, strengthening their ability to comply with corporate climate commitments while advancing equity in the energy transition.

Early pilots demonstrated viability and enabled rapid scaling. For example, a 200-megawatt offshore solar project was purchased by 14 of Decathlon’s suppliers. The project reduces approximately 200,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually, equivalent to taking 45,000 passenger cars off city streets. The model is now being replicated across industries, and companies like Decathlon and Lenovo are considering expanding it to other geographies.

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US Communities Reduce Risks of Wildfires by Improving Forest Health

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:55 +0000

US Communities Reduce Risks of Wildfires by Improving Forest Health wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

Cities4Forests and partners mobilized $115 million to restore 320,000 acres of forests and watersheds, an area the size of Los Angeles. The work protects communities from wildfires while creating jobs and improving the water supply.

The Challenge

Across the United States, wildfires and dwindling water threaten communities and ecosystems. Dry, overgrown forests and degraded watersheds are often the culprits.

Wildfires now burn more than 7 million acres of land and forests annually — an area larger than the state of Vermont — destroying homes and infrastructure and leading to $900 billion in losses each year. The resulting ash and debris pollute waterways, while forest loss in upstream watersheds can reduce water supplies for nearby communities. Rural, Tribal and low-income communities disproportionately face the impacts.

Improving forest health can help prevent wildfires from starting and spreading out of control, but federal agencies face persistent funding gaps that delay proactive measures.

WRI’s Role

Alongside partners including Blue Forest, the Bonneville Environmental Foundation and U.S. Forest Service, Cities4Forests co-developed innovative financial mechanisms to scale forest and watershed restoration. These included the Forest Resilience Bond, the Utah Resilience Fund and the nation’s first certified green bond for watershed protection. Cities4Forests also mobilized more than $11 million from Fortune 500 companies for watershed restoration in collaboration with the Bonneville Environmental Foundation.

Cities4Forests identified priority geographies, designed innovative funding and financing tools, and provided technical analysis to scale investments. The initiative brought together utilities, federal and state agencies, Tribes, residents and corporations around the shared value of resilient forests, watersheds and communities. These efforts ultimately accelerated restoration timelines, unlocked nontraditional capital and created local jobs.

The Outcome

Cities4Forests mobilized $115 million across 15 states to restore and protect more than 320,000 acres of forests and watersheds — an area larger than the city of Los Angeles. Investments fund measures that reduce overly dense vegetation in forested watersheds, which decreases the risk of high-intensity wildfires, improves wildlife habitat and strengthens water security for more than 3 million people.

In California, the Forest Resilience Bond unlocked private capital to accelerate restoration across 63,000 acres in the Tahoe National Forest, lowering wildfire risk and improving water security. In Utah, funds raised for wildfire risk reduction across 61,000 acres in the Upper Weber River watershed help protect water supplies for over 700,000 downstream residents and recharge the shrinking Great Salt Lake. And a $32 million certified green bond safeguarded 3,100 acres around Lake Maumelle in Arkansas, the first of its kind to protect forests for drinking water. Fortune 500 companies now invest millions in watershed health across multiple states.

Collectively, these interventions support 260 jobs, remove or avoid more than 10 million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions (equivalent to the annual emissions of over 2 million cars), and deliver measurable ecological and community benefits for millions of people. They also create a viable financial model for nature restoration and wildfire prevention.

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Rio de Janeiro Makes Streets Safer for School Children

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:53 +0000

Rio de Janeiro Makes Streets Safer for School Children wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

By conducting road safety analyses around Rio de Janeiro’s school zones, WRI Brasil helped the city secure a $135.2 million World Bank loan that’s funded safer streets around city schools and expanded cycling networks.

The Challenge

Every day, thousands of children in Rio de Janeiro walk to school along streets with fast-moving traffic. Unsafe crossings and limited sidewalks do little to separate them from oncoming cars.

In 2023 alone, nearly 900 children in Brazil died from traffic crashes, according to Brazil’s ministry of health. Meanwhile, local data show that nearly half of Rio’s students walk to school. Many report fear of speeding vehicles, harassment and a lack of accessible paths. These challenges are even more prevalent in low-income neighborhoods.

Unsafe streets also discourage greener forms of travel like walking or biking, pushing more commuters toward polluting cars and worsening the city’s air pollution. Yet limited budgets often prevent road redesigns that create safer spaces for pedestrians.

WRI’s Role

WRI Brasil helped Rio de Janeiro secure financing to create safer streets around its public schools.

WRI Brasil researchers conducted 30 in-depth road-safety audits to identify critical risks around schools and develop actionable design recommendations. This research provided the analytical foundation used by city agencies and the World Bank to structure loan priorities around school-area safety, expanding cycling networks and designing safer streets for pedestrians.

The Outcome

The World Bank provided a $135.2 million loan to Rio de Janeiro to create safer streets for school children. Already, the city has implemented traffic-calming measures in 57 areas near schools. This includes actions like installing crosswalks, narrowing roadways, expanding sidewalks and reducing speed limits for cars. More than 200 schools have participated in education and awareness programs.

Early surveys indicate increased safety awareness and a growing preference for walking and cycling in treated areas.

Beyond improving child safety, the loan also provides funding for a broader sustainable mobility agenda. This includes expanding cycling lanes, improving pedestrian safety in low-income neighborhoods and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The experience offers a replicable model for cities across Brazil and Latin America.

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Shanxi, China Creates Over 1,000 Jobs for Displaced Coal Workers

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:51 +0000

Shanxi, China Creates Over 1,000 Jobs for Displaced Coal Workers wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

WRI partnered with Chinese provincial decision-makers, policy institutes, coal companies and communities to shift Shanxi’s economic focus from coal production to tourism. The project ultimately created more than 1,000 jobs for displaced coal workers.

The Challenge

Shanxi is China’s largest coal-producing province, accounting for roughly one-third of the country’s coal production and employing nearly one-quarter of its coal workers. Its economy is deeply dependent on coal, which contributes 73% of local tax revenue and 45% of industrial employment.

As China shifts away from fossil fuels to achieve its decarbonization goals, Shanxi’s coal-dependent economy poses complex challenges for its workers and the community. Local governments focused on maintaining economic stability, coal companies eager to explore low-carbon business models, and workers accustomed to relatively high mining wages are navigating how to survive the transition to cleaner energy. The central challenge is how Shanxi can protect jobs, its economy and communities.

WRI’s Role

WRI worked with Shanxi’s provincial leaders to support an inclusive low-carbon shift — one that ensures coal workers are not left behind as the economy diversifies beyond coal. This required both a top-down and bottom-up approach. WRI collaborated with local governments to produce research underscoring the importance and urgency of the coal transition. We also partnered with coal companies, coal communities, research institutes, and other stakeholders to explore a “coal-to-tourism” business model that encourages coal workers to proactively move into the service sector.

WRI surveyed 56 national experts and conducted in-depth interviews with local officials, coal companies, workers and affected communities. This research helped to identify risks, priorities and viable transition options. WRI also helped connect provincial leaders with national institutions and global expertise to strengthen policy design.

The Outcome

In 2024, Shanxi began transitioning its coal-dependent economy to a more diversified one, with tourism as a key pillar. The province converted mining areas into tourism destinations featuring nature and historical sites.

More than 1,000 displaced coal workers transitioned into tourism-related jobs such as tour guides, heritage restoration assistants and bus drivers. Households near new tourism sites saw annual incomes increase by 10%-20% due to increased economic activity and rental incomes.

The Shanxi coal-to-tourism model has since gained national recognition. It’s now being adopted by Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang provinces. National planning institutions have also endorsed the approach and are considering incorporating similar recommendations into the coal sector’s next five-year development plan.

During this process, Shanxi also became the first Chinese province to formally integrate the principles of a “just transition” into its government workplan. The principles emphasize the importance of inclusion and equity in shifting workers to a green economy.

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Indonesian Communities Protect Millions of Hectares of Rainforest

wil.thomas@wri.org — Tue, 03 Mar 2026 18:40:49 +0000

Indonesian Communities Protect Millions of Hectares of Rainforest wil.thomas@wri.org Tue, 03/03/2026 - 13:40

With WRI support, 22 local agencies used data-based monitoring tools to protect 2.2 million hectares of rainforest in Aceh, Riau and North Kalimantan provinces.

The Challenge

Aceh, Riau and North Kalimantan provinces hold some of Indonesia’s most vital rainforests. Yet they remain hotspots for deforestation driven by illegal logging and clearing for palm oil and other agricultural commodities.

Historically, forest monitoring in these regions has been fragmented and ineffective. Government agencies, local communities and civil society organizations operate in silos and rely on infrequent foot patrols that can be slow in preventing illegal clearing. Frontline forest defenders — particularly Indigenous Peoples and park rangers — lack both timely information and the authority to respond to deforestation. This limits their ability to protect the ecosystems that sustain their lives and livelihoods.

WRI’s Role

WRI established district-level forest monitoring teams by bringing together local governments, civil society organizations and communities in Aceh, Riau and North Kalimantan.

We provided intensive training on Global Forest Watch and other digital tools. These technologies, which use satellite monitoring and other data to spot tree loss in near-real time, help everyone from government agents to forest communities detect and halt deforestation. We also supported the issuance of formal government decrees in Bulungan, North Kalimantan and Aceh Tamiang, Aceh that ensured forest monitoring would continue after the project ended.

The Outcome

As of 2024, 22 local agencies and institutions are protecting 2.2 million hectares of forest across six districts in Aceh, Riau and North Kalimantan through strong monitoring systems. These systems include deforestation alerts, processes to verify tree loss, and response protocols co-developed by WRI and local stakeholders. The transition from reactive to proactive forest monitoring has produced measurable benefits. Forthcoming WRI analysis shows that Aceh saw a 16% reduction in the likelihood of deforestation, with a 19.9% reduction specifically within the Aceh Forest Estate.

The initiative also strengthened local governance. In August 2025, the district of Bulungan in North Kalimantan received a national award for integrating ecology into its budgeting and governance process. This improvement was directly supported by WRI’s forest-monitoring work.

Moreover, the Criminal Investigation Agency of the Indonesian National Police (Bareskrim) requested WRI’s support in deforestation analysis related to the flood disasters that affected parts of Aceh, North Sumatra and West Sumatra last year. Findings are supporting the agency’s ongoing investigation.

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