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RELEASE: Our Ocean Conference Announces Canada and Jamaica as Next Hosts

darla.vanhoorn@wri.org — Fri, 19 Jun 2026 05:16:11 +0000

RELEASE: Our Ocean Conference Announces Canada and Jamaica as Next Hosts darla.vanhoorn… Fri, 06/19/2026 - 01:16

LONDON (June 19, 2026) – Canada and Jamaica have been confirmed as the next hosts of the Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in 2027 and 2029, respectively. World Resources Institute serves as the Secretariat for the conference.

Canada will host the twelfth OOC in Halifax, Nova Scotia in Spring 2027. As host, Canada plans to highlight Indigenous and community leadership in ocean protection and the sustainable blue economy.

Jamaica will then host the first OOC to be held in the Caribbean in 2029, in Montego Bay. No OOC is planned for 2028, as the UN Ocean Conference will be co-hosted by the Republic of Korea and Chile that year.

Launched in 2014 by the U.S. Department of State under then-Secretary of State John Kerry, the Our Ocean Conference brings together governments, businesses and civil society organizations to make voluntary commitments on ocean conservation and sustainable ocean management.

Since its launch, more than 3,220 commitments worth over $175 billion have been announced through the Our Ocean Conference platform. These commitments have supported the expansion of marine protected areas, efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and marine plastic pollution, growth of the sustainable blue economy, improvements in global maritime security, and actions to mitigate and adapt to ocean-climate impacts.

Previous editions of the conference have been hosted by the United States, Chile, the European Union, Indonesia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Greece, the Republic of Korea and Kenya.

“Year after year, the world shows up to the Our Ocean Conference with ambitious commitments, and the data shows the conference delivers, with more than 80 percent of commitments either completed or in progress,” said Tom Pickerell, Global Director, Ocean Program, World Resources Institute. “As members of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, Canada and Jamaica have championed action for a healthy ocean that supports jobs, food security and economic prosperity. We look forward to working with them to build momentum for ocean action in North America, the Caribbean and beyond.”

“As a nation bordered by three oceans and home to the longest coastline in the world, Canada's relationship with oceans runs deep, and we have a duty to protect the oceans and the livelihoods of our coastal communities,” said the Honourable Joanne Thompson, Canada’s Minister of Fisheries. “Canada looks forward to working with global partners as host of the Our Ocean Conference to make sure shared commitments lead to real results."

“Jamaica is honored to host the Our Ocean Conference in 2029. As an island in the heart of the Caribbean, our economy, livelihoods and future are inseparable from the health of our marine environment,” said Matthew Samuda, Jamaica’s Ministry of Water, Environment and Climate Change. “This gathering will allow us to showcase our leadership in ocean governance, strengthen global partnerships, and ensure that our blue economy continues to provide for generations to come.”

About the Our Ocean Conference
The Our Ocean Conference brings together governments, businesses and civil society organizations to make voluntary commitments that advance ocean conservation and sustainable ocean management. The conference attracts more than 3,000 participants from over 100 countries, including heads of state, ministers, scientists, Indigenous leaders, youth representatives and business executives. Since its launch in 2014, the conference has generated more than 3,000 commitments supporting marine protected areas, sustainable fisheries, action against marine pollution, climate adaptation and mitigation, the sustainable blue economy, maritime security, and implementation of international ocean agreements.

About World Resources Institute (WRI)
WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations.

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STATEMENT: Bonn Climate Talks Spotlight Practical Steps to Drive Action, Importance of Trade

nate.shelter@wri.org — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:42:14 +0000

STATEMENT: Bonn Climate Talks Spotlight Practical Steps to Drive Action, Importance of Trade nate.shelter@wri.org Thu, 06/18/2026 - 16:42

BONN, Germany (June 18, 2026) — The mid-year UN climate negotiations in Bonn were pushed into overtime as countries grappled with whether to provide more support to poorer nations to adapt to worsening climate impacts. The gathering also placed a distinct emphasis on translating global climate targets into implementing action on the ground. During the talks, the COP31 Presidency proposed new targets for building efficiency, waste reduction and widespread electrification. International trade took center stage for the first time in an official UN dialogue.

Following is a statement from David Waskow, International Climate Director, World Resources Institute:

“The Bonn climate talks made clear that countries are increasingly focused on delivering climate action that improves people's lives while strengthening economic resilience. A just transition was also squarely on the radar, reinforcing that creating quality jobs and strengthening local economies are the only viable paths to building a transition that is both durable and equitable.

“The COP31 Presidency’s three proposed global targets— to expand electrification, halve growth in global waste, and reduce building energy intensity – provide a strong rallying cry. These are practical actions that governments can implement today to lower costs, improve public health, strengthen energy security and build more resilient communities.

“Enthusiasm around a just transition away from fossil fuels keeps building, thanks in no small part to the recent Santa Marta, Colombia conference and the Brazilian COP Presidency’s forthcoming roadmap. Expectations are mounting for countries to craft their own tailored national roadmaps to shift off fossil fuels.

“Finance debates pushed the negotiations into overtime, particularly on the funding needed for poorer nations to build resilience to climate extremes. A recent WRI study found that these climate adaptation investments can yield massive returns — over $10 for every $1 spent.

“Trade finally moved to the forefront at the first-ever official dialogue at a UN climate gathering. Countries took an important step toward aligning climate goals with economic competitiveness, beginning a long-overdue conversation about how trade policy can support the transition to cleaner, more resilient economies. Countries’ perspectives varied widely, but efforts to align international commerce and climate action are essential.

“Delegates leave Bonn with plenty of thorny issues to hash out, but the broad ambitions of the COPs this year in Antalya and next year in Addis are becoming clear: translating climate ambition into practical actions that strengthen economies, improve lives and build resilience for the future.”

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RELEASE: Global Leaders Announce $6.4 Billion for Ocean Action at First African Our Ocean Conference

nate.shelter@wri.org — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 18:23:19 +0000

RELEASE: Global Leaders Announce $6.4 Billion for Ocean Action at First African Our Ocean Conference nate.shelter@wri.org Thu, 06/18/2026 - 14:23

MOMBASA, Kenya (June 18, 2026) — Over 100 governments, businesses and civil society organizations announced 320 new commitments valued at $6.4 billion to advance ocean conservation, sustainable fisheries, climate resilience and the blue economy at the 2026 Our Ocean Conference, which concluded today in Mombasa, Kenya.

The conference marked a historic milestone as the first Our Ocean Conference hosted in Africa, underscoring the continent’s growing leadership in global ocean governance and sustainable ocean development.

The Our Ocean Conference has become one of the world’s leading platforms for ocean action, translating policy ambitions into measurable commitments, investments and partnerships.

Major announcements from this year’s conference included:

Kenya committed $200 million to install electronic monitoring to all industrial fishing vessels in its waters.
French Polynesia announced plans to strengthen protections within the Tainui Atea, the world’s largest marine protected area, through more than 27,000 square kilometers of new regulated fishing areas, coastal protection zones and seamount protections.
Canada committed $682 million to the Small Crafts Harbours Program to support coastal and rural communities, fishing activity and local economies.
The World Bank Group announced plans to invest $1 billion over the next two years to help developing countries build sustainable and resilient blue economies.

Africa’s role in the global ocean agenda has expanded rapidly in recent years. Home to 38 coastal and island states and more than 13 million square kilometers of exclusive economic zones, the continent has a significant stake in the future of ocean health and the blue economy.

“This conference is about turning words into commitments, commitments into action, and action into a legacy we can be proud of,” said Hassan Ali Joho, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Mining and Blue Economy.

The conference brought together over 5,000 participants, including heads of state, ministers, scientists, Indigenous leaders, youth representatives, business executives and civil society organizations. Its program featured leadership plenaries, high-level thematic panels, official side events, exhibitions, community and cultural events, an Executive Business and Investment Forum, a Youth Leadership Summit and a Research Symposium.

Youth engagement featured prominently throughout the conference. Held in parallel with the main event, the OOC11 Youth Leadership Summit convened young innovators, scientists, entrepreneurs and activists from across Kenya and beyond to showcase solutions for ocean conservation and sustainable development.

Beyond generating new commitments, the Our Ocean Conference serves as a mechanism for tracking progress and accountability. World Resources Institute (WRI), Secretariat of the Our Ocean Conference, analyzed progress on commitments in Africa since the conference began in 2014. Data found that approximately 78 percent of commitments are complete or in progress — and while many historically originated outside the continent, the 2026 conference highlighted a growing shift toward African-led solutions, financing and implementation.

“Africa is home to the world’s youngest and fastest-growing population, with more than 400 million people between the ages of 15 and 35,”said Wanjira Mathai, Managing Director, Africa and Global Partnerships, World Resources Institute. “For many young Africans, the ocean is not simply an environmental issue. It is a source of jobs, food security and economic opportunity. The commitments announced in Mombasa demonstrate growing recognition that investing in ocean health is investing in Africa’s future.”

Many commitments focused on priorities central to Africa’s development, including sustainable fisheries, blue carbon initiatives, marine conservation and efforts to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which is estimated to cost African economies between $11 billion and $13 billion annually.

As host nation, Kenya announced approximately 42 commitments worth an estimated $1 billion, including actions to expand marine protected areas, strengthen fisheries monitoring, mobilize climate finance and advance a sustainable blue economy.

Kenya has emerged as a leading voice on ocean issues as a founding member of the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy, host of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and an advocate for ambitious action on marine pollution and ocean sustainability.

Select 2026 Commitment Highlights

Total Number of Commitments: 320
Total Finance Mobilized: $ 6.4 billion
Number of Countries and Organizations: 104

Action Area	Number of Commitments	Financial Values ($ million)
Ocean-Climate Nexus	57	1,180
Marine Pollution	45	223
Marine Protected Areas	67	355
Maritime Security	14	28
Sustainable Blue Economy	86	2,864
Sustainable Fisheries	51	1,750
Total	320	6,401

The overall total for the 3,220 OOC commitments mobilized since 2014 is valued at $175.6 billion.

Read the full outcome report.

The Secretariat published two reports analyzing progress made on commitments made prior to OOC11, including an analysis of the commitment implementation in the past year, and an analysis of commitment implementation in Africa between 2014 and 2026.

About the Our Ocean Conference

The Our Ocean Conference brings together governments, businesses and civil society organizations to make voluntary commitments that advance ocean conservation and sustainable ocean management. The conference attracts more than 3,000 participants from over 100 countries, including heads of state, ministers, scientists, Indigenous leaders, youth representatives and business executives. Since its launch in 2014, the conference has generated more than 3,000 commitments supporting marine protected areas, sustainable fisheries, action against marine pollution, climate adaptation and mitigation, the sustainable blue economy, maritime security, and implementation of international ocean agreements.

About World Resources Institute (WRI)

WRI works to improve people’s lives, protect and restore nature and stabilize the climate. As an independent research organization, we leverage our data, expertise and global reach to influence policy and catalyze change across systems like food, land and water; energy; and cities. Our 2,000+ staff work on the ground in more than a dozen focus countries and with partners in over 50 nations.

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Retired EV Batteries Can Play a Vital Role in Making Clean Energy More Affordable and Accessible

alicia.cypress@wri.org — Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:30:00 +0000

Retired EV Batteries Can Play a Vital Role in Making Clean Energy More Affordable and Accessible alicia.cypress… Tue, 06/16/2026 - 08:30

Most electric vehicle (EV) batteries are retired with as much as 70% to 80% of their original capacity remaining. They still work, but their performance no longer matches automotive requirements that demand full charging capacity for long-range driving.

Over time, factors like repeated charging cycles, heat exposure and chemical aging gradually reduce a battery’s ability to hold and deliver energy efficiently. Yet even at 70% capacity, retired EV batteries can serve a “second-life,” providing other kinds of electric storage needs, such as powering homes, businesses or even smaller vehicles.

Finding second-life options is critical because by 2035, the supply of retired EV batteries is poised to surge, exceeding 300 gigawatt-hours globally — equivalent to roughly 4.6 million batteries that could be treated as waste. According to BloombergNEF, an energy research firm, at least half of the batteries will come from China alone. The remaining capacity in these retired batteries could power as many as 20,000 U.S. homes or 10 times that amount in India, for an entire year — a staggering amount of capacity.

Yet despite this potential, efforts to repurpose EV batteries remain fragmented, with no shared framework or clear safeguards to ensure their equitable and scalable deployment.

To move forward, we need to answer questions about not only whether these batteries will be repurposed, but also how, and who may benefit. With the right frameworks in place, second-life EV batteries could be a growing energy source and expand equitable access to affordable, clean and reliable power.

How Can Retired EV batteries Find a Second Life?

Retired EV batteries can store electricity with a variety of different use cases, including:

Grid Energy Storage

Second-life EV batteries can have enough capacity for large stationary grid-level storage.

For instance, in California, a 12 megawatt-hour (MWh) facility from energy system developer B2U, uses hundreds of second-life Honda EV batteries that are charged by 1.5 MW of solar generation. The project is interconnected into the electric utility’s distribution system and sells electricity and grid services into the California Independent System Operator market. Similar projects are being piloted globally, too.

B2U Storage Solutions uses second-life Honda electric vehicle batteries to store solar-generated electricity at a facility interconnected with the local electric utility's distribution system. Photo by B2U Storage Solutions.

Commercial, Industrial and Community Backup Power

Many commercial and industrial energy storage solutions rely on lower-capacity lead-acid batteries. Second-life EV batteries, which use lithium, have higher storage capacity and can replace or supplement traditional energy storage systems found in warehouses, telecommunication towers, data centers or in community centers. For example, China Towers, one of the largest telecommunication tower operators globally, is replacing their lead-acid batteries with second-life EV batteries to use as backup power storage for 5G base stations.

Second-life batteries are already being used to support AI data centers, which are raising concerns about supply shortages and blackouts. These batteries instead offer clean energy storage capacity that can improve data center load flexibility.

Second-life batteries can also offer critical support to community centers, particularly emergency shelters, by providing off-grid power for cooling, food distribution and health services during natural disasters, blackouts or other types of emergencies.

Mini-Grids for Rural Electrification

In households or communities where grid access is limited or too expensive — especially rural communities or remote areas of developing countries — second-life EV batteries can be paired with small solar installations to provide power. Mini-grids that use second-life batteries as a substantial, more affordable supply source can help close this gap. The World Bank estimates that more than 160,000 mini-grids are required to address energy access needs in Sub-Saharan Africa alone and in Kenya, analysis from WRI’s Energy Access Explorer estimates that as many as 1.8 million people living in rural areas may benefit from this kind of solution.

Additional EV Applications

Second-life EV batteries can still be used in the EV industry, exemplifying an elegant circular use case. Two key applications are:

Large EV batteries can be repurposed for smaller vehicles like two- and three-wheelers that have much lower power requirements. For example, companies like Qtron in Kenya are using second-life hybrid/electric batteries for electric two-wheelers (boda bodas) and three-wheelers (tuk-tuks). These second-life batteries cost significantly less than new batteries making electric mobility more affordable.
Second-life EV batteries can also buffer fast chargers by slowly pulling electricity from the grid when demand is low, storing it and releasing it quickly during charging. This can help the grid manage EV demand, reduce peak demand charges and enable fast charging in grid-constrained locations. For instance, India’s first off-grid, solar-powered EV charging station near Bengaluru airport uses second-life EV batteries to store rooftop solar energy, enabling 24/7, low-cost charging for up to 23 vehicles. This reduces grid reliance, manages high demand and promotes a circular economy.

Scaling Second-Life Batteries Comes with Big Benefits

In addition to providing more affordable energy storage solutions and expanding clean energy access, scaling second-life batteries includes many benefits, such as:

Creating Jobs

Local microgrids, solar rooftops and other decentralized forms of generating clean electricity create an excellent opportunity for local jobs. For example, an average mini-grid in Kenya creates 12 jobs according to a study by the International Labour Organization. In addition, the process of developing second-life batteries, from collection to capacity evaluation, tends to be labor-intensive and will also create jobs.

Encouraging EV Adoption

The high upfront cost of EVs, combined with rapid depreciation, can often discourage commercial EV buyers. A well-established second-life battery market can help commercial EV owners recover some value after selling their batteries, lowering their total cost of ownership. For example, electric truck components can retain 15% to 20% of the initial value by year five, which can add up for companies that manage large fleets. Expanding efforts like the Community to Advance Finance for Electric School Buses (CAFÉ), that bring together financing and investor communities to develop innovative tools for fleets, can help ensure cost savings are captured.

Second-life batteries can also lower costs for electric two- and three-wheelers and support the affordable expansion of charging infrastructure. At the same time, they allow countries to capture more value from the EV supply chain while providing a sustainable pathway for battery end-of-life management. Together, these benefits can help accelerate EV adoption and strengthen the broader e-mobility ecosystem.

Electric three-wheel vehicles known as tuk tuks, often used as taxis in countries like Thailand and Kenya, can become more affordable by using second-life batteries. Photo by DimaCool/Shutterstock.

Reducing Emissions and Waste

Manufacturing an EV battery comes with a heavy environmental impact. Studies show that second-life battery use is preferred to recycling when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, ecosystem pollution, resource use and human health. Although the numbers vary depending on battery chemistry, second-life applications, electricity mix and recycling efficiency, the “reduce-reuse-recycle” hierarchy is best from an environmental perspective for batteries.

Supporting Energy Security

Regions like Europe face the dual challenge of strengthening energy security by accelerating the deployment of renewables and storage solutions while reducing dependence on imports of clean energy equipment. Using second-life batteries for stationary storage in domestic markets can help meet both goals. Recent research estimates that the EU’s need for stationary storage batteries can be fully covered by reusing 40% of electric vehicle batteries by 2040.

Addressing Key Challenges to Scale Second-Life Batteries

To capture these big benefits, we need to overcome several systemic challenges and uncertainties that include:

Increasing Economic Viability

New battery prices have been falling dramatically over the past decade, from around $1,000 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 2010 to below $100 per kWh in 2025, driven by massive scaling in production and intense competition between manufacturers. At the same time, most of the cost of second-life batteries today comes from labor-intensive disassembly and testing, which has been more difficult to reduce.

Narrowing cost advantage and shorter remaining use life compared to new batteries are putting the economic viability of second-life batteries under increasing pressure. This varies by geography and battery chemistry. In countries like India or Kenya, where labor costs are lower and price sensitivity is higher, second-life battery installations can expect higher margins than countries like the U.S.

Furthermore, due to their longer lifespans and less valuable critical mineral content, second-life use of lithium-iron-phosphate batteries may be more economically attractive compared to other kinds of batteries, like nickel-cobalt based batteries. Continued innovation in battery diagnostics, automated disassembly and pack-level repurposing could reduce second-life processing costs significantly over time, helping preserve competitiveness even as new battery prices decline.

Improving Safety

EV batteries (made of lithium-ion) run the risk of rapid overheating, fire or explosion when the battery temperature increases uncontrollably. Second-life batteries are not inherently more likely to catch fire than new batteries, but they can present higher safety risks if they are not properly tested, graded and managed before reuse. This risk is particularly high in countries where the informal sector is heavily involved in waste collection and management, and lack access to proper training and tools to handle used batteries safely. As regulations, training programs and certification schemes mature, the safety performance of properly tested second-life systems is expected to increasingly approach that of new battery installations.

Mitigating Illegal Dumping Risks

Exporting used EV batteries from wealthy countries to developing countries risks increasing the illegal dumping of hazardous waste. Each year, millions of tons of electronic waste are shipped to Africa under the guise of reusing products, only to end up in dumps, polluting the air, water and land, and causing health hazards to the local community and waste workers. The practice persists in part because exporters are side-swiping costly disposal fees by exploiting a loophole in the Basel Convention — an international agreement that bans the trade of hazardous waste from richer to poorer countries but does not cover products shipped for reuse.

Stronger battery traceability systems, digital battery passports and stricter enforcement of transboundary waste regulations could help distinguish legitimate second-life applications from waste dumping. Clear standards for testing, certification and end-of-life responsibility could further ensure that exported batteries are deployed in productive use cases and ultimately managed responsibly.

Balancing Second-Life Use with Recycling

Second-life batteries may offer greater environmental benefits than recycling, but current market forces are pulling in the opposite direction. Recycling capacity is expanding rapidly — especially in China, the United States and Europe — and is expected to far outpace the amount of retired batteries by 2030, intensifying competition for feedstock.

At the same time, policies like the European Union’s Battery Regulation, which sets recycling targets for lithium, cobalt and nickel, will likely incentivize retired EV batteries be recycled instead of repurposed.

The result is a growing mismatch between what scientific studies conclude, and what the market and policy frameworks reward. This tension can be reduced through policy frameworks that prioritize the highest-value use of batteries across their full lifecycle, recognizing both repurposing and recycling as complementary strategies.

Improved data on battery health and lifecycle impacts can help policymakers and industry determine when second-life use delivers greater economic and environmental value before eventual recycling.

Lithium-ion electric vehicle battery components still hold much of their capacity for second-life use, but clearer policies are needed to align scientific findings with market forces to encourage greater adoption. Photo by IM Imagery/Shutterstock.

Next Steps to Responsibly Scale Second-Life Batteries

Before the big wave of retired EV batteries arrives in a few years, we are at an opportune moment to develop a game plan — to improve market economics, build guardrails and develop policies that can accelerate a broader second-life market. By developing clear policies and standards, advancing supportive technologies and leveraging new business models and financing tools, second-life batteries can scale responsibly, capturing its benefits, while overcoming the challenges.

Develop Clear Policies, Regulations and Standards

Although an increasing number of countries have established national policies in waste management and extended producer responsibility (e.g., India’s Battery Waste Management Rules, Colombia’s National Policy for Integrated Solid Waste Management, Kenya’s Sustainable Waste Management Act), policies targeting second-life batteries are still largely non-existent. Now is the time to develop clear, consistent policy frameworks that include standards for battery testing and certification, safety requirements, traceability mechanisms, producer responsibility obligations and conditions for determining when batteries should be repurposed versus recycled.

Some exceptions include U.S. states like Washington, Colorado and California, which have battery end-of-life policies or bills that consider second-life use, and China, which is the first country to establish a policy framework for both battery second-life use and recycling.

Case Study: China’s Second-Life Battery Policy

The foundation for China’s second-life battery policy began in 2016 with the Extended Producer Responsibility Program. In 2024, China issued the “Specifications for the Comprehensive Utilization of New Energy Vehicle Waste Power Batteries,” which provides guidelines for domestic battery reuse/recycle companies on issues including siting, technical capability, quality, environmental protection, safety measures, social responsibility and monitoring.

It is accompanied by an extensive set of standards, including a subset specific for second-life batteries, which covers pre-testing, disassembly, quality and safety, labelling, as well as design for reusability.

The policy is also complemented by a national Battery Traceability Management Platform, which requires real-time monitoring of the state-of-health of EV batteries, and exchange information with the second-life use and recycling companies.

However, China’s policy guidance on EV battery reuse has also been dynamic. The most recent policy update released in early 2026 banned second-life battery use in e-bikes, most likely out of safety concerns.

International and regional standards specific for second-life batteries are also emerging, with many other standards covering the performance, testing, transport and safety of EV batteries that can be relevant for second-life batteries as well.

However, second-life batteries are still left almost entirely to market forces, which alone are not enough to achieve the benefits, overcome the barriers and avoid their environmental and social risks.

Furthermore, current policies are not only limited on scaling second-life batteries, they may also unintentionally create disincentives (for example, by specifying recycled content requirements). There is a clear need for more policy development that provides direction and guardrails for second-life batteries as well as striking the right balance with recycling.

Advance Enabling Technologies

Rapid technological innovation in battery design and manufacturing directly impact the viability of second-life batteries. Variables like volume, technical viability, cost of repurposing and safety, however, can influence their impacts.

Advancements at the material and chemistry level of EV batteries can influence how much usable capacity remains after first life. Over the long term, as material technologies mature, these innovations are expected to significantly enhance the safety, longevity and overall viability of second-life batteries. In the short term, battery pack design innovations are making batteries easier to disassemble, reducing labor costs and enhancing safety.

Additionally, AI-enabled battery management systems and predictive analytics can enhance the technical viability of second-life batteries by enhancing state of health assessments, early fault detection and automated grading. Coupled with robotics for labor-intensive processes like disassembly, this leads to better valuation, reduced operational risk, offering transparency into battery health, usage history, second-life suitability and lower processing costs.

Leverage Innovative Business Models and Financial Tools

Novel business models have the potential to address some of the economic and operational challenges faced by second-life batteries. Redwood Materials, a leading U.S. battery recycler, has taken an innovative approach by pairing its recycling operations with a dedicated unit that repurposes retired EV batteries for energy storage. By managing both second-life use and recycling in-house, Redwood effectively controls multiple stages of the battery lifecycle, a strategy known as vertical integration. This approach allows the company to optimize the value extracted from each battery, ensuring that energy is reused before materials are recovered, while also streamlining operations and reducing market friction.

Service-based business models can mitigate performance or reliability concerns about second-life batteries and encourage market adoption, such as “battery as a service.” Here, the owner or operator of EV fleets can optimize charging, second-life use and manage battery replacement risks for clients. For example, Zenobe offers Battery-as-a-Service Agreement to finance the up-front cost of bus batteries as well as any battery replacements required over the lifetime of the contract. At the end of their lifecycle in electric buses, Zenobe takes back the batteries and repurposes them for storage applications. Another version is “pay per use,” in which customers are charged based on the actual energy drawn from the battery systems.

Innovative financial instruments such as residual value guarantees, blended finance structures and performance insurance can help scale second-life use responsibly. By enabling financiers and fleet owners to account for the future reuse potential of batteries, these instruments can lower upfront EV costs while incentivizing high standards for testing and traceability. When paired with robust governance and data-sharing frameworks, they can accelerate investment into second-life applications such as stationary storage, microgrids and backup power while ensuring environmental and social safeguards are met. However, a lack of real-world valuation data on second-life EV batteries and a lack of standardized assessment procedures both severely limit the utilization of this value stream in current EV procurements.

Unlocking Second-Life Batteries Requires Ambition and Action

The energy transition is approaching a new and largely overlooked inflection point: a rapidly growing supply of electric vehicle batteries that are no longer suited for transportation, but still highly valuable. Second-life batteries could become a critical resource that lowers energy storage costs, improves resilience and expands clean energy access. But that opportunity is at risk. Falling prices for new batteries are undercutting the economics of second-life use. The lack of clear standards for safety, performance and data transparency is slowing investment. And absent policy is adding to uncertainty.

The result is a growing paradox: At the very moment the world needs unprecedented amounts of affordable energy storage, millions of batteries with years of remaining useful life could be prematurely recycled or disposed. The decisions made in the next few years will determine whether second-life batteries become a strategic asset for the clean energy transition or a missed opportunity. Governments, industry and civil society must act now to establish the policies, standards, business models and market incentives needed to scale second-life batteries safely, responsibly and at meaningful scale.

We need a coordinated global effort to answer the most pressing questions facing the sector: When does second-life use create greater value than immediate recycling? Where can retired EV batteries create the greatest net benefit — within their country of origin or in international markets where demand, affordability needs and economic viability may be higher? And what policies and market structures are needed to ensure batteries reach their highest-value use? The answers will shape not only the future of battery management, but also the affordability, resilience and sustainability of the broader energy transition.

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Millions of retired EV batteries still hold significant capacity. With the right policies and investment, they could provide a second life powering homes, businesses and communities.

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What Can Existing Marine Protected Areas Teach Us about Safeguarding the High Seas?

alicia.cypress@wri.org — Mon, 15 Jun 2026 20:56:10 +0000

What Can Existing Marine Protected Areas Teach Us about Safeguarding the High Seas? alicia.cypress… Mon, 06/15/2026 - 16:56

Less than three weeks into 2026, the international ocean community celebrated a key achievement: the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (often called the BBNJ Agreement or the High Seas Treaty) officially came into force.

This is the first legally binding, global framework to govern biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdictions — an area covering approximately 65% of the ocean and 43% of the Earth’s surface. Because of its size and remoteness, management of this area, known as the “high seas,” has been historically disjointed. The new treaty aims to provide the much-needed thread to stitch together a patchwork of current governance systems.

Work now begins to build a framework that supports international climate and biodiversity goals. This includes the creation of new decision-making bodies, procedures for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the high seas, rules for accessing and benefit-sharing of marine genetic resources, and critically, a mechanism for the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) on the high seas.

We’re at a pivotal moment as the effectiveness of establishing MPAs during the High Seas Treaty negotiations will greatly impact the success of sustainable ocean management efforts globally. Lessons learned from already-established high seas MPAs in the North Atlantic and Southern oceans can help shape the most successful approaches.

Why Are High Seas MPAs Important?

The high seas are crucial in absorbing about 90% of excess heat and a quarter of carbon dioxide emissions through physical, chemical and biological processes. This area also supports important fisheries, including tuna, krill and squid. Beyond these high value species, biodiversity here remains poorly described with estimates that hundreds of thousands of species remain to be discovered. Related to this vast biodiversity, the ecosystem services provided by the high seas (including chemical compounds for pharmaceuticals, nutrient cycling and climate regulation) are thought to be extremely valuable.

Despite their importance, the high seas are facing a number of significant threats from unsustainable fishing and shipping practices, climate change, land-based pollution and mining. Well-designed high seas MPAs and OECMs, which manage a wide range of human activities within designated zones, are essential parts of the solution. They have been shown to promote ecosystem recovery and resilience, including through increased abundance and biomass and greater biodiversity. Their benefits typically extend beyond their boundaries too, boosting biomass and biodiversity through what’s known as the spillover effect.

High seas MPAs will also be crucial to achieving the global ambition to protect at least 30% of the ocean by 2030 — a target formalized within the Global Biodiversity Framework (Target 3, also known as 30 by 30). Their documented power to protect healthy ecosystems and encourage the recovery of impacted ecosystems would significantly contribute to achievingcould contribute to achieving this target –– though there would still be a need for large no-take MPAs in national waters where many threats are concentrated. However, with only 1.6% of the high seas protected as of February 2026, a huge increase in the rate of MPA designation will be needed.

Effectively addressing the full suite of high seas threats will require more than the establishment of MPAs. Sector-specific and global measures are also needed, such as International Maritime Organization (IMO) shipping routing/speed and biofouling controls, regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) rules for fisheries, EIAs under the High Seas Treaty and economy-wide action on greenhouse gases and land-based pollution.

Sustainable Ocean Plans (SOPs), that are currently deployed only in national waters, may be an effective means to coordinate these different bodies. These plans act as overarching frameworks to support the sustainable management of 100% of areas under national jurisdiction. Exploring their development in a high seas context may help extend focus beyond a simple target of 30% protection towards more holistic and multifaceted 100% sustainable management.

How Are the Current High Seas MPAs Managed?

High seas MPAs are currently established in the Southern and North Atlantic oceans. In the Southern Ocean, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was established in 1982 following concerns over the overfishing of krill, and forms part of the Antarctic Treaty. In the North Atlantic Ocean, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) was convened to combat marine pollution after a series of extensive oil spills. Since their formation, both intergovernmental bodies have delineated MPAs on the high seas, providing limited, but useful, case studies to learn from.

CCAMLR

Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

Members: 26 countries plus the European Union, and 10 Acceding States (parties without a vote)

Number of high seas MPAs: 2 (South Orkney Islands MPA, Ross Region MPA)

Decision-making process: unanimous vote

Management responsibility: members

Funding: primarily national funding with assistance from the MPA Special Fund

Since 2002, CCAMLR has been working to determine a representative system of MPAs in the Southern Ocean. A formal agreement was made for this network to be completed by 2012 (Conservation Measure 91-04), but was delayed because its members could not find consensus on the details of this system. As such, only two MPAs are in operation, covering just 5% of the Southern Ocean.

While management responsibility lies with CCAMLR, both MPAs are primarily monitored by a small group of members. The South Orkney Islands MPA is monitored primarily by the United Kingdom through its Blue Belt Overseas Territory work. The Ross Sea MPA has largely been monitored by New Zealand, the U.S., Italy and South Korea, with New Zealand also conducting enforcement activities using its own maritime surveillance and patrols.

The costs of managing these MPAs are mostly covered by national funds from the engaged nations, rather than a central CCAMLR pot. For example, the five-year Ross Sea Region Research and Monitoring Programme (Ross-RAMP) was funded exclusively by the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). There is, however, an MPA Special Fund, that was set up in 2005, to support the development and implementation of MPAs as a complement to these other funding mechanisms.

OSPAR

Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic

Members: 16 contracting parties

Number of high seas MPAs: 11 (2 fully in areas beyond national jurisdiction – Charlie Gibbs South MPA, and Milne Seamount Complex MPA).

Decision-making process: unanimous vote or three-quarters majority

Management responsibility: members, except when coordinating with existing sector-specific intergovernmental bodies

Funding: primarily national funds with no central pot

Recommendation 2003/3 adopted by OSPAR proposed the establishment of a well-managed and ecologically coherent network of MPAs. In the North-East Atlantic Environment Strategy (NEAES) 2030, OSPAR outlined their goal of ensuring this network covers at least 30% of its maritime area in line with 30 by 30. As of their last Assessment Report (2023), 10.9% of the OSPAR region is covered by MPAs — with 11 located in the high seas.

The leniency in decision-making of OSPAR, where if a unanimous vote cannot be reached, a decision may be adopted by a three-quarters majority, contrasts with the voting system in place in the CCAMLR area.

As the management of the high seas MPAs is the responsibility of OSPAR members collectively, it relies heavily on information sharing and coordinated scientific work. Research expeditions from the U.K., U.S. and Russia have provided vital monitoring data for the Charlie-Gibbs MPAs, but monitoring activities for the Milne Seamount Complex remain limited.

Enforcement responsibility depends on the activity in question. Both fisheries management and maritime transport are not in the OSPAR Convention mandate. Instead, OSPAR has a cooperation agreement with other international authorities responsible for these sectors. For fishing, regulation relies on the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), whereas shipping standards are enforced by the International Maritime Organization. Similarly, mineral extraction is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

What Learnings Can Be Taken for the High Seas Treaty?

Both CCAMLR and OSPAR MPAs demonstrate that large high seas MPAs can be established and persist in an intergovernmental setting. They are backed by legally established, multilateral frameworks that are not dependent on a singular government for financial stability or management, making them resilient to changes in geopolitical climate. They can be integrated with other regulatory frameworks and bodies that are active across the high seas, including the IMO, ISA and RFMOs. Further, they can attract funding for scientific research and monitoring activities from national science agencies across the globe.

However, both CCAMLR and OSPAR MPAs demonstrate limitations. With no long-term funding model, and no central budgets or staff, capacity for MPA management and enforcement is dependent on sporadic volunteer contributions from nations or scientific agencies. The pursuit of consensus in decision-making in CCAMLR has also generated significant delays in the delivery of effective marine protection.

There are, therefore, three key lessons that the High Seas Treaty can learn from these existing mechanisms:

Avoid institutional paralysis linked with consensus decision-making. Fortunately, the High Seas Treaty is already taking steps to alleviate this. A similar decision-making model to OSPAR has been proposed, where if consensus cannot be reached amongst member nations, a three-quarter majority vote can pass the adoption of an MPA. This voting system must be kept intact to ensure future proposals of high seas MPAs do not become stifled and hindered by incompatible national political agendas.
Create a specific MPA funding mechanism that is not solely reliant on voluntary national contributions. A robust general funding model is in development for the High Seas Treaty, which includes assessed contributions from parties and a voluntary trust fund for developing state participation in the treaty. A special fund has further been proposed to funnel monetary benefits derived from marine genetic resources, as well as the Global Environmental Facility trust fund for capacity building and implementation. However, none of these funds are specifically reserved for the establishment and management of MPAs. A dedicated and equitable funding mechanism for MPAs will be a key element to discuss ahead of the first BBNJ Conference of Parties (COP) later this year.
Ensure dedicated infrastructure and capacity for monitoring and enforcement processes. While there is already intention to create a specific body to consider MPA management plans, dedicated infrastructure and capacity, including for technical expertise and monitoring and enforcement, needs to be another focus ahead of the first BBNJ COP. Learning from OSPAR’s approach, and taking a Sustainable Ocean Plan approach, this dedicated body should work collaboratively with existing intergovernmental management bodies, such as RFMOs for fisheries, the ISA for mineral extraction and IMO for shipping. This will help alleviate the strain of managing multiple sectors and stop the duplication of efforts.

More broadly, however, the success of high seas protection under the BBNJ Agreement will depend not only on institutional design, but also on navigating complex geopolitical realities. Negotiations over marine protection in areas beyond national jurisdiction have consistently reflected broader North–South dynamics, concerns over equity and differing national priorities. Many developing nations face significant capacity constraints in participating effectively in designation, monitoring and enforcement processes. At the same time, some remain cautious about expansive “no-take” zones, viewing them through the lens of future access to resources, fisheries interests or strategic maritime considerations.

If the High Seas Treaty is to succeed, it must therefore address not only governance architecture and funding models, but also equity, capacity and political trust among parties. If the BBNJ COP fails to secure durable financing and an enforceable management model, designation alone will not deliver protection.

Nevertheless, with an ever-growing list of ratified parties there is clearly strong intergovernmental support to deliver effective protection through the High Seas Treaty, and the protected areas in CCAMLR and OSPAR regions, which despite their challenges, demonstrate what can be achieved. By working collectively toward a robust mechanism for the designation of MPAs through the High Seas Treaty, we can ensure that Earth’s largest public common is protected and restored, for the benefit of all and for generations to come.

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The Roadmap to $1.3 Trillion in Climate Finance Will Rely on Building Coalitions

alicia.cypress@wri.org — Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:15:35 +0000

The Roadmap to $1.3 Trillion in Climate Finance Will Rely on Building Coalitions alicia.cypress… Mon, 06/15/2026 - 15:15

At the 2024 UN climate change summit (COP29), governments agreed to scale up public and private finance for developing countries to at least $1.3 trillion a year by 2035 to support their climate resilient, low-emission development.

But reaching that goal is a steep jump from where we are today. The Climate Policy Institute estimates, for example, that in 2025, only around $200 billion (likely an underestimate due to data limitations) reached these countries.

To help bridge this gap, last year Brazil and Azerbaijan, the COP30 and COP29 presidencies, presented the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T, suggesting how the target could be reached. The roadmap outlines five big areas where public and private institutions need to act: concessional finance, debt sustainability, private sector and the cost of capital, institutional capacity and international rules and standards.

Introducing this roadmap didn’t happen without hiccups. Little time was available for governments to discuss it, leaving few feeling like they had true buy-in on the process, and many wondering about next steps. Now the focus is building buy-in to drive implementation.

This pressing need for expansion comes at a time when international climate finance is facing an onslaught of challenges. These include falling concessional funding and increasing costs associated with global conflicts. At the same time, these conflicts have revealed renewable energy to be a more stable energy source than fossil fuels, that also often provide a higher and more predictable financial return on investment. Meanwhile, investments in resilience can enhance security, particularly in conflict-prone regions, where environmental stress can exacerbate political instability and competition over scarce resources.

Now more than ever, unity among governments, financial institutions and others around a path toward the $1.3 trillion goal is critical for its success. The challenge will be to build effective coalitions for action around vital sources of funding. Policy initiatives like those associated with the Roadmap to 1.3T, while not an automatic fix, can help bring these together. At the same time, a few topics in the roadmap, like remittances from friends and family members, were controversial and could be deemphasized going forward.

Here are three critical areas facing headwinds and in need of this collaborative action:

1) Defend the Multilateral Development Banks

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are currently a significant channel for international climate finance. The Roadmap to 1.3T calls for MDBs — which have already committed to providing $120 billion per year in climate finance by 2030, plus another $65 billion a year of mobilized private finance — to provide even more to reach the $1.3 trillion target. MDB climate finance doubled between 2020 and 2024 (the last year data is available), but this progress is under attack, along with their future commitments.

The United States is leading a fight to try to rid the banks of their climate focus, arguing for example, that the World Bank should scrap its climate finance goal. In a statement, the U.S. Treasury Secretary said the climate finance target “impedes market efficiency, distorts incentives, and undermines efforts to reduce poverty and spur economic growth.”

To make sure the MDBs can play their full role in the $1.3 trillion, shareholding countries need to come together to protect climate finance as a significant percentage of MDB portfolios while also growing the overall size of MDB investing, including through capital increases, as called for in the roadmap.

2) Bring Back Concessional Bilateral Finance

Bilateral finance, where funding flows directly from one country to another, is one of the first things mentioned in the Roadmap to 1.3T and for good reason. Historically, such finance, directly deployed by individual governments, has made up around a third of international climate finance. Sadly, bilateral funding for climate is in decline. The biggest impact has come from the Trump administration, which has essentially eliminated international climate funding from the United States (it stood at $11 billion in the last year of the Biden administration). But the U.S. is not alone. In the face of rising military costs from international wars and political shifts, many European countries are also reducing their funding.

Reversing this downturn will not be quick and will require consistent domestic and international political pressure and coalition building. It will involve coalitions of countries bucking the trend of decreasing development assistance and may be pushed by involvement from higher income countries not historically considered climate finance providers — like China, Korea or United Arab Emirates. It will mean rebuilding the case for development finance with an emphasis on the broad benefits: improved wellbeing through greater resilience to shocks, reduced global emissions, and enhanced global cooperation and solidarity.

3) Shift Large-Scale Private Investors

According to the High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, the Roadmap to 1.3T estimates that around half of the $1.3 trillion will need to come from private businesses and financial institutions, a sixteenfold increase over today. This is massive growth that will need to come from many different types of private investors. Yet political shifts are also impacting how the private sector engages with sustainability and may be reducing sustainability-focused investments.

The UK’s Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDE) Taskforce, an industry-led initiative, assessed opportunities for institutional investors, who manage massive pools of capital, to contribute to the $1.3 trillion goal. They find that an increase in climate investments in emerging and developing markets is feasible — if better conditions emerge. But these investors need supportive political and regulatory environments in both their home and host countries, but without overreliance on precious public funds. They also need to create internal incentive structures that encourage thinking outside normal investment patterns.

A broader international coalition of private financial institutions aimed at increasing cross-border climate-aligned investments into EMDEs could help further clarify barriers, create connections across private investors and government, and build comfort with new investment types and geographies.

An Important Year

The Roadmap to 1.3T traverses the space between the climate negotiations and the real world of finance — a critical space to fill now that international finance targets and agreements are in place and the real job is implementation. Despite political headwinds, the reasons for investing are as strong as ever: more secure energy sources, more resilient food systems, cheaper and cleaner transportation, often with solid financial returns.

This moment calls for prioritization and focus, and for new and stronger alliances between coalitions of the willing. Over the next 10 years, strong partnerships will need to continue to advocate for each major step on the road to the $1.3 trillion.

Countries, multilateral development banks and private investors are increasingly aligning behind scaling up climate finance because there is no viable alternative to managing the growing economic, social and physical risks associated with climate change. The costs of inaction are rapidly exceeding the costs of investment, making climate finance not only a matter of resilience and risk management, but also of economic opportunity.

At the same time, low-carbon markets are proving to be increasingly profitable and attractive. Evidence from Brazil and across emerging and developing economies shows a steady growth in capital flows toward decarbonization, renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and climate-resilient development. Reflecting this momentum, 2026 is on track to become the strongest year for clean industry investment on record, with investors committing to 19 commercial-scale projects worth $43 billion in the last six months alone — more than twice the pace observed a year earlier, despite persistent geopolitical uncertainties. These trends demonstrate that climate finance is no longer driven solely by environmental commitments, but by clear economic incentives, competitive advantages and the need to safeguard long-term prosperity.

The work to reach the $1.3 trillion goal will take a decade, but what happens now will help determine whether we achieve success in 2035.

WRI is partnering with the Brazilian government to bring people together in places like Addis Ababa, Mumbai and New York over the next six months to discuss the Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3T and next steps. We aim to help build momentum and support partnerships around its most vital steps — including increased funding from the MDBs, bilateral financial institutions and the private sector.

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As international climate action faces an onslaught of challenges, unity among governments, financial institutions and others around a path toward the $1.3 trillion climate finance goal is critical for its success.

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Environmental Justice Lives On in Local Communities Despite Federal Rollbacks

alicia.cypress@wri.org — Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:11:52 +0000

Environmental Justice Lives On in Local Communities Despite Federal Rollbacks alicia.cypress… Fri, 06/12/2026 - 10:11

As the federal government advances rollbacks of more than 100 environmental and climate policies and resources, it is redefining the U.S. government’s role in protecting communities disproportionately impacted by pollution — and diminishing opportunities for communities to make decisions that impact their everyday lives.

For 35 years, federal policies have helped scale the national environmental justice movement, building on decades of community-led efforts.

Reversing that long history in 2025, however, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency shuttered its Office of Environmental Justice and External Civil Rights, along with all the regional EPA Environmental Justice offices. They also canceled historic levels of investment aimed at addressing pollution and climate risk in underserved communities. At the same time, new federal actions are directing agencies to scale back on enforcement of policies that address disproportionate harm — such as those that strengthened protections for infrastructure siting, integrated environmental justice across federal agencies, and helped address cumulative exposures to environmental and socioeconomic burdens.

For 35 years, federal policies have sought to protect communities from harmful pollution associated with the siting of chemical plants and oil refineries. Photo by Meinzahn/iStock.

Yet despite these changes, the environmental justice movement has not been undone. Long before it was recognized in federal policy, the environmental justice movement was born out of local movements that identified and fought toxic hazards in their communities and then recognized larger patterns of environmental racism and inequality across the U.S.

Since the 1980s, efforts from local communities and governments have inspired federal environmental justice policies, from planning and permitting reform to funding commitments and reparative investments. While federal action has helped expand these efforts, environmental justice’s durability will continue to be grounded in the actions local communities and governments are taking now, which will help sustain them across future political administrations.

How Communities Are Advancing Environmental Justice

From smallholder farms in Africa to the busy streets of Bogota, communities are reshaping the way the world designs its cities, uses energy and produces food. These examples show not just what could work, but what already does. Learn more about the series.

In recent years, environmental justice advocates have made inspiring progress in cities, states and tribal nations across the U.S., holding polluters accountable by actively getting involved in state and local planning councils, shaping how land is used and developed, and remedying environmental hazards through climate planning and community development initiatives. While environmental challenges and inequities continue to exist, communities are showing how local actions can safeguard public health.

Holding Polluters Accountable

Many decisions about how land is used or what gets built in communities — including where polluting factories or waste sites might be located — are made at the regional, city or neighborhood level. Communities can hold polluters accountable by challenging siting and permitting decisions, even after pollution burdens have accumulated. By getting involved in development decisions, filing legal cases and pushing for new laws, community members can move environmental justice forward and, more importantly, ensure the health of their communities.

In St. James Parish, Louisiana, Sharon Lavigne leads a protest against increased development of oil refineries in her community. Photo by Alejandro Dávila Fragoso/Earthjustice.

In St. James Parish, near New Orleans, Sharon Lavigne — founder of RISE St. James, a faith-based grassroots organization — has long led residents in raising concerns about the concentration of oil refineries and chemical plants, in what’s become known as "Cancer Alley." The 85-mile stretch of land is home to approximately 200 of these operations and a majority Black and low-income population, who, as a result, face elevated rates of cancer and other health problems.

In a closely watched environmental justice legal case — Inclusive Louisiana v. St. James Parish — residents are fighting back against construction of a new petrochemical plant in a neighborhood already saturated with these facilities. The case has bounced around the court system, highlighting both the persistence of community advocacy and the limits of relying on existing legal systems to address the combined impact of multiple sources of pollution, health and socioeconomic burdens over time (known as cumulative harm). The most recent decision has allowed the case to proceed in federal court.

In tribal nations and Native communities, siting decisions can affect environmental health and access to traditional food sources and culturally significant lands. Last August, the Muscogee (Creek) National Council introduced legislation for the development of a technology park, which would have allowed for a large AI data center to be built on tribal lands that are dedicated to hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering. Muscogee citizens fought back: Six community town halls in partnership with the Indigenous Environmental Network raised concerns about the facility's potential water demand, pollution and energy costs to residents. The organizing worked and the proposed bill was defeated last November. In other regions, tribes are also advocating for greater transparency and consultation on the environmental and archeological impacts of proposed projects.

Several states have started enacting policies to prevent these harms before they happen. New Jersey’s 2020 Environmental Justice Law was the first-of-its-kind to require regulators to consider the cumulative impacts of pollution when deciding where new facilities can be built — no longer issuing permits to facilities that would worsen conditions in already overburdened communities. The law initially faced legal challenges, but the New Jersey Appellate Court upheld the law this year. Since 2020, several other states such as Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, New York and Vermont have enacted similar laws. Another 13 states are also proposing similar permitting policies to protect overburdened communities from additional environmental health hazards.

Power to Shape Environmental Decisions

A growing number of cities and states are establishing environmental justice advisory bodies and offices to embed environmental justice across government decision-making to ensure equitable access to clean air, water and green spaces.

Among the 21 states that have established these entities, 18 have set up environmental justice advisory bodies, which are composed of trusted volunteers that support engagement with environmental justice communities, make recommendations on policies such as permitting, and contribute to land-use and climate plans.

In addition, 20 states have established environmental justice offices, within government agencies to lead the day-to-day implementation of environmental justice policies and programs. These offices are integrating environmental justice into planning, funding and technical assistance programs across government.

Together, these offices and advisory bodies represent one of the clearest examples of environmental justice becoming embedded within the routine operations of government rather than existing solely as an outside advocacy effort. While these state entities can face political rollbacks and tensions with state bureaucracies, they are pioneering new ways to build trust between communities and the institutions working to address harms caused by past policies.

In Rhode Island, the city of Providence’s Climate Justice Plan was notably co-developed by the City’s Department of Sustainability and the Racial and Environmental Justice Committee, which began as a nonprofit organization set up by community members. The city has since formally adopted and operationalized a “Just Providence Framework” and continues to collaborate with the committee on equitable and sustainable planning and development.

Pennsylvania’s Department of Environmental Protection established a dedicated Climate Action for Environmental Justice Communities Program in 2023 to engage residents in environmental justice areas who were disproportionately exposed to flooding and heat waves. Their input guided the environmental justice strategies of the 2024 Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan. The program office also developed resources to help communities find energy funding and support and helped other government offices develop programs that advance environmental justice.

Just Climate and Land-Use Planning

Cities, states and tribal governments are also increasingly integrating environmental justice and equity into their climate and land-use plans to protect their residents from the impacts of air, water and climate pollution.

Since Portland, Ore., adopted the first city climate action plan in 1993, climate planning has expanded significantly across the United States. As of 2021, 58 of the 100 largest U.S. cities had adopted climate action plans, with 40 explicitly incorporating justice considerations. These plans are becoming important tools for translating environmental justice into concrete actions, helping to ensure climate actions benefit all residents and do not replicate previous injustices.

From 2021 to 2025, climate planning efforts also expanded across tribal nations, with more than 200 tribes and four U.S. territories creating climate action plans through federal initiatives. Over time, climate action plans have also evolved from treating equity as an aspirational goal to embedding justice considerations more directly into policies, investments and implementation strategies.

Disability justice is an essential yet often overlooked dimension of environmental and climate justice — particularly in climate action planning, where transportation, housing and emergency response decisions significantly affect people with disabilities. This is especially urgent given that a disproportionate number of people with disabilities live in neighborhoods with elevated levels of air pollution that can compound their health challenges.

The Environmental Law Institute lauded Austin, Texas as a leader in the U.S. for including concrete steps to make transit stations and stops, sidewalks and pedestrian street crossings more accessible to people with disabilities in its climate equity action plan. Investing in accessible public transportation simultaneously reduces climate and air pollution, while expanding reliable transportation access for daily needs.

Across tribal nations, climate planning is also advancing through tribal-led processes that integrate cultural knowledge, land stewardship and long-term resilience.

In 2024, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI) developed a priority climate action plan that advances clean energy deployment, tribal energy sovereignty and climate resilience. It includes the installation of a microgrid at the Cherokee Boys Club and electric buses and freightliners. Since adopting their plan, EBCI has deployed 21 electric school buses, achieving full-fleet electrification. The tribe also installed a 50 kilowatt (kW) grid-tied solar canopy that partially powers bus charging, deployed an electric semi-truck and began construction on a 400 kW microgrid to support charging infrastructure.

Cherokee Boys Club staff drive a golf cart retrofitted with solar and battery power at their bus depot, where solar canopy charges their fleet of electric school buses. Photo credit: Bear Allison.

Cities are also addressing environmental justice in their comprehensive land-use plans. Since 2018, California has required all cities to incorporate environmental justice into their general plans, the documents that guide overall city development planning. Cities such as Minneapolis and Seattle have also integrated environmental justice into their comprehensive plans, which will guide future land-use and infrastructure decisions to prioritize community health and environmental quality.

Building Healthy and Resilient Communities

Local communities are also embedding environmental justice values into their development decisions by designing and building sustainable housing, transit and park projects that are cleaning up the air, and promoting walkable, connected and green communities.

For example, the Cully neighborhood, which is one of the most diverse, low-income and polluted areas of Northeast Portland, Ore., helped pass energy affordability legislation and bring climate investments to their neighborhood through a coalition of community-based organizations, including Verde, Habitat for Humanity Portland Region, Hacienda CDC and the Native American Youth and Family Center.

The Cully community developed a park on a former landfill site and multiple affordable housing and homeownership developments over the last 15 years. One of those projects, Las Adelitas, took shape from a Hacienda CDC-driven community design process that transformed a neglected site into a sustainable multifamily affordable housing development. Las Adelitas houses nearly 400 people in 142 apartments and includes rooftop solar, energy efficient appliances, electric vehicle (EV) chargers and an EV car-sharing program. The Cully community also launched a new tax district in 2022 that will generate $350 million in revenue for future affordable housing and economic development projects.

A neglected site in the Cully neighborhood of Portland, Ore., is now the Las Adelitas, a sustainable multifamily affordable housing development. Photo by the City of Portland.

Environmental justice communities across the U.S. are also cleaning up contaminated land, such as former industrial, waste or polluted sites, known as brownfields, and turning them into areas that residents can enjoy, such as parks and gardens. Although these efforts can take years of fundraising, clean-up and project development, communities have demonstrated what’s possible, transforming polluted sites into healthy ones.

In Roxbury, Mass., a historically Black and formerly redlined neighborhood in Boston, the resident-led organization, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) and community development corporations including Nuestra CDC and Madison Park CDC, led a decades-long brownfields cleanup and redevelopment effort that pushed for stricter permitting, secured investment in community priorities and reshaped the neighborhood landscape. For years, highway expansion and the concentration of waste transfer stations and industrial facilities contributed to elevated air and noise pollution in the neighborhood. Today, Roxbury has turned acres of brownfields and vacant lands into new affordable and mixed-income housing, schools and community centers, parks and urban farms, small businesses and commercial spaces. DSNI also established the Dudley Neighbors Incorporated Community Land Trust, one of several community-based efforts helping to prevent displacement by dedicating land to community uses such as permanently affordable housing, commercial and cultural spaces.

The Dudley Greenhouse serves as a food hub, nursery and resource center for local gardeners in Roxbury, Mass. Photo by Dudley Neighbors Incorporated Community Land Trust.

Moving Environmental Justice Forward at the Local Level

Federal environmental policy rollbacks are reducing protections and resources, enforcement capacity and investment for communities disproportionately burdened by pollution. The loss of those commitments will have real consequences for many communities.

Yet environmental justice in the U.S. never depended on just one level of government. Across the country, cities, states, tribal nations and community organizations continue to make advances in strengthening permitting practices, shaping land-use and climate planning, expanding participation in decision-making, reducing pollution, and building healthier and more resilient neighborhoods. In doing so, they are institutionalizing environmental justice at the local, state and tribal levels — and proving it can be adapted and expanded elsewhere. It also positions communities and local governments to scale protections and investments at the federal level if future opportunities return as occurred following the first Trump administration.

Many federal environmental justice policies were built on decades of grassroots organizing and local innovation. The ongoing work taking place in communities across the country helps preserve that foundation — one that is not vulnerable to shifts in federal leadership. The long-term durability of environmental justice will depend on strong governance and partnerships across local, state and tribal governments, as well as the communities that continue to drive this work forward. The more environmental justice is embedded into the laws, policies, plans and institutions that shape everyday decisions, the less vulnerable it becomes to changes in federal policies or political leadership.

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Native American and neighborhood residents helped transform a former landfill into Portland's Cully Park through a partnership among Verde, a community organization, the City of Portland and Knot Studio, a landscape architect.

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Communities are holding polluters accountable, shaping environmental decisions and building healthier neighborhoods — demonstrating how environmental justice advances from the ground up.

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G20 Countries Have Submitted Climate Progress Reports for the First Time. Are They Delivering?

alicia.cypress@wri.org — Wed, 10 Jun 2026 20:05:01 +0000

G20 Countries Have Submitted Climate Progress Reports for the First Time. Are They Delivering? alicia.cypress… Wed, 06/10/2026 - 16:05

Globally, climate action is falling short — and following through on promises has never mattered more.

Last year, more than 137 countries submitted their new national climate commitments (formally called nationally determined contributions or NDCs) setting plans to cut harmful climate emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change. However, these efforts still leave the world dramatically short, closing less than 6% of what’s needed to limit warming to 1.5 degrees C (2.7 degrees F), to prevent the world from experiencing the most dangerous consequences of climate change.

That gap is troubling enough, but there is another more urgent question: Are countries delivering on their earlier commitments which set 2030 targets as part of their initial NDCs submitted in 2020-2021? If major economies can't show credible follow-through on those pledges, how can we be confident these new commitments — which aim to reduce emissions by 2035 — be met?

To answer this question, WRI analyzed progress G20 countries are making toward their mitigation targets using the biennial transparency reports (BTR) that countries are required to submit as part of their commitment to the Paris Agreement. As major economies spanning across developed and developing countries, the G20 is responsible for more than three-fourths of annual global emissions — meaning their progress will largely influence whether the world meets its climate goals.

Our analysis of 14 of the G20 members shows a sobering picture.

If recent trends continue, only five countries — Australia, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey — will trend positively toward meeting their 2030 climate targets. Australia is the only nation in this group currently cutting emissions from levels above its target, while the others need only to limit future growth. Conversely, nine G20 members, including the United States, European Union and the United Kingdom, must accelerate their reduction rates from recent trends — in some cases more than doubling them — to bridge the gap between current progress and their 2030 commitments.

About This Analysis

As part of the Paris Agreement, 132 countries have submitted biennial transparency reports (BTR) to the UN. This analysis focuses on 13 countries and the European Union, that are members of the G20 and have submitted their first BTRs, which include self-reported emissions data through 2022. For these countries, we also evaluated historical data, drawing from each country’s GHG inventory, to show trends over time and added a simple analysis of what emissions cuts or limitations are needed to meet each country’s target. Comparing recent trends with these required pathways shows the extent to which increases in effort are required to meet their targets. (Additional methodology is provided at the end of this article.) The analysis excludes G20 members China, India and Saudi Arabia. These countries have different types of 2030 NDC targets, including emissions peaking, emissions intensity and non-GHG targets, which are not conducive to the methodology employed in this article. We will be able to include these three countries once their emissions level in the target year can be more accurately calculated from their NDC or BTR. The BTRs for these respective countries provide more detail on how they are progressing towards their 2030 targets.

Which Countries Are Trending Toward Their NDC Target?

Progress for G20 members varies. Some countries need substantial decreases in their emissions, while others must limit and manage expected increases to achieve their 2030 targets.

For a number of countries, recent trendlines point positively toward achieving NDC targets. This includes Australia, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, which are collectively responsible for approximately 9% of total global emissions. Among these countries, only Australia has 2022 NDC emissions above its target level, which means the country must continue decreasing its emissions at its recent pace through 2030 to achieve its target.

Russia, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey must focus on limiting any increases in emissions. Russia needs to limit emissions reductions below an annualized 10%, Indonesia and Turkey must limit emissions increases below about 4% and South Africa must limit increases below 1%.

Which Countries Need to Accelerate Efforts?

Nine of the G20 members we analyzed (collectively accounting for 30% of total global emissions) need to increase their emissions reduction efforts to achieve their 2030 NDC targets. For Argentina and Brazil, recent trends suggest emissions increases, but to achieve their targets, they need to decrease emissions. For Argentina, emissions only need to decrease from 2022 to 2030 by an annualized rate of 1%. For Brazil, annualized reductions of nearly 6.5% will be required. However, Brazil’s BTR indicates that it may be making some initial progress in accelerating emissions reductions as a result of deforestation in the Amazon, which fell significantly between 2022 and 2023.

The remaining G20 members we analyzed all must accelerate emissions reductions, compared to recent trends. The scale of this acceleration varies by country. For example, the United Kingdom must scale its emissions reductions from annualized rate of 3.2% over the recent period to 5.4% between 2022 and 2030. Canada must also scale its reductions rate to a similar level of 5.5% from 2022 to 2030 to achieve its NDC target, but its recent rate of reductions has been much slower at 1.3%. For others, like Mexico, the EU and Japan, current emissions reduction rates must double from recent trends to achieve their targets.

What Progress is Being Made by Remaining G20 Members?

Tracking progress toward international climate pledges for China, India and Saudi Arabia must be assessed differently because their NDCs use different approaches than other G20 members. Still, the data and information included in their BTRs provides a window into their progress.

China reports that some NDC targets have already been achieved on renewable energy and forests, by noting the installation of 1,600 gigawatts (GW) of wind and solar capacity by 2024, beyond its 2030 NDC target of 1,200 GW, and forest stock volume has already grown by 6.5 billion cubic meters by 2021, meeting its 6 billion goal for 2030 ahead of schedule.

Carbon emissions from fuel combustion, industrial processes and product use rose nearly 4% from 2020 to 2021; China has committed for these to peak before 2030. China also has a target to reduce carbon intensity by 65% below 2005 levels by 2030 and reports that carbon intensity in 2021 was 51% below 2005 levels. Non-fossil fuels reached 18% of primary energy consumption in 2023; the NDC target is for non-fossil fuels to reach “around 25%.”

A hiker walks along the ancient Shu Road in China's Sichuan Province. China reports it has met its goal to grow forest stock ahead of its 2030 NDC goal.

For India, by 2022, the country had reduced emissions intensity per unit of GDP by 37% against its 2005 baseline, toward its 2030 goal of 45% reductions. In 2022, non-fossil sources reached nearly 43% of cumulative installed power capacity, compared to the 50% target by 2030. And India has already added 2.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in additional carbon sink, approaching its 2030 target range of 2.5 billion to 3 billion tons CO2e.

Saudi Arabia's BTR omits structured reporting on progress toward achieving its NDC, making it difficult to evaluate progress toward its stated goal of reducing or avoiding 278 million tons of CO2e annually by 2030.

The next round of BTRs, due at the end of this year, will provide even more data and information on NDC progress. If increased efforts are not reported in these coming BTRs, trajectories to reduce emissions to NDC target levels will become much steeper.

What Are Countries Reporting About Their Future Emissions?

Countries are required in their BTRs to submit emissions projections under a business-as-usual scenario from 2025 through 2040, showing where emissions are headed under current policies. This allows for comparison of countries’ current projections with the reductions that are needed to achieve their NDC targets. Only 14 G20 members submitted 2030 projections and just eight countries offered 2035 projections.

For seven nations, these reports showed that countries project that their 2030 emissions may be higher than their 2030 NDC emissions targets. Three countries — the United Kingdom, South Korea and Canada — report projections that are at least 25% higher than their NDC target.

While projections are just a snapshot in time view of future scenarios and do not necessarily reflect future emissions or policy trajectories, they might offer insights into a country’s implementation gap, highlighting the need to strengthen domestic action and accelerate execution of existing policies to meet their current targets.

However, many G20 countries offered little explanation of the methodology behind estimating these figures making it difficult to examine and determine the credibility of their climate pledges: If nations do not have the necessary policies in place to meet their near-term goals, it raises doubts about their capacity to achieve more ambitious future commitments.

What Actions are Countries Taking to Deliver on Their NDCs?

In their BTRs, countries are obliged to report and describe policies and measures that support the implementation and achievement of their NDC, while noting whether they’ve been planned, adopted or implemented. This reporting provides a concrete, albeit limited, view into the specific efforts that countries are pursuing.

Among the number of policies reported by G20 members there is wide variation. Some countries described just a handful of policies, while others detailed hundreds. For example, Canada reported 448 policies, Indonesia listed 80 and Brazil mentions just seven of the most impactful policies and notes that these do not represent the entirety of its climate policies. Argentina, Russia and Saudi Arabia did not report any policies. The total number reported certainly cannot — and should not be read to — represent the entirety of a country’s efforts to address their NDCs; rather, it reflects the diversity in approaches to reporting policies and measures in BTRs. Examining the individual policies reported, however, can help us understand the efforts underway and assess their impact.

G20 members labeled 88% of reported policies and measures as “implemented.” This high level of implementation does not indicate that policies have been put into place to achieve NDCs, but rather likely represents a selection bias as countries may be more likely to report on policies that are underway as opposed to those planned, which may be more uncertain. Other assessments such as the UNEP Emissions Gap Report have found an approximate GtCO2e gap — equivalent to just less than the U.S.’s annual emissions — between global emissions projected under current policies and global emissions expected with NDC implementation.

Countries are also required, to the extent possible, to provide estimates of the expected and achieved emissions reductions from each of their policies in their BTRs, which would allow for more granular analysis of policy effectiveness. However, countries have largely been inconsistent with their reporting, with no country providing estimates for each of their policies. Fourteen G20 members reported estimates for at least some of their policies; Mexico and Indonesia were the standouts, estimating emissions reductions for at least 87% of their policies.

Is the G20 Making Progress to Help Reduce Global Emissions?

These first BTRs show that for most G20 members, more work is needed to limit emissions, meet their targets and raise further ambition. 2030 is quickly approaching, and the longer action is delayed, the steeper and more costly the path toward achieving each country’s target becomes.

The next round of BTRs, due this December, could help show whether countries are following through on their commitments. BTRs do not just represent a reporting deadline, they let the world know whether commitments are being kept. With greater scrutiny of what countries report, and greater pressure to act on what the data shows, December's BTRs can be a turning point. The question is whether governments will treat it as one.

Additional Methodological and Data Notes

Argentina: Argentina’s common tabular format (CTF) table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2021 and 2022 and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. Due to methodological differences between Argentina’s national inventory report and NDC accounting (the NDC is accounted for using different global warming potential values than in the national inventory report), historical data prior to 2021 within the scope of the NDC was not available. Data since 2018 is presented to illustrate the five-year recent period, upon which recent trends are calculated. The recent trends calculations draw from Argentina’s GHG inventory in common reporting tables (CRT) table 10s6 (total with LULUCF), with the assumption that these trends may apply similarly notwithstanding the methodological differences noted.

Australia: Australia’s CTF table 4.2 provides NDC emissions data for 2021 and 2022 and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. Because Australia uses data from its national GHG inventory for tracking progress, data from the inventory can be used to present time series data outside of the NDC implementation period. Data from 2005 to 2020 is drawn from Australia’s CTF table 6. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

Brazil: Brazil’s CTF table 4.2 provides NDC emissions data for 2020 to 2022 and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. Because Brazil uses data from its national GHG inventory for tracking progress, data from the inventory can be used to present time series data outside of the NDC implementation period. Data from 2005 to 2020 is drawn from Brazil’s CTF table 6. Data since 2005 is presented because 2005 is the NDC’s base year. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent 10-year period from 2013 to 2022, given substantial variability in emissions, especially LULUCF-related.

Canada: Canada’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2005, 2021 and 2022, and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. To track progress, Canada uses data from its national GHG inventory (without LULUCF) and supplements with separate data on the LULUCF accounting contribution. For data outside of the NDC implementation period from 2006 to 2020, data is drawn from Canada’s CTF table 6 (Total, without LULUCF) and from Environment and Climate Change Canada Data Catalogue, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Projections, 2024 projections, LULUCF Historical Accounting Contribution. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

European Union: The European Union’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for base year 1990, for NDC implementation years 2021 and 2022, and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. The EU’s NDC scope varies from that of its GHG inventory. The NDC includes emissions from international aviation and navigation, while these categories are not included in GHG inventories submitted to the UNFCCC. To track its NDC, the EU supplements emissions estimates from its GHG inventory with estimates for international aviation and navigation based on estimates from the Joint Research Centre’s Integrated Database of the European Energy System (JRC-IDEES), which is published online. We were unable to exactly match the data published with EU BTR Table A-1, in part because the timing of the BTR’s finalization and the JRC-IDEES update meant that the BTR relied on earlier data from JRC-IDEES. We were thus unable to depict emissions within the EU’s NDC scope for the full time series but draw from the EU’s GHG inventory data in CTF table 6 (total with LULUCF). Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022, drawing from the GHG inventory data, with the assumption that these trends may apply similarly notwithstanding the differences in NDC scope.

Indonesia: Table 2.13 of Indonesia’s BTR includes NDC emissions data from 2010-2022 and baseline scenario reference points for the same period. CTF table 4 provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. Indonesia BTR table 2-10 “Description of the Enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution” notes the 2030 scenario value. To illustrate the baseline between 2022 and 2030, a linear line is calculated between the baseline values for 2022 and 2030. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

Japan: Japan’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2013, 2021 and 2022, and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. To track progress, Japan uses data from its national GHG inventory (without LULUCF, with indirect) and supplements with separate data on the LULUCF accounting contribution. For data outside of the NDC implementation period from 2013 to 2020, data is drawn from Japan’s CTF table 6 (Total, without LULUCF, with indirect) and from Japan’s 2024 National Inventory Document, Table A 9-3. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

Mexico: Mexico’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2021 and 2022 and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030 along with the baseline scenario reference point for 2030. Table 2.5 of Mexico’s BTR further includes both NDC emissions values and baseline scenario values for 2012 to2022. Data since 2012 draws on the historical data provided in BTR Table 2.5. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

South Korea: South Korea’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2021 and 2022, and provides the 2018 reference point value. It also notes the target level is a 40% reduction from the 2018 reference point. The 2030 NDC target value is then calculated as percent reduction from the 2018 reference point. As South Korea explains in its CTF table 3, there are methodological differences between the calculation of emissions for tracking the NDC and the most recent national GHG emissions inventory. Therefore, the national GHG inventory cannot be used to provide additional time series data, but we draw from South Korea’s GHG inventory data in CRT table 10s6 (total with LULUCF). Data since 2018 is presented to illustrate the five-year recent period, upon which recent trends are calculated, drawing from the GHG inventory data, with the assumption that these trends may apply similarly notwithstanding the differences in NDC scope.

Russia: Russia’s CTF table 4 tracks progress as a percentage of 1990’s emissions, with the 2030 NDC target being an emissions level less than 70% of 1990 levels. The CTF table 4 notes the emissions levels for 2021 and 2022. This data matches data presented in CTF table 6. As such, CTF table 6 is used to present data for 1990 to 2022. Data since 1990 is presented because 1990 is the NDC’s base year. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent 10-year period from 2013 to 2022, given substantial variability in emissions, especially LULUCF-related.

South Africa: South Africa’s NDC states that emissions in 2030 will be between 350 MtCO2e and 420 MtCO2e. South Africa’s CTF table 4 provides NDC emissions data for 2021 and 2022 and tracks progress toward the upper end of the target range for 2030. South Africa’s NDC excludes GHG emissions from natural disturbances. South Africa accounts for its NDC by using its national GHG inventory (including LULUCF) and then subtracting estimated GHG emissions from natural disturbances. South Africa’s BTR provides information on the estimation of GHG emissions from natural disturbances for only 2021 and 2022. As such, a longer time series of data within the scope of the NDC is not available, but we draw from South Africa’s GHG inventory data in CRT table 10s6 (total with LULUCF). Data since 2018 is presented to illustrate the five-year recent period, upon which recent trends are calculated, drawing from the GHG inventory data, with the assumption that these trends may apply similarly notwithstanding the differences in NDC scope.

Turkey: To illustrate Turkey’s GHG emissions, data is drawn from Turkey’s CRT, Table 10s6 with data from 1990-2022. Some data from this CRT does not match data reported in Turkey’s CTF. However, during Turkey’s technical expert review by the UNFCCC, Turkey confirmed that the correct data for 2022 matches that of the CRT and not as reported in the CTF (and repeated in a few BTR tables). As such, we use the CRT data for Turkey’s historical emissions. These discrepancies reduce overall understanding of Turkey’s BTR. To illustrate its baseline scenario, data for 2012, 2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 were drawn from the BTR figure 67. To present data between those points, a linear trajectory was calculated. For example, the presentation of the scenario in 2013 and 2014 is based on a linear trajectory between 2012 and 2015. Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

United Kingdom: United Kingdom’s CTF table 4.1 provides NDC emissions data for the base year 1990, 2021 and 2022, and provides the NDC emissions target value for 2030. Because the United Kingdom uses data from its national GHG inventory for tracking progress, data from the inventory can be used to present time series data outside of the NDC implementation period. Data from 1990 to 2020 is drawn from the United Kingdom’s CTF table 6 (total, with LULUCF). Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

United States: United States’ CTF table 4.1 provides NDC emissions data for the base year 2005, 2021 and 2022. In the CTF table 4.1, the U.S. notes its target is 50% of the base year value and does not provide the target value in MtCO2e. To determine the NDC target value, we calculate 50% of the provided 2005 base year value. Because the U.S. uses data from its national GHG inventory for tracking progress, data from the inventory can be used to present time series data outside of the NDC implementation period. Data from 2005 to 2020 is drawn from the U.S.’s CTF table 6 (total, with LULUCF). Recent trends are calculated based on the recent five-year period from 2018 to 2022.

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Biennial transparency reports provide a clearer look at whether major economies are actually making progress on their climate commitments. What they reveal is sobering.

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Tracking Climate Action

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Nathan Cogswell

Kirian Mischke-Reeds

Cynthia Elliott

STATEMENT: COP31 Presidency’s Proposed Goals on Global Electrification

darla.vanhoorn@wri.org — Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:35:05 +0000

STATEMENT: COP31 Presidency’s Proposed Goals on Global Electrification darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 06/10/2026 - 07:35

The COP31 Presidency today announced a proposed global goal to increase electrification from around 20% of final energy demand today to 35% by 2035.

The goal was unveiled by COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum at the Bonn Climate Change Conference and is expected to form a key part of the Presidency’s agenda ahead of the summit in Antalya later this year.

The following is a quote from Jessica Isaacs, Global Impact Director, WRI Polsky Center for the Global Energy Transition:

“The COP31 Presidency's goal sends a strong signal that clean power must be the bedrock of the global energy transition. Clean electrification, combined with increased energy efficiency, is essential for strengthening energy security and protecting households and businesses from the price shocks that come with dependence on volatile fossil fuels.

“Electricity demand is surging, driven by electrification trends in transport and heat and compounded by new demand from AI and cooling. Countries must rise to the challenge by scaling up the use of clean, affordable, reliable power for all.

“The next test is turning global ambition into action on the ground. No country will achieve clean electrification at the scale and speed needed without the right policies, investment in grid expansion and flexibility, and new clean energy projects with faster permitting that bring communities along.

“Electrification must also reach communities that have been left behind. Hundreds of millions of people still lack access to electricity and clean cooking. Done right, clean electrification can be one of the most powerful tools we have to expand opportunity, improve lives, reduce inequality and drive economic development.”

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STATEMENT: Global Leaders Issue Letter Calling on COP31 to Place Ocean at Heart of Climate Action

darla.vanhoorn@wri.org — Wed, 10 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000

STATEMENT: Global Leaders Issue Letter Calling on COP31 to Place Ocean at Heart of Climate Action darla.vanhoorn… Wed, 06/10/2026 - 03:00

LONDON (June 10, 2026) — A group of 150+ global experts and leaders shared the below open letter with incoming COP31 hosts Türkiye and Australia, COP30 President and COP CEO Brazil, and the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, urging that the ocean be placed at the center of global climate action at UNFCCC COP31, to be held in Türkiye this November. The letter's signatories include World Resources Institute, Dr. Marinez Scherer (COP30 Special Envoy for the Ocean), and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, as well as Sylvia Earle (National Geographic Society; Mission Blue), the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, and the governments of Kenya, Seychelles and Brazil.

Letter Text:
With climate action more urgently needed than ever, we welcome the dedicated roles you will all play in achieving global climate ambition in the year ahead. With Türkiye now confirmed as the Host and President for UNFCCC COP31, Australia designated as President of Negotiations, and a Pacific Island country to host the pre-COP, we must ensure that this conference delivers on its potential to be a Blue COP, with the ocean firmly at the heart of climate action. Brazil’s Presidency and support at UNFCCC COP30, with the inclusion of the ocean in the World Leaders Summit, ocean and coasts as a thematic pillar of the Action Agenda, and the first High-Level Ocean Ministerial, has laid the groundwork. Now is the time for a Blue COP that super charges implementation of ocean-climate solutions that represent one of the last and best chances to raise and meet desperately needed climate ambition for mitigation and resilience.

The ocean remains our greatest ally in the fight against climate change: absorbing over 90% of excess heat, capturing a quarter of global CO₂ emissions, and sustaining billions of people through food, livelihoods, and resilience. Scaling transformative ocean-climate solutions such as decarbonisation of global shipping and maritime transport, offshore renewable energy, sustainable blue foods, protecting and restoring blue carbon ecosystems and the ocean itself, could provide up to 35% of the emissions reductions needed to meet the Paris Agreement and keep warming below 1.5°C. Yet ocean-based climate solutions remain vastly underrepresented in global climate policy and finance.

COP31 must change this. We believe the time has come for ocean-climate action to have a permanent place in global climate governance. Strongly mainstreaming the ocean across all relevant agenda items would ensure that ocean issues are never sidelined again and delegations are equipped to implement ocean-climate solutions at the highest level. This aligns with priorities being advanced through the mandated Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue at SBSTA, and reflects growing scientific consensus on the urgency of ocean action.

Türkiye, as COP31 Host and President, can continue to embed ocean priorities into the Action Agenda and elevate them politically by appointing Ocean Champions to build consensus and elevate ocean sectors across the Action Agenda. Australia, as President of Negotiations, can ensure ocean–climate action is reflected throughout the negotiation texts. And the Pacific Pre-COP is the moment to anchor these priorities at COP31 outcomes early, elevating the urgency of ocean-climate action for island states. Leveraging the Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue to act as a central pillar to deepen these discussions will enable a successful Blue COP 31.

To make COP31 the turning point the world needs, we urge you to:

Make ocean-climate solutions a core theme of the COP31 World Leaders Summit with a clear political declaration and finance outcomes.
Ensure that ocean and coasts remain a strongly supported pillar of the Action Agenda.
Host a High Level Ocean Ministerial to highlight progress and announce new commitments to the Blue NDC Challenge Implementation Taskforce and Action Agenda Blue Package, both launched at COP30.
Integrate ocean priorities into negotiation texts on mitigation, adaptation, and finance.
Dedicate a COP31 session to outcomes of the Standing Committee on Finance Forum on Financing Climate Action in Water Systems and the Ocean.
Select Ocean Focal Points for the Mitigation Work Program, Adaptation Committee, and Standing Committee on Finance, to raise ocean-climate ambition, ensuring representatives from Small Island Developing States.

COP31 is the opportunity to finally place the ocean at the center of global climate action. Let’s ensure it delivers.

View the full letter and all 150+ signatories here:

COP31 Letter — Ocean at Heart of Climate Action

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RELEASE: Our Ocean Conference Announces Canada and Jamaica as Next Hosts

STATEMENT: Bonn Climate Talks Spotlight Practical Steps to Drive Action, Importance of Trade

RELEASE: Global Leaders Announce $6.4 Billion for Ocean Action at First African Our Ocean Conference

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STATEMENT: COP31 Presidency’s Proposed Goals on Global Electrification

STATEMENT: Global Leaders Issue Letter Calling on COP31 to Place Ocean at Heart of Climate Action