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Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges

Tim Herzog — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 17:08:28 -0500

Significant commitments to reduce developed country greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) will be central to the realization of an effective post-2012 climate treaty in Copenhagen this December.

As the negotiations among the 191 Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) near their climax, emission reduction pledges1 have been put forward by major industrialized countries and economic blocs.2 These include the European Union (EU), Japan, Russia, New Zealand, and Australia. The US House of Representatives has also passed a bill containing emission reduction commitments, although this has yet to become national policy.

This Working Paper presents a comparative analysis of these pledges, which was performed with two key aims:

To enable negotiators from all countries to compare the emission reduction outcomes that would result from industrialized countries’ pledges; and
To facilitate efforts to aggregate emission reduction pledges in order to calculate the global impact on the atmosphere.

The absence of details regarding some countries’ mechanisms to achieve emission reductions (such as Japan’s new pledge, and those of Russia and Belarus) present hurdles to measuring comparability. Countries will need to clarify how they plan to fulfill their pledges, especially with regard to the use of international offsets and inclusion of land use, land use change, forestry (LULUCF) emissions and reductions, if aggregate effort and comparability are to be effectively measured.

Nevertheless, this analysis provides a preliminary picture of where the world is headed in the run-up to Copenhagen. Our key conclusions and recommendations are listed below. Most importantly, we found that while developed country emission reduction pledges could have an important and potentially substantial impact, they will not be enough to meet even the lower range of emission reductions required for stabilizing concentrations of CO2e at 450 ppm and certainly fall very short of goals to reduce concentrations below that level.

Key Findings

Conclusion: Existing pledges by developed countries, when added together, could represent a substantial effort for reducing Annex I emissions by 2020 – a 10 to 24% reduction of emissions below 1990 levels depending on the assumptions made about the details of the pledges. But they still fall short of the range of emission reductions – 25 to 40% – that the IPCC notes would be necessary for stabilizing concentrations of CO2e at 450 ppm, a level associated with a 26 to 78% risk of overshooting a 2ºC goal (Meinshausen 2005). If the pledges are not ratcheted up even beyond the highest pledges, this analysis shows that the additional reductions required between 2020 and 2050 would be significant, with emissions dropping roughly 2.5% annually to reach a goal of 80% below 1990 levels by mid-century.

Recommendation: Developed countries should bring forward more ambitious pledges. The Copenhagen agreement must make provisions for emergency and periodic science reviews to allow for more ambitious emission reduction commitments as the science dictates.

Conclusion: In assessing comparability, this analysis shows that the choice of metrics can have profound implications on a given country’s ambition.

Recommendation: There is no single perfect way to assess comparability. Factors such as population growth and the use of offsets (as well as their integrity) will impact the effort and environmental effectiveness of a target. While comparability is best assessed by considering multiple dimensions of a target as we do here, we need to bear in mind that absolute emission reductions are ultimately what matters for reducing our impact on the climate.

Conclusion: In our analysis, we make the assumption that emission reductions achieved via international offsets contained in pledges, as well as forest-related emission reductions under the supplemental reduction program in the US bill, will be real and additional. These assumptions make an enormous difference for the scale of some country’s emission reductions, such as that of the United States. Therefore, if international emission reductions play a major role in national targets, and they prove not to be real and additional, then pledges such as those in the emerging US bill will fall far short of how they appear at face value.

Recommendation: The implementation of high regulatory standards and the design of robust accounting rules are critical to ensure that international emission reductions, including offsets, proposed new sectoral mechanisms and forest provisions, are real and additional.

Conclusion: This analysis demonstrated the importance of resolving how LULUCF emissions are to be estimated before final commitments are determined. Emissions from the land use sector can vary significantly from year to year and the choice of including them, as well as the choice of a base year, can make a significant difference in defining the stringency of a given country’s target. For example, when Canada’s pledge is calculated below a 1990 base year and LULUCF is included, the pledge is one that allows for growth of emissions.

Recommendation: High and uniform standards for estimating and accounting for the land use sector’s emissions will be essential if targets set by developed countries are to deliver the ambition and impacts that they claim. If LULUCF emissions are excluded in emission reduction pledges, it will be necessary to examine the net impact of pledges as well as emissions and sinks from LULUCF in order to provide an accurate measurement relevant to the state of the global climate.

Conclusion: In this analysis, we include the US legislation, which may account for emission reductions (e.g. via domestic offsets) in a manner that differs from that of Kyoto Protocol Parties. This differentiation will inevitably make comparability exercises more difficult and contentious.

Recommendation: Parties should agree to rigorous and consistent estimation and accounting methodologies.

Conclusion: Annex I countries have categorized their support for forest emission reductions in different ways. In the case of the United States, this analysis accounts for forest emission reductions as a contribution to its mitigation effort. In the case of many European countries, this commitment is expressed purely financially, which makes its inclusion here impossible.

Recommendation: Attention must be paid to avoid double counting of financial and emission mitigation contributions.

Banking on Nature's Assets: How Multilateral Development Banks Can Strengthen Development by Using Ecosystem Services

Maggie Barron — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 16:57:27 -0500

Humanity depends on nature for physical and spiritual sustenance, livelihoods, and survival. Ecosystems provide numerous benefits or “ecosystem services” that underpin economic development and support human well-being. They include provisioning services such as food, freshwater, and fuel as well as an array of regulating services such as water purification, pollination, and climate regulation. Healthy ecosystems are a prerequisite to sustaining economic development and mitigating and adapting to climate change.

The UN-led Millennium Ecosystem Assessment audited the health of 24 ecosystem services globally and reported that two-thirds had been degraded over the past half century. This degradation is undermining development progress. However, by accounting for and managing ecosystem service trade-offs, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and partner countries can improve development outcomes, help address climate change, and reduce costs to people and economies. Toward this end, a growing number of tools are emerging to help factor ecosystem services into economic development decisions.

Traditionally, development planners have focused narrowly on provisioning services with a value in the market place while overlooking regulating services. Expansion of aquacultures has increased shrimp production, for example, but at the same time degraded the fish spawning ground and storm protection services provided by mangroves. Construction of dams has increased power and freshwater for irrigation while leading to downstream loss of wetlands and their purification and flood protection services.

MDBs have already begun to experiment with ecosystem service concepts in development planning and practice. This report makes the case for expanding beyond the current focus on single services and “add-on” projects. The authors recommend a more systematic approach, one that would take into account multiple ecosystem services in all development operations from the earliest stages of the planning process. Such an approach will enable MDBs to make the links among climate, environment, and development and identify risks and opportunities associated with development plans. Banking on Nature’s Assets identifies entry points for mainstreaming ecosystem services in MDBs’ core operations of strategic direction setting, advisory services, and investments and describes a portfolio of tools to help. It also presents a range of policy options that MDBs can help country partners implement to sustain critical ecosystem services.

The report concludes with five interrelated recommendations to scale up MDB and partner-country application of ecosystem services:

Incorporate into environment strategies;
Integrate into core operations;
Build capacity to implement an ecosystem services approach;
Empower local authorities, organizations, and communities; and
Strengthen policies and incentives.

Entry Points for Integrating Ecosystems Services into MDB Operations

The Legal Character of National Actions and Commitments in a Copenhagen Agreement: Options and Implications

Maggie Barron — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 15:54:28 -0500

Executive Summary

The world’s governments may be negotiating the most important treaty in modern history: a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) that may determine whether humanity can successfully reduce anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases and avoid the most dangerous consequences of climate change. With less than two full weeks before negotiations are scheduled to conclude in Copenhagen, delegations have yet to agree whether they are aiming at a legally binding treaty or at a political declaration. If it is a treaty, will the text contain legally binding, specific commitments, backed by robust review procedures, or will it be a legally binding agreement with a hollow core?

Introduction
The elements of legal character
A brief history of legal character under the climate change regime
The Bali Action Plan and legal character under a Copenhagen agreement
State of play: Snapshot of a moving process
Unilateral standard setting for legal character: A case study of draft U.S. climate legislation
Conclusions: the benefits and risks of legal character

Even as consensus builds around the need for urgent, collective action to combat climate change, countries remain deeply divided on how efforts to reach this global goal will be equitably shared among and between developed and developing countries. Part of the controversy centers around how developing country “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) will be expressed in an international agreement, and how procedures for measuring, reporting, and verifying these actions might promote implementation. This Working Paper focuses on the choices facing developing country major economies participating in the Major Economies Forum (MEF) (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others) that are under pressure from industrialized negotiating partners to commit to actions that are comparable to those contemplated by richer nations.

This Working Paper clarifies a complex set of issues around the legal character of commitments that lie beyond the threshold question of whether Copenhagen should result in a legally binding treaty, and helps weigh the potential risks and benefits to developing country Parties of expressing their NAMAs in a legally binding form. The analysis reveals that commitments can differ in terms of their form (binding v. non-binding), their content (specific v. vague), and in terms of the procedures and institutions by which their implementation is reviewed.

To provide context, the authors note recent discussions within the Major Economies Forum (MEF) which suggest that MEF countries seem to be moving towards a “bottom up” approach to a climate agreement that places less emphasis on the international legal character of countries’ commitments. The authors then review the legal character and legal implications of previous undertakings in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. The paper then reviews the major proposals submitted by countries to the Copenhagen process, as well as recent versions of the negotiating text (described in the Appendix). The paper also provides a case study of draft U.S. climate legislation, and analyzes the special challenges facing developing country major economies under pressure to take actions comparable to richer countries.

A key conclusion from our analysis is that a post-2012 climate agreement, whether agreed in Copenhagen or thereafter, should take a legally binding form, but one that contains undertakings by countries with a wide range of legal form and content, and that are subject to differentiated review procedures. It notes that some developing country major economies are likely to be held to a higher standard of legal content and review, than other, poorer or smaller developing countries.

Lessons from other treaties tell us that international agreements with binding, specific content backed by robust review procedures are generally more effective than those with vague content or limited review procedures. The table below indicates some of the benefits and risks associated with strengthening and weakening an international agreement’s legal character, content, and review procedures designed to promote implementation of the agreement.

General Benefits and Risks of Legal Character

Each country has the opportunity to influence the design the agreement’s content and, ultimately, will have to decide whether to become a Party. Signing up to legally binding, clear, specific, measurable, and ambitious commitments demonstrates strong political will to contribute and comply, encourages other countries to do the same, and thus should lead to stronger environmental outcomes. In most cases the international penalties associated with failing to comply with an international treaty are unspecified, and thus the risks of being found in non-compliance seem low. However, a post-2012 climate change regime, built from the “bottom-up” will likely combine multilaterally agreed rules and bilateral arrangements. There are indications that this regime will support performance-based financial mechanisms and carbon markets that could reward countries willing to make more specific undertakings. For example, our case study of draft U.S. climate change legislation suggests that countries undertaking commitments of a stronger legal character may have preferential access to large scale carbon markets, and may be able to avoid the unilateral trade sanctions contemplated by the U.S. and other countries. While each country must weigh these risks and benefits for itself, this Working Paper seeks to assist in this process.

Getting Ready: A Review of the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Readiness Preparation Proposals

admin — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 15:27:58 -0500

Power, Responsibility, and Accountability: Re-Thinking the Legitimacy of Institutions for Climate Finance

Maggie Barron — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 10:27:36 -0500

As the December deadline looms to conclude a new agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), negotiators have yet to agree on how to finance cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while meeting the energy needs of developing countries. If a global deal is to be struck, many estimate that developed countries will need to commit tens of billions of dollars of public money to support developing country efforts. With little money on the table, disagreement remains on whether these billions should be entrusted to new or existing institutions. There is also heated debate over whether a single centralized institution or a decentralized approach that coordinates international, regional and national institutions would be more effective.

A new global deal on climate finance is likely to significantly redistribute power, responsibility and accountability between traditional contributor and traditional recipient countries.

Broadly speaking, industrialized nations want to continue to rely on existing institutions they have funded and led for the past 60 years. Developing countries prefer new institutions, arguing that existing ones favor donor interests, and have failed to deliver on promises to support poverty alleviation and development. Delegations‟ proposals to the UNFCCC reflect this gulf. If the institutional arrangements entrusted with managing new flows of climate finance are to succeed in raising these resources and in investing them well, they will need to be perceived as legitimate by both contributors and recipients.

Institutional Arrangements for Climate Finance: Power, Responsibility, and Accountability

This Working Paper seeks to ground the debate on climate finance in an objective analysis of ongoing efforts to finance mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. The authors step back from the question of “which institution?” should be entrusted with these funds to examine instead how governments can design a climate financial mechanism in a way that is widely perceived as legitimate. We identify three crucial dimensions of institutional legitimacy: power, responsibility and accountability. (See Box A)

We review the governance structures, operational procedures, and records to date of 10 international and national finance institutions, with reference to these core dimensions of legitimacy, to draw lessons for future institutional arrangements. We place special emphasis on the experiences thus far with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) which, since 1994 has served as the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC.

We conclude that a new global deal on climate finance is likely to significantly redistribute power, responsibility and accountability between traditional contributor and recipient countries. In light of the dramatic changes in global politics and the global economy in the past decades, this redistribution seems both long overdue and necessary to provide the basis for a successful global partnership on climate finance.

Building Legitimate Institutions for Climate Finance: Conclusions and Recommendations

Balancing Power:

Formal distribution of power within the governing body of any financial mechanism will color perceptions of its legitimacy. Funds recently established under the Kyoto Protocol and under the World Bank, establish separate governing committees which reflect a more balanced governance structure with equal votes and representation of contributor and recipient countries. However, these funds continue to rely on the existing institutions – so called “Implementing Agencies” such as the World Bank, UN Development Programme and the UN Environment Programme - for financial and project management. As long as the underlying power structures of these institutions remain unchanged, they will continue to reinforce existing relationships between contributors, financial institutions and recipients.

Developing countries can, through their majority representation in the COP to a climate agreement, seek to exercise power over climate financial mechanisms. But the experience of the GEF has shown that the legal and institutional means of exercising this power are limited, and developing countries and other observers continue to view the GEF as unaccountable to the COP.

Formal grants of power have generally been neutralized by other ways in which contributors exercise influence. Contributor countries continue to dominate the processes of replenishment, resource allocation and project cycle management by imposing conditionalities and standards. As long as climate financial mechanisms are dependent on voluntary contributions raised by the parliaments and finance ministries of one set of countries, and channeled to finance activities in another set of countries, donor influence is likely to check the formal power of recipients.

The economic and policy conditionalities that donors have attached to their financing in the past have been neither popular with recipient countries, nor entirely effective in achieving their objectives. But priorities and standards attached to donor resource mobilization have provided a means of prioritizing scarce development financing, and of promoting environmental and social safeguards. It is unclear how developing countries, when they are given greater power, will exercise this power responsibly without deploying similar tools.

Recommendations: If existing institutions are to meet evolving standards of legitimacy, then their fundamental governance structures, as well as their operational procedures, will need to be reformed to give greater voice to developing country recipients. If formal grants of power are to lead to the effective exercise of that power, the international community must also make greater efforts to de-link the source of finance from the exercise of informal power by donors, by adopting new levies – such as the levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects.

Taking Responsibility:

There is a growing consensus that, to be successful, efforts to address climate change must effectively reflect national priorities and circumstances. As developing countries gain more power in the governance of financial institutions, they should be natural champions of “nationally owned” and “country driven” programming. These countries are increasingly keen to have “direct access” to climate finance through their own national institutions, by-passing traditional Implementing Agencies. Arrangements for “direct access” to finance should be supported by nationally derived and owned low GHG emissions development strategies and national adaptation programs. If these strategies and programs contain measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) actions, they should provide a more legitimate basis for allocating resources between countries as well as for designing programs within countries.

The Montreal Protocol Fund, Clean Technology Fund, and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility experiences suggest that countries are ready to embed proposed projects and programs in broader national planning processes, if it leads to more sustained support. But a national plan is a far easier thing to develop than “national ownership”. Too many past efforts at national planning have been rushed, and completed with limited stakeholder engagement. Going forward, the processes by which these plans are developed, and the institutions involved, will influence whether they adequately reflect and respond to national circumstances.

Recommendations: A next generation of climate finance needs to promote the responsibility of recipient countries, by strengthening the national institutions that will implement mitigation and adaptation activities, and by ensuring their transparency and accountability to citizens within countries, as well as to the international community. While it is important that Implementing Agencies provide technical support to national institutions, they should rely less on external consultants and work in closer partnership with national stakeholders. Collaborations with local independent research institutions and civil society can be particularly important to make sure climate finance proposals appropriately reflect national circumstances and priorities.

Ensuring Accountability:

If done properly, shifts of power and responsibility to developing countries, through greater voice in decision-making and “direct access” to funds, will entail greater accountability for the consequences of investment.

Many developing countries are already building the capacity of their national financial institutions to support climate friendly development. Countries including Mexico, India and Brazil have set up units within national development finance institutions that are already supporting investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable forest management. The trend toward greater reliance on national Implementing Agencies raises both opportunities and challenges. Recent experiments to set up national funds in developing countries to finance climate change programs have taken some significant steps to ensure good financial management of funds. Little emphasis has been placed to date on their overarching institutional accountability, or the systems in place to maximize environmental and social benefits and minimize unintended harm.

Direct access to funding for developing countries whose national institutions can demonstrate they meet fiduciary standards, and national systems for measuring, reporting and verifying funded actions are two new dimensions of a more reciprocal relationship and deeper partnership between contributors and recipients. Together, these reflect an agreement on the conditions necessary to empower developing countries to shape their own climate policies.

Recommendations: National implementing institutions that take on a greater role in climate finance need to demonstrate the capacity to be held accountable, both nationally and internationally for the results of their investments. We suggest the following standards of good governance for national implementing institutions, building on the standards to which conventional Implementing Agencies are being held accountable. First, their governance structures should be inclusive and transparent. Second, their responsibilities should be clearly articulated, and they must have the technical capacity to develop ambitious and effective programs in partnership with local stakeholders, particularly citizens and other potential program beneficiaries. It will also be essential to have strong provisions for accountability in place, including to ensure compliance with international good practice for fiduciary management, robust anti-corruption measures, and to manage potential environmental and social impacts. If these standards can be met, then national institutions may hold significant promise for climate finance.

Key Functions for a UNFCCC Technology Institutional Structure: Identifying Convergence in Country Submissions

Tim Herzog — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 09:19:24 -0500

An earlier version of this paper was written by WRI and E3G to assist Chinese and EU participants of the “Informal Workshop on Technology Cooperation and Transfer in Relation to UNFCCC Negotiations,” on October 26, 2009 in Shanghai. WRI and E3G would welcome reviews and suggestions as we refine this paper further.

Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works: Getting to Yes on Climate Change

Maggie Barron — Thu, 29 Oct 2009 11:44:48 -0400

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN LASH
PRESIDENT, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
“LEGISLATIVE HEARING ON S. 1733, CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN POWER ACT”

Good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding the pending legislation, action of other countries to address climate change, and the implications of their action for the United States.

I am Jonathan Lash, president of the World Resources Institute. WRI is a non-profit, non-partisan environmental think tank that goes beyond research to provide practical solutions to the world’s most urgent environment and development challenges. We work in partnership with scientists, businesses, governments, and non-governmental organizations in more than seventy countries to provide information, tools and analysis to address problems like climate change, and the degradation of ecosystems and their capacity to provide for human well-being.

I have a single message to deliver today: The time is ripe for Congress to enact climate legislation to reduce emissions, establish energy security, and create new jobs in clean energy. Other nations are moving; the outcome depends on us.

We need global action to solve this global problem. Those who have worried that the United States might act alone need worry no more. The worry should be that without us, the rising global effort will falter. The worry should be that if we hesitate, we will miss the opportunity to lead the coming clean energy revolution.

With other nations acting, U.S. action now can make the critical difference.

Other countries across the globe are moving to take action to confront global warming. This has transformed the debate over this issue. The time is ripe for the United States to act and it is in our own interest to act promptly. In a nutshell, there are three reasons for this:

Action by other countries increases opportunities for the United States if we are prepared to seize these opportunities.
Steps by other countries help ensure that the United States will not be disadvantaged by taking action itself.
Action by the United States is essential to cement an agreement under which all countries commit to continue and increase the steps they are taking.

In order to take action, we need a better understanding of what we are facing. We need to understand the opportunities. We need to put aside old myths. We need to focus on the real problems and recognize the solutions to those problems. And we need to get busy so we do not miss this opportunity.

A changed landscape

As illustrated by Figure 1, almost 80 percent of global emissions are produced by fifteen countries (counting the European Union as a single country). A majority of these are developing countries, which, until recently, said they would not take action on emissions without clear action by wealthy countries. At the same time, all countries have recognized that the poorest would need assistance in deploying clean energy and preserving forests and also in adapting to minimize the damage from changes in the climate that are no longer avoidable. What has changed is that in the last couple of years, and even in the last few months, without waiting for rich nations to act, countries such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa are stepping forward with significant proposals and actions.

As explained below, China provides an important example among developing nations, but China is not alone. Mexico has pledged to halve its greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, employing a “cap-and-trade” policy like the one under consideration in the U.S. Congress. South Africa has presented a detailed plan to peak its national emissions by 2020. India has defined eight national missions in efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable agriculture and ecosystems and is developing strategies in these areas. Recently, the Indian government announced it will offer new legislative proposals to tighten fuel efficiency standards and pursue other clean energy targets, and there have been indications of increased willingness to subject its actions to review. Deforestation accounts for about two thirds of Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions. Brazil has said it would reduce its deforestation rate 70 percent from recent levels by 2017.

Among developed countries, a new government recently came to power in Japan, transforming that country from a laggard to a leader with an ambitious proposal to reduce emissions 25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020 if other major countries take ambitious action. The European Union position is that it will reduce its emissions by 20 percent regardless and by 30 percent if other developed countries take sufficient action. And Australia, heavily dependent on coal for consumption and exports, has said that it will cut its emissions by 25 percent below year 2000 levels if others take on similar actions.

The ball is now in our court, and it is in our interest to act. In December, the nations of the world will meet in Copenhagen, Denmark to try to reach agreement on plans to confront climate change. In order to reap the benefits of an agreement, we need to bring something credible to the table. That something is what this committee and this Congress write into legislation.

Let me explain what is at stake by focusing on China. China is a country taking action and looking at China helps us understand the problems, solutions, and opportunities before us.

The case of China

Some people have worried that action by the United States on climate change could put us at a competitive disadvantage if countries like China do not also take action and produce at lower cost. In fact, China is taking action, which can help assure that there is a level playing field. As I will explain, they are doing this because it is in their own interest, which should give us confidence they will continue. Instead of more delay, we should get an agreement that helps further to ensure that Chinese action on climate will continue and increase. But there is more. Not only should we lock in a commitment; we should work with China to reap the benefits of the new economic future emerging in the worldwide shift to clean energy.

Here are the facts. In 2005, realizing its growth in energy consumption was unsustainable for energy and climate security reasons, China launched a plan to reduce energy intensity 20 percent from 2005 levels by 2010. This may be the largest greenhouse gas mitigation program of any country. China also plans an increase in renewable energy to 10 percent by 2010. In 2007, China was second in the world in funds invested in renewable energy.

China, like the United States, is a major user of coal. However, China is closing inefficient coal plants, deploying state-of-the-art or better technology, and exploring carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. These efforts can help improve coal technology and bring down the costs. U.S. – China collaboration on development of CCS and other coal technologies is already underway and opens vast opportunities.

At the Major Economies Forum in July, China and India for the first time agreed at the international level to a declaration to take action to meaningfully reduce emissions below business as usual, peaking as soon as possible. Also, they recognized the scientific view that temperatures should not exceed 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

In the first-ever speech by a Chinese President to the UN General Assembly in September, 2009, President Hu Jintao said China will reduce its carbon intensity by “a notable margin” by 2020.

Why are they doing this? “All politics is local.”

China’s aggressive action to improve energy efficiency and reduce emissions is not an act of global charity. China’s leadership realizes they cannot maintain growth and reduce poverty without conservation of resources. Pollution is choking off growth and producing social unrest. Adverse impacts from climate change are projected to undermine agricultural productivity and cause flooding in south China and along the coasts.

Qi Ye, deputy director of the China Sustainable Energy Program in Beijing says you have to “address the global issue in terms of local need” because people act on what they care about. Similar sentiments can be heard in other developing countries. In describing India’s new initiatives on clean energy, the Indian environmental minister said recently, “I want to be aggressive, because, frankly, we are a country that is climate dependent” because of rising seas and monsoons. “We may not have caused the problem, but we have to be part of the solution.”

How do we know they’re doing what they say? “Trust but verify.”

Self interest in taking action to confront climate change affords us some confidence that countries like China will follow through. Still, challenges remain. Reliable data are not always available and standards of enforcement, governance and transparency are variable. This is one of the reasons it is in our own interest to establish an international climate agreement. A key element in the negotiations is creation of a system for measuring, reporting, and verifying actions to give confidence that promises are being kept and action taken.

Just as President Reagan suggested to Soviet leader Gorbachev in signing the nuclear arms reduction treaty and quoting the Russian proverb “trust but verify,” trust is fine, but real confidence depends on verification.

Verification of China’s action to reduce emissions will be feasible. China participates in peer review and verification already under international agreements like the WTO and the Montreal Protocol to address ozone. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has worked with China in successful efforts to improve its control of sulfur dioxide emissions. China has already begun collecting and verifying energy data. Moreover, the United States could invest in satellite tracking as an additional way to help check up on whether China is meeting its commitments.

China and the United States – solving problems, seizing opportunities.

Some people have worried that China would steal American jobs by competing using dirty production processes. The reality is China is pulling ahead of us by being innovative and clean. If doubts remain, a global climate agreement can allay them by ensuring action by all that will help level the playing field. As a fallback, the House-passed climate bill protects energy-intensive U.S. industry by providing free allowances to comply with cap-and-trade, in the form of output-based rebates. When the rebates phase out a decade from now, the president is authorized to impose border duties if action by China and other countries has not done enough to level the playing field.

In September 2009, The Wall Street Journal said that a group of Western firms published a report anticipating a $500 billion to $1 trillion market annually in China for clean technology. In August and September, America’s third largest coal fired electric utility, Duke Energy Corp., announced agreements to explore clean energy and carbon capture projects with Chinese companies. In July, the U.S. and Chinese governments signed an MOU for joint research collaboration.

The opportunities are there in the vast Chinese and global markets and in collaboration with the Chinese and others in the private and public sectors. But to take advantage of the opportunities, the United States will have to get its act together to promote clean energy. We risk falling behind if we don’t move forward. Climate legislation is key because, by putting a price on carbon, it shifts investment into clean energy. The pending legislation also contains important new financial support for clean energy development, clean technology exports, and carbon capture and storage technology. Additionally, it creates economic opportunities in international carbon trading.

Getting it in writing – U.S. legislation and a global agreement.

Now what we need is a global agreement, confirming and strengthening the new trajectory of China, India and others. To realize the benefits of a global agreement, the United States needs to take action – better yet, take action and take the lead – to make the global agreement possible.

Both warming and the emissions that cause it are global. The economy, trade, and competition are global. A global agreement provides a basis on which countries can act with some confidence that others will do so as well. It can address issues of verification, competitiveness, and fairness, and it can create new opportunities for collaboration on clean energy.

In order to get that global agreement, Congress needs to take action on climate legislation so our negotiators can go to the negotiating table with what the United States will do – what emissions reductions we will achieve and what assistance we will provide to help less developed countries shift to clean energy and adapt to climate change.

U.S. negotiators have made clear that they will not commit the United States to greenhouse gas reductions and other critical points without a clear expression of political will by Congress. At the same time, other countries have expressed understandable reluctance to complete an agreement without a commitment from the United States. Thus, until Congress acts on U.S. legislation, the world cannot reach final agreement.

Only if all nations come forward with what they propose to do is agreement possible. The question is no longer whether others will act. They are acting. The question is whether we will act. The point is no longer that global warming cannot be addressed without those other countries. The point is that it cannot be addressed without this country and that we cannot gain the benefits of leadership unless we enact climate legislation.

Then we can not only avert the threat of dangerous global warming; we can reap the benefits of new jobs, economic growth, and energy security in the age of clean energy.

The United States has led the world through great economic and social changes and has thrived by doing so. This is an occasion and an issue on which the world again needs that leadership.

Additional Resources

Comparative Analysis of National Climate Change Strategies in Developing Countries (PDF, 4 pages, 631 Kb). This matrix helps policymakers compare the National Climate Change plans of five developing countries: India, Brazil, China, Mexico and South Africa.

Summary of UNFCCC Submissions

Thu, 29 Oct 2009 00:00:00 -0400

Sections

Party Submissions on MRV
Party Submissions on Shared Vision
Legal Aspects of Proposals for an Agreed Outcome
Party Submissions on Finance
Party Submissions on Adaptation
Party Submissions on Technology
Party Presentations on Architecture in Bonn on August 7, 2009

Section 1 contains submissions as they relate to measurable, reportable and verifiable support and actions, Section 2 contains submissions related to shared vision, Section 3 contains the legal aspects of proposals for an agreed outcome, Section 4 contains submissions on finance, Section 5 presents Party submissions on adaptation, Section 6 summarizes submissions on technology, and Section 7 summarizes Party presentations on the Architecture of a post-2012 Agreement in Bonn on August 7, 2009.

Multiple Party submissions have been synthesized into one row, and the dates in parentheses indicate the date of the submissions reviewed by the authors. The final page lists the acronyms used in the tables. Please note that these tables represent WRI’s interpretation of a selection of Party submissions, and do not necessarily reflect the complete views of the Parties.

Emission Reductions Under Cap & Trade Proposals In The 111th Congress

John Larsen — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 20:35:23 -0400

This assessment is an update to a previous analysis WRI released on June 25, 2009 and includes an assessment comparing the Manager’s Amendment to S.1733 the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA) sponsored by Senators Kerry and Boxer and H.R. 2454 the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA) passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009. To account for the effects of different components of these proposals, reduction estimates are divided into three scenarios that are then applied to both proposals considered in this analysis:

Total emission reductions achieved solely by the proposed emissions caps.
Total emission reductions achieved by proposed caps and all other complementary requirements, including emission performance standards for uncapped sources, allowances set aside for cost-containment and required components of supplemental reduction programs for reduced deforestation through 2025.
A range of potential additional reductions that could be achieved through domestic supplemental reductions in all years, international supplemental reductions beyond 2025 and the 1.25 offset requirement for international offsets.

Key Findings

The emissions caps in the CEJAPA and ACESA achieve reductions of 17 and 14 percent respectively relative to 2005 levels in 2020. By 2050, both the CEJAPA and ACESA achieve reductions of 72 percent relative to 2005 levels.
Estimates of total US emissions in 2012 under the emissions caps in both the CEJAPA and ACESA are approximately 300 million tonnes higher than recent short-term projections of U.S. emissions for 2010 published by the Energy Information Administration.
While the CEJAPA and ACESA contain similar complementary measures in addition to emissions caps, they are sometimes applied in different ways and in turn result in somewhat different relative emission reductions. Specifically:
- When all complementary requirements are considered in addition to the caps, GHG emissions would be reduced 29 and 28 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020 and 73 and 75 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2050 for the CEJAPA and ACESA respectively.
- When additional potential emission reductions are considered, the CEJAPA and ACESA could achieve up to 34 and 33 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020 and up to 78 and 81 percent relative to 2005 levels by 2050 respectively. The actual amount of reductions will depend on the quantity and quality of international offsets used for compliance and the effectiveness of supplemental reduction programs that do not explicitly contain GHG reduction requirements.

“Emission Reductions Under Cap-and-Trade Proposals in the 111th Congress, 2005-2050” graphically presents total GHG reductions achieved by S.1733 and H.R.2454 relative to U.S. historic and projected emissions under the three reduction scenarios.

“Estimates of Total GHG Emissions and Emission Reductions Achieved by Cap-and-Trade Proposals in the 111th Congress, 2005-2050” presents a table of total GHG reductions that could be achieved by these proposals for selected years.

Table 1. Estimates of Total GHG Emissions and Emission Reductions Achieved by Cap-and-Trade Proposals in the 111th Congress (MMtCO₂e)
Absolute Emissions (Million Metric Tons CO₂)	2010	2012	2020	2030	2040	2050
Business as usual emissions		7,185	7,390	7,765	8,102	8,379
Short-term projected emissions	6,685
H.R. 2454 Emissions caps only		6,987	6,109	4,558	3,269	1,963
H.R. 2454 Caps plus all complementary requirements		6,940	5,134	4,294	3,043	1,779
H.R. 2454 Potential range of additional reductions		6,940	4,759	3,816	2,624	1,383
S.1733 Emissions caps only		6,987	5,925	4,558	3,269	1,963
S.1733 Caps plus all complementary requirements		6,894	5,059	4,451	3,200	1,932
S.1733 Potential range of additional reductions		6,809	4,697	4,027	2,833	1,595
Percent change from 2005 emissions	2010	2012	2020	2030	2040	2050
Business as usual emissions		1	4	9	14	18
Short-term projected emissions	-6
H.R. 2454 Emissions caps only		-2	-14	-36	-54	-72
H.R. 2454 Caps plus all complementary requirements		-2	-28	-40	-57	-75
H.R. 2454 Potential range of additional reductions		-2	-33	-46	-63	-81
S.1733 Emissions caps only		-2	-17	-36	-54	-72
S.1733 Caps plus all complementary requirements		-3	-29	-37	-55	-73
S.1733 Potential range of additional reductions		-4	-34	-43	-60	-78
Percent change from 1990 emissions	2010	2012	2020	2030	2040	2050
Business as usual emissions		18	21	27	33	37
Short-term projected emissions	10
H.R. 2454 Emissions caps only		15	0	-25	-46	-68
H.R. 2454 Caps plus all complementary requirements		14	-16	-30	-50	-71
H.R. 2454 Potential range of additional reductions		14	-22	-37	-57	-77
S.1733 Emissions caps only		15	-3	-25	-46	-68
S.1733 Caps plus all complementary requirements		13	-17	-27	-48	-68
S.1733 Potential range of additional reductions		12	-23	-34	-54	-74
Bills analyzed include H.R.2454 as passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009 and the Chairman’s Mark of S.1733 as released on October 23, 2009. “Business as usual emission” projections are from EPA’s reference case for its analysis of the Waxman Markey Discussion Draft. “Short-term projected emissions” represent EIA’s most recent estimates of emissions for 2008-2010.

Bottom Line Series of Climate Policy Briefs

Stephanie Hanson — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 12:15:29 -0400

The Bottom Line series is made possible by the following organizations:

WRI Publications Feed: All

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Key Findings

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Executive Summary

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Power, Responsibility, and Accountability: Re-Thinking the Legitimacy of Institutions for Climate Finance

Institutional Arrangements for Climate Finance: Power, Responsibility, and Accountability

Building Legitimate Institutions for Climate Finance: Conclusions and Recommendations

Balancing Power:

Taking Responsibility:

Ensuring Accountability:

Key Functions for a UNFCCC Technology Institutional Structure: Identifying Convergence in Country Submissions

Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works: Getting to Yes on Climate Change

A changed landscape

The case of China

Why are they doing this? “All politics is local.”

How do we know they’re doing what they say? “Trust but verify.”

China and the United States – solving problems, seizing opportunities.

Getting it in writing – U.S. legislation and a global agreement.

Additional Resources

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Sections

Emission Reductions Under Cap & Trade Proposals In The 111th Congress

Key Findings

Bottom Line Series of Climate Policy Briefs