Hands Free

In Doha, Lead U.S. Negotiator Plays Down Expectations of Climate Action in Obama’s Second Term

2012-12-04T23:20:00.001-02:00

In Doha, Lead U.S. Negotiator Plays Down Expectations of Climate Action in Obama’s Second Term

TV5MONDE : Programas - AVENTURE EN INDOCHINE 1946-1954

2012-12-04T12:55:00.001-02:00

TV5MONDE : Programas - AVENTURE EN INDOCHINE 1946-1954

Baffle

2012-12-04T12:34:00.001-02:00

confuse

mix up

mistake

confound

befuddle

distract

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puzzle

bewilder

perplex

flummox

dumbfound

gravel

nonplus

muddle

obscure

befog

obfuscate

overwhelm

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dazzle

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confute

muddy

embroil

intermingle

disarray

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mull

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addle

put out

fluster

flabbergast

astonish

astound

fog

ravel

maze

embrangle

interfuse

floor

moider

Portuguese

confundir

misturar

erro

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befuddle

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desorientar

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cascalho

atrapalhação

atrapalhar

obscurecer

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ofuscar

submergir

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torpor

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ponderar

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agitação

cambalear

gorar

pôr para fora

agitação

pasmar

surpreender

surpreender

nevoeiro

desfiar

labirinto

emaranhar

impregnar

piso

desnortear

"The crisis on the planet is a crisis of governance."

2012-06-22T12:05:00.001-03:00

Call to action – Reclaiming our future: Rio +20 and Beyond

Via Campesina

On 20-22 June 2012, governments from around the world will gather in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to commemorate 20 years of the “Earth Summit”, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) that first established a global agenda for “sustainable development”. During the 1992 summit, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) and the Convention to Combat Desertification, were all adopted. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was also established to ensure effective follow-up of the UNCED “Earth Summit.”

Twenty years later, governments should have reconvened to review their commitments and progress, but in reality the issue to debate will be the “green economy” led development, propagating the same capitalist model that caused climate chaos and other deep social and environmental crises. La Vía Campesina will mobilize for this historical moment, representing the voice of the millions of peasants and indigenous globally who are defending the well-being of all by implementing food sovereignty and the protection of natural resources.

20 Years later: a planet in crisis

20 years after the Earth Summit, life has become more difficult for the majority of the planet’s inhabitants. The number of hungry people has increased to almost one billion, which means that one out of six human beings is going hungry, women and small farmers being the most affected. Meanwhile, the environment is depleting fast, biodiversity is being destroyed, water resources are getting scarce and contaminated and the climate is in crisis. This is jeopardizing our very future on Earth while poverty and inequalities are increasing.

The idea of “Sustainable Development” put forward in 1992, which merged “development” and “environment” concerns, did not solve the problem because it did not stop the capitalist system in its race towards profit at the expense of all human and natural resources:

The food system is increasingly in the grips of large corporations seeking profit, not aimed at feeding the people.

The Convention on Biodiversiy has created benefit sharing mechanisms but at the end of the day, they legitimize the capitalization of genetic resources by the private sector.

The UN Convention on Climate Change, instead of forcing countries and corporations to reduce pollution, invented a new profitable and speculative commodity with the carbon trading mechanisms, allowing the polluter to continue polluting and profit from it.

The framework of “sustainable development” continues to see peasant agriculture as backwards and responsible for the deterioration of natural resources and the environment. The same paradigm of development is perpetuated, which is nothing less than the development of capitalism by means of a “green industrialization.”

The “Green Economy” – Final Enclosure?

Today the “greening of the economy” pushed forward in the run-up to Rio+20 is based on the same logic and mechanisms that are destroying the planet and keeping people hungry. For instance, it seeks to incorporate aspects of the failed “green revolution” in a broader manner in order to ensure the needs of the industrial sectors of production, such as promoting the uniformity of seeds, patented seeds by corporation, genetically modified seeds, etc.

The capitalist economy, based on the over-exploitation of natural resources and human beings, will never become “green.” It is based on limitless growth in a planet that has reached its limits and on the commoditization of the remaining natural resources that have until now remained un-priced or in control of the public sector.

In this period of financial crisis, global capitalism seeks new forms of accumulation. It is during these periods of crisis in which capitalism can most accumulate. Today, it is the territories and the commons which are the main target of capital. As such, the green economy is nothing more than a green mask for capitalism. It is also a new mechanism to appropriate our forests, rivers, land… of our territories!

Since last year’s preparatory meetings towards Rio+20, agriculture has been cited as one of the causes of climate change. Yet no distinction is made in the official negotiations between industrial and peasant agriculture, and no explicit difference between their effects on poverty, climate and other social issues we face.

The “green economy” is marketed as a way to implement sustainable development for those countries which continue to experience high and disproportionate levels of poverty, hunger and misery. In reality, what is proposed is another phase of what we identify as “green structural adjustment programs” which seek to align and re-order the national markets and regulations to submit to the fast incoming “green capitalism”.

Investment capital now seeks new markets through the “green economy”; securing the natural resources of the world as primary inputs and commodities for industrial production, as carbon sinks or even for speculation. This is being demonstrated by increasing land grabs globally, for crop production for both export and agrofuels. New proposals such as “climate smart” agriculture, which calls for the “sustainable intensification” of agriculture, also embody the goal of corporations and agri-business to over exploit the earth while labeling it “green”, and making peasants dependent on high-cost seeds and inputs. New generations of polluting permits are issued for the industrial sector, especially those found in developed countries, such as what is expected from programs such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD++) and other environmental services schemes.

The green economy seeks to ensure that the ecological and biological systems of our planet remain at the service of capitalism, by the intense use of various forms of biotechnologies, synthetic technologies and geo-engineering. GMO’s and biotechnology are key parts of the industrial agriculture promoted within the framework of “green economy”. The promotion of the green economy includes calls for the full implementation of the WTO Doha Round, the elimination of all trade barriers to incoming “green solutions,” the financing and support of financial institutions such as the World Bank and projects such as US-AID programs, and the continued legitimization of the international institutions that serve to perpetuate and promote global capitalism.

Why peasant farmers mobilize

Small-scale farmers, family farmers, landless people, indigenous people, migrants - women and men - are now determined to mobilize to oppose any commodification of life and to propose another way to organize our relationship with nature on earth based on agrarian reform, food sovereignty and peasant based agroecology.

We reject the “Green Economy” as it is pushed now in the Rio+20 process. It is a new mask to hide an ever-present, growing greed of corporations and food imperialism in the world.

• We oppose carbon trading and all market solutions to the environmental crisis including the proposed liberalization of environmental services under the WTO.

• We reject REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) which allows rich countries to avoid cutting their carbon emissions by financing often damaging projects in developing countries.

• We expose and reject the corporate capture of the rio+20 process and all multilateral processes within the United Nations.

• We oppose land grabs, water grabs, seeds grabs, forest grabs - all resources’ grabs!

• We defend the natural resources in our countries as a matter of national and popular sovereignty, to face the offensive and private appropriation of capital;

• We demand public policies from governments for the protection of the interests of the majority of the population, especially the poorest, and landless workers;

• We demand a complete ban on geoengineering projects and experiments; under the guise of ‘green’ or ‘clean’ technology to the benefit of agribusiness. This includes new technologies being proposed for adaptation and mitigation to climate change under the banners of “geo-engineering” and “climate smart agriculture”, including false solutions like transgenic plants supposed to adapt to climate change, and “biochar” purported to replenish the soil with carbon.

• We resolve to protect our native seeds and our right to exchange seeds. We demand genuine agrarian reform that distributes and redistributes the land - the main factor in production - especially taking into account women and youth. Land must be a means of production to secure the livelihood of the people and must not be a commodity subject to speculation on international markets. We reject “market assisted land reform”, which is another word for land privatization.

• We struggle for small scale sustainable food production for community and local consumption as opposed to agribusiness, monoculture plantations for export.

• We continue to organize and practice agroecology based production, ensuring food sovereignty for all and implementing collective management of our resources

Call to action

We call for a major world mobilization to be held between 18-26 June in Rio de Janeiro, with a permanent camp, for the Peoples Summit, to counter the summit of governments and capital.

We will be in Rio at the People’s Summit where anti-capitalist struggles of the world will meet and together we will propose real solutions. The People’s Permanent Assembly, between the 18 and 22, will present the daily struggles against the promoters of capitalism y the attacks against our lands. Today, Rio de Janeiro is one of the cities which receive the most contributions from global capital and will host the Soccer World Cup and Olympics. We will unite our symbolic struggles from the urban to the landless movements and fishers.

We also declare the week of June 5th, as a major world week in defense of the environment and against transnational corporations and invite everyone across the world to mobilize:

Defend sustainable peasant agriculture

Occupy land for the production of agroecological and non-market dominated food

Reclaim and exchange native seeds

Protest against Exchange and Marketing Board offices and call for an end to speculative markets on commodities and land

Hold local assemblies of People Affected by Capitalism

Dream of a different world and create it!!

The future that we want is based on Agrarian Reform, Peasant’s based sustainable agriculture and Food Sovereignty!

GLOBALIZE THE STRUGGLE!!

GLOBALIZE HOPE!!!

An international movement of peasants, small- and medium-sized producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers.

At Rio 20, Severn Cullis-Suzuki Revisits Historic '92 Speech, Fights for Next Generation's Survival

2012-06-22T11:07:00.001-03:00

At Rio 20, Severn Cullis-Suzuki Revisits Historic '92 Speech, Fights for Next Generation's Survival

AMY GOODMAN: We continue with the largest U.N. summit ever. Juan?

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: We continue our coverage of Rio+20 Earth Summit by turning now to an amazing speech given 20 years ago at the 1992 U.N. Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Twelve-year-old Severn Cullis-Suzuki became known as "the girl who silenced the world for six minutes" after she addressed the delegates in Rio during the summit’s plenary session.

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: Hello. I’m Severn Suzuki, speaking for ECO, the Environmental Children’s Organization. We’re a group of 12- and 13-year-olds trying to make a difference—Vanessa Suttie, Morgan Geisler, Michelle Quigg and me. We’ve raised all the money to come here ourselves, to come 5,000 miles to tell you adults you must change your ways.

Coming up here today, I have no hidden agenda. I am fighting for my future. Losing my future is not like losing an election or a few points on the stock market. I am here to speak for all generations to come. I am here to speak on behalf of the starving children around the world whose cries go unheard. I am here to speak for the countless animals dying across this planet because they have nowhere left to go.

I am afraid to go out in the sun now because of the holes in our ozone. I am afraid to breathe the air, because I don’t know what chemicals are in it. I used to go in—I used to go fishing in Vancouver, my home, with my dad, until just a few years ago we found the fish full of cancers. And now we hear of animals and plants going extinct every day, vanishing forever. In my life, I have dreamt of seeing the great herds of wild animals, jungles and rainforests full of birds and butterflies, but now I wonder if they will even exist for my children to see. Did you have to worry of these things when you were my age?

All this is happening before our eyes, and yet we act as if we have all the time we want and all the solutions. I’m only a child, and I don’t have all the solutions, but I want you to realize, neither do you. You don’t know how to fix the holes in our ozone layer. You don’t know how to bring the salmon back up a dead stream. You don’t know how to bring back an animal now extinct. And you can’t bring back the forests that once grew where there is now a desert. If you don’t know how to fix it, please stop breaking it!

Here, you may be delegates of your governments, business people, organizers, reporters or politicians. But really, you’re mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, aunts and uncles. And all of you are someone’s child.

I’m only a child, yet I know we are all part of a family, five billion strong—in fact, 30 million species strong. And borders and governments will never change that. I’m only a child, yet I know we are all in this together and should act as one single world towards one single goal.

In my anger, I am not blind, and in my fear, I am not afraid of telling the world how I feel.

In my country, we make so much waste, we buy and throw away, buy and throw away, buy and throw and away. And yet, northern countries will not share with the needy. Even when we have more than enough, we are afraid to share, we are afraid to let go of some of our wealth. In Canada, we live the privileged life, with plenty of food, water and shelter. We have watches, bicycles, computers and television sets. The list could go on for two days.

Two days ago here in Brazil, we were shocked when we spent some time with some children living on the streets. This is what one child told us: "I wish I was rich. And if I were, I would give all the street children food, clothes, medicines, shelter, and love and affection." If a child on the streets who has nothing is willing to share, why are we who have everything still so greedy?

I can’t stop thinking that these are children my own age, that it makes a tremendous difference where you are born, that I could be one of those children living in the favelas of Rio, I could be a child starving in Somalia, or a victim of war in the Middle East or a beggar in India. I am only a child, yet I know if all the money spent on war was spent on finding environmental answers, ending poverty, and finding treaties, what a wonderful place this earth would be.

At school, even in kindergarten, you teach us how to behave in the world. You teach us to not fight with others, to work things out, to respect others, to clean up our mess, not to hurt other creatures, to share, not be greedy. Then why do you go out and do the things you tell us not to do?

Do not forget why you’re attending these conferences, who you’re doing this for: we are your own children. You are deciding what kind of a world we are growing up in. Parents should be able to comfort their children by saying, "Everything’s going to be all right," "It’s not the end of the world," and "We’re doing the best we can." But I don’t think you can say that to us anymore. Are we even on your list of priorities? My dad always says, "You are what you do, not what you say." Well, what you do makes me cry at night. You grown-ups say you love us. But I challenge you, please, make your actions reflect your words. Thank you.

AMY GOODMAN: Severn Cullis-Suzuki, then at the age of 12 delivering her famous address at the 1992 first U.N. Earth Summit that took place in Rio de Janeiro. The video of her address has more than 21 million views on YouTube.

Well, now Severn is back in Rio, this time as a veteran international environmental campaigner and mother of two.

We welcome you to Democracy Now! That was 1992. Can you talk about what has happened in the intervening 20 years? Do you feel that there has been real progress now at this summit, Severn?

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: Good afternoon. It’s an honor to be on the show.

Twenty years have passed, and everybody wants to know what have we done, how have we progressed. Well, last week, scientists released a report in the academic journal Nature that suggested that we are pushing for a tipping point in the earth’s biosphere, that we are attacking our ecosystems that sustain us and all life on this earth, in so many ways, on so many levels, that we are pushing for a state shift like what was seen 12,000 years ago with the end of the last ice age. But this time it will be human-caused, and it will be orders of magnitude faster than the thousand-year transition that happened last time. I mean, that report, released on the eve of this world summit, is clear that we have not achieved the sustainable world we knew we needed 20 years ago.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, Severn, yet the draft agreement that is being proposed at this summit, somebody did an analysis of the verbs in that agreement and found that the word "encourage" appeared 50 times, and the word "support" appeared 99 times, but "must" only three times and "we will" only five times. So, in the face of this looming crisis, does it give you much hope at all that the world leaders are couching this agreement in such weak terms?

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: They called Rio+10 in Johannesburg "Rio-Minus-10" because already the world leaders were starting to backtrack on an agreement from Rio 1992 that now looks like this amazing, visionary success. And, I mean, I am ashamed to hear that the Canadian negotiating team was trying their best to omit the word "commit." So I wonder how many times that actually made it through in the draft that we have today.

I think that this is indicative of what is happening in our world at large. There is so much shift right now. We have economic meltdown around the world. We have social unrest. We have revolution just boiling up all over the planet. And now we have our national leaders that are hunkering down more and more, defending their national interests, and less and less looking for the good of humanity. I believe we have a crisis in governance. This is showing that the world’s leaders are not able to come together and lead for the sake of humanity. What does it mean when the world’s elected leaders do not represent the good of the people that they’re supposed to care for?

AMY GOODMAN: Severn Cullis-Suzuki, especially for young people who are listening and watching right now all over the world — we have a room full of interns that we are celebrating today, the summer interns who have begun at Democracy Now! — talk about how it was you who ended up giving this speech 20 years ago at the age of 12. How did you end up addressing world leaders?

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: Well, it was an incredibly grassroots initiatives. I had started a club, and this was really a group of girls who really wanted to do something for the planet in the broadest terms. And how we started was, well, we needed to educate ourselves. When I was nine, we started this club, called ourselves ECO, the Environmental Children’s Organization. We built on very small projects like beach cleanups, basic support for other environmental groups. And finally, we heard about the Earth Summit, after a few years of this, and decided we wanted to go. It’s a very long story. We galvanized support from our community, our parents, our teachers, our friends, fundraised the money, got here, and then, in a sea of 30,000 people here, we started getting our message out because we were young. And this is the key.

Twenty years later, the world is still talking about a speech, a six-minute speech that a 12-year-old gave to world leaders. Why? It is because the world is hungry to hear the truth, and it is nowhere articulated as well as from the mouths of those with everything at stake, which is youth. Today’s youth will spend their entire—the rest of their entire lives, their entire adult lives—my children will grow up in a time characterized by climate change, characterized by social unrest and refugees and all kinds of problems that that brings, because of the ecological crisis that we now find ourselves in. The economic crisis, that’s what everybody’s talking about, but really it is a subsystem within the ecological crisis of this planet earth that is our home.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: I want to ask you about the Canada-to-Texas Keystone XL pipeline. Just two months after President rejected the project after large protests by environmental groups, he announced his support for TransCanada to build a southern leg of the pipeline from Oklahoma to Texas. In his remarks, President Obama said his administration has authorized enough gas pipelines to encircle the earth.

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Under my administration, America is producing more oil today than at any time in the last eight years. Over—that’s important to know. Over the last three years, I’ve directed my administration to open up millions of acres for gas and oil exploration across 23 different states. We’re opening up more than 75 percent of our potential oil resources offshore. We’ve quadrupled the number of operating rigs to a record high. We’ve added enough new oil and gas pipeline to encircle the earth, and then some.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: That was President Obama, who is not attending the summit, nor is David Cameron, the prime minister of England, or Angela Merkel. Now TransCanada has reapplied for a permit—

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: Or Harper.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: —to build a 1,200-mile segment from Alberta, Canada, to Steel City, Nebraska. Just this past Friday, the United States State Department said it would conduct a new environmental impact statement on the Keystone XL pipeline. Talk about the significance of this project and the role of activists in stopping it.

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: The British journalist George Monbiot said yesterday that it’s just—it’s quite staggering to see the president, Democrat leader, Obama, backtracking on commitments that George Bush Sr. made in 1992. It really points to the shift politically that we’ve come to in 20 years. The realm of what is politically possible is totally on the side of the right, and it’s on the side of exploiting the natural resources of the planet as fast as it possibly can, and on a budget and on a scale that dwarfs its opposition.

You know, I’m here in Rio, and there’s so many people, so many young people, who are going through the tracks that have been presented to them to have their voices heard. And they’ve been lobbying, and they’ve been following all the negotiations, and they’ve been staying up ’til 2:00 a.m., and they put their heart and soul into the document and the declaration, because they have good faith that this process works and it matters. And we are seeing, from the lack of interest in this global summit from our world leaders, and in the inability to decide—to decide on anything, on saying anything, that this system is broken, it does not work. And I think the Keystone XL, as well as the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline, which is proposed from Alberta to the coast—I think we can see, by all of the opposition to this, that our governments just want to ram it through at all cost, even at the cost of democracy. And that is what I am interested in talking about, is this crisis in democracy that we have in promoting what the people actually want and what actually will carry us forward into the future with dignity.

AMY GOODMAN: What about the fact that your prime minister, that Harper, is not there, that the U.S. president, which—President Obama is not there? And I think it’s particularly significant, since he weighs every day what he’s going to do in this election year, what kind of message he wants to send. Instead, he sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Yet, more than 130 world leaders are there.

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: This message is loud and clear. This is a message from Prime Minister Harper, President Obama. The message to the rest of the world is: We don’t care about you; we do not care that your countries may be inundated, and huge social strife may be imminent—and is imminent. I was on a panel the other day with a minister from New Caledonia, a small island nation. I mean, for him, climate change is an issue of survival of his people, in—I mean, in direct terms. And what my country, what the American nation is saying is, "We do not care."

AMY GOODMAN: It’s very interesting, the Pentagon has reports on seeing climate change as one of the most serious threats to national security, because of vast migrations of people when their areas are desertified or flooded and they must move to other places. As we wrap up, Severn, can you talk about the effects of climate change? In the United States, it is not a common discussion in any way.

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: It is just—it is staggering how we’re not making the connection between climate change and what is already happening in the ground, not only in the Horn of Africa, not only in the Arctic north, but in the country of America. I mean, I remember in March seeing on the news reports about the hurricanes, the crazy storms that were hitting a huge portion of the continental U.S., and, you know, not to make the connection with what the world’s leading experts are saying is exactly what happened in a situation where climate change was unfolding. You know, actually, we have to really ask, who’s driving the ship here? I mean, really, when we—when the world’s leaders do not listen to science, when they do not listen to the experts who study this, the ones that, you know, really can tell us what’s going on, using facts and data and information, and when we actually have campaigns like in the Canadian current government—

AMY GOODMAN: Five seconds.

SEVERN CULLIS-SUZUKI: —that are actually trying to shut down science, you know, this really points to a huge question of governance and where are we going.

AMY GOODMAN: Severn Cullis-Suzuki, we thank you for being with us, and for being there 20 years ago in Rio de Janeiro. It’s the largest U.N. summit ever.

Peru pre-incaico

2012-06-01T20:03:00.000-03:00

Afficher Meus lugares salvos sur une carte plus grande

The Engineering Economist

2011-09-22T10:37:00.000-03:00

The Engineering Economist

Obsolete skills

2011-09-21T11:51:00.001-03:00

http://scenta.co.uk/tcaep/maths/number/logtab/index.htm http://obsoleteskills.wikispot.org/Skills

Our Climate Crisis Is an Education Crisis

2011-04-02T16:18:00.000-03:00

American Red Cross Responding to Japan Earthquake and Pacific Tsunami

2011-03-13T21:23:00.000-03:00

American Red Cross Responding to Japan Earthquake and Pacific Tsunami

2011-03-13T20:17:00.000-03:00

The Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1876

http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/custer.htm

2011-03-12T14:27:00.000-03:00

Révolutions : comment ça marche ?

Comment expliquer la réussite ou l'échec d'un soulèvement populaire ? Au moment où l'échiquier politique du monde arabe vacille, Geopolitis décrypte cette recette subtile qui mène -ou non- à une révolution.

www.geopolitis.ch

2011-03-12T12:38:00.000-03:00

EU urged to calculate its water footprint
http://www.euractiv.com/en/sustainability/eu-urged-calculate-water-footprint-news-502764?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=7d0cd77451-my_google_analytics_key&utm_medium=email

Der Preis des Überlebens 1/3 (45min ndr)

2011-01-23T01:17:00.000-02:00

Der Preis des Überlebens

Immer mehr Menschen erkranken an Krebs. Mit ihren Todesängsten verdient die Pharmaindustrie Milliarden, doch viele Medikamente nutzen kaum etwas. Während die Preise für die meisten Arzneimittel zurückgegangen sind, sind die für Krebsmedikamente in den vergangenen Jahren explodiert. Moderne Krebstherapien kosten bis zu 6.000 Euro im Monat. Es sind sogenannte zielgerichtete Therapien, die den Krebs ausschalten oder zumindest in eine chronische Erkrankung verwandeln sollen. Meistens bleibt am Ende einer Behandlung nur der Erfolg einer längeren Überlebenszeit von einigen wenigen Monaten, wenn überhaupt und die behandelten Patienten können zudem unter Nebenwirkungen leiden.

2011-01-14T23:46:00.000-02:00

"FAIRCLOUGH,+NORMAN(2006).+Language+and+globalization.+London,+Routledge.+186+pp.+ISBN+10:+0-415-31765-7" autor:RESENDE

Em seu último livro, Language and globalization, editado pela Routledge em 2006, Norman Fairclough explora os efeitos da linguagem em processos de globalização, adotando uma combinação da Análise de Discurso Crítica (ADC) com a Economia Política Cultural (EPC), proposta por Bob Jessop, a fim de desenvolver uma teoria da relação entre discurso e outros momentos desses processos, nos termos de Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999). Nesse sentido, o livro fortalece a relação da ADC com o Realismo Crítico (RC), que já havia sido referida em Fairclough (2003) e em diversos artigos publicados (por exemplo, Fairclough, 2000 e Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer, 2002).

O livro está dividido em sete capítulos antecedidos de Introdução e seguidos de Conclusão, Referências Bibliográficas e Índice Remissivo. São eles: 1. Globalization and language: review of academic literature; 2. My approach to globalization and language; 3. Discourses of globalization; 4. Re-scaling the nation- state; 5. The media, mediation and globalization; 6. Globalization from below; 7. Globalization, war and terrorism. Nos parágrafos que seguem, farei um breve comentário de cada um deles, buscando relacionar as discussões levadas a cabo no livro com debates anteriores, do próprio autor e de pesquisas de outros/as autores/as da área ou de áreas afins.

Embora pretenda desenvolver teoria ampla da globalização, Fairclough apresenta um foco específico nos processos de globalização na Romênia, país que tem merecido destacada atenção do pesquisador nos últimos anos. Logo na Introdução, Fairclough pontua seu interesse em desenvolver uma teoria que relacione discurso com outros elementos dos processos de globalização, afirmando que “as mudanças econômicas começaram a ocorrer [na Romênia especificamente] quando o discurso foi operacionalizado, implementado e posto em prática”. Para Fairclough, há três pontos iniciais acerca da linguagem em processos de globalização: 1. As redes, conexões e interações que cruzam fronteiras e são típicas da globalização incluem formas particulares de comunicação, gêneros especializados na interação transnacional, e dentre os elementos que atravessam fronteiras por meio desses gêneros especializados estão as representações discursivas; 2. É importante diferenciar processos concretos de globalização e discursos sobre a globalização, uma vez que o termo ‘globalização’ tornou-se proeminente em variados tipos de texto em que os processos concretos são diferentemente representados; 3. Apesar da necessidade de se fazer essa distinção entre processos e discursos, também é relevante lembrar que alguns discursos acerca da globalização não apenas representam os processos e tendências, mas guardam capacidade, sob certas condições, de contribuir para a criação de processos concretos de globalização; são uma ‘idéia-força’ nos termos de Bourdieu (1998).

Admitindo a existência de uma pluralidade de discursos sobre a globalização, Fairclough privilegia, na discussão levada a cabo no Capítulo 1, alguns discursos acadêmicos. Mesmo no âmbito da academia, não há homogeneidade de abordagens à globalização e, nesse sentido, Fairclough distingue quatro posições, embora assuma que a divisão possa ser considerada grosseira: objetivista, retoricista, ideologista e sócio-construtivista. Na postura objetivista, trata-se a globalização simplesmente como processos objetivos que cientistas sociais procuram descrever; não se reconhece a existência de um aspecto subjetivo nos processos de globalização. Essa abordagem é negada em ADC, pois o reconhecimento da faceta discursiva de processos sociais implica o reconhecimento também de seu aspecto subjetivo na representação do mundo social. Na postura retoricista, a preocupação é demonstrar como certas representações da globalização são usadas para legitimar determinadas ações políticas, como as reformas neoliberais por exemplo. Na postura ideologista, o foco é, de maneira mais sistemática, mostrar como discursos contribuem para a conquista e a sustentação da hegemonia de estratégias particulares e sua relação com grupos sociais beneficiados nessse processo. Finalmente, a postura sócioconstrutivista – que Fairclough faz questão de distinguir do sócio-construcionismo – enfatiza o caráter socialmente construído das realidades sociais e a importância do discurso em sua construção.

Fairclough ressalta a consistência da abordagem sócio-construtivista com a perspectiva realista, afirmando que não se trata de considerar que a realidade social não exista independentemente de nosso conhecimento sobre ela – em uma referência clara à filosofia do RC de Bhaskar (1989; ver também Collier, 1994 e Danermark, 2002). É a essa última postura teórica face à globalização que o livro de Fairclough se coaduna. A relação entre a versão de ADC proposta por Fairclough e a filosofia bhaskariana é deixada clara nesse capítulo, o que faz do livro uma continuação de argumentos anteriormente aludidos de maneira menos específica (por exemplo, em Fairclough, 2003).

O Capítulo 2 é dedicado a tornar explícita a abordagem de Fairclough em relação à globalização. Por isso, é possível que pesquisadores/as já familiarizados/ as com a proposta de ADC de Fairclough considerem esse capítulo a essência da obra. É aqui que o autor esclarece a relação de sua versão de ADC com a EPC de Jessop, para quem objetos econômicos e políticos são socialmente construídos – daí seu aspecto cultural e sua faceta subjetiva. Os processos de construção social desses objetos implicam a construção de sujeitos associados, são processos de co-construção de objetos e sujeitos. Isso significa que sistemas político-econômicos particulares (a divisão entre economia e política é negada) interconectam-se a significados particulares, interpretações, narrativas, valores, atitudes, identidades e, logo, discursos: têm uma faceta discursiva. Estratégias para controlar mudanças sociais, políticas e econômicas envolvem estratégias discursivas de criação/ manutenção de representações discursivas (discursos), formas de ação discursiva (gêneros) e identidades (estilos) que sustentem tais estratégias (esses conceitos são discutidos com mais pomenores em Fairclough, 2003). A vantagem de relacionar a ADC à EPC, para Fairclough, é a garantia do foco no discurso como uma faceta da globalização, um momento das práticas sociais nos termos de Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999), sem perder de vista a dialética entre o momento discursivo e outros momentos não-semióticos dos processos de globalização.

Tendo esclarecido sua abordagem à globalização e a relevância do estudo de processos de globalização no âmbito da ADC, no Capítulo 3 Fairclough analisa estratégias de globalização utilizadas por agências públicas, governamentais e não-governamentais, e os discursos a elas associados. O foco fundamental do capítulo, o que se observa nos exemplos apresentados e analisados, é o discurso globalista acerca da globalização. O principal exemplo explorado é o excerto de um discurso proferido pelo sub-secretário de Estado dos Estados Unidos da América em 1999, Stuart Eizenstat, sobre o colapso econômico que se iniciou na Ásia nos anos de 1990. O globalismo é entendido como um discurso específico acerca da globalização baseado em seis asserções básicas: 1. A globalização é um processo de liberalização e integração de mercados em nível global; 2. A globalização e inevitável e irreversível; 3. Ninguém é responsável pela globalização; 4. A globalização traz benefícios universais; 5. A globalização fortalece a democracia no mundo; 6. A globalização requer uma ‘guerra contra o terrorismo’. Fairclough procede a uma análise de excertos do texto de Eizenstat, demonstrando sua vinculação ao discurso globalista da globalização. O objetivo da análise é mostrar que a força do discurso globalista reside em sua capacidade de se sustentar por meio de mudanças no conjunto de discursos a que se filia em resposta a circunstâncias, desafios e crises. Isso inclui a construção do discurso da ‘economia baseada no conhecimento’ e estratégias articuladas para sua instalação ao redor do mundo. Ainda no Capítulo 3, Fairclough apresenta alternativas ao globalismo no seio de agências governamentais e não governamentais. Um texto de Mahathir bin Mohamad, ex-primeiro ministro da Malásia, também sobre a crise econômica na Ásia na década de 1990, ilustra um discurso de resistência ao globalismo no âmbito de agências governamentais, e um texto do Manifesto ‘Make Poverty History’, organizado pela Christian Aid, provê exemplo de alternativa ao globalismo em agências não-governamentais.

O Capítulo 4 é dedicado a uma análise da transformação de escalas e da relação entre escalas na globalização, que não é vista apenas como a criação de uma escala global, mas também como a criação de novas relações entre a escala global e outras escalas (local, regional, macro-regional). O foco específico da análise apresentada é a re-escala no nível de um Estado-Nação, a Romênia, no contexto de sua adequação para integrar a União Européia e das contradições das ‘reformas’ exigidas para essa ‘transição’ e o contexto do póscomunismo. Para discutir uma escala como um espaço em que relações econômicas, políticas e sociais são articuladas, Fairclough recorre à obra do geógrafo David Harvey, uma retomada da recontextualização teórica apresentada anteriormente em Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999). A reorganização de escalas no contexto da globalização, teorizada tanto como substrato quanto como resultado de lutas hegemônicas, é investigada com base nas contradições experimentadas na Romênia como conseqüência de seu interesse em integrar uma macro-região e do estabelecimento de uma escala européia. A análise focaliza as reformas na educação superior, defendidas pela Convenção de Lisboa e pela Convenção de Bolonha, de acordo com o discurso da ‘economia baseada no conhecimento’. Entre os textos analisados estão um excerto da Declaração de Lisboa e o Manual de Controle de Qualidade da Universidade de Bucareste. As análises apresentadas mostram que o processo de reescala é em parte um processo textual em que novas escalas são texturizadas – a criação de novas escalas no nível do discurso, segundo Fairclough, é uma condição necessária para que as novas escalas se tornem concretas na ação. Fairclough mostra, entre outras questões, que a mercantilização da educação – processo já tornado familiar em países centrais na União Européia, como a Inglaterra (Fairclough, 2001a) – quando imposta à Romênia implica contradições apagadas pelo processo de inserção na escala macro-regional. Ainda no Capítulo 4, outro problema de re-escala investigado é a recontextualização do discurso da União Européia sobre ‘exclusão social’ na Romênia. A ‘exclusão social’ é tratada também a partir da Declaração de Lisboa e de textos institucionais da Romênia que indicam a recontextualização das estratégias de combate à ‘exclusão’ adotadas pela União Européia. As estratégias padronizadas para a inclusão social, entretanto, quando aplicadas ao contexto da Romênia, trazem salientes contradições, devido à proporção que a pobreza atinge naquele país. As brilhantes análises apresentadas no capítulo mostram que a criação de novas escalas pode ser compreendida como uma tentativa de conformar experiências e realidades particulares, acobertando contradições e desigualdades. No que tange especificamente ao problema da precariedade social, as análises de Fairclough podem inspirar análises semelhantes em países da América Latina onde a desigualdade social também atinge níveis alarmantes, onde a ‘inclusão’ – e não a ‘exclusão’ – é a excessão.

Reconhecendo que a mídia cumpre papel fundamental nos processos de criação de novas escalas, na transformação das relações entre escalas, na construção de aparente conformidade entre diferentes padrões de realidade social, Fairclough dedica o Capítulo 5 de seu livro ao papel dos meios de comunicação no tangente à globalização. Nas sociedades contemporâneas, os ‘meios de comunicação de massa’ são considerados o principal mecanismo para a disseminação de discursos, narrativas e práticas, e para a criação de consenso e aceitação de mudanças sociais ou manutenções de estruturas. Há cinco principais reflexões nesse Capítulo 5: 1. A mídia é um elemento crucial na disseminação de notícias, informações e discursos; 2. As mensagens veiculadas não são, de modo algum, neutras; 3. O posicionamento das mensagens relaciona-se também ao monopólio de corporações midiáticas transnacionais na divulgação de notícias; 4. O impacto da mediação não pode ser tomado como dado, uma vez que depende dos contextos de distribuição e consumo (da prática discursiva, nos termos de Fairclough, 2001b); 5. A globalização dos ‘meios de comunicação de massa’ contribuiu para a criação de um ‘público global’. Os objetivos desse quinto capítulo são incluir a mídia na discussão da re-escala no contexto da globalização e debater a contribuição dos ‘meios de comunicação de massa’ para a criação desse ‘público global’. O primeiro objetivo é alcançado por meio da análise de dois exemplos: de uma propaganda política no contexto de campanha presidencial na Romênia e de um artigo da revista feminina romena correspondente à Cosmopolitan. O segundo objetivo é explorado por meio da discussão da pesquisa de Chouliaraki acerca da cobertura da mídia aos atentados de 11 de setembro de 2001, especificamente à criação de um público global para o ‘sofrimento de outros/as distantes’, como no caso de ataques terroristas, de acidentes ou de desastres naturais. O conceito de mediação adotado é o de Thompson (1995), para quem produtos midiáticos globalizados são localmente interpretados. Esse aspecto da relação dialética entre universal e particular é fundamental à análise do artigo da revista feminina na Romênia, pois Fairclough discute a contradição entre as identidades de gênero globalizadas pela revista distribuída em mais de 100 países ao redor do mundo e as possibilidades concretas de adoção desses estilos por mulheres romenas, tanto em termos econômicos quanto culturais. Isso significa que a seleção e a retenção de discursos e estilos particulares não depende apenas de sua circulação massiva, mas também de condições específicas do contexto recontextualizante – a recontextualização é sempre uma atividade situada. Pesquisas com mídia devem portanto ser capazes de reconhecer as possibilidades de resistência e ação, evitando o pressuposto da massificação.

O Capítulo 6 dedica-se justamente à discussão de contextos situados em relação à globalização, da relação dialética entre local e global, entre particular e universal. O foco são as estratégias de indivíduos ou grupos, em contextos específicos, para se defenderem dos efeitos nocivos da globalização ou para tirarem proveito das oportunidades geradas pelos processos de globalização. Mais uma vez Fairclough refere-se à teoria de Harvey sobre a relação tempo-espaço para debater a constituição de espaços específicos, sua relação com outras escalas, a criação de estratégias localizadas para lidar com questões globais – há uma relação dialética entre interesses ‘particulares’, locais, e interesses ‘gerais’, globais; e grupos envolvidos em lutas hegemônicas locais podem ser mais eficientes se desenvolverem a internalização dos recursos gerais disponíveis. A discussão nesse sexto capítulo baseia-se em três exemplos: o primeiro refere-se às estratégias de desempregados/as crônicos/as na Grã-Bretanha da era Thatcher, mostrando a apropriação do discurso neoliberal como estratégia de sobrevivência; o segundo e o terceiro exemplos referem-se às relações local/ regional/ global em termos do discurso dos riscos ambientais da ação humana: o segundo trata da disputa acerca de um incinerador de lixo na Hungria e o terceiro trata da resistência à construção de uma estação de queima de carvão na Tailândia. Fugindo à regra dos exemplos apresentados nos capítulos anteriores a da tradição analítica do trabalho de Fairclough, nesse capítulo apresentam-se (re-)análises de dados etnográficos, o que torna o capítulo especialmente interessante, sobretudo no caso da análise das estratégias de sobrevivência desenvolvidas por desempregados/as crônicos/as que internalizam o discurso neoliberal da flexibilização da economia e do mercado de trabalho para desenvolverem justificativas para uma estratégia tecnicamente classificada como ilegal: o desempenho de pequenos serviços eventuais (ou ‘bicos’ em bom português) simultaneamente ao recebimento do segurodesemprego. Não se trata de uma estratégia de luta por transformação, mas de uma estratégia de adaptação e acomodação às realidades do desemprego crônico. As análises apresentadas nesse sexto capítulo ilustram a aproriação local de discursos globais, mostrando como a globalização contemporânea afeta a relação entre particular e universal.

O último capítulo do livro é dedicado à abordagem da guerra e do terrorismo no contexto da globalização. O foco da análise é a mudança estratégica do ‘soft power’ para o ‘hard power’ (da busca pela conquista consensual para o uso da violência, em termos de Gramsci, 1995 [1955]) e o discurso da ‘guerra contra o terror’ como uma mudança na trajetória do globalismo. Dois textos são analisados para ilustrar a discussão: um ensaio de Condoleezza Rice, secretária de Estado de G. W. Bush, e um discurso proferido por Tony Blair, primeiro ministro britânico. Ambos os textos filiam-se ao discurso da ‘guerra contra o terror’, ainda que o primeiro refira-se à invasão anglo-saxônica ao Iraque e o segundo à Guerra do Kosovo. Fairclough mapeia elementos do discurso da ‘guerra contra o terror’ nos textos, com destaque para a construção do significado ‘eixo do mal’ em oposição aos valores democráticos, por meio da construção textual da oposição entre ‘eles’ e ‘nós’ (sobre isso, ver a pesquisa de Ramalho, 2005). Os textos analisados apresentam justificativas para a guerra que evocam, segundo Fairclough, os termos de missão civilizatória utilizados para justificar o imperialismo do século XIX. Finalmente, Fairclough identifica quatro ‘temas’ principais na caracterização da mudança do discurso do ‘soft power’ para a estratégia do ‘hard power’: 1. Vivemos em uma nova era que apresenta novos riscos e exige novas respostas; 2. Os Estados Unidos da América e seus aliados encaram riscos sem precedentes que exigem medidas excepcionais; 3. Esses riscos são impostos por ‘forças do mal’; 4. Os Estados Unidos da América e seus aliados representam forças do bem cujas ações são motivadas por valores morais. Por meio dessa ficção procurase criar a ilusão de uma guerra justa ‘contra o terror’, buscando fazer crer em motivações nobres e em conseqüências universalmente benéficas.

Na Conclusão a seu livro, Fairclough apresenta uma revisão de toda a discussão apresentada, dividindo-a em tópicos que auxiliam o estabelecimento de relações pelo/a leitor/a. Destaca-se um excelente resumo do debate teórico acerca da complexa dialética entre estrutura e ação social, questão que vem motivando não só o trabalho de Fairclough, mas também aquele de diversos teóricos da Ciência Social Crítica. Por meio da associação entre a ADC e a EPC, Fairclough procura responder a críticas que denunciam a incapacidade de análises empíricas de textos realizarem todo o potencial transdisciplinar evocado na Teoria Social do Discurso. O autor argumenta que por meio dessa relação é possível assegurar análises sistemáticas com foco no discurso como uma faceta de processos sociais (incluídos os processos de globalização), evitando o risco de um foco descontextualizado nos aspectos lingüístico-discursivos dos textos analisados ou de uma abordagem ingênua do poder sócioconstrutivo do discurso.

Ao retormar o modelo para análise textual utilizado nas análises apresentadas nos capítulos centrais da obra, Fairclough justifica sua impossibilidade de oferecer análises minuciosas pelo escopo próprio ao livro. Assim fazendo, o autor resguarda-se do tipo de crítica que ele próprio levantou quando apontou a superficialidade de análises publicadas nos primeiros quatro números de Discourse & Society (Fairclough, 1999). Ainda que não tenha sido esse um objetivo do livro, pode ser interessante refletir sobre esse desafio em análises discursivas críticas: dadas as relações transdisciplinares de que dependemos para garantir a pertinência de nossas análises lingüísticas, dada a necessidade de apresentar análises lingüisticamente orientadas e contextualmente localizadas e politicamente posicionadas, dadas as limitações de espaço para publicação de análises e reflexões em periódicos, dadas as limitações de tempo a que estamos submetidos/as pelo intenso trabalho de pesquisa/ sala de aula/ publicação/ apresentação de trabalhos – condição que pode facilmente ser relacionada ao contexto dos processos de globalização, o que o próprio Fairclough não deixa de fazer quando discute o controle de qualidade do ensino superior – enfim, dada essa conjunção de fatores que torna o trabalho de analistas de discurso complexo e instigante, como conquistar o necessário equilíbrio entre a contextualização do problema, a profundidade da análise e da reflexão teórica e a defesa de interesses ligados à justiça e a igualdade?

Embora Fairclough não tenha podido conquistar esse desejado equilíbrio em seu último livro, não há dúvida de que os objetivos por ele almejados para essa obra foram plenamente atingidos. Trata-se de leitura fundamental para pesquisadores/as já engajados/as com essa versão de ADC e que desejem acompanhar o desenvolvimento dessa linha de investigação. Language and globalization é indicado também para pesquisadores/as em ciências sociais que desejem ampliar seu foco no aspecto discursivo de problemas sociais criados nos processos de globalização. Seja feita uma advertência: de modo algum se trata de leitura indicada a iniciantes, os quais fazem bem em ler primeiro o livro de 2003, pelo menos.

REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS

BHASKAR, R. (1989) The possibility of Naturalism: a philosophical critique of the
contemporary Human Sciences. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
BOURDIEU, P. (1998) Contrafogos: táticas para enfrentar a invasão neoliberal.
Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor.
CHOULIARAKI, L. & FAIRCLOUGH, N. (1999) Discourse in late modernity.
Rethinking critical discourse analysis. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
COLLIER, A. (1994) Critical Realism: an introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy.
London: Verso.
DANERMARK, B., et. al. (2002) Explaining society: Critical realism in the social
sciences. London and New York: Routledge.
FAIRCLOUGH, N. (1999) ‘Linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse
analysis’, en: A. Jaworski, & N. Coupland (orgs.) The discourse reader,
pp. 183-211. London: Routledge.
_____ (2000) ‘Discourse, social theory, and social research: the discourse of welfare
reform’, Journal of Sociolinguistics, 4(2): 163-195.
_____ (2001a) ‘A Análise Crítica do Discurso e a mercantilização do discurso
público: as universidades’, en: Magalhães, C. (org.) Reflexões sobre a Análise
Crítica do Discurso, pp. 31-82. Belo Horizonte: Faculdade de Letras, UFMG.
_____ (2001b) Discurso e mudança social. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília.
_____ (2003) Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London:
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FAIRCLOUGH, N., JESSOP, B. & SAYER, A. (2002) ‘Critical Realism and
semiosis’, Journal of Critical Realism (incorporating Alethia), 5 (1): 2-10.
GRAMSCI, A. (1995 [1955]) Concepção dialética da história. Rio de Janeiro:
Civilização Brasileira.
RAMALHO, V. C. V. S. (2005) O discurso da imprensa brasileira sobre a invasão
anglo-saxônica ao Iraque. Dissertação. Mestrado em Lingüística. Universidade
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THOMPSON, J. B. (1998) A mídia e a modernidade. Petrópolis: Vozes.

Viviane de Melo Resende

2010-09-01T21:42:00.000-03:00

'Define liberalism'
Answer 1

In extreme brevity: Realism/neorealism: States are the actors playing a rational game in an anarchic international system. They aim for their own self interest, that is typically expressed in terms of power (political, military, economic and so on), and relative gain as compared to other actors. Classical realism explains power as a need, whereas neorealism adds some constraints in terms of power politics and provides further explanation through the international system, using the external structures of the anarchic system as determinants of the power game through mechanisms such as security dilemmas, spiralling models, signals etc. Most often when investigating conflict, realists apply bargaining models and game theory. Read Waltz and Morgenthau for details Liberalism/neoliberalism: States are still the main actors, and are still participating in an anarchic international system but they aim for absolute gain, the maximum possible total output. Thus, while realists contend that power is expressed in relative terms compared to other actors, and thus strengthning another actor is a loss, liberalists consider that power is expressed in absolute terms (and thus, cooperation may bring gains through itself). Another major difference is that liberalism focuses on the connections and interactions as well as interdependence between states in terms of understanding state behavior, while realism explains those interactions solely from the state interest for power. Read Mearsheimer for more. Constructivism is slightly more complex - it focuses on social constructs and ideas and the way they create the relations between states. Individual actors and individual identities create the structure of the system, their social construct (their formation, their internal ideology etc.) will determine how they behave, as will systemic level rules and ideas. States can no longer be defined independently and cannot be considered to be equal and thus act equally - they will act as their nature will dictate (in a very simplified explanation, a democracy will behave different from an authoritarian system), and their nature comes from a large mix of factors, not least the way others have defined it. Furthermore, perceptions, attitudes and social constructs can change and influnce the structure, thus altering the behavior of the state (for example, the IMF can alter the way one thinks about economic behavior or poverty, and thus alter the way a state will behave or perceive itself in the international sphere, as can "security complexes" and "securitization" - the process of perceiving a threat). Thus, the state system is a system of ideas, norms and social constructs and behaviors, that is defined and defines the actors, working with conjectures as the main tool for undestanding the international system. It is thus a post-positivist, post-modernist approach, unlike realism or liberalism. See Read Wendt or Buzan for more. World System theory is a marxist based approach. It focuses on the world as being divided in a core (states posessing power and technology and capital) and a periphery (states posessing labor and resources), with the core, for historical reasons, becoming the center of trade and the accumulator of wealth. International relations are structured along these lines - imperialism and colonialism, where the core exploits the periphery becoming two main attributes of the international system. In this approach, the international system is no longer anarchic, it is structured by history and, in a way, by predispositions towards a certain behavior. It is still positivist in approaches. For more of this, read Wallerstein. There's also functionalism and structuralism, as there is feminism in IR, but since you don't want an answer, that's it.

Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism
Charlie Dunbar Broad

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Published by Cambridge: At the University Press, 1934. Reprinted in Ethics and the History of Philosophy by C. D. Broad (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 195-217.
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The Implications of Obligability
We often make retrospective judgments about the past actions of ourselves or other people which take the form: "You ought not to have done the action X, which you in fact did; you ought instead to have done the action Y, which in fact you did not." If I make such a judgment about a person, and he wants to refute it, he can take two different lines of argument.

He may say: "I could have done Y instead of X, but you are mistaken in thinking that Y was the action that I ought to have done. In point of fact, X, the action that I did, was the one that I ought to have done." If I had done Y. I should have done what I ought not to have done."
He may say: "I could not help doing X," or he may say: "Though I need not have done X, I could not possibly have done Y."
If the accused person makes an answer of the first kind, he is admitting that the alternatives "ought" and "ought not" apply to the actions X and Y, but he is objecting to my applying "ought" to Y and "ought not" to X. He is saying that "ought" applies to X, and "ought not" to Y. It is as if two people, who agree that X and Y are each black or white, should differ because one holds that X is black and Y white whilst the other holds that X is white and Y black. If the accused person makes an answer of the second kind, he is denying the applicability of the alternatives "ought" and "ought not." If he says: "I could not help doing X," he assumes that his critic will admit that neither "ought" nor "ought not" has any application to an action which the agent could not help doing. If he says: "Though I need not have done X, yet I could not possibly have done Y," he assumes that his critic will admit that neither "ought" nor "ought not" has any application to an action which the agent could not have done. It is as if one person should say that X is black and Y is white, and the other should answer that at least one of them is unextended and therefore incapable of being either black or white.

Obligability Entails Substitutability
Now we are concerned here only with the second kind of answer. The essential point to notice is that it is universally admitted to be a relevant answer. We all admit that there is some sense or other of "could" in which "ought" amd "ought not" entail "could." We will now try to get clear about the connexion between these two notions.

Judgments of obligation about past actions may be divided into two classes, viz.

(1) judgments about actions which were actually done, and
(2) judgments about conceivable actions which were not done. Each divides into two sub-classes, and so we get the following fourfold division.

(1.1) "You did X, and X was the action that you ought to have done."
(1.2) "You did X, and X was an action that you ought not to have done."
(2.1) "You did not do X, and X was the action that you ought to have done." And
(2.2) "You did not do X, and X was an action that you ought not to have."
Now both judgments of the first class entail that you could have helped doing the action which you in fact did. If the action that you did can be said to be one that you ought to have done, or if it can be said to be one that you ought not to have done, it must be one that you need not have done. And, since you actually did it, it is obviously one that you could have done. Both judgments of the second class entail that you could have done an action which you did not in fact do. If a conceivable action which you did not do can be said to be one which you ought to have done, or if it can be said to be one that you ought not to have done, it must be one that you could have done. And, since you actually failed to do it, it is obviously one that you need not have done.
It is worth while to notice that the common phrases: "You ought to have done so and so" and "You ought not to have done so and so" are generally equivalent to our judgments (2.1) and (1.2) respectively. The former is generally used to mean: "You did not do so and so, and that was an action which you ought to have done." The latter is generally used to mean: "You did so and so, and that was an action which you ought not to have done." But we often need to express what is expressed by our judgments (1.1) and (2.2). We often want to say that a person did what he ought on a certain occasion, and we often want to say that a person avoided doing something which he ought not to have done on a certain occasion. For this is exactly the state of affairs which exists when a person has in fact done an unpleasant duty in face of a strong temptation to shirk it by lying.

Now the importance of this connexion between "ought" and "ought not," on the one hand, and "could," on the other, is very great. People constantly make judgments of obligation of the four kinds which we have distinguished, and such judgments have constantly been made throughout the whole course of human history. Every single one of these judgments has been false unless there have been cases in which actions which were done could have been left undone and actions which were not done could have been done. And these judgments would all have been false in principle, and not merely in detail. They would have been false, not in the sense that they asserted "ought" where they should have asserted "ought not," or vice verse. They would be false in the sense that nothing in the world has ever had that determinable characteristic of which "ought to be done" and "ought not to be done" are the determinate specifications. They would be false in the sense in which all judgments which predicated redness, blueness, etc., of any object would be false in a world which contained no objects except minds and noises.

It will be convenient to call an action "obligable" if and only if it is an action of which "ought to be done" or "ought not to be done" can be predicated. It will be convenient to call an action "substitutable" if, either it was done but could have been left undone, or it was left undone but could have been done. We may then sum up the situation by saying that an action is obligable if and only if it is, in a certain sense, substitutable; that, unless all judgments of obligations are false in principle, there are obligable actions; and therefore, unless all judgments of obligation are false in principle, there are actions which are, in this sense, substitutable.

Various Senses of "Substitutable"
This is one aspect of the case. The other aspect is the following. There are several senses of "could" in which nearly everyone would admit that some actions which were done could have been left undone, and some actions which were left undone could have been done. There are thus several senses of "substitutable" in which it would commonly be admitted that some actions are substitutable. But, although an action which was not substitutable in these senses would not be obligable, it seems doubtful whether an action which was substitutable only in these senses would be obligable. It seems doubtful whether an action would be obligable unless it were substitutable in some further sense.

At this stage two difficulties arise.

It is extremely difficult to grasp and to express clearly this further sense of "substitutable," i.e. this further sense of "could" in which an action that was done could have been left undone or an action which was not done could have been done. Many people would say that they can attach no meaning to "substitutable" except those meanings in which it is insufficient to make an action obligable.
Even if this other meaning of "substitutable" can be grasped and clearly expressed, people would say that no action is substitutable in this sense. They would claim to see that no action which has been done could have been left undone, and that no action which was not done could have been done, in that sense of "could" which is required if an action is to be obligable.
Now anyone who holds these views is in a very awkward position. On the one hand, it is not easy to believe that every judgment of obligation is false, in the sense in which every judgment ascribing colour to an object would be false in a world containing only minds and noises. On the other hand, it is highly depressing to have to admit that there is a sense of "could" which can neither grasp nor clearly express. And it is equally unsatisfactory to to believe that some actions are substitutable in a sense in which it seems self-evident that no action could be substitutable.

There are two problems to be tackled at this point.

To try to discover and state the sense of "substitutable" in which being substitutable is the necessary and sufficient condition of being obligable. And
, if we can do this, to consider whether any action could be substitutable in this sense.
Voluntary Substitutability
Let us begin by considering an action which has actually been performed. In some cases we should say that the agent "could not have helped performing it. We should certainly say this if we had reason to believe that the very same act would have been performed by the agent in these circumstances even though he had willed that it should not take place. It is obvious that there are actions which are "inevitable," in this sense, since there are actions which take place although the agent is trying his hardest to prevent them. Compare, e.g., the case of a conspirator taken with an uncontrollable fit of sneezing.

Next consider a conceivable action which was not in fact performed. In some cases we should say that the agent "could not possibly" have performed it. We should certainly say this if the act would not have taken place in these circumstances no matter how strongly the agent had willed it. It is obvious that there are conceivable acts which are "impossible" in this sense, since there are cases where such an act fails to take place although the agent is trying his hardest to bring it about. Compare, e.g., the case of a man who is bound and gagged, and tries vainly to give warning to a friend.

We will call acts of these two kinds "not voluntarily substitutable." It is plain that an act which is not voluntarily substitutable is not obligable. No one would say that the conspirator ought not to have sneezed, or that the bound and gagged man ought to have warned his friend. At most we may be able to say that they ought or ought not to have done certain things in the past which are relevant to their present situation. Perhaps the conspirator ought to have sprayed his nose with cocaine before hiding behind the presumably dusty arras, and perhaps the victim ought not to have let himself be lured into the house in which he was gagged and bound. But these are previous questions.

We see then that to be voluntarily substitutable is a necessary condition for an action to be obligable. But is it a sufficient condition? Suppose I performed the action A on a certain occasion. Suppose that I should not have done A then if I had willed with a certain degree of force and persistence not to do it. Since I did A, it is certain that I did not will with this degree of force and persistence to avoid doing it. Now suppose that at the time I could not have willed with this degree of force and persistence to avoid doing A. Should we be prepared to say that I ought not to have done A?

Now take another case. Suppose that on a certain occasion I failed to do a certain conceivablenaction B. Suppose that I should have done B if I had willed with a certain degree of force and persistence to do it. Since I did not do B, it is certain that I did not will with this degree of force and persistence to do it. Now suppose that at the time I could not have willed with this degree of force and persistence to do B. Should we be prepared to say that I ought to have done By It seems to me almost certain that, under the supposed conditions, we should not be prepared to say either that I ought not to have done A or that I ought to have done B.

Consider, e.g., the case of a man who gradually becomes addicted to some drug like morphine, and eventually becomes a slave to it. At the early stages we should probably hold that he could have willed with enough force and persistence to ensure that the temptation would be resisted. At the latest stages we should probably hold that he could not have done so. Now at every stage, from the earliest to the latest, the hypothetical proposition would be true: "If he had willed with a certain degree of force and persistence to avoid taking morphine, he would have avoided taking it." Yet we should say at the earlier stages that he ought to have resisted, whilst, at the final stages, we should be inclined to say that "ought" and "ought not" have ceased to apply.

Primary and Secondary Substitutability
An action which was in fact done, but would not have been done if there had been a strong and persistent enough desire in the agent not to do it, will be called "primarily avoidable." Suppose, in addition, that there could have been in the agent at the time a desire of sufficient strength and persistence to prevent the action being done. Then the action might be called "secondarily avoidable." If this latter condition is not fulfilled, we shall say that the action was "primarily avoidable, but secondarily inevitable." Similarly, an action which was not in fact done, but would have been done if there had been in the agent a strong and persistent enough desire to do it, will be called "primarily possible." Suppose, in addition, that there could have been in the agent at the time a desire of sufficient strength and persistence to ensure the action being done. Then the action may be called "secondarily possible." If this latter condition is not fulfilled, we shall say that the action is "primarily possible, but secondarily impossible." An action will be called "primarily substitutable" if it is either primarily avoidable or primarily possible. It will be secondary substitutable if it is either secondarily avoidable or secondarily possible. In order that an action may be obligable it is not enough that it should be primarily substitutable, it must be at least secondarily substitutable.

We are thus led on from the notion of voluntarily substitutable actions to that of substitutable volitions. Suppose that, on a certain occasion and in a certain situation, a certain agent willed a certain alternative with a certain degree of force and persistence. We may say that the volition was substitutable if the same agent, on the same occasion and in the same circumstances, could instead have willed a different alternative or could have willed the same alternative with a different degree of force and persistence. Now there is one sense of "could" in which it might plausibly be suggested that many volitions are substitutable. It seems very likely that there are many occasions on which I should have willed otherwise than I did, if on previous occasions I had willed otherwise than I did. So it seems likely that many volitions have been voluntarily substitutable.

It is necessary to be careful at this point, or we may be inadvertently granting more than we are really prepared to admit. Obviously it is often true that, if I had willed otherwise than I did on certain earlier occasions, I should never have got into the position in which I afterwards made a certain decision. If, e.g., Julius Caesar had decided earlier in his career not to accept the command in Gaul, he would never have been in the situation in which he decided to cross the Rubicon. This, however, does not make his decision to cross the Rubicon substitutable. For a volition is substitutable only if a different volition could have occurred in the agent in the same situation. Again, it is often true that, if I had willed otherwise than I did on certain occasions, my state of knowledge and belief would have been different on certain later occasions from what it in fact was. In that case I should have thought, on these later occasions, of certain alternatives which I did not and could not think of in my actual state of knowledge and belief. Suppose, e.g., that a lawyer has to decide what to do when a friend has met with an accident. If this man had decided years before to study medicine instead of law, it is quite likely that he would now think of, and perhaps choose, an alternative which his lack of medical knowledge prevents him from contemplating. This, however, does not make the lawyer's volition in the actual situation substitutable. For, although the external part of the total situation might have been the same whether he had previously decided to study medicine or to study law, the internal part of the total situation would have been different if he had decided to study medicine, instead of deciding, as he did, to study law. He would have become an agent with different cognitive powers and dispositions from those which he in fact has. No one would think of saying that the lawyer ought to have done a certain action, which he did not and could not contemplate, merely because he would have contemplated it and would have decided to do it if he had decided years before to become a doctor instead of becoming a lawyer.

Having cleared these irrelevances away, we can now come to the real point. A man's present conative-emotional dispositions, and what we may call his "power of intense and persistent willing," are in part dependent on his earlier volitions. If a person has repeatedly chosen the easier of the alternatives open to him, it becomes increasingly difficult for him to choose and to persist in pursuing the harder of two alternatives. If he has formed a habit of turning his attention away from certain kinds of fact, it will become increasingly difficult for him to attend fairly to alternatives which involve facts of these kinds. This is one aspect of the case. Another, and equally important, aspect is the following. If a man reflects on his own past decisions, he may see that he has a tendency to ignore or to dwell upon certain kinds of fact, and that this had led him to make unfair or unwise decisions on many occasions. He may decide that, in future, he will make a special effort to give due, and not more than due, weight to those considerations which he has a tendency to ignore or to dwell upon. And this decision may make a difference to his future decisions. On the other hand, he may see that certain alternatives have a specially strong attraction for him, and he may find that, if he pays more than a fleeting attention to them, he will be rushed into choosing them, and will afterwards regret it. He may decide that, in future, he will think as little as possible about such alternatives. And this decision may make a profound difference to his future decisions.

We can now state the position in general terms. Suppose that, if the agent had willed differently on earlier occasions, his conative-emotional dispositions and his knowledge of his own nature would have been so modified that he would now have willed differently in the actual external situation and in his actual state of knowledge and belief about the alternatives open to him. Then we can say that his actual volition in the present situation was "voluntarily avoidable," and that a volition of a different kind or of a different degree of force and persistence was "voluntarily possible." An action which took place was secondarily avoidable if the following two conditions are fulfilled.

That this action would not have been done if the agent had willed with a certain degree of force and persistence to avoid it.
That, if he had willed differently in the past, his conative-emotional dispositions and his knowledge of his own nature would have been such, at the time when he did the action, that he would have willed to avoid it with enough force and persistence to prevent him doing it.
In a precisely similar way we could define the statement that a certain conceivable action, which was not done, was secondarily possible. And we can thus define the statement that an action is secondarily substitutable.
Can we say that an action is obligable if it is secondarily substitutable in the sense just defined, though it is not obligable if it is only primarily substitutable? It seems to me that the same difficulty which we noticed before reappears here. Suppose that the agent could not have willed otherwise than he did in the remoter past. It is surely irrelevant to say that, if he had done so his conative dispositions would have been different at a later stage from what they in fact were then, and that he would have willed otherwise than he then did. One might, of course, try to deal with this situation by referring back to still earlier volitions. One might, of course, try to deal with this situation by referring back to still earlier volitions. One might talk of actions which are not only primarily, or only secondarily, but are tertiarily substitutable. But it is quite clear that this is useless. If neither primary nor secondary substitutability, in the sense defined, suffice to make an action obligable, no higher order of substitutability, in this sense, will suffice. The further moves are of exactly the same nature as the second move. And so, if the second move does not get us out of the difficulty, none of the further moves will do so.

Categorical Substitutability
The kind of substitutability which we have so far considered may be called "conditional substitutability." For at every stage we have defined "could" to mean "would have been, if certain conditions had been fulfilled which were not." Now I have concluded that merely conditional substitutability, of however high an order, is not a sufficient condition for obligability. If an action is to be obligable, it must be categorically substitutable. We must be able to say of an action, which was done, that it could have been avoided, in some sense of "could" which is not definable in terms of "would have, if." And we must be able to say of a conceivable action, which was not done, that it could have been done, in some sense of "could" which is not definable in terms of "would have, if." Unless there are some actions of which such things can truly be said, there are no actions which are obligable. We must therefore consider whether any clear meaning can be attached to the phrase "categorically substitutable," i.e. whether "could" has any clear meaning except "would have, if." And, if we can find such a meaning, we must enquire whether any actions are categorically substitutable.

Various Senses of "Obligable"
Before tackling these questions I must point out that the words "ought" and "ought not" are used in several different senses. In some of these senses obligability does not entail categorical substitutability.

(i) There is a sense of "ought" in which we apply it even to inanimate objects. It would be quite proper to say: "A car ought to be able to get from London to Cambridge in less than three hours" or: "A fountain-pen ought not to be constantly making blots." We mean by this simply that a car which did take more than three hours would be a poor specimen of car, or would be in a bad state of repair. And similar remarks apply to the statement about the fountain-pen. We are comparing the behaviour of a certain car or fountain-pen with the average standard of achievement of cars or fountain-pens. We are not suggesting that this car or this pen, in its present state of repair, unconditionally could go faster or avoid making blots. Sometimes when we make such judgments we are comparing an individual's achievements, not with those of the average member, but with those of an ideally perfect member, of a certain class to which it belongs. We will call "ought," in this sense, "the comparative ought." And we can then distinguish "the average-comparative ought" and "the ideal-comparative ought."

(ii) Plainly "ought" and "ought not" can be, and often are, used in this sense of human actions. But, in the case of human actions, there is a further development. Since a human being has the power of cognition, in general, and of reflexive cognition, in particular, he can have an idea of an average or an ideal man. He can compare his own achievements with those of the average, or the ideal, man, as conceived by him. And he will have a more or less strong and persistent desire to approximate to the ideal and not to fall below the average. Now it is part of the notion of an ideal man that he is a being who would have a high ideal of human nature and would desire strongly and persistently to approximate to his ideal. Obviously it is no part of the notion of an ideal horse or an ideal car that it is a being which would have a high ideal of horses or cars and a strong and persistent desire to live up to this. When we say that a man ought not to cheat at cards we often mean to assert two things.

That the average decent man does not do this, and that anyone who does falls in this respect below the average. And
that a man who does this either has a very low ideal of human nature or a very weak and unstable desire to approximate to the ideal which he has. So that, in this further respect, he falls below the average.
Now neither of these judgments implies that a particular person, who cheated on a particular occasion, categorically could have avoided cheating then; or that he categorically could have had a higher ideal of human nature; or that he categorically could have willed more strongly and persistently to live up to this ideal which he had. For an action to be obligable, in this sense, it is plain enough that it should be secondarily substitutable, in the sense already defined.

The Categorical Ought
Some philosophers of great eminence, e.g., Spinoza, have held that the sense of "ought" which I have just discussed is the only sense of it. Plainly it is a very important sense, and it is one in which "ought" and "ought not" can be applied only to the actions of intelligent beings with power of reflexive cognition, emotion, and conation. I think that a clear-headed Determinist should hold either that this is the only sense; or that, if there is another sense, in which obligability entails categorical substitutability, it has no application.

Most people, however, would say that, although we often do use "ought" and "ought not" in this sense, we quite often use them in another sense, and that in this other sense they entail categorical substitutability. I am inclined to think that this is true. When I judge that I ought not to have done something which I in fact did, I do not as a rule seem to be judging merely that a person with higher ideals, or with a stronger and more persistent desire to live up to his ideals, would not have done what I did. Even when this is part of what I mean, there seems to be something more implied in my judgment, viz. that I could have had higher ideals or could have willed more strongly and persistently to live up to my ideals, where "could" does not mean just "would have, if." Let us call this sense of "ought" the "categorical ought." It seems to me then that when we must distinguish between an action being obligable in the categorical sense; and that, if any action were categorically obligable, it would have to be categorically substitutable.

Analysis of Categorical Substitutability
We can now proceed to discuss the notion of categorical substitutability It seems to me to involve a negative and a positive condition. I think that the negative condition can be clearly formulated, and that there is no insuperable difficulty in admitting that it may sometimes be fulfilled. The ultimate difficulty is to give any intelligible account of the positive condition. I will now explain and illustrate these statements.

Suppose that, on a certain occasion, I willed a certain alternative with a certain degree of force and persistence, and that, in consequence of this volition, I did a certain voluntary action which I should not have done unless I had willed this alternative with this degree of intensity and persistence. To say that I categorically could have avoided doing this action implies at least that the following negative condition is fulfilled. It implies that the process of my willing this alternative with this degree of force and persistence was not completely determined by the nomic, the occurrent, the dispositional, and the background conditions which existed immediately before and during this process of willing. In order to see exactly what this means it will be best to contrast it with a case in which we believe that a process is completely determined by such conditions.

Suppose that two billiard-balls are moving on a table, that they collide at a certain moment, and that they go on moving in modified directions with modified velocities in consequence of the impact. Let us take as universal premisses the general laws of motion and of elastic impact. We call these "nomic premisses." Let us take as singular premisses the following propositions.

That each ball was moving in such and such a direction and with such and such a velocity at the moment of impact. We call this an "occurrent premiss."
That the masses and co-efficients of elasticity of the balls were such and such. We will call this a "dispositional premiss."
That the table was smooth and level before, at, and after the moment of impact. We will call this a "background premiss."
Lastly, let us take the proposition that the balls are moving, directly after the impact, in such and such directions with such and such velocities. Then this last proposition is a logical consequence of the conjunction of the nomic, the occurrent, the dispositional, and the background premisses. That is to say, the combination of these premisses with the denial of the last proposition would be logically inconsistent. It is so in exactly the sense in which the combination of the premisses of a valid syllogism with the denial of its conclusion would be so.
The Negative Condition
We can now work towards a definition of the statement that a certain event e was completely determined in respect of a certain characteristic. When we have defined this statement it will be easy to define the statement that a certain event was not completely determined in respect of a certain characteristic. I will begin with a concrete example, and will then generalize the result into a definition.

Suppose that a certain flash happened at a certain place and date. This will be a manifestation of a certain determinable characteristic, viz. colour, in a certain perfectly determinate form. It may, e.g., be a red flash of a certain perfectly determinate shade, intensity, and saturation. We may call shade, intensity, and saturation the three "dimensions" of colour, and we shall therefore symbolize the determinable characteristic colour by a three-suffix symbol C123. When we want to symbolize a certain perfectly determinate value of this we shall use the symbol C abc
123.
This means that the shade has the determinate value a, that the intensity has the determinate value b, and that the saturation has the determinate value c. Each index indicates the determinate value which the dimension indicated by the corresponding suffix has in the given instance.

Now the statement that this flash was completely determined in respect of colour has the following meaning. It means that there is a set of true nomic, occurrent, dispositional, and background propositions which together entail the proposition that a manifestation of colour, of the precise shade, intensity, and saturation which this flash manifested, would happen at the place and time at which this flash happened. To say that this flash was not completely determined in respect of colour means that there is no set of nomic, occurrent dispositional, and background propositions which together entail the proposition that a manifestation of colour, of the precise shade, intensity, and saturation which this flash manifested, would happen at the place and time at which this flash happened.

There are two remarks to be made at this point.

It seems to me that the second statement is perfectly intelligible, even if no such statement be ever true.
It is a purely ontological statement, and not in any way a statement about the limitations of our knowledge.
Either there is such a set of true propositions, or there is not. There may be such a set, even if no one knows that there is; and there may be no such set, even if everyone believes that there is.
We can now give a general definition. The statement that a certain event was completely determined in respect of a certain determinable characteristic C123 is equivalent to the conjunction of the following two propositions.

The event e was a manifestation of C123 in a certain perfectly determinate form C abc
123.
at a certain place and date.
There is a set of true nomic, occurrent, dispositional, and background propositions which together entail that a manifestation of C123 in the form C abc
123
would happen at the place and date at which e happened.
The statement that e was not completely determined in respect of C123 is equivalent to the conjoint assertion of (i) and denial of (ii).
The next point to notice is that an event might be partly determined and partly undetermined in respect of a certain characteristic. As before, I will begin with a concrete example. Our flash might be completely determined in respect of shade and saturation, but not in respect of intensity. This would be equivalent to the conjunction of the following two statements.

That there is a set of true propositions, of the kind already mentioned, which together entail that a flash, of precisely the shade and saturation which this flash had, would happen at the place and date at which this flash happened.
There is no such set of true propositions which together entail that a flash, of precisely the intensity which this flash had, would happen at the time and place at which this flash happened.
We thus get the notion of "orders of indetermination" in respect of a given characteristic. If an event is undetermined in respect of one and only one dimension of a certain determinable characteristic, we say that it has "indetermination of the first order" in respect of this characteristic. If it is undetermined in respect of two and only two dimensions of a certain determinable characteristic, we say that it has "indetermination of the second order" in respect of this characteristic. And so on.
It is obvious that there is another possibility to be considered, which I will call "range of indetermination in respect of a given dimension of a given characteristic." Suppose that our flash is undetermined in respect of the intensity of its colour. There may be a set of true propositions, of the kind mentioned, which together entail that a flash, whose intensity falls within certain limits, would happen at the time and place at which this flash happened. This range of indetermination may be wide or narrow. Complete determination in respect of a given characteristic is the limiting case where the range of indetermination shuts up to zero about the actual value of this dimension for this event. Thus the "extent of indetermination" of an event with respect to a given characteristic depends in general upon two factors, viz.

its order of indetermination with respect to the dimensions of this characteristic, and
its range of indetermination with respect to those dimensions for which it is not completely determined.
We can now define the statement that a certain event e was completely determined. It means that e has zero range of indetermination for every dimension of every determinable characteristic of which it is a manifestation. The statement that a certain event e was not completely determined can now be defined. It means that e had a finite range of indetermination for at least one dimension of at least one of the characteristics of which it was a manifestation.

And now at last we can define "Determinism" and "Indeterminism." Determinism is the doctrine that every event is completely determined, in the sense just defined. Indeterminism is the doctrine that some, and it may be all, events are not completely determined, in the sense defined. Both doctrines are, prima facie, intelligible, when defined as I have defined them.

There is one other point to be noticed. An event might be completely determined, and yet it might have a "causal ancestor" which was not completely determined. If Y is the total cause of Z. and X is the total cause of Y. I call both Y and X "causal ancestors" of Z. Similarly, if W were the total cause of X, I should call Y, X, and W "causal ancestors" of Z. And so on. If at any stage in such a series there is a term, e.g. W. which contains a cause-factor that is not completely determined, the series will stop there, just as the series of human ancestors stops with Adam. Such a term may be called the "causal progenitor" of such a series. If Determinism be true, every event has causal ancestors, and therefore are no causal progenitors. If Indeterminism be true, there are causal progenitors in the history of the world.

We can now state the negative condition which must be fulfilled if an action is to be categorically substitutable. Suppose that, at a certain time, an agent deliberated between two alternatives, A and B, and that he actually did A and not B. Suppose that the following conditions are fulfilled.

The doing of A by this agent at this moment was completely determined.
The total cause of A being done contained as cause-factors a desire of a certain strength and persistence for A and a desire of a certain strength and persistence for B.
These two desires were not completely determined in respect of strength and persistence.
The range of indetermination was wide enough to include in it, as possible values, so strong and persistent a desire for B or so weak and fleeting a desire for A as would have determined the doing of B instead of the doing for A.
Conditions (iii) and (iv) are the negative conditions which must be fulfilled if B is to be categorically substitutable for A. They amount to the following statement. It is consistent with
the laws of nature, including those of psychology,
the facts about the agent's dispositions and the dispositions of any other agent in the world at the moment of acting,
the facts about what was happening within and without the agent at that moment, and
the facts about the general background conditions at that moment, that the strength and persistence of the desires mentioned in (ii) should have any value that falls within the range mentioned in (iv).
Before we go further there is one point to be mentioned. Strictly speaking, what I have just stated are the negative conditions for primary categorical substitutability. For I have supposed the incomplete determination to occcur at the first stage backwards, viz. in one of the cause-factors in the total cause of the action A. It would be quite easy to define, in a similar way, the negative conditions for secondary, or tertiary, or any other order of categorical substitutability. All that is needed is that, at some stage in the causal ancestry of A, there shall be a total cause which contains as factors desires of the agent answering to the conditions which I have stated. That is to say, all that is necessary sary is that A shall have a causal ancestor which is a causal progenitor, containing as a factor an incompletely determined desire of the agent's.

We come now to the final question. Supposing that this negative condition were fulfilled, would this suffice to make an action categorically obligable? It seems to me plain that it would not. Unless some further and positive condition were fulfilled, all that one could say would be the following: "The desire to do A happened to be present in me with such strength and persistence, as compared with the desire to do B. that I did A and avoided B. The desire to do B might have happened to be present in me with such strength and persistence, as compared with the desire to do A, that I should have done B and avoided A." Now, if this is all, the fact that I did A and not B is, in the strictest sense, an accident, lucky or unlucky as the case may be. It may be welcomed or it may be deplored, but neither I nor anything else in the universe can properly be praised or blamed for it. It begins to look as if the categorical ought may be inapplicable, though for different reasons, both on the hypothesis that voluntary actions have causal progenitors and on the hypothesis that none of their causal ancestors are causal progenitors.

The Positive Condition
Let us now try to discover the positive conditions of categorical obligability. I think that we should naturally tend to answer the sort of objection which I have just raised in the following way. We should say: "I deliberately identified myself with my desire to do A, or I deliberately threw my weight on the side of that desire. I might instead have made no particular effort in one direction or the other; or I might have identified myself with, and thrown my weight on the side of, my desire to do B. So my desire to do a did not just happen to be present with the requisite strength and persistence, as compared with my desire to do B. It had this degree of strength and persistence because, and only because, I reinforced it by a deliberate effort, which I need not have made at all and which I could have made in favour of my desire to do B." Another way of expressing the same thing would be this: "I forced myself to do A; but I need not have done so, and, if I had not done so, I should have done B." Or again: "I might have forced myself to do B; but I did not, and so I did A."

It is quite plain that these phrases express a genuine positive experience with which we are all perfectly familiar. They are all, of course, metaphorical. It will be noticed that they all attempt to describe the generic fact by metaphors drawn from specific instances of it, e.g. deliberately pressing down one scale of a balance, deliberately joining one side in a tug-of-war, deliberately thrusting a body in a certain direction against obstacles, and so on. In this respect they may be compared with attempts to describe the generic facts about time and change by metaphors drawn from specific instances, such as flowing streams, moving spots of light, and so on. The only use of such metaphors is to direct attention to the sort of fact which one wants one's hearers to contemplate. They give no help towards analysing or comprehending this fact. A metaphor helps us to understand a fact only when it brings out an analogy with a fact of a different kind, which we already understand. When a generic fact can be described only by metaphors drawn from specific instances of itself it is a sign that the fact is unique and peculiar, like the fact of temporal succession and the change of events from futurity, through presentness, to pastness.

Granted that there is this unique and peculiar factor of deliberate effort or reinforcement, how far does the recognition of it help us in our present problem? So far as I can see, it merely takes the problem one step further back. My doing of A is completely determined by a total cause which contains as factors my desire to do A and my desire to do B. each of which has a certain determinate strength and persistence. The preponderance of my desire to do A over my desire to do B. in respect of strength and persistent, is completely determined by a total cause which contains as a factor my putting forth a certain amount of effort to reinforce my desire for A. This effort-factor is not completely determined. It is logically consistent with all the nomic, occurrent, dispositional, and background facts that no effort should have been made, or that it should have been directed towards reinforcing the desire for B instead of the desire for A, or that it should have put forth more or less strongly than it actually was in favour of the desire for A. Surely then we can say no more than that it just happened to occur with a certain degree of intensity in favour of the desire for A.

I think that the safest course at this stage for those who maintain that some actions are categorically obligable would be the following. They should admit quite frankly what I have just stated, and should then say: "However paradoxical it may seem, we do regard ourselves and other people as morally responsible for accidents of this unique kind, and we do not regard them as morally responsible, in the categorical sense, for anything but such acciddents and those consequences of them which would have been different if the accidents had happened differently. Only such accidents, and their causal descendants in the way of volition and action, are categorically obligable." If anyone should take up this position, I should not know how to refute him, though I should be strongly inclined to think him mistaken.

This is not, however, the position which persons who hold that some actions are categorically obligable generally do take at this point. I do not find that they ever state quite clearly what they think they believe, and I suspect that is because, if it were clearly stated, it would be seen to be impossible. I shall therefore try to state clearly what I think such people want to believe, and shall try to show that it is impossible. I suspect that they would quarrel with my statement that, on their view, the fact that one puts forth such and such an effort in support of a certain desire is, in the strictest sense, an accident. They would like to say that the putting forth of a certain amount of effort in a certain direction at a certain time is completely determined, but is determined in a unique and peculiar way. It is literally determined by the agent or self, considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent. If this could be maintained, our puttings-forth of effort would be completely determined, but their causes would neither be events nor contain events as cause-factors. Certain series of events would then originate from causal progenitors which are continuants and not events. Since the first event in such a series would be completely determined, it would not be an accident. And, since the total cause of such an event would not be an event and would not contain an event as a cause-factor, the two alternatives "completely determined" and "partially undetermined" would both be inapplicable to it. For these alternatives apply only to events.

I am fairly sure that this is the kind of proposition which people who profess to believe in Free Will want to believe. I have, of course, stated it with a regrettable crudity, of which they would be incapable. Now it seems to me clear that such a view is impossible. The putting-forth of an effort of a certain intensity, in a certain direction, at a certain moment, for a certain durations is quite clearly an event or process, however unique and peculiar it may be in other respects. It is therefore subject to any conditions which self-evidently apply to every event, as such. Now it is surely quite evident that, if the beginning of a certain process at a certain time is determined at all, its totaI cause must contain as an essential factor another event or process which enters into the moment from which the determined event or process issues. I see no prima facie objection to there being events that are not completely determined. But, in so far as an event is determined, an essential factor in its total cause must be other events. How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any application? And how can the notion of date have any application to anything that is not an event?

Of course I am well aware that we constantly use phrases, describing causal transactions, in which a continuant is named as the cause and no event in that continuant is mentioned. Thus we say: "The stone broke the window," "The cat killed the mouse," and so on. But it is quite evident that all such phrases are elliptical. The first, e.g., expresses what would be more fully expressed by the sentence: "The coming in contact of the moving stone with the window at a certain moment caused a process of disintegration to begin in the window at that moment." Thus the fact that we use and understand such phrases casts no doubt on the general principle which I have just enunciated.

Let us call the kind of causation which I have just described and rejected "non-occurrent causation of events." We will call the ordinary kind of causation, which I had in mind when I defined "Determinism," and "Indeterminism," "occurrent causation."

Now I think we can plausibly suggest what may have made some people think they believe that puttings-forth of effort are events which are determined by non-current causation. It is quite usual to say that a man's putting-forth of effort in a certain direction on a certain occasion was determined by "Reason" or "Principle" or "Conscience" or "The Moral Law." Now these impressive names and phrases certainly do not denote events or even substances. If they denote anything, they stand for propositions or systems of propositions, or for those peculiar universals or systems of universals which Plato called "Ideas." If it were literally true that puttings-forth of effort are determined by such entities, we should have causation of events in time by timeless causes. But, of course, statements like "Smith's putting-forth of effort in a certain direction on a certain occasion was determined by the Moral Law" cannot be taken literally. The Moral Law, as such, has no causal efficacy. What is meant is that Smith's belief that a certain alternative would be in accordance with the Moral Law, and his desire to do what is right, were cause-factors in the total cause which determined his putting-forth of effort on the side of that alternative- Now this belief was an event, which happened when he began to reflect on the alternatives and to consider them in the light of the moral principles which he accepts and regards as relevant. And this desire was an event, which happened when his conative-emotional moral dispositions were stirred by the process of reflecting on the alternatives. Thus the use of phrases about action being "determined by the Moral Law" may have made some people think they believe that some events are determined by non-occurrent causation. But our analysis of the meaning of such phrases shows that the facts which they express give no logical support to this belief.

Libertarianism
We are now in a position to define what I will call "Libertarianism." This doctrine may be summed up in two propositions.

Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation.
In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause. Thus, Libertarianism, as defined by me, entails Indeterminism, as defined by me; but the converse does not hold.
If I am right, Libertarianism is self-evidently impossible, whilst Indeterminism is prima facie possible. Hence, if categorical obligability entails Libertarianism, it is certain that no action can be categorically obligable. But if categorical obligability entails only Indeterminism it is prima facie possible that some actions are categorically obligable. Unfortunately, it seems almost certain that categorical obligability entails more than Indeterminism, and it seems very likely that it entails Libertarianism. It is therefore highly probable that the notion of categorical obligability is a delusive notion, which neither has nor can have any application.

Determinism/Indeterminism
Alberto Strumia
I. Determinism and Indeterminism in Philosophical Thought. 1. Definition. 2. Determinism and Liberty. - II. Determinism and Indeterminism in the Sciences. 1. Mechanistic Determinism. 2. Statistical Indeterminism. 3. Quantum Uncertainty. 4. Determinism and Indeterminism in Non-Linear Systems. Deterministic Chaos. - III. Chance and Finality. 1. Absence of a Direct Cause. 2. Absence of a Finality. 3. God and Chance.

I. Determinism and Indeterminism in Philosophical Thought
1. Definition. "Determinism" is commonly understood as the thesis that «the laws which govern the universe (or a subsystem), together with the appropriate initial conditions, uniquely determine the entire time evolution of the universe (or subsystem)». "Indeterminism" is the negation of this thesis.

Only recently has this term entered common usage It dates back to 1927, in the same period in which the "uncertainty principle" was discovered by Heisenberg (1901-1976) and has been used throughout the 20th century by physicists and scientists. However, philosophical problems lie hidden in the term which, being of a philosophical nature, are much older and far-reaching than the current question as to the interpretation of quantum mechanics and physical theories: it involves the classical problems of necessity and contingency, of being and becoming, and of causality. As early as the 4th century B.C., Aristotle observed that «chance as well and spontaneity are reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be and to become as a result of chance and spontaneity» (Aristotle, Physics , II, 4, 195b). Moreover, «we observe that some things always happen in the same way, and others, for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the "effect of chance" be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part. But as there is a third class of events besides these two-events which all say are "by chance" - it is plain that there is such a thing as chance and spontaneity; for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind» (Aristotle, Physics , II, 5, 196b). After Aristotle, this problem continued to be one of the central themes of the history of philosophy and can be found in the works of practically every author. For a correct understanding of the relationship between determinism and indeterminism, it is therefore necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary approach which formulates and relates the relevant terms in question from the scientific, philosophical, and theological point of view.

2. Determinism and Liberty. In their quest for knowledge, from antiquity to the present era, human beings have taken two different paths of inquiry: a) one involves knowledge "external to the individual" (the world, nature, the cosmos). b) the other involves knowledge within the individual (thought, emotions, perception of freedom, self-consciousness, etc.).

Often, the first path to knowledge is called the "cosmological approach" and the second is known as the "anthropological approach". One may consider the problem of which path comes first and which really leads to the origin of knowledge. That is, one can study the question whether knowledge originates from sensible experience of the external world ( nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu , as the the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition holds), and only later, does the "self" have an internal experience of itself through the process of reflection; or, alternatively, knowledge originates from innate ideas (Plato, Descartes), from intuition (Bergson), or from divine illumination (Augustine, Bonaventure). Yet aside from the philosophical question as to which path is first and which is really related to the origin of knowledge, there remains the problem of the necessity and contingency of beings and events, of the chain of causes in the world external to us; a problem which has always involved that of the interior reality of human liberty. If a univocal (determined ad unum ) effect follows necessarily from every cause, then the free choice of the will would be impossible because everything, including the choices one makes, would be already determined. And yet we experience our own free-will. This problem has appeared in the history of thought and involves explaining the internal perception of liberty in a way which is compatible with a correct philosophical and scientific description of the external world.

The result of this intellectual effort has been manifold. Some thinkers have preferred to deny the existence of liberty in favor of another datum of experience. This preference is most congenial to the rationalists. For example, Spinoza (1631-1677) went against the evidence of internal experience by declaring free will to be a pure illusion. Others have denied the causal relation between events ("principle of causality") and have maintained that cause-effect relations are none other than a simple operation performed by the human mind by habit, rather than a law written in the nature of things. This is the vision most congenial to the empiricists such as David Hume (1711-1776). Other authors have sought a way to understand the coexistence of liberty and causality in order to be consistent with what is given through experience, without maintaining either of the two facts of experience, namely the existence of liberty and that of a causal order, be mere appearance. They however acknowledge that both liberty and causality have a full metaphysical meaning. This approach has brought with it an element of "chance" in addition to the notion of "cause". One can think of the clinamen of Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) defined as a sort of random and unpredictable deviation of atoms, entities already postulated by Democritus (460-460 B.C.), from their causally determined trajectories.

Several contemporary thinkers having a scientific background have proposed to found the possibility of free-will on the "uncertainty principle" of quantum mechanics. This type of approach turns out to be too simplistic. It is a kind of ontological transposition of a physical theory, since it reduces the metaphysical horizon to the horizon of "quantity" (even if understood in a very wide sense, as in the Aristotelian definition of quantity, which recalls the definition in modern topology) and of "relation", both being categories which constitute the basis of the quantitative sciences. In this perspective, the notion of causality turns out to be too restrictive, and univocally reduced to the simple "mechanical" (or at most "physical") interaction of the four fundamental forces known today. This radical metaphysical interpretation of a physical principle could be viewed as the flip side of determinism. In fact, such an interpretation would not be qualitatively different from determinism with its "univocal" conception of cause.

Several consequences follow from this way of framing the problem, consequences which are paradoxical from both the anthropological and theological point of view. The first consequence is that the "free" choice of will would turn out to be intrinsic to the behavior of the fundamental components of inanimate matter ( quarks, elementary particles), which is identical to the matter in the human body. It would then follow that the electrons freely choose one among all the permitted states known to us on the basis of a probability theory, just as a man chooses freely from several possibilities placed before him. The second consequence is that «we would have to conclude that this inherent unpredictability also represents a limitation of the knowledge even an omniscient God could have» (A. Peacocke, God's Interaction with the World: The Implications of Deterministic Chaos and of Interconnected and Independent Complexity , in R. Russell et al., 1995, p. 279). This would be equivalent to stating that God could not know what traditional philosophy calls "future contingents". In the case in question, the future contingent is the evolution of the single particles which quantum mechanics cannot predict: «this limit on total predictability applies to God as well as to ourselves [...]. God, of course, knows maximally what is possible to know, namely the probabilities of the outcomes of these situations, the various possible trajectories of such systems» ( ibidem , p. 281).

One may recall that as early as the Middle Ages, philosophers asked whether the divine intellect can know singulars, and in particular, singulars which are also future contingents. Different objections arose from various arguments. For example, some argued that singulars, knowable only in their material determination, were not suitable for a spiritual intellect; or, also, that it is possible that they do not exist and are therefore contingent; that they depend in turn on a free will other than the divine will; that there number is practically infinite, etc. Thomas Aquinas would confront this theme in a more direct way showing that God knows singulars, infinite things, and future contingents (cf. Summa Contra Gentiles , I, cc. 65-69).

Such paradoxes can be removed at the root, as we shall see later, if one makes recourse to the "analogic" conception of causality, thereby overcoming the completely univocal conception in mechanics ( ANALOGY). It seems that the necessary physical basis of intellectual and voluntary activity is to be found not in the context of deterministic and indeterministic processes but rather in the complexity of organization of a highly evolved living being and its brain. In this sense, the Aristotelian-Thomistic vision and recent research on the subject of complexity and on the mind-body relationship seem to agree (cf. Basti, 1991).

In the vision of Aristotle -and later of Thomas Aquinas who continued and developed Aristotle's philosophy- the question of causality is approached using the classical theory of the four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. In order to let the theory of four causes be understood in a non-equivocal way (recalling that modern language uses words differently from the way they were used in their original context), we have to keep in mind other two metaphysical theories it presupposes, namely, the "hylemorphic" theory and the theory of "potency-act" ( MATTER, II; METAPHYSICS, I). We review briefly their essential features. a) The "material cause" is that which furnishes the constitutive basis of a material object, making it possible to be what it is with certain properties and not others, that is to receive a certain "form" (in the Aristotelian sense of the term); b) the "formal cause" is that which makes an object to receive a "form", i.e., the "nature" which characterizes it with its properties, and not another; it is that which makes it this object, and not something else; c) the "efficient cause" causes a physical object which is now characterized by a certain form and/or accidental characteristics to assume another form or other accidental characters (quantitative, qualitative, of position, etc.) and is therefore responsible for change and local motion (which is a type of change), and so on; d) the "final cause" lies in the final state reached at the end of a change. In this perspective, the final cause is the most important, since all other causes in some way depend on it. The final state to be reached determines the material constitution of an object and its essential characteristics (form). Moreover, it requires an adequate efficient cause to produce a change from a certain initial state to the final state.

With a similar conception of causality, the cause-effect relationship cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical, electromagnetic, or physical (in the modern sense) interaction. In the strong (metaphysical) sense, cause is rather that which causes a thing "to be" and causes it to be in a certain way, and not simply that which "moves" it locally. Causality is therefore conceived in an "analogic" sense. God, as First Cause ( GOD, I.3) can have among his effects the human being, or a being endowed with "free" will who is not univocally determined (cf. Summa Theologiae , I. q. 83, a . 1, ad 3um ; De Veritate , q. 24, a . 1, ad 3um ). In other words, according to an analogic, and therefore non-mechanistic, conception, there is room for (and the necessity of) a cause whose effects can be free acts of the will of a rational subject, like the human being, acts which God can know singularly and to which he confers being, so making possible any free human choice.

Now we need also understand the way in which free will can act when it uses matter, which is governed by physical laws. This kind of investigation, which directly involves psychology, cognitive science, physiology, and biology, is still to develop. It seems today that an interesting angle to approach this subject is through the sciences of complexity, since they aim to overcome reductionism, to understand scientific reason in a new fashion, and open it to the concept of analogy.

As John Polkinghorne has observed, «the causality which physics most readily describes is a bottom-up causality, generated by the energetic interaction of the constituent parts of a system. The experience of human agency seems totally different. It is the action of the whole person and so it would seem most appropriately to be described by a top-down causality, the influence of the whole bringing about coherent activity of the parts. May not similar forms of top-down causality be found elsewhere, including God's causal influence on the whole of creation?» ( The Metaphysics of Divine Action , in R. Russell et al., 1995, p. 151).

II. Determinism and Indeterminism in the Sciences
In the context of the sciences, and especially in the physical and biological sciences, the question of determinism/indeterminism has been presented historically, in different ways, in the area of classical mechanics (and more generally in physics) and in that of quantum mechanics.

1. Mechanistic Determinism. It is known that "classical mechanics" - that is, Newtonian together with Einsteinian (relativistic) mechanics ( RELATIVITY, THEORY OF) - predicts, on the basis of its laws, the possibility of determining in an exact way in every instant of time, future, or past, the position and the velocity of a particle, conceived as a material point, as long as one knows the force law acting on the point and the initial conditions, that is, the position and velocity of the particle in a particular instant of time. In this way, we are saying that classical mechanics is "deterministic". In this regard, one recalls Laplace's claim that it is in principle possible to know the future of the universe, as well as its past, if one knows the forces, the positions, and the velocities of all the particles of the universe in a certain instant of time. Then there only remains the technical difficulty that, in practice, the positions and velocities of all the particles of the universe cannot be known. And even if one did know this information, one would not be able to perform the great number of calculations needed to model the evolution of the universe.

2. Statistical Indeterminism. This final difficulty is already encountered when one seeks to control the behavior of molecules moving in a container of liquid or gas. What one can do, in this case, is to approach the problem statistically, that is, one can study the "average behavior" of the particles of the system. "Statistical mechanics" is the tool with which one can give exact information about the "probability" that a particle is found in a certain region and with a velocity in a certain range. Thus, in the context of a deterministic classical mechanics, a certain "uncertainty" arises in the knowledge of the positions and velocities of the single particles, an uncertainty of statistical nature due to the practical impossibility of a complete investigation and calculation. In this case, one speaks of "statistical indeterminism". What we succeed in determining, is only the probability that a particle is found in a certain region or has a certain velocity in a certain range. The uncertainty emerges on the macroscopic level, whereas on the microscopic it is absent. In other words, there is a deterministic mechanics underlying the statistical uncertainty. It must be made clear that this type of uncertainty is not inherent in the laws of classical mechanics, which are deterministic, but stems from the intrinsic limits that define what the observer can know. One could speak of a "subjective" uncertainty rather than an "objective" uncertainty.

3. Quantum Uncertainty . The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics ( QUANTUM MECHANICS, IV.1) states that uncertainty is not due to the practical impossibility of accessing all the information necessary to predict exactly the motion of the particles, but that uncertainty is a "law of nature", that is, it is a "theoretical" impossibility to be found precisely at the microscopic level of the system. According to this interpretation, quantum mechanics is not statistical - contrary to what Einstein and the supporters of the "hidden-variable" theories hold. Uncertainty does not stem from ignorance, but from a theoretical impossibility. In this case, we have a kind of "indeterministic mechanics" at the basis of an uncertainty which is of non-statistical nature.

As Schrödinger observed in one of his essays in 1932, there was an attempt in the beginning to overcome "practical" determinism and only later did we came to admit that such determinism was only theoretical. The opinion previously held was: if we knew exactly the initial velocity and position of every molecule, and we had the time to keep track of all the collisions, it would be possible to predict exactly every thing that happens. Only the practical impossibility: a) of determining exactly the initial conditions of the molecules, and b) of keeping track of all single molecular events, has led to the introduction of "average laws", which were deemed satisfactory because they involved quantities which can really be observed with the senses, and because such laws do not have enough precision to allow us to make sufficiently certain predictions. Therefore, it was thought that phenomena were determined in a strictly causal way, as if the atoms and molecules were considered individually. This formed the foundation of statistical laws, which are the only ones accessible to experience. As pointed out by Schrödinger, the majority of physicists held that a strictly deterministic theoretical framework was indispensable for the description of the physical world. They were convinced that an indeterministic universe was not even "conceivable". They admitted that, at least in an elementary process such as the collision of two atoms, the "final result" is implicitly contained with complete certainty and full precision in the initial conditions. It used to be said in the past, and still is sometimes even today, that an exact natural science is not possible if based on premises other than these; and that without a strictly deterministic premise, science would be completely inconsistent. Our "image" of nature would degenerate into chaos and would therefore not correspond to a vision in which nature actually "exists", since, when all is said and done, nature is not complete chaos. All of this is undoubtedly "false". It is without doubt permitted to modify the picture in the kinetic theory of gases of what happens in nature: one may think that in the collision of two molecules, the trajectory is not determined by the "known laws of collisions", but by an appropriate "role of dice"(cf. Schrödinger, 1932).

It must however be made clear that in quantum mechanics there are still deterministic features, and that the wave function y evolves deterministically in time according to Schrödinger's equation. However, its physical meaning is indeterministic, since it contains none other than the probabilities of finding a system in a certain state, at least according to the Copenhagen interpretation.

Max Born's observation that one should not equate "causality" with "determinism", as in the mechanistic viewpoint, is still worthy of consideration. According to Max Born, it is not causality properly speaking that has to be eliminated, but only its traditional interpretation which equates it with determinism. He emphasizes that «the statement, frequently made, that modern physics has given up causality is entirely unfounded. Modern physics, it is true, has given up or modified many traditional ideas; but it would cease to be a science if it had given up the search for the causes of phenomena» (M. Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance , Dover, New York 1964, pp. 3-4).

4. Determinism and Indeterminism in Non-Linear systems. Deterministic Chaos. A third situation in which uncertainty appears was already noted by Poincaré in 1890 in the field of "classical non-linear mechanics". However, it was set aside for a long while because of the "quantum mechanics boom", which supplanted classical mechanics, since the latter proved inadequate to explain the microscopic world. Only in the 1960s did were these studies resumed, which enjoyed a wide diffusion in the scientific and later popular literature.

It has been noted that the majority of differential equations that describe mechanical systems, even relatively simple ones, are "non-linear" equations, that is, equations in which the sum of two solutions is not a solution. For this class of equations, and in the majority of cases, the solutions are "unstable". This means that even a slight deviation in the initial conditions from the theoretically desired ones can lead, after a certain time, to an exponentially growing deviation from the theoretically predicted trajectory. Since we cannot know the initial conditions with infinite precision, we are unable to make reliable long-term predictions. In this situation, in the vicinity of the so-called "strange attractors", a dynamical behavior now known "deterministic chaos", comes to appear (cf. Gleick, 1989; Devaney, 1990). Only a minority of physical systems are stable, and therefore not chaotic. In these systems, the error in the initial conditions is bounded. In the presence of dissipation, the error even disappears while time increases, and the actual trajectory tends asymptotically to the theoretical one.

In the past we did not realize that solutions could be highly sensitive to the initial conditions because we had not yet discovered how to treat non-linear differential equations in a general fashion (cf. F.T. and I. Arecchi, 1990, pp. 23-24).

In this case, a mechanical theory governed by "deterministic" laws provides a "non-statistical uncertainty" (since it appears even in the presence of a single particle and does not require a great number of objects). Such uncertainty is a result of the high sensitivity to changes in the initial conditions. The uncertainty here is related to the intrinsic limits of a mathematical tool, such as the non-linear equations involved, and not a physical law, which would be the case for a law such as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Mathematics, in this case, proves to be limited in making physical predictions because it is not possible to know, either experimentally or theoretically, the initial conditions of the motion of a physical system with infinite precision. We have here an example in which nature cannot be completely described with a mathematical approach (unpredictability).

This situation gives rise to various questions in modern science. The first of these concerns the adequacy of mathematical theories to describe the natural world. A simple mechanical system consisting of three bodies is already mathematically unpredictable, and biological systems, having complex self-organizing structures, all the more ( COMPLEXITY, II, IV). All of this seems to lead to one of the two following conclusions: either a) one should "widen" the scope and the methods of mathematical theories so that they can be applied to these new aspects of nature; or, b) one should adopt a scientific mind-set in which a mathematical description is not absolutely essential or exhaustive, while at the same time keeping a logical-demonstrative methodology. The first of the two alternatives has been adopted by various researchers in the field of mathematics and logic (cf. De Giorgi et al., 1995; Basti and Perrone, 1996) and developed along the lines of a modern formulation of the theory of analogy. The second alternative has been considered in biology, and to a certain extent, in chemistry.

III. Chance and Finality
What is chance? In scientific, philosophical, and common language, the term "chance" is used in opposition to the term "causal".

Following a known Thomistic classification, we call "random" ("by chance") any event which a) does not appear to have a controllable "direct cause" ( per se ) and, as such, is unpredictable; b) appears without any goal or finality (cf. In I Sent. d. 39, q. 2, a . 2, ad 2um ). We will look briefly at these two characteristics and later add some observations concerning the metaphysical and theological aspects of the problem.

1. Absence of a Direct Cause. A truly random event consists of two independent and accidentally concomitant events in which each event is the effect of a proper direct cause without there being a direct cause of the concomitance itself of the two events. To use a common everyday example, the fact that two friends meet in a square and take different streets, without arranging an appointment beforehand is "random" (cf. Aristotle, Physics , II, 4, 196a). Certainly, there is a cause to the fact that each of the two left home and proceeded to the square at that moment, but there is no direct cause of their meeting each other. One could say, at least, that there is no cause on the "same level" as that of leaving home: there could have been, for example, a third person who called them up independently to go to the square so that the two friend would meet as a surprise... In this case, we are dealing with a "second-level" cause which makes use of the "first-level" causes (which are, in this case, the free decision of each of the two friends to go out into the square).

In the course of the history of science, two situations which systematically appear before the researcher have been experimentally observed: the first consists in the constant association of two phenomena in which if one occurs, the other always occurs (and not vice-versa) whereby one recognizes the first as the "cause" of the other; the second consists in the existence of two phenomena which seem to occur together without any clear direct cause linking them. The latter are considered "random". If in the sciences it appears that determinism is closely related to a causal description of observed phenomena, uncertainty in its various forms always introduces an uncontrollable element whose origin is considered by the scientist to be random. However, explaining randomness as a manifestation of the limits on what the observer can practically know is quite different from saying that, theoretically, the reason for randomness depends on the nature of things. Philosophically speaking, "randomness", in the strong sense of the word, is only that which could derive from a reason of the theoretical kind and not from our ignorance.

2. Absence of a Finality. The absence of a direct cause in the random event is related to the fact that the event has no finality: what happens by chance is, by definition, "aimless".

The problem of the relationship between causality, chance, and finality has played an important role in contemporary debates on scientific method, such as, for example, the discussion found in the book of J. Monod, Chance and Necessity (1970): yet finality, which is systematically excluded from the physical sciences, has emerged in many cases as an adequate explanatory principle. For example, in the field of cosmology, it appears in the debate over the Anthropic Principle. In biology, it appears in the concept of "teleonomy", which overturns the notion of "initial conditions", typical of physics, replacing it with that of "final conditions". Such final conditions must be realized by a system according to a predetermined "program", as in biology happens considering the DNA genetic code (cf. Cini, 1994, p. 236).

The possibility of interchange between initial and final conditions has always been present, in principle, also in classical mechanics because the theory of differential equations does not specify the time in which such conditions are imposed. However, in a dissipative system with a stable attractor, the symmetry between initial and final conditions is broken in favor of the final conditions. In this case, whatever the initial conditions may be, as long as they start from some inside the basin of attraction, the evolution of the system tends to stabilize asymptotically into the attractor, which turns out to be the final state of the system. The most familiar example is given by the pendulum moving in a medium with friction, which tends towards the position of stable equilibrium regardless of its initial position and velocity; another example is that of the driven LCR circuit, which after a certain time reaches a stable solution after the energy associated with the "transient solution" is dissipated.

3. God and Chance. In the metaphysical-theological perspective, problems related to determinism and indeterminism - as well as the question of free will alluded to earlier (see above, I.2) - lead to questions regarding the modes of divine action within the world. How may God or, in properly theological language, Divine Providence ( CREATION, IV.3), act on the world, if we admit "random" events, that is, events without a finality, having no direct ( per se ) causes, and not simply events whose finality we do not know?

If one does not admit the analogy of causality, that is, the existence of levels and differentiated modes according to which causality can and must operate and be understood, and if one, instead, supposes that the only possible mode of causality is the physical-mechanical mode, then one is led to attribute to "chance" the same character as an efficient cause from which random events should spring. Since chance has no direct cause in the physical-mechanical sense, then it would assume, in substance, the role of the "first cause", and then everything would spring from chance. This position can be found, for instance, in Jacques Monod, who states that «chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution» ( Chance and Necessity , Collins, London, 1972, p. 110). But this is contradictory, because of the very definition of "chance". In fact such a definition assumes the existence of other (indirect) causes which precede chance and whose effects are accidentally concomitant. Therefore, chance cannot take the place of the first cause since it requires the existence of previous causes in order that their effects may be accidentally concomitant; then it results that chance needs the existence of first cause, instead of eliminating it.

An intermediate solution, which is certainly interesting, was proposed by Arthur Peacocke. Opposing Monod's thesis, he acknowledges the existence of causality, and therefore of a first cause, but requires that the first cause be "self-limiting" so as to leave room for chance. The causal action of God differs from the purely physical action because it is "informative", just as an immaterial action which interacts with the world as a whole and lets the laws of complexity govern the single events. God, acting as an "informer" over the "world as a whole", does not have anything to do with singular events, and therefore cannot know the "future contingents" determined by the complexity of physical and biological systems (cf. God's Interaction with the World: The Implications of Deterministic Chaos and of Interconnected and Independent Complexity , in Russell et al., 1995).

This approach, which draws its inspiration from complex systems and information theory, succeeds in introducing a certain diversification in the modes of causality ("physical" action and "informative" action), but seems to have the same limitation of conceiving divine causality and chance as if they were two competitors who need to divide the field of action. Such a conception does not use the analogy of divine causality, which would allow chance to play a role without diminishing the role of the first cause. But even in this perspective, the contradiction is not resolved: in fact, according to its very definition, chance subsists only if there are causes which precede it, producing, randomly, concomitant effects. It is hard to understand how a single random event can exist independently of the "first cause".

The fact that certain concomitances happen by chance, that is, without a "direct" or "second cause", to use a philosophical term, does not mean that they do not have a cause in the absolute sense, even if considered separately: it is necessary to keep in mind the hierarchy of levels of causality. Metaphysically speaking, all that exists is caused and maintained in its being by the first cause (God), who is also the final end of all things. And the "first cause" acts through a chain of "second causes", up to those causes which are nearest to the single object under observation and act directly upon it. Thus, even events which are random due to their lack of a direct cause, have a cause on a higher level in the chain of causes. And this is where the divine action lies, which even through the happening of random events orients all things to the final end ( AUTONOMY II; CREATION, IV). Thomas Aquinas has adequately treated the problem of the relationship of chance to the existence of Divine Providence. He showed that Providence does not exclude contingency and does not deprive things of fortune and chance. Providence extends over to singular contingents and can, in principle, act either directly or through second causes (cf. Summa Contra Gentiles , book III, chps. 72-77). An interesting way of summarizing the relationship between chance and God was proposed by D. Bartholomew, whose approach is closer to that of St. Thomas. Speaking of "God of chance", he maintains that chance is a deliberate, if not necessary, part of God's creation.

Chance is not something which escapes God's control, nor something which opposes Him or contains within itself its final explanation: «If chance cannot be explained, the life of individuals would be submerged in disorder. On the other hand, if one admits that there can be a universal Cause of the world, this Cause must be responsible for everything that exists, including chance. "And thus it turns out that everything that happens, if referred to the First Divine Cause, is ordered and does not exist accidentally, even if some can be called " per accidens " in their relation to other causes (Thomas Aquinas, In VI Metaph. , lect. 3)» (Sanguineti, 1986, p. 239). We may observe, finally, that the same idea is found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, expressed in a more theological language: «God is the sovereign master of his plan. But to carry it out he also makes use of his creatures' cooperation. This use is not a sign of weakness, but rather a token of almighty God's greatness and goodness. For God grants his creatures not only their existence, but also the dignity of acting on their own, of being causes and principles for each other, and thus of cooperating in the accomplishment of his plan» (CCC 306).

Alberto Strumia
(translated by Eric Chang)

See also: BIOLOGY; COMPLEXITY; FINALISM; LAWS OF NATURE; MATTER; MECHANICS; QUANTUM MECHANICS.

Bibliography:

E. SCHRÖDINGER, Über indeterminismus in der Physik. Ist die Naturwissechaft milieubedingt? , Barth, Leipzig 1932;M. PLANCK, The New Science: Where is Science going? The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics; The Philosophy of Physics, Meridian Books , New York 1959; W. HEISENBERG , Physics and Philosophy. The Revolution in Modern Science , Allen & Unwin, London 1959; E. NAGEL , The structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation , Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961; M. BORN , Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance , Dover, New York 1964; E. SCHRÖDINGER , My View of the World (1931), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1964; J. MONOD , Chance and Necessity , Collins, London 1972; A.R. PEACOCKE, Science and Christian Experiment , Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford 1971; IDEM , Creation and the World of Science , Clarendon, Oxford 1979; D. BARTHOLOMEW, God of Chance , SCM, London 1984; J.J. SANGUINETI, La filosofia del cosmo in Tommaso d'Aquino , Ares, Milano 1986; J. GLEICK , Chaos. Making a New Science , Viking, New York 1987; M. ARTIGAS e J.J. SANGUINETI, Filosofía de la naturaleza , EUNSA, Pamplona 1989; F. SELLERI, Quantum Paradoxes and Physical Reality , Kluwer AcademicDordrecht - London 1990; T. e I. ARECCHI , I simboli e la realtà , Jaca Book, Milano 1990; R.L. DEVANEY , Chaos, Fractals, and Dynamics. Computer Experiments in Mathematics , Addison-Wesley, Menlo Park (CA) 1990; G. BASTI, Il rapporto mente-corpo nella filosofia e nella scienza , Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1991; A. STRUMIA, Introduzione alle filosofia delle scienze , Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna 1992; D. RUELLE, Chance and Chaos , Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ) 1993; M. CINI, Un paradiso perduto. Dall'universo delle leggi naturali al mondo dei processi evolutivi, Feltrinelli, Milano 1994; R. RUSSELL, N. MURPHY, A. PEACOCKE (eds.), Chaos and Complexity. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action , LEV and Center for Theology and The Natural Sciences, Città del Vaticano - Berkeley 1995; E. DE GIORGI, M. FORTI, G. LENZI e V.M. TORTORELLI, Calcolo dei predicati e concetti metateorici in una teoria base dei Fondamenti della Matematica , "Atti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rend. mat.", s. 9, 6 (1995); G. BASTI e A.L. PERRONE, Le radici forti del pensiero debole , Il Poligrafo - Pontifica Università Lateranense, Padova 1996; M. BITBOL , Schrödinger's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics , Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht - London 1996; F. BERTELÈ, A. OLMI, A. SALUCCI, A. STRUMIA, Scienza, analogia, astrazione. Tommaso d'Aquino e le scienze della complessità , Il Poligrafo, Padova 1999.

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2010-07-12T07:51:00.000-03:00

China: Proposal to use more Mandarin in TV provokes Guangzhou citizens

Written by
Andy
Languages Chinese, English

A recent proposal to use Mandarin instead of Cantonese in the TV news programs of Guangzhou, the capital city of China’s Guangdong province, has been strongly opposed by local residents. The proposal, brought up at the city committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on July 5, advised Guangzhou TV to use Mandarin more in its news programs or launch a new Mandarin channel. Ji Keguang, a member of the committee, said the proposal is to help visitors who cannot understand Cantonese during the Asian Games, which will be held in Guangzhou from November 12 to 27.

An online survey on the committee’s website, which attracted over 30,000 respondents among whom two-thirds were Guangzhou natives, showed that 80% opposed the proposal. Many opponents worry that the move would threaten Cantonese and related local cultures. Since 1988, local TV stations in Guangzhou are allowed to broadcast in Cantonese in order to compete with TV programs from Hong Kong, which uses Cantonese predominately. While programs in other parts of China have to be broadcasted in Mandarin, this ‘special right’ enjoyed by Guangzhou has strengthened its local identity, as BBC journalist Shen Ping comments.

An editorial in Nanfang Daily, a broadsheet based in Guangzhou, emphasizes the importance of Cantonese as a cultural heritage:

在反对政协建议的过程中，粤语被当作文化保护的对象加以强调。这是正解，应该被理解。况且，粤语不仅是文化，还是广州居民的生活本身，有资格在最通俗的大众媒体——— 电视上占据与之相称的重要地位。假若把粤语从主屏幕上排斥出去，这绝非淘汰语种那么简单，实质是剥除广州人共有、共享的生活方式。如果尊重广州，敬重广式生活，就不该轻率对粤语节目动刑。

While opposing to the committee’s proposal, we should emphasize the protection of Cantonese as a cultural heritage. This should be understood. Moreover, Cantonese is not only cultural, but also a part of local residents’ daily life. Cantonese should therefore play an important role in TV, the most important channel of mass media. Excluding Cantonese from TV programs is not only eliminating a local dialect; it is also stripping Guangzhou citizens of their common way of life. If we respect Guangzhou and its way of life, we should not make the move rashly.
粤语和普语并非天然冲突，两者目前的共存关系历经时间锤炼，是广州文化、民间社会、政府举动、大众意志相互磨合、融通的结果。广州电视台粤语和普语的节目比例，既有赖于媒体的专业操作，也可看作是此种融洽的表现，不应轻易改变。事实上，无论是新移民融入广州，还是广州宣介自身的魅力，粤语从来都不是普通话的敌人。人为制造粤语和普语的对立，恐怕只会两败俱伤。

Cantonese and Mandarin are not natural enemies. Their co-existence is the result of a long period of interactions between local cultures, civil society, government actions and public will. The current ratio between Mandarin and Cantonese broadcast is not only based on operations by the media profession, but also the result of the above-mentioned interactions, and should not be changed easily. In various situations, such as the influx of migrants into Guangzhou, or Guangzhou publicizing its own charm, Cantonese is never Mandarin’s enemy. Artificially creating this opposition would only hurt both sides.
广州声名在外，为人称颂的是其活泼的市民社会，是自由、包容的公共生活，以及它一脉相承、完整保存的岭南文化。不夸张地讲，粤语是广州的历史和现实，是特征也是灵魂。在遏制粤语的情况下，很难想象广州还可以夸耀自己。而丢掉语言和灵魂的广州也走不出去，更不用说走远。驱除不必要的干扰，粤语广州与普语广州和谐相处，不用担心迷失方向。

Guangzhou is reputed for its lively, liberal and inclusive public life. It is also known for its wholly preserved Lingnan culture. We should not underestimate the role of Cantonese as the characteristic and soul of Guangzhou’s history and reality. It is difficult to imagine how Guangzhou can still be proud of itself when Cantonese is being suppressed. Guangzhou cannot get far if it abandons its soul and language. We should get rid of unnecessary interferences, and have confidence that Cantonese and Mandarin can co-exist in Guangzhou.
Many famous media professionals from Guangdong have also expressed worries about the decline of Cantonese. For example,

Chen Yang, media professional:

广州TV将出现天坑！被消失的方言后面必定是被弱势化的文化。

A hole will soon appear at Guangzhou TV! Behind every suppressed dialect lies a marginalized culture.
Wang Yan, news anchor at Guangdong TV:

一种语言代表一种文化，是广州人都要撑粤语。

A dialect represents a culture. Every Guangzhou citizen should defend Cantonese.
Commentators from other parts of China, however, argue that Guangzhou citizens have over-exaggerated the matter. To them, the intention of the proposal is not to marginalize Cantonese, but just to facilitate communications and the development of Guangzhou, where over two-fifths of citizens are from other parts of China.

Rong Guoqiang writes in Qian Jiang Evening News:

广州电视台有综合、新闻、影视、经济、英语、竞赛、少儿等9个频道，但其中以普通话为基本语言的较少。该建议提议说，也可在综合频道或新闻频道的主时段用普通话播出——广州市政协的建议提得很具体：如综合频道和主要频道的中午12时至下午2时、晚上7时—10时，除此之外的粤语播音可一如既往。如此说来，粤语何“沦陷”之有？何来“捍卫”的必要？

Guangzhou TV has nine channels including composite, news, movies, economics, English, sports and kids. Most programs are broadcasted in Cantonese. The proposal suggests that Mandarin could be used in prime time broadcast for the composite and news channels. It is very concrete: apart from the periods 12 – 2pm and 7 – 10pm, Cantonese can still be used in other times as before. Is this really the ‘fall’ of Cantonese? Is there really a need to ‘defend’ it?
即使电视粤语播音真的全部被取消，粤语也未必会“沦陷”，因为粤语仍然是广州市民的日常用语。而且不会有人傻到要取消某种方言，因为方言的消失只有一种可能：在漫长的经济、文化、人口的交互变动中逐渐自然消亡。

Even if all Cantonese broadcasts are cancelled, the dialect will not disappear. This is because Cantonese is still used in daily life. A local dialect will only disappear through gradual and natural economic, cultural and demographic changes.
In Renmin Net, netizen Zhang Junyu thinks that, as other regions in China catch up Guangdong’s economic developments, Guangzhou citizens must change their ‘special right’ mentality, echoing the point made by BBC journalist Shen Ping mentioned above.

正因为在80年代，广州经济风光全国，直接决定了粤语的坚守；到现在，全国经济在平均水平上都赶了上来，人才也出现大流动，广州作为一个地方，要是再排斥普通话，或者在实际生活中拒绝推广普通话，也只能是心理上的一种本能选择，但却已经失去了粤语坚守的最重要的经济基础。

Guangzhou’s economic vibrancy in the 1980s provided confidence for them to defend Cantonese. Now, other parts of China have caught up with Guangzhou, and mass migration within the country is also commonplace. Losing the aura of economic achievement, Guangzhou’s refusal to promote Mandarin can only be interpreted as a psychological choice.
推广普通话也并不是要消除方言，而是方便交流。很多地方的方言都保护得比较好，比如上海、四川、陕西这些地方，这和当地电视台用普通话播新闻并不矛盾，在广东也没必要就起悍然大波。在广东，你会发现收音机，电视，大部分都是粤语播放，就连公交车上的播音都是粤语。外地人可能一下子成了耳盲，彷佛身处外国，这也阻碍了广东成为一个真正的国家大都市。

The purpose of promoting Mandarin is not to destroy a dialect, but to facilitate communications. In many places like Shanghai, Sichuan and Shanxi, the local dialects are well preserved and not in conflict with Mandarin broadcast. There is no need for Guangzhou to stir up such a debate. In Guangdong, Cantonese is widely used in radio, television and even public transportation broadcasts. This creates many difficulties for people from other parts of China, and obstructs Guangzhou from developing into a major metropolitan city.
Commentator Cao Jingxing from Xinmin Net also advises Guangzhou citizens to be more pragmatic:

广东要不要讲广东话，还是讲普通话，他们自己可以做出抉择，总的来说应该平衡，既要考虑发展，也要考虑到保护自己传统的特色。如果过于偏重一方面，比如说，强调发展，大家都讲普通话，结果广东话没人讲了，那当然对广东话不利，有人提出要捍卫广东话，我也可以理解。但是另一方面，过于地去捍卫自己本土的语言，结果妨碍了自己的竞争优势，那对你自己也不利。

Whether Cantonese or Mandarin is used should be decided by Guangzhou citizens themselves. They should strike a balance between facilitating development and preservation of local culture and not bias toward either side. If they emphasize development to the point that no one speaks Cantonese, this would of course be detrimental to the local dialect. On the other hand, if they defend Cantonese to an extent that their competitiveness is reduced, they would just hurt themselves.
However, not everyone subscribes to the view that facilitating communications means that Mandarin has to be used. Blogger Han Yimin writes:

工业化、全球化时代，是否就是方言消灭的时代？许多人坚信普通话对于经济和交流的作用的重要性，甚至把经济发展与方言对立起来，本身就是盲目相信宣传或者肤浅的理解的结果。人们交流的确是需要有共同的语言工具，但在同一文字的中国，不同方言对于经济交流会有怎样的影响？似乎并没有人做过实证研究。我以为，人们之间的交流是通过很多方式和方法的，只要需要交流，人们会想尽办法去相互理解的，而这些办法中，普通话只是其中一种，而且并非最重要的。历史上以千年计算的时间里，不同的方言并没有阻碍中国文化的成长，就是一个明证。至于，是不是大家都要说一口标准的普通话，就更是现代权力意志极为扯淡的混帐决定。想想近现代中国影响巨大的政治人物，孙中山、蒋介石、毛泽东、邓小平，这些人谁会说很标准的普通话？

Do globalization and industrialization imply the destruction of local dialect? Many people emphasize the importance of Mandarin in economic interactions and exchanges. They even think that economic development and local dialects are mutually exclusive. This is the result of credulous belief in propaganda. A common language is important in people-to-people exchanges. But what’s the effect of using different dialects in economic interactions in China where a uniform written script is used? It seems that no one has conducted detailed research in this area. I believe that people can use many ways to communicate with each other. As long as people need to interact, they will strive for ways to understand each other. Mandarin is only one of them, and is not the most important one. The fact that the existence of different dialects has not obstructed the flourishing of Chinese culture for thousands of years is a proof. Promoting standard Mandarin seems to me a draconian decision made by the contemporary Chinese government not supported by sufficient evidence. Think about important figures in modern Chinese history – Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping – which one of them can speak standard Mandarin?
我以为对待方言应该用放任、自由的态度，让市场和人们的交流实践来决定。需要检讨的，反而是政府不遗余力推行普通话的政策，是否存在打压、破坏多元性的地方文化的一面？

I think that we should adopt a laissez-faire and free attitude toward local dialect. Letting people to decide from actual experiences should be the way forward. What requires examination is whether official policy to promote Mandarin has the intention to suppress local culture.

2010-07-11T21:07:00.000-03:00

Why do Prime Ministers Change Before Upper House Elections?
— The political dynamics behind prime ministers changes
Airo Hino
Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced his resignation right before the Upper House elections. Looking back, it was a short-lived administration which lasted only eight months. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said, “Including the next prime minister, there will have been 16 prime ministers since entering the Heisei Era 22 years ago. Although people call for change, isn't changing prime ministers this often a bit too much?” Except for Koizumi, who held office for five years and five months, each prime minister during the Heisei Era was only in power for an average of approximately one year. Even in the UK, which is said to be a model country in terms of political reform, prime ministers hold office for an average of over five years. So why do prime ministers change so frequently in Japan—after remarkably short terms, when compared with other developed countries?

The reason that prime ministers have been holding shorter terms in recent years might be because the politicians of Nagata-cho, Japan's political center, have begun responding sensitively to opinion polls, which are being carried out more frequently than in the past. It is a fact that even the media has been repeating the message that the cabinet's approval rating will be in the danger zone if it drops below than 30%. However, opinion poll reports are conducted not only in Japan but in other developed countries as well. Opinion polls are regularly conducted in the UK and the US by research and media organizations.

Public opinion poll reports have most likely encouraged the shortening of prime ministers' terms in office. However, I would like to point out that the Upper House elections set the stage for changing prime ministers. In Japan, half of the Upper House members will be re-elected once every three years. As would be expected, except for double elections, this schedule differs from that of the elections of Lower House members who hold terms of four years. This means that national elections are held at least six times in 12 years (including one double election) even if the Lower House is not dissolved.

Actually, the fact that the election schedules for both houses are not synchronized has hardly drawn any attention as something very unusual up to now even in developed nations. First of all, there is no difference in election schedules in Northern European nations that have adopted unicameral systems such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. Furthermore, citizens do not directly elect lawmakers in many countries which have adopted bicameral systems. Citizens cannot vote directly for lawmakers because the UK's House of Lords is fundamentally a hereditary system, and due to the fact that the Dutch Senate, French Senate, and the German Bundesrat have each adopted an indirect system of voting handled by each state or other regional level government. The only other countries with Upper Houses where citizens can vote directly for members as in Japan are nations such as Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland. Additionally, Japan is the only one of these countries where the elections of both houses are held separately. The fact that Japan's bicameral system utilizes a unique election schedule is worthy of attention.

The separate voting days for both houses have an important implication in the political dynamics behind the change of prime ministers. Even if they temporarily earn the trust of citizens in the general elections, prime ministers will definitely be exposed to public examination—the Upper House elections that take place over their four year terms. In US mid-term elections, which are held two years after presidential elections, it is well known that there is a trend for political parties in power to be defeated. Since Japan's Upper House elections are also positioned as mid-term elections, the Hashimoto cabinet stepped down after taking the blame for the loss of the 1998 Upper House elections. This is a classic example of the ruling party losing in a mid-term election. In order for a prime minister to remain in power, they must first jump over the hurdle of the Upper House elections which is considered to be more difficult than the Lower House elections.

The party in power at the time must do everything possible in order to make it over the mid-term election hurdle. The Democratic Party of Japan's so-called replacement this time was a normal measure of the Liberal Democratic Party that was taken in the past. For example, the Takeshita Cabinet stepped down on June 3rd, 1989 amid mounting criticism of the Recruit Scandal and the introduction of the consumption tax. Similarly, the Mori Cabinet stepped down on April 26th, 2001 amid mounting criticism of Prime Minister Mori's behavior. Both resignations occurred with a focus on the upcoming Upper House elections in July of each of those years.

On the other hand, the outcomes of these resignations played out differently. According to a Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper opinion poll, approval ratings for the Takeshita Cabinet in April 1989 sank down into the single digits to 8%. Quickly taking the helm, the Uno Cabinet could not recover approval ratings after its inauguration with an approval rating of just less than 23%. As a result, the party suffered a crucial setback losing 36 seats, around half of the seats up for re-election during the Upper House election that July. In contrast, although the approval rating for the Mori Cabinet had hovered around a low of 8% in February 2001, the Koizumi Cabinet came in and took Japan by storm with its record-high approval rating of 85% in May 2001. And in the following July elections, the LDP was able to make a comeback by successfully gaining 64 seats.

What was the difference between these two incoming cabinets? The difference was how deeply they were able to instill the image into the minds of the citizens that the previous cabinet had been reformed. Sosuke Uno, who served as Foreign Minister of the Takeshita Cabinet, took over the administration because he had upcoming summits at the time. Despite aiming for legitimate politics, such as selecting cabinet ministers that were not involved with the Recruit Scandal, Uno's geisha scandal was catastrophic. This led citizens to believe that the cabinet had not been reformed. In contrast, Koizumi, who once said that he would “crush the LDP” and won the LDP's presidential election, successfully instilled the image in citizens that the LDP, as they knew it, had been reformed. With the inauguration of the new cabinet, citizens felt as if a regime change had occurred. It is safe to say that whether this pseudo regime change can play out or not will determine the outcome of the new cabinet.

I wonder to what extent the newly inaugurated Kan Cabinet will be able to allow this pseudo regime change to play out. Opinion polls after the inauguration of the new cabinet show a v-shaped turn around across the board in approval ratings. It is most likely citizens reacting to the appeal of Prime Minister Kan diluting the influence of former DPJ Secretary General Ozawa in appointing party executives and selecting cabinet ministers. The original members of the former DPJ, who have been around since its founding in 1996, are taking important posts such as secretary general and chief cabinet secretary. Since merging the Liberal Party with the DPJ in 2003, it seems like Ozawa has taken over the house. However, I wonder if Prime Minister Kan will strive to reform this image by returning to the DPJ's initial objectives. Although the LDP is ridiculed for merely promoting vice presidents to be presidents, to what extent can Prime Minister Kan differentiate himself from the Hatoyama Cabinet? I wonder if this can be predicted from the results of the upcoming Upper House elections.

Airo Hino
Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University
Profile
Professor Airo Hino was born in 1974. He graduated from the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University—completing the Master's Program in the Graduate School of Political Science there—and then received a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Essex in the UK. He was a research fellow in the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, received a government sponsored foreign study scholarship from the Region of Flanders, Belgium (Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research, Catholic University of Leuven), and served as a fellow at the Center of Comparative Politics, Catholic University of New Louvain [Belgium]). After holding the position of Associate Professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University, he took up his current position as Associate Professor on the Faculty of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University in 2010.

Professor Hino's major publications include the following:
Censored and hurdle regression models in TSCS data (Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies, Volume 26, No. 1, 2010)
The 2009 General Elections and New Opinion Poll Challenges [2009 Nen Sosenkyo to Atarashi Yoron Chosa no Kokoromi] (Yoron, No. 105, 2010)
Perspectives of Political Change [Seiji Henyo no Pasupekutibu], Second Edition (Kensuke Kaku, Hitoshi Maruyama, coauthors) (Minerva Shobo, 2010)
Why did the 2009 Government Change Occur?- Close Analysis of the Japanese Political Transformation Through Joint Research with Yomiuri Shimbun and Waseda University [2009 Nen, Naze Seijikokan Datta no ka- Yomiuri Waseda no Kyodo Chosa de Yomitoku Nihon Seiji no Tenkan] (Aiji Tanaka, Masaru Kohno, Airo Hino, Takeshi Iida, Yomiuri Shimbun Opinion Poll Department) (Keiso Shobo, 2009)
EU and European Integration Study [EU Oshu Togo Kenkyu] (Koji Fukuda, editor and coauthor) (Seibundo, 2009)
Democracy in Europe— [Yoroppa no Demokurashi] (Ryosuke Amiya, Takeshi Ito, Takashi Narihiro, editors and coauthors) (Nakanishiya Shupan, 2009)
Frontier of Voting Behavior Research [Tohyo Kodo Kenkyu no Furontia] (Masahiro Yamada, Takeshi Iida, Editors and Coauthors) (Ohfu, 2009)
Time-Series QCA: Studying Temporal Change through Boolean Analysis (Sociological Theory and Methods, Volume 24, No. 2, 2009)
New Parties in Government (Kris Deschouwer, Editor and Coauthor) (Routledge, 2008)
Elections: Le reflux? (Andre-Paul Frognier, Lieven De Winter, and Pierre Baudewyn, Editors and Coauthors) (De Boeck, 2007)
De Kiezer Onderzocht (Marc Swyngedouw, Jaak Billiet, and Bart Goeminne, Editors and Coauthors) (Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2007)

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2010-07-11T21:00:00.000-03:00

The Horizon of Historical Research
Japanese-Chinese Historical Perception and Oral History
Ryuji Hattori
Professor of International Policy History, East Asia International Political History,Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University

Past and PresentAlmost 20 years have passed since I began my research in the history of international politics and foreign policy. In academic circles, my area of specialty is referred to as international political history or foreign policy history. Many people are unfamiliar with such fields.

Generally speaking, my research focuses on modern history. My first written work was Japanese Diplomacy and East Asian International Politics, 1918-1931 (Yukihaku Publishing, 2001).

What kinds of possibilities exist in historical research? What is the meaning of emphasizing a historical approach? Even extremely modern phenomena contain a confluence of past events, and today is the result of an accumulating of history. It is essential to deepen one's understanding of history in order to understand the present.

Even in the case of seemingly dry and boring history, a surprising number of interpretations become possible when you increase your knowledge. Study the past in order to understand the present. The present becomes clear through knowledge of the past.

Portraying peopleBiographical research is an antithetical approach to international political history. International political history takes a bird's eye view of the world. In contrast, prosopography, or the research of individuals, focuses on specific individuals and portrays people from within.

I have researched individuals such as the diplomats Kijuro Shidehara and Koki Hirota. Both of these men have served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Prime Minister, thus making them important when discussing Japan's external relations. At some point in the future, I would also like to write biographies about other individuals.

Critical reflection upon my own research was one of the reasons that led me to begin biographical research. Until that time, I had performed research in international political history using a method known as the multi-archival approach. This method uses materials such as the foreign policy documents of various countries. When taking this bird's eye view of history, it seems easy to lose the ground-level perspective of politicians and diplomats who were active in making such history.

However, international politics is nothing other than the ceaseless mutual interaction of deeds performed by individuals. In this respect, it seems that the ideal research would involve both international political history and a biographical approach. However, I feel that performing such research is more time-consuming and difficult than ever.

Historical PerceptionIn recent years, my research also includes the subject of historical perception. In particular, I have researched the Tanaka Memorial as a document that symbolizes the discrepancy of historical perception between Japan and China.

The Tanaka Memorial is a document that is alleged to have been presented to Emperor Hirohito by Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka at the beginning of the Showa Period. It is perhaps the most famous disputed document in the history of Japan-China relations. The Tanaka Memorial describes a plan for the invasion of China. Although the document is viewed as a forgery in Japan, there is a growing trend in China to view the document as authentic.

History buffs may be familiar with an eerie passage from the Tanaka Memorial: “In order to take over the world, you need to take over China. In order to take over China, you need to take over Manchuria and Mongolia.”

After the Manchurian Incident, the Tanaka Memorial was the subject of debate by the United Nations. One particularly well-known incident is the verbal battle which took place at the United Nations between Yosuke Matsuoka and Gu Weijin, a famous Chinese diplomat. During the period from the Sino-Japanese War until the Pacific War, the Tanaka Memorial was used by both China and America to advertise against Japan. The document also appears in the wartime propaganda films of director Frank Capra.

The Tanaka Memorial was also placed on trial at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), and the document has been quoted as if it were true in publications such as the People's Daily newspaper. It is also exhibited as a genuine article at museums in China.

International politics as an information warIf there is a lesson to be learned from the Tanaka Memorial, it is the importance of information wars in international politics. The Tanaka Memorial hints at the enormous role played by advertising and media in modern politics. It must be said that Japan not only lost the Pacific War, but also lost the advertising battle regarding Japan's image.

When remembering both the information war conducted during war time and the long-term influence after the war, the circulation of the Tanaka Memorial throughout the war cannot be dismissed as simply a strange twist of fate. Even though it may appear as such, the presence of advertising and media exist in the background of the affair.

Even in the case of forged documents and mistaken facts, it is difficult to deny a material once it has been circulated overseas. Even an obvious forgery has the possibility of being used to from anti-Japanese sentiment. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department at that time had almost no Japanese experts who were capable of determining that the Tanaka Memorial was a forger.

When arguing about the authenticity of historical issues without discretion, it can be manipulated to be used for advertising even it is a valid assertion. In international politics, the dimension of information wars exists separately from facts. This can influence the view of Japan held by foreign countries.

At the very least, it must be admitted that an information war existed behind the historical perception regarding the Tanaka Memorial. This document has been circulated since more than 80 years ago, and, even today, it continues to exemplify the importance of advertising and media in international politics.

Joint research in Japanese-Chinese history
Image of Japanese-Chinese Historical Perception
Japanese relations with China and Korea had become complicated during the time of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's cabinet, and joint research in Japanese-Chinese history was held beginning from 2006. I participated in the research as an external writer, and I composed a section which includes a discussion of the Tanaka Memorial. The report of the joint research was presented in January 2010.

In Japan, the matter of the Tanaka Memorial is often dismissed with a laugh. However, from the perspective of historical research, we must ask ourselves why an obvious forgery like the Tanaka Memorial is readily accepted as an authentic document in other countries, and why other countries are distancing themselves from Japan.

When considering the long-term influence of the Tanaka Memorial, I thought it would be appropriate for me to publish at least one work regarding the document. With this in mind, I wrote a book entitled Understanding Sino-Japanese History: Conflict over the Tanaka Memorial, 1927-2010 (University of Tokyo Press, 2010).

Oral history
Image of Illuminations
The past few years, I have been focusing on the topic of oral history in addition to historical perception. Oral history is a systematic discussion held directly with politicians, diplomats and other individuals involved in politics. Such discussion provides insight on political processes, human relationships and foreign perspectives that are difficult to ascertain from historical documents.

As a result of such discussions, I published the book Illuminations and Retrospectives on Masayoshi Ohira—The Man and His Foreign Policy (Daiichi-Hoki Publishing, 2010). The work was written with cooperation from Hajime Morita and edited by Ryuji Hattori, Amiko Nobori and Takuma Nakajima. The book contains an oral history of Hajime Morita, former Minister of Transport and also known as the son-in-law and private secretary to Masayoshi Ohira.

Although Morita originally held the position of bureaucrat, he served as the private secretary of Ohira for many years. In 1980, Ohira suddenly died during his term as Prime Minister, and Morita switched to politics by inheriting Ohira's support base in Kagawa Prefecture. In general, my discussions with Morita examined Ohira in great detail from the perspective of foreign policy, and my work Illuminations follows this trend. This year marks both the 30th anniversary of Ohira's death and the 100th anniversary of his birth.

Illuminations examines the foreign policy and structuring of regional order by Ohira from the two perspectives of his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Prime Minister. The book also covers the secret agreement made between Japan and America. All of these topics are discussed at great length by Morita, who was one of Ohira's closest and most trusted confidants. The secret agreement between Japan and America refers to the nuclear secret agreement made when revising the Japan-U.S. Security Agreement and to the financial security agreement associated with the return of Okinawa.

Ohira was persuaded to accept the nuclear secret agreement by Reischauer, the American ambassador to Japan. Ohira worried for a long time whether he should announce the existence of the nuclear secret agreement to Japanese citizens. During his term as Prime Minister, he proposed a disclosure of the agreement to his aides. Regarding the financial secret agreement, Japan transferred 4 million dollars to America in exchange for the return of Okinawa. Morita candidly discusses his involvement in the agreement as a bureaucrat.

Even in the field of domestic politics, Morita held a lively discussion regarding the national image created by Ohira, exchanges with influential politicians such as Kakuei Tanaka, a lineage of the Kouchikai (a political faction of the Japanese LDP), and the dissension of the politician Koichi Kato.

The horizon of historical researchTogether with fields such as biographical research and historical perception, I hope to continue my research in oral history for a bit longer, although I am currently examining the extent of possibilities. I would like to leave research hints for future generations.

Just the other day, I finished discussions with a former Prime Minister and a former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. I am currently preparing to publish another book. Generally speaking, research in oral history is conducted by several individuals, so I am learning a great amount from other researchers.

I also hope to conduct more extensive research regarding the stabilization of Japan-China relationships that Ohira worked to realize during his term as Minister of Foreign Affairs. I would like to traverse the horizon of historical research while holding multiple interviews and filing requests for disclosure of information.

Ryuji Hattori
Professor of International Policy History, East Asia International Political History, Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University
Born in Tokyo. Graduated from the Kyoto University School of Law in 1992. Completed his graduate studies at the Kobe University Graduate School of Law in 1997. In the same year, assumed the position of Research Associate at Chiba University. Served as Associate Professor at Takushoku University and as Assistant Professor at Chuo University before assuming his current position in 2010. Holds a PhD in political science. His major written works include Japanese Diplomacy and East Asian International Politics, 1918-1931 (Yukihaku Publishing, 2001), Shidehara Kijuro and Japan in the 20th Century: Diplomacy and Democracy (Yukihaku Publishing, 2006), Koki Hirota (Chuo Koron Shinsha Publishing , 2008), and Understanding Sino-Japanese History: Conflict over the Tanaka Memorial, 1927-2010 (University of Tokyo Press, 2010).

Proposta: Não A Letra Morta! - Cidade Democrática

2010-04-27T17:47:00.000-03:00

Proposta: Não A Letra Morta! - Cidade Democrática

2010-04-23T21:09:00.000-03:00

http://poets.notredame.ac.jp/Roget/contents.html

Location. -- N. location, localization; lodgment; deposition, reposition; stowage, package; collocation; packing, lading; establishment, settlement, installation; fixation; insertion &c. 300.
habitat, environment, surroundings (situation) 183; circumjacence &c. 227 [obs3].
anchorage, mooring, encampment.
plantation, colony, settlement, cantonment; colonization, domestication, situation; habitation &c. (abode) 189; cohabitation; "a local habitation and a name" [Midsummer Night's Dream]; endenization[obs3], naturalization.
V. place, situate, locate, localize, make a place for, put, lay, set, seat, station, lodge, quarter, post, install; house, stow; establish, fix, pin, root; graft; plant &c. (insert) 300; shelve, pitch, camp, lay down, deposit, reposit[obs3]; cradle; moor, tether, picket; pack, tuck in; embed, imbed; vest, invest in.
billet on, quarter upon, saddle with; load, lade, freight; pocket, put up, bag.
inhabit &c. (be present) 186; domesticate, colonize; take root, strike root; anchor; cast anchor, come to an anchor; sit down, settle down; settle; take up one's abode, take up one's quarters; plant oneself, establish oneself, locate oneself; squat, perch, hive, se nicher[Fr], bivouac, burrow, get a footing; encamp, pitch one's tent; put up at, put up one's horses at; keep house.
endenizen[obs3], naturalize, adopt.
put back, replace &c. (restore) 660.
Adj. placed &c. v.; situate, posited, ensconced, imbedded, embosomed[obs3], rooted; domesticated; vested in, unremoved[obs3].
moored &c. v.; at anchor.

2008-01-18T14:04:00.000-02:00

Luís César Nunes's Storefront
http://stores.lulu.com/luis_cesar_nunes
Strabonos GeographikonStrabonos Geographikon (book)
Hardcover Print: US$27.00
The geography, that we propose to study in this work, appears to us to be as much as any other science the field of the philosopher; and more than one fact authorizes us to think of the kind: this one initially, that the first authors who dared to treat geography were precisely philosophers, Homère, Anaximandre de Milet and its Hécatée compatriot, as Eratosthène makes of it already the remark; then Démocrite, Eudoxe, Dicéarque, Ephore and many other with them; finally Eratosthène, Polybe, Posidonius, philosophers also all three

2007-06-19T13:17:00.001-03:00

Here For
My destiny is to be a Protector.I'm looking for you now, something in you catches my mind and I really wish to know what may happens. Whether you know it or not, this is the role that is most in tune with who I am at my core. As a Protector, I have an exceptional gift for guiding and comforting others when no one else is willing or able because I actually feel their pain as if it were my own. If I could insulate those I love from all hardship, I would consider that my greatest accomplishment. I offer caring and thoughtful advice that helps others heal and move in a positive direction, but I don't call attention to myself, choosing rather to selflessly give to others in order to make the world a better place. This sense of duty and exceptional work ethic will get me far in life, however, it can lead to frustration when I don't get the appreciation I deserve. Remember to take care of myself because if I feel good others will feel reassured by my steady, prudent, and methodical ways, and the world really will be a better place!

2006-11-04T20:42:00.000-03:00

La Dépression peut être guerirLa dépression, après avoir été longtemps taboue, est devenue pour certains le mal du siècle. La dépression peut toucher n’importe qui, n’importe quand. La dépression, ce n’est pas que dans la tête ! Maladie très fréquente des pays industrialisés, la dépression est souvent handicapante.La dépression semble frapper au hasard. A son bon vouloir. Une fois atteints par cette maladie, hommes et femmes, jeunes et moins jeunes, ont parfois bien du mal à sans débarrasser.Rien ne pèse plus lourd que le vide. Et le poids del'absence est encore plus grand quand il s'accompagne du mystère,du manque d'informations, du silence: fugues, disparitions, départssans laisser d'adresse ni donner d'explication.Les symptômes de la dépression sont désormais bien connus : tristesse, baisse d’énergie, fatigue, manque d’entrain, perte du goût des anciennes activités, perte de poids, changement d’appétit, problèmes de concentration. Un événement de vie - une mauvaise note, un divorce, une dispute - ne va pas déclencher un acte suicidaire à lui tout seul. Par contre, il pourra constituer la goutte d’eau qui fait déborder le vase. Chaque événement de vie doit être interprété de façon relative, au cas par cas. Un élève mal noté n’ira pas forcément se suicider, mais il est preocupant que d'importants taux de suicide et de dépression sont apparus chez les jeunes Chinois, conséquence de l'évolution rapidede la société, qui renforce le stress.Les médicaments, s'ils sont capables de soulager les symptômes de la majorité des patients, sont parfois inefficaces et rarement capables de guérir complètement la maladie.Les personnes sont souvent irritables ou tendues. Tout ceci différencie bien la dépression du simple coup de blues ou de la déprime passagère. Dans la dépression, ces symptômes ont la particularité de durer longtemps, avec un degré de gravité important. Malgré ça il y a une esperance: des chercheurs viennent de mettre en évidence que face à un événement stressant, les dépressifs expérimentent une réaction inflammatoire plus importante que ceux qui se sentent bien dans leur tête. Cette découverte pourrait expliquer pourquoi les dépressifs sont plus à risque de certaines maladies. Elle suggère aussi que les réactions inflammatoires pourraient contribuer… à la dépression elle même !Les études ont démontré que les personnes dépressives avaient en général, et notamment par rapport aux gens non dépressifs, un faible taux d’oméga-3 dans le sang. Le Dr François Lespérance, psychiatre de l’Hôtel-Dieu de Montréal qui a mené cette étude, avance que les propriétés anti-inflammatoires des oméga-3 faciliteraient la transmission d’informations entre les neurones. Ainsi, les oméga-3 combattraient la dépression. Plus précisément, consommer plus d’oméga-3 pourrait jouer un rôle préventif ou aider au début de la maladie.

2006-11-01T19:11:00.000-03:00

Eshú Bàbà Alàsé, Ki n'kàn má se omo mí Ki n'kàn má se aya mí Ati èmi nàá Má se mi lu ènìyàn lu mi Lànà öwó, lànà omo kàn mi o. Eshú má se mi, omo elòmíràn ni o se. Asóro lògo akétèpe lògbó. Olòrún máà jé ki arì ìjà Eshú o Asé.
http://www.cubayoruba.cult.cu/
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/ife/hd_ife.htm
http://www.culturalexpressions.com/ifa/ifadef.htm
http://web.uflib.ufl.edu/lac/SanteriaList.htm
http://membres.lycos.fr/cubaphotosfv/cubaphotos.html
Olodumare (la fuente de las fuerzas de la naturaleza que genera el espectro de la luz), también conocido como Olorun (Señor del Cielo) creó el universo y todo lo que en el existe. En la creación fue asistido por dos "ministros": Obatala u Oshanlá (orisa de los paños blancos) y Orunmila (Orisa de la inteligencia, la sabiduría y la adivinación). Oshanla, el primero de los ministros tenía como función moldear una criatura, dándole forma, a espera de Olodumare, para asignarle un soplo de vida. Un segundo ministro, cuya función fue la de ser testigo de la creación, se convirtió en conocedor de los misterios de la creación y el destino de cada ser vivo en el universo, Por eso el conocedor de los misterios de la creación y el destino de cada ser vivo del Universo. Por esta razón es visto como el portavoz de los deseos de Olodumare. Podemos hacer una comparación de esta trinidad como siendo Olodumare = Dios, Obatalá = Hijo y Orunmila el Espíritu Santo. Después de la creación del mundo, este estaba totalmente cubierto por agua y solamente existía un mundo marítimo este era el reino y dominio de Olokun. Existiendo el dominio de las aguas, estaba impedida la vida a otros Orixas. Estos se reunieron y fueron a pedir a Olodumare que crease un nuevo mundo, una tierra sólida para que pudiesen ellos también usufructuar de un nuevo planeta donde pudieran participar de las casas y convivieran con otros seres humanos que serían los Eguns (Espíritus) en Orun (Cielo), a espera de un cuerpo (Ara) para así vivir en la Tierra (Ilé) y de ella aprender sus enseñanzas.Atendiendo a este pedido, Olodumare envió a Obatala al mundo a través de una corriente que ligaba a Orun con Ilé, le entrego una concha conteniendo tierra, una gallina con cinco garras y un pombo Esta entonces comenzó a esparcir la tierra, formando los continentes. El lugar donde Obatalá deposito la tierra y donde todo el trabajo comenzó, paso a llamarse Ile Ifé (Ilé, tierra, Ifé (que se alargó o se expandió), que vino a ser la Ciudad Sagrada de los Yorubas.Después de la creación de los continentes Obatalá volvió a Orun y anuncio a Olodumare que su misión había sido cumplidaAfrican slaves ultimately formed the basis for most commerce between Europe and Africa. Europe's conquest and colonization of North and South America and the Caribbean islands from the fifteenth century onward created an insatiable demand for African laborers, who were deemed more fit to work in the tropical conditions of the New World. The numbers of slaves imported across the Atlantic Ocean steadily increased, from approximately 5,000 slaves a year in the sixteenth century to over 100,000 slaves a year by the end of the eighteenth century.Evolving political circumstances and trade alliances in Africa led to shifts in the geographic origins of slaves throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Slaves were generally the unfortunate victims of territorial expansion by imperialist African states or of raids led by predatory local strongmen, and various populations found themselves captured and sold as different regional powers came to prominence. Firearms, which were often exchanged for slaves, generally increased the level of fighting by lending military strength to previously marginal polities. A nineteenth-century tobacco pipe (1977.462.1) from the Democratic Republic of Congo or Angola demonstrates the degree to which warfare, the slave trade, and elite arts were intertwined at this time. The pipe itself was the prerogative of wealthy and powerful individuals who could afford expensive imported tobacco, generally by trading slaves, while the rifle form makes clear how such slaves were acquired in the first place. Because of its deadly power, the rifle ultimately joined the leopard, elephant, and python as symbols of royal might and can sometimes be found as attributes in depictions of rulers and culture heroes.The institution of slavery existed in Africa long before the arrival of Europeans and was widespread at the period of economic contact. Private land ownership was largely absent from African societies during this era, and slaves were one of the few forms of wealth-producing property an individual could possess. Additionally, rulers often maintained corps of loyal, foreign-born slaves to guarantee their political security, and would encourage political centralization by appointing slaves from the imperial hinterlands to positions within the royal capital. Slaves were also exported across the desert to North Africa and to western Asia, Arabia, and India.It would be impossible to argue, however, that transatlantic trade did not have a major effect upon the development and scale of slavery in Africa. As the demand for slaves increased with European colonial expansion in the New World, rising prices made the slave trade increasingly lucrative. African governments eager to augment their treasuries even preyed upon their own peoples by manipulating their judicial systems, condemning individuals and their families to slavery in order to reap the rewards of their sale to European traders. Slave exports were responsible for the emergence of a number of large and powerful kingdoms that relied on a militaristic culture of constant warfare to generate the great numbers of human captives required for trade with the Europeans. The Yoruba kingdom of Oyo on the Guinea coast, founded sometime before 1500, expanded rapidly in the eighteenth century as a result of this commerce. Its formidable army, aided by advanced iron technology, captured immense numbers of slaves that were profitably sold to traders. In the nineteenth century, the aggressive pursuit of slaves through warfare and raiding led to the ascent of the kingdom of Dahomey, in what is now the Republic of Benin, and prompted the emergence of the Chokwe chiefdoms from under the shadow of their Lunda overlords in present-day Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Asante kingdom on the Gold Coast of West Africa also became a major slave exporter in the eighteenth century.Ultimately, the international slave trade had lasting effects upon the African cultural landscape. Areas that were hit hardest by endemic warfare and slave raids suffered from general population decline, and it is believed that the shortage of men in particular may have changed the structure of many societies by thrusting women into roles previously occupied by their husbands and brothers. Additionally, some scholars have argued that images stemming from this era of constant violence and banditry have survived to the present day in the form of metaphysical fears and beliefs concerning malevolent witchcraft. In many cultures of West and Central Africa, witches are thought to kidnap solitary individuals to enslave or eat them. Finally, the increased exchange with Europeans and the fabulous wealth it brought enabled many states to cultivate sophisticated artistic traditions employing expensive and luxurious materials. From the fine silver- and goldwork of Dahomey and the Asante court to the virtuoso woodcarving of the Chokwe chiefdoms, these treasures are a vivid testimony of this turbulent period in African history.OLOFI u OLOFIN. Dios supremo para la Santería. No es objeto del culto directo, sólo se le invoca. Como fundamento de los ritos de Santería en Cuba, existen leyendas y mitos de gran belleza poética, conservados entre nuestro pueblo por tradición oral y comparables -por su proyección universal- a los de las más altas culturas orientales o mediterráneas. La influencia de los yorubas ha sido determinante en la idiosincracia en los bailes y otras creaciones de nuestro folklore. Y las obras más ambiciosas de la cultura cubana, en música, danza, literatura, etc., también han utilizado sus temas como inspiración, demostrando los grandes valores del aporte hecho por lo lucumíes a nuestro pueblo.ORULA U ORUMILA.Se considera como el Dios de la adivinación. Es objeto de culto, especialmente por una casta de adivinadores, llamados babalawos (padres de los secretos) exclusiva para hombres. Sus colores son el verde y el amarillo. Su equivalencia católica es San Francisco de Asís.ELEGBA. Es el orisha de los caminos y dueño de las encrucijadas. Todas las fiestas o ceremonias de santería se inician con un canto o invocación a esta deidad. Se le considera un Dios de carácter travieso y amante de las bromas. Por ser el dueño de los caminos se le ofrenda primero para propiciar el buen desenvolvimiento de las fiestas. Sus colores son el rojo y el negro y su atributo el garabato (rama de árbol de forma ganchuda con la cual se abre paso en la maleza).Se le sincretiza con el niño de Atocha, con San Antonio de Padua y con el Ánima Sola. Su saludo: LAROYEOGGUN. Es el Dios de los metales, de la fragua, del monte, de la guerra. En todas las ceremonias de, la Santeria se le canta y ofrenda después de Elegguá. Sus bailes son generalmente de carácter guerrero, blandiendo el bailarín, un machete que lo simboliza. Su color es el morado. En La Habana se le equipara con San Pedro. OCHOSI. Es el tercero de los santos guerreros, como se conoce el trío (Elegba, Oggún y Ochosi) con que se inician las ceremonias de santería. Se le considera el Dios de la cacería y lo representa un arco y una flecha. En su danza remeda los movimientos del cazador al acecho. Se le identifica con San Norberto.OSUN. No es orisha de posesión sino de irradiación. Actúa como mensajero de Obatalá y de Olofi. Orula se apoya en él para tener los poderes de la adivinación, y el conocimiento real y trascendente. Es el vigilante de la cabeza de los creyentes.No se sube, ni se asienta.Se recibe cuando se entregan Los Gerreros ( Elegba, Oggún y Ochosi). Se sincretiza con San Juan Bautista. Su día se celebra el 4 de junio.OBATALA. Es el Dios creador de la tierra y de los hombres, de la justicia y la pureza. En sus danzas se representan los movimientos de un anciano eterno, de pasos lentos, y cansados o los de un joven guerrero que impone la justicia con la espada. Su color es el blanco. Su atributo es un Iruke, espanta moscas de crines blancos, símbolo de realeza . Su saludo: JECUA BABA. Se sincretiza con la Virgen de las Mercedes.YEMAYA. Es la diosa de las aguas salobre y de la Maternidad Universal. Su color es el azul. Se le identifica con la Virgen de Regla. En sus danzas se remedan los movimientos del mar, ora ondulante, ora tempestuoso. Se saluda: O MIOCHANGO. Es el Dios de la virilidad, del fuego, del rayo, de los tambores. Su color es el rojo. Se le equipara con Santa Bárbara.El más apuesto y galante de los orishas. Su tributo es un hacha bipenne (Oshé) de significación fálica.Se le saluda: KABIOSILE CHANGOOCHUN. Es la diosa de las aguas dulces, de la belleza, de la coquetería, de la maternidad. Es la orisha de los metales amarillos y del amor. Se le sincretiza con la Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre. Su color es el del bronce. En los manuscritos sagrados que se conservan en Cuba se cuenta que Ochún nació entre los manantiales y las altas cascadas, convirtiéndose en diosa del amor, de la belleza y las aguas dulces, es dueña de los metales amarillos y el coral redondo. Un día, la diosa supo que Oggún el guerrero bravío imponía la muerte con sus armas filosas, y deseando salvar a los hombres partió a la conquista. Ochún adornó sus brazos con manillas tintineantes y ungió su cuerpo desnudo y negro con miel y canela. En medio de la selva el dios de los metales y la fragua quedó preso de aquella piel reluciente de dulzor y de aquella boca que le ofrecía miel."Así, la paz reinó de nuevo sobre la tierra".OYA. Dueña de la centella, del cementerio, del viento y los remolinos. La más guerrera de las orishas mujeres. Danza violentamente mientras agita en lo alto su atributo -un iruke -cola de caballo negro. El metal que le pertenece es el cobre. Sus colores son todos del Iris.Son sus representaciones católicas Santa Teresa y la Candelaria.AGGAYU. Orisha gigante dueño del río y la sabana. Se le considera padre del dios Changó. Se le identifica con San Cristobal.OBBA. Orisha esposa de Changó. Representa la fidelidad conyugal. Equivale a Santa Rita y a Santa Catalina.IBEYIS. Son los dioses de los niños. Según la leyenda son hijos gemelos de Changó, el Dios del rayo y una de sus mujeres (Oshún u Oyá). Son alegres y amantes de las golosinas. Se les representa por dos pequeños muñecos unidos por el cordón umbilical o por los santos católicos gemelos San Cosme y San Damián.OSAIN. Orisha dueño de las yerbas del monte y curandero.Se sincretiza con San José.BABALU AYE o ASOJANO. Es el dueño de las enfermedades y las plagas. Es un Orisha contrahecho y lleno de pústulas. En sus danzas se imitan los movimientos de un hombre enfermo, de manos agarrotadas y movimientos doloridos. Equivale a San Lázaro.INLE. Dios de la pesca y de la medicina. Se le equipara con San Rafael IBEYIS. Son los dioses de los niños. Según la leyenda son hijos gemelos de Changó, el Dios del rayo y una de sus mujeres (Oshún u Oyá). Son alegres y amantes de las golosinas. Se les representa por dos pequeños muñecos unidos por el cordón umbilical o por los santos católicos gemelos San Cosme y San Damián.OSAIN. Orisha dueño de las yerbas del monte y curandero.Se sincretiza con San José.BABALU AYE o ASOJANO. Es el dueño de las enfermedades y las plagas. Es un Orisha contrahecho y lleno de pústulas. En sus danzas se imitan los movimientos de un hombre enfermo, de manos agarrotadas y movimientos doloridos. Equivale a San Lázaro.INLE. Dios de la pesca y de la medicina. Se le equipara con San Rafael Bolagi CampbellYemoja: MermaidOil on canvas, 36 in. x 24 in. (91.4 cm x 61 cm)Private collection In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, states on the Central African coast found their economic power and territorial control threatened by Portuguese attempts to establish a colony at Luanda (in present-day Angola). Many of these states had become regional powers through trade in African slaves. It was the growing demand for this human labor in New World colonies such as Brazil that ultimately led Portugal to seek military and economic control of this region. Old trading partners came under military attack by Portuguese soldiers and indigenous African raiders in search of captives for the slave trade, and rulers were forced to adapt to these new circumstances or face certain destruction. One leader who proved to be adept at overcoming these difficulties was the queen of Ndongo, Ana Nzinga.In 1624, Ana Nzinga inherited rule of Ndongo, a state to the east of Luanda populated primarily by Mbundu peoples. At that moment, the kingdom was under attack from both Portuguese as well as neighboring African aggressors. Nzinga realized that, to remain viable, Ndongo had to reposition itself as an intermediary rather than a supply zone in the slave trade. To achieve this, she allied Ndongo with Portugal, simultaneously acquiring a partner in its fight against its African enemies and ending Portuguese slave raiding in the kingdom. Ana Nzinga's baptism, with the Portuguese colonial governor serving as godfather, sealed this relationship. By 1626, however, Portugal had betrayed Ndongo, and Nzinga was forced to flee with her people further west, where they founded a new state at Matamba, well beyond the reach of the Portuguese. To bolster Matamba's martial power, Nzinga offered sanctuary to runaway slaves and Portuguese-trained African soldiers and adopted a form of military organization known as kilombo, in which youths renounced family ties and were raised communally in militias. She also fomented rebellion within Ndongo itself, which was now governed indirectly by the Portuguese through a puppet ruler. Nzinga found an ally in the Netherlands, which seized Luanda for its own mercantile purposes in 1641. Their combined forces were insufficient to drive the Portuguese out of Angola, however, and after Luanda was reclaimed by the Portuguese, Nzinga was again forced to retreat to Matamba. From this point on, Nzinga focused on developing Matamba as a trading power by capitalizing on its position as the gateway to the Central African interior. By the time of her death in 1661, Matamba was a formidable commercial state that dealt with the Portuguese colony on an equal footing. Nzinga, who reconverted to Christianity before her death at the age of eighty-one, became a sensation in Europe following the 1769 publication of Jean-Louis Castilhon's colorful "biography," Zingha, Reine d'Angola, in Paris.La Tradición religiosa de los Orishas Yorubas, conocida popularmente en América como la Regla Ocha o Santería, se origina en el Oeste de África, en la región conocida actualmente como Nigeria y Benin. Es la religión tradicional del pueblo Yoruba. La trata de esclavos trajo muchos de estos Yorubas a las costas de Cuba, Brasil, Haití, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, entre otros sitios del Caribe. Con estas personas vino la religión.La Santería es una religión considerada como las primeras conocidas por el hombre. Los Yorubas son un pueblo muy civilizado con una rica cultura y un sentido muy profundo de la ética. Creen en Dios, que en el idioma yoruba se conoce como Olodumare que es la fuente del ashe, la energía espiritual de la que se compone el universo. Olorun interactúa con el mundo y la humanidad a través de emisarios. Estos emisarios son los Santos y los Orishas. Ellos viven en cada una de las fuerzas de la naturaleza, e influyen al humano en cada aspecto de la vida. La comunicación con los humanos se logra a través de toques de tambores batá y poseciones por trance(bajar el santo), ritos, rezos, adivinación y eboses u ofrendasEn el Nuevo Mundo, la mayor parte de su religión fue ocultada detrás de una fachada donde los orishas fueron representados por santos católicos. De ahí nace el sincretismo o la comparación de los santos católicos con los yorubas. Los dueños de esclavos prohibían la celebración de ceremonias africanas, pues estaban consideradas como brujería, por eso los esclavos veneraban los santos católicos y a través de ellos llamaban a sus orishas, asi los esclavistas no los molestaban y así fue como la religión llego a ser conocida como Santería. El recuerdo de este periodo de nuestra historia, es la razón por lo que, dentro de la religión muchos consideran el termino Santería como degradante; pero el nombre se hizo tan popular y fácil de recordar que decidimos aceptarlo con orgullo. Las tradiciones de la Santería son celosamente preservadas, y el conocimiento completo de sus ritos, canciones y lenguaje es un requisito previo a cualquier participación profunda dentro de la religión. Los iniciados deben seguir un régimen estricto, y responden por sus acciones ante Olorun y los Santos u Orishas. A medida que una persona pasa a través de cada iniciación , sus conocimientos se vuelven mas profundos, y sus habilidades y responsabilidades aumentan en conformidad. De hecho, en el primer año que sigue a su iniciación dentro del sacerdocio, el nuevo iniciado (Iyawo) debe vestir de blanco durante el año completo. Un Iyawo debe seguir un numero de reglas de santo para purificarse y sintonizarse con su ángel de la guardia. Algunas de estas reglas son: no puede tomar licor, ni trasnocharse en fiestas o en la calle, no usar ropa de colores, no usar maquillaje durante el año, no fumar, ser fiel, etc. Lo que parece difícil a primera vista pero hacer el iyaworage,es más bien bello y muy sano. Después de todo la palabra hacerse el santo lo abarca todo, es volver a nacer, comenzar una nueva vida. La Santería, es muchas veces mal comprendida por falta de investigación. Personas opinan, critican y hablan de lo que no conocen a fondo. Pero podemos garantizar que no somos una secta, ni un culto y mucho menos grupos satánicos. Es hoy día considerada una religión completa. Aunque los Yorubas fueron arrebatados de sus hogares en África y esclavizados en el Nuevo Mundo, sus orishas, su religión y sus poderes nunca pudieron ser encadenados, y la religión ha sobrevivido al presente. La tradición de los orishas es profesada por un gran grupo de intelectuales, artistas, profesionales de la medicina y las leyes, altos personajes de diferentes gobiernos alrededor de todo el mundo. El Oriate u Oba Italero consulta con el Oráculo del Diloggun, mas conocido por los Caracoles. Este sistema de adivinación es parecido al de Ifá pero menos complicado y un poco limitado en sus signos. Sin embargo es un sistema muy acertado y eficaz a la hora de resolver problemas, y se puede confiar en el plenamente. Por medio del Oráculo del Dilogún, hablan todos los Santos. El Oriate u Oba Italero es un personaje de gran importancia dentro de la santería, este Babalosha, siempre es masculino. Es el que más conocimientos posee dentro del grupo de los Santeros. Lleva la responsabilidad de hacer todas las ceremonias de consagración de un Santo. Junto con el Babalawo consagran al nuevo Santero.La Iyalocha (madre de santo) y el Babalosha (padre de santo), son de vital importancia para la tradición religiosa. Estos sacerdotes tienen la primera y gran responsabilidad de iniciar al aleyo(nuevo creyente), dentro de la religión y enseñarle los primeros pasos a seguir.El Santero realiza los eboses, los ofrecimientos y trabajos que dicten los santos.La función principal de un santero es la de salvar vidas, inician a las personas con la ceremonia de los collares y de asiento. Están capacitados para dar santos que se reciben sin haberse consagrado. Como por ejemplo: Olokun, Los Ibeyes, Orishaoko, Inle, entre otros. Los santeros consagrados son los únicos capacitados para consagrar Santo a las personas. La ceremonia se llama Kari-Osha o hacer Santo, en estas ceremonias participan un Italero u Oriate, varios Babalawos, y de 10 a 12 santeros. El santero debe ser limpio, puro y bueno como el Santo mismo. Debe obrar con buena fe hacia sus semejantes y dar buenos ejemplos. Sanan los enfermos, quitan brujerías, hacen ofrecimientos, enseñan a sus ahijados a desarrollarse dentro de la religión. Muchos además son médium o espiritistas y con estas facultades extras, ayudan más a las personas. Hay muchas más labores de igual importancia que hacen los Babaloshas e Iyalochas, pero quisimos enumerarles las más conocidas e importantes. Debemos tomar en cuenta que hay santeros médicos, abogados, actores, ingenieros, periodistas, profesores, psicólogos, etc. y estos aplican a su vez sus conocimientos profesionales y sabiduría para ayudar aún más al ser humano.Yemaya es la Orìsà de la maternidad. Ella es la guardadora de todas las riquezas. Nuestros desperdicios son su tesoro. Lo que se pierde puede ser re- obtenido con la ayuda de Yemaya. Cuando buscamos a Yemaya en la naturaleza tenemos que buscar en el mar. En los océanos en donde encontraremos a Yemaya. Las crestas de las olas contra las costas y rocas. Es en esta forma que Yemaya toma los ofrecimientos y sacrificios. En esta misma forma ella construye y/o destruye, ofreciendo bendiciones o quitándolas.Lo que es tomado de ríos y arroyos, es dado a Yemaya. Todos los desechos y desperdicios incluyendo los ofrecimientos son tomados y llevados al océano y al mar. Este es el porqué los Yoruba dicen "Nadie conoce lo que hay en el fondo del mar".La fuerza destructiva de Yemaya viene en la forma de olas. Este poder no va ni viene solo. La luna y los vientos juegan en una parte mayoritaria de esta energía destructiva. Sin embargo hay otra cara de esto. Si, el viento sopla haciendo rizos y ondas sobre el agua y el empuje gravitacional de la luna hace que el agua se eleve más y más alto, haciendo mas rizos y ondas. El agua comienza a arroyarse y crea mas viento, y el empuje gravitacional de la luna dibuja las ondas mas y mas alto, moviéndose mas aire en múltiples direcciones. Esto es un ciclo contante de este evento que brinda vida de la muerte y ayuda a sostener un balance perfecto.YemayaMadre de Chango. Si no es la madre carnal, lo adora como una madre, (hay quien sostiene que Obatalá parió a Chango y tuvo que abandonarlo porque era fruto del pecado). Yemaya parió a los 16 orishas . Es la dueña de las aguas y representa al mar, fuente fundamental de la vida. Sus colores son el azul y el blanco.Fue mujer de Babalú Ayé, de Aggayú, de Orula y de Oggún. Le gusta cazar, chapear, manejar el machete. Es indomable y astuta. Sus castigos son duros y su cólera es terrible, pero justiciera. Su nombre no debe ser pronunciado por quien la tenga asentada sin antes tocar la tierra con las yemas de los dedos y besar en ellos la huella del polvo. Según algunos, procede de Oyó, otros dicen que es de Mina. Es más temible y de mayor jerarquía que Oyá, la dueña del cementerio, de la centella y del vendaval, concubina de Chango. No hay más que una Yemaya, una sola con siete caminos o avatares. En el Diloggún habla en Oddi(7) su día es el sábado. CAMINOS DE YEMAYA Awoyó: La mayor de las Yemaya, la de los más ricos vestidos, la que se ciñe siete faldas para guerrear y defender a sus hijos. Cuando sale a pasear, se pone los adornos de Olokun y se corona con el arcoiris, Ochumare. Akuara: De dos aguas. En la confluencia de un río, allí se encuentra con su hermana Ochún.Vive en el agua dulce, es bailadora, alegre, pero poco recta, no hace maleficios. Cuida a los enfermos, prepara remedios, amarra abikús. Okute (o Okutí) : la de azul pálido, está en los arrecifes de la costa, "Portera de Olokun". Lo mismo se encuentra en el mar, en el río, en la laguna, que en el monte, es en este camino mujer del dios de la guerra y de los hierros, Oggún, come en su compañía y acepta las ofrendas tanto en el mar como en la manigua. Cuando guerrea, lleva colgados de la cintura, el cuchillo y las demás herramientas de Oggún. Trabaja mucho. Es una amazona temible. El ratón le pertenece. Con él envía mensajes a sus omó, o suele transformarse en ratón para visitarlos y le teme al perro. Es de genio violento, retador, muy severa y rencorosa. Vive internada en el monte virgen o en parajes desolados. Es hechicera, experta en preparar afoche Le gusta bailar con un majá enroscado en los brazos. Detesta el pato y le encanta el carnero. Son suyos, los corales y las madreperlas. Konla: La de la espuma. Está en la resaca, enredada en una manta de lino. Naviera, vive en las hélices de los barcos.Achabá: Peligrosísima, sabia y voluntariosa, la que lleva en el tobillo una cadena de plata. Su mirada es irresistible, su aire altanero. Fue mujer de Orula y su palabra la acata siempre Ifá. Para oír a sus fieles se vuelve de espalda. Sus amarres no se desatan nunca. Asesú: Mensajera de Olokun, la de agua turbia, sucia. Muy seria va al caño, a las letrinas y cloacas. Come pato. Recibe las ofrendas en compañía de los muertos. Es muy lenta en complacer a sus fieles. Mayaleo o Mayalewo: vive en los bosques en una poceta o en el manantial. En este camino se asemeja a su hermana Ochún Ikole, porque es bruja. Tiene estrechas relaciones con Oggún. ATRIBUTOSEl sol, luna llena, ancla, salvavidas, bote, siete remos, siete aros de plata, estrella. Todos elaborados en plata, acero, lata o plomo. Iruke (rabo de caballo con mango) adornado con cuentas azules y blancas. Usa manto de burato ricamente adornado. Agogó (campanita) que se utiliza para saludar y para que preste atención cuando se habla con ella. Abanico con varillaje de nácar y oro adornado con cuentas y caracoles. Agbebé‚ (abanicos redondos hechos de pencas de guano, adornados con plumas de pavo real, caracoles y cascabeles). Todos estos atributos son adornados con patos, peces, redes, estrellas, caballitos de mar, conchas y en miniatura, todo lo relativo al mar, siempre llevan cuentas azules y blancas alternas. COLLARESSiete cuentas de cristal transparente, llamadas de agua y azules, en Yemaya Ocutí son de agua ultramarino. En Yemaya Ayabá o Achabó, azul pálido y agua. Yemaya Asesú: azul oscuro y perlas opalinas o cuentas de jabón. VESTIDOS Bata con serpentinas azules y blancas, símbolo del mar y la espuma, especie de cinto ancho de tela y un peto en forma romboidal sobre el ombligo. FLORES : Flor de Agua y violeta. PERFUME: Verbena. ANIMALES:Carnero, gallo, paloma, guineo, jicotea, pato, gallina, loro, ganso, codorniz. Para Yemaya Asesú, el cerdo con una ceremonia muy cuidadosa. Yemaya Ocute‚ no come pato. Yemaya llama sus chicharrones a las cucarachas. YERBAS ESENCIALES DEL ASIENTO - Lechuguilla - Yerba añil - Verbena - Prodigiosa - Paraguitas(quita solito) - Flor de Agua - Helecho - Berro - Lechuga - Yerba Buena - Albahaca Morada - Guamá - Guásima - Botón de oro - Yerba de la Niña - Coate ó Colonia - Marilope - Panetela- Huevo de Gallo - Helecho de río - Guacamaya - Yerba Mora - Corazón de paloma - Cucaracha - Diez del día - Orozú - Palo de canelaQue es Ifá. La palabra Ifá, de la que se dice es intransferible, se refiere al cuerpo Yoruba de conocimiento ritual y filosófico, tan bien como al sistema de adivinación. Ifa es también uno de los nombres de elogio del Orisa de la Sabiduría y la adivinación, Òrúnmìlà). Ifá no es una religión. "Es mucho más", y realmente lo es. La tradición Ifá / Orisha mantiene la real estructura de la sociedad tradicional Yoruba. Tiene un vasto cuerpo de conocimiento de hierbas medicinales. Su tradición oral mantiene la historia del pueblo Yoruba. Su tradición poética y musical, hasta estos días, tiene una influencia fundamental en la música y la literatura contemporánea, no solo en Africa sino también en el llamado Occidente, incluidos nuestros pueblos de América Latina y el Caribe. Que es un Bàbàlawo El Babalawo ("Padre del Secreto"), es el Sacerdote iniciado en los misterios de Orúnmila, Deidad de la Adivinación, quien utiliza diferentes medios para realizar la adivinación. Un Bàbàlawo es una persona iniciada a una deidad llamada Ifá y es uno de los títulos más altos en el Panteón Yoruba. Interprete de deberes y enseñanzas. Tienen un masivo conocimiento procedente de una multitud de anteriores Sacerdotes de Ifá y de sus ancestros, versados en una multitud de cosas, espirituales y materiales. Un Bàbàlawo es aquel que cree en Ifá y practica las vías que tomaron nuestros ancestros cuando había un problema o un desbalance en alguna vida. Las personas no solamente van al Bàbàlawo cuando hay un problema sino también van cuando quieren tomar una decisión importante en la vida. Cuando las cosas cambian rápidamente y quieren conocer por qué? Y como cambiarlas o hacer cosas mejores, es otra de las causas para ver al Bàbàlawo. Un Bàbàlawo hace honor a Olofi, a la naturaleza, y sus ancestros cada mañana. No hay diferencia entre la forma en que un Sacerdote de Ifá rinde honor y reza al Dios Supremo y otro sacerdote en cualquier otra religión o tradición. Los Bàbàlawos predicen eventos enfocando sobre el individuo y su armonía con la energía del mundo. El proceso de investigación de eventos futuros esta íntimamente relacionado al balance de energía y al comportamiento del individuo. La primera tarea del Bàbàlawo es identificar a través de la adivinación la armonía o desarmonía de un individuo con esta energíaSistema adivinatorio y herramientas del Babalawo. "La ignorancia de como consultar el Oráculo de Ifá, los hace mirar para arriba, pero no hay Oráculo en el techo". "El Oráculo de Ifá es un sistema de calcular diseñadamente para descubrir eventos venideros". Este proverbio Yorubá, nos ilustra la realidad de que algunas personas, encontrándose en dificultades para resolver un problema no hacen más que mirar hacia el techo. El Oráculo de Ifa, esta compuesto por un cuerpo literario, llamados Odu. Los Odu son un sistema binario cuya base está constituida por los dos símbolos I y O, que dan lugar a los elementos I O, O I, I I, y O O, fundamento de la escritura sagrada, Símbolos que se pueden expresar a través de la ecuación: 2 (n) = 16 (N = 4), o sea, 2 (4) = 16 total que constituye los Oju Odú meyis, cuya combinación da lugar a los 256 Omo Odú o Amûlú Odú, equivalentes a 16 (2). Los Odus se estructuran en: Eses Ifá, suyeres, patakines, ebo, refranes y proverbios. Para su utilización se usan los instrumentos y herramientas siguientes: Ikin, nuez o semilla de adivinación, obtenida del árbol Iger Akoko (Newbolia Lambes). Tablero sagrado(Opon Infá) donde se escriben los Odun. Ijerosun, polvo que se obtiene de la planta del Irosun (baphia nitida) utilizado para recubrir el tablero y donde se marcan los símbolos que representan los Odun (en Cuba se sustituye por polvo de ñame y se le conoce como Ijefá.) Uroké, vara de adivinación o símbolo de la autoridad, se le utiliza golpeando el tablero para invocar a Ifá mediante rezos y hacer la comunicación con Olodumare y los Orichas para que reconozcan lo que se está realizando, es de colmillo de elefante, (en Cuba se sustituyo por tarros de venado, y se le conoce como Irofá.) Okpelé. Cadena o mensajero de los Odu de Ifá la que tiene integrada 8 mitades de nueces del árbol Okpelé (schrebira golungeuris) en Cuba se sustituyó con la cáscara de coco y en algunos casos con las de semilla de mango de las encontradas en el estómago de la chiva que se le haya dado a Orunmila. Las ofrendas de animales que se hacen a los Orishas, no son una carnicería ni se matan animales sin necesidad, ni de manera irrespetuosa. Están en dependencia del grado de desarmonía que tenga el individuo y del resultado de la averiguación resultante. Para hacer una limpieza espiritual, no siempre se necesita sacrificar un animal, esta es la verdad. Sin embargo, cuando la sangre de un animal es requerida para limpiar lo negativo o ayudar a obtener un beneficio, el animal no es malgastado, usualmente es comido. El Obi, cuatro pedazos de coco (en Africa es utilizada la nuez de kola), es la forma más simple de adivinación, que aunque limitada, es de uso más común de Babalawos, Babaloshas e Iyaloshas para su comunicación con las deidades del Panteón Yorubá, pero al Obí le dedicaremos otro espacio. IKA FUN (Traducción al español) ADIVINACIÓN PARA LOS DIECISÉIS MAYORES. Ellos ( los 16 Mayores ) andaban por ILE-IFE para pedir larga vida. ¿Viviremos tan larga vida como declaró Olodumare (Dios de los Yoruba)? Esta pregunta fue a IFA, IFA contestó1- Ellos (los Babalawos ) avisaron no llamen esúrú ( es un tipo de ñame) esurú. Es decir, no digan lo que no saben.2- Ellos avisaron a los mayores que no llamen a los esurú (cuentos sagrados) esurú , Es decir no haga ritos de los que no tenga conocimientos básicos )3- Ellos avisaron que no llamen a òdidè ( el perico ) oode (murciélago) Es decir no desorientar jamás a las personas ni llevarlas por falsos caminos.4- Ellos avisaron que no se diga que las hojas de las ceibas son hojas del árbol de oriro. Es decir que nunca se debe engañar a las personas. 5- Ellos avisaron que no se debe intentar nada cuando no se sabe. Es decir que no pretendas ser sabio cuando no lo eres. 6- Ellos avisaron que se debe ser humilde y no egocéntrista. 7- Ellos avisaron que no se debe entrar en la casa de un Akalá ( titulo de jefatura de Ifa) Es decir que no deberás tener malas intenciones con nadie y ser falso (plástico).8- Ellos avisaron que no se debe usar las plumas de Ikoóde ( plumas sagradas) Es decir no romper tabú/ prohibiciones).9- Ellos avisaron que no se debe defecar en Epó ( comida de Ifá o de santo.). Es decir que debemos mantener los instrumentos sagrados limpios.10- Ellos avisaron que no se debe orinar dentro de Áfo ( la fábrica donde se hace el aceite de corojo en tierra yoruba. ) Es decir que debemos mantener nuestros templos bien limpios. 11- Ellos avisaron que no se le debe quitar el bastón a un ciego. Es decir que debemos respetar siempre a los que son más débiles que uno y tratarlos bien y con mucho respeto.12-Ellos avisaron que no se le debe quitar el bastón a un anciano. Es decir que se debe cuidar, respetar y tratar muy bien a nuestros mayores / ancianos. 13- Ellos avisaron que no se deben acostar con las esposas de los ÔGBONI. Es decir respetar las leyes morales.14- Ellos avisaron que nunca se acueste con la esposa de un amigo. ( Es decir nunca se traiciona a un amigo.15- Ellos avisaron que nunca seas chismoso. Es decir que nunca reveles secretos encomendados. 16- Ellos avisaron que no le falten respeto ni se acuesten con la esposa de un Babalawo. Es decir que se debe respetar a los que tienen cargos importantes, el respeto mutuo deberá conservarse.Cuando los mayores llegaron a la tierra hicieron todo lo que se le advirtió que no debían hacer. Empezaron a morir uno detrás del otro.Gritaron y acusaron a Orunmila de asesinato.Orunmila dijo que no era él quien los estaba matando.Orunmila dijo que los mayores morirán porque no cumplen con los mandamientos de Ifa.Orunmila dijo que la habilidad de comportase, con honor y obedecer los mandamientos es su responsabilidad. Orunmila dijo que la habilidad de comportase, con honor y obedecer los mandamientos es mi responsabilidad. Que en dirección equivocada no se puede adivinar. Es decir que a veces un líder aparece inesperadamente. Estos mandamientos de Ifa. No son solamente para los Babalawos sino para todos los creyentes y practicantes de la religión Yoruba.