War Against Terror

A Year On

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Thu, 17 Dec 2009 01:01:00 +0000

A full year has gone past since the horrific events of 26/11. Writing at that time, I wondered whether three months would be too long for India to adopt the hardline against the terror sponsors. We have complained loudly to all and sundry about the number of suspects still walking about freely or the number of terror training camps, their precise locations, the number of attempted border incursions, the upgrades weapons and communications technology, new tactics and all the statistics that can pave the way to decision lululand and back many times over. Frankly, no one is listening and I doubt if anyone gives a damn. I get the impression that this apparent "soft approach" has nothing to do with the maturity of the Indian polity or bureaucracy. It is more likely, that our decision makers have no clue how to wield the hard edge of state power in all its graded scalability beyond soft diplomacy. One often hears statements like "we cannot set deadlines for sovereign states to take a decision" or that "we are willing to wait until all the perpetrators are bought to book" or that "the due process of law should be allowed to take its course". Yes indeed, in a country where there are institutional frameworks that can enforce due process. Is that condition applicable here? Of course not! Yet, there has been little credible action beyond an attempt to pressurize. And of course, the parties involved in the Mumbai carnage, their financial infrastructure, the terror camps, and the infiltration go on. There is a sense of stupor and a feeling that we can do only so much and no more, induced by the fact that both the countries in the equation are nuclear weapon states and any attempt to escalate would result in a holocaust. Is that true? It appears again that, much like a duck, while we have a calm checkmate on the surface, there is vigorous paddling going on below. What if we reach a point where terror organizations possess nuclear weapons? What would we do then? Will we continue to maintain a similar reticent posture for the same reason?

26/11 - where are we today

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:17:00 +0000

A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since the eventful days in November last year. India has been through a lot since - financial crisis, economic slowdown and inflation followed by the general elections, the run up in the stock markets, drought, swine flu, and a new tax code. Enough to distract attention away from all the failures that led to 26/11. Except for the occasional news about the trial of the lone surviving terrorist - Ajmal Amir Kasab - that appears in the news more for his frivilous antics than the seriousness of the crime perpetuated, it is as if the event never even occurred. Anything else to show that we have learnt some valuable lessons? New NSG hubs? Okay, except for the part that they will mobilize through Mumbai's notorious rush hour on BEST buses (and that's a noun, not an adjective - for those not familiar with Mumbai). There is also provision in its charter to requisition any form of transport - suburban trains, taxis, motorcycles, cars, buses, the Volvo service to Pune, private helicopters - and press it into service when needed. The Mumbai police have been modernised - Colt M4 5.56 mm carbines, MP9 subcompacts, Smith and Wesson 9mm pistols, M107 50-calibre SARs. Impressive. Now all that remains is to figure out how to use it.

Recently, I happened, quite by chance, on the attempt by a large hotel group, to find a suitable person to head the security organization of the entire chain. The process was an eye-opener. For starters, the requirement came up not in the aftermath of the 26/11 carnage, but after the bombing of the Pearl Intercontinental in Peshawar on 10 June 2009. The chain first hired a specialist in counter-terrorism from Europe to evaluate the security requirements. Based on the recommendations of this specialist, they were in the process of expanding the security infrastructure. The selection of a person to head this new organization appeared to be an afterthought. Repeated requests to the chain to send a written job specification yielded the following:

"...In this regard, we are looking for a very senior Defence Personnel in the rank of Brigadier and above, preferably a Lt General / Maj General to head the Security Operations for the group ..."

The specification went further to state:

Background, Education and Experience:

The candidate should have :

· A high status (in the Indian context)

· Served in the Security Forces – in a high ranking position

· Proven field experience

· Proven management experience

· Management capability

Personality Traits:

Ideally the candidate should demonstrate the following personality traits:

· Charisma

· Authority figure

· Flexible thinking

· A natural leader

· Assertive

· Good interpersonal skills

The two other conditions on the JD was that the candidate should be in the 40-45 years age group and be approved by two specified stakeholders.

I was appalled! Here was a hotel chain that had just been through one of the most horrific terrorist incidents that had ever been perpetuated in this country. And the job specification appeared to read more like a matrimonial than the description of a key role. Having had some counter terror experience myself, I offered to reevaluate the European security specialist recommendations within an Indian context, but I was told to stay off. I then tried to tell them that it would be difficult to find a Maj Gen or Lt Gen in the 40-45 years age bracket or even in the 50-55 years age bracket, stating that they would personally prefer to be on the board of directors of the company than at an executive level. Even that did not cut the ice. It appears, that even in the otherwise ingeneous private sector, there is very little we learn from a crisis of unimaginable proportions.

Life goes on. India's first nucleared powered submarine was launched with much fanfare and heralded as a significant milestone - even though it was not clear on whose roadmap! For about thirty years now, India has been blundering in the dark in its quest for a coherent nuclear doctrine. With its operationalization still at least two years away and its value as a component of credible deterrence at least a good eight to ten years away, it was difficult to see what all the fuss was about, at least from a national security strategy perspective. A lot of the other pieces of the great Indian nuclear deterrence jigsaw is still either on the drawing board or withering away in the grey cells of military greybeards the government appears unwilling or unable to recognize.

Then there was the great Baluch theatre of the incredulous - Pakistan's claim that India is the prime driver in a secessionist movement. And our prompt endorsement, at least on paper, of that possibility. Statesmanship? Blunder? Trust then verify? Verify then trust? Either way, I guess the jury is still out on that, at least for now.

There appeared an eloquent article, published on the website of an influential Chinese think-tank, that laid open at least the possibility of that country's ambition of creating multiple independent nation-states by dismembering India with the help of a bunch of friendlies - both external and internal. Do we just dismiss it as the rantings of an insignificant figure with a mindset stuck fifty years in the past? Or do our strategic honchos see a pattern emerging? How would China benefit if they are the only credible military and economic powerhouse in the region with the scale required to do business with the rest of the world on a sustainable basis? Food for thought.

And we have news of yet another North Korean ship wandering wide off the beaten track and caught this time, hiding in the waters off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands - the base of India's only military theatre command - where news has it, there is trouble brewing of the turf-war kind, but that's another story. The last time when one of these ships were intercepted they were carrying sugar, and some critical components for a few nuclear missiles. This time, they are carrying sugar. Only? Apparently. Given the political trouble in West Bengal and the Maoist movement in the neighbourhood, the captain sure has a lot of explaining to do. The last time we had some suspicious activity in this neighbourhood was in Dec 1995 when a Latvian AN-26 with a British-Russian crew did a low flight into Indian airspace to airdrop a few hundred AK-47s and a few million rounds of ammunition to friendlies below. While the court case dragged on for years, the weapons and ammunition disappeared. We will continue to watch this space.

Somewhere on Pakistan's western front, a missle fired from an US UAV blew the upper half of a very good Taliban person to bits while he was enjoying a few quiet moments with his second wife. The US could have waited until he finished. Talk about the mean Americans! This good man was what the Pak military called a "strategic asset" though well past its useful life. Then to add insult to injury, the succession planning meeting ended in a few less than desirable outcomes, leaving Pakistan to conduct an emergency review its inventory of strategic assets. This bellyache in Islamabad resulted in a headache in New Delhi, and caused the Indian Army Chief to comment on Pakistan's 'dichotomous policy' of appearing to fight terrorism on its western front while encouraging it on its eastern front. The statement by the chief however, did not cause any flutter across the road - the bureaucrats ignored it due to constraints of protocol, and the politicians were busy addressing concerns that they could get their heads around without putting their foot in their mouths.

Situation normal.

Life goes on!

100-day plan to take on terror

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Tue, 06 Jan 2009 05:15:00 +0000

It is interesting that just days before the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the PM called for a 100-day plan under a high-level central task force to develop an integrated mechanism to fight terrorism and naxalism on the lines of the Department of Homeland Security in the US. He was at that time addressing the 2-day annual conference of Police Chiefs organized by the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The main emphasis of the conference would be on sensitising different states on terrorism related aspects, challenges posed by cyber crimes and the need to have adequate security to ensure national security. The PM had explained the impact of globalization, not just on the financial system, but also on its influence in the realm of security in India. This alludes to the centralized institutional mechanism for coordination among different agencies and state police. With the country having experienced 64 terror attacks - Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Surat, Jaipur and Guwahati among others - in the past six months, the PM stated that "time is not on our side". There appeared to be some appreciation that the US model was not replicable in India except in concept and in specific areas such as an integrated system for information collection, analysis and dissemination. Not surprisingly, he also suggested that it was time to induct some executive level police personnel into the home ministry and induce a degree of field experience into police matters and policy formulation. A welcome change indeed!

Though that still leaves the question open, of when the bureaucrats running the Defence Ministry will feel the need to induct senior executives from the military for strategy and policy formulation on defence matters. After that we still have the question of when - with the merging external and internal threat domains - a greater level of integration of agencies - with their divergent strategies, disparate structures, inimical cultures, outdated processes and arcane systems - would result.

Terrorism Legislations Passed

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sat, 20 Dec 2008 08:32:00 +0000

The two bills related to terrorism, introduced by the UPA, was cleared by the parliament after all the opposition parties pledged to support the measures. These two pieces of legislation include:

- National Investigative Agency (NIA) Bill
- Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ammendment Bill

The NIA Bill provides for setting up an agency at the Central level with powers to probe terrorism and other crimes having national ramifications. The agency will be established in a "concurrent jurisdictions" framework with provisions for taking up specific cases under specific Acts for investigation. It also envisages provisions for setting up of Special Courts to try terror-related cases. The agency will deal with all ramifications of terror including complex inter-state and international linkages and possible connections with other criminal activities such as drugs and arms smuggling, transfer and circulation of fake currency and infiltration across national boundaries. It also includes a schedule of acts covering offences against the state, terrorism, atomic energy, hijacking, WMD, etc, all of which are already in the federal ambit, creating a clear division of center-state agency responsibilites. This however, does not preclude agencies working together at different levels and at different times as required by a situation.

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Ammendment Bill that seeks to ammend the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UAPA), aims at strengthening the arrangements for speedy investigation, prosecution and trial of cases related to terrorism while at the same time guarding against any possible misuse of such provisions. The earlier ammendments to the UAPA to facilitate terror related investigation do not take into consideration various new facets of terrorism and terrorist activities including financing of terrorism, recruiting persons for terrorist acts and for organizing camps to impart training in terrorism.

The idea of a federal agency to deal with grave offences which have interstate or nationwide ramifications had been mooted in the Parliament in 2001. It has taken several terrorist attacks, three different committee reports and seven years since to pass the bill to constitute the NIA. Though a small step in the right direction, these focus on investigation and prosecution AFTER the acts of terror are committed - an element of PURSUE. There is no word yet on the other three aspects of countering terror - PREPARE, PREVENT or PROTECT - especially the mechanism to integrate the functioning of various existing agencies at the center and from the central level, down to the regional and local levels. The recent ruling by the Bombay High Court to constitute an interim committee headed by a retired supreme court judge to recommend measures to the government with a view to prevent recurrence of last month's terror attacks in the city is significant as for the first time, it includes, besides officials from the police, bureaucracy and the judiciary, eminent citizens from different walks of life in Mumbai. Whether other cities follow the precedence set by Mumbai is yet to be seen. What is however apparent is the fact that citizens councils will increasingly provide a way for capable individuals to participate and contribute to the finding solutions to challenges facing society and to hold those in elected office accountable for their actions.

Global Response to Terror: UK

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Mon, 15 Dec 2008 11:09:00 +0000

The UK has had a history of terrorist attacks as a fallout of the long running problems in Northern Ireland. However the current threat is primarily from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify voilence. The UK government has assessed the threat from such "Islamic terrorism" to be serious, sustained and geniunely international in scope, involving a variety of groups, networks and individuals who are driven by particular violent and extremist beliefs. In response the UK put in place a long term strategy to counter international terrorism (CONTEST) which aims to "reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence". The strategy is divided into four principal strands:

PREVENT - prevent terrorism by tackling the radicalization of individuals, by tackling disadvantage (inequalities, discrimination), supporting reform, changing the environment in which these elements operate and challenging ideologies that justify use of violence.
PURSUE - pursue terrorists and those that sponsor them including gathering intelligence, disrupting terrorist activity, strengthening legal framework and working with partners to strengthen different areas of international cooperation.
PROTECT - protect the public, key national services and UK interests overseas including strengthening border security, protecting key utilities, working with the private sector, reducing risk and impact of attacks on transportation and in crowded places.
PREPARE - preparing for the consequences including identifying potential risk and assessing their impact, building capabilities to respond and continually evaluating and testing preparedness.

Subsequent to the terrorist attacks in London on 07 July 2005, the government has worked with others to strengthen and deepen the counter-terrorism effort. On 05 Aug 2005 the British Prime Minister set out a 12-point action plan principally focused on strengthening powers to tackle those committed to facilitating and promoting terrorism and on strengthening community integration.

GBP 775 million was made available following the 9/11 attacks to provide additional resources to respond to terrorist events and in support of the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy, including increasing the funding and capacity of security and intelligence services and the police. By 2008, annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence and resilience will reach GBP 2 billion.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet Office coordinates the UK governments work to enhance the country's resilience to the full range of emergencies. The CCS coordinates the work of the Government departments who are responsible for contingency planning and response within their areas.

A horizon-scanning and national risk assessment capability has been established in central government to spot trouble in advance and ensure long term preparedness. The horizon scans and risk assessments issued by the Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee serve to give the Government Department and others a heads-up on approaching potential disruptive challenges up to 12 months ahead, and a common understanding of the likely nature and extent of the impacts. This operates in harness with a national risk assessment framework, which identifies over a five year period and forms the basis for decisions about emergency preparedness and about capabilities planning.

The UK is one of the pioneers in coordinated risk management for emergencies. The World Economic Forum (WEF) report on "Global Risks 2008" recognized UK's National Risk Assessment as the keystone for national risk management. Publication of the National Risk Register (see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/) will mean that UK will meet most of the five principles of country risk management established by the WEFs Global Risk Network as outlined below:

Accountability: the need for accountabilityof risk assessment as a condition of the legitimacy of the assessment as a basis for concerted government action both within and across departments of government
Integrated Assessment: establishing common procedures across government departments to assess risks reduces the changes of exaggeration of the risks and understatement of the more positive aspects of risks
Devolved Implementation: integrated assessment of the risks should not imply centralised implementation of risk management and mitigation
Seperation of analysis and policy: analysis is best kept within a seperate structure from policy implementation, to prevent pressures from policy makers from impinging upon the independence of the analysis
Disclosure and transparency (if possible): the Global Risk Network recognises that Governments are caught between pressure to disclose risk assessments and the need to keep some assessments confidential so as to avoid panic, protect sources, and maintain resilience. But it considers that disclosure is to be preferred to avoid a situation in which incomplete or inaccurate information causes a popular reaction that may be worse than the risk itself.

The Capabilities Program is the core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the UK. The program identifies the generic capabilities that underpin the UK's resilience to disruptive challenges and ensures that each of these are developed. These capabilities include dealing with mass casualties and fatalities, response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, provision of essential services and warning and informing the public. Some components of the capabilities relate to the activities of central government, such as central crisis management faciliteis or the use of the Armed Forces. Other components are delivered by regional or local responders, but developed within the framework established at the center by the capabilities programme to ensure consistency and high standards. The program consists of a total of 19 capability workstreams which in turn fall into three groups:

three workstreams which are essentially structural, dealing respectively with the central, regional and local response capabilities
five which are concerned with the maintenance of essential services: food and water, transport, health services, financial services and utilities
ten functional workstreams, dealing respectively with the assessment of risks and consequences, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) resilience, site clearence, infectious diseases (human), infectious diseases (animal and plant), mass casualties, evacuation and shelter, warning and informing the public, mass fatalities, humanitarian assistance, flooding and recovery.

Each of these workstreams is the responsibility of a designated lead department. Within each lead department, a workstream leader at senior civil service (SCS) level is responsible for the management of a program of work set out in a delivery plan agreed with Ministers and with the civil contingencies secretariat (CCS) at the center. Within the Cabinet Office, an SCS-level program director reporting to the Director of Civil Contingencies is responsible for the management of the program as a whole, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience. The program director holds quarterly meetings of workstream leaders (the program management team) and provides quarterly report of progress to the committee on Domestic and International Terrorism - TIDO(SD)(PREPARE) - the official committee on UK resilience chaired by the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience. Ministerial oversight of the program is exercised through Defence and Overseas Policy - DOP (IT)(PSR) -committee, the Ministerial committee on UK resilience chaired by the Home Secretary. Leaders of the ten workstreams have responsibility for developing capability at the national level. The well-established regional resilience teams in each of the Government Offices for the Regions are responsible for coordinating activity at the local (local authority or police force) area, and for communications between workstream leaders at the national level on the one hand and the local authorities and first responders on the other. Responsibilities at the local level have been formalised through the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and through regulations and guidance issued after the Act passed into law. The program has no defined end-point or outcome. An important part of the work is to continually identify, challenge and monitor the current levels of resilience in each of the areas covered by the workstreams. This enables Ministers to decide what increased levels of resilience they wish to acheive in each area and then to plan and if necessary to allocate additional resources to acheive that increased level of resilience.

Integrated emergency management (IEM) comprises six related activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. The first four of these relate to pre-emergency elements of IEM while the last two can be described as the post-emergency elements of IEM.

Responding agencies at the local level include Police Services, Fire and Rescue Services, Health Bodies, Coroner, Local Authorities, Government Agencies and other NDPBs, the Armed Forces, private sector, voluntary sector and the community. It is interesting to note that the UK authorities understand that the Armed Forces maintains no standing forces for Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) and hence cannot make a committment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies, that the armed forces should be called upon only as a last resort, and responding agencies should not base plans upon assumptions of military assistance. There is a distinction between the defence of the UK against military threats and UK civil protection as established in statute by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. All military operations undertaken within the UK fall under the generic title of "UK Operations". This designation includes the Defence contribution to resilience, which is provided at the specific request of the civil authorities, is subject to civil primacy and requires the authorization of the Defence Minister.

For management and coordination of local operations, there is an agreed national framework for managing the local multi-agency response to, and recovery from, emergencies - the bronze or operational level, the silver or tactical level and gold or strategic level. Tactical command will be done from an established incident control point near the scene of emergency and will address issues such as the setting up of an outer cordon and the location of key functions or facilities such as a survivor assembly point, casualty clearing station and media liaison point. While the generic framework is designed to be flexible enough to be used to manage a wide range of emergencies.

There is also special provision for communicating with the public and for media management incorporated into contingency planning. First of all, there is the Media Emergency Forum (MEF) that have been working with the media to establish arrangements to ensure the delivery of information to the public in an emergency. A protocol for the delivery of urgent public safety information has also been agreed with national broadcasters. As an emergency develops, there will be a requirement for a more comprehensive media response structure to ensure consistency in the information provided at all levels of the response. The Cabinet office communication group may activate the news coordination center (NCC). The NCC supports the LGD in their communications management of the overall incident.

The UK government considers investment in counter-terrorism and resilience to be a priority and this has been reflected in the resources which have been made available both to respond to terrorist events and in support of the delivery of the counter-terrorism strategy. As the knowledge of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism capabilities increased and as new threats and opportunities have emerged, the government has allocated further resources to this area to enable increased capacity. Since a lot of the Indian central, state and local structures and policies have their origins in British India, the UK's response to terrorism holds a wealth of information that can provide guidance to establishing the new institutional framework for countering terrorism.

Global Response to Terror: EU

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sun, 07 Dec 2008 14:09:00 +0000

In her treatise titled "EU Strategy on Counter-Terrorism - Steps towards a coherent network policy" Annegret Bendiek of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs writes about the difficulties in realising the harmonisation of member state policies against terror into a unified EU Counter-Terrorism strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2005. The strategy reflects the EU's aim of forming a network of the member states foreign and domestic policies in the fight against terrorism. The accompanying action plan on combating terrorism contains 160 separate measures in the four strands of work of the EU strategy (prevent, protect, pursue and respond). The main objective of this EU policy is to confront "the network of terror with networks against terror". The scale of attacks in Madrid, London and a series of disrupted plots across the EU were not profound enough to resolve coherence issues plaguing the EU level policy harmonization across member states, but it has definitely become a catalyst for increased levels of cooperation and coordination among them. Soon after 9/11 the Heads of State and Government declared their intention of making the fight against terrorism a foremost priority of the EU. This intention was emphasised in the adoption of a comprehensive 64 point "Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism". The plan of action, within the framework of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), was aimed at enhancing police and judicial cooperation, putting an end to the funding of terrorism and improving air security. At the Extraordinary Summit in Sept 2001, the European Council found military retaliation by the USA against any states abetting, supporting or harbouring terrorists to be generally legitimate on the basis of UN Resolution 1368. However there was no consensus for a common EU position on the issue of when and under which circumstances "prevention" needs to be enforced through military means in combating international terrorism. In the aftermath of the London bombings of June 2005, the member states agreed to accelerate the implementation of the action plan on combating terrorism which at that point, read more like a list of deficiencies.

Fundamentally however, the strategic committment boiled down to "combatting terrorism globally while respecting human rights". The four functional streams that emerged were (a) PREVENT, dealing with factors or root causes leading to radicalization and recruitment, (b) PROTECT, to ensure safety of citizens and infrastructure while reducing vulnerability, (c) PURSUE investigation globally, impede planning, travel and communication, disrupt support networks, cut off funding and access to weapons and other implements and bring all terror network stakeholders to justice and (d) RESPOND, by ensuring adequate levels of preparation, manage and minimize the consequences of an attack, improve response capabilities including dealing with the aftermath i.e., coordination of response and the needs of the victims.

Overall, this makes for an interesting case study of how different countries can come together to combat the menace of terrorism through an institutional framework. This is however, a long term approach requiring high levels of mutual trust, understanding and funding, and there is always the danger of gold-plating specifications and over-bureaucratization.

Institutional Framework: Institutions

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Thu, 04 Dec 2008 08:06:00 +0000

In his book "Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World", Robert O Keohane says that institutions arise, according to institutional theory, largely because of uncertainty, which generates a need for information. In this specific case of countering terror, India lies at the center of a region in turmoil. With Pakistan to the west a failing nuclear weapons state with a single point agenda, and China to the North, an emerging economic and military superpower, Burma in the North East Bangla Desh to the East and Sri Lanka to the South - our uncertainty lies in not having information about the other states intention and likely choices.Keohane states that since choosing a strategy depends not merely on what a state wants but also on what it believes other states seek, uncertainty can be a very significant problem in security relations. That governments therefore find it worthwhile to invest in information that will enable them to design strategies that are appropriate to their environments. And one way of investing in information is to create institutions that provide it. Institutions can serve as the informational and signalling mechanisms that enable states to get more information about the interests, preferences, intentions and security strategies of other states. They reduce uncertainty by providing credible information. Furthermore, successful institutions may regularize the behaviour of the states belonging to them, making it more predictable and decreasing uncertainty. Hence, if it is rational for states to invest in information, they may also invest in institutions that reduce uncertainty. India as one of the largest (only after China) countries in the region definitely should play a leading role in initiating such institutions. The mechanism of bilateral talks that has been the precedent over so many decades has brought very little in terms of institutionalization. On the other hand, countries like the United States have the power to influence the way others see the world. Much of this soft power is exercised through international institutions ranging from the IMF to NATO. The mere ability to provide credible information to others is a source of influence. Keohane goes on to say that since uncertainty is high in world politics, the credibility of a state's own threats and promises becomes a factor in its ability to exercise influence over the behaviour of others.

But what if the degree of mutual distrust, as has been in the case of India and Pakistan, is still so high, that it does not provide an environment for creation of such institutions? Compounding the problem is also the fact that there are, as someone pointed out recently, there are many Pakistans and it is difficult to gauge who actually you are engaging, putting into question, the sustainability of any such engagement.

The alternative, for the moment at least, is an unified prevention, protection, response and recovery system. Some of the key elements of this system would be an ubiquitous intelligence web, fully integrated with the executive, law enforcement, investigative elements, response units, civil defence and presumably, the criminal justice system, fire and ambulance services, hospitals, private sector representatives and citizen councils among others - essentially, all stakeholders in the response network. The role of private security organizations would need to be reviewed as these provide for custom security requirements of the private sector over and above that given by the federal and state systems. Information is key. Integrated collection and processing web upstream connects seamlessly to a downstream distribution web through the collation and analysis nodes with each stage of the interchange having its in-built governance mechanisms.

The good news is that all the elements needed for such an institution exist today. What is missing is only the integrated institutional framework.

To integrate the existing elements into a unified framework, some understanding of institutionalization is necessary. Institutionalization can be measured along three dimensions: commonality, specificity and differentiation. Commonality refers to the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour are shared by stakeholders. Specificity refers to the degree to which specific and enduring rules exist, governing the practices of officials, the obligation of related organizations and legitimate procedures for changing collective policy. Functional differentiation refers to the extent to which the institution assigns different roles to different members. In the absence of visionary and strong leadership, this exercise would, yet again, deteriorate into another bureaucracy within a bureaucracy.

The national strategy for this initiative could be defined as a national effort to (a) prevent terrorist attacks within India (b) reduce India's vulnerability to terrorism (c) minimize the damage and (d) recover from attacks that do occur. This definition should help the government more effectively administer, fund and coordinate activities both inside and outside the proposed new structure and ensure all parties are focused on the same goals and objectives. The initial challenges of the leadership role would entail (a) establishing a leadership structure for national security (b) defining the roles of different levels of government (c) developing performance goals and measures and (d) deploying appropriate tools to best acheive and sustain national goals. The structure would integrate existing organizations, many of which are already entrenched within a ministry or the cabinet secretariat, from a federal level down to the jurisdiction of well over 10,000 police stations across the country. Acheiving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the central government's ability to form effective partnerships with state and local entities. Decision makers will have to balance the national interest of preventiona nd preparedness with the unique needs and interests of local communities. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach will not serve to leverage the assets and capabilities that reside within state and local governments and the private sector. By working collectively with the state and local governments, the central government gains the resources and expertise of the people closest to the challenge. This is not entirely without risk. The state and local governments may not share the same priorities for use of federal funds. This divergence of priorities can result in state and local governments simply replacing their own previous levels of committment in these areas with the new federal resources. From the state and local perspective, engagement with central programs opens them up to potential central preemption and mandates. From the public perspective, partnerships if not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public programs.

Initiatives at all levels would also need accountability metrics in terms of a baseline set of goals and measures upon which to assess and improve many of its initiatives to prevent attacks, reduce the nation's vulnerability to attacks, or minimize the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. Performance measures will need to be used to evaluate effectiveness of programs, alowing agencies to measure their progress make resource allocation decisions, and adjust priorities. As national strategy and related implementation plans evolve, clearer performance expectations will emerge. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector.

Assessing the capability of state and local governments to respond to catastrophic terror strikes is an important feature of the national strategy and the responsibilities of the new framework. The national strategy should recognize the importance of standards and performance measures in areas such as training, equipment and communications. For example, the national strategy may propose the establishment of national standards for emergency response training and preparedness. These standards would require certan coursework for individuals to receive and maintain certification as first responders and for state and local governments to receive central grants. The national strategy could establish simulation programs or exercises to educate and evaluate civilian response personnel at all levels of government. It would require individuals and government bodies to complete successfully at least one exercise every year. The new framework could use these exercises to measure performance and allocate future resources.

Communication and communication interoperability would be a key requirement across all levels where standards, protocols and processes would need to be developed. It would also require setting national standards for technology acquisition. Central grants can be tied with state and local government procurement of terrorism-related communication equipment to this communication plan.

The choice and design of policy tools to engage and involve all levels of government and the private sector will have important consequences for performance and accountability. Governments have a variety of policy tools including grants, regulations, tax incentives, and information sharing mechanisms to motivate or mandate other levels of government or the private sector to address security concerns. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability fo efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of resources. The design of central policy will play a vital role in determining success and ensuring that scarce funds are used to acheive critical national goals.

Bottomline, the focus would be on strategy, structure, culture, process and systems - the five elements of performance and organizational effectiveness.

Developments

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 06:43:00 +0000

As the investigation processes get underway, picking through the dust and mayhem of the events of last week, first pointers are already leading the beaten path to Pakistan. And the reaction there has been equally shrill and predictable. As India picks up the threads of daily life and the last of the funeral processions wind their weary way through cities across the world, there is growing anger on the streets - in glitzy offices buildings and high rise apartments, in schools and colleges and in cafetarias and malls of modern India - anger that at least for the moment, appears directed at our politicians. The intelligence communities have already started their finger pointing stating that they have been warning the various enforcement arms and the military of the imminence of a terror strike by the sea route. These agencies have been equally vociferous in their denial that there was "actionable intelligence", agency speak for a specific event giving details of date, timing, location and/or actors. There is talk of reform - reform in the police, reform in the intelligence community, reform in the crimimal justice system, reform in the political culture of the country. There is talk about mass participation and transparency in matters concerning the citizen. There are calls for responsibility and accountability and of a peoples movement. There is talk of removing metropolitan areas from the state ambit or converting metropolitan areas into states so that the citizens can determine their own destiny. Overall, there is complete revulsion of the political class and the bureaucracy that supports the system. But hey, aren't we still a democracy? Or are we guilty of allowing what is essentially a feudal system to masquerade as a democracy and sat back assuming it was all A-okay as long as it did not directly affect the safety and privileges of an educated and vocal ruling elite? When the terrorists targetted the general public who travelled by the suburban transit system, we heard voices speak about the spirit of Mumbai. And when it hit a five-star hotel, places for people like you and me, we are suddenly angry. And this time, we are going around assuring everyone who is willing to listen to us that we are going to remain angry until something is done to allow us to sip our coffee and our hors d'ouvres in peace. So Mumbai will have its own MSG - the local NSG - presumably to be based in or near Nariman Point - because if it were based in Panvel or Vashi or somewhere beyond Thane (where would you find the required 100 acres of land in central mumbai), they would be stuck in traffic and take as long as it would take them to arrive from Delhi. And what if the terrorists struck in Pune or Manmad or in Amravati? Would the government then setup a PSG or an MSG or ASG in those cities as well? Probably not as we are not talking about equals here. Mumbai as the commercial capital of India is incomparable. But what is the problem with such an argument? The problem is that the discussion should be about how we secure the lives of each and every citizen everywhere. Its a question of how we an acheive equitable distribution of resources in a country as diverse and impoverished as India, where the struggle is about basic means - nourishment, access to clean drinking water, sanitation, primary education and healthcare - means that would open the doors of opportunity for a better future. It is a question of how to acheive balance as much as it is about institutionalizing democracy.

From that vision, we need to work backward to the realm of reality. The security infrastructure needs urgent upgrades - some immediate, some in the medium term and some more longer term including fundamental changes in the national security framework. We can no longer allow different agencies to determine what is best for them - there has been too much of gold-plating in the past, too much of empire building and too much time spent in protecting their individual turf. This has to be driven by collective will. And a lot of very hard questions at each step of the way.

Framework: Indian Intelligence Apparatus

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Tue, 02 Dec 2008 01:31:00 +0000

The premier Intelligence organizations in India are the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for internal intelligence and the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) for external intelligence. A number of other organizations have their own limited purpose intelligence organizations that are primarily information sinks or consumers, generating tactical level intelligence for their respective organizations. The IB, the RAW and the directorates of Military, Naval and Air Intelligence work under the Joint Integration Council, the apex body for integrating intelligence from disparate sources into a cohesive whole and then disemminating them to their consumers.

In this section, I intend to review the organization and functioning of the Indian intelligence apparatus from documents that are available in the public domain. Since a terror threat is ubiquitous by nature, counter-intelligence organizational elements specific to this type of threat will be the focus of much of my research. But first a quick backgrounder.

In Jul 1999, immediately after the Kargil war, the government constituted a committee (Kargil Review Committee) to look into the intelligence failure that led to the fiasco. The report of the committee, tabled in the parliament on Feb 23, 2003, was a scathing indictment of the state of the intelligence infrastructure of the country. The report stated in no unclear terms that there was a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels, that JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureauratic levels, that the assessment process has been downgraded in importance and consequently various agencies send very junior officials to JIC meetings and that the Chairmanship of the JIC had become the preserve of an IPS officer who was generally a runner-up for the post of Secretary (RAW) or DIB.

Further, there were no system of checks and balances to ensure that the intelligence consumer gets all that is due and available. There was no system of regular, periodic and comprehensive intelligence briefings at the political level and to the committee of secretaries. Bottomline, in the absence of an overall national security framework, each intelligence agency is diligent in preserving its own turf.

Most damagingly, the report stated that there was no evidence that the intelligence agencies conduct periodic review of their basic charter even in the face of evolving and changing patterns of threat perception - not after India went nuclear and nor even after insurgency and terror became a part of the fabric of life and death. The organization had deteriorated to yet another self-serving and bloated bureaucracy with capabilities last reviewed in the light of the security scenario of the cold-war , even though the budgetary allocation went up by an order of magnitudes considering the fact that in 1968, RAW had 250 agents and a budget of 2 crores. By 2000, the organization had expanded to about 10000 agents and a budget of 1500 crores.

Talk about empire building at its best!

Lets take a closer look at the two primary intelligence agencies in the country. First the RAW. Working directly in the cabinet secretariat (a part of the PMO), the RAW is India's foreign intelligence agency and an instrument of Indian national power with significant role in carrying out India's domestic and foreign policies. Founded in 1968, RAW focused largely on monitoring the political and military developments that affect national security in our immediate neighbourhood. RAW is headed by a Secretary. RAW enjoys a greater deal of autonomy in functioning than its western counterparts with direct access to the PM. Control of the cabinet secretary over RAW is limited to administrative and financial matters, with very little say in operational policy. On a daily basis, the Secretary (R) reports to the NSA. Structurally, RAW is organized by region with each having jurisdiction over a number of overseas stations. Intelligence is collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers. This data is either pre-processed by a senior field officer or by a desk officer who then passes the information to the Joint Secretaries who in turn pass these inputs on to the Additional Secretaries level completing the analysis cycle. From here, the intelligence reports go out for dissemination to various intelligence consumers. Director RAW is a member of the JIC steering committee and authorised to brief the PM should the need arise. Liaison with other agencies are maintained through liaison officers or specially designated groups on deputation to RAW from their parent arms. Though RAW has its own specialized service cadre, several of its officers are drawn on deputation from other services.

Now lets take a look at the Central Intelligence Bureau (IB).

IB has in the past been tasked with all intelligence targeting, has since focused on internal security. The IB is officially under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but in practice, its Director (DIB) is a member of the JIC and Steering Committee and has the authority to brief the PM should the need arise, but intelligence inputs (at least in theory) go through the regular channels in the MHA to the JIC.

Collection mechanisms of the IB vary depending on the region, but the IB operates both at the state level and the national level. Bulk of intelligence gathering is carried out by Grade II employees. The Class I officers carry out the coordination and higher-level management of the IB. Most of the grade 2 are cadre recruits or on deputation from state police while the class Is are deputed from state services.

At the state level all IB officers are part of the State Special Bureau and report to a Central Intelligence Officer who is also the intelligence advisor to the Governer. The IB maintains a large number of field units and headquarters and these along with its intricrate process of deputation provide a very organic system of vertical differentiation and linkages between state police agencies and the IB. Special units of the IB at the level of the center track issues like terrorism, counter-intelligence, VIP security, threat assessments and monitoring of sensitive areas.

Issues
One of the fundamental problems facing the intelligence community is with regard to staffing. In the past, postings and deputations to the IB were regarded as positive career choices among police officers and this led to a favourable buildup of expertise in both the state and national law enforcement circles. In more recent times, this has changed and state police postings offer far swifter means of promotion and career advancement. Besides, perks of the state level postings in some cases compare more favourably than those of a central posting. As a result, people have often to be forcibly deputed. The problem is further compounded by extremely hazardous duties in hostile populations often resulting in vacancies that go unfilled for months or even years leading to gaps in intelligence collection.

In certain sensitive areas, to increase the turnaround between collection and dissemination, IB officers serve to coordinate with regular law enforcement. To further lower the cycle time, law enforcement often setup their own intelligence gathering arms which, at least in theory, are supposed to coordinate with the IB for targeting. Many a time, this results in less than optimal levels of coordination or outright competition.

As a principle internal news agency, the intelligence apparatus is also responsible for monitoring all aspects of governance. As an extension of this role, it routinely monitors state governments and often draws up independent assessments of the security situation in a state for the Governer. At the central level, the IB closely monitors political parties and parliamentary affairs and resports back to the Cabinet Secretariat. Vital for maintaining the stability of elected governments, this role is easily subverted to acheive partisan objectives and lends to the general perception of the organization being a pawn in the hands of the ruling political party or coalition.

Other Agencies
Besides the R&AW and the CIB, there are numerous lesser intelligence apparatus functioning within and outside the country, among these the Defence Intelligency Agency (for military specific requirements of the three services), the National Facilities Technical Organization (NTFO), the Economic Intelligence Council under the Finance Ministry with its agencies - the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau and the Narcotics Control Bureau - operate in conjunction with enforcement arms and regulatory and investigative bodies like the RBI and CBI.

Conclusion
The intelligence apparatus in India is a result of an evolution of information requirements over the past 200 years or so. The structure and the culture of these organizations, working in close proximity to the centers of power and patronage, have demonstrated a proclivity to proliferate in headcount and budgetary allocations without serious considerations of efficiency or organizational effectiveness. The intelligence framework in the country is fragmented and fails spectacularly and periodically as the recent events in Mumbai have demonstrated so effectively. Yet there is no move to reform the intelligence community and bring about the level of integration required for it to deliver its mandate. Its a cozy setup that serves both the politician who has unlimited access to funds and resources and to the bureaucrats that serve in its plush offices in New Delhi, often jet-setting to congenial locales around the world on what is purpoted to be matters concerning national security interests. Despite that despicable fig leaf that is routinely proferred to avoid scrutiny, it is time that these organizations be thrown open to public audit.

Framework for National Security

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sun, 30 Nov 2008 05:19:00 +0000

Since our politicians are too inept and our bureaucrats are too self-serving and governmental processes and thinking still too entrenched in colonial times for it to function effectively in an evolving globalized environment, it is time for ordinary citizens of this country with the relevant skills and exposure to come together and create the environment in which a framework for national security can evolve. The Mumbai episode has proven that we can no longer continue to rely on the government to provide the level of security needed for an emerging economy like India to continue to function effectively. The bottomline is that whatever structure is setup has to meet the needs of the ordinary citizen. Here is a small start and I will approach it purely from my present role as a consultant for performance management.

Lets start with the element of national security most visible to the ordinary citizen - the Police - ask yourself a few simple question? Do the police in its existing avatar inspire confidence in ordinary citizens? Would you be confident of walking into your local police station and filing a complaint? Would you be happy to call a 100 number to report suspicious activity? Examine your thought processes as you undertake this exercise? Is it faith, confidence and utmost trust that floods you. Or is it trepidation? Fear? Or the human response to all threat - flight?

The Police Organization in India

Article 246 of the Constitution of India places police, public order, courts, prisons, reformatories, borstal and other allied institutions in the State List. The structure and working of the state police forces are governed by the Police Act of 1861. The Indian Police Service (IPS) is an all India service which is recruited, trained and managed by the central government and provides the bulk of the senior officers to the state police forces. The quasi federal character of the Indian polity, with specific provisions in the constitution allows a coordinating and counselling role for the center in police matters and even authorises it to setup certain central police organizations.
The police station is the basic unit of police administration in a district or metro. A police station is divided into a number of beats which are then assigned to constables for patrolling, survelliance and collection of intelligence. Under section 3 of the Police Act 1861, there is provision for a system of dual control at the district level which places police forces under a district superintendant of police albeit under the "general control and direction" of the district magistrate that made the police force subservient to a bureaucrat on the principle of having a single executive head at district level that was so essential for maintenance of British rule in India. The magistrate role even overlapped judicial functions at this level.

Within a metropolitan area, however, the district structure did not work well and was replaced by the Commissionerate system where the policing responsibility was vested in a Commissioner of Police.

Criminal investigation was vested with the CID - a specialized branch of the police - a comprised two components: the crime branch and the special branch. The crime branch is the most important investigative arm of the state police and is multi-jurisdictional in nature. Special branch on the other hand is an intelligence arm providing for collection, collation and disemmination of intelligence and to monitor the overall security environment. Though structurally weak, the ATS was the state police's response to counter terrorism and has served reasonably well for most routine anti-terror investigations, albeit only where ever these units have been led by able professionals.

The state police itself has two primary components - civil police and armed police. The civil police deals with crime while the armed police provides a police contingency reserve to deal with law and order situations. The civil police man the police districts and have their own armed reserves for guard, escort or first response.

Response to Terror by Western Democracies

Lets examine the policing systems in some more developed western economies like the America and Britain and see what actions have been taken by these two prominent western democracies in response to global terrorism.

The American system of policing is quite unique by world standards states an article on the JRANK.org website (Police: Organization and Management - The American System Of Policing). There are approximately twenty thousand state and local police agencies in the US. Other English speaking democracies have a much smaller number: Canada (461), England (43), India (22) and Australia (8). It goes on to say that the majority of police agencies in the US are only loosely connected to one another with many having overlapping jurisdictions at multiple levels of government. Consolidating all these disparate structures into a more professionalized and unified framework was one of the recommendations in 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The article examines whether the economies of scale acheived from a unified structure results in a more efficient utilization of resources and also considers the information gaps resulting from poor communication, coordination and cooperation between siloed structures that more often than not allowed offenders to "slip betwen the cracks".

As a response to the September 11, 2001 terror strike, the US government setup a new organization - the department of homeland security that went operational in Jan 2003. Under the mandate of the Act, a new organizational chart was presented to the White House within 60 days of the enactment. Besides administrative and management functions, the structure provided for an integrated setup for (a) information analysis, (b) infrastructure protection and (c) emergency preparedness and response (d) science and technology (e) border and transport security operating under an integrating mechanism - the homeland security council. The creation of DHS resulted in a reorganization of the executive branch on a scale not experienced since the establishment of the Department of Defence (DoD) nearly half a century ago. The DHS was and still is a product of legislative compromises with a provision to monitor and adjust its structure as conditions warranted.

The law enforcement in the UK is arranged by geographical police areas matched to the boundaries of one or more local government areas. Majority of law enforcement is done by police constables. After the introduction of the Police Reform Act of 2002, law enforcement is increasingly carried out by people who are not constables. There are 43 police forces in the UK. All forces have teams of police officers who are responsible general patrol duties and response to emergency and non-emergency calls from the public. Most local areas or wards have at least one police officer who is involved in building links with the local community and resolve long term problems. The CID can be found in all police forces and deals with the investigations of more complex, serious nature. And all forces also have specialist departments that deal with certain aspects of policing - traffic, firearms, marine, horse, tactical support et al.

For counter terrorism, the UK Metropolitan police decided to setup a Specialist Counter Terrorism Command - a new bespoke, multi-faceted, single counter-terrorism command not restricted in design or look by existing structures. This has effectively taken over the roles of the Anti-terrorism and special branch of the existing police apparatus. The new command brings together intelligence analysis and development with investigations and operational support activity. Its mandate includes bringing to justice those engaged in terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences, to provide proactive and reactive response to such offences, gather and exploit intelligence, to assess, analyze and develop intelligence to drive operational activity, to assist British Security Service and the SIS in filfulling their statutory roles, to be the single point of contact for international partners in counter-terrorism matters and to assist in protecting British interests overseas by investigating attacks against such interests. The British already have several integrating structure in place - like that Joint Terrorism Analysis Center - that brings together people from the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Staff, Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command and a further six government departments.

So now what?

The police are essentially a public service delivery organization and all processes and performance measures typical of a service delivery organization can be applied even to the police organization and specifically to the organizational frontline - the beat constable within a specific police jurisdiction. Any structural change that does not fundamentally change public perceptions about the beat constable may well be discarded at the outset for it is just money down another bureaucratic drain.

Task forces setup to handle multi-jurisdictional crime routinely become permanent in nature, requiring an additional level of collaborating and coordinating mechanisms and these can be dealt with as part of the organizational design processes based on any of the current practices. Of these practices, the contingency theory appears to be the most applicable at this time. Changing tack, lets consider the legacy of the present police organization - British colonialism. Police structures were based on a military/professional model [Ref: Police: Organization and Management - Managing Police Organizations] where discretion was available only in the hands of the bureaucracy. The police did was they were told to do, irrespective of the inconveniences to the common citizen as long as the requirements of the British rulers were met. This model quite obviously has no place in a modern democracy where police serves the common citizen. Yet the military/professional model of management continues. What is needed it its place is a system of community policing that various reform efforts coalesed into in America during the 1990s. One definition , used by the Justice Departments Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, contains three elements: (a) organizational and managerial change, (b) problem solving and (c) community partnerships. What ensued was the adoption of private-sector business practices and principles for the management of police services organization and delivery. Police reform appears to be the most urgent need of the hour.

Beyond normal policing situations, there is a multiplicity of organizations dealing with different threat perceptions - both internal and external. We will keep the scope of the discussion narrow to the immediate levels of escalation needed by a beat constable, in case of a situation requiring specialized skills specially since the Maharashtra government has already proposed an NSG-like force for Mumbai. The desirability of this along with its control and administrative structure needs to taken into consideration before a state commits to raising such a force. However, in the realm of immediate feasibility is the need to create specialized quick response units, a quasi-military unit armed with military grade weapons for the purpose of dealing with particularly violent situations and which can act within a specified timeframe. However, even here, their situational mandate would be limited to removing innocent bystanders from dangerous people and dangerous situations, not violent resolution.

So what is the solution? It is definitely not setting up an NSG style force for different metros and have them serving under a police organization. The first two requirements for the evolution of a framework for national security would be the definition of structure for a federal, integrated (internal, external and including the criminal justice systems) national security backbone followed immediately by an unification and harmonization of the security backbone standards and processes that facilitate communication, coordination and collaboration among all its disparate elements. What has to be kept in mind while doing this is that the different elements of national security have their own traditions and ethos - cultural elements that are so essential to effective organizations. There should be no attempt to drown out the essential elements of culture at the tactical level during the standardization and harmonization process. At the strategy and policy making levels of the organization, we just need the best talent available across the board - talent, that is measured only by the effectiveness of security that delivered to every citizen. However, there is one caveat. When the wish list is drawn up, the requirements for total security will exceed the GDP of India and grow exponentially. The point of balance between the need and the costs we are willing to sustain over the long term on a security apparatus given India's competing and equally urgent social needs will be difficult to determine.

However, we can no longer leave this to our self serving bureaucrats, not even as an arbitrator between the different silos of national security and not even to our bumbling array of adolescent to geriatric politicians. It calls for leadership, talent and committment of the highest order and this talent has to be drawn from the existing system and facilitated. The amount of rot in the system is monumental and the earlier the work starts with the well being of eachm and every citizen at the center of focus the better prepared we will be for the next event, which by all indications, maybe just around the corner. The only thing that seperates us from acheiving the desired end state is collective will. This has to become a people's movement in order to drive implementation timeframes of the restructuring and accountability of our elected representatives.

Institutional Framework for National Security

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sat, 29 Nov 2008 14:38:00 +0000

When an event of the size of the recent terrorist strike in Mumbai occcurs, there is an immediate consensus on the need to create an institutional framework for national security. History has proved time and again that such a consensus had occured on numerous occasions in the past only to have been given an undignified burial in a bureaucratic crypt each and every time. Why does this happen? Let me hazard a guess.

This has to do with institutional frameworks - a common euphemism for integrating structures in organizational design. National security in India has always been a concept whose understanding has been siloed by the type, nature and scope of the organization that has been reposed by the responsibility for that silo. Traditionally, these silos have been that of Defence, Border and Coast Guard, Police, Intelligence and the various Investigative agencies governed by a bureaucratic maze comprising the defence and home ministries at the central level and the bureaucratic state government machinery at the other. The keyword is "bureaucratic maze". And there is a reason for it.

Our bureaucrats inherited a privileged position in society from our colonial past and they have thrived on its self serving system of pomp and pelf. Politicians and bureaucrats operate back-to-back to preserve this system and resort to connivance and collusion to thwart any attempts to rectify the system if it would in some way reduce their role or importance. Rampant corruption, callousness and debilitating inefficiency are endemic to the system that nurtures the bureaucratic system. It throttles any talent that threatens their attempts to enlarge status and privileges.

"National Security" unfortunately, appears to be beyond the comprehension of the average bureaucrat, so accustomed to the sychopant salute of a security guard outside their posh offices in Delhi or other districts and state capitals. Bureaucracy understands the "National" bit. the "Security" bit is a bit hazy even by itself. But put together into single quotes - "National Security" - is a completely baffling subject, especially in its ramifications. It is not static in nature nor is it a closed system that can work in isolation indefinitely. So the bureaucratic approach to this subject has been a cautious, time-consuming creep up into positions of power within the security apparatus, grasping at fleeting notions of security concepts to appear momentarily knowledgeable at least to the extent required for the occasional sound byte and needed only until they exited the structure on moving to other more lucrative positions of power and pelf in departments that were less euphemistic. All this, fully knowing that the various silos would continue to function effectively in their respective domains without ever needing interorganizational coordination or seek arbitration when there was a conflict of interest. Here, the bureaucracy reigned supreme. This was their ultimate source of power - the ability to arbitrate between two silos. It preserved their system while threatening each other laterally. And in each silo, there would be gladiators who would learn to move ahead despite the system and die when needed. The overhead costs were only a medal, a silo specific funeral and the occasional cheque or two. Total control - power and pelf at its best.

But times are changing. An integrated headquarters for defence was mooted nearly 30 years ago soon after the 1971 Indo-Pak war when the need have a coordinated strategy for defence became apparent. In 1984, terrorism came to India with a big bang and the bureaucracy initiated a chain of events that led to the formation of the NSG, a miracle of careful silo-reengineering. Then came sustained Punjab insurgency requiring close coordination between police, intelligence and defence silos within the jurisdiction of a single state. The Sri Lankan engagement was primarily an Army engagement localized to a single silo hence quite manageable even though the intelligence silo appeared to often work at cross purposes with the defence silo on that occassion.

The Mumbai blasts of 1993 added a regional and an external dimension to security concerns and the bureaucracy muddled through that crisis by creating one committee after another to educate themselves and finally did nothing about it. Security itself was never as rewarding as other bureaucratic functions, except when it came to defence procurement. A procedure was finally drafted for defence that kept the primary stakeholders out of the final decision processes. IC 817 hijacking was an unique twist, but its ramifiations were again minimized to one or two silos. Then Kargil - defence and external intelligence silos managed the situation.

Then came the 9/11 syndrome and the Al Qaida shaped outfits called the Lashkar, the Jaish, the Huji and the Indian Mujahideen. Interestingly, all appeared to be conveniently in the middle of the state list - the police and intelligence silo - still manageable. The various insurgencies across India and that in Kashmir kept the defence and intelligence silos active.

And then came Mumbai - an approach from the sea (coast guard) possibly from a mothership (customs/coast guard) guided by a naval escort (defence), landed at the gateway (customs), crossed over into the Mumbai police jurisdiction (state silo), entered the hotels and other internationally well recognized premises and opened fire on anyone and everyone present. The situation quickly escalated into an international event and sucked in the defence, intelligence, investigative and police silos even as domestic and international media management became a new requirement for special forces strike units. The bureaucrats went into hiding, chosing to send a junior spokesman to read a printed statement on the status of the operations in Mumbai. A junior who did not know how to modulate his smirk of importance in the face of intense media attention. A junior bureaucrat, just in case someone knowledgeable asked a pertinant question, it could be dismissed as the inept response of a junior bureaucrat. Mostly, it would avoid embarassment to a senior bureaucrat attempting to define "national security" and save them from appearing as surprised as (for want of a better analogy) a defecating fawn caught in the headlights of a vehicle in the middle of the night.

The Mumbai situation was completely new and untested waters for any silo based approach and the PM has already announced the need for an institutional framework for national security. The knee jerk reaction of the Maharashtra government was to set up another silo - an NSG for Mumbai. That soon had Bangalore and Chennai and Kolkata clamouring for their own NSGs. At 800 crores per piece, it was a lucrative silo with its own types of perks - the image of a local gun-toting black clad personal security lads was compelling.

The bureaucrats are already hard at work to see how they can preserve and extend their power and pelf into what would be a key organization of the future. The people however, need to ensure our bureaucrats are only a component, not the driver in the decision hierarchy that would be driven by real talent drawn from the various silos and empowered by a federal act. And that is going to be a tough call, given their entrenched positions - very much like the last gunman in Room 206 of Hotel Taj Mahal.

New NSG-type unit for Maharashtra - typical knee jerk reaction of a jaded bureaucracy

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sat, 29 Nov 2008 12:09:00 +0000

The fires at the Taj, the Trident Oberoi and the Nariman House are still burning and our politicians and bureaucrats have come up with their formula for a silver bullet against the scourge of terror - a local force patterned on the NSG. The sheer audacity for politician to make that wide and sweeping statement without understanding its full import is a typical knee jerk reaction that one has come to expect from them. Unfortunately, it is not the politician who probably originated the idea. It is probably our omnipresent bureaucracy that did the background work to facilitate that statement. But do our bureaucrats understand what it entails? Who is most equipped to even arbitrate the discussion on whether a country like India would be most benefited if it were raised as a central, federal or state level organization? What would it take for a state like Maharashtra to raise an unit patterned on the NSG? Would it be a viable local counter terror response unit capable of undertaking the mission? To understand this we need to get to the bottom of the unit on which it is being patterned - the NSG itself.

The NSG is a voluntary force of professionals drawn from the Army and a number of para military organizations - the BSF, CRPF among others and represents a dated attempt to create a federal special forces unit that has the ethos of the Army Special Forces and an administrative apparatus that would enable such a force to operate under a federal ambit in conjunction with a states existing police organization. As such, it is organized into core strike elements - the Special Action Groups - drawing its ranks mainly from the Indian Army special forces units, the cordon elements - the Special Ranger Groups - drawing its ranks from the paramilitary forces, and numerous ancillary specialist units for combat, communication and logistic support and a training organization for induction and development. Other elements, especially its vital and integrated air component that was envisaged in its original vision is best left out of this discussion for the moment. The strike element draws its culture and ethos from an Army that is battle hardened through years of training, indoctrination and almost continuous exposure to low intensity conflicts and counter-insurgency operations in India and in other locations worldwide.

A force for Maharashtra would necessarily have to be a special police unit and would operate within the existing state police organizational hierarchy and be funded through state revenues. Mumbai, being the commercial capital, can most definitely finance the required headcount and provide them with the best equipment and training available to the world. So where is the problem? The problem lies in developing and sustaining the special forces culture and ethos.

The life of a soldier in a counter-terror unit is finite. It is an extremely high energy environment - both physically and mentally demanding - and it takes nearly a year for a soldier drawn from the Army to complete the full acculturation process. And for a new comer, the novelty wears out after a few operations as other normal life time events occur. It is an experience organization as distinguished from a career organization. People need to move on. New blood needs to be infused periodically and this new blood has to have a basic quality and calibre. How will an already overburdened police organization with its myriad responsibilities and numerous ongoing issues provide an nurturing environment for an ethos that takes even an organization like the Army years to build and then its designated role oriented environment, to sustain?

Changing Nature of Warfare

noreply@blogger.com (ranjivk59) — Sat, 29 Nov 2008 12:05:00 +0000

The nature of warfare has been changing over several past decades and very visibly since Sep 2001. The trend first arrived into our collective consciousness during the 1984 army operations at the Golden Temple in Amritsar and exploded onto the mainstream during the 1993 Mumbai blasts. It is warfare that trancends borders in a confusing kalideoscope of characters, events and issues, defying nation state boundaries and leaving mayhem in its path. And into this evil brew it brings religion as the interorganizational strategy to manage the environment and to attract, acquire and motivate its deadly talent.

The NSG, our primary federal counter-terror response unit, setup in the aftermath of the 1984 operations, was patterned at the tactical level on the famed German border guard unit - the GSG9 - and at the strategic level on the American Special Operations Command. It foresaw a high-tech, fully integrated air and ground elements operating within a federal ambit. It ended up enmeshed into a outmoded colonial internal security apparatus, that is even today, a state subject. The dichotomy ensured its ruin. Seen increasingly in its alternate avatar - the comic spectacle of highly visibile gun-toting personal security guards accompanying politicians of all hues - it was reduced to yet another para-military unit under a government ministry utterly incapable of understanding its role. That they can still function in times of crisis should only be attributed to absolute professionalism and to the talent of individuals within its ranks who continue to operate against all odds despite its phenomenonally outmoded ecosystem.
Changing such a well entrenched system requires a powerful intent, the likes of which we will probably never see until the rebirth of the collective conciousness and a strong belief in the concept called "India" - always ephemeral, euphemistic and yet so tantalising for those who can see it occassionally. Maybe it is the attempt to define a region as a nationstate that is creating the problem. Maybe India has always represented the concept of a region which can let a billion nation states coexist - each man, women and child a nation state. And imagine the power of intent if the whole region shrugged off old differences and came together to fight this scourge? Thats still a long while away.

It is however strange coincidence that the NSG bears the sign of a "Sudarshan Chakra", the ultimate weapon of the collective conciousnessness. Maybe, just maybe, its time for rebirth.