My first introduction to the concept of human security was from the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University. As a political scientist, I knew of many conceptualizations of conflict, but had never heard about human security. At that early stage of my education, I was developing my first personal opinions on conflict, what it is, and what it is not. From an undergraduate background focusing on global health, my view of conflict went beyond the traditional focus. Conflict are more than generals, tactics, and strategy. Conflict are also about damaged roads, fleeing civilians, and a loss of stability. That idea crystalized when I stumbled upon this definition of human security:

“Unlike traditional concepts of security, which focus on defending borders from external military threats, human security is concerned with the security of individuals.”

The sentence encapsulated my own beliefs eloquently and simply. Conflicts threaten people. Since then, I have been an avid follower of the Human Security Report Project. Now, the project is using two blogs to offer a human security perspective on AfPak. Both the Afghanistan and Pakistan Conflict Monitors are aggregators of human security information on the conflicts and are worthwhile readings for anyone in the field. Check them out.

A while ago, an internet flash game called Pandemic 2 became popular in some circles. In the game, players manipulate a disease’s characteristics (symptoms, resistances, etc…) to develop the deadliest possible pandemic. Simply put, players design diseases to wipe out the human race.

Play Pandemic 2 for any significant length of time and you quickly realize why the game is so difficult:  Madagascar. In the game, Madagascar has a hairpin trigger for closing its borders, making infecting the island nation almost impossible.

Madagascar’s behavior in the game has started an ongoing internet joke about what goes on in high level policy discussions in the government during the simulated pandemic (one example is shown on the right).

The punchline has a ring of truth. Last spring, Mexico shut down the country for days to counter H1N1. But, is closing down a country (or even part of a country) actually a good option in the real world? Only if you face a biblical plague.

The economic cost of closing down (or closing off) a country for any length of time is immense. It is a lesson Mexico learned the hard way. Not only does the domestic economic activity of a state take a major hit, the closure fuels fears amongst international trading partners that states are unstable and unreliable. Investors like policy stability. States prone to shutting down in the face of pandemics risk becoming less appealing investment locations. As globalization and climate change make pandemics more common, countries with reputations for resiliency during outbreaks will become attractive investment locations. The tendency of Pandemic 2’s Madagascar to close its borders at the slightest sign of danger would make it an foreign direct investment (FDI) pariah. Unless of course, we faced the perfect pandemic, in which case, see you there.

The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) is a document framing the future direction of US Army training and doctrine. Brig. Gen. McMaster has posted a draft version of the ACC online, and is even looking for feedback from the online conflict community.

I have only briefly browsed the document, but one thing is clear: civilians, human security, history, culture, social science, and human terrain have a central role in the new ACC. This is a sea change from the last ACC, which emphasized the importance of advanced technology. Check out a summary of the ACC in this Army video below:

The 2009 Army Capstone Concept from TRADOC on Vimeo.

Have a free evening? Passionate about global health? CSIS’s new Smart Global Health commission has launched an essay competition. And, since you retain the copyright, it is no-loss situation for bloggers. If you lose, you still have a blog post ready to publish!

The CSIS Commission on Smart Global Health is seeking essay submissions that answer the following question in 500-800 words by midnight, November 20th 2009:

“What is the most important thing the U.S. can do to improve global health over the next 15 years?“

We are looking for fresh, innovative approaches to global health problems. The author of the winning essay will receive a $1,000 scholarship with a chance to be published in the Commission’s final report. Complete details can be found at:

Sign up here.

The CSIS Commission on Smart Global Health Policy focuses on practical solutions that maximize efficiency, produce measurable results, and engage the American public. This essay contest is one way we’re expanding the conversation to include the ideas and opinions of people who are passionate about global health issues.

Last week, a fellow contributor to USNI noticed that the US Navy has a new slogan: “America’s Navy – A Global Force for Good” . The slogan is likely an attempt to highlight the Navy’s growing role as a instrument of US soft power around the world. From disaster relief in the Pacific to health clinics in South America, the Navy is quickly positioning itself as America’s de facto soft power force.

I would not at all be surprised if, in five years, you would be hard pressed to find a sailor that hadn’t participated in a humanitarian mission.

A report published by the New America Foundation estimates up to 320 Pakistani civilians have died in US drone-based airstrikes. The statistic was estimated from an analysis of news reports.

We restricted our analysis to reports in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, accounts by major news services and networks–the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN, and the BBC–and reports in the leading English-language newspapers in Pakistan–The Daily Times, Dawn, and The News–as well as those from Geo TV, the largest independent Pakistani television network.

Here is a summary of the results:

It is not possible to differentiate precisely between militant and civilian casualties because the militants live among the population and don’t wear uniforms, and because the militants have the incentive to claim that all the casualties were civilians, while government sources tend to claim the opposite. However, of those killed in drone attacks from 2006 through mid-October 2009, between 500 and 700 were described in reliable press reports as militants, or some 66 to 68 percent.

Based on our count of the estimated number of militants killed, the real total of civilian deaths since 2006 appears to be in the range of 250 to 320, or between 31 and 33 percent.

The report offers a counterargument to the growing number of ‘offshore balancers’, who argue the United States should withdraw all ground forces and instead bomb Afghanistan and Pakistan from afar. Forcing civilians and militants to keep on eye on the sky is not victory as currently defined. In their words, “the drone program is a tactic, not a strategy”.

From time to time, I highlight blogs that have moved to the top of my daily reading list. Here are three conflict and health blogs that I have been thoroughly enjoying with my morning coffee. Check them out and consider adding them to your RSS reader.

VethnoGraphy. Craig Kiebler’s blog focuses on agricultural and veterinary infrastructure, and their relationship with society. In practice, posts often mix global health, veterinary science, and conflict in one soupy delicacy. Why should you read it? Because it is fascinating and (more importantly) original. You can read about child health, HIV, and swine flu on a dozen great blogs, but VethnoGraphy is the only place writing exclusively on the relationship between animals and global health.

CTLab’s Current Intelligence. I don’t think I have given the Complex Terrain Laboratory enough credit. Michael Innes (who just published two pieces at Foreign Policy) and John Matthew Barlow have put together a serious team of contributors, minus one lucky guy who snuck in under the radar. Don’t believe me? Check out this nearly one thousand word post by Professor Charli Carpenter (founder of The Duck of Minerva) on the Russia-Georgia War.

War is Boring. Freelance journalist David Axe has turned his little blog into a solid publication, with one correspondent just returning from Afghanistan and a second just leaving. The site publishes article length posts on armed conflict at least three times a week, often with original photography. War is Boring is one of the few great independent war journalism blogs.

In May, Adam Elkus examined the H1N1 in terms of system perturbation:

Mexico’s image has also taken a severe battering. Already portrayed in international media as a warzone riven by cartel violence, Mexico’s status as a possible origin point of the influenza is likely to have adverse public relations and economic effects long after the influenza outbreak extinguishes itself. Non-essential services in Mexico have currently ceased and 168 have already died from flu-like symptoms. China experienced similar embarrassment after the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2006 Avian Flu outbreak, spurring calls for healthcare and governance reforms. Many international actors perceived the reforms that resulted as effective. By the time the 2008 Olympics rolled around, Avian Flu was a distant memory. As an Associated Press story notes, Mexico will likely face a similar pressure for reform because of its lackluster response to the outbreak…

Could it have the same affect on the international stage? I won’t be holding my breath. Thomas P.M. Barnett defines system perturbation as “like a giant stone dropped into a calm pond”, after which “…all bets are off. The old rule set evaporates, the new one is not yet gelled”. For all their effects, epidemics (and pandemics) have historically been weak causes of this type of international reorganization. United States foreign policy was affected by the 1918 Spanish Flu, but the pandemic did little to change the fundamental structure of United States behavior towards other countries in the international environment. Compared with the aftermath of WWII, which brought about a new system of international relations (e.g. hegemony with responsibilities, international organizations), epidemics are rather ineffectual as agents of system perturbation. Epidemics are significant, but don’t expect them to reset the international environment.

Two former Zambian Air Force officers are suing the country’s military, claiming to have been tested for HIV without their knowledge. Military HIV testing is voluntary in Zambia. The military argues they discharged the two officers for other medical conditions (cancer and TB).

Both were put through medical tests in 2001 that they believed were routine check-ups, after which they were put on medication.

Much later, both men volunteered to be tested for HIV and claim it was only then that they were told that the drugs they had been taking were anti-retrovirals.

The case is bringing the debate over mandatory HIV screening in Zambia back into the public debate. Opponents claim mandatory screening is a violation of human rights. Proponents argue it is a public health necessity.

From April 1775 to March 1776 the Continental Army lay siege to British forces in the town of Boston. The eleven month siege resulted in a major victory for George Washington’s scrappy army. Boston’s geography (a peninsula connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus) is often credited for the lack of an early decisive engagement during the siege. The physical terrain worked against the attacker in any potential maneuver. However, some recent histories highlight another reason for the long stalemate: smallpox.

Smallpox flourished during the war. The highly virulent disease spread rapidly as soldiers on both sides clustered in unsanitary camps. The incidence was fueled by the steady supply of new recruits with no previous exposure. One early report in the war claimed that between 30-35% of Washington’s troops were sick (not always smallpox) and unfit for duty (Becker 2004, 393).

Washington’s army was especially at risk from smallpox. While African Americans, Native Americans, and British troops commonly inoculated themselves to smallpox, American colonists widely scorned the practice. The inoculation procedure required the application of pus from a smallpox pustule onto the skin of an non-immune individual. Many New England colonist considered the practice repulsive — even blasphemous — and enacted heavy legal restrictions against it. As a result, Washington had great difficulty inoculating his troops and his army was perpetually at risk of debilitating smallpox epidemics within their ranks.

Historians debate why the British commander, General Howe, failed to fortify the Dorchester Heights, which overlooked his besieged town. While most historians blame the personal failings of Howe, Ann Becker argues that the epidemiological terrain made Howe consider a Continental offensive unlikely. During the siege, Washington commented in letters that smallpox existed throughout Boston and British troops inside the city were thoroughly inoculated. The Continental general considered smallpox “a weapon of defense they are using against us” and a “surety against any attempt of ours to attack” (George Washington to John Hancock and George Washington to Joseph Reed, both quoted in Becker 2004, 399). Any attack on Boston would expose the Continental Army to smallpox in Boston, giving the inoculated British troops a significant advantage. Thus, General Hume — surrounded by a smallpox epidemic — felt secure from Continental attack.

Work Cited

Becker, Ann M. 2004. “Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during the American Revolutionary War.” The Journal of Military History 68(2): 381-430.