wassertanzen13

*&%&! blogger

2007-02-13T22:33:00.000-08:00

This may well be my last post to this blog, unfortunately. You see, they want me to switch to their new version, which requires me to use a gmail account. Yeah, I have one, but I don't appreciate fascism. Thanks just the same, blogger. Anyway, I'll continue to post here as long as I can without submitting to their will, but I'm not to optimistic about it. Just in case this does indeed turn out to be my last post to this blog, I'll post an update on where my new blogging location will be on the pilots for 9/11 truth forum Screw you google. I won't submit to fascism from you or anyone else.

a few 9/11 truth updates

2006-11-25T02:39:00.000-08:00

I ran into a thing called stumbleupon.com recently. It's pretty cool. You can join groups like the 9/11 Truth Searchers or just pick keywords for topics that you are interested in and see what sites you stumbleupon. I've been slowly adding more blogs to the 9/11 Truth Movement blogshares category. I started a list of some documents which might be helpful to try to get through FOIA requests over at the Pilots for 9/11 Truth forum. That's where I've been writing the most lately; you can find my started threads there from here. Feel free to join us! Anyway, that's about all that I've got right now in terms of updates.

The Secret Service on 9/11

2006-11-05T22:02:00.000-08:00

I've updated my prior blog post on the Secret Service in NYC to add some new information to it and put together some information on their presence and activities in other places on 9/11 here. When read in combination with the current information on the Secret Service in the Complete 9/11 timeline, I think it provides the most complete picture I've seen yet (in only three sources!). Let me know if you are aware of more stuff which should be included that hasn't been covered yet.

Pilots for 9/11 Truth interview with the NTSB's Jim Ritter about the FDR and simulation for Flight 77

2006-10-27T01:05:00.000-07:00

Check this out, it's hot off the presses. No really, you'll want to watch it, and then get others to watch it. Trust me. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPF4Lo4wkJ4 Ask questions. Demand answers.

updates

2006-10-26T22:25:00.000-07:00

I haven't posted here much lately, but I've been busy. Posting at the old Loose Change forum, then trying to save content from there after it shut down and moving over to the Pilots for 9/11 Truth forum. I've just put up a few links on my sidebar, which I will add to as I feel called to. Killtown's site already has a pretty comprehensive listing of various websites, forums and blogs, so I won't be attempting to reinvent the wheel with anything comprehensive. I've also posted a link to the new blogshares industry: 9/11 Truth Movement, which I'm going to try to get blogs added into. Anyway, you can see some of my recent writing at the LC forum (until it goes 404 at least, though I've tried to save what I thought was important from there)
or at the Pilots for 9/11 Truth Forum
So, just because I don't post here that much and have been slacking on my tags, etc. doesn't mean I've gone silent.

A partial critique of Debunking 911 - WTC 7

2006-09-22T01:07:00.000-07:00

Now I know that this site is likely to change (as such things do), but I thought I'd give it a little critique in its current form. Here's the link to the page:
Debunking 9/11 WTC 7
Here's my recent webcitation link, for comparison purposes: http://www.webcitation.org/5J3wv5GIZ

Debunking 9/11 exclusive! ~ World Trade Center 7 South Side Hole

Researching this, I began looking for images of the WTC 7south side hole the firemen talked about. The only photo's I could find had this massive hole obscured by tremendous plumes of smoke. I came across Steve Spak's web site with various 9/11 images. He has an excellent DVD with images not seen anywhere. I E-mailed Mr. Spak to see if he had any photos of the huge hole in the south side of building 7. He sent me back what I conclude is the best photo of the south side damage yet.

Did he send back the exact version posted on the webpage (with Steve Spak Debunking 9 11 written on it) If not, could we see a slightly more original (and less photoshopped) version of the photo for comparison purposes? If all this site can show us is manipulated images without references to the original source material, how seriously can we take it?

Even this photo doesn't show the entire hole.

Got any pictoral evidence to back up that claim?

Mr. Spak said he just happen to take the shot when the smoke cleared enough to see a portion of it.

Hmm, just happened, eh? And the most interesting bits which we wouldn't have seen before just happened to be obscured by a building... just like in all the other photos we've seen. Hmm, what a coincidence, right?

The WTC mezzanine covers the bottom half of the hole so we can't know how wide the hole is on the bottom floors. The skin of the building seems to be detached from the floors as if the north tower debris took some building 7 floors with it on the way down.

Not much worth commenting on here. "Seems" and "as if" mean the author is speculating. Why should I buy his speculation?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Update:

Just as conspiracy theorists used the north side photos to suggest that was the extent of the damage, (A few small fires) conspiracy theorists are now using this photo to suggest the photo shows the total extent of the damage.

Well, maybe some are. Maybe some of those CTers are on the payroll, too... Who knows? That's the disadvantage of never linking to alternate sources and backing things up. All we have to go on is the author's word. Why should we trust that? What evidence have we been shown that this person actually cares about finding out the truth no matter what that might be? Now my personal claim on the topic is that this "evidentiary picture offers us a new angle on damage which we've already established (South West corner of WTC 7 between floors 8 and 18, extending 1-2 columns along the south face of WTC 7). We also get to see a bit of the south face of WTC 7 which does not appear to be significantly damaged, structurally speaking. And a lot of smoke. There may have been more damage to the south face of WTC 7, but so far all we have to go on is conflicting testimony. Popular Mechanics says they've seen pictures which confirm this damage. Apparently, we don't get to. Some firefighters claim there was a big hole, other accounts say that the lobby had no large debris in it and that the only damage to the facade on the 9th floor was on the SW corner. Who knows? Be nice to see some more pictures, though. Popular Mechanics claims they exist, and why would they lie to us? After all, 360 of their brothers perished... oops, I'm getting a little ahead of myself there...

I emphasized the above because for some reason conspiracy theorists don't get it. Yes, I can't find a photo which shows more damage to the south side but conspiracy theorist who have been shown to be wrong time and time again also can't find a photo proving the south side only had the damage we see. I find this double standard comically obvious.

Well, perhaps some "conspiracy theorists" have been shown to be wrong time and time again. Perhaps some "coincidence theorists" have been shown wrong time and time again as well. Something about blind sows and acorns? When I see evidence which persuades me that my thinking has been incorrect, I change my mind. I used to think the smoke on WTC 7 was mostly enhanced by shooting through WTC 6 smoke. Now, I'm less sure. I've seen more photographic and video evidence to indicate that there was quite a bit of smoke coming out of WTC 7. Check out my post on misrepresenting photographic evidence. Rather than change that post, I write a new one to reflect my new thoughts based on new (to me) evidence. Also, so called "conspiracy theorists", at least many of them, should not bear the burden of proof on this issue (not being able to find photographic evidence). That's like saying, "well, they haven't shown us any pictures of the grassy knoll shooters, therefore the official story must be true." What we have here is a situation where there was limited access for close up photography. We know there were cameras in the area taking pictures. Some of them have even been seen by the public, believe it or not! Until we get official under oath testimony from all the photographers who we know were taking pictures at ground zero on 9/11 that every single one of their photos taken on 9/11 are available for public viewing, doubt remains about what we haven't seen. How to clear up that doubt? Release more photos, already! What's the security issue here? Instead, we (those of us who track such things) see photographic and documentary evidence disappearing from public view. Who is saving these things? This is historical. This was a criminal act of mass murder. This event has been used to justify so much that has happened in the last 5 years... sorry. Back to the critique.
Image 1

This photo is copyrighted and was given with permission to debunking911 for use on this site.

A statement from Steve Spak:
This photo was taken a couple of hours before number 7 WTC collapsed. Two water mains that supplied lower Manhattan were damaged leaving little or no water pressure in the area. Hours before the collapse of 7 WTC, Fire Chiefs at the scene advised all units to stay away from 7 WTC because of the collapse dangers. They had no water to fight the blaze and the building was damaged from the collapse of the North Tower. You can see a big hole on the lower floors in this photo. I believe that the Chiefs made the right decision in letting 7 WTC burn.

Steve Spak
stevespak.com

If you count the columns which are visible, you can see this is NOT the corner damage in the FEMA photo below.

Image 2
I disagree. Looks pretty much like the same damage from a different angle to me. But I'll post a bunch of links to images and let the reader decide for him or herself. The problem for me here is that the camera angle and perspective appear to be intentionally designed to create the illusion of a large amount of damage. The obscuring mezzanine, the downward sloping lines which can be drawn on the windows of the Verizon building... these things give perspective on the photographer's position. Compare this image with these three: first, lower floor damage on the west side, second, a closer and somwhat less obscured shot of WTC 7 on 9/11 from a similar POV, third, a shot taken from across the Hudson.

antidote image 1
antidote image 2
antidote image 3

see more pics which I (and others) have gathered together from various internet sites here

The above South West damage is taken into account in the graphics below.

Below is a graphics from the initial World Trade Center 7 report. This might change when the final report becomes available. Note the word "Approximate" when talking about the large hole. I suspect the only evidence they had at the time were the firemen's interviews which seem to be very close to the photo at the top of the page.

Whatever...initial, approximate, suspect, might. Let us know when you're sure dude... some folks don't have multimillion dollar budgets and/or aren't on the payroll. They'd just like to see non BS answers. Let us know when you initially suspect someone might approximately have them.

Update:

Conspiracy Theorist are hard at work looking to find the slightest discrepancy in the NIST preliminary report. The NIST report was created before debunking911.com contacted Spak and sent the photo to NIST.

It's not unreasonable to suspect the members of the NIST who are investigating the collapse weren't there at the time of collapse. It's also not unreasonable to suspect they don't have much video or photographic evidence of the south side because they evacuated the south of Manhattan due to the impending collapse of this very building.

So... Steve Spak et. al didn't think it worth their time to pass their images on to say FEMA and/or NIST, yet Stevie passes it along to you so that you can then notify NIST? Ya think I just rolled off the turnip truck or something? I think that's not "not unreasonable to suspect" myself.

It's safe to say they only know what they have evidence for. Yet the conspiracy theorist expect the NIST to have all the evidence at their fingertips from the first day.

Dude, their initial report came out in 2004. 2006 can hardly be called the first day. Yeah, I know they haven't focused on WTC 7. They were busy. Whatever their excuse was on their FAQ page. (Look it up if you really want to know. I read it once.)

If any evidence comes up which doesn't support the preliminary hypothesis it's taken as a part of some mass murder plot.

Ah, yes, hyperbole... to me it's one more thing that doesn't add up. The list grows. That's why we need a new and truly independent investigation that can really uncover the answer.

Yet these "Truth seekers" give Jones a pass as he changes his hypothesis every few weeks.

Okay, fair enough. You see, I can concede a point. NIST gets to change their story too, as new evidence comes to light. What about the evidence they already have, though? The conflicting reports. The report of no large debris in the lobby, the report of an undamged facade on floor 9 (excepting the SW corner). Sure, there were other reports of damage which I'm sure you're going to tell us all about very shortly...

I wonder what the word "Preliminary" means to a conspiracy theorist? To me it means "a first hypothesis" and not "This is the final conclusion". Science don't work that way.

No comment. I'll be just as casual with my punctuation, grammar and spelling as you were. After all, it's not like either one of us is getting paid to write this stuff, right? It's not like either one of us is ever likely to have an audience for his screed, either.

Insert some BS scientific flowchart graphic image here

As I highlighted above, the NIST said the locations of the damage are not written in stone. Look at the legend below. They use the words "Possible", "Less likely" and "Least likely". Yet conspiracy theorist ignore these qualifiers and try to paint the scientist of the NIST as purposefully lying and supporting a mass murderer because the graphic below may not be exactly what the photo shows.

Yeah, we know you don't like CTers. How about the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? Do you like that? You seem to imply that CTers consistently make stuff up to fit their pet theories. Perhaps some do. I know I've had to wade through a lot of smelly stuff.

We really don't know how much of the graphic below is right or wrong using the Spak image because his image only shows a small portion of the south side. Most of the building is covered by smoke, the WTC 6 mezzanine and the camera angle. It's blatantly dishonest to use Spak's image to conclude their is less damage than on the graphic below. We just CAN'T KNOW from the image. We also don't know what other evidence the NIST has which support the graphic.

I haven't concluded anything just yet. However, we seem to have conflicting testimonies and no available photographic evidence. Seems a little too preliminary to start making up diagrams which then get tossed around as "official", however preliminary they may be. Heck, they could just say, we don't currently know the extent of the damage to the south face and leave it there. Or they could issue two diagrams- one showing established damage and one showing hypothetical conflicting accounts damage. Let's put it this way, I've never seen anyone referencing a NIST established damage diagram.

NIST diagram

Note the amount of columns on the south face. There are 14 columns on the south face. Also note the column on the end right is spaced out farther apart. Spak's image shows 5. We can assume the clearing at the end where daylight is visible is the end of the building. We can then fill in the columns to get a better idea where this hole is...

What makes you say we can assume the clearing is the end of the building? What if that's over on the Federal building next door? But no, let's blithely assume this based on no evidence and then fit our columns in based on this assumption.
Image 3

Green are visible columns, yellow are assumed. We can conclude this isn't the south west corner damage which only had a column or two taken out.

Yeah, whatever. Just assume what you want, draw some lines to fit and conclude what you want. Isn't that what you accuse the CTers of doing? If you want to update your page and columns using some of the photos which I've sent along as an assist, feel free. Somehow I doubt you will. Oh, look, you've already posted one of them below. Somehow, it fit your facts. Next time, be sure to get the perspective correct before you make conclusions.

The mezzanine under building 6 covers at least from the 6th floor down. How do we know? Because we can't see the louvers in Spak's image. No one can say the damage we see is the total damage. I suspect the hole became much larger at ground level given the collection of debris we see in the photo below.

I agree with the first two points. I don't care what you suspect, frankly. You have failed to gain my trust.
insert another image with a building obscuring most of WTC 7 here

Note the large pile of debris and what looks like perimeter columns sticking out of it.

Update:

One conspiracy theorist has done an admirable job inserting columns in the photo to give us a better understanding of what we see. It's such a good job, for the first time I'm going to use a conspiracy theorist photo to make a point.

How convenient for you. An unnamed and unsourced conspiracy theorist just happens to come up with a representation you agree with. Well, show me your source, and I can probably show you either a complete bozo or someone on the payroll. I find myself arguing against yet another photoshopped image, this time a composite with lines and numbers drawn in. Assumptions, once again. Fit the evidence to what one wants to show. You sure you didn't make this little gem up yourself? Haha, just kidding. I know you'd never do anything like that... That'd be dishonest. Oh, BTW, where'd ya get that little cutout for the bottom floor of the Verizon blg.? I'd like to see that image. Doh! you took it from another image with a building obscuring most of WTC 7 here, didn't you? Why you little sneaking, lying little sack of sh*t CTer. Oh, sorry, you didn't make that image, you just "borrowed" it from a CTer for the "first time ever" because it was so admirably done. Dude. I'm packing this review up. It's not even worth my time to continue. Next time, try to get a clue. In fact, next time, don't even bother.

An updated post on Positive Force '01

2006-09-20T02:49:00.000-07:00

April 2001 - The military engages in an exercise entitled Positive Force '01, a worldwide joint military/civilian exercise which includes many agencies which were conducting exercises on September 11th.

Held every 18 months, Positive Force exercises are large worldwide joint civilian/military emergency mobilization exercises.

Major themes cover the continuum of operations: mobilization,
deployment, employment, sustainment, crisis termination, and
redeployment.

(Joint Chiefs of Staff archive)

Some of the many participants in Positive Force 01

included members of the armed forces, members of the Unified Combatant Commands, the Departments of State, Transportation, Justice, and Health and Human Services, DLA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Defense and the Central Intelligence Agencies, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as many other agencies.

(The Defense Logistics Agency's The Provider, September/October 2001 archive)

Since the FAA is within the Department of Transportation and the FBI is within the Department of Justice, it seems likely that those agencies were also participants. Additionally, it also seems likely that the Secret Service would have participated in a large scale continuum of operations exercise such as this.

NORAD is a participant in this exercise, proposing an exercise involving a hijacked plane being crashed into the Pentagon, but the proposal is rejected. (See for instance Killtown's April 2001 entry or Cooperative Research's 'April 17-26, 2001' entry for more information and sources on this)

As far as exercises included within Positive Force '01 are concerned,

Positive Force 01 involved DLA
resources more than previous exercises,
and encompassed many CINC
and DoD agencies major exercises
such as Reception Staging and
Onward Movement and Integration
(RSOI), Turbo Challenge and
Amalgam Warrior into one.

(Defense Logistics Agency's Dimensions- July/August 2001 archive)

Amalgam Warrior is a live fly exercise; some quotes about past Amalgam Warrior exercises-

They are designed to exercise air sovereignty and air defense. Emphasis is placed on realistic target flow employing electronic warfare and other penetration tactics. Functions exercised include, but are not limited to, surveillance, detection, tracking, interception, employing rules of engagement, force generation, counterdrug operations, attack warning, attack assessment, counter cruise mis-sile operations and CONPLAN implementation.

The five-day Amalgam Warrior 96-1 concluded on Oct. 20, and put Americans and Canadians through their paces, challenging forces in the areas that coincide with NORAD's missions. The exercise was conducted in real time with a fictitious world political scenario, which prompts NORAD forces to transition from a peacetime posture to a war-fighting stance. The threat escalates from tracking unknown aircraft, which have incorrectly filed their flight plans or wandered off course, and in-flight emergencies to terrorist aircraft attacks and large-scale bomber strike missions.

(Global Security archive of IA archive)

Amalgam Warrior is often held in conjunction with Global Guardian, as is Vigilant Guardian- both of which we know were occuring on 9/11. (Defenselink.mil archive, Global Security)

The east coast Amalgam Warrior exercises are held in the fall, usually in October (Airman, US Congress, Arkin) but since Global Guardian was moved forward from early FY '02 to late FY '01 (Peterson AFB Observer, 03/01, archive, Arkin, p.379) it seems possible that Amalgam Warrior may have been as well.

We know there was a NORAD exercise involving live fly on 9/11 from Larry Arnold's Code One Magazine interview:

Another AWACS was flying a training mission off the coast of Florida. President Bush was in Sarasota. We moved the AWACS towards the president. Then we received tasking from the Secret Service through the Joint Staff and NORAD to follow the president and protect him. I had set up an arrangement with their wing commander at Tinker some months earlier for us to divert their AWACS off a normal training mission to go into an exercise scenario simulating an attack on the United States.

(Code one interview with Larry Arnold archive)

and from the same article- another AWACS was apparently training somewhere near Washington DC:

Our picture over DC was pretty poor. And the communication was poor. So the aircrews themselves coordinated the refueling and the combat air patrols. An AWACS flying a training mission nearby arrived.

One final quote about Positive Force '01:

The real success achieved during
Positive Force was reflected in how
the Agency responded to the events
of 9-11," Petrucelli said. "Again, the
total force team of DLA, the active
reserve and civilians stepped forward
and made things happen seamlessly.
All this is made possible because of
DLA's active participation and commitment
to joint exercises.

(Dimensions, Winter 2002
archive)

For more information on various Positive Force exercises held in the past, see also Global Security's Positive Force page (archive).

What's wrong with this picture?

2006-09-18T00:20:00.000-07:00

Am I seeing what I think I'm seeing here? I just ran into this photo among the FDNY WTC Ground Zero Image Gallery. Southwest corner and south face of WTC 7 above the firefighter's head, right? Water on the ground. Shadow on his face from the pole is pointing towards WTC 7, indicating an afternoon shot... see any smoke? See any sign of that much vaunted (and only occasionally photographed) damage? What are we dealing with here? A misinterpretation of this photo on my part? Photoshopped image/s? No damage/ smoke on WTC 7 until later in the afternoon? You tell me, 'cause I'm mighty curious to know...

source code pasting # 2

2006-09-17T02:23:00.000-07:00

This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.netcom.army.mil/heroes/spotlight/atha.htm as retrieved on Aug 14, 2006 16:22:32 GMT.

G o o g l e's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as we crawled the web.

The page may have changed since that time. Click here for the current page without highlighting.

This cached page may reference images which are no longer available. Click here for the cached text only.
To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url:

http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:SPgFialXibUJ:www.netcom.army.mil/heroes/spotlight/atha.htm+%22has+played+a+critical+role+in+the+support+of+the+United+States+Secret+Service.+While+on+mission+in+New+York+on+Sept.+11,+2001%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2

Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.

These search terms have been highlighted:

has

played

critical

role

the

support

the

united

states

secret

service

while

mission

new

york

sept

2001

"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">

Salute to the NETCOM Hero

NETCOM Heroes

SFC Stephen Atha has served with the Communications Management Support Team since August 1998, and has played a critical role in the support of the United States Secret Service. While on mission in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, he dedicated himself to assisting in the rescue and evacuation of Secret Service employees and other persons who were injured at the scene of the World Trade Center Complex. SFC Atha was instrumental in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. During the campaign, he was the Operations NCOIC and executed multiple protective communications missions in support of Senators Kerry and Edwards. SFC Atha was selected over his peers to serve as NCOIC of the CMST, a nominative E-8 position. He directed team members to support the 2005 Presidential Inauguration without incident. This is emblematic of the professionalism and the "Make It Happen" attitude that is within him. His professionalism and actions make him a true NETCOM hero.

SFC Stephen Atha

CMST,

21st Signal Brigade

< Back to Full List

source code pasting # 1

2006-09-17T02:13:00.000-07:00

This is G o o g l e's cache of http://www.netcom.army.mil/heroes/spotlight/curtis.htm as retrieved on Aug 14, 2006 16:21:54 GMT.

G o o g l e's cache is the snapshot that we took of the page as we crawled the web.

The page may have changed since that time. Click here for the current page without highlighting.

This cached page may reference images which are no longer available. Click here for the cached text only.
To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url:

http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:pkTyqNDSEBcJ:www.netcom.army.mil/heroes/spotlight/curtis.htm+%22has+played+a+critical+role+in+the+support+of+the+United+States+Secret+Service.+While+on+mission+in+New+York+on+Sept.+11,+2001%22+atha+OR+curtis&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1

Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.

These search terms have been highlighted:

has

played

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role

the

support

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states

secret

service

while

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new

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sept

2001

curtis

"http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd">

Salute to the NETCOM Hero

NETCOM Heroes

SSG Curtis has served with the Communications Management Support Team since May 2001, and has played a critical role in the support of the United States Secret Service. While on mission in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, he dedicated himself to assisting in the rescue and evacuation of Secret Service employees and other persons who were injured at the scene of the World Trade Center Complex. SSG Curtis was instrumental in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. During the campaign, he was a Team Leader and executed multiple protective communications missions in support of Senators Kerry and Edwards. SSG Curtis was selected over of his peers to be the CMST Maintenance NCOIC. In January 2005, SSG Curtis was entrusted with providing communication support to the 2005 Presidential Inauguration and accomplished this mission without incident. His professionalism and actions make him a true NETCOM hero.

SSG Robert Curtis

CMST,

21st Signal Brigade

< Back to Full List

More 404 informational pages - blacked out first, no less...

2006-09-17T00:28:00.000-07:00

Cross posted from the Loose Change Forum:

Okay, check it out...

First read the background information found in this thread:

http://s15.invisionfree.com/Loose_Change_Forum/index.php?showtopic=11750

about a story I quoted a few weeks back (on one of the military units working with the Secret Service in NYC on 9/11). The story went 404 after I quoted it; it had been online since shortly after 9/11.

Now check this out:

As part of my research, I did some Googling of the names of the soldiers mentioned in the story. A few hits, including bios on two of them on Salute to the NETCOM Hero (it was located on the site http://www.netcom.army.mil )

Now our heroes seem to have all gone 404.

Not only that, but the text appears blacked out on the Google caches (except for the highlighted search terms, of course. Whatta pity.

Call me a sentimental fool, but I'd like to remember our heroes. Therefore, I've taken the liberty of viewing the source code on the caches and copying and pasting the text of them here.

SFC Stephen Atha has served with the Communications Management Support Team since August 1998, and has played a critical role in the support of the United States Secret Service. While on mission in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, he dedicated himself to assisting in the rescue and evacuation of Secret Service employees and other persons who were injured at the scene of the World Trade Center Complex. SFC Atha was instrumental in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. During the campaign, he was the Operations NCOIC and executed multiple protective communications missions in support of Senators Kerry and Edwards. SFC Atha was selected over his peers to serve as NCOIC of the CMST, a nominative E-8 position. He directed team members to support the 2005 Presidential Inauguration without incident. This is emblematic of the professionalism and the "Make It Happen" attitude that is within him. His professionalism and actions make him a true NETCOM hero.

SSG Curtis has served with the Communications Management Support Team since May 2001, and has played a critical role in the support of the United States Secret Service. While on mission in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, he dedicated himself to assisting in the rescue and evacuation of Secret Service employees and other persons who were injured at the scene of the World Trade Center Complex. SSG Curtis was instrumental in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. During the campaign, he was a Team Leader and executed multiple protective communications missions in support of Senators Kerry and Edwards. SSG Curtis was selected over of his peers to be the CMST Maintenance NCOIC. In January 2005, SSG Curtis was entrusted with providing communication support to the 2005 Presidential Inauguration and accomplished this mission without incident. His professionalism and actions make him a true NETCOM hero.

Oh, and here is the full listing of NETCOM heroes, if anyone else wants to peruse them or google them before they disappear...

NETCOM Heroes

SFC Stephen Atha
Robert Bachert
Dottie Ballew
LTC Mark Baxter
Curtis Berg
Craig Bouma
Richard Boyle
Vicki Brown
Barbara Calhoun
Adelina Cartagena
Sally Cecil
SSG Robert Curtis
Richard Delgado
COL Dave Devries
CW2 Brent Dixson
Loran Ellis
MSG Patricia Essick
Marcia Ferguson
Charles Fulford
Sally Gann
Jeanna Garland
Jeff Gibert
Sandra Gibson
MAJ Jesus Gomez
Lester Gordy
CPT Justin Haas
Neil Hains
Fred Hajibrahim
Sam Hawkins
SGT Stephen High
Mary Holte
CPT Jeremiah Jette
MAJ Sean Keenan
Gerald King
Tom King
L.P. Kirkland
Calvin Knight
MAJ Kelly Knitter
Jolynn Krall
Robert Kramer
CW3 Anthony Levaine
Bruce Lewis
Greg Lund
LeRoy Lundgren
CSM Donald Manley
MAJ Mark Mattei
SSG Travis McAninch
CPT Hugh McCauley
Gary Miller
Karen Moody
Keith Noha
Jimmy Norris
Clarence Pankow
Elizabeth Patten
Carol Pieper
Robert Plante
Tom Reardon
Mike Repasky
Bob Ringdahl
CW2 Cary Rook
Thomas Roubal
James Schutze
LTC Andrew Seward
Richard Sohm
Vince Speece
William Staley
Ronald Stewart
Scott Strange
Carol “Jeannie” Tanaka
John Thorpe
Ronald Tolbert
Rodrigo Trevino
Marta Vega
COL Steve Walker

check it out

2006-08-31T02:54:00.000-07:00

more pics of WTC 7

2006-08-30T03:22:00.000-07:00

Yeah, yeah, more smoke. You know, actually smoke means an oxygen poor fire. Means it's not burning as hot as it could be. Lots of smoke doesn't mean a really hot fire that can melt (or weaken) steel to bring a building down. Oh, and how come the east penthouse fell first, when all the damage we've seen so far indicates the southwest corner was the biggest problem? Hmm?

Debunking Debunking 911myths.com

2006-08-30T00:17:00.000-07:00

Debunking 911 myths has an exclusive essay with a new picture showing the major damage to the south face of WTC 7. Check out an archived view of their page here

I've added some black lines and blown it up a bit in an attempt to show the camera angle and determine where the shot was taken from and what it actually shows. The Verizon building (far left) has 9 floors of windows above ground story archways before the wedding cake tier effect starts on the next level up as you can see from the second to last picture (top left building, click on the photo to see a larger version (which can be further enlarged)). Therefore, we can conclude that the bottom horizontal line which I've drawn is roughly 2 stories up from ground level. WTC 7 (or smoke, as the case may be)starts to become more visible at approximately the 4th floor. Around the 5th and sixth floors we begin to see actual south facing side of WTC 7 with damage (below that level, I think mostly we see rubble, smoke and damage to the west side of WTC 7). However, because of the severe foreshortening of the south face of WTC 7 (which I've attempted to illustrate with lines drawn from other buildings) it is difficult to tell the extent of the damage to the south side of WTC 7, except that we can probably safely assume that we are seeing the damage to the lower floors of the southwest corner, which we already knew were damaged. See the NYPD photo for the damage down to about the 10th or 11th floor. Now we have a picture of the damage to the southwest corner of WTC 7 which shows us another 5 floors or so, and a bit of the south side of the building. Yay, I guess. The vertical line which I've drawn midway up on WTC 6 (far right) is presumably the roofline of some building, though I'm not quite sure which one.. Obviously, quite a bit of what we see below that line is likely to be various floors of WTC 7 but most of that area is rather vague to say the least. Based on my drawn lines and the parallel lines which intersect, I'm going to say that that picture was probably taken from approximately the position of the firefighter on the far right of picture # 3, or perhaps slightly to the right. That's an approximation only. Once again, we have yet another photograph with a camera angle which seems almost (or perhaps entirely) designed to exaggerate whatever damage was on the south face of WTC 7. I'm still waiting to see that 20 story scoop out of 1/3 of the south face picture, folks. Oh, also, lately the last photo and the accompanying video have been making the rounds. I have just one word for you: solarium. Glass does break in the presence of flying concrete and steel, or so I've heard, at any rate.

CJCSI 3125.01 (August 3, 2001) Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a CBRNE (copied from lsu.edu cache)

2006-08-29T08:07:00.000-07:00

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CJCSI 3125.01, August 3, 2001, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation

REFERENCES: The references listed in Enclosure H are pertinent to the implementation of this policy.

1. Purpose

a. This instruction provides operational and policy guidance and instructions for US military forces supporting domestic consequence management (CM) operations to prepare for and respond to the effects of a threatened or actual chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) situation. Domestic CBRNE CM support encompasses both deliberate and inadvertent CBRNE situations including terrorism, acts of aggression, industrial accidents, and acts of nature. Domestic CBRNE CM may be conducted by US military forces under immediate response authority and in support of the designated lead federal agency (LFA).

b. Domestic CM operations are those conducted in the continental United States (CONUS) (including the District of Columbia), Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Two former trust territories (but now independent countries) are also deemed eligible for assistance under the Compact of Free Association -- the Republic of the Marshall Islands (until 21 October 2001) and the Federated States of Micronesia (until 3 November 2001).

c. This instruction does not apply to foreign CM operations. CJCSI 3214.01, “Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations,” dated 30 June 1998, provides guidance for the planning and conduct of foreign CM operations.

2. Cancellation. CJCS CONPLAN 0400, Annex T, Appendix 2, is canceled.

3. Applicability. This instruction provides guidance the CINCs, especially the three geographic CINCs with domestic CBRNE CM responsibilities (USCINCJFCOM, USCINCPAC, and USCINCSO), Services, and DOD combat support agencies. It is provided for information and coordination to the Secretary of Defense and the appropriate US Government (USG) departments and agencies.

4. Objectives

a. Establish a CJCSI to complement and augment federal plans to execute a cohesive federal response to a domestic CBRNE CM situation.

b. Establish the charter for CJCS CONPLAN 0500 describing operational and policy guidance to facilitate a rapid DOD response for a potential or actual domestic CBRNE CM situation.

c. Provide information to the federal departments and agencies and the Department of Defense, and CJCS operational and policy guidance to the CINCs and Services concerning DOD support to the LFA during a domestic CBRNE CM situation.

5. Policy

a. Authority. External policy documents that provide guidance and authority for DOD assistance to domestic CBRNE CM operations are presented in Enclosure C. The Secretary of Defense issued the following internal policy memorandums:

(1) On 9 May 2001, the Secretary of Defense placed the policy oversight responsibility for all domestic CBRNE CM activities under the ASD(SO/LIC).

(2) On 1 April 2000, the Secretary of Defense recalled the Executive Agency for domestic CBRNE CM from the Secretary of Army. The Secretary of Defense retains CBRNE CM authority.

(3) On 10 August 2000, the Secretary of Defense determined that certain CBRNE situations may be qualitatively and quantitatively different than other situations, and DOD response might require special management procedures and channels. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to determine whether or not the CBRNE situation warrants special management. If so, the Joint Staff will translate Secretary of Defense’s decision into military orders for those CBRNE events, under the oversight of the ASD(SO/LIC). If not, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through normal Director of Military Support (DOMS) military support to civil authorities (MSCA) procedures.

b. Background

(1) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39 and PDD-62 directed measures to strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of a CBRNE device, designated the lead agencies’ responsibilities, and established interagency groups to coordinate policies and programs. These PDDs validated and reaffirmed the overall LFA responsibility of the Department of Justice (DOJ), acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI is also the lead agency for crisis management, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the domestic lead agency for CM.

(2) The Secretary of Defense has issued policy documents (references k, l and m), assigned missions (reference j), and directed structural changes (references j and k). More specifically, the Secretary:

(a) Directed USCINCJFCOM to establish a standing Joint Task Force-Civilian Support (JTF-CS), a headquarters element subordinate to USCINCJFCOM, to plan for and integrate DOD’s support to the LFA responsible for domestic CBRNE CM. Directed that reporting for the JTF-CS be through the CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Directed implementation of congressional direction to create Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) resident in the National Guard and assigned to the governors for domestic CBRNE CM response.

(c) Assigned USJFCOM the mission to provide military assistance to civilian authorities (MACA) for CM of domestic CBRNE situations and to support other CINCs’ CBRNE CM efforts.

c. Mission Guidance for DOD Forces for Domestic CBRNE CM

(1) Immediate Response. Consistent with DOD Directives, when imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack require immediate action, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DOD components may take such actions as may be necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, commanders or officials acting under this Immediate Response Authority may take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. They must also advise the DOD Executive Agent through command channels, by the most expeditious means available, and seek approval or additional authorizations as needed.

(2) DOD Mission Statement. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, DOD forces will prepare for and conduct CM operations in support of the LFA to mitigate the effects of CBRNE situations in the United States, its territories, and possessions.

(3) USJFCOM Mission Guidance. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USCINCJFCOM deploys military resources and forces, and conducts military support operations to assist federal, state, and local authorities in responding to a natural or manmade CBRNE situation within the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.

(a) JTF-CS Mission Guidance. JTF-CS, when directed, will conduct CM operations in support of the designated LFA in response to a CBRNE incident or accident in CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and possessions. The JTF-CS will establish command and control of designated DOD forces and provide military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support.

(4) USPACOM Mission Guidance. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USCINCPAC deploys military resources and forces and conducts military support operations to assist federal, state, and local authorities in responding to a natural or manmade CBRNE situation within the US states, territories, and possessions within its area of responsibility (AOR).

(5) USSOUTHCOM Mission Guidance. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, USCINCSO deploys military resources and forces and conducts military support operations to assist federal, state, and local authorities in responding to a natural or manmade CBRNE situation within the US territories and possessions within its AOR.

d. Command of DOD Forces

(1) Preevent Operations. Designated CINCs are responsible for the conduct of military operations within their assigned AOR or as designated by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Response Operations. In response to an LFA request and upon NCA approval, the Secretary of Defense will designate the appropriate CINC and command relationship for each specific domestic CBRNE CM operation. In CONUS-based situations, USJFCOM will be the supported CINC. For states, territories, possessions, and commonwealths outside of CONUS, either USCINCPAC or USCINCSO will be the supported CINC. DOD will always be in support of the LFA during domestic CBRNE CM operations. DOD forces will remain under military command and control and the chain of command will remain with the geographic CINC.

(3) DOD Installations and Bases Operations. If a CBRNE situation, which appears to be an intentional incident, occurs on a domestic DOD base or installation, the base commander will notify the FBI Field Office as soon as possible. The base commander will request and coordinate support through higher headquarters and/or the supported CINC as required. The base commander has the authority and responsibility to notify state and local officials of the CBRNE situation when it poses a potential threat outside the installation and may make recommendations to state and local officials on actions that might be taken to protect the public. Installation/base commanders will immediately report any CBRNE situation through military channels in order to inform the CJCS who may recommend to the SECDEF to request assistance from other federal agencies. The FRP states: “If an emergency involves an area or facility for which the Federal Government exercises exclusive or primary responsibility and authority, the President may unilaterally direct the provision of emergency assistance under the Stafford Act. The Governor of the affected state will be consulted if possible.” With deliberate events, whether the incident occurs on or off military installations, DOJ/FBI is the overall LFA, as well as the lead agency for crisis management, and FEMA is the lead agency for CM. Although the base commander maintains overall command over the installation, the FBI has command and authority as it relates to the CBRNE situation. State and local officials can assist the base commander through mutual aid agreements.

(4) Control of National Guard Forces. Generally, short of a Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) or mobilization, Army and Air National Guard forces remain under the control of their respective governor. Under 32 USC authority or state active duty status, the Adjutant General in each state may task organize National Guard units and exercise command and control over National Guard forces and resources to support the state's emergency response plan. If ordered to active duty, under 10 USC, National Guard units fall under the command and control of the designated federal military headquarters and conduct CM operations as part of the supported CINC's efforts.

6. Definitions. Definitions are contained in the Glossary.

7. Considerations. Considerations for CBRNE CM operations are contained in Enclosure F.

8. Roles and Responsibilities. DOD roles and responsibilities are found in Enclosure A. Interagency roles and responsibilities are found in Enclosure B.

9. Procedures. Specific DOD procedures are found in Enclosures D
and E.

10. Interagency Coordination

a. The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism chairs assistant secretary/flag rank groups to coordinate policies and programs and reviews ongoing situations relating to WMD. Two of the groups are the Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) and the Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction (PWMD) Group. In accordance with the Federal Reserve Plan (FRP), FEMA chairs the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) to coordinate planning, operations, and exercises for domestic CM, including CBRNE. DOD domestic CBRNE CM planning, operations, and exercises must be thoroughly coordinated within the USG Interagency Community.

b. The ASD(SO/LIC) has policy oversight responsibility for domestic CBRNE CM and is the DOD lead for domestic CBRNE CM interagency coordination.

c. Prior to approving or authorizing DOD forces to deploy, OSD and the Joint Staff will conduct appropriate staff coordination with the lead agency for CM, FEMA.

d. CINCs will coordinate with the Joint Staff during interagency coordination and operations.

11. Releasability. This instruction is approved for limited release. DOD components (to include the combatant commands) and other federal agencies may obtain copies of this instruction through controlled Internet access only (limited to .mil and .gov users) from the CJCS Directives Home Page--http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. Joint Staff activities may access or obtain copies of this instruction from the Joint Staff LAN.

12. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

HENRY H. SHELTON

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures:

A -- Roles and Responsibilities

B -- Interagency Roles and Responsibilities

C -- Authorities and Federal Response Plans

D -- Coordination and Approval Process

E -- Procedures

F -- Considerations

G -- Public Affairs

H -- References

GL -- Glossary

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

DISTRIBUTION

Distribution A, B, C, and J plus the following:

Copies

American Red Cross 2

Central Intelligence Agency 2

Department of Agriculture 2

Department of Commerce 2

Department of Education 2

Department of Energy 2

Department of Justice 5

Department of Health and Human Services 2

Department of Housing and Urban Development 2

Department of the Interior 2

Department of Labor 2

Department of State 2

Department of Transportation 2

Department of the Treasury 2

Department of Veterans Affairs 2

Environmental Protection Agency 2

Federal Aviation Administration 2

Federal Bureau of Investigation 5

Federal Communications Commission 2

Federal Emergency Management Agency 10

General Services Administration 2

Interstate Commerce Commission 2

National Communications System 2

National Security Council 2

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2

Office of Personnel Management 2

Small Business Administration 2

Tennessee Valley Authority 2

US Coast Guard 2

US Secret Service 2

US Postal Service 2

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ENCLOSURE A

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for MACA in the event of a domestic CBRNE incident. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, the Services, and Defense agencies have important roles regarding military support to domestic CBRNE CM.

2. Specific Responsibilities

a. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)):

(1) Provides civilian oversight for all combating terrorism and domestic CBRNE CM activities. This oversight includes direction and supervision for policy, program planning, execution, and allocation and use of resources for DOD.

(2) Represents the Secretary of Defense on all combating terrorism matters, including CBRNE consequence management, outside the Department.

(3) Serves as the OSD representative to the CSG and the PWMD.

(4) Chairs the DOD Crisis Coordination Group (CCG) and the DOD PWMD.

(5) Provides policy oversight for military installations’ first responders’ CM preparedness.

b. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)):

(1) Monitors RC readiness.

(2) In coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), provides policy and program oversight of RC assets designated to respond to domestic CBRNE CM situations.

(3) In coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), Joint Staff, and Services, ensures appropriate Reserve and National Guard forces are integrated into CBRNE CM response efforts.

(4) In coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), reviews PRC procedures and packages for CBRNE CM with the Joint Staff to ensure expeditious and efficient implementation.

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)):

(1) In coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), assists in developing policy for integrating military medical capability with civilian medical resources responding to a domestic CBRNE situation.

(2) In coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), informs the Joint Staff of any changes to the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) that would affect CBRNE CM responses.

d. Secretary of the Army has the same responsibility for domestic CBRNE CM as a Secretary of a Military Department who provides support under 10 USC (organize, train, equip, and provide forces). If special management is not necessary, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through normal DOMS MSCA procedures.

e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will:

(1) Serve as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President in preparing for and responding to a CBRNE situation.

(2) Ensure military planning is accomplished to support the lead agency for CBRNE CM, FEMA, in preparing for and responding to a domestic CBRNE situation requiring special management.

(3) Conduct assessments of military installations to ensure that commanders are preparing for, and are able to respond to, a CBRNE situation.

f. Service Chiefs will:

(1) Identify and assign units to USJFCOM that support its role as DOD lead in domestic CBRNE CM, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with
10 USC.

(2) Provide, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, designated forces, to include reserve forces, in order to prepare for and respond to a CBRNE situation. The Service Chiefs are to be prepared to provide support to the supported CINC through the appropriate Service component commanders.

(a) US Army. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, provides forces to furnish assistance to the lead agency for CM, FEMA, as part of the supported regional CINC’s response during a domestic CBRNE CM situation. These forces may be comprised of, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Specialized chemical and biological units.

2. Chemical detachments.

3. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units.

4. Specialized medical units and research capabilities.

5. Military working dogs.

(b) US Navy. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, provides forces to furnish assistance to the lead agency for CM, FEMA, as part of the supported regional CINC’s response during a domestic CBRNE CM situation. These forces may be comprised of, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Specialized environmental and radiological units.

2. EOD units.

3. Military working dogs.

4. Specialized medical units.

5. Medical research capabilities.

(c) US Air Force. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, provides forces to furnish assistance to the lead agency for CM, FEMA, as part of the supported regional CINC’s response during a domestic CBRNE CM situation. These forces may be comprised of, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Biological, chemical, and radiological detection units.

2. Hazardous material (HAZMAT) first responders.

3. EOD units.

4. Military working dogs.

5. Response-tailored specialty medical assets such as aeromedical rapid response units and specialized environmental surveillance assets.

(d) US Marine Corps. When directed by the Secretary of Defense, provides forces to furnish assistance to the lead agency for CM, FEMA, as part of the supported regional CINC’s response during a domestic CBRNE situation. These forces may be comprised of, but are not limited to, specialized chemical and biological units.

g. Director for Intelligence (J-2) will:

(1) Serve as the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for the Joint Staff coordination with the interagency Intelligence Community in support of domestic CBRNE CM matters.

(2) Provide the supported CINC and the Joint Staff with acquired foreign intelligence in support of DOD responses to a CBRNE situation.

h. Director for Operations (J-3) will:

(1) Serve as the Joint Staff OPR for all interagency coordination and guidance for domestic CBRNE CM planning and operational support in response to a CBRNE situation.

(2) Represent the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in interagency working groups concerning domestic CBRNE CM planning, operations, and exercises.

(3) Coordinate with the Services, regional CINCs, and Joint Staff directorates during the development of joint doctrine dealing with domestic CBRNE CM.

(4) Maintain a CJCSI and CONPLAN for domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(5) Coordinate on the development of plans and policies relating to DOD assets involved in domestic CBRNE CM operations.

i. Director for Logistics (J-4) will:

(1) Coordinate on the development of plans and policies relating to DOD assets involved in domestic CBRNE CM operations, with a particular focus on medical, engineering, and transportation assets.

(2) Review the plans and programs of USCINCJFCOM, USCINCPAC, and USCINCSO to determine logistical adequacy and feasibility for domestic CBRNE CM operations within their respective AORs.

j. Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) will incorporate tasking for domestic CBRNE CM into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

k. Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Systems (J-6) will:

(1) Serve as the Joint Staff OPR for C4 interoperability guidance.

(2) Track deployment and readiness status of CJCS-controlled C4 assets.

(3) Coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Services, federal agencies, and the appropriate regional CINCs to develop an interoperable C4 plan.

(4) Review DOD, USCINCJFCOM, USCINPAC, and USCINCSO C4 plans, programs, policies, and assets involved in domestic CBRNE CM operations to determine adequacy, feasibility, consistency with joint doctrine, acceptability, and interoperability with federal agency systems.

l. Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7) will:

(1) Coordinate with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the appropriate regional CINCs to develop joint domestic CBRNE CM doctrine.

(2) Coordinate individual and collective joint CM training with USCINCJFCOM to meet emerging joint domestic CBRNE CM doctrine principles.

(3) Validate emerging domestic CBRNE CM doctrine through joint training events and exercises. Where appropriate, promulgate lessons learned in the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP).

(4) Coordinate the development of Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks, conditions, and measures of effectiveness to reflect all aspects of domestic CBRNE CM operations.

m. Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8) will coordinate with the Services, supported CINCs, Joint Staff Directorates, and Office of the Under Secretary Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) to develop cost estimates supporting the development of plans and policies relating to DOD assets involved in domestic CBRNE CM operations.

n. Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM), will:

(1) Develop supporting CM plans to provide military assistance to civil authorities in response to CBRNE situations within the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia.

(2) Assume the lead in exercising DOD domestic CBRNE CM capabilities.

(3) Execute joint exercises and training. The Secretary of Defense has designated USCINCJFCOM as the Executive Agent for CM support to CINC exercises. This delegation includes authority to issue directives and order the movement of selected CINC-assigned and participating Service personnel and assets to take part in training and exercises.

(4) Coordinate the development of UJTL tasks, conditions, and measures of effectiveness to reflect all aspects of domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(5) Identify, coordinate resourcing with Service Executive Agent, train, and employ as directed JTF-CS, a command and control (C2) element, capable of planning and integrating DOD's support to the LFA for CBRNE situations in the United States, its territories, and possessions. The JTF-CS:

(a) Serves as the USJFCOM action agent for domestic CBRNE CM operations in support of the LFA. JTF-CS, through USJFCOM, will plan and integrate DOD's CM support to the LFA for CBRNE situations in CONUS. This support will involve capabilities drawn from throughout the Department, including detection, decontamination, medical, and logistical assets.

(b) When directed, accepts Operational Control (OPCON) of designated DOD forces (less designated USSOCOM forces and US Army Corps of Engineers) when the Secretary of Defense approves their use.

(c) Plays a leading role in CM doctrine development, requirements identification, training and exercise management, and the promotion of domestic CBRNE CM interoperability for DOD CBRNE CM-capable assets in the Active and/or Reserve Components.

(d) As directed by USCINCJFCOM, works with the lead agency for CM, FEMA, to develop tailored force CM packages and scenario-based task organizations designed to respond to foreseeable CBRNE situations.

(e) When deployed, operates under the OPCON of the supported regional CINC, depending on the location of the incident (USJFCOM, USPACOM, or USSOUTHCOM).

(f) Develops procedures and plans, in coordination with USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM, for military assistance to civil authorities for CBRNE situations in US territories within their respective AORs.

(g) When coordinated through the appropriate CINCs, Services, and agencies, is authorized direct liaison with DOD CBRNE-capable units for issues related to CBRNE CM information sharing, planning, and interoperability.

o. Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), will:

(1) Develop supporting CM plans for domestic CBRNE situations and CM operations conducted within the US states, territories, and possessions located within the USPACOM AOR.

(2) Identify an organic headquarters element to provide the initial incident response and serve as the initial C2 element for all subsequent DOD support in the domestic area within which the CINC is the supported commander.

(3) Be prepared to accept OPCON of, and employ as required, a JTF in response to domestic CM operations within the US states, territories, and possessions located within the USPACOM AOR.

(4) Exercise domestic CBRNE CM capabilities.

p. Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), will:

(1) Develop supporting CM plans for domestic CBRNE situations and CM operations conducted within the US territories and possessions located within the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

(2) Identify an organic headquarters element to provide the initial incident response and serve as the initial C2 element in the domestic area within which the CINC is the supported commander.

(3) Be prepared to accept OPCON of, and employ as required, a JTF in response to domestic CM operations within the US territories and possessions located within the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

(4) Exercise domestic CBRNE CM capabilities.

q. Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), will:

(1) Be prepared to move selected forces and identified elements of other government agencies to support NCA-directed domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(2) Provide liaison officers (LNOs) and other assistance to the supported CINC and FEMA, as required.

r. Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), will:

(1) When directed, provide special operations forces (SOF) as required in support of the LFA during domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(2) Provide LNOs and other assistance to the supported CINC as required.

s. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), will:

(1) Provide appropriate intelligence support to DOD leadership and the regional CINCs.

(2) Maintain liaison with non-DOD intelligence agencies.

t. Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), will be prepared to provide command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) support and other support as required.

u. Director, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), will:

(1) Ensure the supported CINC and supporting commands receive timely and effective logistics support in planning and executing domestic CBRNE CM operations.

(2) Deploy the Contingency Support Team as required.

v. Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), will:

(1) Provide modeling, simulation, assessments, analysis, publications, training, and other support as required.

(2) Support CM training exercises, the operational deployments of DOD elements in response to domestic CBRNE situations, and provide expertise in domestic CM to CINCs, joint force commanders, and key DOD components.

(3) Sponsor studies and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) to support development and acquisition of CBRNE defense doctrine, training, and equipment.

w. Director, National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), will provide timely, relevant, and accurate imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in support of CBRNE CM operations.

x. Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), will:

(1) Monitor and assist the Adjutants General and the State National Guard in providing well-trained and well-equipped Army and Air National Guard forces and resources to provide military support to domestic CM operations in response to a CBRNE situation.

(2) Facilitate and coordinate with the Services and the CINCs National Guard support for contingency operations, special events, and military support to civil authorities.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

ENCLOSURE B

INTERAGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General. Many different groups and entities at all levels in the USG are engaged in CBRNE CM policy, programs, and operations. Several federal agencies active in CBRNE CM exercise independent authority to activate a federal field response for their respective AORs. FEMA is the domestic lead agency for CM, including CBRNE. FEMA coordinates with other federal agencies to ensure that domestic CM operations are synchronized with other operations.

2. Agency Responsibilities

a. American Red Cross (ARC). The ARC coordinates federal mass care assistance in support of state and local efforts to meet the needs of victims of a disaster upon activation of the FRP. Assistance will include shelter, feeding, and emergency relief supplies to disaster victims, and the collection of information to operate a Disaster Welfare Information (DWI) system for the purposes of reporting victim status and assisting in family reunification. The ARC independently provides mass care and other services to disaster victims as part of a broad program of disaster relief, as outlined in its charter provisions enacted by the US Congress in 1905.

b. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE will provide emergency responder training for nuclear and radiological incidents. DOE operates a variety of nuclear facilities throughout the United States and maintains radiological emergency response assets specifically organized, trained, and equipped to cope with all forms of radiological accidents and incidents. Through these assets, DOE supports both crisis and consequence management response. With specialized deployable assets, such as those under the Radiological Assistance Program and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), DOE assists other federal agencies, state, tribal, and local governments responding to nuclear emergencies.

c. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS is the lead agency for planning and preparing for a national response to medical emergencies and will develop metropolitan medical strike teams, now known as the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), and maintain the NDMS. HHS provides federal support in response to public health and medical care concerns. HHS possesses unique CM capabilities that can be used in a domestic CBRNE CM response, which may include, but are not limited to, agent identification, epidemiological investigation, hazard detection and reduction, decontamination, medical support, and pharmaceutical support operations.

d. Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation. DOJ, acting through the FBI, is the LFA until the Attorney General transfers the overall LFA role to FEMA. The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management throughout CBRNE situations. The CSG notifies the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury when they should designate a National Special Security Event (NSSE). The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury are required to agree on the designation.

e. Department of State (DOS). DOS leads foreign operations and coordinates foreign offers of assistance to domestic operations. If a CBRNE situation occurs along a shared border of the United States and Mexico or Canada, DOS will work with the appropriate agencies to coordinate a USG response.

f. Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT is responsible for coordinating transportation issues in response operations and in restoring the transportation infrastructure after a domestic CBRNE situation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the responsibility for the coordination of any law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft in flight. The USCG is located within the DOT and provides specialized response capabilities for CM operations. The USCG is a co-chair with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the National Contingency Plan (NCP), if the incident occurs in areas under USCG jurisdiction. When directed or requested, the Coast Guard may provide assigned forces in response to a domestic CBRNE CM situation. The USCG and Coast Guard personnel possess unique law enforcement authority to establish and enforce security and safety zones and are not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.

g. Department of Treasury. For NSSEs, the US Secret Service (USSS) is the lead agency for security design/planning and implementation, and will identify and coordinate the appropriate Secret Service and federal antiterrorism measures and counterterrorism assets that will be needed to effect the overall security requirements. The CSG notifies the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury when they should designate an NSSE. The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury are required to agree on the designation.

h. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA will conduct assessments of medical assistance available to support a CBRNE situation. Additionally, the VA will coordinate with the NDMS.

i. Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA responds to actual or potential releases of hazardous materials. Under the NCP, the EPA designates a Federal On-Scene Coordinator for an incident. The EPA is the National Chair of the National Response Team (NRT), a multiagency committee that provides technical expertise and advises in HAZMAT planning and response. Federal response may include, but is not limited to, agent identification, hazard detection and reduction, environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-term site restoration. The EPA established the Radiological Emergency Response Team (ERT) to support its response to incidents involving radioactive materials. Under the FRP, the EPA is the lead agency for ESF-10, Hazardous Materials. EPA also provides emergency responder training for HAZMATs and environmental materials to meet its broad environmental mission.

j. Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA is the lead agency for domestic CBRNE CM situations. FEMA uses the existing FRP structure to manage and coordinate the federal response to consequences of terrorism, including the consequences of a CBRNE situation. Figure B-1 outlines the functions and primary agencies designated in the FRP. DOD may be a support agency to all emergency support functions (ESFs).

EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION PRIMARY AGENCY
#1 Transportation Department of Transportation
#2 Communications National Communications System
#3 Public Works and Engineering Department of Defense, US Army Corps of Engineers
#4 Firefighting Department of Agriculture, Forest Service
#5 Information and Planning Federal Emergency Management Agency
#6 Mass Care American Red Cross
#7 Resource Support General Services Administration
#8 Health and Medical Services Department of Health and Human Services
#9 Urban Search and Rescue Federal Emergency Management Agency
#10 Hazardous Material Environmental Protection Agency
#11 Food Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
#12 Energy Department of Energy

Figure B-1. FRP Emergency Support Functions and Primary Agencies

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ENCLOSURE C

AUTHORITIES AND FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS

1. External Authorities. Several documents provide authority and guidance for DOD assistance to civil authorities. Additionally, many federal departments and agencies have developed response and contingency plans to coordinate activities and to successfully execute a cohesive, integrated response operation to domestic CBRNE CM operations. A brief summary of these authorities and plans is provided.

a. PDD-39. PDD-39, “US Policy on Counterterrorism (U),” validates and reaffirms the DOJ, acting through the FBI, as the overall LFA and lead agency for crisis management and FEMA as the domestic lead agency for CM.

b. PDD-62. PDD-62, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (U),” reaffirms the domestic lead agencies and their responsibilities. Additionally, it outlines the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies, including Public Health Service (PHS) (health/
medical), EPA (HAZMAT/environmental) and DOE (radiological). PDD-62 identifies lead agency responsibilities with regard to an NSSE. The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management, intelligence, and federal criminal investigation. The USSS is the lead agency for security design/planning and implementation. FEMA is the lead agency for CM. Other departments, such as Defense, State, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and the EPA, may provide specialized resources in support of these crisis management, security, and CM efforts.

c. Federal Response Plan

(1) Basic Plan. The FRP provides the mechanism for coordinating delivery of federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of state and local governments overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency. The FRP implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act in order to provide assistance to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; alleviate damage and hardship; and reduce future vulnerability. The FRP organizes the federal response into 12 ESFs and the primary agencies responsible for each ESF. The FRP signatories support FEMA for CM through their response to CBRNE situations. FEMA coordinates with other federal agencies to ensure that domestic CM operations are synchronized with other operations. FEMA publishes the FRP.

(2) Terrorism Incident Annex. The Terrorism Incident Annex ensures that the FRP is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism within the United States. The Terrorism Incident Annex addresses potential CBRNE CM requirements to support crisis management, responsibilities of various federal agencies, and funding guidelines.

d. National Contingency Plan. The NCP provides the organizational structure, procedures, and authority for the Federal Government to respond to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, including radiological, chemical, and biological agents. The EPA and the USCG have the responsibility for the NCP. The NCP may be activated in the initial stages of a CBRNE situation, especially when the nature of the agent is unknown. ESF #10, Hazardous Materials, places the response mechanisms of the NCP within the FRP coordination structure when both plans are implemented concurrently. The EPA publishes the NCP.

e. Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The FRERP provides structure for the Federal Government to respond to peacetime radiological incidents and accidents in order to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex and Base Plan places the response mechanisms of the FRERP within the FRP coordination structure when both plans are implemented concurrently for deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE CM. FEMA publishes the FRERP.

f. USG Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN). The USG CONPLAN provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the Federal Government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving WMD.

g. Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of US Government Agency in Response to a Domestic Threat of Incident. The Domestic Guidelines is a classified document addressing the guidelines for the mobilization, deployment, and employment of USG agencies in response to a domestic threat or terrorist incident. The PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines assigns specific responsibilities to DOJ, FBI, DOD, FEMA, DOE, EPA, and HHS. These guidelines are designed to facilitate and enhance USG interagency coordination to effectively respond to potential or actual domestic terrorism. As the overall LFA for response to threats or acts of terrorism inside the United States, DOJ, acting through the FBI, is supported by FEMA and other federal agencies. The FBI is the lead agency for formulating and executing a crisis management response. FEMA is the lead agency for formulating and executing a Federal CM response in support of state and local governments.

2. Internal

a. Unified Command Plan (UCP)-99. The UCP is the document approved by the President that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders. It establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographic AOR for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. It is submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President every 2 years. UCP-99, approved by the President on 29 September 1999, tasks USCINCJFCOM with the responsibility for “providing, within CONUS, military assistance to civil authorities (including consequence management operations in response to nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction incidents) . . . subject to Secretary of Defense approval.”

b. On 13 September 1999, the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the President UCP-99 with amplification, which directed USCINCJFCOM to establish the JTF-CS to serve as the primary DOD command element for the planning and execution of military assistance to civil authorities for domestic CM operations as a result of a CBRNE situation.

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ENCLOSURE D

COORDINATION AND APPROVAL PROCESS

1. Purpose. The following procedures provide CJCS guidance for the coordination and approval of operational deployments of DOD forces or individuals in support of an LFA request for assistance during a CBRNE situation.

2. Scope. The sensitivity of DOD CM missions and capabilities requires clear and concise procedures for domestic movements of individuals and units. Approval procedures must ensure that proper civilian oversight through ASD(SO/LIC) and the required interagency coordination are accomplished; all appropriate Services, agencies, and organizations are kept informed; and Operational Security (OPSEC) is maintained. This includes coordination with the regional CINC prior to deployment of personnel, units, or equipment.

3. Operational Deployments. Approval procedures for the deployment of DOD forces or individuals in support of contingency or other tasked CM operations are contained in CJCS CONPLAN 0500; regional CINCs supporting CONPLANs; or SECDEF-authorized warning, alert, deployment, or execute orders.

a. CINC Liaison Officers. Upon notification that a CBRNE event has occurred that may require DOD assistance, the affected geographic CINC may send LNOs to the appropriate operations centers to gain situational awareness. However, LNOs cannot obligate DOD resources or commence CBRNE CM support operations without proper authority.

b. Federal Request for DOD CBRNE CM Support. It is clear that certain CBRNE situations may be qualitatively and quantitatively different than other situations that may require DOD support to civil authorities, and therefore, the DOD response would require special management procedures and channels. All official requests for DOD support for a CBRNE situation enter through the DOD Executive Secretary. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will decide whether or not the situation warrants special management. If special management is required for a domestic CBRNE situation, the Joint Staff, J-33 Joint Operations Division (JOD), is the OPR and forwards orders to the appropriate CINC under the policy oversight of ASD(SO/LIC). If special operational management is not warranted, the Secretary of the Army DOMS is the OPR and forwards orders to the appropriate CINC.

c. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). A DCO may be the first DOD representative on site and is the single DOD point of contact. The DCO is the designated DOD on-scene member of the FEMA-led ERT. The DCO coordinates all requests for assistance with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or designated representative. The DCO is supported by a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). Although the DCO may be supplanted by the JTF commander as the senior DOD representative, the DCO will continue to exercise the ERT staff function of mission assignment coordination and validation, and will act as a liaison between the ERT staff and the JTF staff.

d. Command of Forces. When directed, the commander of the JTF (or other appropriate C2 headquarters as determined by the supported CINC) accepts OPCON of designated DOD forces (less USSOCOM and US Army Corps of Engineers), including DCO, DCE, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs).

e. DOD Personnel Accountability. Because of the inherent risk associated with working in a CBRNE environment and the potential for long-term health issues associated with exposure to CBRNE contaminants, strict accountability of all DOD personnel in the vicinity of the incident site is needed. Military commanders must establish adequate controls to account for and maintain records on all DOD personnel entering and departing the affected area.

ENCLOSURE E

PROCEDURES

1. Relationship Between DOD Units Responding to CBRNE Situations and Other Organizations During Times of Deployment

a. DOD Deployed Headquarters. For domestic CBRNE CM situations requiring special management, the commander of the responding headquarters reports to the Secretary of Defense through his respective regional CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Lead Federal Agency. The commander of the deployed CBRNE CM headquarters operates in support of the overall LFA through direct support of the lead agency for CM. With the FRP activated, FEMA coordinates with other federal agencies to ensure that domestic CM operations are synchronized with other operations. The commander of the deployed headquarters will supplant the DCO as the senior DOD representative and will keep higher headquarters informed. However, the DCO will continue to exercise the ERT staff function of mission assignment coordination and validation and act as liaison between the ERT staff and the JTF staff.

2. Operations Security

a. Federal, state, and local agencies conduct CM operations in an unclassified forum. The Department of Defense will be an active participant in the unclassified forum to ensure consistency and expeditious flow of information. Whenever joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) are employed, their employment will be protected in accordance with established procedures and security classification guidelines.

b. Information on DOD CBRNE CM operations will be made public as necessary. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OSD(PA)) is the point of contact for all media inquiries relating to DOD participation in CBRNE CM activities.

3. Fiscal Arrangements. Funding of DOD units participating in CBRNE CM support to other government agencies will be in accordance with law and within the established procedures in PDD-39, PDD-62, DOD Directives, and the FRP. If the President invokes the Stafford Act, FEMA issues mission assignments through the FRP. Each DOD component is responsible for capturing and reporting incremental costs to Service/defense agency comptrollers. All incremental DOD costs should be captured by providers of support for reimbursement by the supported agency. Standard interagency billing procedures should be followed.

4. Public Affairs (PA)

a. OSD(PA) is the lead for releasing public information concerning DOD. This would continue to be the case during a CBRNE situation.

b. PA guidance during a domestic CBRNE CM operation must be coordinated with the LFA and the lead agencies for crisis and consequence management.

5. Use of Weapons

a. Units may deploy to sites of CBRNE situations with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently authorized to carry arms by the Secretary of Defense or is deployed from the CBRNE site to an assignment where weapons are authorized. The military on-scene commander is responsible to ensure that weapons and ammunition are adequately stored and physically secured at the site of the CBRNE situation.

b. Military members providing security for stored weapons and ammunition at military facilities during CM support operations may carry their weapons while performing their normal security duties and will adhere to the rules on the use of force set forth in Annex C, Appendix 6, CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98.

c. There is a presumption that units deployed to sites of CBRNE situations will not carry arms. In an emergency situation and then only when expressly authorized by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Attorney General, units providing CM support may be authorized to carry arms. When weapons are authorized, units will adhere to the rules on the use of force set forth in Annex C, Appendix 6, CJCS CONPLAN 0500-98.

6. Use of Force in Self-Defense. The responsibility for providing security for DOD personnel, equipment, and military sites during CM operations rests with local law enforcement authorities. DOD personnel, however, retain the right to take appropriate actions in self-defense if threatened during CM operations. If feasible, DOD personnel should request civilian law enforcement assistance before acting in self-defense.

ENCLOSURE F

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Intelligence. In a domestic CBRNE CM situation, DOD has no authority or responsibility for the collection of intelligence domestically. Moreover, in the context of a terrorist threat or acts of terrorism, the FBI, as the LFA, has the overall responsibility for assembling, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, whether of domestic or foreign origin, on the operating environment.

2. Information. The LFA has the overall responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on the operating environment. Information relevant to CM operations will be provided to DOD from the LFA or lead agency for CM. The on-scene military commander may request information from the LFA channels to fulfill his specific requirements.

3. Availability and Timeliness of CBRNE CM Capabilities. DOD units possess capabilities that can provide CBRNE CM assistance during a domestic CBRNE situation. However, response times and resources vary. Additionally, several of these units may be committed already to potential or current worldwide military operations. Based on adjusted priorities, the NCA could redirect these units to domestic CBRNE CM operations. The required time to disengage and redeploy the units and the impact on ongoing military operations are key planning considerations.

4. Media Impact. The media will play an important role in reporting and shaping public opinion concerning a CBRNE situation and CM response operations. Any DOD response must take into account possible media repercussions. DOJ/FBI is the lead agency for PA guidance in the crisis management phase. FEMA is the lead agency for PA guidance for CM. The LFA Joint Information Center (JIC) will provide information to the media. OASD(PA) is the point of contact for all media inquiries concerning DOD support to the LFA. See Enclosure G.

5. Medical. During a CBRNE situation, medical and public health needs will be significant factors. NDMS, which includes DOD coordination of participating nonfederal-fixed hospitals and DOD-provided patient evacuation, is the primary federal-level medical response element. Other DOD medical capabilities external to NDMS could be requested if it is determined necessary to augment or sustain the NDMS/local response in order to save lives and minimize human suffering.

6. Domestic Transportation Assets. Transportation of DOD and other federal personnel and assets to a domestic CBRNE situation will be critical to a successful response. DOD transportation assets are in high demand and require planning time. All transportation modes should be considered to support domestic CM operations. Unlike overseas deployments, ground transportation may be a viable option for CONUS situations. Under FRP ESF #1, Transportation, the DOT’s Movement Coordination Center will coordinate deployment of federal resources, including DOD resources, to support CBRNE CM operations.

7. Reserve Component Forces. RC forces are capable of conducting a wide range of domestic CBRNE CM operations. They are geographically dispersed throughout the United States and, therefore, may provide the most timely response to a CBRNE situation. RC forces may be involuntarily ordered to active duty for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear situation. The timeline associated with RC call-up or mobilization is a key planning consideration.

8. Presidential Declaration. Until a Presidential Declaration is issued, federal agencies respond using their individual authorities and funding sources. Pursuant to the Stafford Act and a declaration of an emergency, the Department of Defense may be reimbursed for its assistance to FEMA and FRP operations.

9. Law Enforcement Activities. Military members supporting CBRNE CM operations will neither engage in civilian law enforcement activities nor act as law enforcement agents.

ENCLOSURE G

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. General. A threat or act of terrorism involving a CBRNE may produce major consequences that could overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments, as well as the existing capabilities of the Federal Government. DOD has certain responsibilities for training and supporting civilian authorities' efforts to respond to a terrorist attack involving the use of CBRNE.

2. This PA guidance contains policy-level guidance for use by commanders, public affairs officers, and spokespersons participating in domestic CBRNE CM responses and exercises with federal, state, and local civilian authorities.

3. General Guidance

a. DOD PA activities during domestic CBRNE CM situations are driven by the supported federal, state, or local authorities. For example, the PA posture; location of JICs; along with the time, place, and method of communicating with the media, will normally be driven by the supported civilian authority. PA for a CBRNE situation will be coordinated by the LFA. OSD(PA) is the PA focal point for the Department of Defense. The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Public Affairs) will coordinate with OSD(PA).

b. In every instance, PA personnel will ensure proper contingency planning and coordination are accomplished in anticipation of potential real-world CBRNE response requirements and associated training activities. PA personnel must make accommodation for, and interact with, local, state, national, and international media. The responsible PA element must plan and execute appropriately.

c. The supported CINC, component, or Service commander, as applicable, will have responsibility for PA planning and execution.

d. PA guidance for CBRNE CM response contingencies will be developed and staffed in accordance with applicable DOD Directives. PA guidance will include, at a minimum, statements and questions/answers for use in response to queries. PA guidance should also include details regarding PA architecture and plans for participation in JICs.

e. Whenever JSOTFs are employed, their employment will be protected in accordance with established procedures and security classification guidelines.

4. Questions beyond the scope of this guidance will be forwarded through PA channels to OSD(PA).

5. OSD(PA) POC for plans may be contacted at (703) 693-1074; DSN:
223-1074. OSD(PA) POC for media may be contacted at (703) 697-4162;
DSN: 227-4162.

ENCLOSURE H

REFERENCES

a. CJCSI 3214.01, 30 June 1998, “Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations”

b. CONPLAN 0400-96, 31 May 1996, “Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”

c. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, 21 June 1995, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism”

d. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, 22 May 1998, “Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas”

e. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 9230-1-PL, April 1999, Federal Response Plan (FRP), with Terrorism Incident Annex

f. Title 42, United States Code, sections 5121 et seq, “The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act” as amended (referred to herein as “the Stafford Act”)

g. Environmental Protection Agency, September 1994, “National Contingency Plan”

h. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 May 1996, “Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan”

i. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 16 January 2001, “USG Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan”

j. Unified Command Plan, 29 September 1999, with Secretary of Defense,
13 September 1999, cover memorandum to the President of the United
States

k. SecDef memorandum, 1 April 2000, “Consequence Management Responsibilities Within the Department of Defense for Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE-CM)”

l. SecDef memorandum, 10 August 2000, “Management of DOD Operational Response to the Consequences of Certain Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives”

m. SecDef memorandum, 9 May 2001, “Civilian Oversight of DoD Combating Terrorism and Consequence Management Activities”

n. DOD Directive 3025.1, 15 January 1993, “Military Support to Civil Authorities”

o. DOD Directive 3025.12, 4 February 1994, “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)”

p. DOD Directive 3025.13, 13 September 1985, “Employment of DOD Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service”

q. DOD Directive 3025.15, 18 February 1997, “Military Assistance to Civil Authorities”

r. DOD Directive 3150.5, 24 March 1987, “DOD Response to an Improvised Nuclear Device Incident”

s. DOD Directive 5400.13, 9 January 1996, “Joint Public Affairs Operations”

t. DOD Directive 6000.12, 29 April 1996, “Health Services Operations and Readiness”

u. DOD Instruction 5400.14, 22 January 1996, “Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations”

v. SecDef message 211644Z APR 99, “Public Affairs Guidance - Counter-terrorism/Special Mission Units”

w. SecDef message 112005Z MAR 98, “Public Affairs Guidance for National Guard and Reserve Component Integration into Domestic Preparedness Program”

x. DepSecDef memorandum, 23 November 1996, “Executive Agency for the Domestic Preparedness Program”

y. CJCSM 3122.03A, 31 December 1999, “Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Vol. II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)”

z. CJCSI 5113.02A, 10 August 2000, “CJCS Counterproliferation Charter”

aa. Joint Pub 3-11, 11 July 2000, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments”

bb. Joint Pub 3-08, 1 February 1995, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations”

cc. Joint Pub 3-07.2, 17 March 1998, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism”

dd. Joint Pub 3-61, 14 May 1997, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations”

ee. Joint Pub 3-07.7, 3 July 2000, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations (DRAFT)”

ff. Public Law 104-201, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

gg. DOD Directive 5160.62, 26 April 1989, “Single Manager for Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T)”

hh. Department of Justice, 8 August 2000, “Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a Domestic Threat or Incident of Terrorism in Accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 39”

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GLOSSARY

PART I -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations

AOR area of responsibility

ARC American Red Cross

ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)

C2 command and control

C4 command, control, communications, and computers

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive

CCG Crisis Coordination Group

CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group

CINC commander in chief

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CM consequence management

CONPLAN Contingency Plan

CONUS Continental United States

CSG Counterterrorism and Security Group

DCE Defense Coordinating Element

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer

DepSecDef Deputy Secretary of Defense

DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Services Agency

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOMS Director of Military Support

DOS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DWI disaster welfare information

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer

ERT Emergency Response Team

ESF emergency support function

EST Emergency Support Team

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan

FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment
Center

FRP Federal Response Plan

HAZMAT hazardous material

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

IWG Interagency Working Group

JIC Joint Information Center

JLLP Joint Lessons Learned Program

JOD Joint Operations Division

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOTF joint special operations task forces

JTF joint task force

JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support

LAN local area network

LFA lead federal agency

LNO liaison officer

MACA military assistance to civilian authorities

MACDIS military assistance to civil disturbances

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System

MSCA military support to civilian authorities

NCA National Command Authorities

NCP National Contingency Plan

NDMS National Disaster Medical System

NGB National Guard Bureau

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency

NRT National Response Team

NSA National Security Administration

NSC National Security Council

NSSE National Special Security Event

OCJCS(PA) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Public Affairs)

OPCON operational control

OPR office of primary responsibility

OPSEC operational security

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD(PA) Office of the Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs

OUSD(C) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense - Comptroller

PA Public Affairs

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PHS Public Health Service

PRC Presidential Reserve Call-Up

PWMD Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Group

RC Reserve Component

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SOF special operations forces

UCP Unified Command Plan

UJTL Universal Joint Task List

USC United States Code

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCINCJFCOM Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command

USCINCPAC Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command

USCINCSO Commander in Chief, US Southern Command

USCINCSOC Commander in Chief, US Special Operations
Command

USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USPACOM United States Pacific Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

USSS United States Secret Service

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WMD-CST Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Team

PART II -- TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. area of responsibility (AOR). The geographic area associated with a regional CINC within which a regional CINC has authority to plan and conduct operations.

2. biological agent. A microorganism or byproduct that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the contamination or deterioration of material.

3. Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). The CDRG was established by the Federal Response Plan as the interagency forum to direct planning, operations, and exercises for the FRP community. FEMA chairs the CDRG meetings among the FRP departments and agencies.

4. chemical agent. A chemical substance that is intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through its physiological effects. The term excludes riot agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame.

5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) - Consequence Management (CM). The consequence management activities for all deliberate and inadvertent releases of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives with potential to cause high casualties and large levels of destruction.

6. Consequence Management (CM). Consequence management is defined as measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE situation. The primary authority rests with the states to respond, and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required.

7. Crisis Coordination Group (CCG). The CCG is an internal DOD working group that plans for and/or responds to a possible or actual terrorist incident.

8. Crisis Management. Crisis Management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Crisis Management is predominantly a law enforcement function in domestic situations.

9. Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG). The CSG is the interagency forum for domestic and foreign terrorism. The NSC National

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism normally chairs the CSG. The FBI will chair the CSG when the CSG considers requests for the DEST in response to a domestic or unknown terrorist group. The CSG includes appropriate interagency members and reports to the Deputies Committee (or at the call of its chair, the Principals Committee).

10. Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO is the DOD on-scene representative who coordinates requirements with the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or designated representative. The DCO validates requests by the FCO, passing requirements back to the CINC or JTF.

11. domestic. The continental United States (CONUS) (including the District of Columbia), Alaska, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or any political subdivision thereof. Two former trust territories (but now independent countries) also are deemed eligible assistance under the Compact of Free Association -- the Republic of the Marshall Islands (until 21 October 2001) and the Federated States of Micronesia (until 3 November 2001).

12. Emergency Response Team (ERT). The main ERT is an interagency team, consisting of the lead representative from each federal department or agency assigned primary responsibility for an ESF and key members of the FCO’s staff. ERT elements may operate from several field locations as required.

13. Emergency Support Team (EST). The interagency group comprised of representatives from each of the primary agencies, select support agencies, and FEMA headquarters staff. It operates from the FEMA National Interagency Emergency Operations Center in Washington, DC.

14. Executive Agent. The individual designated by position to have and exercise the assigned responsibility and delegated authority of the Secretary of Defense.

15. Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The FCO, or designated representative, is the focal point for DOD liaison with FEMA during CM operations. The FCO is appointed by the Director of FEMA, on behalf of the President, to coordinate Federal CM operations in the field. The source and level of the FCO will likely depend on the nature of the incident.

16. high-yield explosive. Any conventional weapon or device that is capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to kill or injure large numbers of people.

17. Immediate Response. Any form of immediate action taken by a DOD component or military commander to assist civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions and when time does not permit approval from a higher authority.

18. lead agency. The federal department or agency assigned lead responsibility to manage and coordinate the federal response in a specific functional area. The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management and FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management. Lead agencies support the overall LFA during all phases of the response.

19. lead federal agency (LFA). The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response is referred to as the LFA and is determined by the type of emergency. Specific responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the agency's unique statutory authorities.

20. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Those DOD activities and measures covered under MSCA (natural and manmade disasters) plus DOD assistance for civil disturbances, counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement.

21. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and measures taken by the DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civilian government agency in planning, preparing for, or responding to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks.

22. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). NDMS is a nationwide medical mutual aid network between the federal and nonfederal sectors that includes medical response, patient evacuation, and definitive medical care. At the federal level, it is a partnership between HHS, DOD, Department of Veterans Affairs, and FEMA.

23. National Special Security Event (NSSE). Events designated upon the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury which DOD and other government agencies may be requested to preposition forces. The forces requested may be units with CM capabilities in anticipation of a potential CBRNE situation.

24. Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction (PWMD) Group. The PWMD Group, formerly WMDP under PDD-62, is an interagency forum to discuss policies and programs related to WMD issues. The NSC National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism chairs the PWMD Group.

25. Presidential Declaration. Under the Stafford Act, a Governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or emergency if an event is beyond the combined response capabilities of the affected local and state governments. Based on the findings of a joint federal-state-local preliminary damage assessment (PDA) indicating the damages are of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant assistance under the Act, the President may grant a major disaster or emergency declaration. (Note: In a particularly fast-moving or devastating disaster, the PDA process may be deferred until after the declaration.) If an emergency involves an area or facility for which the Federal Government exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority, the President may unilaterally direct the provision of emergency assistance under the Stafford Act. The Governor of the affected state will be consulted if possible.

26. primary agency. A primary agency, as stated in the FRP, is responsible for coordinating an ESF. A primary agency is designated on the basis of its authorities, resources, and capabilities in that functional area.

27. routine operations. Day-to-day operations, training, actions, and plans conducted when not conducting CM operations.

28. support agency. A support agency assists the primary agency in resolving the requirements of an ESF.

29. supported CINC. The regional CINC designated by the NCA to exercise operational control of DOD forces providing CM support to the LFA.

30. supporting CINC. Any regional or functional CINC providing forces, equipment, or any other resources to the supported CINC for domestic CM.

31. weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

(1) Under 10 USC 1403, a WMD is any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or radioactivity.

(2) 18 USC 2332a, defines a WMD as (1) any destructive device as defined in section of 921 of this title, [which states] any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more than 4 ounces, missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to the above; (2) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (3) any weapon involving a disease organism; or (4) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.

(3) For the purpose of military support to domestic CBRNE CM operations, the term WMD shall be defined as either a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapon, device or material. CBRNE includes any event, industrial accident, act of nature, act of war, or terrorism. WMD refers to a CBRNE device specifically designed to produce casualties.

32. Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Team (WMD-CST). WMD-CSTs are joint Army and Air National Guard teams that provide chemical, biological, and radiological initial survey and assessment operations for domestic WMD incidents. The WMD-CSTs are staffed fulltime with Active Guard/Reserve members from the National Guard. Beginning in Fiscal Year 1999, the Department of Defense established WMD-CSTs to support civil authorities in managing the consequences of a CBRNE situation. The WMD-CST deploys to an area of operations, assesses a suspected CBRNE situation in support of a local incident commander, and advises civilian responders regarding appropriate action.

Sorry Google and thanks to webcitation.org

2006-08-21T22:08:00.000-07:00

Sorry about screenshotting your cache here Google... Any questions on it, please refer to my Fair Use Notice posting

And a shout out to my newly discovered helpful friend WebCite. A great tool for documentation without the worrisome problems that 404s create. I only wish I had known about it when I began this project!

The following screenshots are from the cached page of a story which I referenced in my last post which is now 404. Surprise, surprise, right?

The Secret Service in NYC on 9/11

2006-08-13T02:04:00.000-07:00

Edit: 11/5/06 I'm going to be updating this post with more information which I've found since I wrote it (and perhaps changing the wording around), but you can find a cached version of how it looked before I started this process here.

Now, no doubt you are aware that the Secret Service's largest field office was located in WTC 7. What you may not know, though, is that 100 extra agents were in NYC on 9/11 in preparation for the U.N.'s General Assembly which was scheduled to open that day. Was 9/11 in NYC designated as a National Special Security event due to that opening? Usually, the General Debate begins a few days after the General Assembly opens. That is what was postponed until November, lasted only one week instead of the more typical two weeks and was classified as a NSSE when it happened. George Bush was scheduled to speak near the end of the General Debate in September. Anyway, here are some quotes regarding the Secret Service in NYC on 9/11.

In an interview with Barbara Riggs (the first woman Deputy Director of the Secret Service) she says

The Secret Service New York Field Office is its largest field operation, employing over 200 personnel. An additional 100 employees were in New York to plan, implement and staff the foreign dignitary details for the upcoming United Nations General Assembly.

The General Assembly was scheduled to open that day, but the opening was postponed until the following day due to the attacks. Kofi Annan addressed the General Assembly on September 12th. Much of their session was postponed until later in the year, when it was classified as a NSSE (as the previous year's assembly had also been) which puts the Secret Service in charge. A few quotes about NSSE's follow:

A portion of PDD-62, which is a classified document, deals with the coordination of Federal anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism assets for events of national interest.

When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan.

Certainly, we emphasize the importance of prevention and deterrence when we are developing an operational security plan, but we are also prepared to respond tactically to a threat if the situation dictates. As a result, we will employ a number of our specialized units during the course of this event.

A variety of training initiatives are conducted to include simulated attacks and medical emergencies, inter-agency tabletop exercises, and field exercises.

The Secret Service apparently had at least three (and probably at least four) military unit working under them in New York on 9/11.
First, the 1108th U.S. Army Signal Brigade from Fort Detrick archive:

When four communications soldiers from the 1108th Signal Brigade were on temporary duty to New York City Sept. 11 to support the Secret Service in preparing for the United Nations General Assembly 56, they had no idea how life-altering their trip would be.

You can read about some of my adventures in trying to record that story after it went 404 here.
Two of the soldiers mentioned in this story, Stephen Atha and Robert Curtis used to have webpages made up for them in a location called Salute to the Netcom heroes. You can read about some of my adventures trying to document those pages after they were all blacked out and then went 404 here. A third soldier mentioned in this group, Justo Andaluz, made a complaint to Gateway computers, which you can read here. All of these sources would seem to add to the evidence that these soldiers have been involved with working at other NSSEs- the Winter Olympics for Andaluz and the 2005 Presidential Inauguration for Curtis and Atha.

Military unit number two- Air Force Protective Communications Support team (Scott AFB) archive (article on page 8) screenshot 1 screenshot 2. Quote:

Tech Sgt. Shawn Haynes and Staff Sgts. Craig Walentowski, Mark Provo and Lonnie Wells, of the Air Force Protective Communications Support team, were on temporary duty in New York City to provide communications support for the Secret Service for United Nations General Assembly 56. They left Scott AFB Aug. 27 and were scheduled to return Oct. 5, before their mission was cut short by the destruction of the World Trade Center Sept. 11.
"We were there to provide radio, telephone, computer, cellular phone, and paging support for the assembly," said Sergeant Haynes.
The four had left a morning briefing and begun preparing for the day's mission when the first airliner struck the north tower.

Mark Provo audio interview in the Library of Congress
Part 1 archive
Part 2 archive

Military unit number three
Navy EOD MU 6, Jim Prewitt, team leader archive

That morning, Prewitt, assigned to EOD Mobile Unit 6, was working as a team leader with the U.S. Secret Service in New York City. While on his way to a brief in building seven of the World Trade Center Complex, the first plane struck the north tower.

Probable military unit number four:
754th Explosive Ordnance Disposal company (Fort Monmouth), Richard Spanard and team

Richard J. Spanard, Beta Tau ’93 (Slippery
Rock University) is a U. S. Army
captain and commander of an Explosive
Ordnance Disposal company
based in northern New Jersey. On the
morning of September 11, he was enjoying
breakfast at a deli 50 feet from
the World Trade Center twin towers
when the first plane hit. General
hysteria inundated the deli. Spanard
decided that he and the three
soldiers with him should move to
number 7 World Trade Center, where
they had a scheduled meeting.

Please let me know if you are aware of other military units which were working with the Secret Service on 9/11/01 in New York City in addition to the ones above.

Now, from an interview with Bob Weaver, the Assistant Special Agent in charge of the US Secret Service New York Field Office(WTC 7):

At this point in the conversation, a colleague handed Weaver a picture of his former office in flames.

"I can't believe this picture," he said, the tone of his voice lowering. "There are flames shooting out of my office. There is no other fire on that side of the building (the West Broadway side) but there is in my office. It's incredible.

"I knew we lost everything in the attack, but I guess my friend wanted to be sure I didn't forget."

That would be an interesting picture to see, I think.

As Cynthia McKinney asked Richard Myers (with Donald Rumsfeld present) and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Tina Jonas on March 11th, 2005:

CMK: Mr. Chairman, begging your indulgence, was September Eleventh declared a National Security Special Event day?

RM: I have to look back; I do not know. Do you mean after the fact, or

CMK: No. Because of the activities going on that had been scheduled at the United Nations that day.

RM: I'd have to go back and check. I don't know.

From the 9/11 Commission report, we see that the Secret Service had been involved with potential threats posed by airplanes as far back as 1996-

Clarke had been concerned about the danger posed by aircraft since at least the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. There he had tried to create an air defense plan using assets from the Treasury Department, after the Defense Department declined to contribute resources. The Secret Service continued to work on the problem of airborne threats to the Washington region. In 1998, Clarke chaired an exercise designed to highlight the inadequacy of the solution. This paper exercise involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists commandeered a Learjet on the ground in Atlanta, loaded it with explosives, and flew it toward a target in Washington, D.C. Clarke asked officials from the Pentagon, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Secret Service what they could do about the situation. Officials from the Pentagon said they could scramble aircraft from Langley Air Force Base, but they would need to go to the President for rules of engagement, and there was no mechanism to do so. There was no clear resolution of the problem at the exercise.

Also from the Barbara Riggs interview we get a confirmation the the Secret Service was aware of potential hijackings in real time for at least some part of the morning:

Thru monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA, the Secret Service was able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft. We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, D.C. and our assumption was that the White House was a target. While the White House was evacuated, the Secret Service prepared to defend the facility.

A quote from an exerpt of Richard Clarke's book Against All Enemies:

I resumed the video conference. "FAA, FAA, go. Status report. How many aircraft do you still carry as hijacked?" Garvey read from a list: "All aircraft have been ordered to land at the nearest field. Here's what we have as potential hijacks: Delta 1989 over West Virginia, United 93 over Pennsylvania. . . ."

Stafford slipped me a note. "Radar shows aircraft headed this way." Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what FAA's radar was seeing. "I'm going to empty out the complex." He was ordering the evacuation of the White House.

Ralph Seigler stuck his head into the room, "There has been an explosion in the Pentagon parking lot, maybe a car bomb!" . . .

Roger Cressey stepped back in to the video conference and announced: "A plane just hit the Pentagon." I was still talking with FAA, taking down a list of possibly hijacked aircraft. "Did you hear me?" Cressey was on loan to the White House from the Pentagon. He had friends there, we all did. "I can still see Rumsfeld on the screen," I replied, "so the whole building didn't get hit. No emotion here. We are going to stay focused. Roger, find out where the fighter planes are. I want Combat Air Patrol over every major city in this country. Now." source

Of course, we also know that the Secret Service had been concerned about planes crashing into the White House before this:

The plane that slammed against the White House early Monday morning had been detected by radar at National Airport minutes before the crash, according to federal investigators who are trying to determine why Secret Service officers guarding the mansion weren't warned of the aircraft's approach.

Frank Eugene Corder, 38, a student pilot with a history of alcohol and drug abuse, stole the single-engine Cessna from an airfield north of Baltimore and died in the crash, officials said. Initial interviews with associates of Corder suggest the crash was intentional, federal officials said, but they said they did not believe it was politically motivated.

FBI and Secret Service investigators plan to pore over Federal Aviation Administration records to determine what the FAA's radar showed, whether it seemed to indicate a potential threat, and what was done with the information, federal sources said. source

(early AM September 12th, 1994)

My big project

2006-08-13T01:11:00.000-07:00

So my most recent 30 or so diary posts (in reverse chronological order) were basically written to be read as a single rather long essay. They were intended to be a beginning example of how I feel research on the topic of 9/11 may want to model itself. Given the fact that possibly relevant information has disappeared from the internet (and no doubt will continue to) I think documentation with screenshots may be an important technique. IMO, mirroring information is not as effective a way to document that a certain site contained such and such information at a certain time.

Likely, this essay won't persuade many people to re-examine 9/11. Nonetheless, I felt I had to attempt it. Anyway, below follows a link list to my various posts in the essay. I plan to post some more in the future as well, which I will link to from here. The Fair Use notice should be taken as applying to all of the following posts.
More recent postings on 9/11:
The Secret Service in NYC on 9/11

Essay:
The importance of getting 9/11 right
The Internet Archive and the Rules of Disinformation
The Office of Strategic Influence
Fair use notice - quotes from the 9/11 reading room
9/11 Commission report article versions a & b
Screenshots documenting changed and unchanged Pravda stories
September 11: The world will always remember
Misrepresenting photographic evidence
Potential examples of potential 9/11 internet evidence being changed
More on DCANG
War games and exercises
Amalgam Virgo I
Amalgam Virgo II
Budget shots re: Amalgam Virgo + Amalgam Warrior
Amalgam Warrior description
Some strangeness re: Amalgam Warrior
Amalgam Warrior shots
Positive Force '01
The Office of National Preparedness
TRIPOD
Pre-9/11 intelligence
Quotes about the 9/11 exercises
9/11 internet duels - Who (if anyone) is correct?
911Myths... Reading between the lies: a partial review
Possible examples of possible physical evidence re: 9/11 being destroyed
Former 9/11 Commissioner Max Cleland on the 9/11 Commission
More on the 9/11 Commission
To shoot or not to shoot, that is the question...
AWACS in training and exercises on 9/11
WTC 7
In conclusion

The importance of getting 9/11 right

2006-07-30T05:24:00.000-07:00

CBS News has learned that barely five hours after American Airlines Flight 77 plowed into the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq - even though there was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks.

That's according to notes taken by aides who were with Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center on Sept. 11

With the intelligence all pointing toward bin Laden, Rumsfeld ordered the military to begin working on strike plans. And at 2:40 p.m., the notes quote Rumsfeld as saying he wanted "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H." - meaning Saddam Hussein - "at same time. Not only UBL" - the initials used to identify Osama bin Laden.

Now, nearly one year later, there is still very little evidence Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks. But if these notes are accurate, that didn't matter to Rumsfeld.

"Go massive," the notes quote him as saying. "Sweep it all up. Things related and not." CBS News, 9/4/2002

“I want you all to understand that we are at war and we will stay at war until this is done. Nothing else matters. Everything is available for the pursuit of this war. Any barriers in your way, they’re gone. Any money you need, you have it. This is our only agenda.” When Rumsfeld points out that international law only allows force to prevent future attacks and not for retribution, Bush yells, “No. I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 23-24] source- Complete 9/11 Timeline - 9:00 PM, 9/11/2001

9/11/2001:

(11:30 p.m.): Bush Sees New Pearl Harbor Before going to sleep, President Bush writes in his diary, “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today. ... We think it’s Osama bin Laden.” [Washington Post, 1/27/2002] source- Complete 911 Timeline

(broken WaPo link- see screenshot below for an alternate URL for the article)

But don't you believe that the threat that bin Laden posed won't truly be eliminated until he is found either dead or alive?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I say, we haven't heard much from him. And I wouldn't necessarily say he's at the center of any command structure. And, again, I don't know where he is. I -- I'll repeat what I said. I truly am not that concerned about him. I know he is on the run. I was concerned about him, when he had taken over a country. I was concerned about the fact that he was basically running Afghanistan and calling the shots for the Taliban. source- White House Press Conference, March 2002

During Wednesday's hearing, Leahy questioned Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's Tuesday assertion that the prison camp was an essential part of the U.S.-led War on Terror. "All of us know this war will not end in our lifetime," Leahy said.
source- Congress Probes Gitmo Questions (Fox News)

At least one skeptic of the official explanation for the events of 9/11, Mike Ruppert, feels that looking at 9/11 any further will be like looking at "elephant that just ran us over" instead of at "the herd of elephants charging at us". Since I'm about to write several posts about 9/11 (posted in reverse chronological order for easier flow in reading), it's pretty clear to me that I don't totally agree with this assessment. There are at least three reasons for this- one being that while members of Mike Ruppert's audience may be willing to concede that an elephant has indeed just run them over, not everyone agrees that there was an elephant (or if there was on what the elephant looked like). Another is that the events preceeding, culminating in and following 9/11 (and all that has been written on that subject) seem to me to provide a stellar example for study in terms of conspiracy theory, misinformation and disinformation among other things. The third is what the events of 9/11 have been (and will continue to be) used to justify both domestically and worldwide- wars, torture, domestic spying, etc. and the cost, both financially and in terms of freedom of those things which are being justified by the events of 9/11 (and not just in or by the United States, which is partly why at the end of my essay I will make a plea for worldwide assistance in looking more closely at the events surrounding 9/11). Although the events of 9/11 took place predominantly within the borders of the US, many events around the world led toward that day. Also, the ripple efects from that event have worldwide consequences.

I will often bring up information previously mentioned on other sites which deal with 9/11, but will try to present evidence from primary sources (government websites and pages, official documents, newspaper, magazine and television stories, etc. which quote named sources who have relevant credentials and information) as much as possible. I owe a great debt to all of the researchers who have written on this topic, but I have nonetheless found it necessary to check, recheck, verify and/or refute any and all sources of information presented to the degree that it has been possible for me to do that online in a limited time period. These posts will only scratch the bare surface of a topic on which many books have been and will be written. You may also find some of my diary entries at dailykos useful for background information should you decide to take the plunge into all of this, particularly Keeping track of some of the major neocon players and their connections - who's on first?.

I will be using a primary tool for investigative purposes- the Internet Archive.

My main focus will be to document information (pictures, articles, websites, etc. which may provide relevant information to 9/11) which is no longer easily accessible, has been changed, or in some cases seems no longer to be available on the internet at all (as far as I can determine).

I will be attempting to document the evidence which I come across online by using screenshots.

I believe that my documentation of evidence will fall under the Fair Use guidelines which I have quoted from the 9/11 reading room

There seem to be two basic ways in which one can disprove or debunk theories, arguments, accounts of events, etc. The first one is to point out enough logical flaws (improbabilities, inconsistencies and/or impossibilities, etc.) in the account to call into question its validity as an explanation. The second is to offer an alternative explanation which better fits the known data. To give a simple example of the first method, one does not need to be able to prove conclusively that 1+1=2 in most cases in order to show evidence that 1+1=3 has a high probability of being incorrect. In this essay, I will not attempt to make many claims about what the data I present may mean. Instead, I offer it as potentially interesting data which may suggest that the official account of 9/11 may not be complete, accurate and/or truthful.
Given the possibility of disinformation about the events of 9/11, I won't attempt to present my evidence as more than that or to speculate on alternative explanations which may better account for the verifiable data. Nonetheless, I think that alternate explanations are a valuable avenue of pursuit, they are simpy beyond the scope of this essay. There are certainly enough sites around which delve into various possible scenarios without my attempting to add anything to them. So without further ado, here's what several weeks of research, documenting and writing on my part have produced:

The Internet Archive and the Rules of Disinformation

2006-07-29T01:35:00.000-07:00

In order to pick my way through the potential minefield of information, misinformation and disinformation online I will start by referring to a source which has been found to be admissible in court (with an affidavit):
Archived web pages as evidence

In an October 2004 case called "Telewizja Polska SA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite", the Wayback Machine archives were used as a source of admissible evidence, perhaps for the first time.

Internet Archive (the Wayback Machine)evidence that Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth:
The Rules of Disinformation
by H. Michael Sweeneyexisted on the internet in substantially the same form as today prior to 9/11
corraborating evidence may be found using a google search as well.
Hopefully, this evidence reasonably proves to an internet audience that this document was written prior to 9/11 and has been used since that time by 9/11 sites such as 9-11 Review to help analyse patterns of disinformation. Assuming that The Rules of Disinformation had an existence prior to 9/11, we can then use it as a tool to examine things which have happened on and since 9/11 to see whether we may find any evidence of disinformation occuring and to see how well those events may fit within the Rules of Disinformation paradigm. I won't attempt to present exhaustive evidence support each point and even if I did, my examples would doubtless be subject to interpretation as opposed to definitive. Nonetheless, I feel that I can present reasonably convincing evidence that some points within the rules match events quite well, and I think that a reasonable reader could easily find more supportive evidence in online forums (some of which are no doubt devoted solely to 9/11 and others which may have a significant number of threads on the topic).

So here are some links where you can read the Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation (short version w/o examples; also gives a link to the Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist)
and
a longer version (includes a preamble and pre-9/11 examples)

The Internet Archive can't prove that a documented web page did not exist prior to a certain date, but it can be used to establish that a documented web page did exist on or prior to a certain date in a certain form. Therefore, it can be useful in some cases when web pages have changed, no longer exist, or to establish their existence prior to a certain point in time. All of these things have been useful when trying to track down information and sort out potential disinformation, as you will see. As a point of note, the internet archive's URLs contain the date the archive of that page was created within them. For example, the URL for the oldest IA record for Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth:
The Rules of Disinformation is http://web.archive.org/web/20010820192101/http://www.hasslberger.com/about/about/awa/awa_6.htm (20010820 being August 20^th, 2001). This will be useful to keep in mind. Occasionally, when navigating through links on archived pages, the URL numbers will change to indicate a different date- this means that that particular page was archived at a different time than the page which links to it. Only once have I seen (and documented here) a different date number appear in the URL to the page I end up on than the date which appears for that page in the IA records.

The Office of Strategic Influence

2006-07-29T00:58:00.000-07:00

I mention this because while I will often use as sources of information government and official websites, I don't necessarily believe that all of the information contained on them is accurate. I feel that one has to weigh the possibility of disinformation in all cases in order to maintain proper skepticism. You may feel that this is an overcautious stance to take, but I hope to persuade you on that score why I feel this to be necessary through the combination of the Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth document and the evidence which I will be presenting. I feel that a case can be made that whether or not some or even most of what I present is disinformation it does not detract from my argument, which is that there is a need for the U.S. public to obtain a fuller understanding of the events of 9/11 than has been provided in official accounts so far.

From Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Chile

And then there was the office of strategic influence. You may recall that. And "oh my goodness gracious isn't that terrible, Henny Penny the sky is going to fall." I went down that next day and said fine, if you want to savage this thing fine I'll give you the corpse. There's the name. You can have the name, but I'm gonna keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have.

That was intended to be done by that office is being done by that office, NOT by that office in other ways.

From Wikipedia's entry on the Office of Strategic Influence

The Office of Strategic Influence, or OSI, was a department created by the United States Department of Defense on October 30, 2001, to support the War on Terrorism through psychological operations in targeted countries. The closure of the office was announced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld soon after its existence became publicly known.

The OSI would have been a center for the creation of propaganda materials, for the stated purpose of misleading enemy forces or foreign civilian populations. After information on the office spread through US and foreign media in mid February 2002, intense discussions on purpose and scope of the office were reported. The discussions culminated in a public statement by Rumsfeld in late February that the office has been closed down.

Some argue that due to its secretive nature and stated purposes the existence of such an agency would be hard to determine. In fact, in November 2002, Rumsfeld stated in an interview that only the name of the office was abolished, that it still exists and continues to fulfill its original intended purposes. Much of the OSI's responsibilities were shifted to the Information Operations Task Force. [1]

Fair use notice - quotes from the 9/11 reading room

2006-07-29T00:21:00.000-07:00

The 9/11 reading room archives articles, documents, etc. pertaining to 9/11. Here are a couple of quotes from the site:

This archive consists of news stories and other documents (images, government files) related to the most dire unanswered questions about the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. It is by no means complete: We invite readers to send us articles (or references to them) that will fill out this database.

(from the main page)

and

Because of its importance to the events of September 11, 2001, this article has been archived by the 911 Reading Room

FAIR USE NOTICE: This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of criminal justice, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.

(quoted from below articles)

I agree with their interpretation of fair use in this case for the reasons which they outline in the above quote and so I will also be documenting and archiving articles, images and documents without specific authorization by the copyright owner. As I will attempt to show, a great deal of information about 9/11 is no longer readily available, has changed or in some cases does not seem to be available at all. Due to this, I have attempted to document the existence of some things which I consider to be relevant to 9/11 due to the very real possibility that they may no longer be found in their current state at some point in the future.

9/11 Commission report article versions a & b

2006-07-28T23:56:00.000-07:00

These two articles are documented and compared in Mike Ruppert's Crossing the Rubicon. In light of recent news stories on the 9/11 Commission and NORAD and the FAA (and as part of my essay talking about the 9/11 Commission), I thought it would be worthwhile to document them both in their entirety for comparison (and documentation) purposes. As Mike Ruppert noted, there are no mentions of interim reports in the later version of the story. Since we've not seen any interim reports other than these two from 2003, this is doubtless a good thing, since these would need to be part of the public record at some point (if they existed) just like the rest of the Commission's findings.

Screenshots documenting changed and unchanged Pravda stories

2006-07-27T18:04:00.000-07:00

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So,if you've been following along with the captures above we now have examples of both pre 9/11 unchanged stories and early post 9/11 unchanged stories.

Hmm. I guess that probably means that they didn't overwrite stories because they were running out of storage space, unless they just happened to be selective in what they felt was no longer worth keeping, huh? What can ya say? Those crazy Russians. I noticed in the internet archive versions of the stories that many of them had linked at some point to a video.

September 11: The world will always remember

2006-07-27T17:53:00.000-07:00

But something like the Pravda disappearing photos couldn't happen here, because we will never forget September 11th, right?

September 11: The world will always remember

So read the pages on UPI's photo gallery according to the Internet Archives. So I guess that must mean that those images and pages might be worth saving? I tried to do a few searches on phrases like "Manhattan billow smoke" and "depicting the World Trade Center being hit" to see if I still could find the images on the internet (aside from in the internet archives). I didn't have any luck. I guess The world will still always remember, though, so it's okay if I can't easily find any particular picture, right? Save 'em if ya see 'em is my personal recommendation here...

Perhaps you are thinking, "Well, it's just a few photos and articles; no biggie." Well, let's take a quick look at some of the uses for "a few photos and articles"