We Only Want The Earth

The Great Internship Scam: Free Labour Dressed Up In The Fancy Cloak Of Reciprocity

2013-05-15T15:40:00.000+01:00

As a recent university graduate and new member of Ireland’s massive 14% + unemployed club, I have been eagerly scouring the internet looking for work. Of course this task was never going to be easy with over 400,000 others on the dole queues, but the task is not being made any easier by the government’s promotion of free labour for employers through the normalisation of internship schemes. A cursory glance over any jobs website with show that many companies are no longer hiring for real jobs and it is only internships on offer. I mean one can't blame the companies can they? If you run a for-profit business and there is free labour on offer, you would be mad not to take advantage of it.

When did internships come about?

It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly the concept of internships emerged, although it has been suggested to me that they have been prevalent in the United States for a long time and it is likely that this is where the idea came from. On this side of the Atlantic the phenomenon is relatively new and was not the norm except for specialist (white-collar) work where pre-job training and close supervision was required. However, since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis the number of internships on offer has grown massively. No longer are these internships in specialised (white-collar) work environments, but it now seems that any and every type of work requires the worker to have completed 6-9 months of free labour before they would be considered for a position.

The logic of internships.

The logic of internships from the point of view of those that promote them is that they provide an individual with valuable training under supervision which gives them the experience they need in their chosen profession to further their job prospects. This is what the Irish National Internship Scheme (NIS) www.jobbridge.ie says. “By taking part in the JobBridge scheme, your organisation will:

Give an unemployed person the opportunity to gain relevant work experience
Access potential future employees
Enhance the performance of your organisation by offering an internship to motivated individuals with enthusiasm and a passion for developing their careers
Bring in fresh talent, fresh ideas and new thinking
Access newly trained interns with recent skills sets or skilled workers that add real value to your organisation.

This all seems legit and wonderful, a win-win situation one might say. I mean who doesn't want to give opportunities to unemployed people, to enhance the performance of their organisation and to bring in fresh talent, fresh ideas and new thinking? What is the catch one might ask? Well, there isn't one. It’s free!

The logic of for-profit businesses.

The logic for businesses under the capitalist system is to make as much profit as possible. This profit is produced when workers produce or provide a good or service for an employer. The employer pays the worker less than value of that particular good or service and then sells the good or service onto a consumer. It is the difference between what the employer pays the worker for the good or service and what the employer sells that good or service for that is the profit(minus production costs). Now if an employer can pay an employee as little as possible (i.e. the minimum wage), they can make more profits. If that employer can hire an ‘intern’ to work for nothing then that employer makes absolute profit. It therefore logically follows that the concept of internships are a capitalist construct, dressed up in the fancy terminology of reciprocity and designed to increase profitability for businesses.

The reality of internships.

The reality of internship schemes is far removed from the ideals of reciprocity between the intern and employer that scams such as JobBridge promote. The reality is that most employers use interns for the free labour and not for altruistic purposes. The reality is that many interns do not receive adequate training and supervision to further their skills. The reality is that most interns do not receive job offers from the employers after their 6/9 months internship. The reality of schemes like JobBridge is that they are state sanctioned slave labour.

The illogicality of JobBridge.

JobBridge and other internship schemes are illogical from the point of view of governments and individuals, and logical only from the perspective of businesses. The majority of intern positions are created to fill a gap in a company’s workforce that would otherwise be filled by a paid employee. So by effectively promoting a National Internship Scheme, the Irish government is actually reducing the amount of real jobs being created in the economy and have contributed to the normalisation of the concept of internships for every type of job. This is why now when one looks at a jobs vacancy website, there is an abundance of intern positions on offer yet few real jobs that pay a wage.

This is the reason why internships are now being advertised on the JobBridge website for positions such as Chip Shop Assistant, Car Valet, Seamstress, Off-Licence Sales Assistant, Rent-A-Bike Assistant and Fish Filleter. There are many, many more positions of a similar nature that are purely free labour scams. These are not positions which require 6/9 months of training and experience. They would take a week of training at most to equip a person with enough experience to work in one of these jobs. The government must stop the promotion of free labour explotation. JobBridge is stopping real job creation and encouraging the exodus of young people from our shores. If an internship is all that is on offer to me after my years in university, I will be forced to join the exodus myself.

(

For examples of more internship slave labour scams, I would encourage you to visit both www.jobbridge.ie and www.scambridge.ie )

We Only Want The Earth

A Comparison Between the Great Depression and the Global Crisis

2013-03-16T12:11:00.000+00:00

The 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent ‘great depression’ was the biggest economic crisis that the world has experienced. The depth and length of the crisis and the suffering that it caused is legendary. Therefore when the global financial crisis struck in 2007, many rushed to proclaim that we were about to experience another depression on a similar scale, or at least what some have termed a ‘great recession’. This paper will compare and contrast the two economic crises to analyse the key similarities and differences between the two. To do this, the paper will firstly provide an outline of the conditions that led to the 1929 crash in the economy. Moving on from here the paper will then look at the policy responses that were implemented to tackle the crisis before analysing the conditions that precipitated the 2007 financial crisis and the policy responses, to draw out the similarities and differences of each of the crises, and to ascertain were any lessons learned during the current global crisis from the policies of the great depression era. Finally the paper will conclude with a discussion of the main points raised by the analysis of both crises and a look at the future prospects for recovery.

Capitalism is a system of economic development that has crises as an inherent feature. Many crises have occurred both before and after the 1929 stock market crash, however the length and depth of the great depression has made it the point of reference for judging the severity of a financial crisis. Much debate has occurred over the causes of the great depression. While many see the late October 1929 New York stock market crash as the defining feature of the crisis, the reality was much more complex and multifaceted. As (Teichova 1990, p.8) suggests, the great depression was “the deepest, all embracing (agricultural, industrial, financial, social and political) and longest crisis with catastrophic consequences”. As well as this, although the United States led the way, this crisis was global and the rest of the world also experienced depression. So, any analysis of the great depression must look at the various factors that caused and perpetuated it.

The 1920s in America have been described as the roaring twenties. After the devastation of the first-world-war, during the 1920 to 1925 period US and international economies were experiencing a boom. During that period, world mining and manufacturing output grew by nearly twenty percent (McNally 2010, p.63). However, in terms of inequality the poor were less poor but the rich were getting richer at a rate of four to one. As well as this, four fifths of American had no savings compared to twenty-four thousand families at the top who held a third of all savings combined (Canterbery 2011, p.13). During the boom, ninety percent of all Americans saw their incomes fall in relative terms (McNally 2010, p.64). A factor in this was an increase in union-busting and anti-labour laws which increased income inequality. As well as this, agriculture, coal mining and textile industries were suffering from a post-war hangover which saw their profitability decline and in many instances wiped out. This inequality which concentrated wealth in so few hands led to a huge increase in consumer credit which in turn sparked off rising levels of private debt and a massive speculative bubble in the form of a property boom in Florida (Canterbery 2011, pp.13-14).

The mania of speculation was not confined to property and between May 1924 and the end of 1925, there was a huge eighty percent rise in stock prices. The trend continued and as Galbraith (2009, p.16) has suggested, “in early 1928, the nature of the boom changed. The mass escape into make believe, so much a part of the speculative orgy, started in earnest”. During 1928, the Times Industrials (a pre-cursor to the DOW) gained a huge thirty-five percent, from two-hundred and forty-five points to three-hundred and thirty-one points. To maximise their gambling profits, many investors financed their purchase of stocks with borrowed money, with speculators buying one-thousand dollars of stock by putting down one-hundred dollars (Canterbery 2011, p.15). Of course, capitalism’s bubbles must always burst, and this was no exception.

The US real economy was showing signs on a slowdown long before the stock market crash. However, on Wednesday October 23rd 1929, a drop in the stock market lost four months of previous gains and the following day panic selling began. This was briefly halted by a meeting of the nation’s biggest bankers who promised to pool their resources to halt the slide. Their efforts however were futile and on ‘Black Tuesday’ October 29th the bottom fell out of the market, giving up all of the gains of the previous year (McNally 2010, p.65). Most economists agree that the great depression that ensued lasted for over ten years. Its economic impact was striking as GNP fell from a peak of $104.4 billion in mid-1929 to $56.6 billion in 1933. Its social impact was even more harrowing as twenty-five percent of the US civilian labour force was unemployed by 1933, the worst point of the depression (Canterbery 2011, p.18). There are a number of competing explanations as to why the crisis was so severe.

Explanations can be grouped into the two categories of monetarist and non-monetarist. For example, in a mixture of the two Ben Bernanke (1983) suggests that there were three interlinked factors that propagated the great depression. The first was the failure of financial institutions, in particular commercial banks. The percentage of failing banks in 1930 was 5.6% jumping to 12.9% in 1933 and this left a situation whereby in 1933 there were half the number of banks that had been operating in 1929 (Ibid, p.259). Bernanke goes on to cite defaults and bankruptcies as key, with the ratio of debt service to national income going from nine percent in 1929 to nearly twenty percent in 1933. This was pervasive across all sectors with home mortgages; farm mortgages, personal debtors and even state governments defaulting on their obligations (Ibid, p.260). However, key to Bernanke’s view was the correlation of the financial crisis with macroeconomic factors. The crux of this view was that the financial crisis affected the macro-economy by reducing the quality of certain financial services, primarily credit intermediation (Ibid, p.263). In line with the monetarist view, it could also be argued that the Federal Reserve did not help matters. Its policy at the time was only to increase the credit base in line with requirements of trade, which essentially meant that as businesses were afraid to borrow, the Federal Reserve did not increase the money supply.

Somewhat similar to the monetarist elements of Bernanke’s analysis is that of Friedman and Schwartz (1971,pp. 359-60) who argue that the crisis that originated in the United States was a domestic construct which was prolonged and deepened by a failed policy of failing to cut the discount rate, which meant a failure to provide credit and expand the currency. Kindleberger (1986a) taking a similar monetarist position but focusing more on international factors suggests that the world depression stemmed from reparations and war debt, the overvaluation of the pound, the return to the gold standard in Britain and an undervalued French franc. These factors were aggravated by a fall in commodities and a rise in stocks in New York.

From a non-monetarist perspective US government actions were no better, with the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in mid-1930, sparking of a wave of protectionist tariffs around the world and a trade war which saw world trade figures nosedive (Canterbery 2011, p.19). The deflationary process was exacerbated by the huge levels of unemployment, which combined with other factors to initiate the ‘multiplier/accelerator’ interaction, reinforced by wage-cut enforced under-consumption as wages fell for manufacturing production workers by at least thirty-one percent between 1929 and 1933, as well as debt deflation and international interactions (Devine 1994, p.166). While this was happening, consumer prices only fell twenty percent during the 1929-33 period. This, as Devine points out helps to explain that falling consumption was a major factor in the decline in GNP during this time, more so than previous or subsequent recessions (Ibid).

There are others such as Temin (1976) who suggests that monetarist explanations are wrong, and it was consumption and spending that declined first, therefore leading to a tightening of the money supply. Therefore, it was not monetary factors alone that caused the depression. Taking a different approach to explaining the depth and length of the depression, Kindleberger cites the lack of a lender of last resort as the major factor preventing any form of fast recovery (Kindleberger 1986b, p.4). This he suggests was due to Britain’s inability after the First World War, and the United States’ unwillingness to act in that regard. What each of these arguments above show is there is still no consensus on the policy responses that would have prevented such a deep depression occurring. Such a lack of a consensus has also been a feature of the current global crisis.

Since the global financial crisis broke out, many have rushed to make comparisons between it and the great depression. However, before one makes these comparisons, an analysis of the fundamental differences in the nature of the capitalist system between now and then must be undertaken. After the World War boom in output and the post-war move to Keynesian economics, which essentially saved capitalism from self-implosion, the emergence of neoliberal capitalism in the latter 1970s in the form of Reaganism in the US and Thatcherism in Britain ushered in a new era of capitalist development that was distinctly different from its previous incarnations.

This period of capitalist modification saw the creation of the era of what Canterbury has termed ‘casino capitalism’ (Canterbery 2011, pp.83-121). He suggests that this era began with three powerful forces converging. These were; monetarism, which Milton Friedman advised Regan would bring down inflation with minimal effect on employment or production, the influence of the ‘neo-Austrians’ who sought to reduce state influence over entrepreneurs through deregulation and finally, the pervasive idea that less taxes on the rich produced the trickle-down effect (Ibid, p.83). Regan’s policies during this era, continued under the Clinton administration gave huge power over to Wall St through deregulation, and contributed to a huge shift from production to financial services. As the financial sector grew its asset base, it became a much bigger part of the national economy. This can be seen in the fact that between 1978 and 2005, the financial sector grew from 3.5 percent to 5.9 percent of the US economy in GDP terms. To put this in perspective, from the 1930s to around 1980 the rate of growth for the financial sector was roughly the same as that of the non-financial sector. However, from 1980 to 2005 financial sector profits grew by eight-hundred percent, compared with two-hundred and fifty percent for the non-financial sector (Ibid, pp.116-117). This form of capitalism, where value and profit are not ‘produced’ but the result of speculation is a form that gives huge power to unelected rating agencies and bankers to set the agenda, which even governments and international institutions find difficult to alter. It was under this system of capitalism that the global financial crisis emerged.

Many different arguments for the causes of the global crisis exist and whilst it can be difficult to pin down the exact causality because of its global nature, there is agreement on a number of factors. Just like its sister crisis the great depression, before the global crisis struck, the global economy went through a boom period with the world economy growing at a faster rate between 2001 and 2007 than in any other period in the past thirty years (Wade 2008, p.23). Most agree that the crisis was sparked by the subprime mortgage bubble collapse in the United States. However this spark was not the sole cause of the crisis. Just like the great depression, the factors that caused the crisis were numerous.

Although signs of an emerging crisis first appeared in 2006-7, it was not until 2008 when banks such as Lehman Brothers were going to the wall and financial assets were crashing that the full extent of the crisis was realised. As a result, flows of credit dried up and economies the world over started to suffer. However, this crisis was not solely a monetary crisis and had deeper dynamics at play. In particular, the financialisation of capitalism being built upon debts as a means of making profit (McNally 2010, p.86). The subprime mortgage crisis is illustrative of this. For example, in the year 2000 there was $130 billion of subprime lending in the US, backed up with $55 billion of mortgage bonds. Yet by 2005, those figures had jumped to $625 billion in subprime loans backed by $500 billion in securitised bonds (Ibid, p.103). The ‘speculative orgy’, as Galbraith termed it speaking on the 1929 crash, was back with a bang. What exacerbated the orgy more was the creating of innovative financial instruments in the form of credit default swaps (CDS) and other debt securities. For example, by 2006 the CDS on mortgage bonds was eight times the value of the bonds themselves, so when the crisis hit, that wealth was wiped out (Ibid, p.103).

The European context experienced similar problems as contagion spread throughout the world economy. Trade imbalances within the Eurozone created by the power of the German economy, in particular its exports produced vast wealth within Germany, generating credit that was more than was required for domestic demand. The result was an outflow of cheap and easy credit to peripheral European states. This in turn with low interest rates created the basis for a speculative property bubble in places such as Ireland and Spain, and a rise in consumer debt across Europe (Avellaneda and Hardiman 2010, pp.4-5). This, coupled with the ECB having light regulatory practices and liquidity responsibilities, and the fact that the Euro project created an quasi-federal state with a centralised monetary and exchange rate policy, but had no fiscal control over individual states led to a disaster of structural design in the Euro which prevented adequate policy responses from individual states, who instead were burdened with a one size fits all, centralised Franco / German led response.

It is clear that the immediate causes of the crisis were centred on “excessive debt leverage or imprudent lending” (Wade 2008, p.27). Much of this debt leveraging was in the form of the complexly structured credit securities, like the CDS, and when market panic set in following the collapse of Lehman, and this huge default risk pushed investors towards the tipping point. However, as Bernanke (2010) has pointed out, many factors were at play. Although the most prominent was the prospect of losses on the subprime market when the housing bubble burst, the system vulnerabilities as well as shortfalls in government responses explain the severity of the crisis. For example, the “sudden stop” in June 2007 of syndicated lending of asset backed securities to large borrowers. Other factors included the overreliance of banks on short-term wholesale funding, deficiencies in private sector risk management, an over-reliance on ratings agencies, excessive leverage on the part of households, businesses and financial firms, statutory gaps in regulation on special purpose vehicles and a failure of existing regulatory procedures worldwide (Bernanke 2010).

Although causality had similarities between the United States and Europe, the policy responses to deal with the crisis have been markedly different. Quite early into the crisis, perhaps learning from past mistakes from the great depression, the US government approved various Keynesian inspired fiscal stimuli and financial and auto sector bailouts. In particular, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion rescue fund for the banking sector which bought toxic loans at reduced rates (Nguyen and Enomoto 2011). This policy has been seen to be a relative success with an estimated final cost of $32 billion to the United States taxpayer (Congressional Budget Office 2012). In contrast to this, the European solution has been overwhelmingly austerity based, and the cost of the crisis being mainly burdened by the taxpayers of Europe. In particular, the Irish taxpayer’s bill for the bailout of one bank, Anglo Irish will cost the taxpayer more than the total final cost of the TARP program in the United States. In this regard, it does not seem that lessons from the great depression have been learned in a European context.

When we look to the rates of unemployment over the past number of years, it seems like the American policy of stimulus may be working slightly better than the European austerity agenda. For example, in the US unemployment rose sharply after the onset of the financial crisis going from 4.6 percent in 2007, to 7.2 percent in 2008, 9.3 percent in 2009 and 9.7 percent in 2010. However, in 2011 there has been a decline in unemployment to 9 percent (Index Mundi 2012). The European Union (twenty seven members) on the other hand has seen its unemployment rate grow from 8.3 percent in 2006, to 9 percent in 2009 and 9.7 percent in 2011(United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2012) to a current figure of 11.7 percent (Eurostat 2012).

So, how does the global crisis match up to the great depression? It is obvious that there are a number of similarities between the two crises. For example, with both crises there was an extended period of economic growth preceding the crashes. Each of the crisis periods also saw speculative bubbles based on the flow of easy credit which fuelled both property based and stock market excess. Both crises also saw staggering drops in Industrial production and increases in unemployment. However, there are also key differences between the great depression and the global crisis. Primarily, the nature of the capitalist system has changed fundamentally from productive industrialisation to financial capitalisation. The policy responses of governments have also showed that lessons have been learned, especially in the American case, where Keynesianism and central bank intervention has been preferred to the Laissez-faire attitude during the great depression. In a European context, the decision to make taxpayers foot the bill for the losses of financial speculators marks a departure from the policies of the great depression where speculators suffered heavy losses.

There are of course other key differences between the two crises in-so-far as although initially the global crisis seemed every bit as bad, if not worse than the great depression, there are now signs that this may not be the case. For example, by measuring from the peaks in industrial production the decline in industrial production in the nine month period from April 2008 was at least as severe as in the nine months following the June 1929 peak (Eichengreen and O’Rourke 2009). Similarly, in that initial nine month period, global stock markets were falling even faster than in the Great Depression and World trade was also falling much faster than in 1929-30 (Ibid). However the authors of this study have revised their analysis for 2012 and it paints an altogether different picture. The levels of industrial production had shown shoots of recovery over the past couple of years but growth of global industrial output now appears to be slowing. The upturn had been promising, but this follows months when production was essentially stagnant. Notably in the Eurozone, industrial production declined (Eichengreen and O'Rourke 2012). Since initial early forecasts, global trade had showed signs of recovery “But trade is now also fluctuating without direction, at levels barely higher than those of April 2008” (Ibid). As the authors also point out, while equity markets have recovered to a large degree compared with their initial drop, “it is worth observing that world equity markets remain considerably below pre-crisis levels” (Ibid). The somewhat gloomy outlook is confirmed by the latest United Nations ‘World Economic Situation and Prospects’ pre-release document which states;

Four years after the eruption of the global financial crisis, the world economy is still struggling to recover. During 2012, global economic growth has weakened further. A growing number of developed economies have fallen into a double-dip recession. Those in severe sovereign debt distress moved even deeper into recession, caught in the downward spiralling dynamics from high unemployment, weak aggregate demand compounded by fiscal austerity, high public debt burdens, and financial sector fragility (United Nations 2012, p.1).

So, although there are signs that the global crisis may not be as severe as the great depression, recent economic forecasts do not suggest that there will be a clear path to recovery in the near future. Capitalism has been proven to be susceptible to crises and cycles of boom and bust. The two cases here have been the most high profile of those crises. It does seem that some of the lessons of the great depression have been learned to reduce the severity of the global crisis. However, only time will tell if these lessons will ultimately stop a double dip global recession and if lessons can be learned from the global crisis for the inevitable next financial crisis that will come down the line.

We Only Want The Earth

Bibliography:

Avellaneda, S.D. and Hardiman, N. 2010. The European Context of Ireland’s Economic Crisis. The Economic and Social Review, 41(4),

Bernanke, B.S. 2010. Causes of the recent financial and economic crisis. Statement by Ben S.Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Washington DC,

Bernanke, B.S. 1983. Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,

Canterbery, E.R. 2011. The Global Great Recession. World Scientific Publishing Company Incorporated.

Congressional Budget Office 2012. Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program—March 2012 [Online]. Available from: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-28-2012TARP.pdf [Accessed 12/17 2012].

Devine, J. 1994. The causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian interpretation. Research in Political Economy, 14pp.119-194.

Eichengreen, B. and O’Rourke, K.H. 2009. A tale of two depressions. VoxEU.Org, 6

Eichengreen, B. and Rourke, K. 2012. A tale of two depressions redux. VoxEU.Org, 6

Eurostat 2012. Harmonised unemployment rate by sex [Online]. Available from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teilm020&tableSelection=1&plugin=1 [Accessed 12/16 2012].

Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A.J. 1971. A monetary history of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton University Press.

Galbraith, J.K. 2009. The great crash of 1929. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Index Mundi 2012. United Staes Unemployment Rates [Online]. Available from: http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=us&v=74 [Accessed 12/12 2012].

Kindleberger, C.P. 1986a. International Capital Movements and Foreign-Exchange Markets in Crisis: The 1930s and the 1980s. The Impact of the Depression of the 1930s and its Relevance for the Contemporary World.Budapest: Karl Marx University, pp.437-455.

Kindleberger, C.P. 1986b. The world in depression, 1929-1939. University of California Press.

McNally, D. 2010. Global slump: The economics and politics of crisis and resistance. PM Press.

Nguyen, A.P. and Enomoto, C.E. 2011. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) And The Financial Crisis Of 2007-2008. Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER), 7(12),

Teichova, A. 1990. The Debate about the Causes of the Crisis 1929-33. UPPSALA PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY, pp.7.

Temin, P. 1976. Did monetary forces cause the Great Depression? Norton New York.

United Nations 2012. World Economic Situation and Prospects 2013 [Online]. Available from: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2013Chap1_embargo.pdf [Accessed 12/18 2012].

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2012. Economic Statistics / Labour Force & Wages / Unemployment Rate by Country and Year [Online]. Available from: http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/dialog/Saveshow.asp?lang=1 [Accessed 12/16 2012].

Wade, R. 2008. The First-World debt crisis of 2007-2010 in global perspective. Challenge, 51(4), pp.23-54.

Emigrate Or Flip Burgers!

2013-02-20T10:57:00.000+00:00

“Emigrate or work in a fast food outlet.” That is the extraordinary threat made to graduate nurses by Minister for Health, Dr James Reilly. It is aimed at those who do not wish to accept the slave wages on offer under the new graduate nurse recruitment scheme. The scheme, which intends to recruit 1000 nursing graduates on 80% of the standard minimum pay, has been widely condemned by opposition politicians and nursing unions.

There are some who claim that the government is creating 1000 new jobs and that this is to be celebrated. However, the government’s plan is to save €10 million by cutting out agency nurses and no jobs will be created as agency nurses lose their positions to be replaced by cheaper graduate nurses. The ‘scheme’ or more appropriate ‘scam’, will see new graduate nurses taking a 20% or €5442 pay cut. This is on top of cumulative pay cuts of 24% in recent years. Taking into account that a graduate nurse’s starting salary is €3,000 more in the UK, and €10,000 more in Australia, I think many will see the emigration option of Dr Reilly’s threat as very appealing.

The Irish Nurses & Midwives Organisation is to be commended for its call for a boycott of the scam which has seen a paltry uptake of approximately 60 so far, leading the HSE to extend the deadline for applicants indefinitely and include eligibility for 2010 and 2011 graduates. In contrast, the Union of Students in Ireland and DCU Students’ Union have issued no official statements in support of graduate nurses. It is unacceptable that an issue that affects around 1,000 DCUSU members is not being fought for by our Student Union.

This government scam raises broader issues for all of Irish society. That is the chronic undervaluing of care work. This is illustrated by the government cuts to respite care grants and carers allowance in recent times.

It’s no surprise that both nursing and care work are commonly seen as women’s work and are on the lower ends of the pay scale. In a country where in the 21st century, a woman still does not have the right to choose what to do with her own body, earns 73% of the average man’s income and whose own constitution states that a women’s place is in the home, this is as much a gender equality issue as a fair-pay issue. Again the working class are being asked to suffer the burden of the banking crisis. Again it is mostly women who will suffer hardest.

Dr James Reilly shows total disregard for the profession of nursing when he equates it with flipping burgers. Some might say that this is typical in misogynistic, sexist Ireland. Without doubt, it is typical of Dr Reilly’s opinion of the working class. It’s time to stand up for those who should be the most valued in our society. These people work tirelessly to nurse our loved ones back to health. Shame on you Dr Reilly. Shame on this government.

We Only Want The Earth.

The Different Political Paths Of The 'Two Koreas'

2013-01-17T23:12:00.003+00:00

This paper will begin with a brief overview of the breakup of Korea and the ensuing war before explaining the two different political systems that emerged in each state. The paper will then undertake a comparative discussion of the different regime types in North and South Korea since 1953 to provide some context to the political developments that have occurred in each state since then. Following on from this the paper will assess the literature on each state before going on to apply different regime typology theory to both cases to assess what Korean style dictatorship and democracy have meant for the citizens of North and South Korea respectively. Finally the paper will conclude with a summary of its findings and some recommendations for future policy.

North Korea is increasingly portrayed as a pariah on the world stage, with each news report on the Asian state rushing to caricature the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a state that has a bizarre leadership and an oppressed citizenry. However, a major problem with reporting on North Korea is a lack of information as well as a lack of credibility to much of the information that is forthcoming (Smith 1996, p.xiii). It is the hypothesis of this research that after the division of Korea after World-War-Two by imperialist powers, the different political and economic paths that North and South Korea have taken has produced a situation the economic development of the capitalist South had led to democratisation whilst economic stagnation in and Western policies against the communist North has perpetuated dictatorial rule. This paper will assess what the break-up of Korea and the different political paths the two Korea’s have taken meant for each state.

Korea is one of the oldest nations in existence. It has a rich culture and strong national identity and had more than a millennium of unity before its colonisation by imperialist Japan in 1910 (Halliday and Cumings 1988, p.10). After nearly four decades of rule by Japan, after World-War-Two it was divided along the thirty-eight parallel by American colonels. This division left the capital, Seoul in the south ruled by US forces, whilst the north was ruled over by Soviet forces with a three year occupation in each territory (Ibid, p.16). Although a Korean government of ‘people’s committees’ had taken over the running of the state upon the demise of Japan, the US shunned this idea as a too communistic and set about constructing a government apparatus that was more favourable to its ideals, and supported the conservative Korean Democratic Party (KDP) as its government in the South (Ibid, pp.15-16). With UN support in 1948, elections were held in to elect a national government but the north refused to participate. The vote elected Syngman Rhee as leader and the UN ratified the election as the will of two-thirds of the Korean people (Bluth 2008, p.13). Soon after, the north proclaimed the DPRK and Kim Il Sung became its leader.

With soviet forces leaving the north in 1948 and US forces leaving the south in 1949, a tit for tat guerrilla war ensued. In 1950, North Korean armed forces with the support of Stalin’s Soviet Union invaded the South (Ibid, p.1). Truman in the US saw this as an act of communist aggression and committed US forces with the support of the UN (Ibid, p.2). The war lasted three years. On July 27^th 1953, an armistice agreement was signed by the North and the UN, although the South did not sign as it wanted the war to continue and Korea to be liberated. The human cost of the war was huge with an estimated 2,000,000 Koreans dying, as well as 900,000 Chinese and 54,246 US troops (Ibid, p.20). A demilitarised zone was imposed along the border which deterred another full-scale war, and the division of Korea has existed since then.

The regime that emerged in North Korea has been described and characterises itself as communist, however the state is best characterised as a hybrid dictatorship and a Stalinist, personalistic, totalitarian regime. After the end of the war, Kim Il Sung carefully orchestrated a cult of personality based upon himself and became known as the ‘Great Leader’ (Fredriksen 2001, p.277). His indigenous nationalistic version of socialism was called juche, or “self-reliance,” which required sacrifices for the state. The political institutions of the DPRK were modelled on the Stalinist system of the Soviet Union, however the structure of the political institutions was irrelevant because during the 1960s, Kim consolidated his power to the extent that he could no longer be challenged (Bluth 2008, p.25-26). In the early 1970s Kim Il Sung chose his son Kim Jung il as his successor and began to place him at the centre of power in the DPRK. Research has suggested that Kim Jung il was largely running the government by the 1980s as his father slipped into semi-retirement (Ibid, p.27-28). Although totally going against their proclaimed Marxist/Leninist ideological position, upon Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il took over the mantle of running the state until his own death, and the succession of his son Kim Jong-un in 2012.

Between 1953 and the 1970s, with a Stalinist command economic model, industrial production as well as collectivised farms dominated the North Korean economy and remarkable economic gains were made which eclipsed capitalist South Korea (Fredriksen 2001, P.277). However, between 1970 and 1990 the DPRK economy had been in slow decline with mounting external debt, overspending on military and a series of mismanaged seven-year plans not achieving the desired results (Bluth 2008, p.37-39). By the mid-1990s, various factors combined to produce an agricultural famine with an estimated 3.5% of the population dying (Nolan, 2003 cited in Bluth 2008, p.40). Although some economic reforms have been instigated since then, the economic situation in the DPRK remains dire.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of North Korea’s policies has been its nuclear programme. This, the North Koreans argue is to protect itself from outside aggressors such as the United States. The West in contrast sees its nucleariseation as an aggressive act. Two periods of crises illustrate this. The first in 1993 saw North Korea withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After over a year and a half of military and diplomatic manoeuvres, North Korea succeeded in getting the United States to sign an agreement which gave economic concessions to the North and normalised relations between the two states (Michishita 2009, p.93) and (Niksch 2005, p.4). In December 2002, North Korea stated that it was to resume the operation and construction of nuclear facilities. After economic sanctions from the US, the North launched ballistic missile nuclear tests in 2006. The strategy succeeded in getting some US sanctions dropped and also its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism rescinded (Ibid, p.163), but that is as far as it went and the situation remains tentative.

The political system that emerged in South Korea was markedly different to that in the North. Although nominally a capitalist democracy, the South has had a difficult path in consolidating that democracy, and had to endure decades of military and authoritarian rule. After the Korean War, the South evolved into a bureaucratic entity and owing to its continuing confrontation with its sister state, required a strong military presence. This situation led to a lack of focus on other institutions and allowed the military to assume a direct political role (Cotton 1989, p.248). South Korean politics during Syngman Rhee's regime (1948-60) centred on his struggle to remain in power with the use of fraudulent tactics. After popular dissatisfaction and a student rebellion, Rhee resigned in 1960 (Savada and Shaw 1997). Whilst Rhee had controlled the military by manipulating the generals, his successor Chang could not. Under the command of Major General Park Chung Hee, the army carried out a coup d'état on May 16, 1961 leading to eighteen years of direct military junta rule (Ibid).

As dissatisfaction with the eighteen-year rule of Park Chung Hee grew in 1979, so did the opposition with mass labour unrest and protest. Fearing a revolution because of Park’s hard line against the dissent, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) assonated Park (Shorrock 1986, p.1199). As popular demands for democracy grew, another military coup led by Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan took power again. He was later ‘elected’ president by the National Conference for Unification and set out a bold plan to create a new society. He removed old politicians from the scene and only those certified as "clean" could participate in politics (Savada and Shaw 1997). He appointed a new constitutional assembly which prepared a new constitution which restricted presidential terms to seven years as well as introducing new labour laws which banned workers unions and labour federations. New press laws also put the media under strict control (Shorrock 1986, p.1205).

Chun’s rule was championed by new US president Ronald Reagan whose anti-communist and neo-liberal economic agenda was shared with Chun. Although impressive economic growth was achieved after 1983, by 1987 Chun’s reneging on his promise of a democratic transition led to widespread protest and this ultimately led to his stepping down, with his successor Roo Tae Woo announcing an eight-point democratisation programme which capitulated to the opposition’s democratic demands (Lie 2000, pp.150-152), and paving the way for democratic consolidation ever since.

During the latter part of the military dictatorship and the early years of democratic consolidation, economic development in South Korea was hugely impressive in contrast to its sister state. In effect, one of the world's poorest countries developed into an industrialized member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) within three decades. Growth of GNP per capita rose from $87 in 1962 to $8483 in 1994. As well as this, exports grew from $40 million in 1953 to $96 billion in 1994 (Kim, 1997a, pp.1-2, cited in Hassink 1999, p.128). So, it could be argued that economic growth in some ways spurred democratic demands. Democratic consolidation in turn led to massive economic growth with South Korea becoming one of Asia’s ‘Tiger’ economies.

While there were some similarities between the two states’ leadership since the breakup, there are also some important typological differences. Both Korean regimes, up until 1987 in the case of the South, have had dictatorial regimes. However, there were important differences between these forms of dictatorships that go beyond the economic mode of production that they adopted. To understand what is meant by dictatorship, a definition is useful. For this purpose Przeworski et al.’s explanation that “democracies are those in which those who govern are selected through contested elections. Dictatorships are not democracies” is best (Przeworski, et al. 2000). North Korea is best described as a hybrid dictatorship combining personalist and single-party rule in a totalitarian fashion (Ezrow and Frantz 2011, p.22). In contrast to this, the regime in South Korea between 1961 and 1987 could be best described as a military dictatorship with authoritarian rule (Ibid, p.20).

Single party dictatorships are those in which power is concentrated in the hands of one single party and the leader of the regime is typically the head of that party. Within such a system the ruling party controls the institutions of the state and directs the majority of the political arena including media, local government and civil society (Ibid, p.192). Party officials are typically the masters of policy, and rule is imposed through decrees, mandates or legislation that is uncontested. Within the category of single party dictatorships, different typologies exist including weak and strong systems, hegemonic systems and ideological one party states which in particular are characterised by one party holding power and a reliance on official state ideology (Ibid, pp.193-195). These types of regimes are remarkably robust because they can both suppress and co-opt political opposition (Ibid, p.197).

Personalist dictatorships share some similarities but also important differences. These are regimes where a single individual controls politics without any checks and balances on their power. The leader dominates the military as well as all of the state apparatus, and the ruling party if there is one is used as a tool of the leader to carry out their goals (Ezrow and Frantz 2011, p.215). It is quite common that such dictators are current or were once members of the military, although once in power the military becomes subservient to them (Ibid p.216). Regularly personalist dictators have a close personal clique, in many cases close family who help to rule. Although they are generally durable regimes, their structure often make it problematic for them to survive beyond their reign (Ibid, p.220). They use a number of methods to retain their power including repression, select patronage networks, building cults of personality and using divide and conquer tactics (Ibid, pp.221-224). With this form of dictatorship, intra-regime succession infrequently occurs, although when it does it is normal to a son or male relative (Ibid, p.232). In many cases, a hybrid between the one party and the personalist dictatorships occurs. This can be applied to the case of North Korea.

Military dictatorships are regimes in which control over policy and the security forces rests in the hands of the military. Typically in this form of dictatorship, the leader is a current or former military officer. At times, a group of officers or a ‘junta’ hold the power and govern in a cohesive, disciplined manner with efficient lines of communication (Ezrow and Frantz 2011, p.167). In general, policy is implemented by the military which preserves most of government institutions. Typologies of military dictatorship are varied and include different structural forms such as direct rule. They also include moderator, guardian and ruler types, and professional and praetorian dictatorships (Ibid, pp.168-170). Although many military dictatorships can rule with an iron fist, “many scholars have highlighted the internal fragility of military dictatorships, and among dictatorships military regimes are the most short lived” (Ibid, p.171). The reasons for this include the preferences of military elites for the military over political office, the destabilising effect of factionalism, a commitment to temporary rule and also sensitivity to pressures for democratisation (Ibid, 171-174). This type of dictatorship was evident in South Korea for many years.

The different types of political systems that were adopted in North and South Korea after its divide have produced many different results for the citizens of each state. In North Korea, the hybrid personalist and one-party dictatorship with Kim Il Sung, his son Kim Jong il and his grandson Kim Jong-un has proved very durable, with each of their successions running smoothly and their leadership going unchallenged. In contrast to this, South Korea has flirted with democracy, dictatorship and military junta before eventually consolidating democratic reforms from the late 1980s until now. In North Korea, although initial impressive economic growth showed positive signs for its citizens, subsequent policies have seen an increasing isolation of the state on the world stage because of its nuclear programme, and increasing impoverishment for its citizens due to many different factors. In contrast to this, since democratic consolidation in the South, they have gone on to best one of the world’s best performing economies. The following discussion will assess why the different paths have been taken, what has led to the durability of a dictatorship in one state and democratic reforms in another and why the South has successfully developed economically at a better rate than the North.

In looking to the case of North Korea first, the path towards a personalist one party dictatorship was sown into the fabric of North Korean society for the early days of Kim Il Sung’s leadership. Undoubtedly, the war played a huge role in directing public and military support behind Kim, but other factors have played a role in solidifying the regime. Perhaps most important in this regard has been the cult of personality. As in many personalist dictatorships, Kim Il Sung built up a system with himself as the centrepiece of each and every policy reform. He and his kin have cast themselves as almost divine, and the ‘natural’ leaders of the state. The official state ideology of juche has been used to indoctrinate the population towards a singular goal. This has led to a consolidation of power which in many ways seems unbreakable. This has been achieved by methods such as repression through the ultimate control of the military and the building of select patronage networks like in other personalist dictatorships. It has produced a remarkable situation where two intra-family successions have occurred, an irregular feat in most cases. But other factors have contributed to the North Korean dictatorship’s survival.

Like many other dictatorships, the leadership of North Korea have always maintained a strong anti-imperialist stance. Since the state’s inception it has been the focus of the anti-communist West, and in particular the United States. This it can be argued has produced a situation whereby North Korea’s leadership have capitalised on Western negativity towards communism and portrayed itself as constantly under threat from capitalist powers. This has allowed the solidification of the state ideology, and an acceptance of strong leadership and heavy military spending to protect the state from outside aggressors. In addition to this, sanctions that have been imposed by the Western powers because of North Korea’s nuclear programme have in many ways stifled the prospects for development in the North, and have produced a situation whereby far from reducing internal support for the regime, they have contributed to its survival. The hybrid nature of North Korea’s regime has allowed it to use both personalistic and one party strategy to maintain its grip on power.

In contrast to the North, South Korea has taken the path to democracy and away from dictatorial rule. Its initial period of rule following the division of Korea under the stewardship of Syngman Rhee could be best characterised as a period of authoritarian rule. Rhee spent much of his time in power trying to grab more power and supressing popular dissent and calls for democratisation. Park Chung Hee’s coup and subsequent military dictatorship saw some form of stability in-so-far as it lasted eighteen years. During this period, although elections were held, many opposition politicians were barred from politics and votes were rigged to ensure a majority for the ruling party (Cotton 1989, p.250). Park’s government also manipulated media and used government resources to purchase votes, and to impede funding of opposition parties (Ibid). Essentially, Park’s repression of opposition increased calls for democratisation and this ultimately led to his downfall and assassination as a revolution was feared by elites.

Although calls for democracy intensified, another military dictatorship in the form of Chun Doo Hwan ensued and used many similar tactics of survival to those that had gone before. Despite promises of democratic reform, Chun arrested thousands of political dissidents and sent them to ‘purification camps run by the military. As well as this, hundreds of labour leaders were fired from their jobs and hundreds of critical journalists were expelled from working (Shorrock 1986, p.1204). However it was not repression of the opposition that ultimately led to the failure of Chun’s regime, but the success in promoting economic growth during his era and during the previous military regime. As has been noted (Moffett 2013) and (Lipset 1994) and (Pei 1994), as a non-democratic state experiences economic growth, it is more likely to experience calls for democratisation. This provides a convincing explanation as to why South Korea moved away from dictatorial rule towards democracy and its sister state still lives under its own dictatorship. As a state develops economically its middle class grows, and this in turn increases education and calls for democratic institutions. While other factors certainly play a part in maintaining dictatorial rule in the North, it is un-doubtable that economic progress and growth in the south contributed to its move to and consolidation of democracy.

The division of Korea into two different states was the result of a post-World War II imperialist power grab. As is the case with many places that were carved up after the World War, the nation of Korea has suffered decades of turmoil since and will no doubt experience more until it achieves some form of re-unification in the future. The different political paths that each of the two ‘Koreas’ have taken have produced varied results for their citizens. North Korea remains a personalistic one party dictatorship that suffers poverty and isolation for the rest of the world. After impressive economic growth up until 1970, the Stalinist model of a centralised command economy, fettered by bureaucratic mismanagement destroyed the North Korean economy and it has not recovered since. The dictatorship of Kim Il Sung and his offspring have consolidated power in the reclusive state and have achieved this primarily through repression, cult status and the strict adherence to the official state ideology of juche. The maintenance of a siege mentality has also helped to embolden the leadership as the true and divine rulers of Korea.

In contrast to this, South Korea has also experienced periods of authoritarian and military dictatorial rule. After showing initial signs of democratisation, the state was plunged into decades of military rule. Similar repressive tactics to those in the North were used to supress dissent and political opposition. However one offshoot of this repression was the purges of labour leaders. This allowed a situation where workers’ rights and conditions were decimated, and it provided a fertile investment opportunity for wealthy capitalists. This situation under military rule provided strong economic growth. Paradoxically for the military rulers, this also produced a situation where a growing educated and middle class population demanded democratic rights. After years of opposition to military dictatorial rule, in 1987 democracy was achieved and has been consolidated since then. Economic growth promoting democracy best explains why South Korea moved away from dictatorship. However, the lack of democratic reforms in North Korea cannot solely be blamed on a lack of prosperity or growth. The particular characteristics of the dynasty style leadership, amongst other factors in the North, best describes the maintenance of the dictatorship there. With this in mind, future policy from Western powers towards dictatorships may be best served by promoting economic growth in those states, as this may be a factor in promoting the path to democracy.

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Do Left Or Right Governments In Latin America Achieve Better Results For Their Citizens?

2013-01-09T22:05:00.000+00:00

To discover if ‘left’ or ‘right’ governments achieve better results for their citizens, this article will analyse a range of data on two left-leaning governments, Venezuela and Brazil, and two right-leaning governments, Colombia and Mexico, focussing on the timeframe from 2002 to 2010. The analysis of these governments will centre on their performance in a number of social and economic indices and will include data on gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment and inflation as well as Human Development Index (HDI) values, life expectancy, child mortality, health and education spending as well as homicide rates.

Much has been written by scholars of the recent ‘pink tide’ (Robinson 2009, pp.4-8) that has swept through the Latin American region. However, some states have stuck to the path of staunch neo-liberal market based policies, and while states such as Venezuela and Brazil have favoured social programmes over market based policies, states such as Colombia and Mexico have kept on track with the so-called Washington consensus. The beginning of the pink tide was signalled by the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998 (Beasley-Murray, Cameron and Hershberg 2010, p.2). Chavez used a ‘Manichaean discourse’ to characterise himself as the voice of el pueblo, as the good against the evils of capitalism and imperialism (Hawkins 2009, pp.4-5). He made grandiose promises to electorate that he would use the country’s vast oil wealth to benefit all of society and not just the few.

By looking at economic indices we can see that from 2002 to 2010, GDP annual percentage growth rates in Venezuela had negative growth of -8.85% in 2002. However by 2004, growth had shot up to a massive 18.28%. This dropped steadily from still excellent growth rates of 10.31% in 2005 to 5.27% in 2008 before dipping into negative growth of -3.2% in 2009 and -1.48% in 2010 (The World Bank 2013a). Venezuela also experienced a halving in the percentage of unemployed (as a percentage of total labour force) from 16.2% in 2002 to 7.59% in 2009 (The World Bank, 2013b). In the area of inflation (consumer prices) initially dropped from 31.25% in 2002 to 15.8% in 2006, however since then rose to 30.39% in 2008, decreasing slightly to a still huge 28.18% in 2010 (The World Bank 2013cc) and (Index Mundi 2013).

In looking at social indices, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) human development index (HDI) reports show that Venezuela’s HDI value rose from 0.656 in 2000 to 0.692 in 2005, and 0.734 in 2010 (United Nations Development Programme 2013aa). Life expectancy at birth has also grown from 72.4 years in 2000 to 73.2 years in 2005 and 74.2 in 2010 (Ibid). Child mortality rates (probability of death between birth and age one per one thousand births) showed a steady decline from 19 in 2000 to 15.9 in 2005 and 13.4 in 2010 (United Nations 2013aa). Education expenditure as a percentage of GNI declined from 3.87% in 2002 to 3.39% in 2007, before it rose to 3.55% and remained at that level up to 2010 (The World Bank 2013d). In crime, the homicide rate (per 100,000 citizens) in Venezuela went from 38.1 in 2002 to a high of 52 in 2008 (United Nations 2013b). Finally, per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (US$) went from $207.29 in 2002 to a high of $687.87 in 2009, dropping slightly to $663.38 in 2010 (The World Bank 2013ee).

Luis Inácio Lula da Silva won Brazil’s presidential election in October 2002 with 61.3% of the vote, with his Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) becoming the largest party in Brazil’s parliament (Samuels 2004, pp.999). Both his campaign and his election sparked panic in the markets, with fears over Lula’s past support for debt repudiation at the core of the problem (Williamson 2003, pp.105-106). Lula proclaimed “Brazil, a country for everybody” (Wiarda 2007, p.127) and promised a new politics for Brazil.

Economically, the GDP annual percentage growth rate stood at 2.65% in 2002. This grew impressively to 5.71% in 2004. This growth slowed before jumping again to 6.19% in 2007 before decreasing heavily in 2009 to negative growth of -0.32% and rising again to 7.53% in 2010 (The World Bank 2013aa). During this same period, Brazil’s unemployment rate went from 9.1% in 2002 to 9.3% in 2005 before showing steady decline to its lowest rate under Lula of 7.09% in 2008. The rate climbed again to 8.3% in 2009 (The World Bank 2013bb). In the area of inflation Lula’s government saw an initial huge jump from 8.45% in 2002 to 14.71% in 2003 before declining steadily to 3.63% in 2007 then rising again in 2008 to 5.66%. The rate dropped slightly to just above 5% again in 2010 (The World Bank 2013cc).

Socially, HDI indices show that Brazil’s value grew from 0.665 in 2000 to 0.692 in 2005 and 0.715 in 2010 (United Nations Development Programme 2013bb). Their life expectancy at birth also showed improvement growing from 70.1 years in 2000 to 71.6 in 2005, and a further rise to 73.1 in 2010 (Ibid). The child mortality rates dropped from 27.7 in 2000 to 22 in 2005. This showed a further huge drop to 15 by 2010 (United Nations 2013aa). Education expenditure as a percentage of GNI rose year on year from 3.70% in 2002 to 5.16% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013d). Brazil’s homicide rate per 100,000 people remained fairly steady at 22.5% in 2004, rising to a high of 22.8% in 2008 before dropping to a low of 21% in 2010 (United Nations 2013b). Finally, per capita total expenditure on health displayed a year on year growth rate from $203.25 in 2002 to $990.39 in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013e).

Alvaro Uribe was elected president of Colombia in 2002 as a hardline, authoritarian politician whose base was the middle and upper classes. He promised to restore order in Colombia by dealing with the leftist guerrilla movements in an uncompromising manner (Dugas 2003, p.1117). He is best described as a liberal conservative and followed a largely neo-liberal economic policy during his time is office. With politics in Colombia dominated by individuals of the middle and upper income groups (Kline, H.F. & Gray, V.J 2007, p.201), Uribe’s government focused on neoliberal economic policies during its terms in office.

Economically, Colombia’s GDP annual growth rate grew impressively year on year from negative growth of 0.86% in 2002 to a high of 5.32% in 2007. This however dropped to 0.2% in 2009 before growing to 2.56% in 2010 (The World Bank 2013a). Total unemployment rates were also positive showing a decline from 14.6% in 2002 to 10.5% in 2006. It then rose to 13.19% in 2008 before dropping again to 11.6% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013b). Inflation, after an initial rise from 6.35% in 2002 to 7.1% in 2003, declined to 6.99% in 2008. It then fell to a low of 2.27% in 2010 at the end of Uribe’s second term (The World Bank, 2013c).

Social indices show that their HDI value rose modestly from 0.652 in 2000 to 0.675 in 2005, and this again grew to 0.707 in 2010 (United Nations Development Programme 2013c). Life expectancy grew from 71.0 in 2000 to 72.3 in 2005 and 73.5 in 2010 (Ibid). The child mortality rates showed a year on year decrease from 20 per 1000 births in 2002 to 15.4 in 2010 (United Nations, 2013a). Colombian education expenditure grew from 3.51% in 2002 to 4.1% in 2005, before decreasing to 3.54% in 2008. This grew slightly again to 3.95 in 2010 (The World Bank 2013d). Their homicide rate showed year on year decline from a very high rate of 70.2 in 2002 to 33.4 in 2010 (United Nations, 2013b). Finally, per-capita health expenditure also showed impressive year on year growth from $149.8 in 2002 to $472.15 in 2010 (The World Bank 2013e).

When Vicente Fox was elected President of Mexico in 2000, it was a result that many had once deemed impossible. However, the National Action Party (PAN) had made important gains at local and state level over the previous twenty years (Shirk 2000, p.25). His victory started twelve years of PAN rule with a further victory in the 2006 election going to Felipe Calderón, largely due to positive economic performance in the final three years of Fox’s presidency (Moreno 2007, p.16). Both presidents espoused a right wing agenda.

The economic indices for Mexico show that the GDP annual percentage growth rate stood at 0.82% in 2002 and grew to 5.15% in 2006. The unemployment rate during the same time was comparatively low at 2.9% in 2002, rising to a high of 5.3% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013b). Mexico’s inflation rate fell slightly from 5.03% in 2002 to 3.62% in 2006 before growing each year to 5.29% in 2009. From here it fell to 4.15% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013c).

Mexico’s social indices showed that their HDI value grew from 0.718 in 2000 to 0.741 in 2005 and 0.767 in 2010 (United Nations Development Programme 2013d). Their life expectancy at birth grew from 74.3 in 2000 to 75.6 in 2005 and 76.7 in 2010 (Ibid). Child mortality rates showed year on year decreases from 21.6 per 1000 births in 2002 to 13.4 in 2010 (United Nations 2013a). Education expenditure declined from 5.25% in 2002 to a low of 4.70% in 2007, before rising slightly to 4.79% in 2010 (The World Bank, 2013d). The homicide rate in Mexico flip/flopped between approximate rates of 8 and 9 between 2002 and 2007 before rising sharply to 12.7 in 2008, 17.7 in 2009 and 22.7 in 2010 (United Nations 2013b). Finally, per-capita health expenditure in Mexico during the Fox and Calderon presidencies grew year on year from $391.47 in 2002 to $598.37 in 2008, before dropping slightly to $524.65 in 2009 and then rising again to $603.67 in 2010 (The World Bank 2013e).

The economic and social indices from each country provide an interesting comparative analysis framework. Economically, GDP annual growth rates were most impressive in Venezuela were there was a jump from 0.85% in 2002 to a massive 18.28% in 2004. This rate however dropped to negative -0.32% in 2009. Brazil also showed good growth rates, achieving a high of 7.35% in 2010 which was higher than Colombia’s high of 5.32% in 2007 and Mexico’s high of 5.53% in 2010. Venezuela also scored impressively in cutting unemployment from 16.2% in 2002 to 7.59% in 2009. Brazil also cut unemployment from 9.1% in 2002 to 8.3% in 2009 while Columbia’s rate also fell from 14.6% in 2002 to a low of 10.5% in 2006, before rising again to finish at 11.6% in 2010. Mexico was the only country to actually grow unemployment during the timeframe. For inflation, Colombia and Mexico both score well. Colombia’s rate fell from a high of 7.1% in 2003 to 2.27% in 2010, while Mexico’s fell from 5.3% in 2003 to 3.6% in 2006, before growing back to 5.295 in 2009 and dropping again in 2010 to 4.15%. Taking all of these figures into account, it could be argued that the left-wing governments of Venezuela and Brazil have performed better in the areas of GDP growth and reducing unemployment, whilst the right-wing governments of Colombia and Mexico have succeeded much better at containing inflation rates than their left-wing neighbours.

Social indices show that according to the UNDP human development index, Venezuela’s citizens have experienced the bigger improvement in their life development standards, with a growth of 0.078 on the HDI scale, compared with 0.055 for Colombia, 0.050 for Brazil and 0.049 for Mexico. In terms of growth in life expectancy growth rates, Brazil scored best with a 3 year increase from 70.1 to 73.1, followed next by Colombia at 2.5 from 71 years to 73.5 and Mexico at 2.4 going from 74.3 years to 76.7. Venezuela showed the lowest growth at 1.8 years going from 72.4 years to 74.2. Each country showed good reductions in child mortality rates with Brazil most impressive with a drop of 12.7 per 1000 births, compared with a drop of 8.2 for Mexico, 5.6 for Venezuela and 4.6 for Colombia. These figures seem somewhat inconclusive as to who does better on the left/right divide, however if both left and both right are added we can hypostasise that for HDI, left-wing governments did better while for life expectancy the right-wing governments performed better. By using the same method it could be argued that left-wing governments also performed better at reducing child mortality rates.

For education expenditure as a percentage of GNI, Brazil was the country to increase its rate most over the timeframe with a 1.46% increase. Colombia increased by 0.44% over its term. Mexico cut its percentage most by 0.46% with Venezuela cutting spending by 0.32%. The issue of crime is huge across the political spectrum in Latin America and the homicide rates of each of the countries analysed illustrates this. In this regard Uribe’s government succeeded best in cutting a huge rate of 70.2 per 100,000 citizens to 33.4, a drop of 36.8. Brazil was the only other country to cut its rate, with a 1.5 drop. Both Venezuela and Mexico grew by 13.9 and 14.7 respectively. In the area of health per capita total expenditure, it was Brazil with the biggest growth rate with a per capita increase of $787.14, followed by Venezuela at $456.09 and Colombia and Mexico at $322.35 and $212.20 respectively, although Mexico’s base rate remained higher than Colombia after the increase. These figures are again somewhat inconclusive for the left/right divide although if we apply the same adding method as before, left-wing governments perform better on education expenditure. For per capita health expenditure, left-wing governments far outperform their right-wing counterparts. Finally, the area of crime is hard to judge with varying results on the left/right divide, although Colombia has achieved excellent results in reducing their rate so drastically.

In conclusion, the analysis of economic and social indices for Venezuela, Brazil, Columbia and Mexico between 2002 (2000 for HDI statistics) and 2010 have provided some interesting results. Economic indices show that left-wing governments have performed better in the areas of GDP annual growth and lowering unemployment rates, but fail to keep inflation in check, which right-wing governments perform much better at. Social indices show somewhat inconclusive left/right divide results, however by adding both left governments and both right governments’ results in can be argued that left-wing governments perform better at improving human development and reducing child mortality rates while right-wing governments improve life expectancy more. By using the same adding method, social indices also show that left governments perform better on health and education spending for their citizens. Finally, in the area of crime and in particular homicide, a conclusive answer was difficult to ascertain although Colombia did do extremely well at reducing its huge rate by over half. What the overall analysis suggests is that the left governments of Venezuela and Brazil provided better results for their citizens during the selected timeframe. However, in order to find a definitive answer to the question, a much more wide ranging study would be required.

Bibliography:

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Dugas, J.C. 2003. The emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia? The case of A´ lvaro Uribe. Third World Quarterly, 24(6), pp.1117-1136.

Hawkins, K.A. 2009. Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), pp.1040-1067.

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Kline, H.F. & Gray, V.J 2007. Colombia: A Resilient Political System with Intransigent Problems IN: Kline, H.J & Wiarda, H.J (ed.) Latin American Politics and Development. Sixth ed. Colorado Westview, pp.199-200-233.

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The World Bank 2012a. GDP growth (annual %) [Online]. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/BR-VE-MX-CO?display=graph [Accessed 01/02 2013a].

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The World Bank 2013b. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) [Online]. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS/countries/BR-VE-MX-CO?display=graph [Accessed 01/02 2013b].

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United Nations Development Programme 2011a. Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [Online]. Available from: http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/VEN.pdf [Accessed 01/03 2013a].

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United Nations Development Programme 2011c. Explanatory note on 2011 HDR composite indices: Colombia [Online]. Available from: \[Accessed 01/03 2013c].

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Wiarda, I.S. 2007. Brazil: The Disorders of a Progressive Democracy IN: Wiarda, H.J. & Kline, H.F. (ed.) Latin American Politics and Development. Sixth ed. Colorado Westview Press, pp.127-128-164.

Williamson, J. 2003. Lula's Brazil. Foreign Affairs, pp.105-113.

The Media During The NATO Interventions In Kosovo And Libya

2012-05-31T14:59:00.001+01:00

What were the dominant themes within media narratives during the UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Libya and the non-UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Kosovo?

An analysis of print media discourses.

The recent NATO intervention into Libya had many similarities and some key differences to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Both interventions were justified by NATO and its allies and also in the Western media as ‘humanitarian’, as necessary to prevent a ‘genocide’ or ‘massacre’ from occurring and to remove an undemocratic dictator from power. Both interventions involved an aerial bombardment on the enemy, and the support of a non-state actor in an internal conflict. The differences lay in the fact that the NATO intervention into Libya had UN Security Council sanction, whilst the intervention into Kosovo had not received the same sanction. Since the Kosovo intervention, the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) had come into being, in many ways as the direct result of the controversy of NATO’s illegal intervention into Kosovo. R2P as a growing international norm had now legitimised an intervention into Libya.

During the intervention into Libya, I began to view and read different sources of media and I was interested to see the different interplay of narratives about the intervention from the different sources. While the Western media that I viewed such as Sky News, BBC News and CNN all took a very pro-NATO and anti-Gaddafi stance, the non-Western media I viewed such as Russia Today (RT) and Al-Jazeera took a more critical stand in its reporting. This prompted me to think about the role that media plays in generating public support for various wars. Recently I began to look into the literature on the role of the media during the NATO intervention into Libya, however with the conflict being so recent, the literature is very limited. Through my investigation of sources on media representations of NATO in Libya, the topic of their intervention in Kosovo kept appearing. It was then that the idea of a comparative thematic discourse analysis of the media narratives of NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya came to mind. I felt that the two cases had interesting similarities, but also very remarkable differences insofar as the intervention into Libya had UN Security Council sanction and the changing political context had now ushered in the new norm of humanitarian intervention based on the principle of R2P. With this new international norm in play, this research could analyse if it had changed the media narratives from the Kosovo conflict. I also felt that this piece of research that combined the two case studies will add to the debate.

Literature Review:

In order to assess the relevance and possible uniqueness of this piece of research, I started by investigating the literature on the topic of discourse analysis. In particular I focussed on three prominent practitioners of the critical discourse analysis method. After this I began looking into the previous literature on the media and discourses of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999. Many interesting studies into the role of the media in the NATO intervention in Kosovo had been conducted. However, there is a very limited amount of literature on the media and the Libya intervention and as of yet there has been no comparative discourse analysis of media narratives between the two NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya. Each of the texts that were consulted is of a critical nature.

Discourse Analysis:

This research will use the tools of discourse analysis to discover the dominant themes within media narratives during the UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Libya and the non-UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Kosovo. To do this, a number of texts on discourse analysis were consulted. The first text was ‘Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis’, which is a step by step guide on conducting Discourse Analysis. In the first chapter by Stephanie Taylor, she explains that “discourse analysis is the close study of language in use” and furthermore analysts are looking for patterns (Taylor 2001, p.6). Further on in chapter six, Norman Fairclough explains the basis for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). He suggests that the objective of CDA is to expose how language figures in social relations. He points out that it is critical insofar as it aims to show how language is involved in the “social relations of power and domination, and in ideology” (Fairclough 2001, p.229). It is a form of analysis that questions how language figures in the social processes that produce social inequalities. Fairclough goes on to use Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ to describe how the dominance of the ruling class depends on winning the consent of the majority to the existing social arrangements (Ibid, p.232). This, he argues is achieved through control of discourses. Fairclough also explains that linguistic analysis involves working on a text at different levels including; Narrative, linking sentences, grammar and semantics and finally the choice of words to create semantic relations (Ibid, pp. 241 – 242).

Building upon this work on CDA is Teun Van Dijk’s ‘Discourse and Power’. The author focuses heavily on the relations between power and discourses. He defines social power in terms of control, that is, the control of one group over another through control of discourses (Van Dijk 2008, p.9). This, he suggests is pervasive in society where this control is in the interests of those who hold power. The most pervasive form of contemporary power can be best described as symbolic power, that is, power that grants preferential access to or control over discourses. The control of public discourse is, according to Van Dijk the “control of the mind of the public, and hence, indirectly, control of what the public wants and does (Ibid, p.14). This idea of control of discourse to shape public views can be seen to be closely related to Gramsci’s hegemony that Fairclough also draws upon in his analysis. In its essence, CDA is interested in the critical analysis of power abuses by politicians, and in how media misinforms rather than informs, or what Van Dijk calls ‘power abuse domination’ (Ibid, p.15). Also, the author suggests that CDA is unlike other forms of discourse analysis insofar as it rejects the possibility of a “value-free” science. Instead, CDA comes from a perspective that acknowledges the researcher’s bias before beginning the research and expects that bias to be part and parcel of the research.

Focussing specifically on the issue of the analysis of newspapers from the perspective of CDA is John Richardson’s ‘Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. In his analysis, Richardson picks up on the theme of power and social relations in discourse whilst drawing on Steven Lukes’ concept of three faces of power to illustrate this. In particular Richardson emphasises how Lukes’ third face best describes the way power works in and through discourses. For example, “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over by influencing, shaping or determining his attitudes, beliefs and very wants” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, cited in Richardson 2007, p.31). In a similar sense to the two previous authors, this concept of power is very close to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Keeping this line of thought, Richardson suggests that journalists, having internalised ‘common sense notions of who ought to be authoritative’, accept the frames imposed on events by official sources. This has the effect of marginalising and delegitimising voices outside of elite circles (Ibid, p.36).

In focusing on the analysis of war reporting like the topic of this research, Richardson makes the point that war reporting is generally constructed in a radically polarised way, between the good guys and the bad guys, and so, discourse dominated by official propaganda will only allow two positions to take up, for war or against war (Ibid, p.179). This is a deliberate measure designed to close down a possible critical debate. Richardson also suggests that there are four key professional and occupational procedures that shape journalism as a discourse process, and therefore account for products of newspaper discourse. These are; a declared war against ‘your country’ is highly newsworthy. Journalism requires ‘authoritative sources’, which usually means military or government sources. Journalists live to be first, hence ‘official’ stories that are unconfirmed and unverified. And finally, pressure to avoid stories that are critical of ‘our side’. (Ibid, pp.182-186). All of these, Richardson suggests, “reduce war journalism to being a conduit for the views of the powerful (Ibid, p.186).

The Media and Kosovo:

In ‘Reporting “Humanitarian” Warfare: propaganda, moralism and NATO’s Kosovo war’ Phillip Hammond found a number of trends in British media reporting such as a closer relationship between the military and the media, a “journalism of attachment” and the demonization of enemies (Hammond 2000). The phrase ‘journalism of attachment’ was coined by BBC correspondent Martin Bell to describe a style of reporting that would be openly partisan and engaged as opposed to “the dispassionate practices of the past”. Bell advocated journalism that did not “stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor.” This is very similar to Tony Blair’s explanation of the NATO bombings as “a battle between good and evil, between civilisation and barbarity, between democracy and dictatorship” (Ibid, p.375). This form of journalism functions not as a source of independent reporting for society, but as a propaganda tool for any government that wishes to use it. Hammond also notes a ‘propaganda of moralism,’ i.e. intervention in the name of humanitarianism, was used to further the NATO agenda before and during the conflict (Ibid, p.382).

A similar form of propaganda of moralism and a journalism of attachment was to be found in other pieces of research. In ‘From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo – War Journalism and Propaganda’, Nohrstedt et al conducted a discourse and propaganda analysis involving four leading daily newspapers from Greece, Norway, Sweden and the UK. They found that media reporting was very much in line with US President Bill Clinton’s speeches on the conflict which emphasised the necessity of the bombings to stop ethnic cleansing and that responsibility lay solely with Milosevic. This view was reinforced in the Norwegian, Swedish and UK dailies (Nohrstedt et al. 2000). In a similar way to Hammond’s idea of the ‘demonization of enemies,’ this study also noted an association between Milosevic and Hitler that was inferred by US President Clinton, that was further elaborated on by the media.

The work of Herman and Chomsky in their seminal ‘Manufacturing Consent’ also adds much to the two previous studies. In line with the idea of a demonization of enemies, their work has suggested that US print media have been complicit in using emotive terms such as ‘genocide’ in selective cases that enemy states are involved in, but using the term much less frequently when the US or its allies are involved. For example, an analysis of five major US titles between 1998 and 1999 showed that the term ‘genocide’ was used two hundred and twenty times against the Serbs in Kosovo. Forty one of these instances were on the front page of the title. Contrast this with the case of US ally Indonesia and their occupation in East Timor. Over a ten year period between 1990 and 1999, the term was used just thirty three times, four of those times on the front page (Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. 2002).

Adding to this debate is the book ‘Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis’ (Hammond, Herman 2000) which within its chapters suggests that the media in many ways were used as a propagandistic tool of NATO, producing uncritical reporting in a way that incompatible with the supposed idea of a free and unbiased press. In particular, Chapter nine, ‘Following Washington’s Script: The United States Media and Kosovo’ highlights the way in which the US media overwhelmingly focused on Serbian state violence whilst failing to report on opposition stories nor on many instances of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) violence during the conflict (Ackerman, Naureckas 2000). The authors also note a form of journalism that is reminiscent to the idea of a journalism of attachment between the media and NATO. For example, on February 24^th 1999, New York Times journalist Steven Erlanger reported that Slobodan Milosevic had shown himself to be quite reasonable when trying to find a solution at the Rambouillet peace talks. However, exactly one month later the same journalist was sticking to the NATO line of argument and claimed US negotiators had departed because they were frustrated by Milosevic’s ‘hard line’ stance. This was despite the fact that Milosevic’s position had not changed at all (Ackerman, Naureckas 2000).

In another chapter from the same book, ‘Nazifying the Serbs, from Bosnia to Kosovo,’ evidence of a demonization of the enemy is further illustrated. The way that the Serbs were linked to the Nazi’s was through the accusations that they had committed genocide. British foreign secretary Robin Cook further added to this by stating that “NATO was born in the aftermath of the defeat of fascism and genocide in Europe. NATO will not allow this century to end with a triumph for fascism and genocide (Hume, 2000, p.72). It was also noted by the author how implication of Nazi parallels by politicians or NATO spokesmen were snapped up by journalists. For example, the Daily Mail’s March 29^th front page spoke of Albanian children’s faces evoking memories of the holocaust. There was also references in the Daily Mirror on April 1^st to ‘Nazi style terror in Kosovo’ and in the Sun the same day of ‘Serb cruelty having chilling echoes of the holocaust’ (Ibid, p.72).

Further research has shown how media in different countries reported on the conflict in different ways. For example, in ‘Framing the NATO Air Strikes on Kosovo Across Countries,’ Jin Yang showed that US newspapers presented a picture of a just war providing humanistic aid to Albanians and the legitimacy of the action was taken for granted, as opposed to the Chinese media which challenged the legitimacy of using force and made the claim that air strikes on the basis of humanistic aid sound very suspicious (Yang 2003, p.244). The research further suggested that US newspapers had more stories from the Albanian point of view as opposed to the Chinese having more from the Serb point of view. The research concluded by suggesting that by highlighting certain aspects of the events and ignoring others, the media screened the reality for the audience (Ibid, p.245).

In a similar line of thought was to be found in the research, ‘A Narrative Analysis of US Press Coverage of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo,’ which was carried out by Richard Vincent. In his research, Vincent found that the coverage of the Kosovo conflict was often “peppered with potential bias.” He also concluded that many US media used ‘official’ sources over alternative sources, which typically spun a pro-US and pro-Western point of view, with heavy reliance on government and military officials from Western countries. Further to this he stated that instead of being objective and unbiased, “the US media demonstrated that it was quite vulnerable to serving as an organ of political propaganda and putting national interests over the higher quest for truth and objectivity” (Vincent, 2000, p.20).

Each of the research pieces have taken a critical analysis of the media and the role they played in the Kosovo conflict. They each imply that the dominant narratives running though media reporting of the conflict was overwhelmingly supportive of the official NATO line, and failed to meaningfully critique and analyse the information that they were provided by ‘official sources.’

The Media and Libya:

Although the level of research on the role of the media during the recent Libya conflict is not near the level on the Kosovo conflict, there are some articles emerging slowly. For example, writing in Kenya’s ‘The Nation,’ in his article ‘BBC’s Wartime Propaganda in Libya Illustrates Need for Pan-African Media,’ Murithi Mutiga speaks about how Western media painted a very different media picture of the ‘civil war’ in Libya. In his article he suggests that most Africans would not know that the South African government had petitioned the International Criminal Court to investigate the American, British and French governments for war crimes in Libya. He suggests that this is because most people get their news from the BBC, CNN or Sky News, who have engaged in a “frenzied propaganda war” (Mutiga 2011). He goes on to cite a number of outlandish claims from Western media including the UK’s Daily Mail reporting “Troops fuelled by Viagra”, a story that Gaddafi had distributed thousands of Viagra pills to fighters so that they could rape women. There was also the story that Gaddafi had recruited thousands of black African mercenaries to fight his side, a story which led to the rounding up and execution of many innocent black migrant workers (Ibid).

In another article from ‘The Nation’ (USA), titled ‘Libya: An Old Fashioned Colonial Smash-and-Grab,’ Alexander Cockburn suggests that despite the endless disclosures of NATO’s lies regarding its onslaughts on the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, “the press was more gullible regarding Libya, less inclined to question official claims” (Cockburn 2011). In a similar vein to what Herman and Chomsky described in ‘Manufacturing Consent,’ Cockburn suggests that US media is happy to suppress reports of ‘democracy protesters’ in US allay Bahrain, while at the same time reporting the official line on Libya. He illustrates this by pointing out that “Libya” appears fourteen times in the three major declarations at the G8 summit in France, “Bahrain appears not once (Ibid).

John Pilger, a long standing critic of Western imperialism and media bias has added to the debate with his article ‘Hail to the true victors of Rupert’s Revolution.’ He points out that far from having ‘humanitarian’ ideals, in September 2011 the British government controlled ‘Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)’ hosted an preview to an arms fair entitled ‘The Middle East: A Vast Market for UK Defence and Security Companies,’ in which they lauded the potential profits in selling arms to states in the Middle East. He points out the irony of selling arms to the region yet intervening when states use those arms. Pilger goes on to suggest that journalists happily accepted the story that Gaddafi was about to commit genocide while not investigating claims of massacres by the rebels of black Africans accused of being mercenaries (Pilger 2011).

More in-depth research has been carried out by Raeesah Cassim Cachalia in the paper ‘The Role of the mass media in armed conflict: A Libyan case study.’ In the study the author refers to the lack of in-depth reporting or analysis of the broader issues of the conflict such as the formation of the rebel force, the economic costs of the war and the profits that Western states will make. The author further highlights what he calls “utterly ridiculous” reporting such as reports on the bombing of Mizda harbour by Libyan warships, when Mizda is three thousand kilometres from the Libyan coastline, and hence has no harbour. He also highlighted what mainstream media failed to report, such as, in contrast to the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings; the Libyan uprising was violent from the start with government buildings being attacked. He asks how any state would respond in such a situation? The author also raises serious questions about the lack of media investigation and analysis of the rebel ‘National Transitional Council’ (NTC), and how they came together so fast, and came to be so “well-armed, well-organised and well-funded” (Cachalia , 2011, p.1).

This final piece of research that adds to the overall criticism of the Western media during the Libyan conflict was ‘The Media War on Libya: Justifying War through Lies and Fabrications,’ by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya. In his research he points out that the events that sparked off the uprising in Benghazi were not critically examined. He points out that in any country, including the United States or Britain, soldiers will fire on people who attack a military compound with the aim of acquiring weapons. This is precisely what occurred there yet was reported as the Libyan government shooting peaceful democracy protesters. He also highlighted the demonization of black Africans in Libya by the media through the stories of huge numbers of mercenaries fighting for Gaddafi, stories which led to widespread murder of these people by rebel forces (Nazemroaya , 2011).

In a similar way to the research articles on the Kosovo conflict, these articles take a critical stance on the NATO intervention in Libya and the media’s role in reporting that conflict. Each suggests that far from learning from past mistakes of the Kosovo conflict, the Western media has stuck to the same narrative of uncritically reporting the official NATO line, and failed to fully investigate and analyse the stories that they were reporting. So, according to these researchers, the dominant media narratives had not changed between the two conflicts. It is the task of this research to analyse if this is in fact the case, and to discover if there is a difference in the media narratives of the two conflicts.

Methodology

In order to undertake this research it was decided to use both a qualitative and quantitative approach using primary research. The research used a method of thematic critical discourse analysis to discover the dominant media narratives during the NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya. The research focused on newspapers from two English speaking member countries of NATO, the United States and the United Kingdom. To access these publications I have used the Lexis Nexus database. To start, I used the search for ‘Major World Newspapers’ (English). As the number of publications from the United Kingdom is vast, I had to be selective in my choice of newspapers. To do this I focused on newspapers published in England. As the selection was still quite vast I then decided to choose the remainder based on circulation figures. From the publications that were available, I chose four from the top ten selling newspapers in the UK. Applying the same logic to US publications I choses four papers from the top ten selling papers in the US. The final list, with national circulation rating in brackets is as follows;

1. Daily News (7)

2. The New York Times (3)

3. USA Today (2)

4. The Washington Post (6)

5. The Daily Telegraph (5)

6. The Guardian (8)

7. The Daily Mail (2)

8. The Sun (1)

In order to further narrow down the search I then used the search terms "NATO" and "Kosovo" in the Headline for articles relating to that intervention. I then used the search terms "NATO" and "Libya" in the headline for that intervention. As this search was still producing a very large number of articles, I then narrowed down the search further by using dates between 17/03/1999 to 31/03/1999 for Kosovo, and 12/03/2011 to 26/03/2011 for Libya, a week before and a week into the conflict in each case. These search terms and dates produced twelve articles for the Kosovo conflict and fourteen articles for the Libya conflict. Out of each of these groups, a random sample of seven articles for each conflict was used, with some articles from both before and after the start of each NATO campaign.

Discussion of discourse analysis method

With the articles that this search produced a critical thematic discourse analysis was conducted that searched for words, phrases, sentences and terms that fitted into four different frames or themes of analysis. These themes of analysis were largely influenced by the previous research that has been conducted on both conflicts individually.

1. The first theme was to look for evidence of a ‘journalism of attachment’ in the articles. This includes reporting the ‘official’ line in an uncritical manner and minimal voices from opposing sides. It also includes explicitly taking sides in the conflict.
2. The second theme was the ‘demonization of the enemy’. This included the use of emotive terms such as ‘genocide’, Nazi, massacre, slaughter and the use of war propaganda that paints the conflict as a war between ‘good and evil’.
3. The third theme was a ‘propaganda of moralism’. This included the evoking of a responsibility to protect (R2P), the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and democracy versus dictatorships.
4. The fourth theme was ‘opposition stories’. This refers to any form of story that gives voice to the opposition side, and some critical analysis or support of opposing sides.

In order to conduct this thematic critical discourse analysis, each of the newspaper articles was scanned line by line and grouped into one of the four themes.

With each article I decided to allocate a point to each theme if it was present in the article. So for example, if an article contained elements of a journalism of attachment and demonising of the enemy, I would award each a score of one point, with both other themes receiving zero points. The results would allow a percentage guide for how often each theme appeared in the overall analysis.

Discourse analysis on the each of the articles on the Kosovo conflict.

The first article analysed on the Kosovo conflict was taken from the Daily News, March 29^th 1999 titled ‘NATO steps up its air attack: Called bid to stop ‘Genocide’ against Kosovo Albanians’. This article displayed overwhelming evidence of a journalism of attachment with over seventy percent of the article devoted to reporting the official line uncritically and minimal voices from the opposing side. In particular, large portions of the article were devoted to official sources from NATO, as well as quoted from President Bill Clinton, Sectary of State Madeline Albright, the US National Security Advisor and two US Congressmen. The final section of the article also discussed in depth the weapons that NATO would need to “go after Serb tanks and troops”, listing a collection of “laser-guided bombs, rockeye cluster bombs, hellfire missiles and stinger missiles” amongst others. There was also evidence of a demonization of the enemy in the article with the word ‘genocide’ in the headline as well as twice in the text. The article suggests that NATO was in a “race against time” to stop genocide against ethnic Albanians. Quotes from President Clinton also speak of “the continued brutality and repression” by the Serb forces. The article also showed evidence of the theme of a propaganda of moralism with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stating that NATO was trying to stop a “humanitarian catastrophe” taking place. The fourth theme of opposing stories was present however; the four sentences of opposing voices did not challenge or question the authority of the official stories from NATO or government sources (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

The next article came from the New Your Times on March 29^th 1999 and was titled ‘Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview – NATO planes step up Attacks on Serb Troops: Allies Shifting the Focus to Halting Atrocities Reported in Kosovo’. This article also displayed an overwhelming sense of the journalism of attachment. The article included quotes from NATO’s Javier Solana, US President Bill Clinton and his National Security advisor, a Pentagon spokesman, a British Air Commodore, the UK’s Defence Secretary, US Senators John McCain, Kay Baily, Joe Lieberman and Mitch McConnell as well as NATO Press Secretary Jamie Shea. This was contrasted with a statement from the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic praising his people and armed forces and another from his Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic denying accusations of genocide or ethnic cleansing. The theme of a demonization of the enemy was present with words such as “large scale atrocities in Kosovo” and “Serbian repression underscores the need for NATO to persevere”. The word genocide was also mentioned three times in the article. A propaganda of moralism was also in evidence with NATO spokesmen and the UK Defence Secretary speaking of a “humanitarian catastrophe”, “the deteriorating humanitarian situation”, villages being systematically emptied, looted and permanently destroyed” as well as “reports that civilians may be used as human shields” (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

In the next article taken from USA Today on March 26^th 1999 and titled ‘Milosevic presses on in Kosovo - Next target for NATO: Serb troops’ there is less evidence of the journalism of attachment although it is evident which side the journalist is taking with much more space devoted to the official NATO line than opposing views. The author also seems to have a fetish for military hardware and went into great detail of the weapons in the US and NATO’s armoury which would be used to target Serb troops as the headline suggests. The article also demonises the enemy with a number of references to Serb aggression, whilst not once mentioning any form of NATO aggression while it was dropping its bombs without UNSC sanction. Presumably this is because NATO bombs for peace and not aggressive instincts? Reference is also made to Serbs sweeping “through ethnic Albanian villages where they executed civilians and set houses on fire” (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

In the first English newspaper article taken from the Guardian on March 24^th 1999 and titled ‘Crisis in Kosovo: No choice but to act, says Solana; NATO chief / The West has a duty to end ‘this humanitarian catastrophe’ and restore stability’, there is a quite astounding level of the journalism of attachment. The article reads exactly like a NATO press release and it is devoid of any form of journalistic commentary. The article re-produces word for word a speech from NATO’s General Secretary Javier Solana. In it Solana demonises the enemy in a number of ways by referring to the “Yugoslav government’s refusal of the international community’s demands”, including the Rambouillet peace deal. However there is no criticism of this statement and no mention of the Yugoslav government being open to peace until NATO called for a military presence all throughout Yugoslavia as part of the deal. Solana also mentions the necessity of the “ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo”, and the “intransigence of the FRY government”. The article (speech) also draws heavily on a propaganda of moralism used to justify the military action with Solana stating NATO will take whatever measures necessary to “avert a humanitarian catastrophe”. He went on to say that “our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo”. Solana concluded his speech stating “we must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people… we have a moral duty to do so. The responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfil it” (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

In another article from the United States, from the New York Times on March 23^rd 1999 titled ‘Conflict in the Balkans: In Kosovo; Top Ethnic Albanian Rebel Asks NATO to Start Strikes’, there is a different scope to the reporting. This article shows no signs of the journalism of attachment displayed in other articles. This author relies heavily on opposition stories, but not from the Serbian side. This article is mostly made up of eye-witness accounts and an interview with commander from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Although the article does demonise the enemy from the perspective of the KLA commander when he suggests, the Serbs “aims are ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Albanian population and the destruction of the KLA”, the article uses a number of non-official sources to gain confirmation of Serbian crimes. The KLA commander does not however draw on a propaganda of moralism to support his case, he instead argues that a NATO intervention will even out the fighting and give his side more of a chance (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

The next article, from the Guardian on March 22nd 1999 and titled ‘NATO attack ‘only hours away’; Civilians flee as Serbian forces put Kosovo to the torch’ takes a similar journalistic approach to the previous article. The author is wholly reliant on ‘unofficial’ sources, i.e. sources from eye-witnesses and not those in authority. The theme of opposing stories in very prevalent in the article and the author also writes of what he has witnessed himself while on the ground. He speaks to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and asks them their opinion on what is occurring around them. There are stories of a woman “cowering and cradling her children… to escape detection by the Serb forces”. As well as this we read of men “taken to the police station where some of them were kicked and beaten”. The author also takes time to point out that violence is occurring on both sides when he states that “three Serb policemen were killed and one wounded in an apparent reprisal”. The author however, while showing opposing stories also does his best to demonise the enemy by using emotive phrases semiotics such as “a noose of Serbian tanks, armour and troops is hour by hour tightening its grip in open defiance of the international community”, and “eight M84 tanks and eleven armoured vehicles now waited like birds of prey”. He seems to be taking sides when he downplays the significant violent possibilities of the KLA when he states “this is to crush ill-trained guerrillas with only Kalashnikovs, a few rocket-propelled grenades and little fighting spirit” (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

The final article comes from the Guardian again, on March 18^th 1999 and is titled ‘No way out for NATO: Bombing will only strengthen Milosevic’s hold on Kosovo’. Again this article takes on the theme of opposition stories throughout the article. The author takes on a critical analysis of NATO’s possible air strikes and concludes that even if NATO did proceed, “it is already too late for this alone to be a solution”. He goes on to suggest that Milosevic’s position would be strengthened, not weakened by such an attack. The author does however show elements uncritical reporting when he suggests that the so-called ‘Racak massacre’ was the product of Serbian executions, the victims he suggests “were not guerrillas, 22 of whom were killed in a gully that was so narrow they much have been shot at close range” when subsequent investigations have revealed that thirty-seven of the dead had gunpowder residue on their hands (Appendix 1, Kosovo, 1999).

Discourse analysis on the each of the articles on the Libya conflict.

The first article analysed from the Libya conflict was from the New York Times, on March 26^th 2011 and was titled ‘NATO Takes Lead ON Libya Campaign; Obama Defends His Policy’. This article, perhaps understandably takes quite an American centred approach to this story. However, there is a huge degree of a journalism of attachment contained within the article. We get quotes from ‘Senior NATO and American officials’, the White House, State Department spokesman Mark Toner, Pentagon Administrator William E. Gortney and the American Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz. In contrast to this there is one quote from a Libyan government spokesman Musa Ibrahim. In sticking to the journalism of attachment theme, the author of this article uses the words ‘official’ sources or ‘officials’ from nine times in the article. The author also shows a lack of any real form of critical reporting on the official line and fails to challenge any of the authoritative discourses that are displayed in the article (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

The next article came from the Guardian on March 25^th 2011 and is titled ‘Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey: Climbdown by Sarkozy ends infighting among western allies’. This article also shows strong evidence of a journalism of attachment with a strong focus on the reporting of official statements. Rather than focussing on the reasons for the conflict, this article mainly focusses on in-fighting and squabbles within NATO over control of the mission. The article also to a small degree evokes an idea of a propaganda of moralism. In this regard we see a quote from Hillary Clinton who suggests that NATO would take responsibility for “protecting civilians, enforcing an arms embargo and supporting the humanitarian mission”. As well as this we receive a quote from French President Nicolas Sarkozy who suggests that NATO is “protecting civilians through air strikes”. The article also has some elements of the opposing stories theme with five paragraphs devoted to an on-going argument between the Turkish and French governments over the French role in the military action. In particular, a critical quote from the Turkish Prime Minister is used where he states in relation to France “I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when the look in Libya’s direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on” (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

The next article from the same authors comes from the Guardian again, on March 25^th 2011 also and is titled ‘Libya: France give way to Turkey as deal is struck to put NATO in charge’. This article takes on a more critical stance than the last article and has large elements of the opposing stories theme. Over fifty-percent of the article is of a critical nature towards France, with that criticism coming from Turkey. In particular, the quote “I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when the look in Libya’s direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on” was used again. As well as this, there were other quotes such as “the aim of the air campaign is not the liberation of the Libyan people, there are hidden agendas and different interests”. The words of French interior minister Claude Gueant were also cited. He stated that the French President was “leading a crusade” to stop Gaddafi massacring Libyans. The article points out that the use of the word ‘crusade’ caused outrage amongst the Turkish government and in the Muslim world (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

In another article from the New York Times on March 25^th 2011 titled ‘NATO To Assume New Role in Libya’, there is evidence of a journalism of attachment again. In the first five paragraphs of the article, the words “officials said” are used five times. The article also quoted a range of ‘official’ voices inside the US administration, the US military, NATO, The French Defence Ministry and a spokesman from the Libyan rebel group. None of the other themes of analysis were present in the article (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

The next article was from USA Today on March 25^th 2011 and was titled ‘As NATO takes over in Libya, Gaddafi’s fate remains fuzzy’. In this article there is a strong journalism of attachment from the author. A summary analysis of the article reveals that the author is clearly taking sides. For example, it is stated that “the news is good” that Gaddafi’s forces have little likelihood of standing up to the firepower of NATO. It goes on to state “if the allies remain aggressive rather than limiting themselves to the inadequate no fly zone, Libyan ground forces should run out of tanks, heavy weapons, ammunition, fuel, will-power or all five”. Further to this, the author laments the fact that the UNSC resolution authorising “all necessary means” is confined to protecting civilians. This implies that the author would like to see more than the protection of civilians such as a total defeat of Gaddafi. The article also has strong elements of the demonization of the enemy theme. For example, Gaddafi is accused of using mercenaries to supplement his army. As well as this, the tactics being used to punish Gaddafi such as sanctions and asset freezes are compared to those employed on Saddam Hussein and South Africa’s apartheid regime. This implicitly implies that Gaddafi is similar to both (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

The next article came from the Guardian on March 24^th 2011 and is titled ‘There's nothing moral about Nato's intervention in Libya: The western attacks risk a bloody stalemate and are a threat to the region. The alternative has to be a negotiated settlement’. This article takes on a strong theme of opposition stories. It is highly critical throughout the article on all aspects of the NATO led military operation. The author suggests that US, British and other NATO countries have a “habit they can’t kick” of attacking Arab countries. While doing this, the article states, they are “incinerating soldiers and tanks on the ground and killing civilians in the process”. It goes on to state that these states insist that humanitarian motives are crucial, yet the media are baying for the blood of a pantomime villain and regime change is quickly replacing the stated mission. The author further questions the legitimacy of the military action and points out that far from having the support of the international community, Russia, China, Brazil and Germany did not support the UN vote and have criticised the bombings along with the Arab League and African Union. In particular the author emphasises the hypocritical nature of the intervention, and states that “it’s that such double standards are an integral part of a mechanism of global power and domination that stifles hopes of any credible international system of human rights protection. Further to this the article suggests that “A la carte humanitarian intervention” has nothing to do with human suffering, but depends on how reliable an ally the regime is (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

The final article came from the Guardian on March 19^th 2011 and is titled ‘Libya On the ground: Jets prepare to deploy despite ceasefire by Tripoli regime: Warplanes head for Mediterranean as Nato envoys meet to back no-fly zone’. The article has a strong theme of journalism of attachment running through it. The majority of the article is compiled of a discussion of military strategy for a possible upcoming campaign. This strategy discussion includes a quote from a ‘Middle East expert’ from the Royal United Services Institute who suggested that any involvement of an Arab state in the military operation was “important as a way of countering the accusation that this is an intervention which is colonialist and imperialist in nature”. The article also suggests that British SAS and SBS soldiers are already in Libya “on the ground”, however the author does not question the legality of this at all (Appendix 2, Libya, 2011).

Results and findings.

The Kosovo case:

Overall the thematic discourse analysis produced some interesting results. As well the qualitative thematic discourse analysis above, a quantitative analysis was also conducted. This allowed the gathering of statistics about how often each theme appeared in the analysis in percentage terms. The table is reproduced below as Table 1.

As illustrated by the table, seventy-one percent of the articles analysed on the Kosovo conflict showed evidence of a journalism of attachment. This perhaps illustrates that journalistic practices during this conflict were not as independent and unbiased as they should have been. In a large majority of the cases, journalists reproduced the official line without questioning and gave minimal space to opposition sources. As well as this, eighty-six percent of the articles showed a demonization of the enemy. Perhaps this is a product of the journalism of attachment, with the official line having to fulfil such a demonization process to legitimise the intervention. Only forty-three percent of the articles displayed evidence of a propaganda of moralism theme. This was quite surprising because as there was no UNSC sanction for this intervention, it seemed logical that the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ would have been used more often. However, as the research sample was quite small at seven articles, it is possible that a higher percentage could have been recorded with a larger sample. Finally, only forty-three percent of the articles showed evidence of opposition stories. This illustrated a lack of critical reporting and an underreporting of stories that challenged the ‘official’ propaganda.

Table 1:

Another interesting result was the difference between the articles in American newspapers and in English newspapers. The percentages for this are reproduced below as Table 2.

Table 2:

As this table above shows, the articles in American newspapers showed a strong journalism of attachment in seventy-five percent of the articles. This perhaps illustrates a stronger bond between American journalists and their politicians and a stronger sense of national pride that precludes a journalist from taking an overly critical line for fear of being branded ‘unpatriotic’. English reporters seem to trust the official line a little less with sixty-seven percent, although this is still quite a high number and illustrates the lack of critical reporting. The American articles also showed a strong demonisation on the enemy in one-hundred percent of the articles. This seems in line with the strong journalism of attachment score. The English press was less inclined to demonise the enemy but still showed a high score, on a par with the level of journalism of attachment. A propaganda of moralism was again higher in American articles with fifty percent compared to thirty-four percent of English articles. And finally, showing a trend, American articles displayed much less evidence of opposition stories than English newspapers at twenty-five percent compared to sixty-seven percent in English newspapers. This seems to imply that the English newspapers took a much more critical line than their American counterparts.

The Libya Case:

As a comparative study, it would be interesting to find out if the themes had changed between the two conflicts. The articles on Libya again produced interesting results. The results are reproduced in Table 3 below.

Table 3:

The articles of the Libyan conflict produced some different results to the articles on Kosovo. This time, seventy-one percent of articles showed the theme of a journalism of attachment compared with the same percentage score during the Kosovo conflict. There was however a huge drop in the theme of demonising the enemy with only fourteen percent of articles doing it compared with eighty-six percent During Kosovo. The theme of a propaganda of moralism was also surprisingly low at fourteen percent compared with forty-three present during Kosovo. This is even more surprising when one considers that the Libya intervention had UNSC approval and the growth on the international norm of a R2P since the Kosovo intervention. Finally, the level of opposition stories has stayed the same at forty-three percent since Kosovo and shows that critical voices are still not being heard enough.

Again, when we split the articles up between American and English articles (Table 4), we find some key differences.

Table 4:

As this table shows, when the articles are divided up, the journalism of attachment was present in one-hundred percent of the American articles. This was compared to just fifty percent of the English articles. This shows that since the Kosovo conflict, there has been an increase in the journalism of attachment on the American side and a decrease on the English side. The demonisation of the enemy was present in thirty-four percent of the American articles but not present in any of the English pieces. This shoes a drop in this them from both Americans and the English. The theme of a propaganda of moralism was not evoked at all in the American articles, yet it was present in a quarter of the English articles. This again, showed a drop on both sides when compared with the Kosovo reporting. Finally, and quite shockingly, the American articles showed no signs of opposition stories, in line with their one-hundred percent journalism of attachment rate. This dropped from twenty-five percent during Kosovo. The English articles had improved on their Kosovo score with seventy-five percent opposition stories.

Conclusion:

This research set out to discover what the dominant themes were within the media narratives during both the NATO interventions into Kosovo and Libya. The researched was strongly influenced by the previous research that had been undertaken on the role of the media during the Kosovo conflict. It was decided to undertake a thematic critical discourse analysis as this had not been done in any of the previous studies that had been completed. The choice of critical discourse analysis was strongly influenced by the work of Norman Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk and John Richardson, in particular their ideas on how power works through discourse to benefit those in authority. The thematic analysis that was chosen took influences from the previous research that had been done and the four frames of analysis were chosen as a way of understanding the dominant narratives within articles during both conflicts. As a method of analysis this worked quite well and it produced some interesting qualitative and quantitative analysis.

The most noteworthy of the results that emerged was that a majority of journalists during both conflicts showed evidence of a journalism of attachment. However, during both conflicts the American articles showed higher levels of this form of journalism. Both the American and the English articles showed high levels of demonising the enemy also, with eighty-six percent of articles displaying this theme during Kosovo. Again the American journalists were the worst offenders with one-hundred percent of their articles displaying evidence of this. However, during the Libya conflict, this number had dropped to fourteen percent of articles demonising the enemy. The propaganda of moralism theme was also higher during Kosovo at forty-three percent as opposed to fourteen percent during Libya. Perhaps most interesting was the instances where the theme of opposition stories appeared. During both conflicts, only forty-three percent of articles showed evidence of opposition stories. This suggests a lack of critical engagement from journalists in American and English newspapers. However, when the results are broken down, it reveals that during both conflicts, English articles displayed sixty-seven and seventy-five percent respectively, and it was the American articles that dragged the overall average number down. During the Kosovo conflict, American articles only displayed opposition stories in twenty-five percent of the articles, and this number dropped to zero percent during the Libya conflict. The results seem to imply that the English press takes on a more critical role in war reporting than their American counterparts, although both sets of journalists display high levels of a journalism of attachment, with this being the dominant theme throughout the analysis.

Bibliography:

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Fairclough, N. 2001, "The Discourse of New Labour: Critical Discourse Analysis" in Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis, ed. Wetherell, M. Taylor, S. Yates, S.J, Sage / Open University, London, pp. 229-- 266.

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Appendix: Newspaper Articles.

Kosovo 1999

NOTE: 17-03-1999 to 31-03-1999

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Terms: NATO, Kosovo

Source: Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;Daily News (New York);The Daily Telegraph (London);The Guardian (London);The New York Times;The Sun;USA Today;The Washington Post

Combined Source: Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;Daily News (New York);The Daily Telegraph (London);The Guardian (London);The New York Times;The Sun;USA Today;The Washington Post

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	Results
1.	NATO STEPS UP ITS AIR ATTACK CALLED BID TO STOP 'GENOCIDE' AGAINST KOSOVO ALBANIANS Daily News (New York), March 29, 1999, Monday, 902 words, By HELEN KENNEDY, With Kenneth R. Bazinet

2.	CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW -- NATO Planes Step Up Attacks on Serb Troops; Allies Shifting the Focus to Halting Atrocities Reported in Kosovo The New York Times, March 29, 1999, Monday, Late Edition - Final, Section A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk , 1452 words, By ADAM CLYMER

3.	Milosevic presses on in Kosovo Next target for NATO: Serb troops USA TODAY, March 26, 1999, Friday,, 746 words, Andrea Stone

4.	CRISIS IN KOSOVO: No choice but to act, says Solana; NATO CHIEF/ The West has a duty to end 'this humanitarian catastrophe' and restore stability The Guardian (London), March 24, 1999, The Guardian Home Page; Pg. 3, 556 words

5.	CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN KOSOVO; Top Ethnic Albanian Rebel Asks NATO to Start Strikes The New York Times, March 23, 1999, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final, Section A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk , 992 words, By CARLOTTA GALL

6.	Nato attack 'only hours away'; Civilians flee as Serbian forces put Kosovo to the torch The Guardian (London), March 22, 1999, Guardian Home Pages; Pg. 1, 941 words, CHRIS BIRD IN GORNJA KLINA

7.	No way out for Nato; Bombing will only strengthen Milosevic's hold on Kosovo The Guardian (London), March 18, 1999, Guardian Features Pages; Pg. 18, 765 words, ISABEL HILTON

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Daily News (New York)

March 29, 1999, Monday

NATO STEPS UP ITS AIR ATTACK

CALLED BID TO STOP 'GENOCIDE' AGAINST KOSOVO ALBANIANS

BYLINE: By HELEN KENNEDY, With Kenneth R. Bazinet

SECTION: News; Pg. 5

LENGTH: 902 words

NATO broadened its attacks on Yugoslavia yesterday in a race against time to smash Serb military units and stop what it called "genocide" against ethnic Albanians of Kosovo.

The escalation to "Phase 2" on the fifth night of bombing increases the risk to fighter pilots flying lower and slower to strike the Serb ground troops who are reportedly forcing tens of thousands of civilians from their homes.

"We're entering a phase which is more focused on trying to stop the humanitarian catastrophe which is taking place on the ground," said NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.

Thousands of refugees, mostly women and children, flooded into Albania and Macedonia from Kosovo, telling of Serb soldiers who torched their villages. Men were reportedly being rounded up separately.

"Genocide is starting," warned German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping.

NATO said more than 500,000 ethnic Albanians, a quarter of the population of Kosovo, had been driven from their homes 50,000 of them in just the past few days.

President Clinton said, "The continued brutality and repression of the Serb forces further underscores the need for NATO to persevere."

When asked whether five days of NATO air strikes were pushing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to step up his attacks on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Clinton shot back: "Absolutely not."

Secretary of State Albright said Milosevic "was planning to do this anyway. It is just simply an upside-down argument to think that NATO or we have made this get worse."

Albright called the plight of the ethnic Albanians "a very, very bad scene."

"There are terrible reports about men being separated from women and children, then they being taken off and executed, villages being torched, people arriving across the border with no shoes," Albright said.

Albanian President Rexhep Meidani pleaded for NATO ground troops to stop the carnage, but U.S. officials continued to reject that possibility.

"I do not believe that sending several hundred thousand soldiers in to occupy Serbia for the next five or 10 years is the right way to deal with this problem," said national security adviser Sandy Berger.

The Yugoslav government denied it was carrying out "ethnic cleansing" or pushing ethnic Albanians from the province.

Instead, Bratislava Morina, Serbia's commissioner for refugees, said ethnic Albanians were fleeing the NATO attacks. "There is no humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo whatsoever," Morina said.

Officials said the air campaign would not be deterred by Saturday's downing of an F-117A Stealth fighter near the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade.

Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, estimated the bombs would keep falling for at least a month. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the top Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, said the campaign could go on for "many, many weeks."

In the stepped-up bombing runs in which six of the Stealth fighters participated NATO warplanes and missiles took aim yesterday at some ground troops and military targets, like headquarters and command bunkers.

The Kosovo Liberation Army's news agency said NATO planes had attacked a Yugoslav Army column and destroyed four tanks. A NATO military official could not confirm the report but said it was "entirely possible."

NATO planes were still trying to find and destroy elements of Yugoslavia's sophisticated air defense system. NATO needs to take out the air defenses so that slower and lower-flying planes like the A-10 Warthog can go in to attack the 300 or so Serb tanks shelling Albanian villages.

Opposition to the air strikes continued to be voiced around the world. In his Palm Sunday address, Pope John Paul said, "It is never too late to meet and negotiate."

In Sydney, Australia, 7,000 demonstrators marched on the U.S. Consulate, pulling down the U.S. flag and setting it ablaze. In Moscow, unidentified gunmen aimed a rocket launcher at the U.S. Embassy before being chased away by cops.

Graphic: MORE MUSCLE IN THE AIR

If NATO makes a concerted effort to go after Serb tanks and troops, a primary weapon will be the A-10 Thunderbolt, a slow-flying, low-flying jet that is highly maneuverable. They would be joined by EA-6B radar jamming Prowlers. Tank killing Apache helicopters could also be added to the force.

A-10 THUNDERBOLT

Nickname: Warthog, for its unlovely appearance, or Tank Killer, for its remarkable record in the Gulf War.

Speed: 420 mph.

Length: 53 feet.

Wingspan: 57 feet.

Range: 800 miles.

Armament: Maverick missiles and laser-guided bombs; can also carry Rockeye cluster bombs or 2,000-pound bombs. Armed with seven-barrel Gatling gun.

Cost: $ 8.8 million.

Maker: Fairchild Republic Co.

EA-6B PROWLER

Its radar tracking equipment has been key to the U.S. and British success in knocking out missile and radar sites in Iraq.

Speed: 610 mph

Length: 60 feet

Wingspan: 53 feet

Range: 1,100 miles

Armament: Carries up to four HARM missiles.

Maker: Northrop Grumman Corp.

AH-64 APACHE HELICOPTER

Earned a fearsome reputation in Iraq and Kuwait, killing hundreds of tanks and radar sites during the Gulf War.

Rotor diameter: 48 feet

Speed: 162 mph

Range: 253 miles

Armaments: Can carry 16 Hellfire missiles, and has room for Stinger or Sidewinder missiles. Also has machine gun in its nose.

LOAD-DATE: March 30, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: [Map by DAILY NEWS/KRT]

AP SERB women dance on wing of U.S. F-117a Stealth jet that crashed Saturday in Yugoslavia, possibly downed by anti-aircraft missile. Pilot was rescued unharmed by U.S. teams hours later.

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The New York Times

March 29, 1999, Monday, Late Edition - Final

CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW -- NATO Planes Step Up Attacks on Serb Troops;

Allies Shifting the Focus to Halting Atrocities Reported in Kosovo

BYLINE: By ADAM CLYMER

SECTION: Section A; Page 1; Column 6; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 1452 words

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, March 28

Allied warplanes braved bad weather tonight to step up attacks on Yugoslav troops while NATO officials repeatedly accused Serbian forces of large-scale atrocities in Kosovo.

The United States and Britain committed additional aircraft to the allied force, and NATO's Secretary General, Javier Solana, said its mission was shifting from neutralizing air defenses to stopping "the humanitarian catastrophe which is taking place on the ground."

President Clinton, in a brief statement before boarding a helicopter for Camp David, said he supported the decision to hit a broader range of targets, including "forces in the field." He said continuing Serbian repression "underscores the need for NATO to persevere." When a reporter asked if the bombing was accelerating the atrocities, he replied, "Absolutely not."

The shift in targeting, according to Kenneth H. Bacon, the Pentagon spokesman, meant that attacks on military and police targets -- like barracks, headquarters and fuel and ammunition depots -- would now account for more than a third of all strikes, compared with about a fifth in earlier raids. While there may be occasional attacks on tank columns or artillery, the basic plan was to cut off such forces from their supply lines and communications, he said.

In a fifth straight night of bombing tonight, NATO mounted attacks that included cruise missile strikes by B-52 bombers.

Hours after the first allied plane loss of the war, an American F-117 stealth fighter whose pilot was rescued, Britain announced that it would add 4 Harrier fighters to the 8 already based in Italy, and also assigned 8 Tornado bombers and a Tristar air-to-air refueling tanker to the force. The United States followed with an announcement that it was adding between 6 and 12 B-1 bombers and B-52 bombers.

At NATO headquarters in Brussels, Air Commodore David Wilby of Britain said, "I'm sure we will get a few more contributions."

In Yugoslavia, state television insisted repeatedly that the stealth plane had been shot down, and several times aired footage of the burning wreck. Yugoslavia's President, Slobodan Milosevic, defiantly praised his people and his armed forces for their defense of Serbia, and staged a celebration in downtown Belgrade -- a rock concert to show solidarity with the armed forces and to mark the 10th anniversary today of his 1989 move to strip Kosovo of broad autonomy.

Air raid sirens wailed several times in Belgrade, and state-run media gave some details of Saturday night attacks. But no new casualty figures were announced. Yugoslav state media previously have spoken of dozens killed in the NATO raids.

On both sides of the Atlantic, officials were being asked what they would do if air power failed to halt the violence against Kosovo's Albanians. Clinton Administration officials, as well as those at NATO headquarters, insisted they had no intention of committing ground troops.

In Washington, Samuel R. Berger, the President's national security adviser, was asked on the ABC News program "This Week" if he could "rule out the use of ground forces in the future?" He replied: "We have no intention of doing that. I don't think it would be advisable."

In London, Defense Secretary George Robertson said NATO was "disrupting the violence," adding, "We have to make sure that we keep doing it until the genocidal attacking stops." But when asked about sending NATO troops in to stop the atrocities, he said, "There are absolutely no plans for an opposed entry into Kosovo."

The United States has agreed to take part with NATO allies in a Kosovo peacekeeping force should Belgrade relent and join delegates of the Albanian majority in Kosovo in signing a peace agreement.

Mr. Solana, also appearing in the ABC program, said the NATO allies "are not in a position to deploy troops on the ground prior to a settlement, to an agreement," adding: "This is a position all the countries maintain until this moment. I don't know how things are going to evolve, but at this point troops will not be deployed on the ground."

One strong voice from the Senate disagreed. "We're in it, and we have to win it," said Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, appearing on "This Week," adding, "That means we have to exercise every option."

He said: "The American people have to know that these young men and women that are piloting our airplanes are prepared to go into harm's way to get the job done. And I would, all of us would, grieve at the loss of a single American. But when you go into these things, your primary purpose cannot be the safety of your forces. It has to be the achievement of your strategic and tactical goals."

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, a Texas Republican, appeared on the CBS News program "Face the Nation" and suggested that "troops on the ground" from other NATO countries might be the right response, because the United States has taken the leading role in the air campaign.

European politicians tend to express less fear of public reaction to military casualties than American leaders do, accepting loss of life as a part of fighting a war. But even so, they would demand American participation in any attacking force, as they have for peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Macedonia.

And the subject has been discussed, at least gingerly. A minister in the Cabinet of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder of Germany said that the Chancellor had told him before the air campaign began that everyone had to be aware that bombing might not stop Mr. Milosevic, and that an invasion by NATO troops might have to be considered.

Another option -- urged by Senators Joseph I. Lieberman, a Connecticut Democrat, and Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican -- is for the United States to arm the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army to fight Mr. Milosevic's forces.

But Mr. Solana said, "I don't think at this point, with a U.N. resolution preventing the deployment of arms, I don't think it would be a good idea to help in that direction."

Before the President left for Camp David, he met with his national security advisers. First he saw Mr. Berger alone, and then he spent an hour with Mr. Berger, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen; George J. Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence; Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, and Jim Steinberg, a foreign policy adviser.

They briefed the President on the details of Saturday's rescue operation and on the situation in Kosovo, and they reviewed tonight's military plans. An aide said that they had not discussed the possibility of sending in ground troops, but that the President was increasingly concerned about the refugees fleeing Kosovo.

Briefings on Saturday night's attacks were conducted today in Brussels and London. In Brussels, Jamie Shea, a NATO spokesman, said 66 aircraft had flown in two waves, attacking 17 major targets. Both he and Air Commodore Wilby focused their remarks less on military matters than on what Mr. Shea called "the deteriorating humanitarian situation in and now around Kosovo."

He said it was particularly disturbing that hardly any men of fighting age were among the refugees fleeing into Albania and Macedonia, who are mostly women and children.

Mr. Shea asked, "What has happened to the males between the ages of 16 to 60?" Air Commodore Wilby said, "Villages are being systematically emptied, looted and permanently destroyed."

In London, Mr. Robertson made a similar case, beginning his briefing by telling reporters: "I am sorry to have to report that Yugoslavia's campaign of repression against the Albanian population is continuing. Seven towns on the Albanian border are reported to be burning, and on the Macedonian border, as we have all seen on television, Dakovica is in flames."

"Thousands of refugees are streaming across the border from Kosovo into Albania, and there are also reports that civilians may be used as human shields to protect Milosevic's military machine," he said. "If that is true, this would of course be a war crime in its own right."

Vuk Draskovic, the Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister, denied accusations that Serbia was committing genocide against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo or that its security forces were carrying out systematic "ethnic cleansing."

"No, absolutely no," he said in an interview with CNN. "We need Albanians in our state. No one has that genocide strategy." He added, "Albanians are doing that crime against us, I mean Albanian terrorists."

In his briefing, the British Defense Secretary also renewed his warning to Serbian security forces that they were committing war crimes and that evidence of that was being assembled. He did not say how.

http://www.nytimes.com

LOAD-DATE: March 29, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: Photos: The wreckage of an F-117A in the village of Budjanovici, about 35 miles northwest of Belgrade. NATO would not confirm whether the stealth fighter plane had been shot down. Royal Air Force crew under a Harrier GR-7 fighter at Gioia del Colle air base in southern Italy. NATO said it would keep bombing Yugoslavia. (Photos by Reuters)(pg. A8)

Map of Yugoslavia highlighting some of the sites attacked by NATO. (Source: NATO)(pg. A8)

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USA TODAY

March 26, 1999, Friday, FINAL EDITION

Milosevic presses on in Kosovo Next target for NATO: Serb troops

BYLINE: Andrea Stone

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 3A

LENGTH: 746 words

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON -- Operation Allied Force may aim to halt Serb aggression

in Kosovo, but that clearly has not sunk in yet with Yugoslav

President Slobodan Milosevic.

On the second day of the biggest air offensive in Europe since

World War II, Serb military and special police forces intensified

their nearly two-week offensive in Kosovo. They swept through

ethnic Albanian villages where they executed civilians and set

fire to houses. Yugoslav forces also shelled neighboring Albania.

The NATO attacks are designed to force Milosevic to stop killing

ethnic Albanians and sign a peace agreement. More than 2,000 have

died, and 400,000 have been left homeless, in Kosovo, a province

of Serbia. Serbia and Montenegro make up Yugoslavia.

Now Pentagon officials say NATO is about to switch the focus of

its attacks from air defense and command-and-control centers to

the troops behind the violence in Kosovo.

Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said Thursday that about 20%

of targets hit in the first attack Wednesday were military or

security forces. The gradual switch to targeting troops and tanks

will require allied pilots to fly closer to the ground. That is

far riskier than the high altitude runs of the past two nights.

NATO Commander Gen. Wesley Clark warned Thursday, "There is no

planned sanctuary" for Serb aggressors.

"We are going to systematically and aggressively attack, disrupt,

degrade, devastate and ultimately, unless President Milosevic

complies with the demands of the international community, we're

going to destroy these forces and their facilities and support,"

Clark said in a news conference in Brussels, Belgium. "The operation

will be just as long and difficult as President Milosevic requires

it to be."

The assault resumed after dark Thursday when sea-launched cruise

missiles and Stealth bombers swarmed across the Adriatic to targets

deep inside Yugoslavia.

Four U.S. surface ships and two submarines in the Adriatic launched

Tomahawk cruise missiles at a far faster pace than the night before.

The destroyer USS Gonzalez fired 16 half-ton warheads. A 17th

misfired, tumbling in flames into the sea.

Two jets from a fleet of 21 B-2 Stealth bombers made the 30-hour

round-trip from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to unload

2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs over Yugoslavia.

From Aviano and Istrana in northern Italy and Gioia del Colle

in southern Italy, dozens of NATO jets roared off into the night.

Among them were F-117 Stealth fighter-bombers, F-15 and F-16 jet

fighters and EA-6B radar-jamming jets.

In NATO's first damage assessment of Wednesday's strike, Clark

said allied missiles and bombs hit more than 40 targets, including

air defenses, command-and-control centers, a power plant, arms

factories and military and ministerial police forces. Yugoslav

officials say 50 targets were hit.

Yugoslav authorities also reported at least 10 civilians killed

and 60 wounded. Bacon said allied strike and support aircraft

made 150 sorties Wednesday, and officials were satisfied with

the results. The Yugoslav commander in Kosovo, Lt. Gen. Nebojsa

Pavkovic, said the first night's strike did "minimal" damage.

But the Russian General Staff in Moscow said NATO bombs badly

damaged five military airfields, two factories, a communications

center, several barracks and a police-training base. Clark denied

reports that a pharmaceutical plant had been bombed.

He did confirm that an aircraft repair plant was hit. So were

three fighter jets from Yugoslavia's small air force of 15 modern

MiG-29s and 64 older Russian-made fighters. Clark raised the number

of Russian-made MiG-29 jet fighters downed by allied aircraft

on the first night from two to three. Two American pilots and

one Dutch pilot got credit for the kills.

Despite dogfights in the skies, all NATO aircraft returned to

base safely Wednesday and were accounted for Thursday.

By contrast to the first night, a defense official said that no

air-to-air confrontations were reported Thursday.

One element of the Serb military that wasn't moved was its tiny

navy of four submarines, four frigates and an assortment of small

patrol and missile-firing boats. Clark said he called the Yugoslav

army chief of staff, Gen. Dragoljub Ojdonic, on Wednesday before

the strikes began and warned him that if Serb vessels entered

the Adriatic they would be attacked. They stayed in port.

LOAD-DATE: March 26, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, B/W, Stefan Rousseau, AFP; GRAPHIC, B/W, Grant Jerding, Dave Merrill, USA TODAY, Source: USA TODAY research (Map); Heading out: A British pilot boards his fighter jet to take off from Gioia del Colle, Italy, on Thursday.

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The Guardian (London)

March 24, 1999

CRISIS IN KOSOVO: No choice but to act, says Solana;

NATO CHIEF/ The West has a duty to end 'this humanitarian catastrophe' and restore stability

SECTION: The Guardian Home Page; Pg. 3

LENGTH: 556 words

Nato's Secretary-General, Javier Solana, yesterday explained to reporters at the organisation's Brussels headquarters the background to his ordering of air strikes against Yugoslavia. He said:

'I HAVE just directed the Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark, to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

I have taken this decision after extensive consultations in recent days with all the allies and after it became clear that the final diplomatic effort of Ambassador Holbrooke in Belgrade has not met with success.

All efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but to take military action. We are taking action following the Yugoslavia government's refusal of the international community's demands:

Acceptance of the interim political settlement negotiated at Rambouillet.

Full observance of limits on the Serb army and special police forces agreed on October 25.

Ending of excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo.

As we warned on January 30, failure to meet these demands would lead Nato to take whatever measures were necessary to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.

Nato has fully supported all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the efforts of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and those of the contact group.

We deeply regret that these efforts did not succeed, due entirely to the intransigence of the FRY government.

This military action is intended to support the political aims of the international community.

It will be directed towards disrupting the violent attacks being committed by the Serb army and special police forces and weakening their ability to cause further humanitarian catastrophe.

We wish thereby to support international efforts to secure Yugoslav agreement to an interim political settlement.

A viable political settlement must be guaranteed by an international military presence.

It remains open to the Yugoslav government to show at any time that it is ready to meet the demands of the international community. I hope it will have the wisdom to do so.

At the same time, we are appealing to the Kosovar Albanians to remain firmly committed to the road to peace which they have chosen in Paris. We urge in particular Kosovar armed elements to refrain from provocative military action.

Let me be clear: Nato is not waging war against Yugoslavia. We have no quarrel with the people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of the policies of their government.

Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo. We must also act to prevent instability spreading in the region.

Nato is united behind this course of action. We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo.

We know the risks of action but we have all agreed that inaction brings even greater dangers. We will do what is necessary to bring stability to the region.

We must stop an authoritarian regime from repressing its people in Europe at the end of the 20th century.

We have a moral duty to do so. The responsibility is on our shoulders and we will fulfil it."

LOAD-DATE: March 29, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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The New York Times

March 23, 1999, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final

CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN KOSOVO;

Top Ethnic Albanian Rebel Asks NATO to Start Strikes

BYLINE: By CARLOTTA GALL

SECTION: Section A; Page 10; Column 1; Foreign Desk

LENGTH: 992 words

DATELINE: POLJANCE, Serbia, March 22

The general commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army called on NATO today to carry out air strikes on Serbia to put an end to the violence, as Yugoslav Army and police forces continued their ransacking and burning of villages.

Special police units were setting houses and farm buildings ablaze here this afternoon, leaving a trail of dead cows and downed fences before pulling back to their base in Srbica.

"There are no terrorists here," said the officer, referring to the ethnic Albanian rebels. "It is all calm," he added as he led out a column of 20 armored vehicles and police jeeps packed with armed men.

Almost every second house in this sprawling village was on fire. Flames leapt from the windows of houses beside the main road, while others were already gutted shells, still smoldering, their blackened rafters collapsed.

Late this afternoon police officers wearing camouflage and carrying automatic weapons, spare magazines strapped across their chests, walked wearily up the road and gathered at the top of the village. They climbed into jeeps, the day's work apparently over.

Two dark blue armored troop carriers and a vehicle mounted with an antiaircraft gun accompanied the column out of the burning village.

Officers riding on top waved their guns and raised a Serbian three-finger salute as they passed. Further down the road two stragglers walked away from a burning house and fired a burst of gunfire into the air.

While the operation was going on the top commander of the Kosovo force, Suleyman Selimi, accused the Serbian military of using heavier weaponry against his people than ever before. He called on the international community to act to stop the violence in Kosovo.

"They are using more modern weapons," Mr. Selimi said of the Serbian military today. "The kind of tanks are more sophisticated and they are using new mortars, 120 to 200 millimeters, as well as ground-to-ground missiles."

He said that his forces had signed the peace agreement because they trusted the West and that he thought NATO air strikes on Serbian military hardware would stop the violence. "I think if they want to stop the violence, they should do that," he said of the NATO threat of strikes. "If we did not trust them we would not have signed the peace deal."

Sitting in a two-story house high in the Drenica region, some 18 miles northwest of the provincial capital Pristina, Mr. Selimi -- who is known among fighters and villagers by his nom de guerre, Sultan -- has a view of villages for miles around.

This morning missiles fired from a multiple rocket launcher were audible, as were the whoosh and detonation a few seconds later on impact. Smoke rose from Poljance and the surrounding area.

Mr. Selimi said Serbian forces had fired ground-to-ground missiles from positions near Istok, 25 miles away near the provincial border with Montenegro, the day before. Three hit the village of Likovac, where the Kosovo force's headquarters are, but landed harmlessly in a field, he said.

A doctor from a French relief group, Doctors of the World, who was running a clinic in a nearby village confirmed that mortars were hitting civilian areas, saying he had treated two wounded civilians on Sunday.

The fighting in recent weeks has been some of the heaviest since last summer. Mr. Selimi said he had lost 47 men in the last three weeks. But he said his forces had inflicted casualties on the Serbs as well.

Mr. Selimi, 28, who is over six feet tall and a former soccer player, cuts an athletic figure. He wears combat fatigues and a short military haircut. Soft-spoken, even shy, he said he studied metal engineering in college and helped found the Kosovo force in the early 1990's when he was a student. He commands obvious respect from fighters and civilians alike.

He said his forces had knocked out three Serbian tanks in a battle for the village of Prekaz on Saturday.

As for his strategy, he said it was to try to defend villages as long as possible, as a conventional army would, to delay the Serbian advance. But he acknowledged that his fighters were in no position to compete with Serbian heavy guns.

"In the end the most important thing is not to lose any men," he said.

He accused the Serbs of carrying out a scorched-earth policy, trying to clear the area and then sending in infantry to raze villages, burn crops and kill livestock.

"Their aims are 'ethnic cleansing' of the Albanian population and the destruction of the K.L.A.," he said. "By this they aim to keep Kosovo under their control."

There were unconfirmed reports of killings of ethnic Albanians in Srbica over the weekend.

Mr. Selimi said that he had heard about six deaths at Serbian police hands in Srbica on Saturday, but that he had only personally interviewed one witness. She told him that her husband had been shot in front of her and her children, he said.

A teacher, Sabit Veliki, whose family lives in Pristina, was killed in Srbica on Saturday, according to the chief editor of the Albanian language daily Koha Ditore. The editor, Baton Haxhiu, said he had interviewed a man arrested with the teacher and later released.

The Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom in Pristina has collected a list of 15 men reported arrested or missing by their relatives.

Without intervention from the West, Mr. Selimi said, the Serbian offensive would escalate and sweep not just the Drenica region but the whole province.

But he maintained that it could not defeat the Kosovo force. "We will be here no matter how they react," he said. "We will hang on as long as we can. Kosovo never belonged to the Serbs. The Albanians will be here always."

Violence exploded in Pristina late tonight when two attacks occurred on an ethnic Albanian cafe and a restaurant. One person was reported killed and several wounded. A heavy police presence scared people off the streets amid reports of beatings and harassment of civilians.

http://www.nytimes.com

LOAD-DATE: March 23, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: Photos: Like this little boy forced to leave home and these patients at a clinic run by a French relief agency called Doctors of the World, ethnic Albanians throughout the Drenica region sought help and safety yesterday. LIVES LOST -- Serbian police units set fires across the Drenica region of Kosovo yesterday, leaving a trail of dead livestock and smoking farms. The ethnic Albanian military leader Suleyman Selimi accused the Serbian military of using heavier weapons than ever before. Serbian forces have stepped up their attacks since international monitors withdrew last weekend. FAMILIES TORN -- Like this little boy forced to leave home and these patients at a clinic run by a French relief agency called Doctors of the World, refugees throughout the Drenica region sought help and safety yesterday. (Photographs by Tyler Hicks for The New York Times); Serbian police units set fires across the Drenica region of Kosovo yesterday, leaving a trail of dead cows and smoking buildings. The Kosovo military leader, Suleyman Selimi, accused Serbian military of using heavier weapons against his people than ever before. (Photographs by Tyler Hicks for The New York Times)

Map of Kosovo shows location of Poljance: Poljance was one of several villages attacked yesterday.

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The Guardian (London)

March 22, 1999

Nato attack 'only hours away';

Civilians flee as Serbian forces put Kosovo to the torch

BYLINE: CHRIS BIRD IN GORNJA KLINA

SECTION: Guardian Home Pages; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 941 words

THE Serbs did not want us to see it. But there was no mistaking the hellish fires raging in Kosovo yesterday as ethnic Albanian villages were torched by Serbian security forces.

Our vehicle was turned back a fifth time from a different approach when we tried to drive to Srbica, to where about 5,000 refugees from surrounding villages had fled a push by Serbian forces late last week.

But we could see smoke rising in grey plumes from villages nearby. Then, as we retreated back down the road and up a dirt track, the Serbian security forces' hidden assault came into view. The horizon was obscured by thick smoke after Serbian forces set light to the village of Prekaz. The fumes fanned out over the tops of the low houses, a sea of grey which rippled up over the surrounding Cicavica mountains.

Prekaz is where ethnic Albanian guerrillas of the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army say the war started just over a year ago. And it is here that a noose of Serbian tanks, armour and troops is hour by hour tightening its grip in open defiance of the international community.

Nexhmije, aged 35, fled Prekaz at 6am on Saturday morning. Her husband, a guerrilla, had advised her to leave after a shell landed behind the school. She grabbed a bag of bread and cheese and walked out of the village with her six young daughters and eight-month-old son, heading for the next village.

She stopped to hide in a field, thinking she might be able to return home later on. She waited in vain for 18 hours, cowering and craddling her children flat on their faces to escape detection by Serbian troops.

'We had to wait until 2 this morning until the fighting ended before we could move on,' said Nexhmije, now with relatives in the nearby town of Mitrovica. 'We had no blankets to keep warm. Two of my daughters couldn't stop screaming, they were so scared by the shooting.' She has no idea where her husband is. 'He is in the hands of God.'

In the past week, there have been 40,000 other such stories. The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) says 40,000 people have been displaced by a Serbian offensive Western states had hoped to halt last October with the threat of air strikes.

The ceasefire and the deployment of 1,400 international monitors last October put a flimsy lid on the Kosovo conflict. But yesterday, with the monitors evacuated, taking with them any sense of security that remained, it was as if the lull of the past few months had never existed. Nexhmije was on the run with her daughters for a third time in under a year.

In Srbica, where only last week children were playing in the snow, eight M84 tanks and 11 armoured vehicles now waited like birds of prey.For even as the monitors were leaving on Saturday, the tanks and heavily armed Serbian police units were sweeping in. 'We woke up on Saturday morning when we heard tank engines,' said Miftar Korolli, aged 57. His family were barely out on the street when he said the Serb police marched into his house.

'They asked me what I was waiting for. I told them I was waiting for nothing, that this was my house but they told me to get out,' Mr Korolli said. Outside, he and his son were separated from his wife and mother.

The men were taken to the police station, where he said some of them were kicked and beaten.

Fernando Del Mundo, head of the UNHCR's operations in Kosovo, was yesterday trying to get food and other aid to the new ethnic Albanian exiles. 'I saw a group of about 20 tractors and trailers with families heading for Glogovac, I saw houses burning in Srbica. I talked to two women who said the soldiers had taken their husbands, they were crying, and they said after the men had been taken away, their houses were set on fire,' he said.

'This has been going on for two weeks now. Everyone expected this to happen after the talks were delayed and a lot of people have left.

The refugees were still trickling out. Down from Gornja Prekaz, an ethnic Albanian family was taking no chances and hurriedly left their home. 'We are afraid,' said Veli Uka, aged 49. 'There are so many police on the road.'

The women, tearful, clutched a few plastic bags of clothes and food. The family's 19 members climbed into a minibus and sped off, not waiting to fix a punctured tyre.

You could see Mr Uka's point. Everywhere we drove round the edges of Drenica yesterday we saw tanks, anti-aircraft guns, soldiers, trucks: Kosovo has been turned into one vast armed camp. Armoured cars careered down the middle of the roads. This to crush ill-trained guerrillas with only Kalashnikovs, a few rocket-propelled grenades and little fighting spirit. An attempt to drive down a back road past a checkpoint on the main road failed when Serb villagers crowded round our vehicle, swiped the keys and called the police on a walkie -talkie. Most of the Serbs, outnumbered nine to one by ethnic Albanians in the province, have quietly been supplied arms by the military.

As darkness fell over the capital Pristina last night, automatic weapon fire rang out. Despite braving grenade attacks in the past few weeks, most of the shops and restaurants had finally given way to fear and were shuttered. The streets were empty.

Three Serb policemen were killed and one wounded in an apparent reprisal on a quiet street not far from a Serbian Orthodox church. The call to prayer which floated briefly and gently over the streets was haunting.

The last Serb police officer to turn us away politely yesterday could not resist giving his view on the West's air strike threat: 'I pray God that Nato bombs. Then we could finish these Albanians.'

LOAD-DATE: April 30, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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The Guardian (London)

March 18, 1999

No way out for Nato;

Bombing will only strengthen Milosevic's hold on Kosovo

BYLINE: ISABEL HILTON

SECTION: Guardian Features Pages; Pg. 18

LENGTH: 765 words

THERE was a curious reluctance to name names in yesterday's forensic report on the Racak massacre, but the message came through loud and clear: the victims were not guerrillas, 22 of them were killed in a gully that was so narrow that they must have been shot at close range, the angle of the wounds on some victims suggested that they were kneeling when they were shot and on others that they were running away.

Despite Dr Helena Ranta's reluctance to blame the Serbs outright - a hesitation some reports attribute to pressure from the German government - the evidence she was allowed to publish points, of course, to Belgrade.

There are already loud cries of 'unfair' from the Yugoslav government. They claim that the timing of the report - coinciding, as it does, with the Paris talks - is a political manouevre and that there is ample evidence (provided by themselves) that the victims were not the innocent villagers that the rest of the world perceives. All this is wearisomely predictable.

More than 2,000 people have died in Kosovo in the past year, but then, recent history suggests that mass death is perhaps the only spur to diplomacy in the Balkans. The problem now is that we seem to be fatigued by the sight of mutilated civilian corpses and lost as to how to proceed.

AFTER what Robin Cook hailed as the diplomatic triumph of the interim settlement last autumn, the international community sat with its fingers crossed, hoping - against all reason and experience - that the plaster would stick. Racak was the dismal result. Now, in Paris, with the Albanians on side, we are back where we have been so many times before, trying to persuade Milosevic to sign a deal that nobody believes he will keep to, under threat of Nato action that may not happen and will achieve little if it does.

Echoes of Bosnia, of course, are never far away. Through the miserable years of the Balkan wars, European and American diplomacy was hampered by two things - disagreements over troop commitment and tacit sympathy for Milosevic's desire to prevent the fragmentation of Yugoslavia - an objective the West supported, even while (reluctantly) being convinced that his way of achieving it was unacceptable.By the time Nato got around to telling Milosevic, in language he understood, that enough was enough, all sides had lost heavily. Hard to believe, then, that the same slow-motion mistakes have been repeated, but there are striking similarities.

The main problem is that Europe and the United States do not want an independent Kosovo, but seem to be doing all they can to bring it about. The US first threatened Nato action over Kosovo in 1992. Perhaps had they meant it, they could have reinforced the moderate Kosovo Albanians. As it was, the moderates lost ground and now the West is forced to deal with a radical independence movement that promises to be a difficult and unreliable partner in any deal and is fighting for an outcome that the West does not support.

Milosevic worked this out a long time ago. His moves in the last few weeks have been familiar: he has built up his forces in and around Kosovo - there are now up to 21,000 Yugoslav army troops on the perimeter and up to 18,000 inside Kosovo - six times as many as he is allowed under the October agreement. All this could be read as preparation for a military defiance of Nato, but a more likely explanation is that he plans an intensive assault on the KLA, similar to the one he conducted before the interim settlement last October. Already Serb forces are attacking a KLA area in the north and a growing number of Albanians are being abducted, killed, and their bodies dumped at roadsides. All of this, of course, is in breach of last autumn's deal, in which Milosevic promised to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. That alone could trigger Nato action, let alone the fact that Nato has now threatened it so often that there's a matter of face involved now. But even if Nato does proceed with air strikes against Serb military targets, it is already too late for this alone to bring a solution. If Nato were to bomb, Milosevic's position in Belgrade will be strengthened, not weakened, and his forces are in position to move wholesale into Kosovo, defying Nato to come in and get him out. There will be more massacres, more marketplace bombs, before he graciously agrees to better terms than the ones he is now being offered.

If that is the outcome, will the KLA still agree to any 'peace' deal the Contact Group cobbles together and Milosevic signs? Put it this way - would you?

LOAD-DATE: April 30, 1999

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Appendix 2

Libya 2011

NOTE: 12-03-2011 to 26-03-2011

Download Request: Tagged Documents: 1-7

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Terms: NATO, Libya

Source: Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;Daily News (New York);The Daily Telegraph (London);The Guardian (London);The New York Times;The Sun;USA Today;The Washington Post

Combined Source: Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday;Daily News (New York);The Daily Telegraph (London);The Guardian (London);The New York Times;The Sun;USA Today;The Washington Post

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	Results
1.	NATO Takes Lead on Libya Campaign; Obama Defends His Policy The New York Times, March 26, 2011 Saturday, Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 4, 1346 words, By STEVEN ERLANGER and ERIC SCHMITT; Steven Erlanger reported from Brussels, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya.

2.	Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey: Climbdown by Sarkozy ends infighting among western allies The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, March 25, 2011 Friday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 26, 912 words, Ian Traynor in Brussels, and Nicholas Watt

3.	Libya: France gives way to Turkey as deal is struck to put Nato in charge The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, March 25, 2011 Friday, GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 27, 685 words, Ian Traynor in Brussels, and Nicholas Watt

NATO To Assume New Role In Libya The New York Times, March 25, 2011 Friday, Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 9, 1193 words, By ELISABETH BUMILLER and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK; Elisabeth Bumiller reported from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya. Reporting was contributed by Kareem Fahim from Benghazi, Libya; Thom Shanker from Cairo; Alan Cowell, Scott Sayare and Steven Erlanger from Paris; and Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers from Washington.

5.	As NATO takes over in Libya, Gadhafi's fate remains fuzzy; OUR VIEW USA TODAY, March 25, 2011 Friday, EDIT; Pg. 10A, 573 words

Comment: There's nothing moral about Nato's intervention in Libya: The western attacks risk a bloody stalemate and are a threat to the region. The alternative has to be a negotiated settlement The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, March 24, 2011 Thursday, GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 37, 1077 words, Seumas Milne

Front: Libya On the ground: Jets prepare to deploy despite ceasefire by Tripoli regime: Warplanes head for Mediterranean as Nato envoys meet to back no-fly zone The Guardian (London) - Final Edition, March 19, 2011 Saturday, GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 4, 867 words, Richard Norton-Taylor Nick Hopkins Robert Booth

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The New York Times

March 26, 2011 Saturday

Late Edition - Final

NATO Takes Lead on Libya Campaign; Obama Defends His Policy

BYLINE: By STEVEN ERLANGER and ERIC SCHMITT; Steven Erlanger reported from Brussels, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Mark Landler contributed reporting from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya.

SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 4

LENGTH: 1346 words

BRUSSELS -- Resolving internal divisions, NATO prepared on Friday to assume leadership from the United States of the military campaign against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's forces as allied officials scrambled to work out the precise command arrangements, senior NATO and American officials said.

The agreement came as President Obama, facing criticism from his political opponents, began trying to seize control of his message about the Libyan conflict. On Friday, he defended his handling of the Libya crisis in a White House meeting and conference call with more than 20 Democrat and Republican Congressional leaders.

The White House also announced that he would give a speech to the nation on Libya on Monday night. And his two top foreign policy advisers -- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates -- prepared to appear on the Sunday talk shows to explain the administration's Libya policy.

Mr. Obama has come under criticism from Republicans in Congress for failing to provide a coherent explanation of the operation, which is in its seventh day. Administration officials portray it as an already successful effort to prevent the Libyan leader from attacking his own people. But the military campaign has been dogged by friction over its ultimate mission, and which of the disparate countries involved should command the operation.

The allied effort won rare military commitments in the Arab world on Friday when two Qatari fighter jets flew on patrol with the Western allies and the United Arab Emirates said that it would send warplanes to join them.

NATO had agreed late Thursday that it would take over not only command and control of the no-fly zone, but also the much riskier campaign to protect civilians through aggressive coalition airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi's troops on the ground, the officials said. Details of the second part of the operation will be worked out in a formal military planning document in time for a meeting of coalition foreign ministers in London on Tuesday, the officials said.

''It's been handed over to military planners,'' Mark Toner, a State Department spokesman, said on Friday.

As the air campaign entered its seventh day, allied warplanes and Tomahawk cruise missiles pounded Libyan air defenses, communications posts and troops. At the Pentagon, Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, the director of the joint staff, said that the airstrikes were making it harder for Colonel Qaddafi to supply and communicate with his troops, but that they had not yet seriously weakened the Libyan military forces or pushed them to heed the Americans' call to defy their leader.

In an apparent bid to bolster the loyalty of Colonel Qaddafi's armed forces, Libyan state television said Friday without details that the military would promote all its officers, implying a raise in pay. A government spokesman, Musa Ibrahim, said that similar raises were carried out during earlier crises, like Colonel Qaddafi's failed war with Chad in the late 1980s.

The London meeting of coalition foreign ministers and subsequent meetings will deal with the larger political campaign, including sanctions and other measures intended to put more pressure on Colonel Qaddafi to quit. It will also have representation from the United Nations, the Arab League and the African Union. But that meeting of what the British are calling ''the contact group'' will not be running the military side of the operation, the officials said.

Left unresolved, of course, is how long the campaign will last, because Colonel Qaddafi shows no sign of obeying the United Nations Security Council resolution demanding a cease-fire and refuses to pull his troops back to barracks. At the same time, the ragtag opposition may not be strong enough, even with the coalition's air power, to force the colonel from his redoubt in Tripoli.

NATO officials said Friday they thought the no-fly zone would last about three months, but Pentagon officials privately expressed fears that it could last much longer.

A sticking point in the negotiations to broadening NATO's control was what military officials call the ''no-drive zone,'' the bombing of Colonel Qaddafi's ground forces, tanks and artillery outside Libyan cities. France wanted to have a clearer leadership role in the campaign, while Turkey was concerned about the operation's evolving into one involving ground troops. Many countries, like Italy and Norway, however, said they would participate only if NATO ran the entire military operation.

France was placated by the London coalition, while Turkey's fears were allayed by putting the military campaign under the full control of NATO, which operates only by the unanimous consent of its member nations.

The United States, which contributes most of NATO's military capability and traditionally dominates behind the scenes, is in this case eager to hand off responsibility and will have more limited roles, officials said. Reinforcing that point, Canada said Friday that one of its officers, Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard, would be taking command of NATO no-fly operations in Libya.

The United Arab Emirates agreed on Friday to commit 12 aircraft -- six F-16 and six Mirage warplanes -- to join patrols enforcing the no-fly zone, the official Emirates News Agency reported. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar are the only members of the 22-nation Arab League that have committed planes to an active role in enforcing the no-fly zone. On Friday, British and French officials said their planes had conducted assaults on loyalist forces around the beleaguered eastern city of Ajdabiya, which controls the approaches to the de facto rebel capital of Benghazi. Pro-Qaddafi units have been holding their easternmost line against rebels in Ajdabiya, thwarting any rebel advance to the west toward Tripoli, but rebel forces say they have been trying to negotiate the withdrawal or surrender of one loyalist unit in the strategic crossroads town.

Gene Cretz, the American ambassador to Libya, said on Friday that the United States was in regular touch with leaders of the Libyan opposition, and stood ready to offer them political training and legal advice as they try to form a provisional administration. But Mr. Cretz said the United States had not yet decided whether to recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of Libya, saying that raised legal questions.

He also said no decision had been reached on whether to provide weapons to the rebels. ''The full gamut of potential assistance that we might offer, both on the non-lethal and the lethal side, is a subject of discussion within the U.S. government,'' he said.

Mr. Cretz, who left Tripoli last year amid fears for his safety after the release by WikiLeaks of secret cables with embarrassing details about Colonel Qaddafi, praised the so-called transitional national council for getting off to a good start, noting that it had organized people in rebel-held towns to provide services, and pledged its commitment to democratic principles, human rights and women's rights.

''I don't think we're at a point where we can make a judgment that this is a 100 percent kosher, so to speak, group,'' Mr. Cretz said. But he added, ''the personalities that we are dealing with, the actions that they've taken, the statements that they have made have all led us to conclude, at least at this beginning stage, that they are a positive force and one that we should be engaged with at this point.''

The administration has named a special envoy to the Libyan opposition, Chris Stevens, and Mr. Cretz said he hoped Mr. Stevens would be able to travel to Benghazi in coming days for meetings with opposition leaders.

Mr. Cretz said officials from Colonel Qaddafi's government had reached out to American officials in recent days. ''I'm not exactly sure what the message is, but it clearly indicates, I think, at least some kind of desperation,'' he said. In his conversations with Libyan officials, Mr. Cretz said he reminded them of President Obama's warning that they would face consequences if they did not break with Colonel Qaddafi.

URL: http://www.nytimes.com

LOAD-DATE: March 26, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: PHOTOS: Libyan rebels watched for coalition planes on Friday near Ajdabiya on the road to Benghazi. Fighter jets from an Arab nation, Qatar, flew with a Western patrol. (A4)

Despite British and French forces' attacks on loyalist positions, the Libyan government's shelling around Ajdabiya led many rebel fighters to flee the area on Friday. (PHOTOGRAPHS BY GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS) (A10)

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The Guardian (London) - Final Edition

March 25, 2011 Friday

Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey: Climbdown by Sarkozy ends infighting among western allies

BYLINE: Ian Traynor in Brussels, and Nicholas Watt

SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 26

LENGTH: 912 words

Western allies and Turkey secured a deal last night to put the entire military campaign against Muammar Gaddafi under Nato command by next week, UK and French sources have told the Guardian.

The US, Britain, France and Turkey agreed to put the three-pronged offensive - a no-fly zone, an arms embargo, and air strikes - under a Nato command umbrella, in a climbdown by France that accommodates strong Turkish complaints about the scope and control of the campaign.

The deal appeared to end days of infighting among western allies, but needed to be blessed by all 28 Nato member states. At the end last night of a four-day meeting of Nato ambassadors in Brussels, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the secretary general, said Nato had agreed to take command of the no-fly zone from the Americans. Disputes have raged at Nato HQ every day this week. Rasmussen contradicted leading western officials by announcing that Nato's authority was limited to commanding the no-fly zone, but he signalled there was more negotiation to come.

"At this moment, there will still be a coalition operation and a Nato operation," he said. This meant Nato would command the no-fly zone and police the arms embargo. But on the most contentious part, air strikes and ground attacks against Gaddafi, consensus remained elusive.

The agreement emerged from phone calls yesterday between William Hague, the foreign secretary, Alain Juppe, the French foreign minister, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, and Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister, following rancorous attacks from the Turkish leadership on French ambitions to lead the anti-Gaddafi war effort.

The agreement also gives political oversight of the military action to a committee of the international coalition in the campaign. Since the no-fly zone and air attacks on Libya began last Saturday, Washington has been in charge of operations, but is eager to surrender the role.

Under the scheme agreed yesterday, the transfer to Nato will take place by the latest on Tuesday, when the parties to the coalition gather in London for a special "contact group" conference. French sources said the Benghazi-based Libyan rebel leadership would be in London to attend. The conference will consist of two meetings: a war council made up of the main governments taking part in the military action, as well as a broader assembly including Arab and African countries devoted to Libya's future.

Hillary Clinton welcomed the Nato decision to take command of the Libyan operations and police the no-fly zone, and she expected that it would eventually take over responsibility for protecting civilians, enforcing an arms embargo and supporting the humanitarian mission. She said the United Arab Emirates was to join Qatar in sending planes to enforce the no-fly zone.

President Nicolas Sarkozy, who had tried to diminish the role of Nato, conceded, in the face of Turkish opposition, that a two-tier structure would run the operation: Nato "assets" will co-ordinate all aspects, including enforcement of the no-fly zone, protecting civilians through air strikes, and enforcing a UN arms embargo. Juppe agreed that Nato would be in control of the entire operation.

Political oversight will be in the hands of a committee of a smaller number of countries involved in the military campaign.

There had been bitter attacks from the Turkish government on Sarkozy's leadership of the campaign, accusing the French of lacking a conscience in their conduct of operations, with criticism from the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the president, Abdullah Gul.

France had insisted on Tuesday that the operations would be "non-Nato". Turkey was emphatically behind sole Nato control of the operations. In Istanbul, Erdogan said: "I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when they look in (Libya's) direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on."

This week, Claude Gueant, the French interior minister who was previously Sarkozy's chief adviser, angered the Muslim world by stating that the French president was "leading a crusade" to stop Gaddafi massacring Libyans. Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin also used the word in reference to air strikes on Libya.

Yesterday Erdogan said: "Those who use such hair-raising, frightening terms that fuel clashes of civilisations, or those who even think of them, need to immediately evaluate their own conscience."

The Turks are incensed at repeated snubs by Sarkozy. The French failed to invite Turkey to last Saturday's summit in Paris, which preceded the air strikes. French fighters taking off from Corsica struck the first blows. The Turkish government accused Sarkozy of launching not only the no-fly zone, but his presidential re-election campaign.

The dispute over Libya appears highly personal. Sarkozy went to Turkey last month for the first time in four years as president, but the visit was repeatedly delayed and then downgraded from a state presidential event. He stayed in Turkey for five hours. "Relations between Turkey and France deserve more than this," complained Erdogan. "I will speak with frankness. We wish to host him as president of France. But he is coming as president of the G20, not as that of France."

Captions:

Air combat

A French Rafale fighter returns to base in Corsica after a Libyan trainer plane was shot down with a missile as it was coming in to land at an airbase in Misrata within the no-fly zone

Photograph: Francois Mori/AP

LOAD-DATE: March 25, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

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The Guardian (London) - Final Edition

March 25, 2011 Friday

Libya: France gives way to Turkey as deal is struck to put Nato in charge

BYLINE: Ian Traynor in Brussels, and Nicholas Watt

SECTION: GUARDIAN INTERNATIONAL PAGES; Pg. 27

LENGTH: 685 words

Western allies and Turkey last night reached a breakthrough deal to put the entire military campaign against Muammar Gaddafi under Nato command by next week, senior UK and French sources told the Guardian.

The deal being finalised last night at Nato headquarters in Brussels gives political oversight of the military action to a committee of the international coalition involved in the campaign.

President Nicolas Sarkozy, who had tried to diminish the role of Nato, conceded, in the face of determined Turkish opposition, that a new two-tier structure will be established to run the operation:

Nato "assets" will be used to co-ordinate all aspects of the military campaign against Libya, including enforcement of the no-fly zone, protecting civilians through air strikes and enforcing a UN arms embargo. Alain Juppe, the French foreign minister, conceded that Nato would be in control of the entire operation.

Political oversight will be in the hands of a Nato-led committee modelled on the body that oversees the International Security and Assistance Force (Isaf) in Afghanistan.

The breakthrough came in a conference call yesterday between Hillary Clinton, William Hague, Alain Juppe and their Turkish counterpart. The agreement reached by the four key countries was put to a meeting of Nato ambassadors.

Hague had told MPs he was hopeful of a breakthough. He said: "We have made a great deal of progress.

"We should understand this is a new coalition, put together very quickly for obvious reasons last week, and so there are bound to be issues to sort out in its management. But we are getting through those pretty well."

Earlier, Turkey attacked Sarkozy's and France's leadership of the military campaign, accusing the French of lacking a conscience in their conduct of operations. The vitriolic criticism, from the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the president, Abdullah Gul, followed attacks from the Turkish government earlier this week and signalled an orchestrated attempt by Ankara to wreck Sarkozy's plans to lead the air campaign against Gaddafi.

With France insisting that Nato should not be put in political charge of the UN-mandated air campaign, Turkey has come out emphatically behind sole Nato control of the operations.

The clash between Turkey and France over Libya is underpinned by acute frictions between Erdogan and Sarkozy, both impetuous and mercurial leaders who revel in the limelight, by fundamental disputes over Ankara's EU ambitions, and by economic interests in north Africa.

Using incendiary language directed at France in a speech in Istanbul, Erdogan said: "I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when they look in (Libya's) direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on."

President Gul reinforced the Turkish view that France and others were being driven primarily by economic interests. "The aim (of the air campaign) is not the liberation of the Libyan people," he said. "There are hidden agendas and different interests."

Earlier this week, Claude Gueant, the French interior minister who was previously Sarkozy's chief adviser, outraged the Muslim world by stating that the French president was "leading a crusade" to stop Gaddafi massacring Libyans.

Erdogan denounced the use of the word crusade yesterday, blaming those, France chief among them, who are opposed to Turkey joining the EU.

The Turks are incensed at repeated snubs by Sarkozy. The French failed to invite Turkey to last Saturday's summit in Paris which presaged the air strikes.

The dispute over Libya appears highly personal, revealing the bad blood simmering between the French president and the Turkish prime minister.

Sarkozy went to Turkey last month for the first time in four years as president. But the visit was repeatedly delayed and then downgraded from a state presidential event. He stayed in Turkey for five hours. Sarkozy has declared loudly that culturally Turkey does not belong in Europe, but in the Middle East.

Captions:

Erdogan was especially offended by a French minister's use of the word 'crusade' in reference

to the attacks

LOAD-DATE: March 25, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

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The New York Times

March 25, 2011 Friday

Late Edition - Final

NATO To Assume New Role In Libya

BYLINE: By ELISABETH BUMILLER and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK; Elisabeth Bumiller reported from Washington, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Tripoli, Libya. Reporting was contributed by Kareem Fahim from Benghazi, Libya; Thom Shanker from Cairo; Alan Cowell, Scott Sayare and Steven Erlanger from Paris; and Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers from Washington.

SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 9

LENGTH: 1193 words

WASHINGTON -- NATO will assume leadership from the United States of patrolling the skies over Libya but the military alliance remains divided over who will command aggressive coalition airstrikes on Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's ground troops, NATO and American officials said Thursday.

After a day of confusion and conflicting reports out of NATO headquarters in Brussels, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced late Thursday in Washington that NATO had agreed to lead the allies in maintaining the no-fly zone. Effectively, that means that planes from NATO countries will fly missions over Libya with little fear of being shot down since Tomahawk missiles, most of them American, largely destroyed Colonel Qaddafi's air defenses and air force last weekend.

But NATO and American officials said NATO had balked at assuming responsibility, at least for now, of what military officials call the ''no-drive zone,'' which would entail bombing Colonel Qaddafi's ground forces, tanks and artillery that are massing outside crucial Libyan cities, and doing so without inflicting casualties on civilians.

Late Thursday night a senior Obama administration official insisted that NATO had agreed to assume responsibility for the no-fly and ''no-drive'' zones but said the details remained to be worked out. The official's statements appeared to contradict those of the secretary-general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who said in Brussels earlier Thursday that NATO was still considering whether to take on ''broader responsibility'' for the war.

A NATO official said that two member nations, Germany and Turkey, objected to NATO participating in strikes that they consider beyond the mandate of the United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the military action in Libya.

The announcement of at least a partial handoff of responsibility to NATO came only five days after the conflict started and reflected the intense pressure on President Obama to deliver on his promise that the United States would step back ''within days, not weeks'' from command of the effort.

Mrs. Clinton, in her comments on Thursday night, said the United States was already cutting back its role. ''As expected, we are already seeing a significant reduction in the number of U.S. planes,'' she said.

At the Pentagon earlier Thursday, Vice Adm. William E. Gortney, the director of the joint staff, said that American fighter jets would continue bombing Libya and that American surveillance planes would provide reconnaissance even after NATO, in partnership with other coalition members, assumes leadership of the coalition. He also said the United States would provide airborne refueling tankers for coalition warplanes as well as other logistical support.

As the United States and its European allies tried to work out a coherent agreement for control of the war, the allies continued to pound Libyan ground forces, tanks and artillery outside three key Libyan cities -- Misurata, Ajdabiya and Zintan. Admiral Gortney said the airstrikes were aimed at cutting off the communications and supply lines of the Libyan forces. The coalition was not bombing inside the cities to avoid inflicting civilian casualties, he said.

Admiral Gortney said the coalition would continue to attack Libyan ground forces as long as the Libyan forces threatened the lives of Libyan civilians. He said the United States and its allies had repeatedly told the Libyan forces to cease and desist -- he did not say whether the communications were by radio, leaflets or other means -- and that they had been ignored.

''Our message to regime troops is simple: stop fighting, stop killing your own people, stop obeying the orders of Colonel Qaddafi,'' Admiral Gortney said. ''To the degree that you defy these demands, we will continue to hit you and make it more difficult for you to keep going.''

In Libya, it appeared that the barrage of coalition airstrikes -- the Pentagon said there had been 49 strikes on Libyan targets on Thursday -- had begun to shift momentum from the forces loyal to Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi to the rebels opposing him.

In Misurata, rebels said they were feeling reinvigorated by a second night airstrikes against the Qaddafi forces that have besieged them. The rebels said that they continued to battle a handful of Qaddafi gunmen in the city but that the armored units and artillery surrounding the city appeared to have pulled back, their supply and communication lines cut off by the airstrikes.

Earlier on Thursday a French Rafale fighter jet fired on a Libyan warplane that had been detected by reconnaissance aircraft flying above the embattled city of Misurata, the French Defense Ministry said in a statement. The plane was hit by a missile shortly after landing at a nearby military airbase, the Defense Ministry said.

At a news conference in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, Khalid Kaim, the deputy foreign minister, issued sweeping denials that the rebels had made battle gains. Contradicting the reports of residents in Misurata, Mr. Kaim said the Qaddafi government had controlled the city for a week ''except for pockets of violence.''

Again contradicting residents, he said that utility companies had turned on the power and water, and he faulted the rebels and international airstrikes for turning them off.

Mr. Kaim also denied that French fighters had shot down a Qaddafi warplane, saying that no Libyan warplane had taken off in days in observance of the United Nations resolution.

Rebels in Libya said that Qaddafi warships that had closed the port in Misurata ( had departed, opening a vital supply outlet and allowing them to make arrangements with an international aid group, Doctors Without Borders, to evacuate 50 of their wounded by boat to Malta on Sunday. A rebel spokesman in Misurata said that only two residents were wounded on Thursday, after 109 deaths over the previous six days.

In Washington, Mrs. Clinton said that a group supported by the Agency for International Development would soon be able to provide humanitarian relief to Libyan civilians, but she gave no details.

In what was potentially one of the first signs of breakdown in discipline among the Qaddafi forces, rebels near the eastern city of Ajdabiya said they were in negotiations with a unit of pro-Qaddafi troops who have offered to abandon their position and withdraw further west. The unit, stationed at the northern entrance to the city, had lost contact with its commanders, said a rebel spokesman, Col. Ahmed Omar Bani.

The negotiations, which were being conducted through a local imam, hit a snag on the issue of whether the troops would keep their weaponry and withdraw further west or simply surrender, as the rebels were demanding. ''We are trying to lead them to peace,'' Colonel Bani said.

The rebels have made inflated claims in the past, and these reports have not been corroborated by independent sources. As rebel leaders continued to plead for weapons, along with communications and night-vision equipment from abroad, they said that no foreign experts had been sent to help train their fighters. ''The only foreign expert we use is Google Earth,'' Colonel Bani said.

URL: http://www.nytimes.com

LOAD-DATE: March 25, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: PHOTO: Rebel fighters near Ajdabiya, on Thursday. ''We are trying to lead them to peace,'' one rebel officer said of negotiations with a government military unit. (PHOTOGRAPH BY GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS) MAPS: Rebel forces reported making gains after coalition airstrikes.

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

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USA TODAY

March 25, 2011 Friday

FINAL EDITION

As NATO takes over in Libya, Gadhafi's fate remains fuzzy;

OUR VIEW

SECTION: EDIT; Pg. 10A

LENGTH: 573 words

A week after the U.S. and its allies attacked Libya, progress is evident, but the outcome remains predictably and troublingly fuzzy.

In purely military terms, the news is good. Moammar Gadhafi's forces are still attacking rebel strongholds, but there seems little likelihood that they can stand up to firepower from NATO, which is moving to assume control of the still-murky mission.

On Thursday, the U.S. military proclaimed the Libyan air force crippled, and armored columns that had been crushing rebellious regions are under steady attack. Sooner or later, if the allies remain aggressive rather than limiting themselves to the inadequate no-fly zone, Libyan ground forces should run out of tanks, heavy weapons, ammunition, fuel, willpower, or all five. A naval blockade and attacks on airfields, meanwhile, might cut off the flow of mercenaries Gadhafi has used to supplement his army.

But NATO's ability to crush an inferior military force has never been in doubt. The question is what will happen once civilian populations are no longer under attack, either because Gadhafi's forces are destroyed or because the besieged Libyan leader recognizes that a strategic retreat could limit and potentially split the alliance attacking him.

Much as the U.S. and its allies want Gadhafi gone, they are not fully committed to evicting him. Therein lies a quandary. The United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing "all necessary measures" is confined to protecting civilians, and the Arab League, whose support is critical politically, has already objected to the ferocity of the attacks.

As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it Thursday evening, the U.S. role is "limited in time and scope."

When that limit is reached, it's safe to assume Gadhafi will no longer control eastern Libya, or even rebellious parts of the west. But he could retain power over a vast area surrounding Tripoli, where he enjoys popular support.

On their own, the rebels seem unlikely to depose the dictator. It has become increasingly clear that they are far less formidable than they once seemed, perhaps having as few as a thousand trained soldiers. So in the worst case, Gadhafi would still have means to cause familiar problems, and the freed area of Libya would be fractured among various tribes contesting for power and settling scores, creating the potential for civil war or a failed state.

To be sure, there are brighter scenarios, and the situation remains fluid.

The Obama administration says its policy is that Gadhafi should go, and while it doesn't say how or when, it is pursuing that goal by several means: embargoes, sanctions and blockades; freezing of Libyan assets worth billions of dollars; blunt warnings to people around Gadhafi that they will be held accountable for war crimes; and, presumably, inducements to Gadhafi to leave voluntarily. In doing this, the U.S. has unusually broad international support.

Such tactics sometimes succeed, but they tend to take a long time. After the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein survived 12 years of sanctions and no-fly zones before the U.S.-led invasion deposed him in 2003. South Africa's apartheid regime lasted even longer despite broad international condemnation.

That is not reason for the U.S. to plunge into full-scale war. It is a reminder that removing dictators is never as simple and easy as imposing a no-fly zone might seem, and it's always hard to be confident about what comes next.

LOAD-DATE: March 25, 2011

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, B/W, Aris Messinis, AFP/Getty Images

DOCUMENT-TYPE: EDITORIAL

PUBLICATION-TYPE: NEWSPAPER

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The Guardian (London) - Final Edition

March 24, 2011 Thursday

Comment: There's nothing moral about Nato's intervention in Libya: The western attacks risk a bloody stalemate and are a threat to the region. The alternative has to be a negotiated settlement

BYLINE: Seumas Milne

SECTION: GUARDIAN COMMENT AND DEBATE PAGES; Pg. 37

LENGTH: 1077 words

It's as if it's a habit they can't kick. Once again US, British and other Nato forces are bombarding an Arab country with cruise missiles and bunker-busting bombs. Both David Cameron and Barack Obama insist this is nothing like Iraq. There will be no occupation. The attack is solely to protect civilians.

But eight years after they launched their shock-and-awe devastation of Baghdad and less than a decade since they invaded Afghanistan, the same western forces are in action against yet another Muslim state, incinerating soldiers and tanks on the ground and killing civilians in the process.

Supported by a string of other Nato states, almost all of which have taken part in the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations, the US, Britain and France are clinging to an Arab fig leaf, in the shape of a Qatari airforce that has yet to arrive, to give some regional credibility to their intervention in Libya.

As in Iraq and Afghanistan, they insist humanitarian motives are crucial. And as in both previous interventions, the media are baying for the blood of a pantomime villain leader, while regime change is quickly starting to displace the stated mission. Only a western solipsism that regards it as normal to be routinely invading other people's countries in the name of human rights protects Nato governments from serious challenge.

But the campaign is already coming apart. At home, public opinion is turning against the onslaught: in the US, it's opposed by a margin of two-to-one; in Britain, 43% say they are against the action, compared with 35% in support - an unprecedented level of discontent for the first days of a British military campaign, including Iraq.

On the ground, the western attacks have failed to halt the fighting and killing, or force Colonel Gaddafi's forces into submission; Nato governments have been squabbling about who's in charge; and British ministers and generals have fallen out about whether the Libyan leader is a legitimate target.

Last week, Nato governments claimed the support of "the international community" on the back of the UN resolution and an appeal from the dictator-dominated Arab League. In fact, India, Russia, China, Brazil and Germany all refused to support the UN vote and have now criticised or denounced the bombing - as has the African Union and the Arab League itself.

As its secretary general, Amr Moussa, argued, the bombardment clearly went well beyond a no-fly zone from the outset. By attacking regime troops fighting rebel forces on the ground, the Nato governments are unequivocally intervening in a civil war, tilting the balance of forces in favour of the Benghazi-based insurrection.

Cameron insisted on Monday in the Commons that the air and sea attacks on Libya had prevented a "bloody massacre in Benghazi". The main evidence was Gaddafi's threat to show "no mercy" to rebel fighters who refused to lay down their arms and to hunt them down "house to house". In reality, for all the Libyan leader's brutality and Saddam Hussein-style rhetoric, he was scarcely in any position to carry out his threat.

Given that his ramshackle forces were unable to fully retake towns like Misrata or even Ajdabiya when the rebels were on the back foot, the idea that they would have been able to overrun an armed and hostile city of 700,000 people any time soon seems far-fetched.

But on the other side of the Arab world, in western-armed Bahrain, security forces are right now staging night raids on opposition activists, house by house, and scores have gone missing as the dynastic despots carry out a bloody crackdown on the democratic movement. And last Friday more than 50 peaceful demonstrators were shot dead on the streets of Sana'a by government forces in western-backed Yemen.

Far from imposing a no-fly zone to bring the embattled Yemeni regime to heel, US special forces are operating across the country in support of the government. But then US, British and other Nato forces are themselves responsible for hundreds of thousands of dead in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last week more than 40 civilians were killed by a US drone attack in Pakistan, while over 60 died last month in one US air attack in Afghanistan.

The point isn't just that western intervention in Libya is grossly hypocritical. It's that such double standards are an integral part of a mechanism of global power and domination that stifles hopes of any credible international system of human rights protection.

A la carte humanitarian intervention, such as in Libya, is certainly not based on feasibility or the degree of suffering or repression, but on whether the regime carrying it out is a reliable ally or not. That's why the claim that Arab despots will be less keen to follow Gaddafi's repressive example as a result of the Nato intervention is entirely unfounded. States such as Saudi Arabia know very well they're not at the slightest risk of being targeted unless they're in danger of collapse.

There's also every chance that, as in Kosovo in 1999, the attack on Libya could actually increase repression and killing, while failing to resolve the underlying conflict. It's scarcely surprising that, outgunned by Gaddafi's forces, the Libyan rebel leadership should be grateful for foreign military support. But any Arab opposition movement that comes to power courtesy of Tornadoes and Tomahawks will be fatally compromised, as would the independence of the country itself.

For the western powers, knocked off balance by the revolutionary Arab tide, intervention in the Libyan conflict offers both the chance to put themselves on the "right side of history" and to secure their oil interests in a deeply uncertain environment.

Unless the Libyan autocrat is assassinated or his regime implodes, the prospect must now be of a bloody stalemate and a Kurdistan-style Nato protectorate in the east. There's little sympathy for Gaddafi in the Arab world, but already influential figures such as the Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah have denounced the intervention as a return to the "days of occupation, colonisation and partition".

The urgent alternative is now for countries such as Egypt and Turkey, with a far more legitimate interest in what goes on in Libya and links to all sides, to take the lead in seeking a genuine ceasefire, an end to outside interference and a negotiated political settlement. There is nothing moral about the Nato intervention in Libya - it is a threat to the entire region and its people.

s.milne@guardian.co.uk

LOAD-DATE: March 24, 2011

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The Guardian (London) - Final Edition

March 19, 2011 Saturday

Front: Libya On the ground: Jets prepare to deploy despite ceasefire by Tripoli regime: Warplanes head for Mediterranean as Nato envoys meet to back no-fly zone

BYLINE: Richard Norton-Taylor Nick Hopkins Robert Booth

SECTION: GUARDIAN HOME PAGES; Pg. 4

LENGTH: 867 words

British Tornado and Typhoon ground attack aircraft are expected to fly to bases in the Mediterranean today as Britain, France and the US step up military pressure on Colonel Gaddafi despite his announcement of a ceasefire.

The UK is also expected to set up a joint command centre with the US and France to co-ordinate operations that will be supported by a number of other countries, including Canada and Denmark. In further evidence of mounting determination to confront Gaddafi, ambassadors from Nato's 28 member countries are due to meet today to lend added support to the UN-backed plans for a no-fly zone.

Nato also emphasised humanitarian operations, but suggestions that ground troops from Britain and other countries could be deployed in Libya were dismissed last night.

"The absolute priority is to enforce the no-fly zone, and to secure maritime supply routes," said a defence source. "Nothing else is in the mix at this stage."

Nato secretary general Anders Rasmussen said the UN resolution sent "a strong and clear message from the entire international community" to the Gaddafi regime to stop his "systematic violence against the people of Libya immediately".

To this end, an array of other British military assets, including reconnaissance aircraft and air-refuelling tankers, will be deployed to bases in the Mediterranean. Military commanders in the UK have called the entire effort Operation Ellamy.

Though the MoD never talks about special forces operations, it is understood that SAS and SBS soldiers are already on the ground in Libya, providing information on likely first targets for any bombing raids. They could include airfields, supply routes and Libya's anti-aircraft defence batteries. "Any operations will be highly targeted to ensure that civilian casualties are avoided," said the source.

Yesterday it became clear that the complexity of co-ordinating joint operations with so many countries would stymie any immediate plans for air strikes to help the rebels. One strategic priority was to find a way of binding in Arab help for any attacks, even though this is likely only to be at a logistical and support level.

The prime minister told the Commons yesterday morning that British Tornado and Typhoon aircraft were within hours of being deployed. However, Whitehall sources later admitted that no planes had left the UK, and nor were they likely to until the weekend.

The day began with no clarity over the command structure for any operations - and whether they would be led or supported by Nato. These details were being frantically developed in the hours after the UN resolution was passed. General Sir David Richards, chief of the defence staff, worked through Thursday night trying to secure agreement over who would do what and when, before attending the Cabinet meeting in Downing Street.

He has been liaising closely with Air Marshall Sir Stuart Peach, chief of joint operations, who is based at the permanent joint headquarters of the three services in Northwood, to the north-west of London.The most likely scenario is that British fighters will be stationed at the British sovereign base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, where the RAF already has E3-D long-range air surveillance aircraft that are monitoring Libyan airspace.

Nato is also operating 24-hour surveillance of Libya with Awacs reconnaissance aircraft based in Germany. British fighters may also be stationed at the Nato airbase at Sigonella in Sicily - Canada is sending six fighters there.

The Royal Navy still has two ships in international waters off Libya - the frigates HMS Cumberland and HMS Westminster. There are no plans to increase the number at this stage.

However, the navy is working up a response force task group, which will include up to six different support and warships. That may be deployed in the weeks to come, sources said.

The US already has a strong naval presence in the Mediterranean: a battle group of five vessels led by the ageing aircraft carrier USS Enterprise includes the nuclear-powered submarine USS Providence and the destroyer USS Mason.

The USS Kearsarge is also in the area with a contingent of US marines on board while the USS Mason, a guided missile destroyer, was in port in Haifa, northern Israel on Wednesday.

"Surveillance will be 60% of the strategy if the plan is to dissuade Libyan aircraft from taking off," said Professor Trevor Taylor, head of the centre for defence management and leadership at Cranfield University. "And ground surveillance will be much more important still if the Libyans start using armoured vehicles because that will multiply the number of targets."

Barak Seener, a Middle East expert at the Royal United Services Institute, added: "Symbolically it's very important to include an Arab element in any attacks.

"Logistically they cannot provide very much, but it is important as a way of countering the accusation that this is an intervention which is colonialist and imperialist in nature."

Diplomats have said Arab countries that could participate in possible strikes might include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Captions:

Libya Foreign minister Moussa Koussa addresses a press conference

Libya A checkpoint on the road from Benghazi to the front line

LOAD-DATE: March 19, 2

The Truth About Tech

2012-05-18T12:22:00.001+01:00

This is a very interesting graphic that was sent to us at We Only Want The Earth recently (Thanks Jen). The graphic takes a closer look at the labour conditions behind our everyday tech gadgets.

Take a look and feel free to comment and tell us what you think!

Created by: MastersDegree.net

Convention on the Rights of the Working Class

2012-04-04T16:04:00.003+01:00

Convention on the Rights of the Working Class

Preamble

· Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

· Whereas disregard and contempt for the rights of the working class have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want of employment has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

· Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that the rights of the working class should be protected by the rule of law,

· Whereas the peoples of the world have reaffirmed their faith in fundamental worker’s rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

· Now, Therefore the Communist International proclaims this CONVENTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WORKING CLASS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Convention constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

· The Communist International also rejects completely capitalism and everything it stands for. We reject the idea of private property, greed and ‘free’ markets. We call on the workers of the world to rise up, throw off their chains and seize the means of production from the capitalist class, and use these means for the betterment of all men and women, not just the few.

The Convention on the Rights of the Working Class

The States Parties to the this Convention,

Recall;

Article 23 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Recall;

Article 2 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998)

1. freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;

2. The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;

3. The effective abolition of child labour; and

4. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Recall;

Article 11(1 &2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:

A. The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;

B. The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;

C. The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;

D. The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;

E. The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;

F. The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.

2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:

A. To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;

B. To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;

C. To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;

D. To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

Recall;

Article 7 and 8 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

Article 7

States Parties undertake, in accordance with the international instruments concerning human rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention without distinction of any kind such as to sex, race, colour, language, religion or conviction, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, economic position, property, marital status, birth or other status.

Article 8

1. Migrant workers and members of their families shall be free to leave any State, including their State of origin. This right shall not be subject to any restrictions except those that are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present part of the Convention.

2. Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right at any time to enter and remain in their State of origin.

Convinced, therefore, of the need to bring about the international protection of the rights of all of the workers of the world and members of their families, reaffirming and establishing basic norms in a comprehensive convention which could be applied to a socialist world, for it is only a socialist world based on equality of all human beings that the potential of humanity can be achieved,

This convention sets forth the following provisions;

Article 1

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention, without distinction of any kind, such as class, race, ethnicity, colour, sex, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other discriminatory factor or status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs.

Article 2

1. The right to full education is a fundamental right for the betterment of the individual, their society and the world. Therefore, every person enjoys the right to full and free state funded education, from primary all the way to Ph.D. level if that person so chooses. Every person shall be free to return to education at any time in their life to re-educate and re-skill for new employment opportunities.

2. Every person will receive full state support and funding for each and every period of education in that person’s life.

Article 3

1. Every person enjoys the right to work and the right to employment as an inalienable right of all human beings and shall be free from any form of unemployment with the exception of times of illness, re-education, re-training or maternity leave.

2. Every person enjoys the right to be free from all forms of forced or compulsory labour. Each person shall be employed in an occupation that is in accordance with their skills and aspirations, except where certain employment endangers the rights of others.

3. Every worker shall enjoy the right to freedom of movement for themselves and their families, and be subject to no restrictions on that movement. Every person shall enjoy the full economic, social and cultural rights that they would enjoy in their home state.

Article 4

Every person is to enjoy the right to a maximum working week of thirty hours. No person shall be compelled or forced to work more hours than this limit, except for personal choice or in times or national emergencies and for the good of all society.

Article 5

1. Every person shall have a right to decent pay for the employment that they engage in. This pay shall be reviewed annually to ensure that a decent standard of living, in line with the norms of a particular society is ensured for every person.

2. Every person shall enjoy safe and secure working conditions, and shall be free from any form of danger or injury whilst in their place of employment.

Article 6

1. Every person as a birth right shall enjoy the right to fully state funded childcare as a child. This provision shall allow every parent the right to enter the workforce or education should they wish to do so.

2. If a person wishes to not enter the workforce and instead raise their child or children, that person will be entitled to maternity leave from employment until a child reaches primary school going age.

Article 7

Every person shall enjoy fully state funded essential healthcare from birth until death.

Article 8

1. Every person shall enjoy the fruits of their labour and shall never be alienated from and unable to afford the goods that they produce.

2. Every person shall enjoy the right to leisure time and a minimum of four weeks holidays per year.

Article 9

1. Every person shall enjoy the right to retire from employment and enjoy a full yearly state pension that is equal to their yearly employment salary at the age of sixty.

2. A person shall enjoy the right to continue to work after sixty years of age as long as they are fit and able and the employment is of their choosing.

Article 10

No person has the right to privately accumulate wealth that has been produced by the labour of other workers of the world. Any person found to be privately profiting from the toil of others shall be liable for prosecution in line with the laws of that person’s society and the laws of the International Criminal Court.

Justification for the Convention on the Rights of the Working Class

The Convention on the rights of the Working Class (CRWC) in a revolutionary document and ground-breaking in the field of human rights. The convention takes into account the previous treaties, declarations and conventions on the rights of workers and the human rights of all peoples and seeks to extend and build upon them. The convention is an aspirational document that seeks to address the centuries old problems of inequality, poverty and discrimination involving all peoples of the world. Each of the problems mentioned are all problems that stem from the economic system that permeates in our world today. That economic system is capitalism. It is a system that has enriched a minority of the world’s population at the expense of the majority. It is a system that has produced war, poverty, inequality, environmental degradation and endless suffering for billions of human beings. In order for true human rights, and in turn worker’s rights, minority rights, children’s rights and the rights of all to be achieved, the economic system of capitalism must be eradicated. This convention, with the provision of fundamental rights to education, employment, leisure time and healthcare sets forth the means for the realisation of a world in which true equality for all can be achieved.

In order for this convention to become a reality, successive socialist revolutions by the workers of the world are necessary. The convention is one of aspiration, like all previous human rights instruments. The working class, the majority of people in the world, have long suffered through being forced to sell their labour in order to survive. The nature of the capitalist system has forced them into this exploitative relationship. However just because reality suggests that a socialist world is not likely in the short term, that should not restrict our aspirations for a world in which there is equality of all human beings, based on an economic system that values all and not the few. This convention sets out the basis on how such a world can be achieved.

The current system of United Nations, enshrined in the charter, various conventions, declarations and protocols sets out a number of aspirational worker’s rights, human rights and rights for various minority and discriminated groups. All however fail to address the underlying reasons for the problems they seek to solve. The Convention on the Rights of the Working Class seeks to address the underlying cause of those problems. In designing this convention various rights instruments were consulted. Four of these instruments provided the building blocks for the Convention on the Rights of the Working class (CRWC). These were the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was and is a visionary document. In looking for a template for a rights document there is no better starting point. The preamble for the UNDHR, with some minor alterations provided the basis for the preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Working Class. In particular, Article 23 sets forth some comprehensive rights in relation to employment[1]. The article however falls just short of the necessary right of employment. The reason for this is that the drafters of the UNDHR document knew that the right to employment could not and never can, be guaranteed under the capitalist system. Therefore the UNDHR had to limit its rights in full knowledge that the ‘right to work’ and to ‘free choice of employment’[2] could never realistically be achieved. The CRWC builds upon the provisions of Article 23 by providing the right to employment for all. This is set out in Article 3.1 of the CRWC which provides all with the ‘right to work and the right to employment as an inalienable right of all human beings’. Of course, the Convention accepts that this can only be achieved under a socialist system and not under capitalism.

The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) also builds upon the rights set out in the UNDHR. In particular, Article 2.2 which sets out ‘the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour’[3] provided the inspiration for Article 3.2 of the CRWC ‘every person enjoys the right to be free from all forms of forced or compulsory labour’. So, while every person has the right to employment, that employment must be of the choosing of the person once they have been provided with the education and training to engage in that employment. This is set out in Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the CRWC.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) was also consulted to ensure that traditional forms of discrimination against women that are systemic to capitalism would not be repeated in the CRWC. In particular, Article 11.2 (A, B & C) which provide for maternity leave with pay, social benefits and childcare[4] provided the inspiration for Article 6.1 and 6.2 of the CRWC. These provisions set out a revolutionary system whereby if a person wants to enter the workforce, they will be provided with state funded childcare for their children who are under primary school age. It also provides the option for people to choose to provide that childcare to their children themselves and be funded by the state to do it.

The final convention that was consulted was ‘the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ (1990). In particular, Articles 7 and 8 set out the rights of non-discrimination and freedom of movement[5]. This provided the basis for Article 1 and Article 3.3 of the CRWC which provide for non-discrimination of workers and the right to freedom of movement without the loss of national rights.

Each of these four instruments set out lofty ideals and rights that are admirable. However, the rights that they set out can never be fully achieved under the capitalist system. This is what must be recognised so that we can move on to a system whereby true equality and human rights can be realised. The CRWC sets out the basis for that system.

One author that takes a similar approach in relation to the right to healthcare in an age of neoliberal globalisation, but does not go as far as calling for an overthrow of capitalism and the right to employment for all is Paul O’Connell[6]. In his excellent work he highlights that although the right to health is recognised in international human rights law, the nature of capitalism, neo-liberalism and ‘market solutions’ deem this right as unworkable. O’Connell’s mode of analysis takes a similar approach to the one that I have set out, but does not go as far. His analysis recognises the limitations of the human right to healthcare within a system of capitalism that refuses to provide a basis for those rights to be realised. As he notes, human rights and the idea of collective welfare over individual or private interests as “values are complete anathema to the logic of neo-liberalism, consequently a commitment to the former raises serious questions about the extent to which it can be pursued in the context of market hegemony[7]”. This line of argument can be just as easily applied to the logic of worker’s rights. Unfortunately O’Connell seems to be one of the lone figures in the field of human rights academia who challenges the existing social order and points out how capitalism and certain human rights are incompatible with each other.

In conclusion, the CRWC is a visionary document that does not accept the limitations that are imposed upon the idea of human rights by the economic system of capitalism. For many centuries the working class have suffered at the hands of capitalism through being forced to sell their labour to support themselves and their families, whilst the capitalist class become wealthier from the fruits of the working class’ labour. In a system that is based on exploitation of a certain group, the working class, it will always be impossible to achieve a true realisation of equality and full human rights. It is inadequate to argue for the realisation of human rights without questioning the economic system that creates the abuses of those rights in the first place. While the rights of workers have to some degree been set out and protected in theory, in practice those rights could never fully be realised. What the CRWC sets out is a rights instrument that would require the eradication of an inequitable economic system, but would then provide for the most fundamental of human rights. The right to a fully free education, the right to a job as a means of supporting oneself and one’s family, the right to free healthcare, the right to leisure time, the right to non-discrimination, the right to early retirement and the right to true equality between all peoples in a socialist world. All of the rights contained within the CWRC are aspirational, but are achievable when the break with the capitalist market system is complete.

Bibliography:

Nations, United. “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.” 1990. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm (accessed March 27, 2012).

—. “The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” 1979. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article11 (accessed March 26, 2012).

—. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations Web site. 1948. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a23 (accessed March 25, 2012).

O'Connell, P. “The Human Right to Health in an Age of Market Hegemony.” 2010. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568383 (accessed March 25, 2012).

Organisation, International Labour. “ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.” 1998. http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm (accessed March 26, 2012).

[1] Article 23, The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

[2] Article 23.1, The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948

[3] Article 2.2, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998

[4] Article 11.2, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979

[5] Articles 7 & 8, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990

[6] O’Connell, P. ‘THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH IN AN AGE OF MARKET HEGEMONY’, 2010

[7] O’Connell, P ‘THE HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH IN AN AGE OF MARKET, P.19, 2010

The Arrogance And Hypocrisy Of Imperialism

2012-01-31T19:51:00.002+00:00

As the UN Security Council meets to thrash out a resolution on Syria, it seems like the arrogance and hypocrisy of the imperialists knows no bounds. Recently there have been calls from Western powers for Syrian President Assad to step down from power, with Jay Carney, the White House spokesman saying "Assad's fall is inevitable". UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, supposed to play a neutral role in world conflict situations, even chipped in saying "he hoped the Security Council would reflect international will to get Dr Assad to quit power". It seems that the Western imperialist thirst for regime change has not been quenched by the removal and murder of Gaddafi in Libya. Yet the standards that the imperialists apply to others are never applied to themselves. Such is the nature of the world order we live under.

While the dictatorships of both Gaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria were and are undemocratic and outdated, it does not give the powers of imperialism the right to change the regime. In both Libya and Syria we have seen evidence of popular uprisings and elements of civil war, yet in both cases we have seen the imperialists intervene and take the side of anti-government forces. In Libya, this resulted in a direct military intervention which resulted in the murder of Gaddafi and the overthrow of his regime. Already we are seeing a similar story in the process of playing out in Syria. In both Libya and Syria it is undoubted and undeniable that government forces have killed protesters and those involved in the uprisings. This is a deplorable occurrence no matter what the situation. This is the justification given by the imperialists as to their intervention and interference into the affairs of a sovereign state. However, it is this justification that exposes the arrogance and hypocrisy of the major powers.

When the state of Libya or Syria cracks down on the dissent within its borders, then that state is only following a natural course of action that any other 'democratic' state follows. The only difference between the the dissent from the people in North Africa and the Middle East and the dissent expressed all across the Western world through the 'Occupy' movement is that lives have been lost in the former. Whilst lives have not been lost in the West, the expression of state violence to suppress protests and dissent has been extreme in many cases.

Now this is where the crucial question must be posed. If the Occupy movement (or some other) developed into violent protests that exploded on a huge scale in the United States and beyond, would the governments of these countries suppress that violence in a similar fashion to Gaddafi and Assad? Would these governments 'step aside' and relinquish power as Gaddafi and Assad have been urged to do? It is not for me to answer that question, but for you to question yourself and come to your own conclusions. What is for sure is that violent suppression of protest and dissent in one place is the same as another. It is wrong. It does not however provide the justification for imperialist intervention. It is for dissenters and protesters themselves to effect change in their state, and not for the imperialist states to intervene for them under false altruistic justifications.

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth

Does Money Equal Power In American Politics?

2012-01-12T18:27:00.000+00:00

“The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx, Engels).

The American political system is often portrayed as a model liberal democracy where anyone can have access to power and decision making through a system of representative democracy. On the surface this is completely true, with open and transparent government at the core of the American political system. In the United States, the lobbying of politicians is a central feature of the system, with lobbying seen as an industry that is a natural part of a liberal democracy. However, a deeper look at lobbying, interest groups and political action committees (PAC’s) reveal a controversial world where critics suggest that money equals power and political influence can be bought. As the above quote from Karl Marx suggests, the power of capital is the same now as it was long ago and will be the same in the future as long as democracy is twinned with the capitalist mode of production where wealth and power is concentrated in the hands of a minority.

The constitution of the United States of America was adopted in 1787 and set forth a progressive system of federal government which was bounded by the principles of federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances and judicial review. The constitution created the three separate branches of government; the executive led by the President, the legislature consisting of a bicameral Congress made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Judiciary with the Supreme Court at its head (Griffith 1961, pp.7-15). The system was designed with a series of checks and balances so that no one branch of government would have omnipotent power neither over another nor over the people. The First Amendment to the Constitution set out, amongst other things the right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution). This right has been used since to legitimise a practice of lobbying that has come to dominate and control American politics.

The practice of lobbying has, in some form or another always existed in American politics, and involves a process whereby individuals are financially incentivised to try to influence and persuade politicians in positions of power to support a particular policy option. As far back as 1792, William Hull was hired by Virginia veterans to lobby for extra compensation for their war efforts (Public Affairs Links). One might question why a situation exists whereby a politician is in many respects forced by a political system to be in constant fundraising mode. This situation exists because of the hard fact that without money to fund an election campaign, it is unlikely a person will be elected. It is estimated that in order to run a sufficient campaign, a candidate for the House of Representatives will need $6 hundred-thousand, whilst a candidate for the Senate will require in the region of $2 Million (Katznelson, Kesselman & Draper 2002, p.234). In a system where there is little or no public funding of elections, candidates are forced to seek campaign contributions for re-election. This creates a situation whereby a politician has no chance of being elected on policy alone, and requires huge sums of money to pay for a campaign. This leaves candidates beholden to organised wealthy interests to pay for their campaigns. It seems only logical that these wealthy interests would want something in return.

The first efforts to control lobbying in the US came in 1938 with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The aim of this act was not to stop the practice of lobbying but to make the process of campaign financing more transparent (Holman, 2009, p.4). The act was in response to a perceived threat of foreign agents distorting the political process and not the threat of wealthy interests dominating the political arena. The first substantial piece of legislation to deal with the issue of lobbying came with the ‘Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act 1946’. This law was also solely a disclosure law which did not seek to end the practice of lobbying (Ibid). The act defined a lobbyist as someone "who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used principally . . . to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States” (Zeller 1948, pp.443 - 444).

More recent attempts to regulate the lobbying industry have come in the form of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 and the 2007 “Honest Leadership and Open Government Act” (HLOGA). The LDA was essentially another disclosure act, albeit one that was more comprehensive in its scope and dealt with many of the definitional issues of earlier acts. The HLOGA enhanced the disclosure of lobbying activities, but also implemented more regulation on the conduct of lobbyists. Some of the most important reforms included requiring lobbyists to electronically file their reports, establishing a disclosure database on the Internet, requiring that campaign fundraising by lobbyists be disclosed on the Internet and the prohibition of gifts and travel by lobbyists for lawmakers (Holman , 2009, pp.6-9). However, each form of legislation that has ever been enacted on the issue of lobbying has accepted the practice as a feature of the democratic system, and not something that needs to be eradicated.

To assess the true nature of lobbying in the United States, a look at the official figures is required. Data from the Senate Office of Public Records shows that the number of officially registered lobbyists operating in and around Washington D.C. is quite huge. In 2006 the number of registered lobbyists stood at 10,406. In 2007 at the onset of the worldwide financial crisis that figure had risen to 14,856. The latest figures from 2011 show that the figure has now dropped slightly to 12,242 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012). This is a ratio of approximately twenty-three lobbyists to every one Congressperson. The amount of money spent on lobbying politicians is also quite vast. In 1998 the amount of money spent on lobbying amounted to $1.44 billion. By the year 2009 that figure had risen to $3.49 billion. The most recent figures for 2011 show a drop to a still whopping $2.47 billion (Ibid).

When one acknowledges that this money is being spent, mostly by organised industry interest groups to influence policy decisions, then it suggests that one must also acknowledge that these interest groups may have more influence than an ordinary citizen without monetary resources. The arguments put forward by those who support lobbying as a practice point out that lobbying is legitimate under the First Amendment of the constitution, and by keeping lobbying practices open and transparent, there will be less corruption in politics. In contrast to this, it can be argued that an analysis of the interest groups and PAC’s who engage in lobbying show a disparity of influence between the wealthy and the less well-off.

Interest groups are a central feature of any functioning liberal representative democracy. An interest group is defined as “a group that shares common political beliefs and values and organises in an attempt to gain access to the political process” (Kaskla 2008, p.77). Such a group can come from any sector of society with an interest in any particular policy area. However, when one looks at the interest groups that dominate American politics it is quite obvious that money equals power in this sphere. This money is channelled through individual contributions and PAC’s contributions. An individual may contribute up to $2,500 to each candidate per year, as well as $30,800 to a national party committee per year and a total maximum of all political contributions amount of $117,000 per year (Center for Responsive Politics, B).

PAC’s were set up to circumvent funding limits. While individual contributions to PAC’s are limited to $5,000 per year, as a result of the 2010 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision in SpeechNow.org vs. FEC, campaign spending by PAC’s that are coordinated with candidate’s campaign or political party are not subject to contribution limits (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit , 2010). This in effect leaves PAC’s free to contribute as much funding as they wish to a candidate’s campaign as long as it is coordinated with the candidate. 527 Groups (named after the tax law under which they fall) are essentially the same as PAC’s, except they cannot explicitly advocate or oppose a candidate in a federal election. They can however advocate on policy issues. If they meet this requirement then they avoid the restrictions on contribution limits. This effectively leaves these groups free to spend as much as they like supporting a candidate’s campaign indirectly. When one looks at the figures for various forms of lobbying and campaign contributions in the policy areas of finance, insurance and real estate as well the policy area of health, we begin to see that in American politics, money does equal power.

If the recent financial crisis in the United States and around the world has taught us anything, it is that the policy areas of finance, insurance and real estate are all intertwined. The financial sector has long been the largest source of campaign funding for federal election candidates and political parties. During the financial crises of 2008, the financial sector still came out on top of the pile of campaign funders, providing $468.8 million to campaigns and candidates during the election that year. This was an eighty percent increase on the two years previous to that (Center for Responsive Politics, C). What bonds each of the industries in this sector together are their opposition higher corporate taxes and the regulation of hedge funds or financial instruments, such as derivatives (Ibid). However, the financial sector enthusiastically welcomed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 which established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that provided up to $700 billion of taxpayer money to buy bad subprime mortgages and other assets that were clogging the balance sheets of financial institutions. This ‘bail-out’ effectively put an astronomical level of private debt onto the shoulders of the US taxpayer.

The sub-prime mortgage crisis has exposed for all to see the level of interconnectedness between this industry and the higher levels of government. In order to fully grasp the level of connection between this industry and government then we must go back to the 2004 presidential election. An analysis of the campaign contribution figures for the victorious George W. Bush reveals some interesting reading. For example, 80 percent of Bush’s PAC contributions came from business interests (Center for Responsive Politics, D). While it is not unusual for PAC contributions to come from business interests, it does go some way to showing where his interests lay. Further analysis of Bush’s campaign contribution figures show that the finance, insurance and real estate sector was his biggest contributor at $33,844,215. This, coupled with the $20,625,735 that Bush received from the miscellaneous business sector shows the level of support that he had from bourgeois interests in general (Ibid).

In the context of the TARP bailout of the financial sector in 2008, perhaps the most interesting figures from Bush’s campaign fund are those which highlight his top twenty contributors. Bush’s highest contributor in the 2004 election campaign was the global financial services firm Morgan Stanley who contributed $603,480. The second highest contributor to Bush’s campaign was investment banking giant Merrill Lynch who contributed $586,254. The fifth highest was the banking colossus Goldman Sachs who contributed $394,600. The ninth highest was Citigroup at $320,820, the tenth was Bear Stearns at $313,150 and finally the nineteenth highest was Bank of America at $218,261 (Ibid). What makes all these financial companies significant here is that just four years later, each of them received many multiples of what they had given to Bush’s campaign through the TARP bailout of the financial sector in 2008.

To suggest that President Bush gave the financial sector a bailout because of the campaign contributions he received would be a foolish conspiracy theorist fantasy. However, to suggest that Bush and his cohorts did not have an extremely close relationship with the captains of this industry is also a naive fantasy. What is undeniable in this situation is that huge amounts of money changed hands from the finance industry to get President Bush re-elected, and it is un-doubtable that the finance industry would have wanted something in return for its ‘investment’. As Jerome Kohlberg, founding partner of major investment firm Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co has commented, “contributions are a small price to pay for big corporations to pay to gain political influence… Corporations give for one reason: Self-interest” (cited in Katznelson, Kesselman & Draper 2002, p.152).

While big corporate interests donating money to the campaign funds of prospective presidents and Congress-people does not signify outright corruption, it does cast doubt on the legitimacy of the decision making of elected representatives. Doubt however does not prove anything, but academic studies can attempt to do just that. One such study was ‘The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest Group Campaign Contributions’ (1986). This piece of work sought to assess whether PAC’s contributed disproportionately to legislators who had an advantage over others in producing the services desired by the PAC. The study found that the legislative committee seat that a legislator ‘owned’ would be more likely to receive funds from an interest group that may be affected by that committee’s rulings. It went on to explain that special interest groups are interested in sourcing cost-effective legislative services, and the attributes a legislator possesses, such as a powerful committee seat, will attract certain interest groups. The study suggested that having a seat on the Energy and Commerce committee could produce around $25,500 in extra corporate PAC contributions to a legislator (Grier, Munger 1986). This study was conducted in 1986 so it may need some updating.

To attempt to use the thesis above in a rather crude and unscientific way, a look through the campaign contribution figures of the two most influential members, the Chair and the Ranking Member, of the two most powerful finance related committees in Congress may be revealing. Perhaps the most powerful committee in all of Congress is the House Ways and Means Committee, the chief tax writing and all finance relating committee in Congress. It stands to reason that corporate America has an interest in having favourable decisions made by this committee. This committee also deals with issues relating to Medicare, the government’s health insurance programme for over sixty-fives and the disabled. The sector contributing the highest amount to all members of this Committee in the 2012 election cycle is the finance, insurance and real estate sector, with $3,554,599 coming from PAC’s and $2,517,255 from individual donors. The current Chairman of this committee is Rep. Dave Camp and its Ranking Member is Rep. Sander Levin. For the 2011-2012 election campaign two of Rep. Camp’s top five industry contributors have been the securities and investment industry at $201,050 and the insurance industry at $143,331 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012, E). Three of Rep. Camp’s top five contributors are the Stephens Group, Blackstone and Citi Group, each from the finance and insurance industries (Ibid). In a similar vein for Rep. Levin, two of his top five industry contributors have been from the insurance industry at $72,850 and the real estate industry at $38,950. Also, three of his top five organisation contributors are the Credit Union National Association, New York Life Insurance and Northwestern Mutual, all part of the finance and insurance industries (Center for Responsive Politics , 2012, I).

The next most powerful committee in Congress is the Senate Finance Committee. This committee is in many ways similar to Ways and Means insofar as it deals with taxation and other revenue measures. This committee also deals with both the government’s Medicaid and Medicare social health insurance programmes. As with the Ways and Means Committee above, the sector contributing the highest amount to all members of this Committee in the 2010 election cycle is the finance, insurance & real estate sector with $10,985,816 coming from PAC’s and $28,233,739 coming from individual donors. The current chairman of this committee is Sen. Max Baucus and its Ranking Member is Sen. Orrin G. Hatch. For the electoral cycle of 2007-2012, two of Sen. Baucus’ top five industry contributors have been the Securities & Investment industry at $884,469 and the Insurance industry at $658,150 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012, F). Interestingly, none of Baucus’ top five organisation contributors come from either of these industries, but instead come from the health and pharmaceutical sectors which will be addressed later in this paper. Ranking Member Sen. Hatch’s campaign contributions follow a similar pattern. Two of his top five industry contributors are the Securities & Investment industry at $522,521, and the Insurance industry at $412,994. Again, Sen. Hatch’s top five organisation contributors mainly come from the health and pharmaceutical industries (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012, G).

What the campaign contribution figures for the two most powerful Congressmen in each of the two most powerful committees above show is that corporate interests will contribute huge sums of money to the campaigns of those who have influence over a policy area that affects their business interests. What they do not show however is corruption, for corruption would imply something illegal happening. Corporate interests donating money to candidates in US politics is all perfectly legal, as long as certain guidelines are adhered to. The figures do however show is that in American politics, the money that the finance industry contributes to the campaign funds of federal candidates is huge, and it only seems logical that these business people would expect some form of return on such an investment. But is the finance, insurance and real estate industry the only industry that uses its money to try to influence policy? A look at the area of healthcare reform shows a similar disturbing pattern.

The issue of healthcare reform has been perhaps the most contentious issue over the past few years in American politics. President Obama was elected in 2008 on a pledge to reform the way healthcare was provided in the United States. The issue threatened to divide American society, perhaps best illustrated by the division of both houses of Congress along partisan Democrat and Republican lines, with Democrats pushing for sweeping reforms with a state provided health insurance system and Republicans supporting the maintenance of the status quo. An analysis of the campaign spending and lobbying of the Health and Pharmaceutical industries, who did not want a government provided healthcare insurance system, is quite revealing when the question of money equalling power in American politics is posed.

In 2006, when Barack Obama was just starting out on his bid for the Presidency, the total number of health lobbyists stood at 3,334. When Obama was elected in 2008 on a promise to reform the way health insurance was provided the number of health lobbyists had risen to 3,520 (Center for Responsive Politics , 2012, H). In 2006 the total spending for lobbying on health issues was $383,281,126. By 2009, at the time when the reform of healthcare was being debated in Congress this number had risen to $552,267,320 (Ibid). It seems that the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries had a lot riding on the maintenance of the status quo and were willing to pay for it. A look back at the Ways and Means Committee, which has input into Medicare legislation, and the Senate Finance Committee, which has control over Medicare and Medicaid legislation shows a similar pattern.

For example, if we look at the campaign contributions that Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rep. Dave Camp received during the 2009-2010 cycle, his third and fourth top industry contributors came from health at $316,896 and pharmaceuticals at $305,450 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012, B). His top organisation contributor was Dow Chemicals, a company involved in the production of healthcare products that would be affected by a government takeover of health insurance. In a similar fashion again, during the 2007-2012 cycle, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee with influence over Medicare and Medicaid, Sen. Max Baucus’ second top contributor was the health industry at $807,379, and his fifth top was the pharmaceutical industry at $643,464 (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012, G). It is also interesting to note that four of his top five organisation contributors are from both the health and pharmaceutical industries.

Whilst none of these figures show that the money from the health and pharmaceutical industries had the power to stop the reform of healthcare in America, the fact is that Obama’s plans for a government run health insurance provider never materialised, and the eventual healthcare reforms that he signed into law were a much watered-down version from his original vision. So, while money did not equal the power to stop reform, it did have the power to water down that reform. An interesting piece of research that may highlight this is from the Center of Responsive Politics. After the US House of Representatives passed its ‘Affordable Health Care for America Act’ in November 2009, research suggest that “opponents of the measure have received an average of fifteen percent more from health industry and health insurance interests over the past twenty years” (Beckel , 2009). The same researchers also found that upon passage of the ‘Health Care Reform Bill’ in December 2009, Senators who opposed the bill received approximately thirty percent more political donations from PAC’s and individual employees of health and health insurance-related groups and companies since 1989 (Beckel , 2009, B). The study also found that Republicans who opposed the legislation received forty-one percent more from medical professionals, forty-one percent more from pharmaceutical companies and twenty-eight percent more from health insurers than those Democrats who supported the bill (Ibid). So, it seems that although money didn’t have the power to stop the reforms going through, money it seems persuaded certain politicians to vote and argue against the reforms and this produced a watered down version of Obama’s healthcare reform plan.

What the figures provided above from former President Bush’s 2004 election campaign, and from the campaign contributions that leading members of powerful Congressional committees received from the finance, insurance and real estate, and health industries show, is that in American politics, power rests with wealthy business interests who fund election candidate’s campaigns. When industry bosses or company executives are spending vast amounts of money to fund the election campaigns of politicians, it is un-doubtable that these people will want a return on their investment. That return may be having direct influence over a policy, or perhaps just having their concerns on a policy heard. Whichever it is, the fact remains that wealthy business interests have the financial resources to give them the access to political decision making that ordinary citizens do not have. Supporters of this system suggest that because the lobbying and campaign figures of elected officials are provided for all to see in an open and transparent manner, then this reduces the likelihood of corruption in politics. However, this line of argument misses the point entirely. Private money funding politics leads to a corruption of ideals. Just because this takes place in a transparent manner does not absolve its injustice, it simply casts further cynicism on the idea of democracy in general. In America, like any other capitalist democracy, money equals power and power equals political influence.

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Why Does NATO Still Exist?

2011-12-22T20:23:00.000+00:00

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) came into being at the end of World War II in 1949. The treaty was signed by twelve members in Washington, DC. Although not explicit in the treaty, the alliance was a direct response to the perceived threat of the ideology and military power of the Soviet Union. The treaty was designed, in the words of NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down” (Eden 2000, p.2). The main provision of the treaty was in its Article 5 which stated;

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence” (NATO 1949).

Since the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the threat that it posed to Western security, there has been much debate as to the explanations for the continued existence and expansion of the alliance. This essay will firstly give an overview of the area of alliances and their characteristics before providing some information about the case of NATO and its continued expansion since its formation. Moving on, the essay will then discuss four different explanations for NATO’s expansion since the end of the Cold War before concluding that the organisational and institutional practices of NATO have had a socialising effect on its staff and the political and military elites of member states who have come to see it as a community of values that needs to live on with a new purpose that is far removed from what the organisation was originally designed for. A purpose of Western imperialist hegemony.

Alliances:

In the area of international relations, alliances have long existed as one of the foremost tools of statecraft. They have been so common that between 1815 and 2003 there have been 648 recorded alliances (ATOP 2005). A useful definition of an alliance comes from Walt who describes one as “a formal or informal relationship of security between two or more sovereign states” (1987:1, cited in Duffield 2008, p.292). The reasons for a state joining an alliance can be explained by both international and domestic determinants (Duffield 2008, p.295).

Perhaps the most prominent school of thought on alliances is that of realism which suggests that states get involved in alliances to aggregate their military power against a perceived common threat or enemy. Within this line of thought, Waltz’s balance of power theory, where it is suggested that states form alliances to balance the power of another powerful state, has been very influential. However, Walt has suggested that a balance of threat, where states align to balance a common threat and not solely power may explain the situation better. Domestic determinants may also be a factor in the formation of alliances. Again Walt (1987) has suggested that states will form alliances with other states that have similar political systems to themselves, such as the liberal democratic states contained in NATO, or the communist states in the now defunct Warsaw Pact.

The case of NATO’s expansion:

Whilst all of these examples try to explain why alliances form, they can also signify why alliances also disband. For example, in line with balance of power / threat theories, when the power or threat of another state wains, it seems logical that the need for the alliance that was formed to balance against it would naturally disappear. However, the case of NATO’s continued existence and expansion after the end of the Cold War has challenged this idea. Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 NATO has undergone six rounds of enlargement. The first three rounds of enlargement brought in Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982, with each taking place during the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War a further three rounds of enlargement have occurred. In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, joined the Alliance. In 2004 Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia increased the number of former communist states in the alliance and in April 2009 Albania and Croatia boosted the alliance further to twenty-eight independent states (NATO). This continued expansion seems to go against the norm of alliance theories which suggest that the organisation has outlived its purpose. So, what does explain the continued expansion of NATO?

The threat of Russia:

One possible explanation for NATO’s longevity could be explained by the threat posed by the still powerful and nuclear capable Russia. Although the military threat that the Soviet Union posed to NATO members during the Cold War was substantial, that threat diminished greatly after the break-up of the Soviet bloc. However, Russia still remains a nuclear superpower and even its former satellite state Ukraine still has a nuclear arsenal greater than those of France and the UK (Duffield 1994, P.768). Although Russia has in recent time pursued friendly relations, there are no guarantees that this will remain the case. A strong nationalist sentiment that has characterised Russian parliamentary elections in recent times has shown that there are always possibilities for a return to an expansionist foreign policy. The Russian excursion into prospective NATO member Georgia’s territory in 2008 illustrated that ‘the Russian bear’ can still roar. Also, the fact that Russia borders and has forces near a number of NATO members may go in some way to explaining the reluctance of members to disband the organisation. To some degree the balance of threat theory is still relevant in this case, although the balancing weight of NATO far exceeds that of Russia at this time.

New Threats:

With the end of the Cold War, the raison d'etre of NATO seemed to have passed. Early into the 1990s and the break-up of Yugoslavia presented a challenge to the stability of Central Europe. NATO forces played a pivotal role in in the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995, including launching its first ever combat operation in 1994 with the shooting down of four Serb jets (NATO). As Hallams has suggested, the NATO involvement in Bosnia was a key event, showing the relevance of the organisation following the Cold War (Hallams 2009). We still live in a world of threats as illustrated by the attacks on The Twin Towers of The World Trade Centre and other targets inside the United States on September 11th 2001. In fact, the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda spurred on the first activation of the mutual defence clause in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, leading to the war in Afghanistan in 2001. With the threat of a terrorist attack from organisations like al-Qaeda ever present, the continued existence of NATO to deal with the threat through cooperation seems logical.

As well as the threats of terrorism, the rise of China may also pose a challenge to the hegemony of the United States. Although the threat of China has perhaps historically been seen as not explicit, the economic growth that it has experienced as well as the corresponding financial crisis that the West is currently experiencing may be a factor for future NATO planning. It has been argued that NATO serves as a tool of American hegemony (Waltz 2000) that can be used to balance against new emerging powers, of which China is one. The same may also apply to both India and Pakistan. Although not seen as a direct threat to NATO members at this time, India is one of the world’s nuclear powers, and instability in that region could pose a threat to NATO member’s interests. More likely to pose a direct threat is Pakistan, another regional nuclear power and a country beset by instability and Islamic terrorist attacks. NATO has already had many problems with militants from Afghanistan using the Pakistani border region as a base, with a Pakistani government seemingly reluctant to deal with the problem. Of course, the recent NATO killing of twenty-eight Pakistani troops by NATO has not helped matters (Reuters).

Organisational, Institutionalist and Socialisation theory:

The perception of old and new threats may help explain the continued expansion of NATO; however there are other somewhat convincing explanations. Since its beginnings, NATO has built up a huge organisational structure and bureaucracy around itself. Its headquarters in Brussels employs nearly four thousand people, all of whom have an interest in preserving their jobs. In line with organisational theory, members will behave in ways that are resistant to change, affirmative of the organisation’s necessity and will adapt to change to preserve a purpose (McCalla 1996, p. 457). This would suggest that NATO officials have denied the need for change and tried to protect the status quo. As well as this it suggests that they have affirmed the value of the alliance through engaging in actions to garner support from domestic audiences. Finally, it suggests that NATO would modify roles and missions as well as creating new ones. According to McCalla (1996, pp.458-461), each of these criteria have been met by NATO. This statement seems correct as recent events have shown that NATO has engaged in ‘humanitarian’ missions to garner support, as well as to create a new purpose for itself. It may also explain the continued growth of the organisation as it seeks new members to give itself a new purpose.

Institutional theory may also build upon organisational explanations. This view suggests that an institution may acquire capabilities that are beyond what they were originally designed for. Thus, as NATO’s original purpose has been outlived, it has moved to use its vast resources into addressing new threats and security concerns. According to McCalla (McCalla 1996, p.464), an institutionalist approach suggests that NATO has used existing procedures to deal with new problems, modified its structures as necessary and used those structures to build ties in pursuit of its member’s goals. So, while the security environment has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, NATO has used its institutional capacities to adapt to new security concerns. Wallander (2000) has backed this claim as well as suggesting that NATO has grown its institutional assets in the form of its Partnership for Peace (PfP), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), therefore conforming to the institutionalist theory of self-perpetuation.

The idea of socialisation may add to the two perspectives above. This perspective suggests that alliances can persist through a process whereby member states, and in particular the political elites of those states become socialised into alliance related interactions (Duffield 2008, p.299). The same can also apply to the military elites who have experienced enhanced cooperation with other member state’s military commanders. Through these interactions at the political and military level, common bonds are formed that promote a sense of community. This sense of political community may contribute to alliance longevity (Walt, 1997: 168, cited in Duffield 2008, p.299). The idea of a community of values has been reinforced recently by NATO through its ‘strategic concept’ document, adopted in Lisbon in 2010 which stated “NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (NATO 2010). This, along with the membership criteria that NATO expects from new members supports a theory of a socialisation of its members, and this perpetuating the alliance.

Humanitarian imperialism:

While the explanations provided above go a long way to providing answers to the continued existence and expansion of NATO since the end of the Cold War, they all fail to critically examine the role of NATO in today’s world. Since the end of the Cold War, far from being an organisation that has lacked a purpose and a presence on the world stage, NATO has been at the forefront of a number of major conflicts. Since 1992, NATO has engaged in seven military missions, three of which have had ‘humanitarian’ justifications and all of which could be described as imperialistic. These are Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 and Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. These missions are part of what Chomsky has called ‘humanitarian imperialism’ (2008). Reluctant to believe that NATO had moral concerns when initiating a bombing campaign, Chomsky has suggested that if a new moral compass was now guiding NATO, it would also have seen calls for an intervention in East Timor at the same time when a massacre of East Timorese was occurring. Indonesia was of course an ally of the United States (Ibid). However, this intervention never occurred.

It could be argued that an analysis of the missions that NATO has been involved in recently could all be classed as imperialist. So, by cloaking its missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya in ‘humanitarian’ and moral justifications, NATO is in essence a wolf in sheep’s clothing and a tool of Western imperial interests. If this is not the case, the question must be asked, if morals now guide NATO policy, then why has no intervention occurred in the many African conflicts that have led to huge loss of life? In line with this argument, the continued existence and expansion of NATO since the Cold War is therefore best explained as its use as a convenient cloak with which Western powers can shield their true imperialist intentions with a degree of moralistic and ‘humanitarian’ justification.

Summary and conclusion:

Each of the above explanations for NATO’s continued expansion since the end of the Cold War are convincing in their own right. The idea of a residual threat from Russia does hold some credence when the fact that Russia still holds a nuclear arsenal and borders a number of NATO members is taken into account. However, the threat that Russia once posed is not now a reality, and the NATO members who border it are minor players unlikely to hold much influence in a grouping of major Western powers. The explanation that new threats now form the basis of NATO’s expansion holds sway also. However, the threat of a non-state actor like al-Qaeda cannot in reality be used as a justification for an organisation with the size and scope of NATO’s bureaucracy. More compelling an explanation is the idea that NATO is expanding to balance against an emerging power like China, India or Pakistan. It is true that one of these states may pose a threat to Western interests at some stage in the future, although the idea that NATO exists and is expanding at this time to counter this possible future threat may be a little far-fetched.

Organisational, institutional and socialisation theories provide interesting and compelling explanations as to why NATO continues to expand. In line with organisational theory as McCalla has suggested, NATO’s staff and member states have behaved in ways that are resistant to change, they have been affirmative of the organisation’s necessity and have adapted to change to preserve a purpose for the organisation. Institutional theory builds upon this to suggest that NATO has used existing procedures to deal with new problems, modified its structures as necessary and used those structures to build and develop new ones, in the process growing its institutional assets in the form of its PfP, the NACC and the EAPC, therefore conforming to the institutionalist theory of self-perpetuation. On top of this, the theory of socialisation demonstrates how political and military elites become socialised into alliance related interactions and form common bonds based on a community of values. This it is suggested has led to the elites of NATO member states perpetuating the alliance to maintain common bonds. All three examples are quite convincing and it is arguable that they form the basis for the continued expansions of NATO. However, the purpose that NATO serves for its powerful members must also be taken into account.

An analysis of the missions that NATO has engaged in since the end of the Cold War shows that each of those missions could be described as Western imperialist. Its missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya, although justified on ‘humanitarian’ grounds, all in some way or another served the national interests of the powerful NATO member states. NATO no longer serves the purpose it was designed for. Organisational, institutional and socialisation theories provide a convincing argument as to why the organisation has perpetuated itself, however it is Chomsky’s view of humanitarian imperialism that best describes NATO’s current purpose. Rather than existing and expanding to deal with old or new threats, NATO has continued to expand in the post-Cold War period due to organisational, institutional and socialised perpetuation that has turned the organisation into a tool of Western imperialist interests.

Bibliography:

Available: http://atop.rice.edu/home [2011, 12/12].

Chomsky, N. 2008, "Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right", Monthly Review, vol. 60, no. 4.

Duffield, J.S. 2008, "Alliances" in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. P.D. Williams, Routledge, Oxon.

Duffield, J.S. 1994, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 5, pp. 763-787.

Eden, D. 2000, "NATO and the Atlantic Relationship" in Europe and the Atlantic Relationship, ed. D. Eden, Macmillan Press, London.

Hallams, E. 2009, "The Transatlantic Alliance renewed: the United States and NATO since 9/11", Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 38-60.

McCalla, R.B. 1996, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", International Organization, vol. 50, pp. 445-476.

NATO 2010, “Strategic Concept: For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation”, NATO, Lisbon.

NATO 1949, The North Atlantic Treaty. Available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-45C62E05-246E06A9/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm?selectedLocale=en [2011, 12/12].

NATO a, 1994-1998: One Team, One Mission! NATO Begins Peacekeeping in Bosnia. Available: http://www.aco.nato.int/page14672955.aspx [2011, 15/12].

NATO b, NATO Enlargement. Available: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm? [2011, 14/12].

Reuters, Pakistan stops NATO supplies after deadly raid. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/26/us-pakistan-nato-idUSTRE7AP03S20111126 [2011, 17/12].

Wallander, C.A. 2000, "Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the Cold War", International Organization, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 705-735.

Walt, S.M. 1987, The origins of alliances, Cornell Univ Pr.

Waltz, K.N. 2000, "NATO expansion: A realist's view", Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 23-38.

The Role Of The Media In An illegal Imperialist War

2011-12-16T22:37:00.004+00:00

“A massacre in one place was a fight against terrorists in another, and what was unavoidable collateral damage from one perspective was a war crime from a different angle” (Bahador 2007, p.18)

On March 24^th 1999, NATO forces launched an aerial bombing campaign on multiple targets inside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The campaign lasted until June 11^th 1999, when an agreement was reached to allow a peacekeeping mission to enter Kosovo. NATO’s official justification for the intervention was ‘humanitarian’. It suggested Slobodan Milosevic’s troops were committing crimes against humanity by massacring ethnic Albanians in its Kosovo province. The war against Milosevic was illegal under international law, having not received a sanction for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Because of this, NATO fought a media war in conjunction with its aerial bombardment. NATO’s justifications for the intervention have been widely disputed, with academics such as Chomsky suggesting that the media was used as a tool to help justify what he calls ‘humanitarian imperialism’ (Chomsky 2008).

This article will assess how decisive a role the media played in generating support for NATO’s Kosovo campaign. To do this, I will begin by providing evidence of the high value that NATO placed on the use of media to get its message across during this conflict. After this, I will then use a number of theoretical frameworks to assess if the media did play a decisive role in generating support for the NATO campaign. The frameworks used will be the pluralist model which includes aspects of the CNN effect and the elite model which includes Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model. Through this analysis, a discussion will take place on the influence of the media on the area of foreign policy. Finally I will conclude that the strong emphasis that NATO placed on winning the media war shows that media did play a decisive role in generating public support for an illegal war.

We now live in an age of 24/7 news. It is rare that any major event happens in any corner of the globe that is not picked up by the media and beamed into our homes on a continuous basis. The internet has further intensified this process. The globalisation of media has added a new dimension to the area of war. Whilst wars are fought and won by military force, it has become increasingly important to win the media war for hearts and minds as well. The use of propaganda by both democratic and non-democratic states alike through history illustrates this. NATO knew that because their campaign in Kosovo in 1999 had not received UNSC sanction, they would have to win the war for hearts and minds in justifying their intervention. Initially they relied on their Deputy Director of Information and Press Jamie Shea and his small staff to get the message out. However, after the Djakovica incident, where NATO bombed a convoy of refugees and then proceeded to blame Serb forces, the NATO media war was on shaky ground and British PM Tony Blair’s press secretary Alistair Campbell was brought on board to shore things up (Stourton , 1999).

Campbell, the spin doctor for Blair’s New Labour project in Britain, is an expert in media manipulation. An analysis of an article he penned after the conflict titled ‘Communications Lessons for NATO, the Military and Media’ illustrates his and NATO’s thinking about how decisive the media was in generating public support for the campaign (Campbell 1999). In the article he points out “that NATO could win militarily was never really in doubt. The only battle we might lose was the battle for hearts and minds”. Campbell went on to point out on a number of occasions that combatting the Serb “lie machine” (Ibid) was central to the NATO media war. This presumably included the bombing of Serbian state television station RTS, killing a number of employees on April 23^rd,a target that NATO spokesman Air Commodore David Wilby called “legitimate” (Chomsky 1999, p.129), although Campbell does not allude to this. Campbell’s assertion that the media war was essential to NATO’s campaign illustrates the high value that NATO placed on the use of media to get its message across during the campaign. An analysis of different theoretical frameworks can help us to understand this viewpoint more extensively.

Frameworks for understanding the relationship between the media and foreign policies can be grouped into two models. The pluralist model assumes that in liberal democracies, power rests with the media who keep governments in check, and also with the public whose opinion dictates the policies of their representatives. The model suggests that if the media is oppositional to the idea of a war, then the influence that they have would make it very difficult for a state to engage in military action. It also suggests that if media and public opinion are strongly in favour of a military intervention, then the foreign policies of a state can be influenced in that direction (Robinson 2008, p.138). In contrast to this, the elite model suggests that power rests with wealthy elites control the political system and society. In line with this view, public opinion and the media are acquiescent to the wealthy and powerful who control politics and indeed the media itself (Ibid). Both models suggest that the media plays a role in foreign policy, however whilst the pluralist model suggests that the media influences foreign policy, the elite model suggests that societal elites use the media as a tool for generating public support for their foreign policies.

In line with the pluralist model, the CNN effect is perhaps the most famous theory to emerge in recent times. According to Steven Livingston the CNN effect has “three conceptually distinct and analytically useful understandings of media’s effect on the foreign policy process”. These are a policy agenda-setting agent, an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and an accelerant to policy decision making (Livingston 1997, p.2). The policy agenda-setting refers to the way emotionally charged coverage or framing of events may encourage influence public opinion which in turn influences foreign policy.

In line with the idea of media being a policy agenda-setting agent, research conducted on media representations of the Kosovo conflict before the NATO intervention shows that American television networks framed coverage in a pro-Albanian way during and after a number of crucial incidents in the conflict. Whilst there were two sides to the story in each case, after the Drenica incident, the Gornje Obrinje incident and the Racak incident, all of which contained causalities on both sides, the American television networks contained a majority of pro-Albanian framed stories on the incidents. During the Drenica incident, the pro-Albanian stories made up forty-one per cent of coverage, compared to five per cent pro-Serbian coverage. The Gornje Obrinje incident produced pro-Albanian stories in seventy-seven per cent of the coverage, compared with zero per cent pro-Serbian. Finally, the Racak incident resulted in eighty-six per cent pro-Albanian stories, to zero per cent pro-Serbian (Bahador 2007, pp.75-89). The author of the research suggests that there is “substantial evidence” to suggest that media framing in a pro-Albanian way led to a gradual policy shift towards war (Ibid, pp.161), although he does note that this was not the only factor pushing this policy forward.

In contrast to the pluralist model, the elite model takes a different view on the power of the media to influence policy. Instead, the elite model suggests that the media is used by elite political and societal interests to further their particular policy goals. At the forefront of this theory is the work on Herman and Chomsky in their seminal work Manufacturing Consent (2002). They put forward the propaganda model that suggests the media serve to “propagandise” on behalf of vested interests. This, they argue is not through a “crude intervention” but through journalists’ “internalisation of priorities and definitions of news worthiness” (Ibid). Structural factors such as funding sources and ownership also play a role in defining what makes the news. So, essentially what the propaganda model says about the Kosovo conflict is that the decision of NATO to go to war was not one influenced by the media. Instead, it suggests that NATO used the media to gain support for its war efforts.

In order to fully understand this viewpoint, it is necessary to expose some facts of what occurred before the NATO intervention, and also how the media reported the unfolding conflict. As Chomsky points out, although western media was reporting that the NATO intervention was in response to a Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign on Kosovar Albanians, and the campaign allowed displaced Albanians to return to their homes, the truth was that the NATO bombing actually preceded the ethnic cleansing campaign and forced Albanians to flee their homes, thus creating a refugee crisis (Chomsky 2003, p.55). Also, as Nicholas Wheeler estimated, Serbs had killed five hundred Albanians before the NATO campaign, with an implied one thousand five hundred deaths attributed to the Kosovo Liberation Army (Wheeler, cited in Chomsky 2003, p.57). Therefore, this would suggest that the Serbs were not the solely aggressive agents that they were being portrayed as. With these facts in mind an analysis of media reports before and during the conflict reveal that an agenda that would increase public support for an intervention was being pursued.

Research has suggested that US print media have been complicit in using emotive terms such as ‘genocide’ in selective cases that enemy states are involved in, but using the term much less frequently when the US or its allies are involved. For example, an analysis of five major US titles between 1998 and 1999 showed that the term ‘genocide’ was used two hundred and twenty times against the Serbs in Kosovo. Forty one of these instances were on the front page of the title. Contrast this with the case of US ally Indonesia in East Timor. Over a ten year period between 1990 and 1999, the term was used just thirty three times, four of those times on the front page (Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. 2002, p. 21). This contrast is relevant because many more deaths and massacres occurred in East Timor during that period as during the one year period of Serbian attacks in Kosovo. A look back to the previous evidence of the pro-Albanian framing of stories used in the CNN effect example could also be used to support the propaganda model’s theory.

A further piece of discourse and propaganda analysis involving four leading daily newspapers from Greece, Norway, Sweden and the UK found that in line with US President Bill Clinton’s speeches on the conflict, the NATO / US propaganda view that the bombing was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing, and that responsibility lies solely with Milosevic was reinforced in the Norwegian, Swedish and UK dailies (Nohrstedt et al. 2000, P.400). The research also suggests that selective reporting was used paint over the lack of a UNSC sanction in the UK, and that there had been a Serbian peace offer the day before the bombings began (Ibid, p.401). This does point towards the view of propaganda model that the media serves the interests of political elites, and rarely falls into what Hallin calls “The sphere of deviance”, where journalists and political elites reject news as unworthy (Hallin 1986, p.117). This type of reporting suggests that a pro-intervention agenda was being pushed by the media, but in whose interests? Essentially that question has different answers depending on whether one subscribes to the pluralist or elite model.

The pluralist and elite models illuminate our understanding of media connections to foreign policy. They provide a framework for understanding how decisive the media was in generating support for NATO’s campaign in Kosovo. But to really understand how decisive the media are now were then during the conflict, the words of Alastair Campbell are crucial. During the same article mentioned earlier, Campbell pointed out that “our enemy was Milosevic’s media machine, but our judge and jury was the Western media” (Campbell 1999, p. 36). The words in Campbell’s article are taken from an address he gave to an audience of journalists. As Hammond (2000, p.384) has stated, “Campbell’s intention was evidently to drive home the importance of supporting the government in any future wartime battle for hearts and minds”. It is obvious from the reporting from Kosovo that he need not worry too much. Campbell knew well how decisive the media were in generating public support. It was the reason he was hired for the job.

Levels of public support for NATO’s Kosovo campaign varied from country to country. However research has shown that public support in the ‘big-three’ NATO countries was on average, France 61%, United Kingdom 67% and United States 68% (Everts 2001). These figures show that the media war that NATO and Campbell waged was won in the powerful Western states, and provided the catalyst for a war that was illegal in accordance with international law at the time. Whether one sees the media as influencing foreign policy or as a tool of it is a matter for one’s own ideology. However, what is clear is that is that when a NATO spokesman claims that a television station is a “legitimate target” for bombing, then one has to draw the conclusion that control of media and information to generate public support for an illegal war was a decisive factor in NATO’s Kosovo campaign.

In Conclusion, I have sought to assess how decisive the media were in generating public support for NATO’s Kosovo campaign. What was clear from the words of NATO employed spin doctor Alastair Campbell was that the media war in Kosovo was just as essential as the military war. The pluralist and elite models of media influence on foreign policy show different ideas on how public opinion is constructed and in whose interests. Each has its merits, however the emphasis that NATO placed on getting their message across shows how decisive they knew the media to be. It also shows that the elite efforts to generate public support for an illegal war was successful, as the average percentage public support ratings in the three major NATO powers above illustrates.

Bibliography:

Bahador, B. 2007, The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West toward War in Kosovo, Palgrave, New York.

Campbell, A. 1999, "Communications Lessons for NATO, the Military and Media", the RUSI Journal, vol. 144, no. 4.

Chomsky, N. 2008, "Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right", Monthly Review, vol. 60, no. 4.

Chomsky, N. 2003, Hegemony or Survival. America's Quest for Global Dominance, Penguin Books, London.

Chomsky, N. 1999, The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo, Pluto Press, London.

Everts, P. 2001, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo", Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259.

Hallin, D. 1986, "The Uncensored War, The Media and Vietnam",

Hammond, P. 2000, "Reporting “Humanitarian” Warfare: propaganda, moralism and NATO's Kosovo war", Journalism Studies, vol. 1, no. 3.

Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. 2002, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Pantheon Books, New York.

Livingston, S. 1997, CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. Available: http://tamilnation.co/media/CNNeffect.pdf [2011, 7/12].

Nohrstedt, S., Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R. & Riegert, K. 2000, "From the Persian Gulf to Kosovo - War Journalism and Propaganda", European Journal of Communication, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 383.

Robinson, P. 2008, "The role of media and public opinion" in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases., ed. Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T, Oxford, pp. 137.

Stourton, E. , How the Kosovo war was spun. Available: http://www.fpp.co.uk/online/99/10/KosovoSpinDr.html [2011, 7-12].

Democracy Suppressed In DCU

2011-12-15T07:30:00.003+00:00

The farce of the DCU referendum on higher education funding descended deeper into controversy last night when the DCU Student's Union President Ed Leamy vetoed a FEE DCU motion at Class Rep Council to have the result of the recent referendum respected as a 'democratic survey' and adopted as union policy. The action by DCU SU President Ed Leamy cast further suspicion on a process that has been tainted by a constitutional screw-up by the referendum Electoral Committee and the Student's Union Executive.

The referendum last week, which produced a result which mandated the DCU Student's Union Executive to campaign for a 'fully free education system', was deemed "null and void" on legal advice after students had been advised to vote in a way that was contrary to the DCU SU constitution. The information campaign for the referendum which was overseen by President Ed Leamy advised students that "There are five questions on the ballot paper. You may express your vote on the ballot paper in one of two ways. The funding model with the greatest first preference wins. If you wish you can also express a second, third, fourth and fifth preference.The additional preferences will not carry, but will instead allow the Students’ Union to better measure the spectrum of opinion, strengthening our lobbying argument".

After counting was concluded on Friday evening, funding option 5, the 'fully free education system" option had received the most votes and should have been declared the winner. This would have mandated DCU SU to campaign for a fully free education system. However, upon hearing of the results, DCU SU President Ed Leamy called for a recount as he had realised that "a major constitutional breech had occurred. Under article 9: Elections and Referenda, 9.5.1.1 states “The counting procedures shall be in accordance with the system of proportional representation by the single transferable vote method”. Of course, this was different to how students had been advised to vote. Upon legal advice, the recount never went ahead, and the referendum was declared unconstitutional, and therefore "null and void".

Whilst FEE DCU accepted that the constitution states that counting should be conducted by PRSTV, the fact is that this referendum was advertised as a PR referendum, with students advised by DCU SU that only 1st preference votes would count. The result of the first count conducted on Friday produced a result in accordance with how students were advised to vote, and in accordance with how they were advised their votes would be counted. Therefore, FEE DCU decided to bring a motion to Class Rep Council to have the result of Friday's first count respected as a 'democratic survey', which should now mandate DCU SU to campaign for free education for everyone.

Proposing the motion at council yesterday evening, FEE DCU member Derek McKenna stated that while he recognised that the referendum had been conducted contrary to constitution election regulations, this did not stop the council from respecting the democratic will of students who had voted the way they had been told to vote. He then asked that "the result in which the fully free education system option had won the vote be respected and adopted as DCU SU policy". Immediately, the chair of the council issued McKenna with an "official warning", as he pointed out that "as the referendum had been declared null and void, no option had won". The actions of the chair set the tone for the debate, and after 3 speakers on the motion, the DCU SU President Ed Leamy intervened and declared that " as the referendum had been declared unconstitutional, the motion before the council must fall". The actions of Leamy meant that Class Rep council was not allowed to further discuss the motion to have the 'fully free education system' adopted as union policy, and meant that the council could not even take a vote on the matter.

These events cast further doubt on DCU SU's ability to respect the voice of their members. The facts of the case show an amazing level of arrogance from members of the DCU Student's Union that they feel they can disrespect the democratic choice of their students. For the facts are this;

1) DCU students were asked to vote and given 5 options for the funding of higher education

2) They were advised that "The funding model with the greatest first preference wins" and "The additional preferences will not carry"

3) DCU students voted in accordance with these guidelines

4) That vote produced a result in which the "fully free education system" model had the most "first preference" votes.

5) That result was the democratic choice of DCU students and should be DCU SU policy.

6) The advise given to students on voting and counting was different than what the constitution stated.

7) The referendum was declared unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.

8) There was nothing stopping DCU SU from accepting the results as a 'democratic survey' and thereafter as union policy.

The facts are there for all to see and the facts are indisputable.

We Only Want The Earth

DCU Student's Union Disrespect Democratic Result

2011-12-12T10:02:00.003+00:00

DCU SU President Ed Leamy has just declared the result of the DCU referendum on the funding of higher education "null and void".

The option of a "fully free education system" had won the vote.

FEE DCU will campaign for the democratic will of students to be respected, and for the result to be maintained.The declaration that the result is "null and void" shows a lack of respect for the democratic choice that students have made.

A new referendum has been called for next year. We don't want another referendum. The students democratic choice was reflected correctly after the first count.

This is not the Lisbon Treaty. We can't re-run the vote until the people in authority get the result they desire.

Have your voice heard. Demand that the result of the first vote is respected!!

For a background to this story, see the previous post HERE

We Only Want The Earth (And Free Education for Everyone)

DCU Students Vote For Free Education For Everyone - DCU SU Call A Recount

2011-12-11T00:54:00.001+00:00

After a mandate from DCU's Class Rep Council, a historic referendum was held in DCU this week to ask students their opinion on how higher education should be funded in Ireland. The original mandate put before the council had four options for students to vote on, but left out the option of a "fully free education system" funded through progressive taxation. During a rigorous debate, FEE DCU fought hard to have this option put on the ballot paper, however council voted to have a "less ideological" question regarding free education. Finally, the question “Would you agree with a fully free higher level education system that is funded fully through the conventional taxation system?” was put on the ballot.

FEE DCU campaigned hard on campus during the week, discussing with students our vision of a fully free education system and how this could be funded through taxation. We pointed out to students that a simple 2.5% increase in corporation tax would raise €640 million per year, well over the suggested €500 million extra per year that the Hunt Report suggests that we need to fund higher education by 2020.

On Friday evening the results were announced. They were as follows;

Total poll: 1238
Spoils: 91
Total Valid Poll: 1147
#1: Full Tuition Fees - 50 votes
#2: Graduate Tax - 80 votes
#3: Student Loan - 145 votes
#4: Cap Reg Fee at €2000 - 399 votes
#5: Fully Free Education System - 472 votes

This democratic vote means that DCU SU are mandated to build a campaign to fight for a fully free education system. However no sooner was the result announced and a recount had been called by the returning officer. The reason given for this recount was given in an email to FEE DCU. It stated " Because a violation of Article 9 of the DCUSU Constitution: 'Elections and Referenda' has occurred, I have called a full recount which will begin at 10am on Monday" Article 9.5.1.1 states: "The counting procedures shall be in accordance with the system of proportional representation by the single transferable vote method".

It seems logical that if counting of the votes was conducted in an incorrect manner, then nobody could dispute a recount. However, when one realises that DCU students were informed that they would be voting in a system of proportional representation where only their first preference counted, the farcical nature of the electoral committee's actions were exposed.

DCU's referendum website http://dcusureferendum.ie/?page_id=44 and their referendum information campaign advised students how to vote. It stated " There are five questions on the ballot paper. You may express your vote on the ballot paper in one of two ways. The funding model with the greatest first preference wins. If you wish you can also express a second, third, fourth and fifth preference. The additional preferences will not carry, but will instead allow the Students’ Union to better measure the spectrum of opinion, strengthening our lobbying argument.

FEE DCU spoke with both the returning officer and the DCU SU President before the campaign got under way. We were assured that the counting method was to be PR, and not PRSTV. This is what we advised our campaign team, and it is how we advised people to vote. As we were told that 2nd, 3rd and 4th preferences would not affect the result, we never asked people for any other preference than their 1st. For the electoral committee to now call for a recount under the PRSTV system, despite the fact that students were not advised that this method would be used to count the votes is outrageous in the extreme. This type of election scamming would not be out of place in Mugabe's Zimbabwe.

Whilst we accept that the constitution states that counting should be conducted by PRSTV, the fact is that this referendum was a PR referendum, with students advised by DCU SU that only 1st preference votes would count. The result of the first count conducted on Friday is the real result. Any attempt to now recount the votes using a system that students were not advised of before casting their vote is in our view legally wrong. FEE DCU will be seeking legal clarification on this matter and has urged the returning officer not to go ahead with this recount.

We Only Want The Earth (And Free Education for Everyone)

The Responsibility To Protect In Libya: The New Imperialism?

2011-11-15T16:15:00.004+00:00

The idea of military intervention legitimised by ‘humanitarian’ ideals is nothing new. The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) however, has risen to prominence in international relations discourse since the end of the cold war. The R2P concept has created much debate, with some seeing it as an important development that redefines state sovereignty in terms of responsibility to protect citizens rather than borders or territory. Critics however see the concept of R2P as Western liberal imperialism dressed up to cloak its true nature. The recent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military intervention into Libya, based on the concept of R2P, has reignited this debate.

In order to better understand the background to this debate, this essay will provide an overview of the history of the idea of humanitarian intervention leading up to the adoption of the R2P principle at the 2005 UN World Summit. The essay will then move on to set the scene for the events leading up to the NATO military intervention in Libya. After this, an analysis of the arguments based on four categories supporting and opposing the NATO intervention in Libya based the R2P principle will be carried out. Within this analysis of the arguments for and against military intervention based on R2P, a discussion of the merits / demerits of the RP2 concept will be conducted. Finally, the essay will provide a summary of the main points from either side of the debate before concluding that while it is true that the spirit on which the R2P principle is based is morally right, until a further developed principle with strict criteria that govern actions before, during and after interventions, R2P will just be another form of humanitarian imperialism.

Military intervention based on humanitarian ideals has long been a feature of international relations. Colonial adventures of former great powers were often portrayed as in the interests of the colonised, due in the main to the ‘civilising’ of the natives. Famously, Hitler even suggested that the 1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia was to protect the “life and liberty” of Czechoslovak citizens from their government (Bellamy 2010, p.366). Even after the UN Charter entered into force in 1945, with provisions banning the threat or use of force and territorial integrity of states(United Nations 1945) a steady stream of interventions numbering eleven up until 1989 have had humanitarian reasons cited as explanations (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, CD Rom).

Since the end of the cold war, instances of humanitarian interventions have increased comparatively; with twelve interventions including the recent Libya case (Bellamy, 2010, Table 22.1, pp. 360-361). Thomas Weiss explained this as “the notion that human beings matter more than sovereignty radiated brightly, albeit briefly, across the international political horizon of the 1990s” (Cited in (Bellamy 2010, p.364). This renewal of interest in the concept of humanitarian intervention can be explained in a number of ways. Primarily, as Bellamy and Wheeler suggest (2008), due to the high importance placed on sovereignty during The Cold War, armed humanitarian intervention was not seen as a legitimate reason. However, during the 1990s, a number of events led liberal democratic states to push forward with the idea that a state’s sovereignty involved more than territorial integrity, and entailed a responsibility to protect the human rights of citizens.

The spur for the concept of R2P came in the mid-1990s from the writings of Francis Deng in his book ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’. Deng and the co-authors suggested that “responsibility, rather than control, should be seen as the essence of sovereignty”. They went on to suggest that the international community had a responsibility to ensure that states live up to this standard (Orford 2011, pp.13-14). Further events such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the slaughter of over seven thousand men and boys by Serb forces in Srebrenica in 1995 and the non-UN sanctioned NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to force its leader, Slobodan Milosevic to cease violence against Kosovar Albanians in 1999, all prompted the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to enter the debate (Bellamy 2010, p.369). Annan used his annual address to the General Assembly in 1999 to suggest that the concept of sovereignty was being redefined, and it would not be a barrier to action to protect human rights (Bellamy 2010, p.369). All of this led to the Canadian government to set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

The commission’s report in 2001 signalled a new way of thinking about sovereignty and human rights (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). The concept that grew from the report was that sovereignty entailed a responsibility to protect, and if states failed in that responsibility, “the principle of non-interference yields to the responsibility to protect” (Bellamy 2008a, p.620). The report also laid down a number of criteria that the international community should adhere to when contemplating intervention; but also, the international community had the responsibility to prevent suffering where crises were occurring, and to rebuild societies after they occurred (Bellamy 2008a, p.621). The commission’s report was met with both support and scepticism from varying quarters.

The 2005 UN World Summit adopted the principle of R2P, albeit a different watered down version from the recommendations and criteria set out in the ICISS report in 2001. The principles, unanimously accepted by the General Assembly set out three main points. 1; The responsibility of states to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 2; The support of the international community in helping states meet these obligations, and 3; the responsibility of the UN member states to respond when a state is ‘manifestly failing’ to provide the required protection (Bellamy 2008b, pp. 66-97). These principles of R2P were the guiding principles that led to the recent UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Libya.

The start of 2011 saw popular movements in both Tunisia and Egypt mobilise to call for change and an end to decades of dictatorships in both states. The ousting of both Ben Ali and Mubarak led the ‘Arab spring’ to spread across the North Africa / Middle East region. Libya had also been experiencing mass protests in the Benghazi region, sparked by the arrest of a Libyan human rights activist, and the subsequent government crackdown on protesters (France 24, 16-02-2011). As the protests spread and reports of human rights abuses emerged, the UN Security Council issued resolution 1970 on February 26th, which Imposed targeted sanctions on key regime figures including an asset freeze and travel ban, imposed an arms embargo and other arms restrictions, referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), provided for humanitarian assistance and committed to review the measures to strengthen, modify or lift them as the situation progressed (United Nations Security Council 2011a). When the situation in Libya did not improve, on March 17th the UN Security Council issued resolution 1973. This authorized member states to impose a no-fly zone over Libya and to “take all necessary measures” to protect civilians and civilian populated areas in the Libya, excluding an occupation (United Nations Security Council 2011b). The ban excluded humanitarian missions and missions to protect civilians or benefit the Libyan people. The resolution paved the way for UN sanctioned NATO intervention based on the R2P principle. The intervention had both support and opposition.

The arguments for intervention based on the R2P principle can be grouped into four categories. These are; moral, legal, ideological and legitimacy. While the lines between each of these categories can become very blurred, they are useful nonetheless. To begin with, there are many moral arguments of why it was right to intervene in Libya. In keeping with the view that sovereignty entails responsibilities, it has been argued that when states fail in their duties, they lose out on a moral right of non-interference (Caney, 1997 and Teson, 1998 cited in Bellamy 2010, p.363). As the protests in Benghazi developed, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi spoke on national television to declare that “any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed” (ABC, 23-02-2011). On the same day the UN Secretary General insisted that Libya comply with its 2005 commitment to R2P, and the international community comply with its own commitment (Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. 2011, p.839). It was against this background that the UN Security Council issued resolution 1970 mentioned above. The resolution invoked Libya’s responsibility to protect its citizens.

On March 16th, Gaddafi once more issued threats to protesters which Kinsman describes as “chillingly similar to radio broadcasts before the massacre in Rwanda, saying “we will march to cleanse Libya, inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alley by alley, person by person, until the country is cleansed of dirt and scum” (Kinsman 2011, p.84). The following day the UN Security Council issued resolution 1973 which authorized member states to ‘take all necessary measures, to protect civilians. Based on Gaddafi’s pronouncements, it is hard for anyone to argue against a moral justification for intervention when a massacre was being hinted at. Libya had signed up to the R2P principle, and in failing to live up to its standards to prevent crimes against humanity, then morally, intervention was on the agenda.

There are a number of legal arguments that support the intervention. Firstly, in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, Pacific settlement of disputes (United Nations, 1945), the Secretary General personally contacted Gaddafi to persuade him to comply with resolution 1970, and failed (Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. 2011, p.840). Secondly, there has been a suggestion that since the end of The Cold War, there is now a customary right of humanitarian intervention (Lepard, 2002 and Finnemore, 2003 cited in Bellamy 2010, P.364). This concept was used by the then UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in 1991 with regard to the UK’s intervention in Northern Iraq (Bellamy 2010, p.365). Finally, as Chesterman (2011, p.2) suggests, Security Council resolution 1973 was consistent with previous resolutions authorizing ‘all necessary means’. The attempt to have R2P accepted as a new international norm since 2005 can be seen as building upon this concept.

A further line of arguments supporting the intervention are those based on ideology. Through the whole process of the ICISS and the adoption of R2P at the World Summit in 2005, the idea of liberal internationalism has been evident. The idea suggests that the promotion of liberal human rights and democracy through humanitarian interventions is justified. In what has been termed ‘imposing the liberal peace’, it is advocated that international peace and human rights are best served by democratic and peaceful states ensuring humanity’s common interests. It is argued that the ‘liberal peace thesis now reflects the balance of power in the international sphere, and thus provides a justification for liberal interventionist norms (Chandler 2004, pp. 60-61).

A final set of arguments supporting intervention cite legitimacy in their reasoning. To begin with, the recent intervention in Libya was unprecedented insofar as authorization of use of force by the Security Council to prevent an expected massacre was what Kinsman called “the inaugural application of the responsibility to protect” (2011, p.82). The legitimacy of the intervention was also justified on the basis that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) both called on the UN to enforce a no-fly zone based on the R2P principle (Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. 2011, p. 841). The fact that the UN Security Council authorized, and regional organisations called for the intervention based on R2P does provide arguments based legitimacy some credence.

While the arguments for military intervention based on the R2P principle can be somewhat convincing, a critical approach to the four categories of arguments provides an alternative way of viewing the debate. Firstly, the suggestion that morals play a role in interventions based on R2P may be misguided. The argument that the world now has a common morality is to look through rose-tinted liberal spectacles. While it is un-doubtable that morals were the key to the process of adaption of R2P, the intervention into Libya was anything but moral. As the realist perspective points out, states do not engage in genuine humanitarian interventions, as they would be against national interests (Bellamy, A.J., and Wheeler, N.J. 2008, p.527). The words of President Obama, in showing his support of US intervention in Libya are quite telling. He said “America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action” (Chesterman 2011, p.8). This, it can be argued is why the United States rejected the idea of criteria for intervention in the ICISS report, because it could not commit to intervention where it had no national interest (Bellamy 2010, p.371). So, what selectivity of intervention shows, is that for every intervention like Libya, there will be many non-interventions like Darfur and Rwanda. This shows that while morals are bound up in the idea of R2P, they do not play a role in actual interventions. Interventions occur because of national interests, and R2P gives them moral legitimacy.

The legal grounds for the Libya intervention can also be challenged. As Chesterman has rightly pointed out, R2P was never strictly legal, but more political and much more rhetorical. Also, it never changed the prohibition of force without Security Council approval (2011, pp.4-6). While resolution 1973 had Security Council approval, what is telling that the Libya case was far from the portrayed global consensus on the intervention. Five members of the Security Council, including two permanent members, abstained from voting for resolution 1973, and all of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries abstained (Dunne, Gifkins 2011, p.523). Once the operation had begun, concern at the way NATO had interpreted the mandate was echoed by Russia, China and South Africa (Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. 2011, p.845).

Concern on legal grounds must also be expressed over the fact that the conflict in Libya prior to intervention bore all the hallmarks of a civil war. As the protests in Libya turned violent, defections from the government and the army facilitated the formation of a rebel army and the Interim Transitional National Council (Bellamy, A.J., and Wheeler, N.J. 2008, p.838). The principle of non-interference in internal conflicts could easily be used in arguments opposed to intervention. This coupled with the fact that French and UK special forces were “very discreetly on the ground” to train rebel forces (Kinsman 2011, p.86), shows that the legality of the mission was neither black nor white, but firmly in the grey area. As well as this, NATO’s non-apology for killing one of Gaddafi’s children, and three of his grandchildren, as well as a statement in May by the UK’s Chief of Defence, General David Richards that if NATO didn’t up its game, Gaddafi may stay in power, all goes some way to showing that regime change, and not saving civilians, was the prime focus of their military adventure (Rieff 2011, pp.14-15). It could be asked, where was NATO’s responsibility to protect during its intervention?

As John Stuart Mill suggested, democracy and human rights must be won from below and not imposed from above (cited in Bellamy, A.J., and Wheeler, N.J. 2008, p.528). The nature of R2P is that it seeks to impose Western liberal values onto states that do not believe in them. While the basis of R2P can apply to any legitimate society, the discourse of democracy, human rights and Western values that accompany it do not apply to many states. This is an intensely ideological crusade and must be recognised as such. It could be argued, as David Rieff does, that the human rights movement is an unwitting force for the re-colonising of the world (Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley 2003). With the ideas expressed about regime change in the preceding paragraph, it is not difficult to suspect that R2P may be just another tool in the imperialist toolbox.

There are many arguments that an intervention based on R2P lacks legitimacy. When an analysis is carried out of the previous foreign policies of those who readily intervened in Libya, it can be argued that rather than legitimate moral, legal and ideological concerns, it is selfish national interests that drive state actions. Chomsky elaborates on this point when he suggests that R2P is no more than “humanitarian imperialism” (Chomsky 2008), under which Western imperial forces try to cloak their past crimes in a cloth of respectability. Can it be legitimate for Italy, France and the UK to intervene into Libya over Gaddafi using weapons against his people, when Italy, France and the UK were the three biggest European arms suppliers to Libya (The Guardian, 1-03-2011)? Perhaps the best illustration that the R2P intervention into Libya bypassed legitimacy comes from Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and one of the architects of R2P. For Evens, an initial cheerleader of resolution 1973, NATO’s stretching to the limit of the original UN mandate left future cases of UN Security Council sanctioned R2P interventions in doubt. As he wrote recently, “there is a real concern that events in Libya, far from setting a benchmark for future commitment, will prove to be the high water mark from which the tide will now recede” (cited in Rieff 2011, p.15).

So, how do the moral, legal, ideological and legitimacy categories inform our understanding of the arguments for and against military intervention based on the R2P principle? The moral justifications for intervention into Libya in the face of a promised Gaddafi massacre cannot be denied. It must be argued that an intervention was necessary. However, it must also be argued that the reasons for NATO’s intervention were far from moral, and undoubtedly served the national interests of the interveners. The quote from Barack Obama previously mentioned perfectly illustrates this idea. The concept of R2P served to justify the intervention on moral grounds.

Legal arguments that the intervention was sanctioned by the Security Council, and efforts were made by the Secretary General to diffuse a conflict do hold true, however the idea that humanitarian intervention is a customary international norm is fanciful. The fact that the conflict pre-intervention looked distinctly like a civil war, the reported UK and French Special Forces on the ground and the stretching of the UN mandate by NATO into regime change all suggest that that the legal justifications are shaky at best. These occurrences have no doubt damaged the prospects of further interventions based on R2P being sanctioned by the UN Security Council, as Evans suggested. Ideological ideas that liberalism is now a global ideology which should be exported in many ways harks back to a colonial way of thinking that other nations need to be ‘civilised’.

Finally, arguments that the intervention into Libya was legitimate do have some credence. It is unimaginable that the international community could have stood by and witnessed another massacre like Rwanda. However, the fact that the interveners into Libya were also its biggest arms suppliers and the fact that the same interveners have abused the concept of humanitarian intervention in the past, leads to the conclusion that the concept of R2P does legitimise humanitarian imperialism, and it requires a lot of reform and development to enable it to gain comprehensive legitimacy. While the concept of R2P has laudable ideals, it is a concept that requires reworking, perhaps returning to the criteria for intervention set out in the ICISS report in 2001 as a starting point.

Bibliography:

ABC, Defiant Gaddafi issues chilling threat. Available: http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2011/s3146582.htm [2011, 12-11].

Bellamy, A.J., and Wheeler, N.J. 2008, "Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics" in The Globalisation of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, ed. Baylis, J., Owens, P. and Smith, S., 4th edn, Oxford, Oxford, pp. 522-522-539.

Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. 2011, "The new politics of protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect", International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 825-+.

Bellamy, A.J. 2010, "Humanitarian Intervention" in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. A. Collins, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford, pp. 359-359-376.

Bellamy, A.J. 2008a, "The responsibility to protect and the problem of military intervention", International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 615-639.

Bellamy, A.J. 2008b, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Polity, Cambridge.

Chandler, D. 2004, "The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'", International Peacekeeping (13533312), vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 59-81.

Chesterman, S. 2011, "'Leading from Behind': The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya", Ethics & International Affairs, Forthcoming.

Dunne, T. & Gifkins, J. 2011, "Libya and the state of intervention", Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 65, no. 5, pp. 515-529.

France 24, Violent protests rock Libyan city of Benghazi. Available: http://www.france24.com/en/20110216-libya-violent-protests-rock-benghazi-anti-government-gaddafi-egypt-tunisia-demonstration [2011, 11/11].

Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, Conversations with History; Human Rights and Imperialism. David Rieff interview. Available: http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Rieff/rieff-con4.html [2011, 11-12].

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, The Responsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.

Kinsman, J. 2011, "LIBYA: A CASE FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION", POLICY, vol. 81.

Orford, A. 2011, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Rieff, D. 2011, "Saints Go Marching In", National Interest, no. 114, pp. 6-15.

The Guardian, EU arms exports to Libya: Who armed Gaddafi? Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya#data [2011, 11-13].

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. Available: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [2011, 11/09].

United Nations Security Council 2011a, Peace and security in Africa: Resolution 1970 (2011) [Homepage of United Nations], [Online]. Available: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/245/58/PDF/N1124558.pdf?OpenElement [2011, 11-11-2011].

United Nations Security Council 2011b, The situation in Libya: Resolution 1973 (2011 [Homepage of United Nations], [Online]. Available: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement.

New Blog Posts Coming Soon...

2011-09-24T00:18:00.000+01:00

Apologies about the lack of blog posts lately, I have been on an extended break from writing and political activity. I was re-charging the batteries! I will have some stuff to write from next week on once I get back into student politics, and back into the cut and thrust of political activity. Keep an eye out for what's new on the blog!

Stand Up, Get Up - UK Riots 2011

2011-08-16T20:35:00.000+01:00

This is a song that I wrote and recorded in early 2010. I have not had the opportunity to create a video for the track until now (due to my lack of knowledge of Windows Movie Maker), but the recent riots in the UK provided me with the video footage, and the inspiration to match the song to the video. This is the end product. If you like the song or the video, feel free to share it on!

Speeches From The ULA Forum (Part 2)

2011-08-10T17:11:00.003+01:00

The recent United Left Alliance forum in Liberty Hall (25/6/2011) was the first real opportunity for the different factions within it to debate a possible future programme that the ULA should adopt. Following on from my previous post containing videos of the first plenary session, below are the main speeches from the debate from the floor on the first plenary session "The left response to the crisis" and the speeches from the second plenary session of the day from Seamus Healy, Declan Bree, Richard Boyd Barrett and Joe Higgins.

Debate from the floor (1st plenary session)

Seamus Healy TD

Cllr Declan Bree

Richard Boyd Barrett TD

Joe Higgins TD

The Labour Party: A Party Of Lies And Broken Promises

2011-08-03T19:20:00.004+01:00

A recent Facebook rant made from the profile of Labour Youth (Dublin South-West) on a ULA event page caused a bit of embarrassment to the national leadership of that organisation, who moved quickly to have the comments removed and went on to issue an apology on their national Facebook page. A young man named Sean Glennon also went onto the national Facebook page to say it was he who had posted the comments, and that he was not a member of Labour youth and did not agree with their values and policies.

However, since then it has emerged that the young man who posted the comments was in fact a prominent Labour Youth member, and was an administrator on their Facebook page. While the comments could be passed off as juvenile naivety, I believe that the whole debacle provides a deeper and more disturbing insight into the policies of the current Labour Party in Ireland.

These are the comments that were posted on the ULA event page. >>

The young man who posted the comments, Sean Glennon, came out later and said he was not a party member and did not agree with their values, yet if you look at his blog he quite explicitly explains that he is " currently a member of the Irish Labour Party having joined in 2008 at the age of 15." His initial rush to distance himself from the party seems to have been on the direction of the Labour Youth leadership in the hope of damage limitation, and perhaps to portray the comments as some form of hacking incident. Once it became clear that Sean Glennon was indeed a party member, a Labour Youth member informed me that "the person involved was immediately disciplined and removed as an admin on the page." As these pictures show, Sean Glennon is quite a prominent member of Labour Youth, and not someone who is new to political activity.

I believe that the photo in the middle is one that is particularly telling, as the sentiments that were expressed in Glennon's Facebook rant were in fact no more than a bare, unconcealed and unpolished version of Joan Burton's recent viewpoints and policy proposals in relation to the dole being a 'lifestyle choice' . Glennon's comments on the proposed scrapping of the JLC Sunday pay rates also show the level of Labour Party acquiescence to Fine Gael policy, now that they are in government with them.

Joan Burton morphing into a Margaret Thatcher like figure is just the latest in a long line of betrayals from the Labour Party towards the working class base that voted them into government. Other recent betrayals have come in the form of Ruairi Quinn, Education Spokesperson for the Labour Party, signing the USI pledge on behalf of the Labour Party promising not to reintroduce 3rd level fees or cut student grants in the next Government. As we all now know, Labour had no intention of keeping this promise to students, and fees have been upped to €2000, and the grant has been cut for many. Since the Labour party have got into bed with Fine Gael, it has become hard to see which party has the more 'right-wing' agenda.

The complete turn 'right' that the Labour Party has undergone is perhaps best illustrated by the issue of water charges. Pre-election, in their manifesto, the Labour Party were opposed to the introduction of water charges. Yet now that they are in government, we see them implementing the 'household charge', water charges by another name. If one digs deep enough, they will find some interesting election material from Eammon Gilmore on the issue of water charges as this picture shows. During his days in the Worker's Party, Gilmore was encouraging workers not to pay this unjust tax. I wonder what his advice will be now that he is in Government? So, while Sean Glennon's rant on Facebook will be passed off as a juvenile prank, the record of the Labour Party as one that sells out the working class is clear to see, and they should be exposed for this at every opportunity.

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth.

The Enough Campaign And The ULA

2011-07-20T22:27:00.002+01:00

The 'Enough' campaign's recent #IrishRevolution July16th protest demonstration drew a crowd of between 400 to 1000 people (depending on who you ask) onto the streets of Dublin's city centre. The event didn't quite live up to its billing, but was an energetic and encouraging demonstration nonetheless, by groups opposed to the EU / IMF deal, and other issue specific groups. The Enough campaign was initiated by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) to try to create a broad opposition campaign against the EU / IMF deal, and to demand a referendum on that deal. Whilst this type of initiative is to be welcomed, I believe that its demands do not go far enough. I also believe that future campaigns ought to be initiated, developed and prepared for under the banner of the United Left Alliance (ULA). Unfortunately, the SWP don't agree with this, and prefer to push ahead with their own 'Enough' campaign.

The Enough campaign attempted to be a 'catch-all', cross-class movement to channel the anger that is felt in society over the level of cuts and austerity that we are all experiencing. However, many people (including myself) have asked, why has the campaign not been the product of a combined ULA effort? What I have been informed (I am open to correction if I'm wrong) is that initial discussions were convened by Richard Boyd Barrett to construct a broad campaign and the SWP and People Before Profit (PBP) wanted a movement to be based on proposals such as "jobs, fairness and democracy," "cancel the debt", and a demand for a referendum on the EU / IMF deal. This, they argued would enable the movement to attract broad layers of society, including right wingers such as David McWilliams or Shane Ross and Stephen Donnelly in the Dail technical group that the ULA in a component of. After the Enough campaign was set up, the Socialist Party was asked to come on board with this campaign but disagreed with limiting the demands to these proposals, and argued that the movement should demand a complete break with the capitalist system and based on working class struggle, which would of course mean less right wing support. This disagreement meant that the SWP went on to create the Enough campaign without the agreement of the ULA.

I believe that the SWP was wrong in taking this approach. If the ULA is to be the force with which young people, workers and the unemployed identify with as this crisis intensifies, then each component part of the ULA should be putting their full weight behind attempts to grow the alliance. Creating campaigns that are not under the banner of the ULA is, I believe, detrimental to this goal. This crisis of capitalism is unprecedented. Each component part of the ULA agrees that we fundamentally require a break with the capitalist system. If that is what we all believe then that is what we must advocate!

During the discussions that decided on the programme that the ULA would have before the recent general election, the Socialist Party argued that the ULA should put forward explicit socialist policies, such as nationalisation, democratic public control of the economy etc etc. The SWP and PBP argued for a less explicit programme that shyed away from these socialist demands. The resulting programme was one of compromise.

During a discussion I had with a prominent member of the SWP on the day of the Enough demonstration in which I asked him why the campaign was not a ULA one, he informed me that creating a campaign under the ULA banner would dissuade the broader layers of society from taking part in such a demonstration. In my opinion, if one follows this line of argument, what that SWP member was suggesting was that the ULA programme as it stands is 'too left wing' for many, and that the Enough campaign is sufficiently reformist as to attract the broad layers that were hoped for. If this is the line of argument that the SWP is taking towards the ULA, then the question must be asked, how far away from left wing / socialist policies does the SWP want the ULA to go?

The crisis of capitalism that we are experiencing is one that is of epic proportions. It has already led to the growth of huge anti-capitalist movements and sentiments across Greece and Spain. It is inevitable that such movements will emerge here in the coming period. For the ULA to based itself on weak reformist demands would be to fundamentally misjudge the the nature of this crisis and the consciousness that will develop as it continues.

If the ULA is explicit in calling for a break from capitalism, is explicit in calling for a democratic socialist society and is explicit in what it stands for, then the movements that will emerge will gravitate towards the ULA. To water down the ULA's policies towards what the Enough campaign advocated, in an attempt to attract a broader layer now, would in my opinion be a grave underestimation of what lies ahead and of the class consciousness that will develop from it.

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth

Debunking The Myths Of Irish Capitalism

2011-07-13T21:02:00.001+01:00

There is no alternative. We must rely on foreign direct investments and on the private sector to create jobs. Private is more 'efficient' than public. An entrepreneurial spirit will drive economic growth. These are just some of the mantras that we are exposed to on a daily basis from economic commentators, whom our mainstream media promote as 'experts'. They have a monopoly over our airwaves and newspapers, and use it to espouse their ideas as if they were common sense facts that are irrefutable. However, with a serious analysis of Irish capitalism it is quite evident that their mantras are neither common sense nor facts, and are very refutable indeed. A look through the figures on the Irish economy reveal a very different picture to the one painted by our government and the economic 'experts,' who argue that an economic recovery based on real job growth is to be achieved through attracting foreign direct investments (FDI's) into the country, and a strong Irish entrepreneurial spirit.

Since its foundation, the Irish state has failed to create a strong domestic manufacturing base on which to grow its economy. This has led to the situation where we are heavily reliant on, and at the mercy of foreign investment. It was hoped and expected that the huge amount of investment that occurred in Ireland during the boom years would encourage and facilitate a strong growth in our domestic economy, through the learning of foreign skills and expertise, and the fostering of entrepreneurial opportunities. This has not transpired, and the Irish capitalist class remain notably weak. Currently, the Irish private sector that does exist accounts for only 10 percent of our exports. This figure shows the fundamentally weak nature of indigenous Irish capitalism. Between 2000 and 2007, at the height of the Celtic Tiger period, Irish businesses that based themselves in the export sector did not, as one might expect, create any new jobs but in fact shed 11,000 of them. Also during this period, Irish venture capital invested 1.5 billion here, yet invested 60 billion in foreign property deals. If our own private export sector could not create jobs during the boom years, how can we realistically expect them to create jobs now during an economic depression?

The idea that Multinational Corporations (MNC's) will provide a route out of this crisis for the 440,000 unemployed is another myth that requires debunking. In Ireland, MNC's account for around 140,000 workers. This is only around 7 to 8 percent of our total workforce. This figure is quite surprising considering the amount of emphasis that the government places on this sector. MNC's also account for 90 percent of Ireland's total exports, with pharmaceutical companies accounting for 60 percent of that figure. Since 2005, exports in pharmaceuticals here grew by 30 percent, yet during that same period there was no corresponding job growth in that sector. Their real effect on the economy is limited at best, with much of their raw materials imported and their profits repatriated. The fact that MNC's account for 90 percent of our exports, yet still only employ 7 to 8 percent of the total workforce is both a damning indictment on indigenous capitalism, and an indicator that a recovery based on FDI will not provide the required jobs to take the hundreds of thousands off the dole queues.

So what do all these figures indicate? They indicate that the daily mantras that we hear from the government and the mainstream media that we must keep our corporation tax rate low, that we must become more 'competitive' through lowering wages, that we must satisfy the markets and that if we do all of this, we will see an influx of FDI which will create the jobs needed to get us out of the unemployment crisis, are mantras that are based on flawed analysis of the nature of the Irish economy. The figures also indicate that a different strategy will be required to create the jobs that the thousands that are emigrating and the many thousands more who languish on the dole need. If, as is evident, the Irish and international investors are unable to create these jobs, then the state must step in and provide them. With two simple measures this could be achieved.

Firstly, the banks must be nationalised and taken under democratic public ownership so that they are run in the interests of ordinary people in society and not for private profit. This would allow for representatives from all sectors of society to run these banks in the interests of society, in a way that provides cheap credit so that communities, Small and medium sized businesses etc would be able to create the jobs that we need to economy moving again. Secondly, the state must nationalise the major profit making industries in Ireland. The knowledge and skills to run all of these industries are already here, but a system of private profit leaves hundreds of thousands on the dole while billions sit unproductively in bank vaults. These are indeed revolutionary measures, but they are ones that would change the nature of Irish society. They also pose the revolutionary questions, if capitalism can't provide the people of Ireland with a guaranteed job and a decent standard of living, then what kind of system will?

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth.

The Crisis Of Capitalism: What Lies Ahead?

2011-07-12T18:06:00.004+01:00

We are often told by the innumerable economic commentators on the issue, that we are currently experiencing the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. However, the current crisis is in many ways different to others because of its globalised nature and because of the ‘advanced’ form of capitalism it exposes. It must be recognised that capitalism as a form of investment in manufacturing has been in decline since the 1970s, with modern ‘advanced’ capitalism now based on financial speculation. The crisis we are experiencing illustrates that far from being part of a boom and bust process, the inherent greed that capitalism predicates itself upon has led to the system destroying itself from the inside out.

What we have witnessed recently is a systemic breakdown in the workings of the neo-liberal market system, where free markets with light touch regulation rule as the most efficient way to allocate goods and services. This light touch regulation has facilitated the unproductive system of financial speculation to replace traditional capitalist investment in manufacturing. This process has been occurring since the 1970s and what we are now witnessing is the system’s self-destruction. However, in contrast to the traditional workings of capitalism, where employers continuously exploit workers to drive down cost to increase their profits, this advanced stage of capitalism builds upon that strategy, and has used the political system it has built up around itself to inflict the losses of capitalist gamblers onto the backs of the working class around the world.

The capitalism we are now experiencing is more parasitic than ever before and this, I believe, will be its downfall. This system has been and will be further exposed for what it truly is, as a corruptible system driven by profit and greed, where the capitalist gets wealthier off the backs of ordinary workers, whilst the gap between the rich and poor grows steadily. All of this is being facilitated by a political class that is supposed to represent the people. It won’t take long for Irish people to realise the true nature of this system, as they have done in Spain and Greece recently, and look for an alternative.

The ideology of the capitalist contains an inherent contradiction. As the capitalist strives to lower the cost of business and the wages it pays to the generators of wealth, the worker, those same workers have less purchasing power in their lives and thus become alienated from the products of their labour. The austerity process that the agents of capitalism are currently implementing onto society, to pay for the gambling losses of financial speculators will have the same alienating effect through the unemployment it creates. The unemployed or alienated worker provides today’s Socialist with an opportunity to promote class consciousness. The pace of any economic recovery, if there is one, will be torturously slow, owing to capitalism's inherent contradiction. What we will now enter into is a period of stagnation (slow or no economic growth). The inadaptability of capitalism indicates that the promised recovery will not emerge for a long time. This period that lies ahead will provide the opportunity for a workers fight back and a move towards a socialist future.

Thus far, the current crisis has been a missed opportunity to forge a militant working class fight back in Ireland, although our comrades in other countries such as Greece and Spain have made more progress. There is now a growing necessity for this fight back, and I believe it is not far away. It will be spurred on by a growing class consciousness which will develop through the coming period of economic stagnation, high unemployment and struggle. Socialists everywhere must be prepared and ready. To achieve victory, a combined, unified and galvanised Socialist movement of working class people, spurred on by a growth in class consciousness and a rejection of sell-out politicians and trade union leaders, is required. The task of today’s Socialist is to facilitate the education of the masses in class consciousness and to be prepared and ready for the inevitable fight towards a Socialist society that lies ahead.

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth.

Speeches From The ULA Forum

2011-07-08T01:38:00.004+01:00

The recent United Left Alliance forum in Liberty Hall (25/6/2011) was the first real opportunity for the different factions within it to debate a possible future programme that the ULA should adopt. Below are the main speeches from the first plenary session of the day, with an introduction from Ailbhe Smith from People Before Profit, and speeches from Professor Terrence McDonough from NUI Galway, Kevin McLoughlin from the Socialist Party and Kieran Allen from the Socialist Workers Party. In a previous post I have already put forward my views on the internal debates within the ULA. By watching these speeches, you can make your own mind up.

Here is the opening speech from Ailbhe Smith from People Before Profit

Next up was Professor Terrence McDonough from NUI Galway

Followed up by Kevin McLaughlin from the Socialist Party

And finally Kieran Allen from the Socialist Workers Party

Unfortunately, I don't yet have the video from the second plenary session, but as soon as it is available, I will add it on here...

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth

The Race To The Bottom Continues...(High Court sanctions cuts to the low paid)

2011-07-07T16:13:00.004+01:00

The news that the High Court of Ireland has upheld a challenge from the 'Quick Service Food Alliance' on the constitutionality of laws setting the mandatory minimum wages of 200,000 low paid workers, is indicative of the race to the bottom in pay and conditions of workers in Irish society. It is also illustrative of the rotten system we live under. When High Court judges, who on hugely over-inflated salaries themselves refuse to take a pay cut, an issue that will need be put to a referendum, can condemn the lowest paid workers in Irish society into further poverty, we know we live in a screwed up system. The Joint Labour Commission (JLC) wage setting mechanism was there to set minimum pay rates for workers in the retail, bar, restaurant, hairdressing and catering sectors amongst others. These workers, most often women, students or migrants, already victim to low pay, will now face the prospect of further pay cuts in their meagre salaries.

The case to slash the pay of the lowest paid in society was taken by John Grace Fried Chicken of Cork and the Quick Service Food Alliance, which represents a group of fast food outlets. This "alliance" includes the likes of Burger King, Subway, Abrakababra and Supermacs among its ranks. "Speaking after the ruling, Mr Grace said the pay of existing workers in fast food sector would not be affected by today’s ruling. However, he said that new employees taken on in the future could have to work on inferior terms and conditions such as the national minimum wage." Anyone who is familiar with the recent case of the Davenport Hotel workers case will know that this type of talk from employers means nothing, and as soon as employers can, they will attempt to reduce the pay of existing employees wherever possible. Luckily for the Davenport Hotel workers, they had the organisational capacity to tackle their employers and win their case. However, many thousands of young women, students and migrants will not be in the same position.

A quick look at the companies that took this case to the courts shows that hugely profitable companies are using the cover of the financial crisis to attack the pay of workers on the basis that they can't afford to take on new staff. For example, Supermacs, a member of the 'Quick Service Food Alliance' enjoyed a fourfold increase in pretax profits to €5.2 million in 2009. The same company profits increased by 18 per cent to €6.2 million in 2010. Abrakebabra was on such a sound financial footing last year that it was able to purchase O'Brien's Sanwich Bars when the company went into liquidation. It was pointed out during the court case that "workers in the catering sector have the lowest average earnings across any sector." Disregarding this, these Irish companies, along with multi-nationals like Subway and Burger king want to cut their pay.

This judgement will give employers a free reign to implement the Fine Gael led government's plans to reduce the wages of many workers, across all sectors of the economy, to the minimum wage of €8.65 per hour. This, we are told, will make the Irish economy "competitive" again. The reality of the situation is that it will create very few jobs, and will only further enrich employers who are already raking it in. The judgement will also leave the sheepish Labour Party TD's free to say that their hands are now tied on the issue, and that there is now nothing they can do. In reality, it was quite obvious that Labour had no intention of standing up for the low paid on this issue, as my previous correspondence with Labour TD Sean Kenny illustrated.

The race to the bottom in pay and conditions of workers continues apace in Irish society, and will continue to do so unless workers get organised and make a stand against these attacks. Both employer's groups IBEC and ISME, as well as Chambers Ireland have campaigned and lobbied to have these wage cuts implemented. Organised capitalists are colluding to enrich themselves further off the backs of Irish workers. It is well past time that organised labour, through their unions, should be fighting back. Unfortunately, the leadership of ICTU lack any real desire for a fight on these issues. Workers need to become vocal and challenge the desperate leadership from ICTU that they are receiving, whilst at the same time getting behind the only political organisations that are truly committed to fighting for the rights of workers, the Socialist Party and the United Left Alliance.

Be Moderate? We Only Want The Earth.