A Mid-East Journal

Operation “Dawn of Yemen”

2026-10-20T04:41:11.382+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 20 October 2026

Early in September the Houthis launched a rapid and unexpected offensive along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. They captured the strategically important port of Mocha and pushed south towards the Bab al-Mandeb strait, gaining roughly 150km of coastline and threatening the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

The offensive turned Bab al-Mandeb into a second maritime pressure point in Iran’s conflict with the United States. Before it, American naval and military resources could concentrate on the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s principal economic lever. The Houthi advance put the Red Sea route into play as well, giving Iran potential leverage over both of the region’s main oil-shipping corridors.

Oil prices are determined at the margin, so even when actual lost production is relatively small, the mere threat of disruption can produce a large price increase. That is exactly what happened in September. Brent crude, the principal international benchmark price for crude oil, had averaged about $89 per barrel for most of 2026. After the seizure of Mocha, despite there not yet being an equivalent actual loss of global oil production, it went above $110. It now sits just below $110..

The Houthi assault was too vitally significant to go unanswered. On October 4, the internationally recognized Yemeni government, backed by Saudi Arabia, launched a major counter-offensive. With substantial Saudi air and naval support, government forces attacked the areas recently gained by the Houthis.

In its public statements the Yemeni government has emphasized that its long-term aim is national reunification.

Accordingly when Rashad al-Alimi, president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) announced the operation on October 5, he described it as an effort to restore state institutions, retake Sana’a, and defeat the Houthi movement. Probably more in hope than expectation, he dubbed it "Operation Dawn of Yemen".

Reuters suggests that Saudi Arabia’s more immediate strategic requirement is to recover the Bab al-Mandeb area and remove the leverage the Houthis acquired in September.

Former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Michael Ratney, put that narrower objective succinctly: “Ideally, it would be a fairly limited operation to retake coastal areas and get back to normal maritime traffic.”

The coalition’s military effort is considerable. Its spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, said that 100 fighter aircraft participated in the opening phase, and that 324 “high-value targets” had been destroyed. The coalition also announced round-the-clock support for Yemeni ground forces and air cover over Bab al-Mandeb, while naval operations have extended north to Hodeidah governorate. The coalition says it struck weapons depots and facilities storing explosive-laden boats and naval mines, and thwarted a planned attack on southern Red Sea waterways.

Who are these Houthis, who call their movement Ansar Allah and are perhaps the most blatantly antisemitic of all jihadist groups? They brandish a flag inscribed with the words: “A curse on the Jews”, in addition to such slogans as “Death to America” and “Death to Israel.”

They emerged in the late 1980s from within Yemen’s Zaydi Shiite communities in the northern Saada region. The current conflicted state stems back to the sadly misnamed “Arab spring” uprisings of 2011. Inside Yemen they resulted in mass protests against the long dictatorial rule of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Saleh was forced to step down in favor of his vice-president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. In 2015 Hadi tried to sponsor a revised constitution for Yemen that envisaged a federal system split between northerners and southerners. The Iran-backed Houthi rebels rejected it.

Although the Houthis are fundamentalist Shiites, Yemen’s ex-president Saleh, a Sunni Muslim, decided to collaborate with them in a bid to return to power.

It was through Saleh that the Houthis were able to gain control of most of the Yemeni military, including its air force. As a result, and supported with military hardware from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, they overran large tracts of the country, and in September 2014 captured Yemen’s capital city, Sanaa.

Subsequently they expanded their control across much of north-western Yemen.

Saudi Arabia, alarmed at the prospect of Iran gaining a foothold on the Arabian peninsula, formed a coalition to support Hadi’s government, and intervened in March 2015 to beat back the Houthis. The internal struggle for power has continued ever since, and despite years of coalition air operations and ground fighting, the Houthis have retained their north-western power base.

A UN-brokered truce in April 2022 substantially reduced fighting. Although it formally expired in October that year, the UN acknowledges that relative restraint had continued until the present escalation.

The Houthis’ conflict with Saudi Arabia has been both religious and political. Zaydis opposed the spread of Saudis’ Sunni Wahhabi influence on religious grounds. It was the Saudis’ political and military influence in Yemen that the Houthis resisted.

From 2022 Riyadh cut back substantially on its own military activity, attempting a policy of support for the PLC by way of diplomacy. Even so, it continued to fund and arm anti-Houthi forces. In the past year it has increasingly reasserted direct military involvement, culminating in its current support for the offensive against the Houthis.

Although the ground fighting is being conducted primarily by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces rather than Saudi troops, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has been a significant driver of the counter-offensive.

Following the Houthi advance toward Mocha and Bab al-Mandab in September, he personally pressed US President Donald Trump to strike them. Trump declined direct US participation, but Washington subsequently provided intelligence and targeting support.

MBS's likely strategic objectives are to restore the Red Sea security buffer by pushing the Houthis away from Bab al-Mandab and the Saudi-facing Red Sea coast. He is probably not at one with the PLC in seeing the conflict as another attempt to win the Yemeni civil war.

The rapid Houthi gains were a serious setback to the Saudi-backed Yemeni order. Reversing them, even partially, demonstrates that Saudi Arabia can still defend the security of its southern frontier.

MBS's immediate strategic calculation is probably to deny the Houthis — and by extension Iran — a durable position at Bab al-Mandab, protect Saudi maritime and energy interests, restore Saudi leverage, and enter any eventual negotiation from a position of strength, backed now by the offer of Egyptian support.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia’s offensive against the Houthis aims to secure Bab el-Mandeb", 20 October 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-912142

Britain’s breach with Israel

2026-10-13T22:39:42.737+01:00

Published in the new issue of the Jerusalem Report, dated 26 October 2026

On October 1 the UK’s Daily Telegraph quoted a senior Israeli official accusing the British government of being “hell-bent on destroying a relationship that has saved countless British lives.”

Strong language. What sequence of events could have led him to this conclusion?

Early in September Israeli intelligence warned MI5, Britain’s secret service, that an Iranian-backed attack was imminent on an air base in England used by the US Air Force. The very next day Ed Miliband, the UK foreign secretary, announced plans to ban the import of goods from Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

In the early hours of September 27, armed police intercepted three suspicious vans near RAF Fairford in England. Fairford is an airbase used by the US Air Force. Five British men in their twenties were arrested. The men were later released on bail while the investigation continued. Former counter-terrorism police officers have since speculated that the incident was a “hostile reconnaissance operation”, intended as a “dry-run” for a more sinister attack.

Britain’s prime minister, Andy Burnham, said there were “strong indications” that Iran had played a part in the suspected plot, and on October 1 police arrested a 27-year-old British-Iranian on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts. He too was later released on bail, and the investigation continues.

That same day, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was interviewed on Fox News.

“Do you want to hear how absurd things are there?” he said, referring to Britain. “And how far the anti-Israeli propaganda has gone? We gave the Brits the intel, that there was going to be an attack, and it’s an Iranian-sponsored attack, and pretty much the next day they slap sanctions on us. It’s wild, the caving in. The collapse before the Islamist-Marxist alliance is very dangerous for the future of the West.”

Netanyahu is, of course, in the run-up to a vital general election. His political future is at stake. He needs to project as strong and positive an image as possible. Opposing Britain’s tougher pro-Palestinian approach gives him that opportunity.

The political situation in the UK is similarly abnormal. Andy Burnham has been the UK’s prime minister only since July. He was shoe-horned into office following the resignation of Sir Keir Starmer, so he has no direct mandate from the electorate. As a new broom, he needed to gain the strong support of the Labour majority in the House of Commons. One certain way was to announce an even more stringent pro-Palestinian policy than his hapless predecessor, who had gone so far as to recognize the non-existent state of Palestine.

So it was that on September 8 Britain’s foreign secretary, Ed Miliband, came to the Commons to announce a “reset in our relations with Israel“, including a sweeping new sanctions regime targeting Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

This new deterioration in UK-Israeli relations stems back to October 7, 2023.

When details of Hamas’s attack on Israel first emerged, Starmer, then leader of the opposition Labour party, stood shoulder-to-shoulder with then-UK prime minister Rishi Sunak, then-US president Joe Biden, and most Western political leaders, in proclaiming Israel’s right to defend itself.

Unfortunately for Starmer, his moral stance was not acceptable to two entities he faced on his own political terrain. One was the powerful hard-left element within his party; the other the strong Muslim presence in some Labour-held constituencies.

Britain’s general election in July 2024 resulted in a massive win for the Labour party. Starmer came to power with a huge majority. But the activities of a brand new organization calling itself The Muslim Vote cost the Labour party five seats, slashed Labour majorities in a fair number of other constituencies, and placed a caucus of rabidly anti-Israel MPs in the House of Commons.

Traditionally, general elections in Britain turn on domestic issues. This time though, for one bloc of ethnic minority voters a foreign war taking place 3000 miles away was more important than all the usual domestic concerns. Any support for Israel, justified or not, is anathema to pro-Palestinian activists. The Muslim Vote was an alliance of 23 such organisations. Its purpose was to unseat those MPs deemed insufficiently hostile to Israel, particularly Labour party members.

They succeeded beyond their expectations. Once voted into parliament, the five candidates who beat their Labour opponents formed themselves into a new pro-Palestinian bloc – the Independent Alliance – headed by Jeremy Corbyn, one-time leader of the Labour party.

Their success shook Starmer, despite his huge majority. When in November 2024 the International Criminal Court (ICC), alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity, issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and cabinet minister Yoav Gallant, Starmer declared that the UK “respects the independence of the ICC”, and indicated that Israel’s prime minister would face arrest if he entered Britain.

A new political factor came into play in September 2025 when Zack Polanski, a charismatic young politician, won the leadership of the Green Party.

He rapidly repositioned the party as a much more assertive, left-wing national force. In a February by-election the Greens took a parliamentary seat from Labour, and in May won the mayoralty of the London borough of Hackney.

These successes precipitated the eventual removal of Keir Starmer as prime minister. Polanski then decided to contest Starmer’s vacated parliamentary seat, but in the by-election on October 8 he was beaten by the Labour party candidate.

His defeat has been ascribed in no small measure to the furore created within the party and the media by the motion debated at the Green party conference on October 4 that defined Zionism as racism, advocating a single Palestinian state. It passed, with 55.7% of those voting in favour, and is now party policy.

Israel’s instant response was to ban Polanski from entering the country.

Although Burnham has called the Green party motion "completely wrong", his government gains domestic credit by maintaining an uncompromising stand over settlements. Meanwhile Netanyahu gains domestic credit by depicting Britain as an unreliable ally.

An uneasy compromise has been reached over the closure – or rather the renaming – of Britain’s consulate in east Jerusalem, but the danger is that the spat could evolve into a mutually reinforcing cycle.

The forthcoming Israeli elections may lead to a resolution.

Published by the Jerusalem Post online titled "Israel's intel protects Britain; Britain's politics punish Israel", 13 October 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-911506

Published by Eurasia Review, 14 October 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14102026-britains-breach-with-israel-oped/

A terror-free Turkey?

2026-10-13T05:50:22.636+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 13 October 2026

On August 10, 2026, the Turkish parliament passed, by 467 votes in the 600-seat legislature, a law putting into effect what Ankara calls the “Terror-Free Turkey” process – a euphemism for the disbandment and disarmament of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK is designated a terrorist organization not only by the Turkish government, but by the US and the EU.

The overwhelming majority by which the law passed was made possible because it was supported not only by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AK party and its political allies, but also, perhaps surprisingly, by that long-time thorn in Erdogan’s flesh, the pro-Kurdish DEM Party. That unusual accord between long-time political opponents sealed a compromise that had been decades in the making: the dissolution of the PKK in exchange for unprecedented leniency for its former members.

The new law provides a mechanism for suspending certain prosecutions relating to PKK offences, and for deferring the execution of some prison sentences. Most important, it establishes a framework intended to facilitate the reintegration of eligible former PKK members into civilian life. The Associated Press reported that the measure could potentially affect approximately 4,000 PKK members not directly involved in violent crimes.

The new law becomes operative only after Turkish security authorities have determined that the PKK and affiliated structures have indeed ended their armed existence and surrendered the weapons and ammunition under their control. This must then be confirmed by the National Security Council and published in the Official Gazette.

These requirements are not as oppressive as may first appear. The ground has been well prepared, and the PKK is ready and willing to comply.

The Kurds are an ethnic group of some 30-40 million people. They inhabit a contiguous mountainous area divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Most live in Turkey, where they constitute roughly one-fifth of the population.

For decades Erdogan, together with many in the Turkish establishment, believed that granting their Kurdish citizens political autonomy could weaken the unity of the state. Some feared it would be a first step toward an independent sovereign Kurdish state, particularly after the constitutional recognition of the autonomous Kurdistan administration in northern Iraq in 2005.

These fears were compounded during the Syrian civil war, starting in 2011. Kurdish forces established autonomous institutions in northern Syria, creating the possibility of a Kurdish-controlled zone along much of Turkey’s southern border. Links between the Kurdish forces in Syria and the PKK were perceived by Erdogan as a security threat.

He had already authorized military operations against PKK bases in northern Iraq. Turkish aircraft struck them in late 2007, and this was followed by a major ground offensive in February 2008. Subsequent PKK attacks on the Turkish military in 2011 led Erdogan to repeat air strikes against them, alongside intensified fighting in southeastern Turkey.

The current Terror-Free Turkey initiative is not the first time that Erdogan has attempted to hold out an olive branch to the PKK. In late 2012, when still prime minister, his government began a serious negotiation process with Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK, imprisoned on Imralı island since 1999.

The initiative produced a positive result in March 2013, when Ocalan issued a message calling for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkey. Armed resistance ceased for a time, but the ceasefire did not hold.

A historic moment came on February 28, 2015. At a joint press conference involving government representatives and leaders of the HDP (the Peoples’ Democratic Party), a message from Ocalan was read out calling on the PKK to take the “strategic and historical decision” to end the armed struggle.

It looked like a genuine call to transition from armed conflict to politics. Yet once again the ceasefire unraveled. During 2015 a series of incidents led Erdogan to resume airstrikes against PKK positions in northern Iraq.

The resulting fighting was extremely destructive. Almost 3,000 people were killed between July 2015 and July 2017. Overall Reuters estimates that since 1984 the conflict has killed more than 40,000 people, including combatants and civilians.

This second attempt at resolving the PKK issue is quite different, triggered by a quite unexpected event.

In October 2024 Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Erdogan's principal parliamentary ally, unexpectedly suggested that Ocalan be brought from prison to address parliament and call upon the PKK to dissolve itself.

The initiative was all the more startling because Bahceli had historically taken one of the hardest nationalist positions against the Kurdish political movement. Erdogan described the development as a potentially “historic window of opportunity.”

A dramatic address by Ocalan to the Turkish parliament – akin, perhaps to that by Anwar Sadat to Israel’s Knesset in 1977 – never took place. But there were a series of meetings between DEM politicians and Ocalan at Imrali prison, and in February 2025 Ocalan issued a crucial statement.

He called upon the PKK to abandon the armed struggle and lay down its arms, to dissolve itself and pursue the Kurdish question through democratic politics.

The important difference from 2015 is that the current process does not seek yet another ceasefire, but explicitly envisages the end of the PKK as an organization – an outcome announced in May 2025, when the PKK said its 12th Congress had decided to dissolve the organization and end its armed struggle.

In July 2025, Ocalan appeared in a rare video and said the armed struggle was over. He called for a transition toward democratic politics and asking the Turkish parliament to establish a mechanism to oversee disarmament and the broader peace process.

The result is Turkey's August 2026 law – a legal mechanism for implementing the PKK's decision to dissolve and disarm. But its principal provisions are conditional on verified PKK disarmament, and that step has not yet been taken. The process is at its most delicate point.

Currently the debate is focused heavily on where and how PKK weapons are to be surrendered and who verifies the operation. Reports indicate that Turkish intelligence and security officials have been dealing with counterparts in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Syria over precisely these practical questions.

A terror-free Turkey is in the balance.

Gaza’s comeback kid

2026-10-06T06:46:12.761+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 6 October 2026

On July 9, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas announced that parliamentary elections would be held on November 28 in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. In my original text I wrote: "If they indeed take place, they will be the first for 20 years." Well, of course, Abbas has now postponed them to the latter end of 2027.

The last, in 2006, were won by Hamas. They were followed by a violent power struggle with Fatah, culminating in Hamas gaining control of Gaza in 2007. Ever since, the continuing popularity of Hamas with the Palestinian people has inhibited Abbas, fearful of losing power, from holding elections. Perhaps it is the Trump peace plan for Gaza, currently being implemented by the Board of Peace and committed to disempowering Hamas, that has encouraged Abbas to try to regain some democratic credibility by approving new elections.

In any event, the announcement has brought Mohammed Dahlan once again to the forefront of the Palestinian political arena.

Dahlan was born in Khan Younis refugee camp in Gaza in 1961. He joined Fatah's youth movement as a teenager and was repeatedly imprisoned by Israel. Following the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, Abbas appointed him head of the Palestinian Preventive Security Force in Gaza. He became so powerful that the Strip was nicknamed "Dahlanistan".

Their relationship subsequently collapsed amid growing fears within Abbas’s camp that Dahlan was being primed by the US to succeed him. Dahlan was expelled from Fatah in 2011 amid allegations of corruption and involvement in a plot to assassinate Yasser Arafat, allegations he denied. He went into exile in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where he became an adviser to Mohamed bin Zayed, now UAE president.

By removing Dahlan from Palestinian politics Abbas unintentionally converted him into a regional political operator who was no longer dependent upon the PA. Over the subsequent decade Dahlan accumulated regional connections and became an important political operator for Abu Dhabi. He also developed relationships in Egypt and elsewhere and maintained connections with Israeli security figures.

While living in exile in the UAE, Dahlan founded a party called Democratic Reformist Current (DRC) inside Gaza. The DRC worked hard to secure a joint alliance with both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and on October 1 an electoral coalition was announced. Palestinian sources say the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) could also join.

Dahlan is attempting a political re-entry via Gaza. He is not seeking to govern it personally. He seems to be trying to turn his UAE-backed Fatah dissident network into a bridge between Hamas, other Fatah breakaways, Egypt, the UAE and the US-led Gaza peace process.

He has proposed what amounts to a political formula for overcoming the Palestinian split. Rather than a contest for control of the PA, he advocates a “national partnership”. This would incorporate elections to determine political representation and office, alongside a new constitution or “national social contract” emphasizing popular legitimacy and the peaceful transfer of power.

His proposals are deliberately broad in scope. They give Hamas a say in Palestinian national decision-making; they offer a future Palestinian leadership a language of unity; and they give the UAE, Egypt and the US a Palestinian figure with Gaza roots who can speak to all the parties involved, including Israel and external sponsors.

Dahlan’s plan has not yet been endorsed by his electoral allies, but neither have they disavowed it. His involvement places him at the center of the Palestinian political game. He has brought himself closer than ever to a return to Palestinian political leadership.

Moreover, Dahlan seems to have taken on a mediating role – a position he could not aspire to ten years ago. He now appears to have channels of communication with Hamas and other Palestinian factions, as well as with the UAE, Egypt, Washington and parts of the Israeli security establishment.

He will be aware that the Palestinian parliamentary elections could possibly bring to an end the transitional administrative arrangements in Gaza being overseen by the Board of Peace.

The Gaza peace plan, endorsed by the UN Security Council, envisages Gaza moving through a temporary international-backed arrangement. The Board of Peace was established to oversee that transition, while the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) was created as a Palestinian, technocratic and explicitly apolitical body to administer Gaza's civil affairs. It is intended to operate until the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform program.

The ultimate objective is therefore not an international administration of Gaza, but the reconstitution of Palestinian government, with Gaza eventually reunited politically with the West Bank. Nobody has yet formally declared that the November elections are the mechanism by which the Board of Peace will hand Gaza to its eventual government. But Dahlan’s recent contacts with Hamas and his involvement in discussions over Gaza's reconstruction appear to fit remarkably well into this political problem.

A possible scenario could see Palestinians participate in national elections and a substantially reformed Palestinian government emerging. Gaza and the West Bank could be brought back under one Palestinian political authority.

In short, the election could become the mechanism through which the old Palestinian political order is replaced without the Board of Peace itself choosing its successor. An American- or Arab-appointed Palestinian government taking power in Gaza would be vulnerable to the accusation that it was simply an externally imposed administration. An elected Palestinian legislature producing a new government would have a much stronger claim to legitimacy.

If Dahlan succeeds in bringing Hamas, his DRC, Fatah dissidents and other Palestinian currents into a workable political arrangement, he would inevitably become central to Gaza’s political future. The wider issue is whether Dahlan can help construct a bridge between Hamas's exit from government, international reconstruction, Palestinian elections and a reformed Palestinian Authority.

If that bridge can be built, the Board of Peace would cease to be merely an international administration imposed upon a devastated territory. It could become the temporary scaffolding allowing a new Palestinian political system to be constructed. Far from simply rebuilding Gaza, Dahlan could therefore play a central role in providing the Strip with a truly viable and hopeful future.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Mohammed Dahlan: The man who could help reshape Gaza after Hamas", 6 October 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-910525

Jordan and the Palestinians

2026-09-29T08:39:01.994+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 29 September 2026

On September 23, King Abdullah of Jordan addressed the UN General Assembly. He devoted much of his speech to lambasting Israel. He maintained that what he called “one of the world's longest running occupations” broke international law, and that the world had ignored it for decades.

Of course he had nothing to say about the Jordanian monarchy’s unhappy relationship with the Palestinians, with its own history of violence, repression and unresolved grievance, nor of the several charges of flouting international law that Jordan has been accused of over the years.

In the 1948–49 war, for example, Jordan’s Arab Legion took control of the West Bank. On April 24, 1950, the Jordanian parliament approved its annexation, declaring “complete unity between the two banks of the Jordan” in a single Hashemite kingdom ruled by King Abdullah’s great-grandfather, Abdullah I. Arabs resident in the West Bank became Jordanian citizens.

The Arab League refused to recognize Jordan’s annexation. So did the rest of the world, with the sole exception of Britain and, it has been suggested (though details remain unclear), Pakistan.

The UN characterized Jordan’s annexation as lacking international legal validity. International law does not recognize the acquisition of territory through the use of force as a lawful basis for acquiring sovereignty.

If Jordan flouted international law when it annexed the West Bank, it compounded its disregard for the legal niceties when it reversed its decision.

Until July 31, 1988 most Arabs living in the West Bank were, as a matter of Jordanian law and practice, Jordanian citizens. On that day King Hussein, Abdullah’s father, announced that Jordan was ending its legal and administrative relationship with the territory with immediate effect. Under the disengagement regulations, some one million Arabs resident in the West Bank were suddenly stripped of their Jordanian citizenship. All at once they were no longer Jordanian.

Human Rights Watch describes them as becoming stateless Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Over time their Jordanian passports were replaced with temporary Jordanian travel documents that did not confer citizenship.

Loss of nationality had serious legal consequences. They had no right of residence in Jordan. Non-citizens could not vote or stand for office. They were excluded from state employment and faced serious obstacles in accessing work, education, health care and other services.

International human rights law prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of nationality. Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.”

The fact that Jordan’s 1988 disengagement stripped a whole defined population of its existing nationality, without an individualized process and without a replacement nationality, makes the charge against Jordan of arbitrary illegality a powerful one.

In his speech to the UN, Abdullah called on world opinion to denounce Israel for Palestinian deaths. He might also have acknowledged that Yasser Arafat once accused King Hussein, his father, of killing 25,000 Palestinians – a figure generally believed to have been wildly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

The episode is usually called Black September, although it lasted from September 1970 until the following July, and the death toll remains disputed. The commonly cited estimate of Palestinian deaths is in the low thousands, including both fighters and civilians. Jordanian soldiers also died. What is not disputed is that the events of 1970–71 left a deep and bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy.

After the Six-Day War in 1967, it was from Jordan that Palestinian fighters began mounting guerrilla operations against Israel. By 1969 Arafat was leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella body in which his Fatah movement was dominant. The organization and its constituent groups started functioning increasingly from within Jordan. Armed groups established bases and checkpoints in and around cities and refugee camps acting as a law unto themselves, sometimes defying the police and civil authorities.

Soon King Hussein was facing an armed Palestinian movement operating inside his kingdom and challenging the authority of the state. He decided to move against Arafat's PLO and its armed forces, the fedayeen.

The crisis came to a head in September 1970. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a constituent body of the PLO, hijacked several international passenger aircraft. Three aircraft were eventually taken to Dawson's Field near Zarqa, Jordan, where passengers were removed and the aircraft blown up before the world's television cameras – a spectacular display that humiliated the Jordanian authorities.

For Hussein, the question was no longer how to restrain the fedayeen, but who governed Jordan. On September 16 he declared martial law. The following day the Jordanian Army opened a major offensive against Palestinian positions in Amman, Zarqa, Irbid and elsewhere.

The operation was considerably more than a simple expulsion. For a time it amounted to a civil war between the Jordanian state and heavily armed Palestinian organizations. The fighting was intense and involved artillery, tanks and infantry. Jordanian forces attacked PLO positions. Palestinian fighters resisted and, in some places, effectively controlled territory.

A ceasefire hammered out in Cairo on September 27 proved totally ineffective. The Palestinian militias remained entrenched and operative within Jordan. In early 1971 Hussein resumed the campaign against them. Finally the Jordanian Army succeeded in driving the fedayeen out of their remaining urban strongholds. The last major encounter took place in July 1971, and organized Palestinian resistance in Jordan was effectively destroyed. Arafat and senior PLO figures fled.

They escaped across the Jordanian-Syrian border, and regrouped in Lebanon. Thousands of Palestinian fighters were driven out of Jordan and followed them.

It had been a bloody encounter. As well as Jordanian soldiers, thousands of Palestinians, including civilians, had been killed. The episode produced a particularly bitter Palestinian-Jordanian legacy. In 1971 a militant Palestinian group, which subsequently called itself the Black September Organization, assassinated Jordan’s prime minister Wasfi al-Tal.

None of this unhappy history disposes of any moral or legal questions raised by the current situation, but it does complicate Abdullah’s posture of unqualified moral denunciation of Israel.

In short, standing at the UN podium vilifying Israel, King Abdullah might have borne in mind the old adage: “People in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "King Abdullah’s UN attack on Israel overlooks Jordan’s own troubled history," 29 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-909962

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 October 2026

https://www.eurasiareview.com/05102026-jordan-and-the-palestinians-oped/

Israel’s electoral system: Room for improvement?

2026-09-28T16:51:20.474+01:00

This article appears in the forthcoming edition of the Jerusalem Report, dated 12 October 2026:

This is an unusual moment in Israeli politics. For the first time since 1988 the Knesset has completed its statutory four-year term (between 2019 and 2022 the nation went to the polls no less than five times).

The general election on October 27 gives Israelis the opportunity to say how, in their opinion, the nation should progress in the next four years. They will vote for the party advocating the policies closest to their heart. But the national mood will emerge from a highly fragmented vote. Given the number of parties competing in the election, no clear winner can emerge.

As a result each general election is followed by weeks of negotiations, as the party with the largest mandate attempts to assemble a majority in the Knesset and form a coalition government.

A coalition is by its very nature a compromise. Usually the smaller parties use their prospective support to secure policy concessions or ministerial posts. The party seeking to govern may in turn press potential partners to moderate or defer some demands. As a result many electors find that the policies they originally voted for are so modified that, even if they are pursued, they are pale shadows of what they were.

In short, the policies ultimately pursued by the governing coalition may bear only a limited resemblance to the political programs that voters endorse at the ballot box.

This is one of the democratic deficits of the present system.

Another is that the people voted into the Knesset are virtually anonymous to most Israeli electors. Apart from the party leaders, most of the candidates on party lists are totally unknown to most voters. Once they become members of the Knesset they have no connection, and feel no obligation, toward the electors who voted them into power.

This is because Israel’s electoral system differs from that of most other Western democracies, including the US, in one vital respect – it lacks any constituency-based element. It is, for example, radically different from that of the UK, the system favored by David Ben Gurion in the 1950s but never introduced.

Britain is divided into 650 constituencies. Each elects one member of parliament. Any political party may put up a candidate, but party lists are an unknown phenomenon. The candidate who wins most votes is elected, regardless of how many votes were cast for others. In this system, known as “first past the post”, proportional representation does not feature. The idea of instituting PR was put to the UK electorate in 2011 in a national referendum, and overwhelmingly rejected.

Britain’s system nearly always results in one or other of the two major parties – Conservative or Labour – obtaining a clear majority. Its leader becomes prime minister. Except in rare cases, which do arise from time to time, there is no need for the leader of the winning party to negotiate with anyone about anything. The day after the election, the winning party takes power.

As for elected members of parliament, each is regarded by their constituents as “their” MP, whether or not they voted for him or her. All MPs hold regular “surgeries” in their constituency where members of the public with problems can speak personally to them and ask for advice or help. The personal connection between MPs and their local areas is very strong.

This electoral system, like all electoral systems, is far from perfect. Its main disadvantage is its failure to match the national voting pattern with seats in parliament – undoubtedly a democratic deficit.

Ben Gurion had advocated dividing Israel into 120 single-member constituencies – but he never had a sufficiently large coalition to overcome the parties that benefited from proportional representation.

His idea was revived in June 1980 by MKs Yigael Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval, and was subsequently embodied in a bill introduced in February 1981. It did not survive the legislative process.

Proposals for reform that combined the constituency concept with the proportionality of the present system were advanced in 1958, 1972 and 1988. The 1988 proposal, sponsored by MK Mordechai Virshubski and supported by 43 other MKs, included a model in which 60 MKs would be elected in constituencies and 60 through the current system. Under that arrangement, voters would effectively cast two votes – one for a constituency candidate and another for a party list. The bill passed a first reading but subsequently foundered.

In 2005, the President himself – Moshe Katsav – took the initiative.

He set up a commission containing the country's leading political scientists and chaired by Hebrew University President Menahem Magidor. It met regularly for more than a year, and it too finally favored a combined system. Highlighting the lack of “clear linkage between an elected person’s performance and their chances of being reelected,” its report recommended that half of the Knesset should be elected directly in 17 regional constituencies based on Interior Ministry districts, while the other 60 would continue to be elected through the nationwide proportional system.

The commission’s recommendations, like the earlier parliamentary bills proposing electoral reform, were not followed up. Nor indeed were subsequent attempts, such as the determined effort by Professor Menahem Ben-Sasson. Appointed Chair of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in 2006, Ben Sasson set to work with a will.

Undeterred by all the previous unsuccessful attempts, he declared: “This generation might be ready. At least I have to try”. Try he did, but his bill, presented to the Knesset in 2008, was blocked by those who feared a loss of influence in any revised system.

Vested interest is the great enemy of change in any electoral system. For those benefitting from any current procedure, reform carries with it the danger of a loss of power. Even though there has been for many years a general recognition that Israel’s electoral system is far from perfect and that change is desirable, time and again the parties in power have declined to grasp the nettle of reform. And so we journey on, as Shakespeare has it, “with all our imperfections”.

Israel-Saudi security links revived

2026-09-23T06:35:40.848+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23 September 2026

On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement, known as the Mecca Pact. At its public core is a political commitment modeled in part on NATO’s Article 5 – namely an armed attack on one party is to be regarded as an attack on all.

On September 8, the Houthis launched a major wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia, striking civilian and economic sites and energy infrastructure in several southern cities. Subsequently the country has been attacked time and again by the Houthis. Civilian and economic facilities have been struck, King Khalid air base and Aramco facilities have been targeted.

Why have Turkey and Pakistan not rushed to Saudi’s defense?

Rather like the small print on insurance policies, the Mecca Pact seems to exclude as much as it offers. The publicly released description of the agreement, while making much of the NATO-like commitment, does not specify an automatic military response should one of the parties be attacked. Nor does it publicly stipulate the circumstances in which troops must be deployed. In fact, the full text of the agreement has not been released, so important questions about its scope and implementation remain obscure.

Rather late in the day, on September 19, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudry, chief spokesman for Pakistan’s military, is reported as saying “Pakistan fully stands with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both diplomatically and physically…We will go to any extent.”

But the statement, whatever it meant, was too late. Given the ambiguities inherent in the Mecca Pact, and the obvious reluctance of either Pakistan or Turkey to become involved in a military operation in Yemen, it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia turned to Washington for support that subsequently connected it to Israel.

CENTCOM is the US military command responsible for the Middle East and parts of Central and South Asia. It directs US military operations and security partnerships in that area.

Some time during the week of September 7, at a secluded ski resort in Germany (rumored to be Garmisch-Partenkirchen), CENTCOM’s commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, hosted a conference of senior military leaders from eight countries.

It is extraordinary, but the fact, that sitting round the same table were Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the IDF chief of staff, and military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt. CENTCOM, functioning as an intermediary, had succeeded in connecting Israel with Arab militaries that do not have diplomatic relations with it – Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular.

According to a report by Axios, the respected digital news outlet, the central purpose of the conference was to discuss the continuing US–Israeli war with Iran, and the broader regional-security situation. Cooper reportedly assured those present that, despite Iranian attacks on US bases, the US would retain forces in the Middle East. He also primed the group on plans to expand maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Zamir is said to have briefed the participants on IDF operations on several fronts.

Axios further reports, citing “a source with knowledge of the matter,” that Israel and Saudi Arabia, with CENTCOM assistance, began discussing how Israel could assist Saudi military operations against the Houthis. The possible support mentioned is ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), on the lines of the assistance that Israel has reportedly provided to the UAE.

On September 14, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) met Cooper in Jeddah, amid the rapidly worsening Houthi offensive. The next day Reuters reported that Washington, while declining to conduct direct US strikes against the Houthis, had agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with targeted assistance.

That same day, September 15, the Jerusalem Post reported that Israel and Saudi Arabia had held CENTCOM-mediated discussions about Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against the Houthis. Regional diplomatic sources had told the paper that the Saudi side was seeking intelligence that could help build a picture of Houthi deployments, and thus anticipate future operations.

A similar report emanated from the Institute for the Study of War in a document published jointly with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. It commented that this prospective arrangement would: “…resemble Israel’s current intelligence support relationship with the United Arab Emirates.”

There is no doubt that the Iran war is creating an unusually powerful common-security denominator. The countries represented in CENTCOM’s conference have very different political relationships with Israel, but they share an immediate security problem: Iran. Iranian-aligned armed groups have acted against some of them, and are capable of threatening all.

Israel possesses substantial intelligence and surveillance capabilities concerning Iran and its regional partners. Saudi’s cities and energy infrastructure have been struck repeatedly by Houthi missiles and drones. CENTCOM possesses the command-and-control machinery that can connect Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Although Saudi Arabia still has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the emerging arrangement potentially constitutes a major step in Saudi-Israeli military normalization. Israeli intelligence is being used to help defend Saudi Arabia against the Houthis, even without diplomatic normalization.

This arrangement gives Saudi Arabia considerable political cover. Publicly, its relationship with Israel can remain highly constrained; operationally, cooperation can become increasingly sophisticated.

So the present position, according to media reports, is that Saudi Arabia is being offered direct targeted support by the US, while CENTCOM is mediating Saudi–Israeli discussions on intelligence assistance against the Houthis.

Saudi-Israeli collaboration is nothing new. There is a 60-year history of covert strategic cooperation. But the Saudi-Israel connection remains as delicate as it has ever been. It is not any form of military alliance, nor has there been any change in Saudi policy on formal normalization. In fact reports emanating from Saudi sources suggest that Riyadh, even while seeking Israel’s help against Houthi attacks, is still resisting movement on normalization.

Meanwhile, the law of unintended consequences is in full play. While the Houthis continue their strikes on Saudi Arabia and make territorial gains in areas surrounding one of the world’s critical maritime chokepoints, the Bab el-Mandeb, they are inadvertently fostering greater military cooperation than ever before between Israel and Arab states, and both reviving and strengthening Israel’s covert security links with Saudi Arabia.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia turns to Israel as Houthi attacks expose limits of the Mecca Pact," 23 September 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-909254

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 September 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26092026-israel-saudi-security-links-revived-oped/

The end of the SDF

2026-09-16T06:00:57.702+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2026

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was formed back in 2015.

A year earlier ISIS had proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, claiming religious and political authority over all Muslims. It then proceeded to conquer and absorb great swathes of Syria and Iraq, and was designated a terrorist organization by the UN, the US and many countries, including Muslim-majority states.

Opposing ISIS in northern Syria were the Kurdish-led YPG (People’s Protection Units). Together with the closely linked YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), they joined with Arab, Assyrian and other local armed groups to create a broader coalition, and this became the SDF.

The US had already begun supporting the YPG, particularly during the battle for Kobani in 2014–15. After the SDF was formed, Washington began arming, advising and providing air support to it as its principal ground partner against ISIS.

Backed by Washington, the SDF proved remarkably successful in combating ISIS. It conquered stronghold after stronghold, and finally, with the capture of Baghouz in 2019, ended the ISIS caliphate in Syria.

In the years that followed, the SDF developed its own security forces and civilian administration, and became the military and governing authority across much of north-eastern Syria.

Because the SDF was Kurdish-led and YPG-dominated, its powerful presence was opposed by Turkey.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regards the YPG as closely linked to the PKK, a political and militant element within the Kurdish autonomy movement that Turkey and the US designate as a terrorist organization.

He was doubtless delighted with the announcement on August 25 by Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the SDF. Speaking in a televised press conference in Damascus, he declared that, following an agreement with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF's mission had ended and that it was being dissolved “as an independent military force” and was being integrated as brigades into the Syrian army.

His announcement covered not only the military functions of the SDF, but also the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its affiliated military and civilian institutions. Abdi said these structures had likewise been integrated into Syrian state institutions.

As president of the post-Assad government in Syria, Sharaa is attempting to bring the disparate political, military and social forces that have been operating independently under the authority of a unified Syrian state.

On 10 March 2025 Sharaa and Abdi hammered out a deal. The SDF's civilian and military institutions, including border crossings, oil and gas facilities, and airports, would come under state control. In return the Kurds would be recognized as an integral part of Syria, be granted citizenship, political participation and other rights.

The deal lacked detail and was too fragile to hold. In January 2026 government forces launched a lightning offensive against the SDF, rapidly capturing substantial SDF-held territory. The SDF’s hopes of US protection, as in the past, were dashed, but a generous ceasefire deal saw SDF personnel entering Syria’s defense and interior ministries, while the government took over the border crossings, oil and gas fields and civilian institutions.

The integration process continued over the next few months leading, eventually, to Abdi’s dissolution announcement which was not, of course, simply a voluntary decision by the SDF to disband. It was the end-point of a negotiated political settlement whose terms were progressively reshaped by the dramatic change in the military balance. The SDF leadership ultimately calculated that incorporation into the new Syrian state offered a better prospect for preserving Kurdish interests than trying to maintain an autonomous armed enclave against Damascus, Turkey and a less dependable US patron.

A few days after the SDF's dissolution Sharaa appointed Mazloum Abdi as a presidential adviser. The appointment was widely read as a sign that Sharaa, far from trying to destroy the Kurdish leadership, was intent on integrating it into the nation’s governance.

The SDF's disappearance is a major piece of Sharaa's state-consolidation project, but it is not the last, or necessarily the hardest, piece. Major steps are still required. He has to complete acquiring state monopoly of armed force. The SDF was the biggest remaining autonomous military structure, and its dissolution is therefore a major breakthrough, but there are a fair number of former rebel and militia formations, and all need to be subordinated to the state.

He has to resolve the problem of the semi-autonomous Druze community in Sweida, which remains largely outside effective central-government control. His challenge is to negotiate a restoration of state authority without provoking another major sectarian conflict.

Then there is the problem of building a genuinely national political settlement. Ideally he would like Syria's Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians and other minorities to accept that their future security lies within a central Syrian state. The Kurdish settlement illustrates the model Sharaa appears to favor – recognizing communal rights, but eliminating autonomous armed and quasi-state institutions.

Sharaa needs, within a reasonable period of time, to complete the transition from revolutionary government to a fully functioning state – national ministries, judiciary, police, taxation, public services and a unified economic administration. It is currently a fragile transitional administration dependent on concentrated presidential power.

Finally there is his declared objective to establish a permanent constitution and elected government.

On March 13, 2025, Sharaa signed a Constitutional Declaration establishing the legal framework for a five-year transitional period leading to a permanent constitutional settlement and democratic elections.

The People’s Assembly, which first convened in Damascus in July 2026, is a transitional legislature rather than a fully elected parliament. Two-thirds of its 210 members were selected by regional electoral colleges, while Sharaa appointed the remaining 70.

The roadmap is to move from this interim framework to a permanent constitution, followed by parliamentary elections. The Constitutional Declaration provides for a five-year transition from March 2025, ending only when both the permanent constitution has been adopted and elections held under it. March 2030 is currently the outer horizon. The immediate next step is to establish the body that will be charged with drafting the new constitution.

The absorption of the SDF’s military and administrative functions into the state was a vital step toward the eventual achievement of a fully functioning, democratic, constitutional Syria.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The end of the SDF: What the dissolution means for the Kurds and Sharaa's state", 14 Sep 2026: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-908532

Published in Eurasia Review, 19 September 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/19092026-the-end-of-the-sdf-oped/

The Two-State Solution

2026-09-11T08:10:46.319+01:00

This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 11 September 2026:

Sir

Ed Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said: “securing the two-state solution in its fullest form is the North Star of this government’s policy.”

Palestinian leadership has been offered a two-state solution on six separate occasions – first by Britain in 1937. The Peel Commission proposed the separation of Mandatory Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state. Zionist leaders accepted the principle; Arab leadership rejected it.

In 1947 the UN Partition Plan, which proposed independent Arab and Jewish states, was accepted by the Jewish leadership and rejected by the Arab.

Two-state offers were made at Camp David in 2000, and later that year by Bill Clinton. Neither was accepted by Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

In 2008 Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, rejected the two-state solution offered by Ehud Olmert, then Israel’s prime minister,. He also refused to consider the two-state plan in 2020 that emerged from the efforts of Donald Trump’s team during his first term in office.

The West seems determined to thrust the two-state solution down the throat of a Palestinian leadership for whom it has no appeal.

Russia ditches its Syrian bases

2026-09-08T07:02:33.598+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2026

On August 9, the Syrian foreign ministry announced that, following approximately 18 months of negotiations, Syria and Russia had concluded a memorandum of understanding. The Russian presence at the Tartus naval facility, and at the Hmeimim air base adjacent to Latakia International Airport, would be “reorganized”. The bases would pass into Syrian civilian administration, and their military facilities would be redefined as joint Syrian-Russian training and qualification centers.

As a result the Russian naval base at Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, operational for 55 years, is now virtually defunct. A Nato official is reported as saying: “There has been nothing there since June. That’s the first time in more than 10 years. This is pretty significant.”

Russian vessels previously stationed in the Med have been diverted to protect Putin’s armada of sanctioned oil tankers which operate principally on Baltic-to-ocean routes, passing through the Danish straits, the North Sea and, in some cases, the English Channel.

Immediately after the announcement, Syrian foreign minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani traveled to the coast with an official delegation. He inspected both Tartus Port and the Hmeimim air base, established in 2015 by agreement between Russia’s president Vladimir Putin and Syria’s then-president, Bashar al-Assad.

SANA (the Syrian Arab News Agency) described the visit as “a tour of the facilities covered by the newly concluded memorandum.”

The official Syrian accounts of the tour make no mention of any Russian representative being present. But two days later, on August 11, Reuters reported the Russian Foreign Ministry's spin on the agreement: “We regard the signing on August 9 of the memorandum between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on the operation of our bases in Hmeimim and Tartus as an important step aimed at further improving bilateral cooperation in the military sphere.”

So the focus of the Russian narrative is not abandonment of its Mediterranean presence, but continued military cooperation – and a Syrian source subsequently told Reuters that some Russian forces would indeed remain at the newly designated joint training centers. But by August 12 Russian personnel were observed vacating buildings around the previously Russian-controlled commercial berth at Tartus, while Syria had already begun using it for civilian shipping.

So the former Russian naval base at Tartus is being dismantled as a military facility and is being converted into a joint Russian-Syrian training facility, and the same is true of Russia’s former air base at Hmeimim. Arguably Hmeimim is the more consequential loss for Russia. It was the hub for Russia's air operations in Syria, supported its wider military activities, and enhanced its regional standing.

The effective end of Russia’s military presence at Tartus and Hmeimim is a strategic gain for Israel. When Russia established its air base at Hmeimim in 2015 to support the Assad regime, there was a risk that Israeli and Russian air operations over Syria could come into conflict. Jerusalem and Moscow consequently developed a deconfliction mechanism under which each side was given advance notice of planned air operations. With Russia no longer maintaining a significant aerial presence in Syria, Israeli air operations will face fewer constraints.

Israel’s current concerns in Syria are disrupting attacks against its troops in the south, preventing hostile forces from consolidating near the Golan Heights, and frustrating any attempt by Turkey to gain a military foothold that could threaten Israel.

For Turkey is increasingly filling the vacuum caused by Russia's withdrawal. The post-Assad Syrian government has developed a close military relationship with Turkey, which has been helping rebuild Syrian military capabilities. Israel has warned Turkey officially against embarking on what defense minister Israel Katz called “dangerous adventures in Syria.”

Israeli media reports have described Israel’s negotiating “red lines” as: no Turkish military activity in Syria; demilitarization of the Syrian side of the Golan; security for Syria’s Druze community; and limits on certain Syrian strategic weapons systems. These would include ground-based air-defense systems, missiles, armed drones and military aviation infrastructure such as radar networks.

On August 18, shortly after a Turkish delegation visited Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, Israel carried out airstrikes on the facility. Israel said the action was intended to prevent an impending Turkish military deployment there.

Damascus condemned the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty, arguing that Syria was entitled to rebuild its armed forces and ally with whatever foreign partner it chooses. Meanwhile the US, in the person of Tom Barrack, has been trying to establish a deconfliction process among Israel, Syria and Turkey.

Barrack, whose official title is lengthy and perhaps a trifle excessive (he is currently US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq) described the Abu al-Duhur strike as an “unnecessary escalation” that did not advance regional stability.

His increasingly critical stance towards Israeli policy in Syria has itself attracted criticism, particularly following recent remarks on Israel’s military stance in Syria and equivocal statements, later clarified, about the Golan Heights.

Russia’s loss of exclusive military control at Tartus and Hmeimim changes the geopolitical landscape. For roughly 55 years, a Soviet/Russian military presence on the Syrian coast has been part of Israel's strategic environment. The Soviet Union was one of Israel's principal military adversaries during the Cold War; Putin's Russia subsequently became a partner of sorts in managing the Syrian battlefield. Now that presence is being reduced to a joint training role under Syrian sovereignty.

For Israel, therefore, this is much more than the closure of two Russian bases. It is evidence of the collapse of the geopolitical system that existed along Israel's northern frontier for half a century.

While Russia’s effective withdrawal from Syria, and therefore from the Middle East as a whole, appears a net positive for Israel diplomatically and militarily, strategically it seems to be fostering the emergence of a Turkish-influenced Syria.

Turkish military penetration of Syria is a substantially more serious problem than the Russian presence that it is replacing. For Turkey, close alignment with Damascus offers the prospect of curbing Kurdish autonomy on its border, facilitating refugee returns, winning a large share of Syria’s reconstruction and trade, reopening overland routes to Arab markets, and consolidating Ankara’s regional influence at the expense of rival powers.

Israel will need to be vigilant.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online, 8 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907793

Published in Eurasia Review, 12 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/12092026-russia-ditches-its-syrian-bases-oped/

Disabling Hamas

2026-09-01T09:56:18.907+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2026

Sunday, November 15, 2026 – a date to circle in your diary. By then – precisely 90 days since a meeting in Jerusalem on August 17 to discuss the Board of Peace’s plan for Gaza – Hamas should be demobilized and the IDF should have begun withdrawing from the Strip.

That August 17 meeting brought prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu together with the three-man team of Jared Kushner, Nickolay Mladenov and Sir Tony Blair. They had just returned from an unprecedented negotiating session in Egypt with Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya. The significance of November 15 lies in what was agreed in Cairo – a handover by Hamas of weaponry and tunnels within 90 days.

As Kushner told Fox News, following the meeting: “For Israel we think this is a win-win situation, because if Hamas actually gives over the weapons and the tunnels willingly over the next 60 to 90 days that obviously would be the elimination of a huge security threat for Israel, almost an unthinkable achievement.”

To advance the Board of Peace’s aim of reconstructing Gaza, the August meeting agreed to set up two working groups. One would facilitate the disarmament and demilitarization process which, according to a statement from Netanyahu’s office, “both Israel and the Board of Peace are determined should be prompt and completed before any reconstruction happens.” The second would focus on sanitation, clean water and public health in Gaza.

While Israel has consistently supported the 20-point peace plan produced by US President Donald Trump and endorsed by the Board of Peace, there seemed to be a problem regarding sequencing. The plan requires both the disarmament of Hamas and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza, and for a time both Hamas and Israel were asserting that they would indeed act, provided the other party acted first.

Initially the Board of Peace planned to connect incremental disarmament with gradual Israeli withdrawals. The August meeting seems to have established a way through the impasse. It now seems there will be no IDF withdrawal until Hamas has disarmed. The IDF’s withdrawal is linked to agreed standards, milestones, and timeframes as the International Stabilization Force (ISF) establishes control and stability, although an Israeli security perimeter may remain until Gaza is judged secure.

Under the UN-endorsed Trump peace plan, the ISF is envisaged as a temporary multinational security force, operating alongside Israel, Egypt, and a newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force. Its mandate includes helping to secure borders, supporting Gaza’s demilitarization, dismantling military and terrorist infrastructure, permanently decommissioning non-state armed groups’ weapons, and protecting civilians.

At Israel’s request, the parties agreed that in the initial stage of disarmament Hamas’s weapons would not be turned over to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.

Why did Israel make this a condition? Because the National Committee is a wholly Palestinian body – and even though it is specifically apolitical, Israel was taking no chances. Concerned principally with civil administration, it is led by Dr. Ali Shaath, a civil engineer and former deputy minister, and composed of independent Palestinian technocrats and experts.

Israel and the US are reported to have agreed that Hamas weapons surrendered during the opening phase would be placed under the control of the ISF for destruction. Maj.-Gen. Jasper Jeffers, the US commander of the ISF, would oversee the process. Precise operational details and sequencing remain for the moment unresolved.

However the viability of the ISF as a credible military force is far from assured. Five countries have made provisional commitments to provide troops to the ISF: Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Morocco. These commitments are at different levels of firmness, and some have subsequently been delayed or narrowed.

Indonesia offered up to 8,000 troops but subsequently put the commitment on indefinite hold. Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev publicly committed the country to fully supporting the ISF. Subsequent reports, however, indicate that Kazakhstan does not envisage its contribution as a combat contingent, but primarily as a humanitarian component, including medical units and a field hospital.

As for Kosovo and Albania, though they both committed to contributing troops, as yet no figures for their contingents have been released and no troops have been sent.

On August 6 Uganda’s parliament approved the potential deployment of Ugandan forces to Gaza as part of the US-backed ISF, if required. The size, timing, command arrangements, and final operational deployment of any Ugandan contingent have not been publicly settled. Burundi, too, has been engaged in active preliminary discussions – including a reported pre-deployment site survey – but has not publicly made a final commitment to contribute troops.

Around the time of the August 17 meeting, senior military officers from Uganda and Burundi are reported to have visited the Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat to prepare for the deployment of hundreds of troops in the Gaza Strip as part of the ISF. They met with officers from the IDF and the US Army, who presented the operational plans to them.

In late July, Israel authorized the entry into areas of Gaza outside its control of an
initial multinational contingent of approximately 200 personnel, reportedly from Morocco and Uganda. Despite the international commitments, that appears to be the current extent of the ISF – namely 1% of its projected strength of 20,000 troops. All the same the Board of Peace says recruitment and deployment efforts are "well advanced".

Meanwhile the ISF is functioning primarily as a command, planning, liaison, force-generation and limited pilot-deployment operation.

The 200 personnel are, among other tasks, reported to be establishing the first ISF headquarters, securing a limited humanitarian zone and preparing the logistics and command infrastructure for subsequent troop arrivals. One report says a 150-person Moroccan military outpost is being constructed in Gaza as an initial facility which will eventually be substantially larger.

There is evidence that the ISF infrastructure is beginning to materialize. A US funding notification reported by Reuters on August 19 commits $200 million for ISF equipment, vehicles and operations, plus about $6 million to adapt US armored vehicles for the force.

Surely the troops themselves will have materialized by November 15.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "The Board of Peace plan for Gaza: Will it really disempower Hamas?", 1 September 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-907115

Published in Eurasia Review, 5 September 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/05092026-disabling-hamas-oped/

Iran’s other army

2026-08-25T05:41:21.280+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 25 August 2026

A network of Iran-linked Shiite militias is operating in Iraq. Taken together, they are an extremely powerful military force.

When the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan on July 28, the US, in association with Saudi Arabia, did not aim its response at the IRGC direct. They struck a number of the Iraq-based militias instead, accusing them of past attacks on US forces and carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities, acting under the direction of the IRGC.

In short the US and its allies have recognized that the militias are in effect an integral part of the Iranian military, a functioning wing of the IRGC.

This network of Shiite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qassem Soleimani, the one-time commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Responsible for Iran’s external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone, on the orders of US President Donald Trump.

His network has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran’s military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals which include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. They are, in short, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in long, costly conflict.

That was precisely Soleimani’s intention. The militias were built to fight Iran’s enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself. With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani’s plan appears to be working.

The UK’s Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst’s opinion of the militias. “They have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq…If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week. But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”

Most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS. In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state's security structure. It remains separate from the army and operates through its own command framework under the Iraqi government. In practice, however, the framework is loose and the main factions retain their own chains of command, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations, giving them substantial autonomy from the Iraqi state.

The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.

Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.

Moreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq’s political, economic and social fabric. Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy. Moreover they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings and reconstruction contracts.

Not all the money acquired is illicit. Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq's security apparatus and receive government funding. Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.

But Iraq's borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial "fees" from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures and gain control over transportation and logistics services.

After the war against Isis, Iraq set aside large amounts of finance for rebuilding damaged cities and infrastructure. Militia-linked businessmen and companies have been accused of winning government contracts through political influence, demanding kickbacks from contractors seeking permits or security access, and controlling local economic activity in areas where the militia is dominant.

Consequently, the Iran-linked militias function not merely as armed groups, but as an entrenched political-economic network embedded within the Iraqi state.

This is a situation that Iraq’s recently elected prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi – very much like Lebanon’s president, Joseph Aoun – finds intolerable.

Both have declared their intention to bring all non-state military groups within their respective nation‘s control. Al-Zaidi has gone so far as to set September 2026 as a target for significant progress. His pledge enjoys support from Washington and from many Iraqis who wish to strengthen national sovereignty.

He faces formidable obstacles. The strongest militias reject complete disarmament. With powerful parliamentary allies and independent sources of finance, they are in a position to frustrate any attempt by al-Zaidi to bring them under government authority. In any case, many of those within the groups do not see themselves as part of Iraq’s security forces, but as integral to Iran's wider "Axis of Resistance".

A complete dismantling of these organizations therefore appears unlikely in the short term. Al-Zaidi may succeed in reducing their autonomy, but not in eliminating their independent military and political influence.

An Iranian official is reported in the Telegraph as describing the militias as “indispensable”.

“They are the backbone of the resistance forces in the region,” he said, “and their nature of multiple groups and closeness to Iran are their biggest strengths.” He added that “some of them were in Iran during the war to help our armed forces control the streets” – that is, to subdue anti-government protesters – an indication of how deeply the militias are woven into Iran’s war machine.

For the foreseeable future Iran can continue to rely on this substantial external military power to bolster its own military capacity.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Iran's powerful militia network could expand war", 25 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-906410

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 August 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/29082026-irans-other-army-oped/

Israel in Gaza

2026-08-25T05:05:47.050+01:00

This letter appears in the Daily Telegraph today, 25 August 2026:

Sir

Tony Greenstein, seemingly endorsed by Gary Lineker, states as undisputed fact that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza (report, August 24). But “genocide” is a precise legal term, requiring proof of an intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. It should not be treated as a synonym for a high civilian death toll.

The demographic record is relevant to any alleged genocidal intent. When Israel captured the Gaza Strip in 1967, a census recorded about 355,000 residents. The latest Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimate puts Gaza’s population at about 2.11 million. The population has therefore increased roughly sixfold since 1967. It is difficult to reconcile this with the assertion that Israel’s aim has been the destruction of the Palestinian people.

In fact Israel’s declared objective since October 7, 2023 has been the defeat of Hamas, whose 1988 charter called for the destruction of Israel and contained virulently antisemitic language. Hamas’s extensive military infrastructure, including its tunnel network, was embedded within a densely populated civilian environment, making military operations extremely hazardous for civilians. This is why the number of Palestinian deaths cannot establish genocidal intent.

It is positively denied by Col. Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, who said during the Gaza conflict: “The IDF is also operating within the laws of armed conflict, doing its best to minimise civilian casualties, including by warning people to leave areas it is about to attack.”

Nor should Gaza casualty figures be treated as infallible. The records of the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health have been subject to methodological criticism and, it is now accepted, require careful interpretation.

The charge of genocide deserves evidence and argument, not constant assertion in the hope that the aphorism often attributed to Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, will prevail: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.”

Published in the Daily Telegraph titled: "Israel's intent in Gaza":
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2026/08/25/letters-paralysing-effect-public-sector-productivity-crisis/

Gaza’s anti-Hamas militias

2026-08-18T03:36:07.852+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 18 August 2026

Hamas's internal security and counter-intelligence apparatus in Gaza includes a specialized unit known as the Radaa Force. It is focused on monitoring threats to Hamas from rival factions, and in identifying dissidents, suspected informants and “collaborators” working with Israel.

The size, command structure, and exact responsibilities of the Radaa Force are uncertain; Hamas has revealed few details about it. Its name derives from an Arabic root meaning “deterrence” or “prevention”.

On August 6 Radaa issued an appeal to the Gazan public in general, and to members of anti-Hamas militia groups in particular, urging them to assassinate the leaders of those bodies.

“We say to all members of the collaborator gangs,” ran the Radaa Force statement, “that assassinating senior collaborators in these groups will be your salvation – before us, and before your people.”

What are these anti-Hamas militia groups, and who are their leaders?

The most internationally visible, and arguably most consequential, of the anti-Hamas armed network in Gaza is known as the “Popular Forces”. Originally led by Yasser Abu Shabab until his death in December 2025, it is now under the leadership of Ghassan Duhine, his deputy. It is the only anti-Hamas force that appears to have reached battalion-scale strength. Estimates in open sources range up to 700 fighters.

The Popular Forces emerged in southern Gaza, especially around Rafah. On June 5, 2025, in a video statement responding to allegations by former defense minister Avigdor Lieberman, prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel had "activated" and supported clans in Gaza opposed to Hamas. Subsequent reporting by the Associated Press and other outlets identified Abu Shabab's Popular Forces as one of the groups receiving such support.

Reported assistance included weapons, intelligence, logistical support, access to Israeli-controlled areas, and protection from Hamas. The reported activities of the Popular Forces include an attack on a Hamas facility near Khan Younis that the group alleged was being used to store aid confiscated by Hamas. They also participate in intelligence gathering against Hamas, securing aid convoys and routes near Israeli-controlled areas, and protecting access routes to aid distribution points.

Unlike Fatah, the Popular Forces do not prioritize Palestinian nationalism or a state-building ideology. Abu Shabab publicly condemned the brutal onslaught on October 7, 2023 and argued Hamas had brought catastrophe on Gaza.

Politically, this group is the least clearly ideological of the major formations. Its motivations seem to combine anti-Hamas hostility, tribal autonomy, economic interests, personal power, and dependence upon Israeli patronage. Its principal political proposition is effectively that Hamas must be removed and that local Palestinian actors should assume control.

The Popular Forces’ politics are moved partly by clan interests. The Abu Shabab clan is a large family network in the Rafah area of southern Gaza, connected to the larger transborder Tarabin tribal network, which extends into Sinai. Its priorities are protecting its local influence, its territory, economic resources, and clan autonomy.

Hamas has traditionally sought to subordinate armed groups and local power brokers to its own authority. During periods when Hamas's control has weakened because of war, some clans – the Popular Forces among them – have sought to expand their own security and political roles.

The second particularly important anti-Hamas organization in Gaza is the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force (CTSF), centered on Khan Younis and commanded by Hussam al-Astal. Al-Astal has a security service background within the Palestinian Authority, and his opposition to Hamas is more political and institutional than purely tribal.

The declared objective of the CTSF (sometimes known simply as the Anti-Terror Force), is the removal of Hamas and the establishment of an alternative security authority. Al-Astal portrays his organization as an independent Palestinian anti-Hamas force, though there is significant evidence of operational cooperation with Israel.

The group crossed an important threshold on January 12, 2026, when gunmen killed Mahmoud al-Astal, a senior Hamas police officer. Hussam al-Astal's organization publicly claimed responsibility. Hamas described the perpetrators as Israeli collaborators.

The common surname is almost certainly not accidental. Mahmoud al-Astal and Hussam al-Astal appear to have belonged to the same extended al-Astal clan, but they were aligned with opposing political-military camps. Publicly available sources do not identify their precise familial relationship.

The Hellis clan represents a third category of anti-Hamas groupings.

The Hellis family, long associated with Fatah, has opposed Hamas's rule ever since the terrorist organization seized control of Gaza in 2007. Its most important contemporary figure is Rami Hellis, who has reportedly formed an armed network with Ahmed Jundeya, another prominent local figure from Shejaiya, a large neighborhood in the eastern part of Gaza City.

Their forces have operated in areas under Israeli control, and have resisted Hamas attempts to re-establish its authority in the area. Reuters describes the Hellis/Jundeya network as one of the principal armed challenges to Hamas following the 2025 ceasefire.

The al-Majayda clan is based around Khan Younis and it, too, has become involved in the struggle over postwar authority. Members have clashed with Hamas during attempts by Hamas security forces to arrest suspects. Although the clan has criticized Hamas's use of extrajudicial violence, its political position is notably ambiguous. At least one senior al-Majayda figure subsequently expressed support for Hamas's efforts to restore order.

The al-Majayda clan has been linked to the CTSF through local alliances and cooperation, although the clan and the militia are distinct entities.

The Doghmosh clan is somewhat different from the others. It is not primarily an Israeli-backed militia. It is one of Gaza's longstanding armed families and has historically shifted between relationships with Hamas, Fatah, Salafist groups, and independent activity.

Back in October 2025 armed members of the clan fought Hamas forces in Gaza City and it was described as a significant armed rival to Hamas. Currently there does not seem to be a formal Doghmosh militia.

As for the 20-point Trump peace plan for Gaza, there is no evidence that any major anti-Hamas militia has formally adopted the plan as its platform. Some – especially the Popular Forces – have objectives that do overlap with key parts of the plan, particularly supporting a post-Hamas administration after ending Hamas rule. Others – anti-Hamas though they are – seem more intent on pursuing their own more narrow interests.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Who are Hamas's adversaries in Gaza?", 18 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-905761

Published in Eurasia Review, 27 August 2026:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/22082026-gazas-anti-hamas-militias-oped/

Iran’s last effective proxy

2026-08-11T07:51:39.379+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 11 August 2026

With Hamas and Hezbollah substantially weakened, Iran is increasingly relying on the Houthis as its principal remaining proxy capable of exerting sustained military and economic pressure on the US and its regional partners. Currently, as a complement to Iran's campaign in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis are attempting to exploit their control of the Bab al-Mandab strait, situated at the foot of the Red Sea and controlling access to the Suez Canal.

Simultaneously with harrying the shipping in the strait, they are striking targets in Saudi Arabia in conjunction with Iran, whose 2023 pact with Saudi has been consigned to the trash.

On February 28, 2026, in response to the US-Israeli attack, Iran launched missiles and armed drones against Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, mainly because they harbored US bases, but also to punish and deter both Saudi and other governments for their close connection to the US.

Iranian strikes were reported to have hit energy facilities in Saudi, including igniting a fire at the Ras Tanura oil refinery. The Prince Sultan Air Base was also targeted by drone attacks, then and later.

On July 16, Reuters, citing multiple regional and Iranian sources, reported that Iran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab strait. The directive to do so would be given if the US struck Iran's power grid or energy infrastructure.

Although the order was described as a contingency directive, the Houthis reportedly began positioning missiles and drones near the strait while awaiting any further authorization.

Four days later, on July 20, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree appeared on television to announce that "a maritime embargo against the criminal Saudi enemy" would be imposed immediately.

He described it as an "eye for an eye" measure, in response to what the Houthis called Saudi Arabia's long-running blockade of Yemen, and a recent attack on Sanaa’s International Airport.

The result is a second maritime chokepoint, augmenting Iran’s pressure on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis are targeting Saudi oil exports and commercial tankers using Saudi ports, thus attempting to close off the principal alternative export route available after disruptions in Hormuz. The operation as a whole is, in effect, a joint effort by Iran and its Yemeni ally to exert maximum pressure on global oil markets.

A few days later, in response, the Saudi-led coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen.

In short, Iran-Saudi rivalry is being fought out mainly on the Houthi front, the crisis is being sustained by Houthi military action, and the Saudi coalition clearly regards the Houthis as part of Iran’s regional leverage network.

But Saree’s TV address clearly revealed that, from the Houthi’s point of view, two wars are overlapping, and in taking up the fight, the Houthis are killing two birds with one stone. Saree referred to Saudi Arabia’s “blockade” of Yemen, and its strike against the airport at Sanaa, once Yemen’s capital. So in attacking Saudi Arabia the Houthis are not only acting in direct support of Iran, but they are also striking at the ally of their main opponent in Yemen’s long-running civil war – the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

Since 2014 the Houthis, having overthrown the official government, have controlled Sanaa and much of north-western Yemen. That government – now based principally in Aden – continues to be recognized by the UN and receives military and financial backing from Saudi Arabia.

Saudi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was alarmed at the prospect of Iran gaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, and in 2015, with the civil war at its height, intervened militarily. He formed a coalition whose declared objective was to restore the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and prevent the emergence of an Iranian-aligned regime on his country’s southern border.

Although a UN-brokered truce in 2022 substantially reduced cross-border fighting, it never resolved the underlying political conflict. The Houthis retained control of the capital and most of Yemen's population centers in the northwest, while the recognized government retained international legitimacy but exercised authority over only part of the country.

Accordingly, from the Houthi perspective, Saudi Arabia remains not merely a regional rival, but the principal foreign military supporter of its domestic enemy. Conversely, from Riyadh's perspective, the Houthis are an armed insurgent movement backed by Iran that displaced Yemen's legitimate government.

Most intelligence services and academic experts now reject earlier characterizations of the Houthis as merely "Iranian puppets." They are currently seen more as partners with overlapping interests but independent agendas. Iran provides support because the Houthis advance Tehran's regional interests, while the Houthis, retaining significant autonomy in decision-making, accept support because it enhances their military and political position. Both sides derive substantial benefits.

Particularly since October 7, Iran has reportedly supplied the Houthis with missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology, including training, intelligence and financial support, and diplomatic backing. The Houthis, meanwhile, provide Iran with pressure on Saudi Arabia and on Red Sea shipping, leverage against Israel and a relatively inexpensive means of projecting regional influence.

Two possible developments might cause the mutually beneficial partnership to disintegrate. The first, and perhaps the more plausible, would be a decisive weakening or collapse of the Iranian regime following a renewed US military campaign, should the Trump administration in the future conclude that Tehran remained irredeemably hostile and that diplomatic options had been exhausted. Such an outcome could deprive the Houthis of their principal source of advanced military technology, training, and political backing, forcing them to pursue a more independent course.

A second, less likely possibility would arise if sustained efforts by Hans Grundberg, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, succeeded in bringing the principal parties to the civil war into meaningful negotiations, securing a durable ceasefire and a comprehensive political settlement. Were the Houthis to become stakeholders in a recognized governing arrangement, their incentives could shift toward economic reconstruction, international legitimacy, and stable regional relations, reducing the strategic value of close alignment with Iran.

For the moment, though, the liaison is firm, and the Houthis have become Iran's only major proxy capable of exercising direct international pressure by threatening world oil supplies.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Are the Houthis Iran's last gaming card?", 11 August 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-905067

Published in Eurasia Review, 14 August 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/14082026-irans-last-effective-proxy-oped/

Israel on Trial

2026-08-06T18:37:40.477+01:00

My review of "Israel on Trial: Examining the History, the Evidence, and the Law"

by Roy K Altman

Published in the Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, 7 August 2026

Roy K. Altman, a graduate of Columbia University, served as a federal prosecutor for the US Court of Appeals before being appointed a US District Judge for the Southern District of Florida – at the time the youngest district judge ever so appointed.

In his new book, Israel on Trial, he takes the six accusations most widely levied against Israel and subjects them to what he calls “the legal methodology judges, juries and lawyers have used for centuries.” He sets out the evidence for and against each of the crimes that Israel is charged with, and scrutinizes it forensically, using the time-honored rules of evidence that he applies consistently in his own courtroom.

The six allegations that he subjects to this scrupulous analysis are first that Jews are colonists in the Land of Israel; then that the founding of the State of Israel was illegitimate; that Israel has prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state; that Israel was occupying Gaza before October 7, 2023 and had turned it into an “open-air prison”; that Israel is an apartheid state; and that Israel committed genocide in Gaza.

Using factual, historical, archeological, even the latest genealogical evidence, he demonstrates the shaky, unreliable, often illogical nature of the charges that have become routine among those who reject Israel’s right to exist.

Why is Altman’s book so important, indeed vital? After all, his conclusions, solidly based though they are, will certainly not convince committed anti-Zionists, while pro-Israel advocates will already be familiar with them.

No, it is the ordinary every-day Jew faced with irrational antisemitic hatred – the person in the workplace, shopping center or social setting, the young person in the classroom or campus – that needs, and will surely welcome, Israel on Trial. In these pages Altman provides a convincing fact-based rebuttal to the anti-Israel tropes that are so casually tossed around these days.

There are also vast numbers of largely uncommitted people across the globe who are subject to a constant flood of false narratives about Israel, Zionism and the Jewish people. If only some could be enticed to open the pages of Israel on Trial, they would discover that there is an antidote for the poison they are perpetually fed.

To the charge that Jews are colonists, he begins with the accepted definition of “colonist” – “an outsider with no historical, linguistic, cultural or religious connection to the land he is conquering.” Then he demonstrates that “the Jews were living in (and often governing) the Land of Israel thousands of years before Islam existed, hundreds of years before the Roman emperor Hadrian invented the word Palaestina…and long before Arab Muslims first invaded the land in AD 636.”

As for Israel’s legitimacy, Altman rebuts the assertion that the “biblical promise is Israel’s only claim to legitimacy”. He asserts that the criteria set out in the 1933 Montevideo treaty are universally accepted as international law on the subject of legitimate statehood. A nascent state has to fulfil four requirements: have a permanent population, have a defined territory, be governed by a single effective government, and have the capacity to conduct foreign relations.

Altman points out that when Israel declared independence in May 1948, it met all four criteria.

As to the claim that Israel has prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state, Altman cites the six occasions that Israel (or the international community with Israeli acquiescence), “has offered the Arabs a Palestinian state – and, each time, the Arabs have rejected that offer.”

Each of those attempts, says Altman, was thwarted “by the Palestinians’ own demand for an Arab state that stretches ‘from the river to the sea’.”

To the charge that Israel was occupying Gaza on October 7, 2023 and had turned it into an “open-air prison” or a concentration camp, Altman sets out the irrefutable historic facts, linked to the commonly understood meaning of both “prison” and “concentration camp, which prove the reverse.

His Chapter 5 is concerned with the widely-voiced charge that Israel is an apartheid state. In addition to setting out the irrefutable facts concerning the equal status and rights of the 20% of Israel’s Arab citizens, Altman lays bare a inherent illogicality in the extreme anti-Israel position.

“True,” he writes, “the Palestinians who live in Gaza and in parts of Judea and Samaria enjoy none of these rights in Israel. But that’s because they don’t live in Israel, don’t want to live in Israel, and thus aren’t Israeli citizens at all.”

More than 140 countries around the world, he notes, as well as many of the organizations and individuals asserting the apartheid claim recognize the State of Palestine.

“Israel cannot be practicing apartheid by refusing to afford citizenship rights to the citizens of another country,” writes Altman,”…but that’s exactly what Amnesty International, for instance, is suggesting when, on the one hand, it recognizes the existence of a “State of Palestine,” while on the other, it claims that Israel is an apartheid state for refusing to afford full citizenship rights to the citizens of that Palestinian state.”

And so Altman reaches the assertion repeated ad nauseam – that Israel committed, and continues to commit, genocide against the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza. It is an accusation, as Altman demonstrates, that relies on re-interpreting the meaning of the word “genocide”. It is used by many as a measure of their antipathy to the loss of civilian life during Israel’s fight against Hamas. But the term “genocide” has a very specific meaning.

Altman makes it abundantly clear that he regards the loss of a single civilian life in war as a tragedy. However, “the question in a genocide case isn’t whether innocent civilians have died in Gaza. They unquestionably have—just as they have in every war that’s ever been fought.”

The essence of the crime of genocide is the specific “intent to destroy” the victim group’s existence. To be guilty of genocide, the State of Israel must have intended to wipe out the population of Gaza. Altman demonstrates, with irrefutable facts and figures, that Israel did not have, and never has had, any such intention.

In Israel on Trial Altman provides all who love Israel with sound evidence-based arguments to counter the disinformation that clogs the social media platforms and so often the official news media as well. It is a book entirely in tune with the times, and is highly recommended.

Published in the Jerusalem Post online:
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-904749

The new US-Syria-Iraq connection

2026-08-04T05:45:01.010+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 4 August 2026

On July 8, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump had a face-to-face meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

According to the official Syrian read-out and US reporting, they discussed strengthening US-Syrian relations, Syria’s economic recovery, and foreign investment. Following their meeting Trump announced he was removing Syria from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, a designation Syria had borne since 1979.

Reuters reported that Trump handed Sharaa a personal letter during the meeting. The key passages were: "I promised to remove all barriers stopping you from rebuilding your country, and very soon, you will finally be able to do so," and "We have US companies ready to invest in Syria and help make your country greater and more prosperous than ever before."

Speaking to the media after their meeting, Trump praised Sharaa in unusually strong terms. He’s: “doing an unbelievable job in unifying Syria….Syria was a mess…now it's just come together….He's done a fantastic job." All the indications are that Trump has decided to adopt post-Assad Syria as a working partner in developing a reinvigorated Middle East.

One week later, Trump was entertaining Iraq’s prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, at the White House.

Once again the meeting was notable for its tone. Trump repeatedly praised Zaidi and spoke of their "tremendous chemistry." He made it clear that he regarded Iraq’s new prime minister also as a partner with whom Washington could build a stronger long-term relationship.

The discussion covered expanding economic relations between the two countries, while both sides endorsed a series of memoranda of understanding (MoU) involving US participation in Iraq's oil and gas sector. Zaidi reiterated his government's intention of bringing all armed groups, including Iran-backed militias, under state control, while confirming that the remaining US forces in Iraq are expected to complete their withdrawal by September 30, 2026.

What was not specifically referred to by either party – and not mentioned either following Trump’s discussion with Sharaa – was the US-Syria-Iraq plan to revive the historic 500-mile pipeline from the oilfields of Kirkuk in northern Iraq to the town of Baniyas, on Syria's Mediterranean coast – a determined effort to reduce Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz.

Tom Barrack, Trump’s ambassador to Turkey and envoy to Syria and Iraq, had been working on the details of the agreement before Zaidi’s visit.

The pipeline was completed in 1952 by Iraq’s Petroleum Company with a capacity of around 300,000 barrels per day. Baghdad shut the pipeline in the 1980s after Syria sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.

The pipeline will almost certainly have to be wholly replaced – a project calculated to last up to three years.

A glance at the map shows that reviving the pipeline would give Iraq a strategic alternative to exporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Gulf exports, shipments through the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline would avoid the Persian Gulf altogether. It would spare tankers the need to negotiate the strategic Hormuz chokepoint on both their outbound and return voyages. Oil reaching Syria's Mediterranean coast via the pipeline could be shipped directly to European markets.

Routing Iraqi oil this way could cut a tanker's voyage to European refineries by roughly 3,000 nautical miles and more than a week at sea, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars in normal shipping costs while avoiding the war-risk insurance and disruption associated with the Strait of Hormuz.

Although it has clearly been agreed between the parties to keep the resurrection of the historic pipeline low-key, Reuters and other media outlets indicate that the project has advanced well beyond the conceptual stage. It is claimed that the US is officially backing restoration of the 891 km (about 550 mile) long pipeline, and that the US expects American firms to take part in rebuilding the line. Chevron has been widely mentioned as a potential participant, although the company has declined to comment publicly.

Other pipeline projects with outlets on Syria’s Mediterranean coast are also under consideration, and could link major energy producers in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, directly to Syria’s ports. Indeed, with Syria shorn of its sanctions and established as a fully-fledged partner, it has the potential to become a major energy transit hub. It has about 2.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, but some geological estimates suggest its undiscovered onshore and offshore petroleum resources could ultimately exceed 20 billion barrels.

In February 2026, Chevron signed a memorandum of understanding with Syria's state-owned petroleum company and Qatar's Power International Holding to develop the country's first offshore oil and gas field. Days later, Saudi and American energy companies formed a consortium to explore four or five oil and gas blocks and rebuild energy infrastructure in north-east Syria.

Finding gas is, of course, only the beginning. Syria would ultimately need to sell it. Trump's decision to remove Syria from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism signals that Washington now regards Sharaa's government as a legitimate partner. That political endorsement encourages investors who might otherwise have stayed away, and it makes it much easier to construct pipelines, use Mediterranean export terminals, attract investment and conclude long-term gas sales contracts with foreign buyers.

Were Israel to follow Trump’s lead in considering Syria's potential as a commercial partner, several hazards would need to be overcome. One is the strong influence that Turkey, no friend of Israel, exercises on Sharaa.

Then there is the fact that Russia has retained a significant military and commercial presence in Syria. President Vladimir Putin has preserved his strategic foothold on the eastern Mediterranean, having negotiated continued access to Russia’s naval facility at Tartus and its Khmeimim air base near Latakia. At the same time, according to reliable media reports, a Russian commercial logistics hub is expected to become operational at Tartus very soon, handling Russian cargo and providing a maritime link between the Syrian coast and Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.

Trump seems determined to enfold both Syria’s Sharaa and Iraq’s al-Zaidi into a close commercial and economic embrace. In Israel, however, both are viewed rather more cautiously. Trust cannot simply be bestowed; it will have to be earned.

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online titled "Trump’s Syria-Iraq pipeline plan aims to weaken Iran’s leverage", 4 August 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-904406

Published in Eurasia Review, 13 August 2026

https://www.eurasiareview.com/08082026-the-new-us-syria-iraq-connection-oped/

"Queers for Palestine" and the intersectionality trap

2026-07-29T16:06:54.003+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Report, and the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2026

A tidal wave of antisemitism has swept across the Western world in recent years. One of its more puzzling aspects is the bizarrely incompatible alliances it has fostered.

A striking case is the common sight of LGBTQ+ activists and “Queers for Palestine” marching in solidarity with Palestinian movements such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad. They either do not know, or they choose to ignore, that according to the law and norms of their fellow campaigners homosexuality is a criminal offence, punishable with imprisonment or even death.

A similar pattern appears among some women’s rights activists. They proclaim their solidarity with regimes or movements such as Iran or its proxy Hamas, whose gender policies are starkly anti‑feminist. Iran’s legal system fuses patriarchal culture with rigid Sharia‑based rules, producing discrimination and state‑sanctioned violence against women, including lethal force over dress‑code violations. In this strange alliance, some left‑wing feminist elements in the West are prepared to turn a blind eye to extreme misogyny, just as long as it is embedded in forces opposed to “Western imperialism” and Israel, condemned as a “white, colonial, patriarchal” oppressor.

This unnatural conjunction of progressive, left-wing activists with narrow-minded, homophobic, misogynistic entities is glued together by a doctrine that mesmerized feminist and critical race theorists in the late 1980s, and rapidly captivated large parts of the social sciences world. It is called “intersectionality”.

The term was coined in 1989 by the American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw. She invented it to explain how Black women’s lives were adversely affected by discrimination not only of race but also of gender, and that the two impacted on each another.

This basic idea – that one form of oppression actually influences another – appealed to sociologists. It quickly became an obsession, mushrooming to encompass the concept that every form of discrimination within a society against oppressed or disenfranchised groups is interlinked.

It did not require much effort to incorporate into these intersecting forms of oppression the old chestnut that – despite all the evidence to the contrary – Israel was an apartheid state dedicated to oppressing Palestinians. As a result, the groups that considered themselves oppressed were led to embrace the Palestinians as fellow victims, and to perceive Israel as part of the oppressive global power structure. In short, intersectionality soon offered anti-Israel organizations a fashionable and acceptable way of wielding the ultimate antisemitic weapon – linking every perceived evil in the world to the Jews or the Jewish state.

From the 2010s, intersectionality became mainstream in progressive NGOs, campus politics, social justice and anti-fascist campaigns. Movements increasingly adopted an “intersectional” language of overlapping systems. In left-wing circles it became both fashionable and a matter of self-preservation to maintain, for example, that equal pay for women is related to Black Lives Matter, or that climate change activism is inseparable from the struggle against colonialism. And since left-wing opinion has decreed that Palestinians are quintessential victims and their villainous oppressors are Israel, dogma dictated that in opposing any form of discrimination you must oppose Israel.

Your opposition must, of course, extend to all those who support Israel – which means the vast majority of diaspora Jewry. And then, by a further extension, to all Israelis. You must deny them a voice, ban them from public life, cut them off from academic interchange, boycott or disrupt their artistic performances. It is on the basis of intersectionality that the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement operates its anti-Israel and anti-Israeli campaigns.

Pride Month events in the US and Europe supply clear examples of this frankly antisemitic thinking. LGBTQ+ organizations regularly accuse Israel – the only state in the Middle East with a liberal approach to sexual issues – of “pinkwashing”, that is of cynically using its advanced LGBTQ+ rights to distract the world’s attention from its alleged human rights violations. In other words, nothing that Israel can do – even demonstrate its open-hearted support for liberal sexual politics – can outweigh the underlying antipathy toward the Jewish state.

As a result Jewish and pro‑Israel LGBTQ+ groups have been harassed or excluded from Pride marches, while organizations which support Palestinian factions with deeply homophobic ideologies are welcomed in the name of solidarity with the “oppressed.”

Groups and movements intent on putting intersectional theory into practice simply fail, or refuse, to perceive antisemitism as a rampant form of oppression. None take into account that for centuries Jews across the world were subject to discrimination and persecution. Nor do they acknowledge that Zionism was the political reaction – a movement aimed at restoring to the Jewish people the right to determine their own future in their ancestral homeland.

It is heartening, however, to note that the intersectionality tide is beginning to turn. Some scholars have started to argue that intersectionality sidelines antisemitism.

Sociologist Karin Stogner writes that intersectionality as usually practiced shows a “tendency to exclude global antisemitism from its understanding of oppression.” She notes that movements guided by this exclusion—she names the Women’s March, Chicago Dyke March, and parts of Black Lives Matter—have “excluded Jewish organizations and individuals from participation and take a vehement anti‑Israel stance.”

In one paper she describes “strange alliances that occur between queer and intersectional feminism on the one hand and global antisemitism on the other.”

Professor Christina Hoff Sommers has written: “Of course, intersectionality theory is a confused muddle. It fights racism and sexism by classifying everyone according to race and sex. It views race and gender privilege as the root of all evil, while ignoring the role played by dogmatic ideologies held by all genders."

Even Kimberlé Crenshaw herself, some twenty years after devising the idea of intersectionality, complained that her concept had been stretched beyond what she intended. She wrote that intersectionality was “originally meant to be a tool used to understand and frame the discrimination faced by black women in the United States,” but that it had been “contorted” to become something that she never intended it to be.

No-one could speak with greater authority. She has asserted that intersectionality as she conceived it has burst its banks and flooded out of control. Are its proponents at last beginning to perceive that the misguided application of its theories to Israel and the Jewish people is in part responsible for the uncontrolled expansion of antisemitism in the West?

Published by the Jerusalem Post online, 28 July 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/jerusalem-report/article-903414

Trump’s nuclear deal and Saudi Vision 2030

2026-07-28T08:37:39.946+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 28 July 2026

It was on July 22 that a new Saudi civil nuclear agreement was signed between the US and Saudi Arabia. First reports indicated that the agreement assured Saudi Arabia of a 30-year cooperation with the US on civil nuclear development with no reference to the requirements laid down in the past by the US as essential to such a deal – such as joining the Abraham Accords or a ban on enriching uranium domestically.

Within 24 hours US President Donald Trump had posted clarifications on both issues on his Truth Social platform. He endorsed the nuclear agreement – which, incidentally, still requires a 90-day congressional review, and could face opposition – but, he wrote, it “is totally subject to Saudi Arabia joining the very respected and successful Abraham Accords.”

Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Saudi Arabia joining the Accords “would be an historic leap forward for peace in the Middle East.”

Since no international inspection process had been built into the deal, there were immediate fears that Saudi Arabia would be able to enrich uranium, leading eventually to a nuclear weapons program.

Trump was intent on quashing that assumption as well.

“The Civil Nuclear Deal,” he wrote, adding in brackets “(there will be no enrichment of material)…pertains only to non-military use such as the ones that Iran and UAE (and others) already have.”

Little attention has been paid to how the new arrangement will impact on the ambitious plan, launched by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in April 2016, aimed at revitalizing the kingdom – Saudi Vision 2030.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is less than a hundred years old. It was only in 1932 that Abdul Aziz ibn Saud emerged from many years of political and military struggle against the Ottoman empire and other local chieftains, and was able to name the area he had conquered “Saudi Arabia”, and proclaim himself its monarch.

No doubt MBS had an eye on the eventual centenary celebrations in 2032 of the monarchy and the kingdom when he launched the Vision 2030 program. If it succeeds, by the centenary year Saudi Arabia will have been transformed from virtual total dependence on oil revenues into a modern, liberalized, thriving society, its prosperity underpinned by flourishing industrial, financial, economic and commercial sectors.

When first announced, Saudi Vision 2030 envisaged, among hundreds of initiatives, privatizing entire sectors of the economy, cutting subsidies, courting investors at home and abroad, streamlining government services, and going public with the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, the world's largest oil producer and most profitable company.

This last step was achieved in 2019, when Aramco’s initial public offering (IPO) raised $29.4 billion, the largest in history, Yet it was only 1.5% of the company that was sold to the public; the Saudi state and its sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund, still own 98.5% of Aramco.

A key objective of the program is to achieve economic diversification not by diminishing oil production, but by reducing the kingdom’s dependency on oil. Ten years after the launch of Vision 2030, in April 2026, the government published a new progress report. It reveals a rapid expansion and diversification of non-oil economic activity, employment, investment and government revenue sources.

The report states that by the end of 2025, non-oil GDP was contributing 55% to the economy – the first time that non-oil sectors have made up a clear majority of the kingdom’s real economic output.

To reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil, Saudi Arabia is also investing heavily in renewable energy projects. The kingdom has become the fastest-growing renewables market outside China.

Vision 2030 includes nearly 50 large-scale construction and development projects aimed at transforming the nation's infrastructure. A cornerstone of the program is Neom, a $500 billion futuristic city sited in the northwest of Saudi Arabia.

Envisioned as a hub for innovation and sustainability, it aims to incorporate smart city technologies and renewable energy sources. Recent reports indicate that Neom is facing significant financial challenges, with rising costs and delays leading to concerns about the project's feasibility. This is one obvious area where Israeli hi-tech know-how, under an Abraham Accords umbrella, could help the development.

The Red Sea Project is an initiative focused on developing a luxury tourist destination along Saudi Arabia's west coast. With environmental conservation built into the concept, it features resorts across an archipelago of pristine islands and inland sites. When all phases are completed it will comprise 50 resorts offering 10,000 hotel rooms in addition to more than 1,000 residential properties. Saudi Arabia hosts millions of Muslims each year on their Hajj pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca, but inside an Abraham Accords partnership Israeli expertise in global, as opposed to Islamic, tourism could be of invaluable assistance in realizing the project.

The Red Sea Project is a 28,000-square-kilometer tourism masterplan on the northern Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia, developed in collaboration with the Red Sea Development Company under Saudi Vision 2030. Covering more than 90 islands, two coastal village hubs, and inland development across a planned 10,000 hotel keys and residential units, the masterplan is designed to generate 100% of its required power on-site through photovoltaic panels and solar roads.

Positioned near Riyadh, Qiddiya is envisioned as a vast entertainment city, encompassing theme parks, sports facilities, and cultural venues. It aims to become a major tourist destination, contributing to the diversification of the economy. Construction of a variety of parks, performing arts centers. sports stadiums and other projects is forging ahead, with several attractions planned to open well before 2030.

Recently announced, the Mukaab is set to be the largest building in the world, featuring a unique cube-shaped design. It is part of the New Murabba development in Riyadh and aims to offer a mix of residential, commercial, and entertainment spaces. Construction has commenced, with the first phase expected to be completed by 2030.

Ever since the idea was mooted of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, their prequisite has been a clear path to Palestinian sovereignty. They may decide that Phase 3 of Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza provides that assurance.

Now a multi-billion dollar US-partnered investment program in civil nuclear development is to be added to the immensely challenging program already under way. It presages a partnership way into the future, allowing US companies to help Saudi Arabia not only develop a civilian nuclear power program, but also realize MBS’s ambitious Vision 2030 project.

Whoever leads the US in 2032 will certainly merit a seat of honor at Saudi Arabia’s centenary celebrations.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Saudi Arabia-US nuke deal helps MBS realize Saudi Vision 2030", 28 July 2026
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-903756

Published in Eurasia Review, 31 July 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/31072026-trumps-nuclear-deal-and-saudi-vision-2030-oped/

Trump, Erdogan and the F-35 enigma

2026-07-21T16:37:27.701+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 21 July 2026

Designed as a multirole combat aircraft, the F-35 combines low-observable (stealth) shaping with advanced sensors, data fusion, and networked communications, enabling it to conduct air-to-air combat, precision strike missions, intelligence gathering, and electronic warfare in contested environments.

On July 7, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump met the media together with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Trump used the occasion to announce that the US would be lifting the sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey in December 2020 under the CAATS (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions) Act.

Turkey had been sanctioned because Erdogan, in defiance of Washington’s express warnings, had gone ahead and purchased the Russian S‑400, a long-range surface‑to‑air missile system specifically designed as a defense against aircraft such as the F-35, the advanced multirole stealth fighter that has become the cornerstone of America’s tactical air power.

Trump was then asked whether Turkey would be allowed to buy the F-35.
"Turkey has been in many ways much more loyal than other countries that we thought would be loyal,” he replied “…so it is something we definitely would consider."

That was an astonishing response, given that Turkey is still deploying the S-400 system, specifically designed as a defense system against aircraft such as the F-35.

It was Erdogan’s decision to acquire the S-400 that got him ejected from the F-35 program back in 2017. As soon as he announced his intention to do so, Washington made it clear that any attempt to fly US F-35s and simultaneously operate the Russian S-400 defense system was an absolute non-starter. It would effectively turn the S‑400 into a live intelligence‑collection platform on the F‑35’s stealth and mission‑system profile.

The S-400 mobile air defense system is designed to detect, track, and engage aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and certain other aerial targets using a combination of phased-array radars, command vehicles, and multiple types of interceptor missiles operating at different ranges and altitudes.

What was obvious then remains obvious today. If F-35s routinely flew within range of an operational S-400, the Russian-designed radars could collect enormous quantities of data about the aircraft's radar signature, flight profiles, electronic emissions and tactics. Highly classified information about the F-35's stealth characteristics could be exposed.

That concern explains why Congress enacted legislation barring the transfer of F-35s to Turkey while it retains the Russian S-400 air defense system.

It has not prevented continued low-level negotiations between Turkey and the US about the possibility of Turkey rejoining the F-35 program. On December 10, 2025, US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack wrote on social media that the US was in ongoing discussions with Turkey “regarding their desire to rejoin the F-35 program and their possession of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. As laid out in US law, Türkiye must no longer operate nor possess the S-400 system to return to the F-35 program."

By April 2026 Barrack’s stance had hardened. Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum he expressed confidence that the long-running dispute over Turkey's Russian-made S-400 air-defense system was nearing resolution. "I think you're going to see the S-400 [problem] solved soon," he said, adding: "From my boss's point of view, acceptance into an F-35 program is fine."

There may be political and practical reasons for Trump’s change of heart.

Deteriorating relations with Iran has made Turkey's strategic value to Washington considerably greater. Turkey controls NATO's southeastern flank and borders Iran, Iraq and Syria. Trump may judge that rebuilding the alliance with Ankara is now a priority.

Moreover a confidential understanding may have been reached over the S-400. Although nothing has been announced publicly, media reports suggest that there have been discussions about deactivating the system. Reuters notes that transferring the system to a third country is another proposal under discussion.

Congress has not changed the statutory restrictions of the sale of the F-35, meaning that any proposal to do so could face a significant legal and political battle. Trump may be prepared to challenge Congress. But all he may be signaling is intent rather than a settled policy. All he said was that he will lift sanctions and "consider" F-35 sales.

If Erdogan is ultimately to win the F-35 struggle, then either Turkey has to remove, export or permanently deactivate the S-400; or Congress has to agree to relax or amend the legal restrictions despite the continued presence of the S-400.

Currently there is no evidence that the first has occurred, while there is substantial evidence of bipartisan resistance in Congress to the second. That is why, despite Trump's dramatic shift in tone, the path to restoring Turkey's F-35 status remains uncertain.

Speaking at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 17, Barrack threw in a casual remark that raised a few eyebrows at the time, but has not been followed up.

"Greece has S-300s and F-35s," he said.

Greece, like Turkey, is a member of NATO. Could it possibly be deploying the advanced US fighter and the Russian anti-missile defense system at the same time – the very situation that Washington totally vetoed in the case of Turkey?

An examination of the facts reveals a complicated but innocuous situation that has little in common with Turkey’s.

Barrack was entirely accurate when he spoke of the S-300, an older version with significantly more limited capabilities than the S-400. Moreover the S-300 system operated by Greece was not a Greek purchase.

In 1997 Glafcos Clerides's government in Cyprus ordered two S-300 PMU-1 batteries from Russia. Turkey threatened military action if the missiles were deployed in Cyprus. After a major diplomatic crisis involving the US, Britain and NATO, Cyprus agreed not to install them. In 1998-99 the missiles were transferred to Greece.

So Greece inherited the S-300, designed during the late Soviet period and delivered more than 25 years ago.

US officials have consistently argued that Turkey's case is fundamentally different. Despite repeated US warnings, Turkey deliberately negotiated a major strategic defense contract with Russia in 2017, and it bought the far newer S-400 Triumf, one of Russia's most advanced strategic air-defense systems..

As for the F-35s, in January 2024 the US State Department approved the sale of 40 Lightning II aircraft to Greece.

On July 8, following the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, Greece’s prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, told Greek journalists: "Greek pilots will begin training on the Greek F-35s in 2027.”

Greece’s situation may indeed be different from Turkey’s, but a convincing case could be made for a precedent having been set.

Could this be the chink that leads to opening the door for Turkey’s acquisition of the F-35?

Published in the Jerusalem Post and the Jerusalem Post online, 22 July 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-902969

Published in Eurasia Review, 24 July 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072026-trump-erdogan-and-the-f-35-enigma-oped/

Iran’s internal power struggle

2026-07-14T05:29:27.409+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 14 July 2026

Ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has been an autocratic theocracy, ruled with an iron fist by the supreme leader – first Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini until his death in 1989, and then Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, until he was killed on February 28, 2026 in an airstrike.

Today’s Iran is no longer what it has been. What it has become is the subject of controversial interpretations.

Some believe that Iran is no longer a republic of any kind but has morphed into a dictatorial, mafia-style oligarchy in military uniform. The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), they maintain, exercises total control over political, economic and strategic decisions, whilst maintaining a theocratic veneer for the purposes of internal and international legitimacy.

They believe the new supreme leader, Motjaba Khamenei, is a puppet of the IRGC, selected under direct military pressure which bypassed the constitutional process. The new Khamenei certainly lacks religious credentials and public legitimacy, and has yet to demonstrate any independent authority.

Real power, they say, resides in three IRGC hardliners: IRGC Commander‑in‑Chief Ahmad Vahidi; Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr; and senior military adviser to Khamenei Mohsen Rezaei. All three rejected the renewed negotiations with the US and want to continue the war.

They are only too aware that Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president since July 2024, wants a ceasefire, and they act systematically to thwart him. The IRGC has blocked his ministerial appointments and countered his signals of de-escalation.

On July 6 some source of power within the regime authorized Iranian forces to attack three commercial vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, well aware that this would prompt a US reaction. In response US Central Command struck more than 80 Iranian military targets.

This supports those who maintain that Iran is governed today by an IRGC which functions simultaneously as an armed force, an economic empire, an intelligence service, a political party and the effective government.

Yet, while many expert commentators do believe that the IRGC has reached a level of power never previously achieved, others are convinced that the internal struggle for dominance is not over and that the IRGC still has to consolidate the level of control it has acquired. They hold that power in Iran today is heavily contested between the IRGC and a more pragmatic political‑diplomatic camp, while the newly elected supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, sits above them as an ambivalent, vulnerable arbiter whose authority is real in law, but fragile in practice.

On the evening of June 30, Iran’s state news TV channel was broadcasting a pre-recorded interview with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator in the ongoing talks with the US over sanctions relief, nuclear constraints and regional de‑escalation.

Having confirmed that there are “behind‑the‑scenes negotiations” with Washington leading to a possible deal on limiting Iran’s nuclear activity, Ghalibaf was in the middle of a sentence when the screen went blank. After a second or two, an old speech by Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader, was on the air.

Iranian hardliners had succeeded in cutting off a television interview with the country’s chief peace negotiator, as he was defending the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

In reporting the incident, the UK’s Daily Telegraph said that the censored sections included Ghalibaf’s response to reports that international inspectors would be allowed to visit Iran’s nuclear sites, his account of how frozen Iranian assets would be released, and details of the agreement’s proposed $300bn fund for post-war reconstruction.

Most importantly, Ghalibaf was about to discuss the new supreme leader’s equivocal message about the deal with the US, in which he had remarked that “in principle I had a different opinion” but had nonetheless authorized the agreement. Hardliners had seized upon the remark as proof that the supreme leader was basically opposed to the negotiations that his own government was pursuing, even though he had given his approval to do so.

The television blackout prompted Parliament’s media center to issue a rare public protest, accusing state TV of violating normal protocol. This led to a public debate about who controls the airwaves.

Vahid Jalili, deputy chief at Iran’s state broadcaster, is the brother of Saeed Jalili, a former negotiator aligned with the Paydari Front, Iran’s most uncompromising conservative bloc, which opposes talks with the country that killed the former supreme leader. For the Paydari Front and its allies, resistance to the US is the ideological core of the revolution.

The Ghalibaf TV incident was not the first of its kind. Just ten days previously, on the evening of June 20, Mahmoud Nabavian, a cleric and former member of Iran’s negotiating team, had gone on the air to allege that in agreeing to the US-Iran MoU, the Iranian negotiating team had gone way beyond their brief, and that the terms they had agreed to did not reflect the conditions that the supreme leader had previously set.

In a television interview, he began reading out what he claimed was classified correspondence from the supreme leader. He claimed Khamenei had written to the negotiating team saying: “What was agreed upon in the Pakistan talks is completely different from what was supposed to happen, and was a condition for the legitimacy of the talks, and the talks must be stopped.”

The TV broadcast was cut off abruptly, and soon afterwards the public relations office of the news network announced that it "accepts the resignation of the relevant director general of the network" and would charge him with "negligence in professional management."

Commentators said Nabavian could not have gained access to the supreme leader’s letters without the complicity of a hardline source.

So what is the true situation within Iran? Evidence from reports in Iranian and international media points to a multi‑layered contest for supremacy being waged within the upper echelons of Iran’s governance.

Many believe that Iran is currently operating with four overlapping centers of authority: the supreme leader, the IRGC, the president, and senior IRGC-aligned political figures – and that each is vying for supreme power. All, however, are probably united behind Khamenei's pledge to avenge his father's death; the ideology that has driven the revolution since 1979 lives on.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Hardliners in Tehran are running the show while the Iran's supreme leader watches", 15 July 2026: https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-902329

Is the Gaza peace plan dead?

2026-07-07T05:26:45.131+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 7 July 2026

US President Donald Trump’s 20‑point plan for Gaza, announced on September 29, 2025, linked a one‑off hostage/prisoner exchange to a transition period in which Gaza would be demilitarized and placed under tightly managed international oversight.

The new governance features a technocratic National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) – a Palestinian body running services and reconstruction. It would operate under the strategic control of a Trump‑chaired “Board of Peace” and an international security presence.

Hamas is to be removed from governing authority and stripped of its military capacity. In its place vetted local forces and international troops would enforce a terror‑free, demilitarized Gaza. Meanwhile massive, externally directed reconstruction and investment programs would get under way.

In due course the Palestinian Authority would inherit Gaza from this interim committee, but only if the PA completes a prescribed reform program on security, corruption, and governance. At that point a unified Palestinian administration over Gaza and the West Bank, backed by elections, is envisaged.

Beyond that, the plan holds out the prospect of US‑backed negotiations toward a Palestinian state, but only once the demilitarization process is in progress, and the reformed PA proves it can govern Gaza within this heavily circumscribed framework.

The plan was formally adopted by the UN Security Council on November 17, 2025 in Resolution 2803. Eight Arab and Islamic states had already issued a joint statement welcoming Trump’s effort and confirming that they were ready to work with the US on implementing it: Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. Even Hamas had agreed to some parts of the proposal, including hostage release and transferring authority, while maintaining that other elements – such as its own disarmament – required further negotiation.

The first phase of the plan – ceasefire plus hostage and prisoner exchange – was achieved and ended large‑scale Israeli–Hamas hostilities. For phase two the UN resolution authorized a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) to help demilitarize Gaza and train Palestinian police, with US coordination and contributions from Arab and other states.

As of mid‑2026, Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania had pledged troops, while Egypt and Jordan have agreed to train Palestinian police. However no ISF units have actually deployed inside Gaza, while the $100 million earmarked by the UAE for police training remains frozen.

Meanwhile the military geography on the ground has been changing. Since the ceasefire the IDF has steadily reduced the area controlled by Hamas from 47% of the Strip to 40% or even less. In May 2026 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he intended to expand Israel’s control to 70% of Gazan territory. However territory and population are not in balance. No more than 15% of Gaza’s population remains in Israeli-controlled areas; at least 85%, and perhaps more, are living in wretched conditions in the coastal zones and urban enclaves held by Hamas. Reports speak of overcrowding, problems with sanitation and access to services, and a severe lack of water.

Gaza’s traditional water sources have been badly degraded by the war, leaving much of the population reliant on minimal supplies, some trucked in daily. Trump’s 20‑point plan and its Board of Peace envisage substantial investment in repairing Gaza’s water infrastructure, but in reality these water‑sector reconstruction measures remain largely at the planning and pledge stage.

More generally, despite Trump's announcement that billions has been pledged through the Board of Peace, the Financial Times reported on May 27 that no donor money has actually reached the World Bank, and that informed sources said “not one US dollar” had yet been spent on Gaza reconstruction through the Board's funding mechanisms.

Turkish and Egyptian construction giants, US and European firms, and Gulf‑based companies are preparing bids to benefit from the envisaged multi‑billion‑dollar rebuild. Most projects are at planning or competition stage, except for one large‑scale build actually under way.

A Gaza‑based contractor, Masoud & Ali Contracting Co (MAC), is constructing an Emirati‑funded housing compound for tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians in an Israeli‑controlled part of southern Gaza. In addition a few businesses and contractors have started some limited reconstruction.

In mid-2026 Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan can best be described as wilting. While still formally in play, phase two seems to have stalled. The ceasefire is repeatedly violated, Hamas demilitarization and therefore Israeli withdrawal have not occurred, and reconstruction in accordance with the plan remains minimal.

This is not precisely the picture presented on March 24 by Nickolay Mladenov, the UN High Representative for Gaza and director‑general of the US‑backed Board of Peace, in his first appearance before the UN Security Council. He was present to brief members on progress in implementing the Gaza peace plan endorsed the previous year in Security Council Resolution 2803.

Mladenov informed the council that a plan, developed with and guaranteed by the US, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, “is now in place for the decommissioning and reintegration of armed groups in Gaza.” He described the principle at the heart of the framework as: “one authority, one law, one weapon.”

This formula, he stressed, applied without exception to all armed active militias in the Strip, explicitly including Hamas. The objective was the complete decommissioning of weapons in Gaza and their transfer to the control of the technocratic Palestinian authority.

Mladenov said that the first priority, after consolidating a total ceasefire and emergency humanitarian measures, would be to identify and remove heavy weapons systems and military‑grade infrastructure, including tunnels. Subsequent stages would expand disarmament in parallel with staged Israeli withdrawals. The process would be supervised by Palestinian security forces answerable to the National Committee.

Crucially, Mladenov linked compliance with disarmament to the start of large‑scale reconstruction, arguing that collecting the most dangerous weapons was a precondition for economic recovery.

Meanwhile, starting on June 30 the Board of Peace held a two‑day “reset” meeting at a Cyprus resort,
bringing together Board officials, the NCAG, and allied advisers to review stalled plans for post‑war governance, reconstruction, and a transition away from Hamas rule. Participants later called the talks “highly productive”.

So the Gaza peace plan is not dead; it is languishing. It could surely be nursed back to health.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem post online, 7 July 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-901467

Lebanon – fantasy and reality

2026-06-30T05:07:06.690+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026

The three-way US-Israel-Lebanon deal, agreed and signed on June 26, brings clarity to what has been the somewhat obscure situation produced by the US–Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), agreed on June 17.

It has certainly seemed that, when it comes to Lebanon, US President Donald Trump and Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu were pulling in somewhat different directions.

The published text of the MoU states that the US, Iran “and their respective allies involved in the current conflict” declare an “immediate and lasting cessation of military actions across all fronts, including Lebanon.” Opening a 60‑day window for negotiating a fuller agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the MoU declares a ceasefire, implicitly including Israel and Hezbollah in the truce.

But neither Israel nor Hezbollah had been involved in negotiating the agreement, which embodies the fantasy that the US and Iran completely control their “respective allies”. They do not, and for the US to have assumed it could take Israel for granted was presumptuous. Although Israel could scarcely be considered bound by its terms, it has chosen to abide by the MoU, though not abdicating the right to defend itself against any breach of the ceasefire by Hezbollah.

For its part, Iran has been unable to restrain Hezbollah, which has ignored the MoU and mounted a whole series of armed assaults on the IDF. There have been at least two major, lethal Hezbollah attacks since the MoU was signed, with five Israeli soldiers killed (four in a tank strike on June 18, and one in a drone strike on June 20), plus several additional non‑fatal attacks. For example, a Hezbollah explosive‑drone attack in southern Lebanon on Saturday June 20 wounded 13 Israeli soldiers.

Despite earlier calls from the White House for Israel to observe the ceasefire, basic justice for the soldiers who lost their lives demanded a response. Israel characterizes these retaliatory actions as self‑defense against clear Hezbollah violations, essential to deterring further attacks. On June 18, performing something of a volte-face compared with the recent past, Trump publicly warned Tehran that it is responsible for reining in Hezbollah, and must ensure the group fully respects the truce.

Iran retaliated on June 20, declaring that Israel was breaching the agreement by attacking Hezbollah, and itself promptly proceeded to violate the MoU by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The Lebanon situation is full of anomalies. In demanding that Israel cease its military activity in Lebanon, the US, the UN and Western nations, providing no background, declare they are protecting the country and its people from the effects of air strikes. But Hezbollah’s very raison d’être is to attack Israel in pursuit of its declared aim, and that of its Iranian sponsor, to annihilate the state and its people. This basic truth is too often ignored or discounted by Western politicians.

The reality is more nuanced, for what is often ignored is that the Lebanese government has taken matters into its own hands and for many months has been in a deal of its own with Israel, predicated on containing and eventually disarming Hezbollah. The latest round of talks was held in Washington on June 23-26. And the historic three-way agreement of June 27 is the result.

Joseph Aoun was elected Lebanon’s president on January 8, 2025. His top priority was to restore national sovereignty – and that meant reining in the overmighty Hezbollah organization that had become “a state within a state”, and in particular disarming it.

In August 2025 Aoun and his cabinet instructed the army to develop a plan to bring all weapons in the country under the control of state security forces, thereby ending Hezbollah’s autonomy.

One month later Lebanon’s army chief, Rodolphe Haykal, presented the cabinet with a multi‑phase plan to achieve just that. The first phase aimed at disarming all Hezbollah personnel south of the Litani river.

The cabinet authorized the army to put the plan into operation. But it soon became clear that government forces lacked the military capacity to achieve the desired result. Despite some success in dislodging Hezbollah from a few areas of southern Lebanon, it became clear that the plan was not viable. The state on its own could not bring Hezbollah to heel. It needed help if it was to regain national sovereignty.

So from March 2026 Aoun began pushing the idea of face‑to‑face ceasefire talks with Israel, as part of a broader strategy that would ultimately bring Hezbollah’s weapons, and therefore Hezbollah itself, under state control.

The first 2026 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire deal was agreed on April 16. It was extended by 45 days on May 15, following US-mediated talks in Washington, and then renewed and expanded again on June 3. Under this arrangement, a conditional ceasefire was agreed, contingent on a complete halt to Hezbollah’s military strikes against Israel, the evacuation of Hezbollah forces from the South Litani sector, and the creation of “pilot zones” in which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would exercise exclusive control to the exclusion of non‑state actors.

By moving into key areas in southern Lebanon and clearing them of Hezbollah, Israel has laid the groundwork for implementing this agreement. Under the new and historic deal, Israel has agreed to withdraw from two areas that will be taken over by the Lebanese army as pilot zones. Now Israel and Lebanon are in effect acting hand-in-hand to degrade Hezbollah, and restore national sovereignty to the Lebanese state itself. The US has agreed to improve the capabilities of the LAF and support its anti-Hezbollah operations.

Aoun has to tread very carefully in implementing this policy. Hezbollah commands considerable support among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community – roughly a third of the population – even if recent reports indicate a degree of disillusionment setting in. Memories of the 1975-1990 civil war are still fresh, and Aoun is determined to avoid reigniting it.

He is also well aware that tens of thousands of the residents of northern Israel’s border are still displaced, and that Israel’s policy is to remove Hezbollah’s offensive capability – by military action if necessary – before a full return is possible.

The Lebanese government is as anxious as Israel to see that day.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2026, and in the Jerusalem Post online tiled: "The new US-Israel-Lebanon deal reshapes the fight against Hezbollah," 1 July 2026:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-900802

Erdogan – an uncomfortable fact of life

2026-06-22T18:41:42.358+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 23June 2026

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is preparing to host the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 – a high‑visibility platform, if ever there was one.

The occasion will emphasize how central Turkey has become in Western planning, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkey faces Russia across the Black Sea. In the light of NATO’s new ten-year Russia-focused strategy, adopted in 2022, Turkey's geography and capabilities have assumed key significance.

In elevating Erdogan to the chair of this NATO summit, however, Western leaders have had to turn a blind eye to a number of uncomfortable facts. For example their host – a key frontline member of NATO which is totally opposed to Russia’s war in Ukraine – is helping to fund that very war by purchasing Russian gas in enormous quantities. Russia is Turkey’s largest gas supplier, providing more than half of Turkey’s pipeline imports.

Nor is Erdogan in any way moderating his position. Turkey had already renewed two gas supply contracts with Russia in December, but in the last few weeks it has actually enhanced them. The expansion agreement with Gazprom, Russia’s energy corporation, was announced on May 31 at the Baku Energy Forum by Turkey’s energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar.

At a time when Moscow has lost most of its European customers and is waging war on Europe’s doorstep, NATO’s leaders will once again have to look the other way as Erdogan engages with their principal adversary.

In fact, they have been indulging Erdogan’s erratic behavior for years. For example, they have long turned a blind eye to Erdogan’s disdain for democratic norms.

Erdogan has been leading Turkey since 2003, first as prime minister and latterly as president. Over those 23 years he has constructed a highly autocratic system within the country.

His key method, honed by long use, is to mount prosecutions against political opponents, often charging them under critical speech legislation. He has not only increased the use of existing speech crimes, but has introduced new categories, notably “insulting the president” and “disinformation”. These steps were justified as essential when the nation’s security was threatened. Turkey has endured a succession of such crises under Erdogan, some genuine, some exaggerated, some manufactured.

Between 2014 and 2020 tens of thousands of investigations and over 35,000 prosecutions were mounted under the critical speech provision. Nearly 13,000 people were sentenced, including children. Comparable, detailed official statistics for the period after 2020 are difficult to obtain. Researchers rely on monitoring undertaken by journalists’ unions and human rights groups.

Between late 2022 and late 2024 the government introduced a new offence of “disinformation.” It led to some 4,100 investigations involving 4,590 people, including at least 56 journalists. At the end of 2025 more than 20 journalists were still in prison.

The CHP is Turkey’s main center‑left, secular political party. It led the decisive 2019 victories in the Istanbul and Ankara mayoral races, marking an unprecedented electoral setback for Erdogan. Under the leadership of Ozgur Ozel, the CHP frames itself as a defender of social justice against Erdogan’s dictatorial presidency.

In May 2026, an Ankara appeal court annulled the 2023 CHP congress at which Ozel was elected leader, effectively ousting him and reinstating the previous leadership. This ruling is widely seen as an attempt to neutralize Turkey’s largest opposition party. Ankara’s mayor Mansur Yavas said the decision was aimed at “breaking” the CHP and rendering it ineffective.

Ekrem Imamoglu, the CHP mayor of Istanbul and widely seen as Erdogan’s most formidable rival, was arrested in March 2025 on corruption and terror‑related accusations just days before he was expected to be nominated as a presidential candidate.

Authorities accused him of leading a “criminal organization”, committing fraud and extortion, and assisting the PKK, the armed Kurdish militant organization that Erdogan’s government has long designated a terrorist group. In November 2025, prosecutors filed a nearly 4,000‑page indictment charging Imamoglu with 142 offences, including running a criminal enterprise, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and money laundering. The combined potential sentence is calculated at up to 2,430 years in prison.

With the main opposition leader facing legal disqualification and the most popular rival detained under the threat of a multi‑millennium sentence, the field of credible challengers to Erdogan is being drastically narrowed. This contributes to what some now describe as a transition from “competitive authoritarianism” to outright autocracy, in which elections remain but the regime systematically removes viable opponents before they can contend for power.

Turkey’s economic deterioration is a crucial backdrop to understanding why Erdogan finds external crises politically useful.

For years Erdogan pressured Turkey’s central bank to maintain very low interest rates arguing, contrary to orthodox economics, that high rates cause inflation. By 2023 inflation was around 40%, the lira had lost over 80% of its value in five years, and foreign reserves were critically low. By 2025 Turkey had technically entered recession, with GDP contracting 0.2% for two consecutive quarters, household consumption falling and annual inflation near 49 percent. This combination of recession and high inflation has severely eroded living standards and public support, and fueled public protests.

Erdogan systematically downplays domestic economic problems as global phenomena, often deflecting blame on to foreign conspiracies.

Autocrats do not relinquish power easily. Under Turkey’s 2017 constitutional changes – actually engineered by Erdogan – his period in office should end in 2028. The constitution created an executive presidency with a two‑term limit of five years each. Erdogan was elected under this system in 2018 and again in 2023.

The constitution allows a president to run again if early elections are called by parliament during the second term. Some opposition figures fear he could engineer just such a snap poll to reset the clock. He would need 360 MPs out of 600 to call a referendum, or 400 for direct adoption in parliament.

His current bloc falls short of both. Nevertheless his main nationalist ally, Devlet Bahceli, has recently been calling for a constitutional amendment to let Erdogan stand again in 2028. It is clear that his own camp is already preparing arguments to keep him in play.

Erdogan is not likely to go quietly.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and in the Jerusalem Post online titled: "Erdogan's grip on Turkey deepens as NATO gathers in Ankara," 23 June 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-900103

Published in Eurasia Review, 29 June 2026:

https://www.eurasiareview.com/26062026-erdogan-an-uncomfortable-fact-of-life-oped/

Abraham Accords partner in trouble

2026-06-16T05:12:23.179+01:00

Published in the Jerusalem Post, 16 June 2026

When Sudan signed up in 2021 to the Abraham Accords, they had been presented to the world as the foundation stone of a new architecture for the Middle East, bringing the prospect of peace, cooperation and stability to the region. That vision is being tested in Sudan, where General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan, the man who authorized Sudan’s Abraham Accords agreement with Israel, now presides over a country shattered by civil war. It is one of the deadliest and most destructive conflicts globally, and has created the world’s largest and most devastating displacement and humanitarian crisis. There is no end in sight, and it is getting worse.

Having embraced Burhan as a normalization partner, Israel and the other Abraham Accords states have at least a moral obligation to regard Sudan’s agony as a problem in which they have an interest. A member of the pact is in serious trouble. Joint action might help.

For three years the Sudan civil war has been inflicting intolerable suffering on the nation, resulting in “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” according to the UN. Rigorous estimates suggest that tens of thousands, and possibly well over a hundred thousand, people have already died in Sudan’s war, putting it among the deadliest conflicts of our time.

The nation’s basic infrastructure – water, electricity, transport, health care – has more or less collapsed. Over 11 million people are internally displaced, and roughly 4 million have fled to neighboring countries, including South Sudan, where refugee camps also face severe food and water shortages. Outbreaks of malaria, respiratory illnesses and diarrheal diseases, linked to very poor sanitation and hygiene, are reported rampant in displaced-population areas.

How has this desperate situation come about?

It all began with Sudan’s popular revolution in April 2019 – described at the time as Sudan’s “Arab Spring moment” – and the collapse of the 30-year-long regime of the authoritarian Omar al-Bashir. In the transitional democratic government that followed, Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), became head of the ruling Sovereignty Council. Its members jointly pledged to move the country toward democracy, and to parliamentary elections in 2023.

After some two years the administration was clearly making no progress toward any form of democracy. It was, moreover, clearly failing to deal with the country’s severe economic problems. On October 22, 2021 national frustration erupted in a mass protest in the capital, Khartoum, in support of civilian rule.

Burhan, together with his deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (often referred to as Hemedeti), orchestrated a military coup and took over control of the country.

However it was not long before the two fell out. Dagalo headed the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Burhan considered such a strong force outside the army a source of instability, and announced plans to merge the RSF with the nation’s formal armed services. This was enough for the two former colleagues to take up arms against each other.

On April 15, 2023 the RSF launched coordinated attacks on key SAF sites in Khartoum, claiming early control of major airports. By early 2025 the SAF had pushed the RSF out of Khartoum and most of Omdurman, giving Burhan control of the greater part of Sudan, including the capital region. In February 2025, Burhan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council announced the formation of a new transitional government. In May, Kamil Idris, a civilian, was appointed prime minister. This administration is accepted by the UN, the African Union, Egypt and a number of other states as the legitimate government of Sudan.

In April Dagalo, still in control of significant parts of western and southwestern Sudan, established a rival “Government of Peace and Unity” to administer the territories under their control. This body lacks international recognition.

Meanwhile the civil conflict continues to inflict unprecedented misery on the people.

International humanitarian agencies, reporting in mid-April 2026, put the number of people in need of assistance at roughly 34 million, with about 26 million facing acute food insecurity, over 20 million requiring health assistance, and around 14 million displaced.

In a report published in March 2026 by Doctors Without Frontiers, sexual violence was found to be “part of everyday life” in large areas of Sudan. Researchers documented more than 3,396 cases of sexual violence in 2024 and 2025. Women or girls reported being assaulted by armed individuals. In South Darfur 41 children under the age of five were assaulted.

A report published by the Mercy Corps on May 4 traces how disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is affecting Sudan. The country is already inside the planting periods that will shape harvests through late 2026 and into 2027. If farmers have to reduce fertilizer use, switch crops or plant less land, those losses cannot be reversed by a later political settlement. The result will be even greater food insecurity.

After more than 1000 days of civil war the two sides are entrenched. The SAF appears to have the upper hand in central Sudan, but the RSF remains resilient in its western strongholds. There is no effort to achieve a ceasefire. It seems like a fight to the death by the warlords, who apparently remain indifferent to the horrendous impact of their conflict on the people they both claim to represent.

Efforts have been made by some states to intervene. The Jeddah process (a US‑ and Saudi‑led mediation platform to broker ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements) produced several short‑lived agreements but failed to stop the war. The “Quad” of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and US failed to secure even a temporary ceasefire. Could the Abraham Accords nations, in a collaborative partnership, exercise a stronger influence and achieve a positive outcome?

Israel has maintained contacts with both Burhan and Dagalo; the UAE is known to have direct channels to Dagalo. In principle, a joint push for de‑escalation by Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco might carry weight with both camps, especially if accompanied by a package of tangible political and economic benefits for a post‑war Sudan.

The Abraham Accords are undoubtedly much more than a mere branding exercise. Given an unprecedented crisis, the signatories should surely be willing to act together to foster peace and regional stability.

Published in the Jerusalem Post, and the Jerusalem post online titled: "Sudan's war poses a challenge for Abraham Accords partners", 16 June 2026:

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-899442