To my knowledge, the Mianyang visit was the first of its kind. Needless to say, foreign visitors were on a very short leash, but our entry was a significant gesture by our Chinese hosts, demonstrating serious intent to engage on strategic issues. These doors were soon closed as a result of the Cox Commission inquiry and report.

Jeffrey, our ACW information-gathering omnivore, somehow got ahold of my trip report and passed it along. My seventeen year-old assessment demonstrates, in dismaying detail, how ritualistic the anxieties over missile defenses have become. Countries of concern may have changed – back then, coercive PLA missile tests prompted debates over selling TMD to Taiwan — but not much else. Have a look:

Chinese concerns about TMD appear to be strongly felt, if considerably over-dramatized. Since unimpeded and deep reductions of US and Russian strategic forces are in China’s national security interest, it makes complete sense that Beijing would support strongly the ABM Treaty and embrace fully the arguments developed in the United States to defend the treaty. Nonetheless, the crux of Chinese concerns over TMD clearly appears to be related to Taiwan and Japan, not to their public litany of arguments.

China would clearly rather not have to deal with new defense requirements posed by TMD deployments in East Asia. None of the Chinese participants second-guessed the PLA’ s missile tests directed against Taiwan, even in private, but surely they must now appreciate the boost that these firings have given to TMD programs in the United States. On the other hand, several Chinese colleagues said in private that the exercises “worked,” in that they reduced support in Taiwan for independence. It will be very interesting to see what lessons the PLA has internalized as a result of its missile-firing military exercises…

Great care is therefore required regarding the provision of TMD to East Asia. How does the United States convey the messages that we are prepared to support friends against threatening missile attacks, that we are serious about devaluing weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, but also that we wish to further improve bilateral relations with China? US actions regarding TMD need to be calibrated in order to be interpreted correctly by Beijing. If US messages are misinterpreted, the TMD issue could foster troubling behavior by Beijing across a broad range of issues…

The worst case assessments of advanced TMD deployments circulated by some US arms control groups have subsequently been adopted in toto by the Chinese government. US opponents of advanced TMD, however, do not believe that the THAAD or Navy Upper Tier programs would actually provide the coverage they have depicted, since they assume that relatively simple counter-measures would vastly shrink the defended area or eliminate it entirely. Nonetheless, US analysts who present the worst case have done so in the belief that Russian and Chinese experts would likely succumb to worst case thinking and over-react in negative ways.

My sense from talking privately with Chinese technical experts is that they, too, clearly understand the utility of counter-measures. As one Chinese participant told me in confidence, China understands that its case against TMD is quite overdrawn, but that it is “practical” to adopt a worst case view. This is not to say that China views US missile defense programs with equanimity. To the contrary, Chinese experts are most definitely concerned about the possible negative impact of US missile defense programs on deep, deep cuts in US and Russian arsenals, and China strenuously opposes TMD deployments in Taiwan and Japan. The combined deployment of advanced TMD and multi-site national missile defenses would greatly trouble China. But these are very different concerns than China’s public stance, which echoes the case made in the United States by some NGOs.

A perverse feedback loop is at work here: The worst case that arms controllers warned about has been rhetorically embraced by China, even though experts from both countries know better. How might NGOs avoid this echo chamber effect whereby worst case assessments become mutually reinforcing, just as in the Cold War? In the future, it might make sense to think about the formulation of arguments with multiple audiences in mind. For example, in addition to showing vugraphs of the considerable theoretical potential of upper tier TMD systems, why not also show how coverage would shrink due to countermeasures? A refocusing of the TMD debate, especially on the Navy’s upper tier’s susceptibility to countermeasures, might be particularly useful at this time for both domestic and foreign audiences.

It makes sense that debates over BMD are as ritualistic as those over nuclear weapons and arms reduction treaties. All have much in common: deployments and agreements are highly symbolic, and in most cases, political utility exceeds military utility. The dramatis personae fear slippery slopes, so argue tenaciously to avoid ceding any ground. Habits of mind are passed along from one generation to the next, and the debaters rarely depart from well-rehearsed scripts.

Debates over missile defenses are prompted by three circumstances: (1) when arms controllers seek to constrain missile defense programs and deployments; (2) when true believers in BMD assume positions of responsibility in a new administration; and (3) when prompted by the actions of a competitively disadvantaged nuclear-armed state.

The first of these conditions no longer applies to treaties, but continues unabated since skeptics remain convinced that the military utility of missile defense programs do not justify their expense. The second is likely to reoccur with the next Republican administration. The third condition – states that seek to gain leverage by means of missile flight tests — is now the principal driver of BMD programs and deployments. Whenever these coercive warnings occur, skeptics of missile defenses highlight the military deficiencies of BMD, while downgrading their symbolic and political utility.

Advocates of missile defenses are on weak ground when they argue for deployments at any cost, regardless of technical limitations. Skeptics of missile defenses are on weak ground when they diminish the political and symbolic value of missile defenses. How much BMD is required to convey alliance solidarity against a weak but unpredictable state like North Korea and to help shore up the NPT? Not that much – and certainly not enough to negate the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrents.

Nonetheless, anxieties about missile defenses are imprinted in the Kremlin’s DNA, and it would be most unwise for Washington to take steps that would unnecessarily lead Moscow to retain nuclear force structure or for Beijing to expand it. Great care has always been required in sizing national missile defense deployments. In my view, the strongest argument against a third NMD site is that deploying more deeply flawed interceptors constitutes an ill-conceived jobs program. Repeating dire warnings emanating from Moscow is not a strong argument. Russian as well as Chinese strategic analysts and defense scientists are quite competent. They know how to penetrate US missile defenses. So why get so spun up by echoes from the Cold War?

Associated Press | Whoops.  Seems like the people in charge of the most powerful weapons known to man just weren’t up to the job, and needed a bit of extra training.  Not the first mistake of this manner.

Navy Live | Apparently, the Navy actually listens to talk about nuclear force cuts.  Hint: it doesn’t really like it.

Breaking Defense | The SM-3 Block IB missile seems to be working, following three successful tests since May of 2012.

Breaking Defense (again) | The X-47B performed a touch-and-go landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.  I wonder what’s next?

Foreign Policy | New START implementation is facing opposition, never mind the New START follow-on.  Yousaf Butt proposes a DIY solution. Is the President listening?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Apparently, the Pentagon’s China Report omitted some key facts about strategic nuclear forces.

Bloomberg | Gary Milhollin sees Iran’s nuclear plans as a long-term, not a near-term, threat.

Nukes of Hazard | Senator Graham just can’t get enough MOX money, can he?  But he really promises it wasn’t pork or anything!

We hope you enjoyed this installment of FYRP.

The column is largely an act of media criticism.  After several Air Force mishaps relating to the handling of nuclear weapons systems came to light in 2007 and 2008, many of us began to argue that declining competence in the nuclear field was the inevitable result of the declining mission for nuclear-armed ICBMs and bombers.

What is interesting about the AP story about the disciplinary actions at Minot is that it represents an attempt to reframe that argument, blaming Global Zero and other arms control efforts for the loss of focus.  As I note in the piece, the timeline of mishaps and disarmament talk simply doesn’t support such an inference. The increase in disarmament talk is, like the increase in mishaps, the effect of the declining utility of these systems.

Having said that, I wanted to explore the relationship between readiness and reporting in a way that I couldn’t fit in the column.

On one hand, the poor performance of the unit does seem to be an example of the sort of problems identified in the Raaberg, Peyer, Donald, Schlesinger and Welch reports.  The Deputy Commander of the 91OG called it “rot” — a metaphor that conveys a systemic problem.

On the other hand, this case is different for the others in an important way.  The incidents in 2006 and 2007 each came light in a manner that reflected poorly on the Air Force. The Air Force did not discover the mistaken 2006 transfer of Minuteman III components until 2008! One might say the Air Force stumbled on to both incidents.

In this case, however, the disciplinary action against the personnel at Minot arose from tougher inspection procedures created in response to past failures.  In 2009 — the first year of the tougher inspections — the Air Force handed out 3 “unsatisfactory” grades on Operational Readiness Inspections.  The Air Force had only given four such grades in the preceding decade.  The three unsatisfactory grades did not represent a sudden one-year decline in operational readiness; they are a statistical artifact of different (and tougher) reporting requirements.

There is truth to the Air Force’s defense that tougher inspections mean more units will receive lower scores, but this should result in higher readiness overall.

SEC. DONLEY: Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that I am confident in the Air Force’s ability to maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent. The circumstances that you referred to some years ago are very much personally known to me, as it was the proximate cause for my arrival in the Air Force in 2008. [Donley is referring to Secretary Gates's decision to fire the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff in response to two nuclear weapons-related mishaps. Ed.] And we have made substantial progress in restoring the confidence, I think, of our entire DOD and congressional leadership in the Air Force’s management of this important responsibility. It is a number one responsibility for our Air Force that we take very, very seriously.

As part of the changes made after this period that you referred to earlier in the 2008 and ’09 period, we substantially strengthened the inspection process. And what you’re seeing and hearing reported in the article you referenced represents a stronger inspection process that has been put in place.

I’ll let the chief amplify on this particular set at the unit involved, but generally, the inspection was satisfactory. But it was rated marginal in one area in particular, and this is an area where the group commander is following up after the inspection to make sure that the officers involved are focused as they need to be on all the details of their mission, and that they have appropriate focus exactly where it needs to be. So we support commanders following up on inspections with those actions that they think are necessary to maintain the highest professional standards for this work.

[snip]

SEC. DONLEY: First of all, we need to remember that these are lieutenants by and large. They — some of them can be new to the Air Force; they’re within their first few years. So the training process that we have for the nuclear mission is — has the highest standards but needs to be reinforced continually — every day, every week, every month — throughout the year, as there are new people coming in to the system. So the command responsibility to maintain visibility on this and to ride herd on young officers with this awesome responsibility is something — is something that we support. And in this instance the commander stepped in, said these people need refresher training. And so he took them offline to do that. And that is an appropriate command response.

[snip]

SEC. DONLEY: Senator, thank you. If I could make one comment on that, back to the missile incident — just a brief bit of context. The inspection that was conducted actually has 22 graded areas. The wing was rated excellent in 14 of those 22 and satisfactory in all but one of the others. And that one was an crew operations. They received a marginal rating, which is a passing score but clearly a flag to the leadership of the wing.

As a result of that, the group commander, the wing commander — who are both excellent officers, by the way, and excellent officers and doing exactly what I expect them to do — they followed up with additional testing, additional –

SEN. SHELBY: You’re talking about Colonel Vercher?

SEC. DONLEY: — I’m talking about Colonel Robert Vercher, yes, sir — to make sure that they didn’t have an issue they needed to deal with aggressively.

And as a result of that review, they decided that there was more of an attitude problem than a proficiency problem. And they are not willing to accept that, which is what I pay them for.

I believe this is the kind of commander intervention that prevents the incidents that occurred in 2007. They took very aggressive action early to make sure that there was no question in the mind of their crew force that marginal behavior or sort of satisfactory, just above the line, was not acceptable.

Now, there’s nothing good about the incident, Chairman. I’m not saying that. I’m just saying I like the way they responded. I wish they’d used different language in the email they sent. The word “rot” didn’t excite me, but it got my attention.

I don’t believe that that’s the problem. I don’t believe we have a nuclear surety risk at Minot Air Force Base. I believe we have commanders who are taking very aggressive action to ensure that never occurs. And in that respect, this is a good thing. The idea that we have people not performing to the standard we expect will never be good, and we won’t tolerate it.

SEN. SHELBY: But you’re basically saying that the commander, in this case Colonel Vercher at the top, was doing the proper thing in getting to it and following up on it and trying to correct it. Is that right?

GEN. WELSH: Yes, sir. That’s exactly what I’m saying.

We can disagree about whether tougher inspections will solve the problem — I have my doubts — but I do think we are all over-reacting to the results of a single inspection.

There is, by the way, a broader question of whether a morale problem exists at all. Matthew Vanderschuere  – who spent five years as a Flight Commander in the 320th Missile Squadron (from 2007-2011 as best I can tell) — has argued that he didn’t see a morale crisis during his service:

Speaking broadly, after a five-year missile assignment, I observed that most of our top troops opted to fight for competitive slots to “stay in nukes.” Follow-on assignments to U.S. Strategic Command, ICBM Weapons School, or the 576th Flight Test squadron (which tests unarmed Minuteman III missiles over the Pacific) only went to the best missileers with the best resumes.

I don’t know what to say other than Vanderschuere’s anecdotal reporting differs from the anecdotal reporting in several of the reviews, including the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review and the Secretary of Defense Task Force, which both concluded that the missileers with the best resumes were leaving ICBM force for space operations. It is possible that the situation has improved since the Secretary of Defense Task Force visited FE Warren in 2008, that Vanderschuere is just an optimistic sort of guy, that F.E. Warren has unusually happy missileers, or even that the various reviews got it wrong.

One cautionary thought – Vanderschuere didn’t decide to stay in nukes himself.  He’s now working on a PhD at American University, serving in the reserve.  Presuming he was among the best and brightest, that’s at least one more anecdotal case of brain drain.

I have a column up at 38North discussing whether North Korea will test a Musudan anytime soon (“Pit or Get Off the Shot“) — with a bottle of the local plonk riding on the outcome with Joel Wit.

I touched briefly on the issue of politics inside North Korea, but wanted to have an extended discussion of the recent rumors of an assassination attempt against Kim Jong Un.

The reason for the rumors?  North Korean awarded one of Pyongyang’s traffic wardens — a woman named Ri Kyong Sim – the title of “DPRK hero” for “safeguarding the security of the headquarters of the revolution in an unexpected circumstance.”

What sort of unexpected circumstance you ask? Maybe an assassination attempt?

The reality seems to be a little disappointing.  New Focus International reported that Ri had extinguished a fire near a poster bearing the name of Kim Jong Un, a possibility also suggested by Andrei Lankov (subscription only).

Assassination is, of course, more interesting.  There is a reason that Frederick Forsyth had the Jackal try to kill DeGaulle, rather than merely defacing his portrait.

Still, the fire-near-a-poster story strikes me as plausible.  I thought maybe I might try to explain why.

A few weeks ago, I asked whether readers had their own private indicators of when tensions with North Korea were really, really bad.  I was reluctant to reveal mine, but here goes:  When the North Koreans start packing up the pictures and the statues.

A South Korean magazine published what purports to be the 2004 Wartime Work Guidelines (sorry, Korean only).  The most important part was that “the first task for the North Korean people in wartime is … to move portraits, plaster figures, and bronze statues” of the Kim family to safe places. Shutting down Kaesong doesn’t scare me.  Packing up Grandpa’s bronze would.

In the context of a regime that apparently treats protecting regime images as wartime task number 1, it isn’t hard to understand why a traffic warden gets the full state-media treatment for saving a poster from fire. The DPRK takes statues, portraits and other representations of regime figures very, very seriously.

We actually see a lot of this sort of thing.  Last year, the DPRK was expressed outrage at reports that ROK soldiers had posted an image of the two Kims, with text that says either “defeat” or “kill” Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, posted in a military facility.  (As best I can tell, the picture appeared in the print version of the Korea Herald Business.)

Then the North Koreans arrested someone they accused of being a South Korean spy sent to blow up statues of the Kims. The made guy offer a full confession for the benefit of state media. I should add that the North Koreans aren’t above a little statue defamation themselves.

This all might seem a bit paranoid, but there are also news reports that the South planned to strike regime statues – what RJ Koehler cleverly calls ”urban beautification” — in response to another provocation such as the sinking of the Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo. The Defense Minister later denied the statue threat. (Update | New Focus International has a nice story on the role of statues from March that I had missed.)

So, regime images are serious business in North Korea. Why? I don’t happen to know of a particularly erudite discussion of the role of leadership images in totalitarian states, but it has always seemed to me the purpose of such images is to demonstrate the ubiquity of the state in everyday life and, further, to exclude the possibility of imagining life without the state. The total nature of such an authoritarian state requires the destruction of both the past as well as the future — at least insofar as historical memory or dreams of the future involve life without it.  The Kim Il Sung pins are, I suppose, the most well-known representation of this aspect of totalitarianism.

It is not surprising, then, that the regime would heap lavish praise on a mere traffic warden for such a trivial act as extinguishing a fire near a poster of one Kim or another.  The very triviality of the act — the attentiveness to the most minor aspects of the regime’s well-being — is its grandeur. By contrast, to have taken no notice of the threat to the poster would suggest something less than total devotion to the Kims.  Perish the thought.  If it is possible to live everyday life neglecting the images of the Kims, then perhaps it is possible to live everyday life neglecting the Kims themselves.  And the one thing that a totalitarian regime cannot by definition abide is to be less than total.

The statues of Kim Jong Il in an anorak and the little pins are still absurd, of course, but then again so is the entire idea of totalitarianism. I suspect that fundamental absurdity is why such regimes find humor so threatening.  They can’t afford to start laughing at themselves for fear no one will stop.

This is true everywhere the state seeks to control all aspects of the lives of its citizenry — not just North Korea. Before we conclude that the emphasis on symbols is just another weird North Korean peccadillo and that we’re above such nonsense, it is worth noting how important defacing those symbols can be to people all over the world fed up with oppression.  Take a look at these images and ask yourself whether the Kims might not be onto something when it comes to taking themselves, and their symbols, so seriously.

Images are, as best I can tell: Budapest (1956), Berlin (~1990), someplace in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union (~1989), Beijing (1989), Baghdad (2003), Tripoli (2011). 

States that possess nuclear weapons are reluctant to argue whether and how their use applies to the laws of armed conflict. To do so would risk undermining deterrence by nullifying battlefield applications, except as a last resort and for responses in kind. Even here, I suppose legal scholars, like The Hague Court, would have more than a few words to say.

Cluster bombs are not supposed to be used in built-up areas because they can have indiscriminate and long-lasting effects. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are widely presumed to be targeted against command and control, war-supporting industry, and leadership targets in and around cities.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried (briefly) to place metropolitan areas off-limits to nuclear targeting. He gave a commencement speech at the University of Michigan in June 1962 on this subject. Here’s the key passage:

The US has come to the conclusion that, to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general war should be approached much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population… In other words, we are giving a possible opponent the strongest possible incentive to refrain from striking our own cities.

McNamara’s good intentions were defeated by the logic of Cold War nuclear deterrence. The imperative of damage limitation meant that high-value targets in or close to cities could not be stricken from targeting lists – particularly since there could be no assurance of comparable restraint by an adversary once the nuclear threshold was crossed.

Can you imagine hearing an address about nuclear targeting at your college graduation? Thankfully, I’m no longer in the business of reading or grading exams. Still, the question lingers, especially when the answers are unpersuasive.

The first result of the decision to delay for most in my former line of work is likely to be relief.  But two years is not that far away.  And in terms of difficulty, may not be enough time to agree on a longer-term, 30- or 40-year agreement if the South keeps pushing on the enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) door.  Congress has a role, and while it may be an imperfect place, our Constitution and our laws give us no other for adjudication of such matters.

It’s incumbent on the Administration to submit proposed language allowing this “extension” to come into force, and on Congress to examine it.  At a minimum, the cognizant Committees ought to hold a hearing to establish clear legislative history, just in case we find that in 2015 we see another extension of this agreement being considered along side other, tough 123 agreements.

So far, only  Voice of America has covered this matter.  Note to Jack Spencer over at Heritage.org:  What exactly is “proliferation-resistant used-fuel-management technology”?  What makes it resist proliferation?  And if it’s so good, why don’t we let everyone use it?

An Open Letter to Mr Turner, a Representative from Ohio

As an American taxpayer with engineering expertise in and historic experience with the topic of your letter to President Barack Obama on the 17^th of April; I would like to address certain issues of fact in that letter. Missile Defense development consumes significant national treasure and personnel effort so careful adherence to fact based discussion is important to the security of the nation.

Your letter appears in your Congressional website at http://turner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=329539

Certain elements of your letter refer to the National Academy of Sciences / National Research Council (NAS/NRC) report regarding missile defense development, the complete report is found at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13189

You did not cite the important messages regarding engineering and scientific talent needs and the apparent lacks of such talent within DOD/MDA based on multiple sources including the NAS/NRC work as cited by Dr Coyle at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Back-to-the-Drawing-Board-The-Need-for-Sound-Science-in-US-Missile-Defense

As a point of law and common sense predating the current Administration; US missile defenses are specifically not designed or capable against either the Russian or the Chinese nuclear deterrent forces. Discussions with the Russians and the Chinese with regard to US missile defense postures against either rogue or accidental missile attack do not decrease US security. In the case of Russian or Chinese actions to curb rogues or enhance their nuclear forces command surety; such discussions significantly enhance US security against missile attack.

You made several specific points in the letter where you criticize the Administration; I repeat them with your bolding of section headings for clarity.

Unproven Technologies (Re SM3-IIB v GBI)

“The previous U.S. missile defense strategy relied upon proven technologies”.

Incorrect, the only ‘proven’ aspect of the GMD technology base is that it has the worst test record of any un-cancelled program in DOD. In their diligent review, the NAS/NRC panel recommended essentially scrapping the existing GMD entirely and starting a properly disciplined program to address BMD needs; their GMD-E proposal has no relationship to the existing GMD.

Abandoning our Allies (Re Bush 3^rd site and EPAA Phase IV)

Such assertions require specific data to clearly assess whether or not Administration actions either increase prior risks “placing the United States at greater risk” or  “alienated” allies.

The Bush 3^rd site included two key elements, the European Midcourse Radar (EMR) sited at a former Soviet/Warsaw pact missile base in Brdy near 49.85N, 14.165E and the European 3^rd Site for interceptors, the Redzikowo Warsaw Pact airbase. The asset locations were generally unsuitable for technical coverage for the stated missions and appeared to have been selected for political purposes. Unlike the implicit assumption of your letter, none of the Bush 3^rd site plan appeared to have been a credible functional approach for either the defense of the US homeland or to defend the Allies who were requested to host those facilities.

Central to the credibility question, the EMR as a large phased array with early 1990s processing technologies would have a tiny ‘soda-straw’ view with some minimal range depth for detections. It is poor engineering to expect such a system to operate without precision cuing and the Bush proposal failed to provide needed cuing capabilities. Further, the expectation of relocating the critical radar equipment from years of exposure in the tropical marine environment of Kwajalein to the Czech Republic fails sanity checks as to technical risks, cost and schedules.

The Bush plan would have emplaced 10 GBI interceptors without the 3^rd stage of the present missiles to reduce the minimum flight time (but also reduce the velocity of those interceptors) near the Polish Baltic coast (within 200km of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad). Given their commonality with the current GBI interceptor stage (EKV) all present GBI issues and limitations would be present in the European GBIs. Missile engagements are always limited by sensor support, with the EMR, the Bush plan offered no credible sensing support for GBIs to defend the US. Finally, in the event that the Iranians applied some modest design margins on their undeveloped ICBMs, the GBIs could be simply overflown.

The Russian reactions to US plans for emplacing large missiles near their borders (threatening to emplace Iskander missiles — potentially nuclear tipped — in Kaliningrad) are responsive to a perceived challenge to their strategic deterrent or to suspicions of a nefarious US plan to put offensive systems in those silos. As to the interactions the Bush plan created with our Allies, the Czech government that agreed to host the EMR was defeated in the subsequent election and the Poles specifically requested that the US provide them with F16s to replenish their air force as payment for the host nation agreement.

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) first appeared in Congressional Budget Office documents apparently ghost-written by a defense contractor. Similar analysis of EPAA phase IV (SM3-IIB and attendant support), shows the Administration failed to understand the inherent deficiencies of European missile basing for the Homeland defense as the best locations for interceptors are in Northern UK, Iceland or Greenland. The current Administration was certainly unsophisticated by failing to properly restrain contractor marketing by asserting technically adequate government architecture analysis.  The recent cancellation of EPAA phase IV appears to lack technical downsides for either US or European defenses and represents appropriate conservation of scarce resources.

Using our Nation’s Security as a Gambling Chip

Interactions with other nations involve risk, you can call that “gambling” if such terms are desired. Administrations do manage risks and the point of ‘all forms of national power’ is to allow the US to suitably concentrate efforts to effectively manage risks while investing the minimum prudent resources.

Intelligence is an exercise in “gambling” where the analysts apply the available material to form an assessment (a “gamble” where they don’t have to believe it enough to risk personal funds). The current public interpretation of bad missile mockups on parade is a canard; ICBM development is a highly public engineering exercise that is non-credible without successful flight testing.

US nuclear forces exist and serve in a deterrent role as a critical part of the “gamble”; effective missile defenses merely allow less apocalyptic responses in the event of accident or failed deterrence.

Underfunding of Missile Defense

“Your Administration has consistently underfunded missile defense.”

BMD has always been politicized; it lacks military need definition, lacks a coherent architecture definition and holds a waiver against normal DOD oversight. What are rational funding comparisons in this environment?

Russian and Chinese Approval of Defense of the Homeland

“So why is your Administration now repeating a failed policy initiative by offering to China the same deal in trying to dissuade North Korea?”

To avoid wasting the ‘one billion dollars’ for buying 14 more GBIs (given their dubious technical heritage) and refitting the defective silo implementations of missile field one at Fort Greely. If successful, such negotiations would be a genius foreign policy coup, saving taxpayer dollars while simultaneously enhancing national security.

No Quid Pro Quo

Treaties between the US and the Russian Federation form the basis in the current domain of mutual nuclear deterrence; the underlying basis of those treaties is shaped by “Quid Pro Quo”. It would significantly enhance security by removing some aspects of uncertainty if the Chinese could join those normative behaviors. Missile defenses cannot be expected to blunt or degrade the Russian or Chinese deterrent forces and serious attempts to change that situation would rapidly exceed the entire current Federal budget.
A Failed Strategy

“… leaves the United States without an articulated missile defense strategy.”

The absence of mission definition, the absence of an architecture and the continuing ad-hoc political exhortations to spend more money on contractor concepts without proper government oversight shows that the United States has never had “an articulated missile defense strategy” from President Reagan’s speech onward.

Modest Recommendations for Representative Turner

1. Jointly establish the national security role and priority of missile defenses within defense; eliminate the wholly political nature of current discussions, this must be a joint position of both parties.

2. Jointly establish the acceptable risk levels and resource constraints appropriate to achieve the missile defense national security mission without endangering the fiscal security of the nation.

3. Assure, via Congressional oversight, that US BMD efforts are expertly staffed with scientific and engineering talent as is necessary for such a complex and difficult undertaking. Assure that DOD oversight is sufficiently rigorous to end the historic pattern of false-starts and failed programs that have plagued the US BMD program.

Washington Examiner | Congressmen Doug Lamborn and Trent Franks give us their views on President Obama’s missile defense plans. Space-based interceptors are still needed, they say. How much that would cost?  And how practical that would be?

Lobe Log | Usha Sahay discusses the differences between Iran and North Korea.  With roads like these, how could anyone confuse the two?  More from Meir Javedanfar.

CS Monitor | Israel has ostensibly obvious motives for bombing Syria, but is it worth the risk?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Russia’s SSBN fleet hasn’t been doing much. Come to think of it, the U.S.’s hasn’t been very active of late either.  The financial burdens of SSBN modernization are heavy both at home and abroad.  And while we’re reading the FAS blog, what are the Chinese doing with their ICBMs?

Department of Defense | The Pentagon’s eagerly awaited annual China military report has arrived, so now we know what the Chinese are doing with their ICBMs. Hey, now there’s a North Korea report along with it. There’s an Iran report, too, but you can’t read it.

Foreign Policy Association | Why is the NRA so interested in the ATT?  Scott Monje explains.

Aviation Week | The X-51A went really, really fast. Video.

The Diplomat | Despite being a phenomenal TV show, Battlestar Galactica cannot help us determine military policy.  Right?  Wrong, says James Holmes.

Japan Times | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has lately been making some bold moves in cutting nuclear supply deals.  What is he heading towards?

We hope you enjoy this installment of FYRP.

On April 24th, the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, delivered an important address in New Delhi affirming the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent. Mr. Saran has over two decades of close engagement on strategic matters, including time spent as Foreign Secretary and Special Envoy dealing with the US-India civil-nuclear agreement. What he said, speaking in his personal capacity, bears close scrutiny.

The tone of these remarks is defensive at the outset, reflecting domestic criticisms of the pace of Indian strategic modernization programs. Mr. Saran also takes aim at US, Pakistani, and Chinese analysts who maintain that India sought the Bomb for reasons of status rather than national security. He seeks to set the record straight, making significant observations and recommendations in the process. Here are a few passages:

Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s strategic programme continues apace. [Note: unless Mr. Saran is referring to China's help with Pakistan's nuclear power sector, this is especially noteworthy.]

Pakistan is the only country where nuclear assets are under the command and control of the military and it is the military’s perceptions and ambitions which govern the development, deployment and use of these weapons. This is a dangerous situation precisely because the military’s perceptions are not fully anchored in a larger national political and economic narrative. The pursuit of a more powerful, more effective, and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal, dictated by the Pakistani military, may run in parallel with a steadily deteriorating political, social and economic environment. Would it be possible to island an efficiently managed and sophisticated nuclear arsenal amidst an increasingly dysfunctional polity? There is an air of unreality about the often adulatory remarks about the Pakistani military’s stewardship of the country’s military assets.

What Pakistan is signaling to India and to the world is that India should not contemplate retaliation even if there is another Mumbai because Pakistan has lowered the threshold of nuclear use to the theatre level. This is nothing short of nuclear blackmail, no different from the irresponsible behavior one witnesses in North Korea. It deserves equal condemnation by the international community because it is not just a threat to India but to international peace and security. Should the international community countenance a license to aid and abet terrorism by a state holding out a threat of nuclear war?

Mr. Saran argues that strategic misperceptions regarding the state of India’s nuclear deterrent and the reasons for it can be dangerous. His public remarks, which include helpful clarifications on steps taken to assure India’s second strike capabilities, may signal more to come. He concludes that, “The secrecy which surrounds our nuclear programme… is now counter-productive,” adding,

I would hope that the Government makes public its nuclear doctrine and releases data regularly on what steps have been taken and are being taken to put the requirements of doctrine in place. It is not necessary to share operational details but an overall survey such as an annual Strategic Posture Review, should be shared with the citizens of this country who, after all, pay for the security which the deterrent is supposed to provide for them.

Pakistani authorities have also been close-lipped about their strategic programs and requirements. The people of Pakistan, like those in India, have been in the dark regarding the size and costs of their nuclear deterrent. Would more openness be helpful, or would it add even more impetus to the nuclear competition in southern Asia? This could go either way. It is clear, however, that the absence of disclosure hasn’t slowed down the competition.

Scott argued, persuasively in my view, that veiled threats to use nuclear weapons trapped U.S. officials. If CW or BW were actually used by an adversary — regardless of their scope and military effectiveness, whether from top-down dictates or breakdowns in command and control — Washington could feel impelled to carry out its threat, thereby inviting immeasurable but significant costs to its international stranding and to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Alternatively, by refraining from carrying out its nuclear threat, Washington could also lose international standing, inviting new adversaries to call its bluff and old friends to question the protectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. To avoid these awful choices, Scott proposed that calculated ambiguity be replaced with a clear and credible U.S. commitment to respond to CW and BW use with prompt and devastating conventional retaliation.

One measure of the devaluation of nuclear weapons is the decreased utility of nuclear threats, whether blatant or veiled. Only one state currently employs blatant, crude and credible nuclear threats. By making them, Pyongyang increases its separation from states that are not in the grip of paranoia. Veiled nuclear threats have been more frequent. Along with the second Gulf war, they were made during intense crises between Pakistan and India from 1999 – 2002, but were notably absent after the 2008 crisis sparked by terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Russia, which has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons, has no reason to threaten their use, making any public statement along these lines to seem strangely atavistic. Major Powers in possession of nuclear weapons lose rather than gain standing by making veiled nuclear threats against weaker states.

The commitment trap that Scott wrote about two decades ago has changed significantly. As before, the trap is set by drawing red lines and making assertions that certain actions are “unacceptable.” What’s different is that these public statements are prompted not only to deter actions – currently by Syria and Iran — but also to delay or prevent actions by a friendly state, Israel. Another big difference is that the commitment trap is no longer about the veiled threat of using nuclear weapons. Nor is Scott’s proposed remedy — prompt and devastating use of conventional capabilities – a likely option.

The commitment trap is now about drawing red lines and then feeling obliged to back them up with selective, conventional military strikes. The prelude to U.S. air strikes in Syria could be the establishment of a no-fly zone. For some, military action is not a trap – it’s a long-postponed necessity. For the Obama administration, rhetorical devices employed to deter and to buy time are running out of time.