Bear in mind that the map shows the standard term for literary, musical and artistic works. Other terms apply to sound recordings, movies  and photographs. The term of a particular work will be affected by a number of other considerations including whether the work was anonymous or pseudonymous, the rule of the shorter term and whether there is a work for hire provision in the applicable copyright law.

The map is up to date for 2010. Click on the map to enlarge.

World Copyright Terms (created by Balfour Smith of Duke University)

Today if you live in South Africa you have received an instalment of the creativity that you’ve been paying for; the books, movies and sound recordings that you supported through the award of copyright monopolies now belongs to you the public. Books by Ernest Hemingway (For Whom the Bell Tolls, Islands in the Stream) and Dashiell Hammett (The Maltese Falcon) are now in the public domain. The writing of Frantz Fanon psychiatrist, philosopher and post colonial theorist are now in the public domain in almost all of Africa. Books and articles by Carl Jung can now be freely copied and adapted.

Movies and sound recordings released in 1961 are now in the public domain in South Africa*; hit songs include Lets Twist Again, Walking Back to Happiness and A Girl Like You by Cliff Richard and The Shadows, and movies include One Hundred and One Dalmatians, West Side Story and Breakfast at Tiffany’s. Wikipedia lists more sound recordings and movies released in 1961

But what if you live somewhere else in the world? If you live in a country that applies the international standard for copyright terms established by the Berne Convention then the same works are free in your country. If you are unfortunate enough to be in a country that has departed from the international standard in the Berne Convention then you probably have a long wait. If you live in the United States then you have no published works entering the public domain to celebrate. Professor James Boyle at the Center for the Study of the Public Domain at Duke University explains:

“What is entering the public domain in the United States? Nothing. Once again, we will have nothing to celebrate this January 1st. Not a single published work is entering the public domain this year. Or next year, or the year after that. In fact, in the United States, no publication will enter the public domain until 2019.”

How do you figure out if something is in the public domain in South Africa?

For musical, literary and artistic creations (what copyright law calls ‘works’) the term of copyright in South Africa is the life of the author plus fifty years. The fifty years is actually a bit more than than fifty years, because it ends at the end of the year on which the author died. As a result, the 1st of January every year is the day on which new works enter the public domain, or least should enter the public domain if copyright terms are not extended again.

How it works is this. If an author died during 1961 then in South Africa, that author’s works enter the public domain in South Africa. It doesn’t matter whether that author wrote in an another country which has retrospectively extended the copyright term, such as Germany, in South Africa you are free to copy, change and distribute the entire work.

If an author died before 1961 then her work is already in the public domain. If the author died after 1961 or is still alive then the work is still in copyright, unless the work was published pseudonymously or anonymously and the author’s actual identity was not revealed, in which case the copyright expired fifty years after publication. For  sound recordings and films copyright expires after fifty years in countries that use the Berne Convention international standard.

What else enters the public domain today? Please use the comments to list movies and sound recordings released in 1961, and authors, artists and composers who died in 1961.

Others whose works enter the public domain today in South Africa:
Authors;
H C Bailey, Joanna Cannan, Louis Ferdinand Céline, Jessie Redmon Fause, Kenneth Fearing, Moss Hart, Claude Houghton, George S. Kaufman, L A Lewis, Oliver Onions, Norvell W Page, Isabel Paterson, Frank Richards, E Arnot Robertson, Henry Morton Robinson, Mazo de la Roche, Alice Grant Rosman, Clark Ashton Smith, Angela Thirkell, James Thurber, Patricia Wentworth,
Composers;
Thomas Beecham, Percy Grainger
Artists;
Eero Saarinen (architect), James Thurber (Cartoonist)

*Although a movie or a sound recording is in the public domain a literary or musical work that is used in it may still be in copyright. That doesn’t meant that you can’t remix the the movie or sound recording but it does mean that your use of the literary or musical work (if it is in copyright) must be either licensed or permitted under an exception. An example of how this works; Are you lonesome tonight? was released by Elvis Presley in 1961 but the music and lyrics date from the 1920’s so there are no restrictions on remix.

Edited to add: Here is a more extensive list of creativity that enters the public domain in life + 50 jurisdictions.

Referring to the quasi-religious nature of bourgeoisie pre-occupations with food he claims: “Food is at the center of elites’ anxieties about science and modernity, yet the truth is that it has become a scapegoat, or perhaps I should say scapetofu, for a host of imaginary sins we associate with technology. The timing of this obsession is no surprise; never before has such complex technology occupied such a central place in the economy, to say nothing of daily life.”

He goes on to claim that the roots of this suspicion lie in ignorance, narrow specialisation and, citing the ambivalent history of nuclear technology, the negative consequences of some technologies. He intimates that concerns about the unintended consequences of knowledge amount to a superstition. But something important is missing from his account.

He mentions that at one time asbestos was touted as “a wonder product”. What he does not talk about is that there were reports about negative health outcomes associated with asbestos as early as 1898 but appropriate regulation was introduced in the United States only in 1989. It wasn’t ignorance that caused that delay, it was the desire to make a profit, and the utter failure by regulators to protect the public.

Mining companies continue to refuse the claims of miners whose lungs were irreparably damaged so that those companies could profit. The Anglo American Corporation is one of those, resisting the claims of miners from the Northern Cape while miners die. Payouts to the estates of dead miners are smaller than compensation to living miners.

There are many accounts that Akst ignores in which people were harmed not by  science or technology but by people making money selling poison and the authorities failing to hold them to account. The root of the suspicion that Akst considers needless is not ignorance but knowledge, knowledge not of science but of the kind of world in which we live, a world in which marketers lie glibly, cloaking themselves in the authority of science, a world in which politicians are the creatures of corporations that pay their campaign contributions, a world in which regulations are written to suit the industries being regulated.

Akst writes: “Food irradiation is a great example of a safe, effective technology that could save lives, if only people could get over their terror of it.” But once again Akst fails to mention the larger story. The irradiation of meat is championed by the meat processing industry in the United States because it is cheaper than making sure that meat is not contaminated with faeces during slaughter. Irradiation is intended to kill e.coli that might be present in the faeces of slaughtered animals. Akst suggests that the main question is whether the irradiation is effective or not. But that is not the question. The question is whether you want to eat shit sprayed meat whether not it is irradiated?

*Chattering classes is a termed used by some members of the elite in America and England in a self defeating attempt to suggest that they are somehow exempt from the bourgeoisie triviality suggested by the term while they remain ironically unconscious that only members of the chattering classes use the term.

** E.R.A. Merewether & C. W. Price, “Report on Effects of Asbestos Dust on the Lung” H.M. Stationery Office, 1930

The problem that law (or perhaps it is lawyers) has with new ‘technologies’ stems from law’s orientation in time; law changes relatively slowly, and law is orientated towards the past. The result is three related sources of dissonance.

“The strongest impacts of an emergent technology are always unanticipated. You can’t know what people are going to do until they get their hands on it and start using it on a daily basis, using it to make a buck and u­sing it for criminal purposes and all the different things that people do.”

Those are the words of William Gibson in a recent interview in The Paris Review.

The result is that any prediction of how a particular new technology will change the future must necessarily be wrong, probably in important ways. That gap between prediction and experience has become a feature of the present. Gibson’s own career illustrates the point nicely, he co-founded a movement in science fiction writing that was critical of the simultaneously bland and triumphalist vision of (white, male and wealthy) scientists ruling humanity and conquering the physical universe. Gibson opposed a dystopian future to the utopian futures popular in science fiction at that time. Three decades later he sets his work in (a slightly alternative) present, a present characterised by the same ambivalence about the products of human ingenuity, and the same expectation gap between those who first introduce those products and how others experience them. Or in Gibson’s own words: “The future is already here — it’s just not very evenly distributed.”

We could call that the prediction or expectation problem. Both positive and negative outcomes cannot be completely predicted and so a cost/benefit analysis of a particular rule just isn’t possible.

While being unable to predict negative outcomes is problematic it is unexpected positive outcomes that far more difficult. That is because in any economy those who are currently most successful and thus have the most money and power are also those who business models are likely to be disrupted by new technologies that simultaneously introduce greater efficiencies and eliminate their profit margins. This is a type of collective action problem. An economy may gain efficiencies and most people stand to benefit, but a small wealthy and powerful group stand to lose that very wealth and power. This could be called the Hercules problem; only if a new technology or firm is strong enough to survive the attempt to strangle it at birth can it survive long enough to be valued.

A third problem is that new technologies often raise novel ethical issues. Is it ethical for employers to monitor the private email of employees? Should patents be awarded over human genes. Society, the collective of people in whose interests laws are (avowedly) made, hasn’t yet had time to develop a consensus on such difficult issues. This could be called the ethical-consensus problem.

As I typed those words I was conscious of a question that I’ve heard many times from my friend and colleague Bob Jolliffe: : “what do you mean by technology?” He warns against making a fetish of human products; attributing independent agency to them, and regarded complex and novel products as manifestations of that agency which is some regarded as an end in itself.

Understanding what we mean by new technologies, in a culture that values new technologies would necessarily be one of the important questions in a scholarly inquiry into law and new technologies. As a beginning though I’ll refer to three insights. The first is way that computer scientist Bran Ferren memorably defined technology as “stuff that doesn’t work yet”. The second is Marshall McLuhan’s reminder that however much we might like to think of ourselves as rational beings cooly manipulating a variety of toosl we are tool using animals; our tools are extensions of our bodies; and bodies bring with them physiological reactions and emotions. Thirdly as my friend and colleague Laura DeNardis points out “technology is politics by other means”.

What is your immediate response to that description of the “Silk” browser software on Amazon’s Kindle Fire pad? Are you amazed at the pace of technological change? Or are you curious about how the software works? Does it cause you to speculate about other applications?

Or do you immediately ask whether the caching is copyright infringement, or is it fair use, is it permitted by a safe harbour provision? That is the question Stephan Kinsella asked. Why would that respond spring to mind before others. Kinsella is concerned by the way in which laws, in this case intellectual property laws, rely on unexamined assumptions about technology. But when technology changes and courts try to apply laws to new technologies there are unexpected and often negative results. Many self described technology lawyers are familiar with the reflexive dynamic of intellectual property law and information and communications technology but its not just in intellectual property law and its not ICT’s for which this is true.

Who is responsible for damage caused by genetically modified organisms that reproduce in the wild? If one country, in an attempt to manage the climate change resulting from global warming, releases reflective sulfate particles into the upper atmosphere with the result that the climate changes for the worse for neighbouring countries is there a remedy in international law? Is is lawful to make part human part dolphin chimera’s?

But hasn’t the law always had to play catch up to technological change? From silks to motor cars and aircraft to video recorders* the law has responded sooner or later (but usually later) regulating use, assigning liability and (far too infrequently) assuring freedom. The law, especially common law, has responded through the incremental adaptation that characterises law. Occasionally law has been changed dramatically in response to a particular technological development usually through passing a comprehensive statute. Ironically these kinds of attempts at comprehensive change are often the most time bound and become anachronistic more quickly than the more flexible common law.

It may not be possible to quantify but it seems that something in the relationship of law and technology has changed. As I see it the pace, range and impact of technological change have each increased so much that law can no longer rely on ad hoc approach to technological change. Instead what is needed is a systematic approach that seeks to understand the relationships between law,  technology and society.

It isn’t simply a matter of trying to speed up the process of law making. Overhasty and under theorised law making can be even more disastrous than a delay between the appearance of problems and a legal response. The systematic response must enable scientists and technologists to share a common framework with policy makers so that conversations about new technologies draw on all the available disciplines and knowledge. Lawyers need conceptual tools that will help them take into account the unknown and the unknoweable, risk but also benefits. Jurisprudence must take account of technology as a phenomenon.

*For younger readers a “video recorder” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “n. an apparatus for making video recordings; spec. a form of tape recorder for recording television programmes from the broadcast signal.”

The Egyptian military have unlawfully detained Alaa Abd El Fattah an Egyptian technology entrepreneur who lived in exile in South Africa until the transition in Egypt began. He returned to Egypt to work for democracy. The transition to democracy is threatened by the behaviour of the Egyptian military in detaining civilians like Alaa without trial, and subjecting them to military trials.

According to Global Voices:

“Egypt’s veteran blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah (@alaa) was detained today (Sunday, Oct. 30) for 15 days pending investigation after refusing to be interrogated by a military investigator, insisting on his right to be tried before a civil court.

Alaa was called in for investigation last week in light of the Maspiro events in Cairo, where 27 people died and many more were injured after the army cracked down on a Christian-majority demonstration. Alaa was very active in the aftermath of these tragic events, and spent two days at the morgue alongside other activists in solidarity with the victims’ families, while trying to convince them to agree to autopsies and trying to make sure the reports of the autopsies are correctly documented. Alaa wrote a very moving piece of that experience in Al Shorouk newspaper (a translation of which can be found here) in which he repeatedly reminded everyone that solidarity is the way out of any problems in Egypt.

Alaa was in San Francisco when he was called to the investigation last week. His father, veteran human rights lawyer Ahmed Seif El Islam Abdel Fattah, appeared in court and asked for the case to be postponed. Alaa came back to Cairo on Saturday afternoon and appeared in court on Sunday morning.”

The Mubarak regime detained Alaa for 45 days without trial in 2006. Now the Egyptian military prosecutor is behaving in the same way. The detention was ordered by a military tribunal and not a court. That alone would renders it unlawful under international human rights law. I detail exactly which human rights provisions a little later in this post. Boing Boing links to more detail.

The detention was ordered because Alaa refused to answer questions by the military prosecutor because he does not recognise the right of military prosecutors to interrogate civilians, and he refuses to recognise the right of military tribunals to try civilians. I know Alla, the charges are ludicrous and patently designed to deflect criticism of the role of the military in violence against Egyptians.

I’ve sent the following email to the Egyptian Ambassador to South Africa protesting Alaa’s unlawful detention. I’ve also sent copies to the South African Minister of International Relations and Co-operation and the South African Human Rights Commission. I haven’t asked the South African authorities to do anything at this stage but think it is necessary to make them aware that South Africans are very unhappy about this development and may call upon them to act if the situation is not remedied soon.

If you share my concern then join me in contacting the Egyptian Ambassador in your country. You may freely re-use the following email without attribution*.

To: egyptemb@global.co.za, Minister@dirco.gov.za, nvkwaza@sahrc.org.za

The Ambassador of Egypt to the Republic of South Africa

Sir

As a South African I was inspired by the movement towards democracy in Egypt and looked forward to South Africa working with Egypt as partners to uphold democracy in Africa. I have however received news that the Egyptian military has unlawfully detained Mr  Alaa Abd El Fattah.

Mr Alaa Abd El Fattah was apparently detained by a military prosecutor because he refused to accept the jurisdiction of the prosecutor over civilians. Detention of anyone by a government official other rather than a court is contrary to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Article 11 (1) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires “Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”  Allowing a prosecutor to order imprisonment is to allow a prosecutor to act as judge in his own trial. A prosecutor cannot make an impartial or unbiased decision.  Detention on order of a military prosecutor also violates The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which stipulates in Article 9 that:
“(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

(2) Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.”

Mr. Alaa Abd El Fattah objected to the competence of military tribunal to  try civilians. Trial by a military tribunal instead of civilian court in both principle and in practice in Egypt violates both the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights requires that: “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” Article 14 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that: “(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

The members of a military tribunal are subject to military discipline, lack security of appointment and thus cannot be competent or independent or impartial. Since Mr. Alaa Abd El Fattah has been critical of the involvement of the Egyptian military in violence against civilians and of military courts trying civilians a military tribunal cannot possibly behave in a competent, independent and impartial manner in respect of allegations against him.

Kindly convey to your government that South Africans such as myself are outraged by the unlawful detention of Mr. Alaa Abd El Fattah.  His detention without trial is reminiscent of the invidious methods of the erstwhile apartheid regime in South Africa and suggests that the Egyptian military are not committed to a transition to democracy.

You will note that I have sent a copy of this email to the Minister for International Relations and Co-operation and the South African Human Rights Commission. While I am not calling on these authorities to take any action in this email should the Egyptian government not release Mr. Alaa Abd El Fattah shortly I and many other South Africans will request them to take action. As you may already know every part of the South African state is legally obliged to respect, protect and promote human rights.

You can also telefax the Egyptian Embassy in Pretoria on  at Fax number: +27 12 343 1082 or call them at +27 12 343 1590 / 1591  or +27 12 344 6040 to protest.

* The usual requirements of the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license are waived for this email.