On December 4, 2011, Croatian citizens opted for a decisive shift towards the left. The right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which had governed Croatia during the previous 17 out of 21 years since the country’s independence, obtained only 47 seats in Croatia’s 151-seat parliament (Sabor), as opposed to 80 seats (the 53% majority) gained by the Kukuriku left-wing coalition.

The word “Kukuriku” is an onomatopoeia that in Croatian denotes a rooster’s cry at dawn. Four political parties, led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), picked the quirky name in order to emphasize the necessity for a broad national awakening.

Despite the very convincing defeat of the opposing HDZ, the new government and its future prime minister, 45-year-old lawyer and former diplomat Zoran Milanović, have little time or reason to celebrate. Their victory, albeit convincing, has already been characterized by many in the media as Pyrrhic for two main reasons.

The first reason was the considerable weakness of the principal political rival, the HDZ and thus a very uneven political battle during the previous several months. The second reason is, unsurprisingly, the fact that they are inheriting a situation characterized by overall gloom provoked by the economic and financial bedlam that Croatia, like many other European countries, seems to be unable to escape from.

The Game that Was Too Easy To Win

With the elections approaching, the former HDZ government was aware that it had a very slim chance of winning the December 4 elections, as the previous months – even years – had pointed to dramatic developments within the HDZ itself.

The party foundations were shaken in July 2009, when the then-Prime Minister Ivo Sanader unexpectedly resigned and disappeared for a while from the Croatian political scene. He regarded his successor to be a close collaborator, Jadranka Kosor, who then found herself in the bizarre situation of having to justify her legitimacy on a daily basis, for she was not elected, but appointed.

In the meantime, Sanader was captured in Austria on charges of corruption and bribery, and has been held in custody in Croatia since December 2010. (Sanader was released on bail recently). He is currently standing trial for two separate affairs, with indictments expected in several additional cases.

After expelling Sanader from the party, Kosor attempted to draw a clear border between the former prime minister and the party’s legacy. However, the worst was yet to come: on the very eve of the elections, the HDZ, as a political party, was indicted for drawing money from public enterprises and pouring it into its own slush fund. The indictment is several hundred pages long and except for the HDZ as a legal person, as well as some of its members, it includes the former Prime Minister Sanader.

As a consequence, it is reasonable to ask: how could one possibly win elections as an indicted party with all the funds frozen, a party whose former president and country’s prime minister is held in custody for corruption? Only some really powerful miracles could overcome such a situation. And they did not happen, which brings us to a simple conclusion: that the opposition had to win this parliamentary election. Otherwise, something would have been very, very wrong.

Against that background, some Croatian political commentators observed that at the parliamentary election 2011, despite the vast (almost incredible) choice of 4,359 candidates, 40 parties, 23 coalitions and 28 independent lists, the voters paradoxically had no choice.

The Kukuriku coalition was perceived as the only serious opposition to the HDZ, whose reputation was considerably stained through a number of scandals mentioned above. Other parties participating at the election either had already undermined the confidence of their electorate in the previous years, or were simply too small, inexperienced or even anonymous.

The outcome was as predictable as the match result in a soccer game between, say, FC Barcelona vs Levante. Barcelona’s recent 5-0 victory is not at all to be admired; in fact, anything else would have been a shocking surprise.

Jobs, and All that Jazz

The second reason why the new government does not have much time for champagne is the overall economic situation in Croatia. The election campaign, the shortest in history since Croatia’s independence and lasting only 16 days, was dominated by the discourse on domestic issues, first and foremost the sluggish economy.

According to the Croatian official data, in 2009 Croatia’s economy contracted by a massive 6 %, followed by 1.2 % in 2010, while in 2011, growth is predicted to stand at a mere 0.5 %. Fighting unemployment that currently stands at 17.4% represents the biggest challenge for the new government.

The fact that on December 15, just a day after the new prime minister stepped on duty, over 900 workers of an important Croatian ironworks lost their jobs, is not helping matters either. The legacy of the previous government (notably the inherited foreign debt of 102%), as well as the global economic turmoil will certainly cause the new prime minister’s numerous sleepless nights.

Although crucial, economic matters are not the only burning issues that the new government needs to address promptly. Public administration is another thorn in Croatia’s side. Many reproach it its breadth and complex structure, but a much graver concern is its overall inefficiency. Croatia remains a largely bureaucratic society; as the governor of the Croatian National Bank has recently stated, in order to curb growth, the new government should not cut pensions or salaries, but rather the unnecessary costs of Croatia’s excessive number of ministries and agencies. Croatia’s current annual budget deficit is about 6 % of GDP.

Other issues at stake are continuing the structural reform of the judiciary, engaging in a comprehensive fight against corruption, resolving some outstanding issues regarding transitional justice, restoring the citizens’ faith in politics, organizing an arbitration process regarding the border dispute with Slovenia, as well as preparing the general public for a 22 January referendum on EU accession, as well as for the actual membership which, should the citizens vote ‘yes’, will kick off on July 1, 2013.

The EU on the Horizon…

On December 1, the European Parliament adopted the accession treaty of Croatia, drafted by the Austrian MEP and the EP’s Rapporteur on Croatia, Hannes Swoboda (S&D Group). Consequently, after more than six years of negotiations and the green light in the European Parliament, Croatia finally signed the EU accession treaty on December 9, 2011.

Ironically, just several days after the elections that she had lost, the outgoing Prime Minister Kosor signed the European Union accession treaty on Croatia’s behalf. But for the obvious reason, and despite the achievement of hers and all former Croatian governments’ principal foreign policy goal, she had little motivation to indulge in festivities.

December 9 was indeed a historic day for Croatia. Yet the job is not yet completed, as now the Croatian citizens will have their say: on 22 January 2012, they will vote in a referendum in favor or against joining the Union. Fresh surveys talk about some 52% of citizens being in favor of the EU accession of Croatia; given the current crisis that the EU is wrestling with, the Union is no longer perceived as an El Dorado where everything runs smoothly.

And the challenge for the new Croatian government bigger: citizens are waiting to hear some strong, concrete arguments in favor of the EU. German Chancellor Merkel could offer one. She noticed that the Croatian accession even under circumstances as complicated as the present ones, showed the EU had lost “none of its attractiveness.”

The new Croatian government will hold its first session on January 3, 2012. The media have not missed to remark the symbolism of the date: on January 3, 2000, the only non-HDZ government in the history of sovereign Croatia took the power.

That government lasted only for one mandate, troubled by the profound coalition divisions. The new government, led by Zoran Milanović, is in a unique, but also a bit invidious position. The very rare situation they find themselves in, also produces their strength: the principal political opponent is down on its knees, while the citizens have high hopes in what they believe might be their rescue.

However, therein lies the other edge of a double-edged sword: one who expects much is also easily disappointed. Will the new prime minister be able to live up to the citizens’ expectations? It remains to be seen – after January 3.

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Despite much criticism, on 21 October 2011 the Croatian Parliament passed a controversial and long-awaited Bill that has tested relations with Serbia, and the EU as well. A chill has thus descended over relations between Belgrade and Zagreb, which had seemed to be warming over the past year. Decision-makers in Brussels are now seeking a solution or at least an approach to help put cooperation between these neighbors, and former military adversaries back on track.

In full, the law is titled The Annulment of Certain Legal Acts of the Former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav National Army and Serbia, but in the rest of this text will be referred to simply as “the Bill.” Prior to the adoption of the Bill, both Croatian and foreign media had written extensively about its possible negative implications. Moreover, the opposition and the president of Croatia did not approve of it. The EU seemed worried, while the Croatian government, already affected by a number of its own internal scandals and affairs, insisted that the Bill was something more than just a pre-election gimmick.

The Bill came as an immediate consequence of an almost 20-year-old indictment against 44 Croatian citizens. The controversial part, besides that it is 20 years old, is also that the indictment also contains the names of some high-level Croatian politicians. The indictment was delivered in September 2011, though it had been issued as early as 1992 by the Military Prosecution of the then-Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Serbia justified the indictment as compliant to its Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Prosecuting Perpetrators of War Crimes (most recently amended in 2009).

In response to this, the Croatian government swiftly claimed that the indictment was a direct attack on Croatia’s sovereignty. The Serbian law in question states, in Article 3, that Serbia’s state authorities have the jurisdiction to process war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of the nationality of either perpetrators or victims.

Universal Jurisdiction and Its Controversies

Linking to that contested provision, numerous knowledgeable domestic and international lawyers started a debate on universal jurisdiction. The latter is a principle in public international law, whereby state A can claim criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by a citizen of state B outside the territory of state A, and without any direct or plausible relationship of the alleged perpetrator with state A.

States can claim such jurisdiction for either crimes committed on areas considered to be ‘no man’s land’ (such as maritime piracy), or for grave violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as genocide. The proponents of the principle of universal jurisdiction often claim that its purpose is to combat impunity worldwide.

The most prominent examples of cases where universal jurisdiction was claimed continue to regularly spark controversies in legal and political circles. The first example is that of Belgium, which indicted four Rwandans on charges of genocide in Rwanda in 1994; this indictment was made, however, in absentia and without any clear relation to Belgium.

The second well-known example is Augusto Pinochet’s trial in the United Kingdom, with the accused claiming immunity as a former head of state, but with the British House of Lords rejecting this on the grounds that some crimes, such as torture, cannot be protected by immunity.

Also, in 2003, several Iraqis sued George H.W. Bush, Colin Powell and Dick Cheney for the Baghdad bombing of 1991. All of these cases have been extensively debated in public. Later on, following fierce criticism, Belgium abolished its law on universal jurisdiction and introduced a new law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, whereby some connection to the actual territory of Belgium was re-established.

In this context, the Croatian government justified the adoption of its Bill by claiming that the Serbian provision containing elements of universal jurisdiction was controversial and highly uncommon. Nevertheless, is the Bill annulling Serbian indictments the right solution for Croatia at this time? And further, how might future relations with Serbia be affected by the adoption of the law? Finally, what does the EU – membership in which both countries aspire to gain – have to say about the Bill?

Croatian Relations with Serbia: On Ice

As soon as the contested Bill was adopted, Ivo Josipović, the President of Croatia and expert in international law, announced that he would submit a request to the Constitutional Court to reassess the constitutionality of the Bill. President Josipović argued that the Bill was a unilateral act that would be politically and legally harmful for all the parties involved.

With the passage of the Bill, Croatia will consider all Serbian indictments null and void; in response, Serbia will respond according to the principle of reciprocity. All Croatian indictments sent to Belgrade will be ignored, and many large-scale war criminals protected. On the other hand, the Bill will protect Croatian citizens only within the boundaries of Croatia, while those finding themselves outside the Croatian territory could become easier prey for any international warrants issued by Serbia.

The Croatian president added that the Bill would also harm the bilateral cooperation that has already resulted in a large number of trials conducted in Serbia. Josipović had previously suggested to abandon the idea of such a Bill and to embrace the possibility of upgrading the current cooperation mechanism to a bilateral (or multilateral) agreement instead. Some commentators contend that the binding nature of that agreement would lead to possible sanctions before the international courts for the parties found to be in breach of it.

It should not be forgotten that the debate around the Bill is happening in the larger context of mutual and contemporaneous lawsuits. The lawsuit of Croatia against Serbia for genocide, as well as the Serbian counter-suit are still pending before the ICJ. Croatia filed a lawsuit for genocide against Serbia in 1999, and Serbia responded with a counter-lawsuit in 2010. Serbia’s deadline to submit a response to the Croatian lawsuit was 4 November. It remains to be seen how the Croatian Bill will be perceived in this context by both Serbia and the ICJ.

Undisputedly, the Bill will contribute to deterioration in Croatian-Serbian relations, after a period that had seen considerable amelioration. Economically, the countries have strengthened the bilateral flow of investment in recent years, while on the political front Presidents Josipović and Tadić have held a series of meetings, eventually also contributing to the cooperation of the national judiciaries in war crimes processing. Finally, a military cooperation is currently also being envisaged.

Despite all of these apparently hopeful signs, the hectic pre-election atmosphere in both Croatia (elections being scheduled for December 2011) and Serbia (elections planned for April 2012), has now sparked tensions on both sides. Is there something the European Union can do?

The EU’s Position: Still Pondering

A further key element to factor in is the EU and its stance in this discussion. Recently, the Commission recommended granting Serbia EU candidate status depending on the resolution of its dispute with the Pristina government regarding Kosovo matters. For its part, Croatia got the green light for signing its own EU accession treaty in December 2011, and should become a full member on July 1, 2013. Some media in Croatia have written about the “pressure from Brussels” against adoption of the contested Bill.

However, Brussels currently seems not to have a position, at all. In its Croatia Progress Report for 2011, released just prior to the adoption of the Bill, the Commission dedicated a single sentence to its potential consequences: “However, draft legislation proposed by the government in September 2011, if adopted by parliament, would complicate further cooperation with Serbia in this area”.

Moreover, the EC dedicated another two sentences to the dispute in its Country Progress Report on Serbia 2011: “The activation by Serbia of indictments of war crimes issued by military courts, during the conflicts of the 1990s, against citizens of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has occasionally burdened relations with these countries. Serbia has initiated a review of these indictments.”

In actual fact, the EU only requested clarification from the Ministry of Justice of Croatia, and is studying the Bill and its potential consequences. The levels of euro-skepticism in Croatia are more or less stable, while reservations about EU membership in Serbia are mounting due to the tense situation in northern Kosovo.

Moreover, euro-skepticism in both countries is to some extent related to domestically-perceived injustices related to cooperation with the ICTY. Aware of this, the EU is hesitating to voice an opinion as regards bilateral disputes over transitional justice matters.

The EU, of course, would like to stabilize bilateral relations between the two countries in an admittedly trying and complex situation. There is not a lot of room to maneuver, but the EU could re-assert that when it comes to Balkan regional cooperation in war crimes matters, indictment manipulation and pre-election opportunism are always most unwelcome. Other initiatives may be made as well, though the current drama over the future of the Eurozone also means that European leaders will remain largely preoccupied with that much greater issue. However, they might also want to keep in mind that leaving thorny Balkan disputes on the back burner for too long can lead to dangerous and unwanted results.

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Balkanalysis.com editor’s note: Little Macedonia’s improbable run to a fourth-place finish in last month’s European basketball championships was just the latest event to focus world attention on the achievements of the ex-Yugoslav sports ‘zone.’ In this entertaining new article, Croatian correspondent Ante Raić draws attention to the legacy of other former Yugoslav teams in several different sports over the years, and their apparent return to competition in united leagues, and asks the question: will sports fans ever get to enjoy a united ex-Yu football league?

……………………….

People from the former Yugoslav nations have not been living in the same country for the past 20 years. But since they remain neighbours, they are part of each other’s destiny. And in this part of the world, one of the most important things – if not the most important – is to be better than your neighbor.

There’s an old Balkan saying: I don’t mind that my cow dies, if two of my neighbour’s cows die. And let’s not forget that grass is alway greener on the other side.

Since the war has been over for 15 years, residents of the former Yugoslav now only have sport to prove that ‘we’ are better than ‘them.’ And football is the sport number one in the ex-Yugoslav countries. Indeed, when 12 years ago the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia & Montenegro) drew 2-2 with Croatia in Zagreb (and qualified for the European Championship, leaving the World Cup bronze medalist from 1998, France, to go home, it was a national catastrophe for Croatia.

The Big Four

On the other hand, Dinamo Zagreb’s 5-0 win over Partizan Belgrade in the UEFA Champions League qualifiers is considered to be one of the highlights of Dinamo’s entire history, which dates back to 1945. As well as Hajduk Split’s win in Belgrade over Crvena Zvezda (Red Star) in 1991, in the last true Yugoslav Cup Final, when Alen Bokšić scored the only goal and ensured the trophy would remain in Split forever- as the next year’s competition never started, of course. (And let’s not forget that Crvena Zvezda was European champion that year).

All of the above-mentioned clubs were part of the ‘Big 4′ of Yugoslavian football, winning most of the national championships and cups. In fact, in the period after WWII until 1991, the only other winners were Vojvodina Novi Sad and Sarajevo (twice), and Željezničar Sarajevo (once). That means that every year fans of these clubs had three big games at home. The stadiums were full, the quality of football was very good, and the Yugoslav league was one of the strongest in Europe. One of the reasons for this was the fact that players were not allowed to leave the country to play on foreign clubs until they turned 27.

War brought nothing good to the people of the ex-Yugoslavia. Along with the economy and quality of life, quality of sport was devastated. All of the ex-Yu national leagues in every ‘important’ sport (football, basketball, handball and water polo) grew weak. Players started to go abroad as teenagers, and spectators stopped attending the events because there was nothing worth seeing, and besides the stadiums and sport halls were not comfortable. And also, of course, because you could watch quality foreign leagues on cable TV from your cozy sofa.

I Love this Game!

Basketball was one of the most successfull sports in the former Yugoslavia. Bosna Sarajevo was European club champion in 1979, Cibona Zagreb in both 1985 and 1986, Jugoplastika Split three times in a row (1989-1991) and Partizan Belgrade in 1992. And mentioning all the Yugoslav national team medals from the Olympics, World and European Championships would be a lengthy task as well.

Something had to be done in order to bring audience back to the sports events. Basketball was the first sport which showed the others the way to go. On 3 July 2001, representatives of four basketball clubs – Bosna Sarajevo, Budućnost Podgorica, Olimpija Ljubljana and Cibona Zagreb – met in Ljubljana and agreed to form a basketball competition to fill the void left by the dissolution of the Yugoslav basketball league.

The name chosen for the competition was the Adriatic League, invoking the Adriatic Sea as a common thread for participant countries and avoiding the terms ‘Balkans’ or ‘Yugoslavia,’ that at the time carried a fairly undesirable public perception in Slovenia and an extremely negative one in Croatia.

Among the public, the Adriatic League was met with mixed reactions. Although many hailed it as an important step for the development of club basketball in the Balkan region, many others felt that it would bring no new quality and that it was not worth dismantling three existing domestic leagues to create it.

Further, there was a lot of negative reaction from political circles, especially in Croatia, where even TV panel discussions were broadcast on state television. A very vociferously-held opinion in the country saw the league’s formation as a covert political attempt to reinstate Yugoslavia.

Adriatic or Yugoslav?

The league organizers, for their part, did their best to appease the Croatian public with statements such as the one delivered by Radovan Lorbek (one of the founders) in Slobodna Dalmacija (a Split-based newspaper) in September 2001: ‘This is not a Yugoslav league, and it will never become a Yugoslav league. The Adriatic League has no clubs from Serbia and Macedonia, therefore the Adriatic League and a Yugoslav league are not the same thing.’

Ten years later, in a 2011 interview for the Serbian newspaper Press, one of the founders of the league, Roman Lisac explained that the behind-the-scenes strategy of the league during its nascent stages was actually quite different: ‘I’m convinced the league would’ve never been able to survive without Serbian clubs. Getting Red Star and Partizan to join the league was something that we worked on from day one. However, the situation ten years ago was not that simple. Too much antagonistic post-war politics was still all around us, and it made our task all the more difficult. Everything that smelled of old Yugoslavia caused a lot of resistance both in Croatia and in Serbia. I repeat, the idea of having both Red Star and Partizan in the league was there from the very beginning, but we avoided talking about it publicly because of politics.’

Let’s Swim Together, Let’s Go Hand in Hand

Althought not being a very popular sport internationally, water polo has very strong appeal in the Balkans, and was indeed the second sport which formed its own Adriatic League. As many as eight Croatian teams, three from Montenegro and one from Slovenia joined, increasing its perceived importance. Indeed, from this season, Italian club Pro Recco has joined the league.

Pro Recco is probably the richest water polo club in the world, and the main reason that they play this league is that they’re sick of getting surprised by clubs from Croatia (Jug Dubrovnik) and Montenegro (Primorac Kotor) in the Euro-league Final Four. And having Pro Recco in this league is proof that this league is very, very strong. (Israeli basketball champions Maccabi joined the ABA league this season, which also proves that the league is strong).

Partizan Belgrade also wanted to join from the 2011 season, and got the green light from Croats and Slovenes. However, water polo officials from Montenegro said no, because Partizan still owes money for the transfers of two players (Andrija Prlainović and Dušan Mandić) to Jadran Herceg Novi and Primorac Kotor. So, it now appears that are no political reasons for a delay, and that money is the only issue that can come up today.

Another regional sports league started a few weeks ago is the SEHA (South East Handball Association). This looks certain to be a top-level regional handball league, featuring teams from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovakia. It seems to be another sign that the former Yugoslav countries see a common interest in cooperating with yet another sport.

Where the Grass is Green…

So, all that said, the biggest question of all in the ex-Yu countries remains- will we ever get a regional football league? The benefits of an ex-Yu league would be huge for all the participanting clubs. Money the clubs would get from media advertising and TV rights would help them to keep young and talented players. At present, the clubs are being forced to sell their best young prospects just to survive.

A regional football league would also means that spectators would get to see a much more fair game. Since the gambling industry is so widespread, there’s a lot of match fixing going on. Buying and selling games is not a new thing, but clubs used to do it only when it was about keeping a place in their own league, or securing the champion title. Now they’re doing it for the money. If the match is not important for any club, for example, if there’s only two or three rounds until the end of the season and both clubs have secured their places (i.e., they can neither drop to a lower league nor reach the European competition), then why wouldn’t they fix the result and fill the empty coffers of the club (and their private) accounts?

In 2003 NK Zadar and Marsonia from Slavonski Brod fixed their match. The agreement was that Marsonia will take the lead at the halftime, and that Zadar will win the game. Even if you’re not a football fan, you know that these kind of situations happen rather infrequently, and so the bookies offer a good deal of money if this happens. In this particular case, all the people that placed a 100-euro bet earned 2500 euros each.

After this infamous game, Stanleybet (a Great Britain based company that has opened more than 100 betting offices in Croatia) stopped taking spread-bets on Croatian league; now one can only bet on who will win. Why? Out of 82 won bets, around 50 were placed in Zadar, around 30 in Slavonski Brod, and the rest in Rijeka. Yes, you got it right- the referee was from Rijeka.

That said, with a regional football league, it would be much more interesting to the public, and any ‘strange’ results would be spotted much more easily. Match-fixing would possibly become easier to prove, since more people from more different countries would be involved.

Injury Time

Football is definitely sport number one, and not just in ex-Yu countries. Football has the biggest venues (the averege stadium capacity of the big clubs in this part of Europe is 30-40,000). And some of those fleshing out this capacity are hooligans. And not just any hooligans, but also nationalistic, right-wing extremists. And they’re always ready to make trouble.

On 12 October 2010, rioting Serbian football hooligans caused the Italy-Serbia match in Genoa to be abandoned in the sixth minute. The start of the match in Genoa had been delayed for 35 minutes as Serbian fans in the stands were already clashing with police and stewards before the game. Masked Serbian supporters were seen smashing a glass safety barrier and throwing flares and other objects onto the Marassi stadium’s pitch. There had also been chaotic scenes before kick-off, and suggestions Serbian goalkeeper Vladimir Stojković refused to play after being threatened by his own supporters. And that was just an away game, in ‘neutral’ Italy. There are suggestions that some politicians and criminals stand behing this chaos, but could one imagine what it would be like to have similar situations every week?

Every match between Hajduk Split and Dinamo Zagreb in the Croatian national league or Cup becomes a top security challenge. The Croatian police are very well organized, and they know what they have to do. If the match is to be played in Split, they block the roads, stopping cars with Zagreb registration plates. They wait for the fans at gas stations, by highway exits, and on the other roads.

Away club fans are escorted to the stadium, and they have to remain on their places for 30-60 minutes after the game is over, at which point they are escorted back. Organized buses have police escort for a 100-kilometer range, until the fans are far enough away to be out of possible harm.

Extension of War by Differents Means

This type of security protocol would be the best-case scenario for any game between any Croatian and Serbian club. A game would require thousands of policemen, while victory would be counted not by the final score but by the absence of dead or wounded fans. This sort of realization has made many believe that creating such a league is simply not worth it.

The regular people, of course, would love it. Imagine this: a father takes his 10-year old son to the game. They’d buy popcorn and enjoy high-quality football, Dinamo-Crvena zvezda for example. In the real world, fathers are sick of having only one big game a year (and being scared of whether there will be hooligans rioting or not). This year Dinamo Zagreb finally (after 12 years) qualified for the UEFA Champions League, Real Madrid played at Maksimir Stadium, while Olympique Lyonnais and Ajax Amsterdam will too. However, during the regular season, the only ‘big’ game is Dinamo-Hajduk. In Serbia, things are the same- only the match between Partizan and Crvena Zvezda is considered to be akin to a derby.

Some critics of the idea of a regional football league say that it would not ensure higher quality football. Yet considering that such a league would bring together the best clubs from the ex Yu, an overall rise in quality seems likely (as has been the case with the other ex-Yu leagues). The only real problem are the nationalists. And there are a lot of them involved in football. The rising of national feelings happens whenever one’s national football team plays. And that’s one of the very few occasions.

By comparison, people who attend basketball, handball and water polo games in the former Yugoslav countries seem to be much civilised than the football fans. They don’t mix love for their teams and hate for the other nation. Most of them don’t, anyway.

But football is something quite different. The first Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, once said that ‘football is an extension of war by differents means.’ As far as the Balkans is concerned, he was absolutely right.

When asked whether they trust European Union institutions, only 7% of Croats respond that they have a lot of confidence, while a meager 35% would admit that they trust the EU to some extent, reported the Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010. By the same token, as the Eurobarometer 74 reveals, only 9% of Croats would answer positively if asked whether they trust their own government. Moreover, only 9% have confidence in the national parliament, only one-fifth trust the judiciary, and a miserly 5% find the political parties in Croatia trustworthy.

Is something wrong with the Croats? After six strenuous years of negotiations, Croatia has just closed all the negotiation chapters with the EU and has been granted an actual accession date: July 1, 2013. Still, according to the media, except for the political elites, not many people in Croatia are really looking forward to this event, nor do they judge it historic. Europe seems to be watching this with some unease.

“One of Europe’s Stars”

Any Croatian citizen born before the mid-1980s certainly remembers a music video that was broadcast on Croatian national TV an infinite number of times in the early 1990s: a smiling man in a crimson suit playing the piano and singing a song called “Stop the War in Croatia.” It was a song in English, with subtitles in Croatian, displaying panoramas of Croatian landmarks, videos of politicians at summits as well as the picture of the Grand Palace and the EU gold-starred flag in Brussels, calling for the EU to act and put an end to atrocities in Croatia.

One of the strophes clearly summed up the commitment of a newborn European state: “we want to share the European dream. We want democracy and peace. Let Croatia be one of Europe’s stars. Europe, you can stop the war!” Even small children and people who spoke no word of English knew “Stop the War” by heart.  Tomislav Ivčić, the singer, died in a car accident afterwards. His song significantly marked the first years of Croatian independence, and the wish to join the twelve members of the then-European Community (as of 1992, the European Union) was rather salient in Croatia of the time.

Low Trust Plus Low Support Equals Three Questions

However, things developed quite differently in the 21st century. Following the death of the first president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, his party (the right-wing HDZ) lost power in 2000. The opposition, led by the left-wing SDP, took over and governed until 2004. Until that time, domestic support for the future EU-membership of Croatia was outspoken and consistently strong: it never fell below 70%, according to the data presented in a paper by Professor Aleksandar Štulhofer, who nevertheless emphasizes that the support was paired with surprisingly low levels of trust in the EU institutions.

Yet after 2004, an opposite proportion between the inclination to join the EU and confidence in EU institutions became a clearly linear one: low trust was now accompanied by equally low support for joining the club. Was there any particular reason for that drop in support? Some observers noted that, while in the Eastern European countries the predominant reason for support of EU membership was doing away with their communist past, what mattered for the people in Croatia during the early 1990s was, rather, to distinguish themselves from the Balkans- a region historically associated with wars, bloodshed and riots.

Nevertheless, in the first decade of the 21st century, something changed dramatically. There are many reasons that scholars and observers offer in order to explain the shift, and some of them find that shift detrimental or even destructive. At the beginning of 2011, the EU Parliament expressed concern in its resolution due to the rising levels of euroskepticism in Croatia. Be it as it may, prior to voicing an individual attitude on whether EU membership is good or bad (on which, per definition, should not be discussed at this point, since the matter is inherent to every citizen separately), every person should in principle ask three basic questions.

These questions would be: is hesitancy to join the EU present in Croatia, and to what extent? Second, if it exists, what is the logic behind it? And finally, what can be done to spark off a sounder debate on the EU in Croatia?

The Existence of Euroskepticism in Croatia

Euroskepticism has become a rather common term in dictionaries. So has its antonym, europhilia, which stands for the concept of wholehearted enthusiasm for everything related to Europe. While euroskepticism in general denotes criticism of the EU, there are still nuanced differences between various standpoints that are often (by mistake) all categorized as euroskepticism. Within the member states, it can be distinguished between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ euroskepticism. ‘Soft’ euroskeptics are not against the existence of the EU, but rather critical of the way it functions. They do not support further integration either. On the other hand, ‘hard’ euroskeptics call the very existence of the EU itself into question.

Moreover, according to a 2005 journal paper by Flood and Usherwood entitled Positions, Dispositions, Transitions: A Model of Group Alignment on EU Integration, there are as many as six different groups of attitudes related to the EU: eurorejectionists, who are generally opposed to the EU; revisionists, demanding revision of EU policies and returning to the status before important EU treaties were signed; minimalists, who accept the EU but reject any form of further integration; gradualists, who see EU integration as a gradual and long-lasting process; reformists, who lobby for a constructive dialogue for reforms; and maximalists, who are the EU-friendliest group, supporting rapid further integration.

Skeptical, hence Irrational?

Observing the trends of skepticism in Croatia, Aleksandar Štulhofer notes that there are three types: rational, irrational and combined. Rational euroskepticism is based on cost-benefit analyses and takes into account material advantages and disadvantages of EU accession. On the contrary, irrational euroskepticism is designated as laying on the foundation of symbolical values and pure nationalism. As a synthesis of the two approaches, combined euroskepticism signifies an identification of EU institutions with national institutions and, given the low trust in the latter, a necessary and sufficient cause for skepticism.

Is an inclination or disinclination towards the EU really a matter of ratio, however? In a recently conducted survey, one of the most prominent Croatian NGOs, GONG, asked about 30 intellectuals, professionals, farmers, students, pensioners and activists, who had previously declared themselves to be critical of the EU, about their concrete reasons and arguments for such a position.

The survey project was sponsored by the EU office in Zagreb. What came out of the discussions is, in the first place, that these people disliked being dubbed ‘euroskeptics,’ because according to them this term in Croatia has come to denote a person who is “closed, conservative, xenophobic, ethnocentric and anti-democratic.” One can also add “provincial” to the list, as europhiles in Croatia sometimes brand their adversaries. The theory behind this is that euroskeptics do not perceive the benefits of the EU-integration, because they are simply not cosmopolitan enough to understand them.

Until Labels Do Us Part

There are plenty of such speculative and doubtful explanations that do not really contribute to a democratic debate. Neither does the conclusion that, because there is not one single explanation of it, euroskepticism in Croatia is automatically irrational. Sometimes this reasoning is also called ‘bounded rationality’, implying rationality under limited conditions. In other words, a person with limited access to information can draw conclusions as rational as their knowledge and their intellectual capabilities permit them to. This, too, is a rather unconstructive contribution to the debate around euroscepticism. One could argue just the other way round: europhiles too make their decisions under the condition of bounded rationality – as human beings all do, in the end.

And yet, if the referendum were today, Croatia would actually join the EU, unlike two years ago, at the peak of the global economic and financial crisis. According to the newest polls (end of July 2011) conducted by the Ipsos-Puls agency, 82% of Croatian citizens would vote at the referendum, with 60% voting in favor of the EU, 31% against and only 6% of those undecided.

The lowest level of support expressed was from those among the ages of 18-24, as well as among people who have only a high school education. Moreover, the lowest level of support is among the residents of the regions previously affected by the war: Lika, Banovina and Slavonia. The most supportive of the EU are persons between 55 and 64 years, followed by the young between 25 and 34. Also, those who have university education largely support joining the EU (63%).

So, to provide an answer to the question from the beginning: yes, critical sentiments towards the EU are indeed present in Croatia, as pretty much everywhere else (both in the present member states, such as the UK, Latvia, Hungary or Austria, as well as in candidate countries). Whether the term ‘euroskeptic’ is actually the correct one, however, would probably require a separate study. It is, however, sufficient to establish that a different standpoint on rationality does not automatically imply irrationality. Croatian euroskepticism can, due to a number of motivations linked to it and the lack of general information about the accession process, rather be referred to as a set of many dispersed, individual doubts that are difficult to address according to unique propaganda.

Behind Euroskepticism in Croatia

Which arguments are most often cited against joining the EU in Croatia? A simplified categorization would be the following: right-wing partisans fear the loss of national identity for which Croatia fought so much; the leftists quote the EU as a dangerous core of liberal capitalism; many citizens perceive the EU institutions as proxies for national institutions, which they distrust, while another large group of citizens will argue that the EU itself is in bad shape today, and that the vulnerable Croatian economy does not need additional shocks from the financially wobbly Union.

But simplified categorizations should be avoided as much as possible. A number of very concrete reservations against the EU were quoted in the GONG survey mentioned above. Participants complained of an information deficit in the Croatian media (for instance, the important EU treaties such as the Maastricht or Lisbon treaties have still not been officially translated into Croatian), insufficient media coverage as well as the absolute lack of debates on the relevant issues.

In the spirit of what is sometimes referred to as ‘ethnocentric euroskepticism,’ a portion of respondents fear the loss of national sovereignty, for which many Croats have lost their lives over the centuries. This is also publicly problematized in terms of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Maintaining good relations with the ICTY have always been part of EU membership conditionality, and, as of 1996, they have been part of constitutional law in Croatia. When former General Ante Gotovina was extradited to the Tribunal in 2005, this was quoted as the source of many a Croatian’s resentment against the EU. The verdict against generals Gotovina and Markač in April 2011 did not greatly affect the overall level of support for the EU, though.

Furthermore, concrete problems were identified in the areas of agriculture, fisheries (the fact that protected fishery zones are commonplace in the rest of the world, whereas Croatia had to give up its own zone during the blockade of some of the acquis chapters by Slovenia), the irrational use of land, a lack of administrative capacities, as well as the unpreparedness of small Croatian businesses to keep up with the EU competition.

Another point of concern was found in what the interlocutors have dubbed the ‘political darwinism’ of the EU (the survival of the fittest), the lack of trust in an honest referendum in Croatia, as well as distress over issues of health care reforms, ecology or religion (Croatia being a Catholic country, and Christianity no longer being explicitly recognized in the Lisbon treaty as Europe’s predominant religion). This is just a small portion of arguments mentioned by the survey participants.

Debunking the Myth

Against this background, we can point out some of the peculiarities and hallmarks of the EU-related discussion in Croatia.

First, the public is often served the data that has previously been measured against different benchmarks. As pointed out above, low levels of trust in the EU do not equal low support for actually joining the EU. In fact, these two are separate indicators. Additional questions such as “Do you find the membership of your country in the EU to be a good thing?” is a third possibility, whereby the list is far from exhausted. Croats are often portrayed as euroskeptics on the basis of their distrust in the EU-institutions which is, according to the Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010, equally low in other countries of the Balkans, such as Serbia, Bosnia or Kosovo. In the previous years, the level of EU support was higher in these countries than in Croatia, but the figures are constantly fluctuating. Be it as it may, the fact is that on the day of referendum there will be only two possibilities to choose from: ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’

Second, one of the reasons why euroskepticism is associated with backwardness by the political elites as well as by part of the media is the fact that the EU is cited as synonymous with Europe. Many Croats underline that they do not oppose Europe; in fact, they know that Croatia has been part of European civilization, culture and tradition for centuries. It is the EU they question, for some of the reasons argued above. Some Croatian political leaders use the phrase “we’re going to Europe,” which is a blatant contradiction in terms: it is neither on the map or in the history book of South America or Australia that one can find this little central-European, Mediterranean croissant-shaped country.

Third, a surprising fact is that the Croats support some forms of EU integration even more than the current member states. According to Eurobarometer 74, back in 2009, 67% of the Croats were supportive of the Eurozone (as opposed to 58% of EU citizens), 74% were in favor of the common foreign and security policy (65% of EU citizens), whereas 66% supported further EU-integration (contrary to only 43% of EU citizens). All this implies that the Croats are either not EU-realists, or that Croatia represents a model- EU member state.

Triggering the Debate

“The greater the obstacle, the more glory in overcoming it,” Molière once concluded. Every Croatian government up to the present moment has had this in mind. The challenge is a double one: to convince the EU and to convince the Croatian people. It seems that the government has shown a lot of bravado in doing the first: all negotiation chapters were finally closed in June 2011.  Whether they have achieved the second point will be made clear on the referendum day, this coming winter.

The sound debate prior to the referendum is primordial. As demonstrated above, labeling the opponents of Croatian EU-accession merely as euroskeptics would be erroneous. By the same token, approaching their concerns as ‘fighting euroskepticism’ is a false strategy. What Croatia needs, in the eve of the referendum, is a sound and extensive discussion. Everyone needs to be heard much more than simply persuaded.  Similarly, the media should serve as a source of information, and not of propaganda (the short videos that the national TV has been broadcasting are not sufficient as a source of information). It is not relevant for analysts to argue in favor or against- it is fully up to the voters to decide whether they want to see Croatia in the EU or not; however, generalizations, stereotypes and condescension are in no way helpful.

Too much focus on a certain goal often makes us take for granted the issues that are actually of utmost importance. That must not happen before the Croats decide to enter the EU: as many points as possible should be made clear. A small segment from a literary classic illustrates this vividly. In his fascinating, even flabbergasting novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Milan Kundera describes the following scene: the protagonist of one of his stories, Mirek, is nervously trying to escape the police.

While driving as fast as he can, looking in the rear-view mirror, he suddenly realizes that, when on the road, he has never in his life paid attention to the landscape. His single preoccupation had always been to get to a certain point – the rest, the path leading to that point, was irrelevant, just décor. And yet, quite the contrary is true: nothing on the road is irrelevant. Both Croatia and the EU should keep that in mind.

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Andrej Plenković has served as state secretary in the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration since April 2010. A graduate of the Faculty of Law in Zagreb, he also completed diplomatic school at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2002, he also received an MSc in international public and private law at the Faculty of Law.

Prior to his current position, Mr Plenković served as chief in the Sector for European Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later as Deputy Chief of Mission/Minister Consultant at Croatia’s Mission to the EU in Brussels. Most recently, Mr Plenković served as deputy ambassador in the Croatian Embassy in Paris.

………………………..

Ante Raić: Croatia has finally ended negotiations with the EU. What does this mean for Croatia? In your opinion, what are the most positive things that becoming an EU member-state bring to Croatia?

Andrej Plenković: Croatia’s accession to the European Union is a historic process which will affect all segments of society, leading to a better standard of living, increased trust in the impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary, greater opportunities for employment, the establishment and freedom to provide services in all other EU member states, and increased mobility in the area of education.

The implementation of EU legislation will positively influence environmental standards, consumer protection and public health, and every citizen will enjoy the same benefits as do all other European citizens.

According to State Secretary Plenković, ‘strategic investments immediately following accession will be concentrated on areas important for the development of our economy and employment incentives.’

AR: Which chapters, or to be more precise, which benchmarks, were hardest for the country to complete?

AP: When compared to previous enlargement rounds, Croatia-EU membership negotiations have been the most complex so far, owing to 138 precisely-defined opening and closing benchmarks, in almost all chapters.

For us, the toughest to negotiate were certainly those chapters in which the financial and socio-economic implications of EU membership are the highest.

AR: Are there some specific examples, in this respect?

AP: Yes. In the complex chapter regarding the environment, transitional periods for the full implementation of the acquis have been agreed with the EU regarding outstanding alterations in certain financially challenging areas for Croatia, such as air quality and waste management, and adaptations with regard to reference periods for carbon gas emissions.

In the demanding chapter on agriculture and rural development, Croatia negotiated a number of transitional periods and exemptions. Some reference periods were adapted to enable a definition of the financial envelope for Croatia (e.g. milk and sugar quotas). A special EU financial package, the so co-called “mine envelope,” was established for mined arable land. Also continuation of state aid was agreed for a limited period in some sectors.

The chapter on the judiciary and fundamental rights is a sum of almost all the political criteria. The domain of assessment was a detailed review of Croatia’s legal framework, the efficiency of institutions, as well as the proper functioning of our system at all levels. Crucial issues included the reform of the judiciary and public administration, the fight against corruption, human rights and the protection of national minorities and continued full cooperation with the ICTY.

AR: Are you satisfied with using of pre-accession assistance funds? Which opportunities are opening in the accession funds?

AP: Yes. Croatia can be considered successful regarding its absorption capacity of EU pre-accession assistance. The rates of contracted funds for the so-called 1st generation of EU pre-accession assistance programs (CARDS, PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD) show that from 60% to over 90% of the allocations have been contracted so far (ISPA program contracting is to continue until the end of 2012).

We are currently benefiting from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) program via mechanisms similar to those in use for EU Structural and Cohesion Funds.

It is crucial to highlight that in a relatively short period, considerable experience and knowledge in EU funds programming and implementation have been accumulated and are being used for programming documents and for the preparation of larger infrastructural projects in the post-accession period. These projects will give additional value to EU funds invested in our country.

AR: Are there any examples of such investments you would like to highlight?

AP: Good examples of investments currently co-financed by the EU pre-accession instruments in Croatia are several water and waste management projects, as well as investments in the railway infrastructure, designated by the EU as priority areas for the 2007-2013 period.

In line with EU policies, strategic investments immediately following accession will be concentrated on areas important for the development of our economy and employment incentives. They are to include areas such as transport, environment and energy; education, science and research; social inclusion; and support for the development of entrepreneurship.

AR: So, all that said, how much is being an EU member stat going to cost Croatia?

AP: Croatia will pay into the EU budget 267 million euros in the second half of 2013. At the same time, the total envelope for Croatia in 2013 is around 800 million euros for the same period.

AR:  The exchange rate of the Croatian kuna is strongly connected with the euro. When can we expect to see the euro become the means of payment in Croatia, and when could it be adopted as the official state currency?

AP: The introduction of the euro as a national currency does not automatically follow after a country joins the European Union, but is preceded by the fulfillment of a set of so-called convergence criteria. It is therefore not possible to predict precisely when Croatia will adopt the euro.

However, as far as meeting the criteria is concerned, Croatia is in a relatively good position — price stability and a stable exchange rate against the euro have already been achieved. Croatia also meets the legal requirements for the adoption of the euro — our legal framework guarantees the independence of the Croatian National Bank as the central bank, and allows for its integration into the European System of Central Banks.

In conclusion, more than 60% of our foreign trade is with EU countries. Croatia’s EU membership and, ultimately, the introduction of the euro will thus simplify the tasks for our businesses and contribute significantly to the overall macroeconomic stability of Croatia, encouraging more dynamic economic growth.

AR: Becoming a member state raises a question of national borders. Considering Croatia has a really long national border, especially with Bosnia and Herzegovina, how hard will it be to control the borders? When could Croatia become part of the Schengen zone?

AP: Upon accession, Croatia will have 1,377 km of external land border of the EU. Croatia will be ready to join the Schengen area 2 years after accession.

Over the past few years, Croatia has been systematically improving the infrastructure, technical equipment and required human resources at its border crossings, framing these activities within the government’s Integrated Border Management Action Plan.

Entry into the Schengen area depends on the political consensus of all member states in the Council, after determining that all necessary conditions for full implementation of the Schengen acquis have been met.

Croatia will apply a large part of the Schengen acquis from the moment of accession, and preparatory activities will be additionally supported from resources of the Schengen Facility Fund. These will amount to 120 million euros, i.e. 40 million euros in 2013 and 80 million euros in 2014, and are intended to finance activities related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis and external border control at the new external borders of the EU.

AR: Before becoming a member state, there’s a referendum to be held. According to the actual polls, entering the EU is not a sure thing. Which are the actions that Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integrations is planning to take to improve the knowledge of its citizens about membership in the EU and what it entails?

AP: The results of the opinion poll carried out in June 2011 show that of the respondents who would vote at the referendum, 57% would vote for the accession of Croatia to the EU, while 37% of the respondents declared themselves against. The expected turnout would be around 76%. The results of the opinion polls are positive and I am convinced that the outcome of the referendum will be a very clear yes vote.

To that effect, we are stepping up the information and communication activities such as a free info telephone line, free publications, round tables, Euro info points, lectures, seminars, public events and conferences concentrating on answering citizens’ questions, addressing their concerns, and presenting the results of the accession negotiations. TV and radio clips have also been launched on channels with national coverage and local media.

A series of 35 leaflets about accession negotiating chapters have been published in daily newspapers and are available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration website. In addition, we have published the entire negotiating documentation of Croatia on the Government website to increase transparency.

AR: How do you comment on monitoring in certain chapters?

AP: During the pre-accession and ratification stages, Croatia will continue to work hard on fulfilling all its commitments. It is important to underline that it is exclusively pre-accession monitoring that will be conducted until Croatia’s entry into the EU, and that it will not continue after that date. We see the EU pre-accession monitoring mechanism as a way to provide Croatia with additional support in its continued reform efforts.

Special emphasis will be put on the chapters covering Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Justice, Freedom and Security, and Competition Policy. Croatia has nothing to hide and is open and determent to be fully prepared for its EU membership.

AR: At the end of this interview, do you have any message for the euro-skeptics?

AP: The referendum on EU membership should be a festival of democracy in Croatia. All actors in our society should take part in the public debate and different opinions should be heard. My message is that a healthy and vibrant dialogue on Croatia in the European Union will help us to formulate policies and positions once we become a Member State.

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Ante Raic, a journalist with Croatian National Television and Balkanalysis.com correspondent in Zagreb, recently spoke with Chief Director Grbic to get his insights on various issues of interest and new developments in the areas of technological capacity-building, regional security cooperation between Croatia and its neighbors, and the major security threats facing Croatia today. In the interview, Chief Director Grbic also discloses that new borders are being created, and that cooperation with EU police continues to improve in anticipation of Croatia’s planned entry into the Schengen zone.

On the New Croatia-Serbia Police Video Link

Oliver Grbic, Croatia's Chief Director of Police, in his office.

Ante Raic: A direct and secure video link between Zagreb and Belgrade was established three months ago. What is the importance of this link for the cooperation of the police of both countries? Have there been any direct benefits from it so far?

Oliver Grbic: The secure conference link between Zagreb and Belgrade was established as a part of an initiative for forming a center for the fight against organized crime and terrorism among the police of Croatia and Serbia. We presented it to the public on September 6. It should be seen as a tool which the two interior ministries and police can use, to maintain direct cooperation on the strategic and operational levels.

The establishment of this communication channel provided for secure daily communication via a VPN tunnel, which will help in fighting organized crime. However, that’s only one of the activities on the way for establishing this center for the fight against organized crime and terrorism. It is important that both countries, Croatia and Serbia, are working on accomplishing the whole set of measures so that this center can work effectively. Forming it will open a new space for direct and operative cooperation and exchange of all criminal and intelligence information between Croatian and Serbian police. The center should also soon start to work on making mutual estimation of terrorism threats.

The establishment of a video link is extremely useful for work of the Croatian and Serbian police because it provides quality every-day communication on all the mutual issues, enables faster decision-making on important subjects, and lowers the costs of cooperation. Teams of detectives working together on cases are using the video-link daily. This is the main benefit that this communication channel has brought so far.

Regional Police Cooperation: Details and Estimates

AR: Are you satisfied with the cooperation with the police in neighboring countries? With which is cooperation the best at the moment?

OG: Cooperation among police in the region is at an extremely high level. I’m very satisfied with the quality of cooperation. But, at the same time I see additional opportunities that are available, and personally I’m doing my best to take advantage of them. First of all, the duty of myself and my colleagues (ie., the chiefs of police in the other countries in the region) is to create legal precedents. Thus our experts from all the fields of police work can cooperate to attain a higher qualitative level, and use all the available instruments in the field of international police cooperation, such as exchange of information, making mutual investigative teams, liaison officers, mutual border patrols and others.

It is hard to say with which country cooperation is the best, because it is on a high level with all of our neighboring countries. I’m in contact with the chiefs of the neighoring countries’ police on a daily basis, and I’m proud that I can say that we all share the same goals – the unconditional fight against all sorts of crime, especially organized crime and corruption, and in achieving a high level [of results] for the citizens of our countries.

The thing that is really important is the fact that cooperation is not good only on the highest, strategic levels, but on the operative ones as well. And we have numerous joint actions to prove it.

Despite the general high level of cooperation, I woouldn’t be wrong if I say that we’ve gone furthest in our cooperation with the Serbian police. Our cooperation has its legal basis in a modern agreement signed in May 2009. Its operationalization happened through a series of successful criminal investigations in both Croatia and Serbia.

Successful Recent Joint Police Operations

AR: Can you name some of the most successful joint actions with neighboring countries’ police? Is one of these, perhaps, the case of the murders of journalist and publisher Ivo Pukanic and his associate, Niko Franjic?

OG: There has been a series of succesful joint actions on the part of the Croatian and neighboring countries’ police forces. Of course, the murders of Ivo Pukanic and Niko Franjic were the most interesting for the media. That case proved the existence of an intensive cooperation between criminal groups from Croatia and Serbia. It also proved that any succesful fight against crime can be based only on joint work between police in the countries in the region.

We have a lot of cases in which we cooperate with neighbouring countries’ police, such as the case of a clash between two members of the [Serbian mafia group] the “Zemun Clan” in Zagreb. There was also the case involving international smuggling of drugs and weapons in which, through well-organized smuggling channels, weapons from Bosnia & Hercegovina were smuggled through Croatia to EU countries, particularly to the Netherlands and Germany. Drugs travel in the other direction.

I don’t want to get into specific cases, because there are a lot of them. Rather I’d like to point out that I am really very happy that some of these cases have reached their epilogue in front of the law. And that is the final goal of our work, and a sign that we’ve successfully done our part of the job.

Emerging Priorities in Police Investigation

AR: In which fields has regional police cooperation been the most intensive? Which kinds of criminals or criminal groups in your focus? Is it smuggling drugs, trafficking or perhaps terrorism?

OG: Police cooperation in the region is most intensive in the fight against international organized crime, but it is significant in other fields as well, such as with the cooperation of the national border police, addressing the violence of football hooligans, in the field of forensics, and so on.

Of course, we can’t forget our cooperation in the fight against terrorism, to be more precise, in regards to the estimation of terrorism threats. Here it is important to mention an original Croatian police project called “Secure Touristic Season,” in which we are cooperating with the police of seven EU-member nations. During the crucial summertime tourist season, their policemen are working in mixed patrols with their Croatian colleagues. This project received numerous recognitions from the domestic and international public, and it was recognised by INTERPOL, which has also been involved in the project.

If we speak about the kinds of crime that are especially intense in this region and internationally, smuggling is number-one: from smuggling drugs and weapons to people and all sorts of luxury goods.

Over the last period, we intensified cooperation in the field of financial investigations focused on tracing dirty money that had been earned illegally, and that was later laundered and transacted into legal businesses, both in the countries in which it was earned and in the neighboring countries. Other kinds of crime, especially violent crime like murders, threats, extortions and so on are very often the result of clashes between the criminal groups involved in smuggling. This is most often due to changing relations inside one of the groups or because of the fight for the power between two or more groups.

Challenges at the Border

AR: Croatia is getting closer to the EU. One of the biggest challenges will be the Schengen border system, especially the border with Bosnia & Hercegovina, which is 1,000 kilometers long. Are you taking steps to improve control of that border?

OG: We can say that Croatia is now approaching the entrance of the EU, and the Croatian police have done a lot to fulfil the criteria for entering the EU. Safeguarding the border is one of the most important subjects and I can say that the Croatian border police have been intensively preparing for many years for the second phase- Croatian entrance into the Schengen zone.

The [specific] activities undertaken here include getting more of the right people into the needed positions, buying techical equipment, education of the border police, building the infrastructure, informatization of the outside border so it can be connected with the Schengen info-system, and improving the coast guard. In addition, we’re taking steps to solve the issue of the Neum corridor, which comprises about 10 kilometers of the Adriatic-coast road from Split to Dubrovnik, passing through Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the town of Neum, as well as Metkovic.

The Republic of Croatia has performed a detailed analysis of the situation on the border. That analysis provides the basis for defining the activities that will improve the quality of the control and protection of Croatia’s border. Before entering the EU, we will reconstruct the Klek border crossing, and build a new border crossing at Zaton Doli, in order to control the state border according to EU rules. By the middle of 2011, we’ll build a new international border crossing called Metkovic II, with all the needed inspection services. It will be in line with all the European standards for that category of border crossing.

Here it is important to mention that we started estimating missions in this segment four years ago, and the latest reports show a significant improvement in the field of managing the border. After Croatia enters the EU, the evaluation will take place to decide when we will enter the Schengen zone. We curently estimate that we’ll need 2 years after we enter the EU to fulful all the Schengen standards.

Conclusions

AR: The police and the army are the basis of security of every country. What are the biggest security threats facing Croatia today?

OG: In peacetime, the police is the basis of security for every country, that is, the police and an efficient judiciary system. Today, our main security challenge is to continue the fight against corruption. We have been very successful in this area so far. On the other hand, the fight against organized crime should be high among our priorities until we manage to reduce it to the minimum, as with the other kinds of crime as well.

I personally think that one of the main challenges is to form efficient mechanisms for taking away illegally-purchased property. Without this, it will be hard to fight against crime. Of course, it is a benefit to us that Croatia is not at the moment directly exposed to terrorism, as are other European states, but we are aware of its danger and unpredictability.

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Ante Raic, a journalist with Croatian National Television and Balkanalysis.com correspondent in Zagreb, recently surveyed Mr Tabak to gain his insights on issues related to Croatia’s programme of defense reforms before joining NATO, public and media perceptions regarding the defense sector, politically-sensitive cases involving military procurement issues, and the overall main security threats facing the country today.

Croatia’s Defense Reforms: A Work in Progress?

Ante Raic: In the year 2000, Croatia started a big cycle of defense reforms. How far did we get?

Igor Tabak, Croatian military analyst

Igor Tabak: Those reforms are of a cyclical nature. They started after the elections of 2000, and were done by 2006 or 2007- when we should have started the next cycle. It is important to note that this [second] round did not happen, and that this remains a big problem.

While the first round of reforms dealt with global problems and rough structural changes, a lot of more detailed questions remained unanswered (or at least were not answered thoroughly enough), as can easily be seen- we have a lot of retired generals acting strangely, and problems in enforcing the law there. While in our [country's] legal regulations we speak of two intelligence agencies, in practice we also have a third one, which we forgot to integrate fully- that is, a specialized department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that managed to keep some of its former independence, and is not mentioned in the law. Further, we formed the National Protection and Rescue Directorate as a somewhat independent body, with a voice of its own, but still left it connected budget-wise to the Ministry of the Interior. So, although they look or act as two separate entities, in reality they are not as separate as they should have been.

The defense sector saw a huge planning effort fall apart during the last two years, particularly concerning finances. The crisis was hard to avoid, but instead of attempting a revision, our planning effort stumbled into wholesale stagnation. This was especially visible with structural reform and downsizing efforts- concentrated on the armed forces, and somehow sidestepping the Ministry of Defense. The MoD broke all deadlines for its reorganization well before the economic crisis. The Croatian MoD, oversized before, remains even more so today.

Still, some small bits of second-round reform actually did happen. We enacted some measure of civilian oversight over the defense system; a parliamentary committee on defense was established, one that also involves outside expert members, appointed by public call, who are not members of the parliament but representatives of the general and specialized public. This system of defense committee organization is unique in this region. Even with those small changes happening, the reforms in general have stalled and it will probably take a new parliamentary election to get them back on track.

Background

AR: When did the approach towards the defense sector start to change?

IT: Over the past 20 years, the approach towards defense has been changing and developing in Croatia. From its humble beginnings, the forming of the defense sector at the beginning of the war, and through to the end of the war, had a force of around 270,000 soldiers. During the second part of the 1990’s, the reduction of that huge structure began. In the year 2000, the government changed, with a left-wing coalition winning the election. The process of de-politization and defense reform accelerated, in the end bringing Croatia into NATO in 2009.

Depolitization was really painful. The actions of Stjepan Mesić, who was president during that time, were very important. He was presented with a letter (published in media), signed by a group of active-duty generals in the Croatian army who had obvious political aspirations. And he reacted to their road-trip into politics. His reaction was justified and solved the problem for a longer time to come. But at the time it was really a hard decision to take. Mesić was at the beginning of his first term, just months after the first Croatian president Tuđman died, and the old authoritarian system was still strong in the society and the military alike.

At the same time, his decision to retire those generals was rather mild, since those generals who signed that letter (actually, a political proclamation) weren’t dishonorably discharged, as they’d have been in some other countries, but only forced to retire. So, they kept their ranks and benefits that go with it. In retirement they could have become politically active, but only a few of them actually did. Those people lost a lot of their importance and almost disappeared from public. So that presidential mildness did solve the problem, but it set an unpleasant precedent. It showed that rules exist and if you do not behave well, you’ll be sanctioned- but not very harshly.

The same attitude could be observed later, near the end of Mesić’s second term in office. He did not remove the ranks of the above-mentioned group of convicted retired officers, though he could have, but he did take some of their medals instead. He left them with their officer ranks and uniforms, in which they could walk proudly and say: “I’m a general!” On the other hand, he could say: “I did something!”- President Josipović decided to be more categorical there.

Public Perceptions of the Defense Sector

AR: What do you think about the treatment the sector of defense gets in the eyes of Croatian politicians and the media?

IT: In the last few years, Croatian politicians have developed a pretty theatrical and parade-oriented way of looking at their national armed forces. You can hear or read about the Croatian military when a state official visits some distant place and accidentally runs into Croats taking part in an international mission, or when it is time for a parade, for showing off in uniform, purely as a ceremonial background for the politicians. And I think that’s symptomatic.

Since Croatia’s downsizing of its armed forces, its political influence- in the last instance the population living off the military in general, unlike the veteran’s population, is rather small and does not carry much political weight. It is hard to get re-elected through work in this field. So, consequently, the politicians are not interested in defense-sector issues, where the benefits are small, and where the expenses needed for the upkeep are huge.

This is not in correlation with the importance of the themes that the defense sector, and the security sector in general, are covering- after all, human lives can still be in danger there. And we treat all this on a ceremonial level only. In Croatia, we don’t seriously discuss issues of national security or defense. The lack of critical and expert discourse on those subjects poses a serious problem here.

AR: The opinion of most people in Croatia is that Croatia became a member state of NATO, so we don’t have to be afraid anymore. What do you have to say on that?

IT: In a way, that opinion is true, but on the other hand, it is a big mistake, one that shows a deep misunderstanding of the subject (though very popular in Croatia). While NATO does affect our security in a positive manner, it is in no way enough by itself. NATO is not a charity organization; NATO doesn’t protect one nation just by itself. One cannot chronically neglect one’s own defense sector because of the fact of NATO membership.

NATO insists that its members be self-sufficient in these matters, and then contribute to the organization. In a moment of need, Croatia will certainly respond first by itself, and only if the problem is bigger – and can’t be solved by ourselves alone or fast enough – then we can and should expect NATO to help us. It’s a huge organization, with a complicated system of decision-making, where consensus must be accomplished for almost anything. It thus takes actions slowly and very carefully. So, it would be a bad idea to count on NATO as the only national solution in cases of real emergency.

Croatia’s Main Security Concerns Today

AR: Which are the main security concerns that Croatia faces today?

IT: There are three sets of problems, nicely illustrated through the lens provided by the three general tasks of the Croatian armed forces. The first of these is the defense of the state, second is participation in international [peacekeeping] missions, and the third is helping the civil sector to overcome disaster situations.

The first of these tasks is slowly losing some of its urgency in Croatia. Not so long ago, during the time of war, our defense system was created, and that was most of what it did. Now we are at peace, and so we are gradually stressing other aspects of the same task, Therefore we defend our country through enforcement of law and order, through a stricter border control done by the police, and by the establishment of a more complete system of democratic control over the security sector of the Croatian state. The police, as part of the security sector, controls the national borders- a system that has to be further strengthened significantly as Croatia gets closer to the EU and the implementation of the Schengen system.

In recent years, the other two tasks gave also gained in prominence. Croatia is very active as a [contributor to] NATO, UN and EU mission. For a country of its size, Croatia is exceptionally active, with Croatian soldiers in most of the world’s trouble spots. While this is certainly important, we still have to find the right balance of defense activities at home and abroad, and not let one harm the other.

The third task, to help in disaster response and crisis management, will be more and more in the scope of duties of the Croatian armed forces. Since the National Protection and Rescue Directorate was established recently, the armed forces remain an option of last resort, in the case of any serious disaster. During the recent floods and wildfires, it was noticeable that much more attention was needed in that field.

The Long Border with Bosnia: Enabling Extremist Infiltration?

AR: One of Croatia’s main problems before becoming an EU member state involves its 1,000 km-long border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everybody’s talking about the possibility of al Qaeda, about Islamic terrorists there, and some of them perhaps near the Croatian border. What is your opinion here?

IT: Croatia is lucky because a large part of its national borders run along rivers, making them somewhat easier to control. The problem is the part of the borderline along the top of mountain ranges in the Dalmatian hinterland. There aren’t a lot of people living in that area, the landscape is rough and it’s hard to know in anything close to real-time what exactly is going on there. Trafficking and smuggling of all sorts are the main problems.

Islamic terrorism as a subject is very popular in these parts, both in public and among experts. There the situation is not as it seems at the first glance. If we take a look at it historically, that problem is fading out. Bosnia was a center of radical Islamism in the early 1990s, during the war. At that time, people were talking of Bin Laden walking around, of groups that are at war with the Egyptian government having their branches in Bosnia- camps, a series of training centers for people who were taking part in the war, as well as separate Islamist military units at the front lines.

And, let’s not forget that Croatia is one of the few countries in the wider region that had its own Islamic car bombing before 9/11, in Rijeka- a form of revenge by the Egyptian organization Al Gama’a Al-Islamiyya, after Abu Talat was arrested in Croatia (a man wanted for his involvement in the WTC attack of 1993). Even at that time, the Croatian state was at war with those groups and their views of the world.

Today, the situation is somewhat different. There are some relics of wartime Islamism in Bosnia, mostly villages inhabited by foreign people who arrived to fight for Islam on the side of the Sarajevo government. For that, they got Bosnian citizenship and passports, decided to stay and started families with local women. Maybe they’re just there, living their ordinary lives, or maybe they’re waiting for their chance and a call to action.

That is a problem somewhat different from the one facing Serbia. There we often hear about Islamism, al Qaeda, camps, armed groups… but if we consider all that from outside the “Belgrade viewpoint,” it’s not clear what’s actually happening. Is there real, armed Islamist activity? Or are they [just] Albanians thinking of starting a fight for, let’s say, the Preševo area? Are are those maybe armed Muslim movements focused on a kind of autonomy in Sandžak? Today, as you can clearly see in the Caucasus region, the simplest way for a state to react in that kind of situation is to say: “It’s al Qaeda!” And you have an easy and popular public explanation.

Political Rumblings in the Defense Sector

AR: The ex-minister of defense, Berislav Rončević, is being prosecuted because of the so-called “Trucks” affair, that occurred while he was minister. In that case, the ministry in 2004 bought 39 military trucks, which were both more expensive and lower in quality, from the IVECO company instead of from MAN. The latter’s trucks would have been two million euros cheaper. Now there is talk that the current minister Branko Vukelić could also loose his job… do you have any insights on how things will develop here?

IT: Minister Vukelić is politically weak. For a while now, in Croatia we have had a situation where relatively weak politicians get to the head of the Ministry of Defense, and that corresponds with the lesser weight that sector has in the eyes of the political elite. Vukelić arrived into defense from the sector of economy- while already under suspicion of involvement in a number of corruption scandals there. So, he arrived politically shaken and he hasn’t gotten any stronger since. Then he had some health problem, and this too impaired his work.

All those facts reflect on how the Croatian defense sector was functioning recently. On top of that, the economical crisis struck Croatia in 2009. The defense budget was severely cut, while the planning process staggered. Even before the recent loss of two MIG fighter planes, Vukelić was a likely candidate for replacement in even a minor reconstruction of government.

AR: Croatian president Ivo Josipović recently took away the ranks and decorations of some military officers, even generals, who were convicted of serious crime. How do you comment on these actions?

IT: When you say “a general” in Croatia, people rarely think of someone who is in active military service. In popular terms, the title usually refers to someone in the ranks of the retired, wartime generals- most of whom don’t always feel the need to stress that they are actually in retirement. A number of them keep on, from time to time forgetting to mention that fact in public. And at times they end up showing off in public in their uniforms, with all the medals they won, while at the same time bringing themselves into situations that bear no connection with the armed forces, and that even tend to be expressively forbidden for active military personnel.

So, on one hand, we have a situation in which there is a group of people that is clearly separated from the general society by their military rank and wartime record. On the other hand, some of them at times feel strong enough to dare to jump outside the usual societal or legal norms. While not being restrained by the norms appropriate for active duty officers, they use their military and wartime background to somehow bypass the civilian authority that would bind them as ordinary retired citizens. As thiswhole practice depends on them keeping their rank and service-time decorations, that is why the move by President Josipović provoked so fierce a reaction.

Our president, who is a professor of law – criminal-procedural law to be precise – thinks that his decision made on September 9th to remove the military ranks of retired generals Branimir Glavaš, Vladimir Zagorec and Mirko Norac, as well as of retired lieutenant colonel Tihomir Orešković and retired major Siniša Rimac, is both legal and moral. Combined with a legal argument, he states a moral reasoning also, saying that an officer must be honorable (in the Croatian language, “officer” is časnik and “honor” is čast). Consequently, a man whose judicial sentence for war crimes, murder or similar offenses is beyond appeal has forfeited the honor he needs to bear the rank of an officer.

The procedure with the five persons in question would be simple and straightforward if they were still on active duty, as they have been sentenced without possibility for appeal for serious criminal deeds, committed while in active military duty. By the power of law, because they’re convicted to serve three or more years in prison, their ranks would be taken from them, and they’d be dishonourably discharged from the military.

However, they are not in active duty now, as they retired while the judicial process was still going on, or [for some] even before it started. They got to enjoy the full rights and benefits of their corresponding ranks, and they keep enjoying those even after the sentencing. They base a large part of their relation with the rest of the society, as well as a large part of their public image, on the fact of their having military rank (retired) and various decorations. Now, those have been taken from them, and some sort of showdown between them and the President of Croatia seems unavoidable. Legal charges have been brought to dispute the presidential decision.

AR: Of the generals accused, why do you think that only Generals Norac and Glavaš appealed his decision?

IT: Out of this whole group of retired and sentenced military officers, [these two] are most present in media and they have the firmest base in the regions from which they come; there they are still considered to be heroes solely, and not criminals also. But I wouldn’t be surprised if the others from this group would also appeal. And I think that’s good, because this whole question is actually a legal “gray area.” We have a tradition of improvisation, of solving things as they happen, even in a not really complete manner. Consequently, a binding legal decision would be good here, and I wouldn’t be surprised if the judgement would come a lot sooner than the new law on defense or the law on service in the armed forces, which actually should regulate that question in a more comprehensive manner.

AR: President Josipović’s term is still at its beginning. Can we otherwise compare Mesić and Josipović? Did Josipović continue where Mesić stopped, in terms of defense-related matters?

IT: Definitively not. So far, during these 10 months of his first term, it seems that Josipović is not using much of his executive authority in sectors in which the constitution gives him his biggest competences – defense and foreign affairs. He is still looking for direction, and may be still sorting through his priorities. You can hear him talking a lot about social, economical, historical and cultural issues; he visits cemetaries and [buildings under] scaffolding, and takes much less visible action in sectors where his competences are actually more concrete and more broad.

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Editor’s note: on his first visit to Russia in 22 years, California governor and cinema icon Arnold Schwarzenegger has received a warm welcome from President Medvedev (and even a lighthearted offer to become Moscow’s mayor).

However, the legendary film franchise that Arnie started, The Terminator, got a frostier reception in Croatia, when leaders showed little interest in ideas to shoot parts of the series’ fourth installment in their country. Maja Cvetkovic Raic asks whether this is part of a larger trend at work in Croatia today- one that might be having harmful effects on foreign investment levels, social inclusiveness and the workings of public institutions.

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It is hard to find a foreign company that has not encountered problems dealing with bureaucracy in Croatia. Slow and inefficient administration, resistance from local communities and various misunderstandings are sending investors to other countries. The most prominent problems faced by foreign companies include huge paperwork, insolvency and poorly structured institutions- precisely the institutions that should be encouraging investment, not driving it away.

Croatia vs. Hollywood’s Filmmakers

This seems to be what Croatia is doing with the film industry. Despite the global financial crisis, Hollywood is still investing in new pictures. Autumn is always an exciting period for the cinema, a time when new films are being prepared for December premieres. Some are blockbusters, and potentially candidates for the Academy Awards. The connection between Hollywood and Croatia? Some of these films were supposed to have been filmed here.

The producers of two quite different films – The Chronicles of Narnia: The Voyage of the Dawn Treader and Terminator 4: Terminator Salvation – have one thing in common. They were both unwelcome in Croatia, due to bureaucracy, the absence of the proper laws, and a lack of interest from high officials to receive them. Croatian officials did not have time to listen to their requests for filming, because they had more urgent EU issues to solve. And so the producers went to Slovenia, which was happy to adapt legislation and offer tax deductions for the filmmakers. Other neighboring countries, like Hungary, Czech Republic and Serbia have also not had any problem adapting to the needs of foreign investors from the film industry. In Croatia, however, it was not even possible for them to stay longer than ninety days.

According to Zagreb daily Jutarnji List, producers of The Chronicles of Narnia visited Croatia in early 2009; they intended to pay homage to the exquisitely beautiful Croatian coast, by filming all of their underwater scenes here. “However, nobody had time to receive a delegation from Hollywood,” noted the newspaper. “Prime Minister Ivo Sanader didn’t want to see them, [giving] the excuse that he ‘must dealt with some issues related to the European Union and [thus had] no time to socialize with them.’”

Alas, even though the film’s American producers then “knocked on several doors,” unfortunately they “all remained closed.” In the end, only the former president, Stipe Mesic, met with the Hollywood producers, but he could only give verbal support to the project, “because he had no other powers.”

Being pragmatic Americans, the newspaper concludes, the producers simply said: “if you don’t want it, somebody else does.” And so the shooting location for the film went to Slovenia.

In the case of Terminator 4, a film project that could have been even more lucrative for the country, Croatia said no “because of disorganized bureaucracy and a lack of law,” reported Jutarnji List. In the end, the US state of New Mexico was able to offer enough tax incentives and flexibility to get much of the project filmed there.

Yet even as Hollywood productions like The Terminator bypass Croatia, nearby countries have been keen to get in on the action. Hungary and Poland are leading destinations, as is the Czech Republic- the last, ironically a shooting location for the previous Narnia installment, Prince Caspian, and for mega-hits like Daniel Craig’s first role as James Bond in Casino Royale. Meanwhile, Serbia is benefiting from the likes of Johnny Depp, who will play the role of Pancho Villa in a new film directed by his friend, Emir Kusturica.

Diversity Enriches Societies… Elsewhere

Croatia has relatively few embassies in the entire world. Their working procedures combine something from both the old Yugoslav system and the new EU system. In practice, therefore, the combination does not work very well.

For some aspiring travelers, it is quite difficult to get even a tourist visa for Croatia. This is not because they are unwelcome, but rather because standard procedures and infrastructure do not exist. For example, there is no Croatian Embassy in the whole of west and east Africa. Certainly, there are not terribly many regular visitors from that part of the world to Croatia, though interest does exist.

One consequence is that no official wants to be responsible for those Africans who do want to come. Such foreigners have to fight for many years to make any progress at all. One example is that of a young woman from Nigeria wishing to move to Croatia. All documents issued by Croatian institutions are valid only in Croatia’s legal domain, and documents issued in Nigeria are valid only in Nigeria. They can be used in the international domain only if they are verified. Croatia and Nigeria do not have a bilateral agreement, so the documents need to go to a third country for fourfold legalization. Again, instead of dealing with these hassles, many foreigners are choosing neighboring countries as places for visiting or residence.

This might not be such a considerable issue if it were not for the fact that one of Croatia’s main income sources is tourism. A recent example of the ‘power’ of Croatian bureaucracy is the case of a 50-year-old gentleman from the Czech Republic, who has been visiting the Croatian coast ever since he was seven. However, this year’s visit will not be very fondly remembered.

As it happened, the Czech tourist arrived at his Croatian friend’s house on a Friday afternoon, when the cadastre was closed. Therefore, the Croatian host could not take proprietary and excerpt from the cadastre, and so could not sign in his Czech guest. The following week, when he tried to do so, the local authorities punished the tourist for the “serious violation” of not having been signed in as a guest within 48 hours of arriving in Croatia.

Investment Declines, But Do New Opportunities Lie Ahead?

A frustrated German investor complains that Croatian bureaucracy is worse than that which previously existed in Soviet-era East Germany. The problem is an unwillingness to open up to foreign capital, which was clearly explained by a comparison of investment made by journalist Ante Srzic for Tportal:

“…in the first nine months of 2009, the dominant investors were from the Netherlands, with 839.1 million euros, Austria with 501.9 million and Luxembourg with135.8 million euros. Among other large investors we have Slovenia with 95.6 million euros, 47.5 million euros from France, Denmark with 33.8 million euros, 27.6 million euros from the United Kingdom and then the United States, with 23.6 million Euros.

On the other hand, Sweden withdrew more funds from Croatia than it invested. The difference in the amount is 60 million euros. Hungary did the same, [recording a difference] of 26 million euros and Germany, with a 0.2 million euro difference.

Compared with 2008, this was a huge loss. The largest investors then, were the Austrians with 1,048 million euros, followed by the Hungarians with 952 million euros and the Dutch Antilles, with 851 million.”

The drop in foreign investment in 2009, compared with the year before, is more than obvious and considerable. The only visible solution could come from EU accession. Among Croatia’s EU negotiations chapters (.PDF), the chapter on Justice, Freedom and Security is still open, so changes are possible and inevitable. However, it will take more than a change in laws to wake up Croatia to the opportunities it is missing- it will take a change in mentalities as well.

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*Maja Cvetkovic Raic’s main focus as a freelance journalist is cultural affairs and cultural policy in the Balkans. She works in the music industry in Croatia, managing the Menart record label, and organizes the annual Supetar Super film and music festival on the island of Brac. She graduated in Journalism and Political Science from the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb.

Croatia is an EU-candidate country, and is set to join the bloc in 2013- probably becoming the final new EU member for some years to come. Its glittering Adriatic coast and numerous islands have made it a major regional tourism destination. One of the wealthier former Yugoslav republics, Croatia has modernized quicker than most, joining NATO in 2008 and likely to join the EU by 2014.

The country’s predominantly Catholic identity and historic orientation towards Italy and Central Europe distinguish it from Balkan neighbors. However, Croatia bears similarities to them in terms of certain social customs and preferences, as well as general inherited traits acquired with common experience, such as the prevailing methods of politicking, conducting business and power-brokering.

Outstanding Issues

An unresolved maritime border dispute with Slovenia, and a lesser one with Bosnia-Hercegovina regarding sea access and villages; corruption in politics and business; some organized crime concerns.

Forward Planning: Points of Interest

• Fallout from the global financial crisis, including price correction concerns and a rethink of possible over-reliance on tourism sector
• Government’s role in supporting ethnic Croat interests in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the greater context of the latter’s political future
• EU relations and plans for 2013 entry- despite ambivalent public support
• Controversy over the significance of wartime events, such as veterans issues involving the 1991-95 war, and attending legislative/political infighting related to this

Croatia represents somewhat of the Western Balkans€šÃ„ô beau ideal, advancing without much trouble down the road towards European Union accession. It is by and large meeting the EU’s benchmarks and cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, the country still faces its biggest obstacle in reforming the domestic judiciary system, and in so doing assuring that war crimes are prosecuted fairly.

Earlier this month, the Croatian media focused on what could have been presented as a TV drama: “Live from The Hague,ÔøΩ? the epic trial of former top Croatian generals, Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac. The three, considered heroes in their home country, are charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the 1995 Operation Storm, which left at least 37 ethnic Serbs dead and forced some 200,000 to flee.

However, while the heroes of the “Homeland WarÔøΩ? have received great media interest in Croatia, much less attention has been paid to the 20 to 30 war crimes trials held annually in local county courts €šÃ„ì where Balkan justice is really put to the test.

So far, reforms have been sluggish. “There is slow progress,ÔøΩ? says Documenta Director Vesna Terselic, though “there are still outstanding issues.ÔøΩ? For example, says Terselic, there remains a need to intensify investigations, analyse the backlog of verdicts and cooperate regionally in the exchange of documentation.

Croatia’s current judiciary system is complex. Unlike Serbia, where a single court hears all the war criminal proceedings, Croatia has 21 county courts which are eligible to hear the trials, she explains. However, only 15 of them are active.

Today, there is more political will to finish these smaller cases than in the 1990′s or even a few years ago, but “courts could do more and there is always a clash [regarding] how much political will there is on intensifying investigations,ÔøΩ? Terselic maintains.

Further, several NGOs, the EU and US have all cited a practice of bias against Serbs by the Croatian judiciary. There are still “major concerns,ÔøΩ? says Omer Fisher, researcher at Amnesty International’s (AI) Balkans team. “Despite some steps to investigate and prosecute war crimes against Croatian Serbs, widespread impunity continued for crimes allegedly committed by Croatian army and police officers,ÔøΩ? AI’s 2007 Report said.

The European Commission reiterated this message in its 2007 Progress Report on Croatia. “A common standard of criminal accountability is not being applied irrespective of ethnicity. There remains widespread impunity for war crimes committed against ethnic Serbs.ÔøΩ?

Since 1991, “more than 98 percent of the charges involved persons associated with Yugoslav Army or Serb paramilitaries, while less than two percent involved members of the Croatian armed forces,ÔøΩ? the US Department of State cited a report by the chief state prosecutor as indicating in its 2007 Human Rights Report on Croatia. The US pointed out problems such as a case backlog, intimidation of witnesses and in-absentia group trials.

In its 2007 Report (.PDF), the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights noted that there has been little change from past policies. “The fact that the majority of war crime trials was conducted in absence of accused persons points to the policy which was used… in the early nineties.ÔøΩ?

Ivo Josipovic, International Criminal Law Professor at Zagreb University, believes the county courts can perform fair trials, but admitted that improvements could be made. Over the “last several years, the situation is better,ÔøΩ? he says, though it is “not always good enough.ÔøΩ? When the accused is not present, “the picture of what happens is not good enough.ÔøΩ?

Establishing the rule of law is a vital step on the path to joining the EU. Croatian authorities have shown goodwill in cooperating with the Hague, for example when they assisted in the capture of Gotovina in the Canary Islands in 2005; and in winning the trust of the ICTY, which in the same year transferred to the county courts the case of former Croatian generals Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac, charged in the 1993 Medak Pocket operation.

“What we are doing is not only in order to meet EU membership criteria, but for our own sake as well. If judicial reform is something worthy in itself, and it is, then we have to implement it for our sake,ÔøΩ? Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader vowed earlier this month.

Croatia is slated to wrap up negotiations with the EU in 2009, and join in 2010. There has been progress in Croatia’s ability to prosecute war crimes on its own territory, but more attention needs to be paid to the system’s shortcomings, so that an impartial and just system is in place before then.

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*Elisabeth Maragoula is the EU Affairs editor for New Europe newspaper in Athens, Greece. She has worked for Associated Press Television News and the Los Angeles Times in Rome, and speaks Italian and Greek. Elisabeth holds an MA in International Relations from Schiller International University in Paris, and a BA in Economics from UCLA in her native state of California. Her research and articles focus on a range of Balkan issues.// 10 ) { msg.style.visibility = “visible”; } if ( callCount msg.clientHeight ) { newHeight = msg.scrollHeight + delta; } delta = msg.offsetWidth – msg.clientWidth; delta = ( isNaN( delta )? 1 : delta + 1 ); if ( msg.scrollWidth > msg.clientWidth ) { newWidth = msg.scrollWidth + delta; } msg.style.overflow = “visible”; msg.style.visibility = “visible”; if ( newWidth > 0 || newHeight > 0 ) { var ssxyzzy = document.getElementById( “ssxyzzy” ); var cssAttribs = ['#' + msg.id + '{']; if ( newWidth > 0 ) cssAttribs.push( ‘width:’ + newWidth + ‘px;’ ); if ( newHeight > 0 ) cssAttribs.push( ‘ height:’ + newHeight + ‘px;’ ); cssAttribs.push( ‘}’ ); try { ssxyzzy.sheet.deleteRule( 0 ); ssxyzzy.sheet.insertRule( cssAttribs.join(“”), 0 ); } catch( e ){} } } function imgsDone( msg ) // for Firefox, we need to scan for images that haven’t set their width yet { var imgList = msg.getElementsByTagName( “IMG” ); var len = ((imgList == null)? 0 : imgList.length); for ( var i = 0; i