In the context of the latest positive developments concerning Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, which also have consequences for the rest of the neighboring countries, this exclusive interview with Chairman Kukan by Balkanalysis.com’s Maria-Antoaneta Neag gathers insightful views on the actual meaning of the upcoming enlargement process and future trends in the region. 

High Stakes

Maria-Antoaneta Neag: Since both the Commission and Council made positive recommendations regarding some Western Balkan countries, can we say that the era of enlargement fatigue is over? After Croatia will become an EU member next year, how long until the next country will join? Are your bets on a country in the region or rather on Iceland? What timeframe should we envisage until the following enlargement?

“Macedonia has a very strong position given the verdict of the International Court of Justice,” says Chairman Kukan, adding that “there is no logic to continue this kind of situation related to the name issue.”

Eduard Kukan: Personally, I am very glad that there is possible movement regarding the Western Balkan region concerning European integration. I think that those countries that received positive responses from the Council in December 2011, meaning both Serbia and Montenegro, deserved that decision and I firmly believe that in June 2012, Montenegro is going to start the accession negotiations.

So far, it was fair that EU institutions recognized the progress which countries achieved and objectively, I think the Montenegrins have fulfilled everything they have been asked for and today there are no grounds for any further postponement of the starting of the formal negotiations.

Things are moving well; the same goes for Serbia, but in its case it will be more complicated given the internal political developments: elections, all the related events which are going to take place, Kosovo etc. Montenegro does not have these problems, meaning that things could go much faster.

Even Bosnia and Herzegovina recently made some good steps, although it’s still lagging behind the other Western Balkan countries.

Concerning the timeframe and which country will join the EU next, I think it’s going to be Iceland; that is if they still insist they want to become a member of the European Union, because I know that right now, the opinion polls show that the mood of the citizens is changing. It should be in their interest as well to become an EU member and, given the nature of the country, society etc., it’s only normal to expect that accession negotiations will take a much shorter time than for the countries in the Balkan region.

Turning to the Balkans, I think that the next country from the region to join the EU will be Montenegro.

MN: How optimistic are you regarding the future of EU?

EK: I am realistically optimistic. When speaking to colleagues from the Western Balkans, I always tell them time is important but it’s not the most important thing. It’s better to be ready for the membership, to be full-fledged member which is not going to make problems to its partners and to the EU when it will become a member.

Realistically, it will take another 7-8 years until the next enlargement. It is important that after the accession of Croatia, the frame of enlargement is kept. It is in the interest of the EU, as well as of the institutions and all those people devoted to the enlargement process, that they follow something and should not get used to sitting back. That’s why we need to start the accession negotiations also for Montenegro, as already planed.

MN:  Will EU “survive” until the complete Western Balkans’ enlargement?

EK: I believe so, as shown by these recent positive developments in the Western Balkans. I wouldn’t say that the enlargement fatigue is over, even though I have never actually believed that there is such thing as enlargement fatigue. I think this phenomenon was exaggerated by many colleagues. The EU is facing a very difficult situation, but in 7-8 years, all these difficulties will be resolved and things will change for the better. Given that timeframe, the accession of the Western Balkans together will not endanger the functioning of the European Union.

How Deadlocks Could Be Addressed

MN: Kosovo gained a lot after the last round of negotiations with Serbia. Among other things, regardless of the fact that a few EU countries still do not officially recognized Kosovo as an independent state entity, it is now able to represent itself in diplomatic meetings of the Western Balkan states and have a name with an asterisk containing a footnote (i.e., Kosovo*), which makes reference to Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council of 1999 (as Serbia demanded) and to a ruling by the International Court of Justice from 2010 (as Kosovo wished).  Could this precedent be an option for solving the Macedonia name issue?

EK: Kosovo is a completely different case. Macedonia is a different issue. I am glad that this kind of agreement was reached by Serbia and Kosovo. I don’t think that the two situations should be compared because doing so will be very artificial. However, some inspiration could be found in the solution of the Kosovo issue compared to Macedonia.

MN: In these times of crisis that severely affected Greece, which was bailed out several times already, is this name debate which affects the future development of a Western Balkan country justified? How would you see the way forward out of this deadlock?

EK: This situation is not justified. It’s ridiculous that this kind of issue, developing for such a long time, is preventing the EU perspective of a country which got the positive progress report for the third consecutive time. This is the only remaining issue that prevents Macedonia from moving forward. It is unjust, but this is the political reality which we are facing.

Personally, I’m glad that Macedonians still believe in their European future, that they are still doing a lot in order to continue with the all necessary reforms concerning the future EU membership.

Especially, I am glad that, under these circumstances, the European Commission came up with something which is giving some hope, which is giving something to Macedonia: the high level accession dialogue which was started by Commissioner Füle and PM Gruevski.

I know there are still three more rounds planned already. There’s a timetable for that and will continue because this is really something tangible they are getting. All the issues that they are going to discuss, i.e. the chapters 23 and 24, will be positively affecting the process of formal accession negotiations.

Going back to your question, I’m only supporting Macedonia’s faster progress towards the EU. The last resolution of the European Parliament is speaking about the starting of the accession negotiations “without further delay“, which was also recommended by the Commissioner and upheld very much by the EP with an overwhelming majority, and I think they really deserve that.

It is also in the interest of Greece. I am aware of the sophisticated arguments that Greek colleagues are using; although some of them are good arguments, they are artificially created. I believe that we should really look to the future.

The problem is more complicated because of the situation in which Greece is finding itself- without a proper government, with a unity government which is going to be there only temporarily thus making it more difficult to adopt substantial, serious decisions. Let’s hope that with a new government, Greece is going to take this issue seriously- and the same we expect from Macedonia.

Macedonia has a very strong position given the verdict of the International Court of Justice, which supported its case. Given all these facts together, there is no logic to continue this kind of situation related to the name issue.

MN: As Chairman of the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo and AFET member, you have been very active on latest developments regarding Macedonia. What should Macedonia do in practical terms? How should Macedonia plan its future strategy?

EK: I think they should be broadminded in accepting compromise proposals for the name, with a geographical reference like Upper or Northern, some adjective maybe… I don’t want to criticize Macedonia; I am trying to help them as much as possible. But, if there is a Greek proposal, Macedonia should be broadminded in trying to accept it. However, first they have to receive a proposal!

Kosovo

MN: Can Kosovo’s EU perspective be envisaged? What kind of dialogue should the EU have with Kosovo, as several MS still didn’t recognize it as a state entity?

I think that Kosovo is developing well. We are all glad that agreements on the IBM (Integrated Border Management) and the representation of Kosovo in regional relations were concluded. It is important to implement and materialize them, because it will be still a very difficult environment (considering, for instance, the situation in the North of Kosovo, the upcoming elections in Serbia etc., which complicate the general state of affairs). It will be a test for both how ready they are to implement the agreed solution on these two issues.

Nobody, not even those five “non-recognizers” – to call them in short – are against the European future of Kosovo. A couple of days ago, we had a meeting with Baroness Ashton and she informed us about all these issues.  When questioned why she is not more active against the five “non-recognizers”, Lady Ashton answered that this is a decision that each MS is responsible to take.

She mentioned that when these issues are being discussed – concerning the feasibility studies, the visa liberalization for Kosovo – all these five countries do not create any problems, on the contrary, they are very cooperative.

I think that the main message for Kosovo is that they should fulfill the necessary criteria for Europe and, sooner or later, when they’ll show concrete results and progress, everybody will recognize that.

I’m from one of those countries who didn’t recognize the independence of Kosovo and I know that at least my country is very closely developing relations with Kosovo and Serbia, and concrete results by both partners will affect Slovakia much more serious than any resolution of the European Parliament containing an appeal to recognize Kosovo.

Electoral Trends

MN: Elections will soon take place in Serbia. Considering the latest achievements in the EU dialogue, will the current government pass the electoral test? Did you notice any other political force or leader emerge as a credible counter-candidate for Tadić?

EK: It’s very tricky to bet on results. It is really difficult to give any credible tips on how the elections are going to end and what kind of government we shall see in Serbia after the elections.

The most important thing is that the new government of Serbia will continue to work towards Europe, as it was done by the previous government.  President Tadić proved several times that he really managed to go forward with the European agenda. We know him: he has been tested and we know what to expect from him.

The elections are the real expression of the will of the population. I could only hope that all the work undergone so far by Serbia’s government concerning the reforms, the fulfillment of the criteria will not be wasted. We all hope that the country will continue along the same way after the elections.

Russia: A Cause for Concern?

MN: In view of Tadić’s recent statements regarding Serbia’s close ties with Russia, how do you see their future relationship with Russia and the ex-Soviet satellites? Should this be a cause of concern for the EU?

EK: It’s not the only case when Serbia’s relations with Russia are being mentioned. We know that there are some politicians from smaller parties now who even say that Russia is the alternative to the EU. The way Serbia develops its relations with Russia will be followed much more closely. Serbia is a candidate country and we should follow this aspect very carefully and they should be aware of that. We expect them to behave as an EU candidate country.

There’s nothing wrong in developing relations with Russia. We all have relations with Russia, economic, trade-related relations, etc. All Western democracies, including the United States, have relations with Russia. Basically, the issues surrounding the future direction of the country should be very clear and in that respect any movement towards Russia will be followed and assessed.

MN: How do you see Serbia’s relations with Turkey, as the latter has invested a lot in the Western Balkans?

EK: I have very definite opinion about that. Turkey is a very big, important country. Its influence in the Western Balkans is growing, they are very active. I think that the European Union should try to find as many ways of cooperation with Turkey as possible and not to compete, block or try to stop the relations or influence of Turkey. This kind of approach will be good for Turkey, for the Western Balkans and for the EU. No unnecessary competition or blocking would be wise, so let’s cooperate!

BiH

MN: Bosnia and Herzegovina made small steps towards political normality and resuming a constructive dialogue with the EU. Will this compromise last? How will Republika Sprska adapt to these new political developments?

EK: We are again all glad that, after a very long time, it was possible to achieve these small steps. They are concrete steps and if they manage to find a solution to the Sejdić and Finci v. BiH case, then the Stabilization and Association Agreement can be signed; there were two conditions, they fulfilled them, but it is disturbing that the constitutional change challenge remained.

Solving this would be another concrete example that they can do things together. I would say that I’m a little bit optimistic about the continuity of this positive trend in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think that the European Commission is doing a really good job for the country.

The dialogue on the reform of the judiciary in Republika Sprska, which was suggested by Commissioner Füle, has started and these discussions are going to continue. I think that they will change into a more cooperative approach to Republika Sprska and Milorad Dodić.

Sometimes, the bad image of Republika Sprska is not reflecting the reality and it’s being exaggerated and treated with a negative approach. The politicians of the country used enough time to come to the conclusion that there are no reasonable arguments not to go ahead faster on the European way.

MN: As a final question, do you believe that the presence of the international community and EU in the region has an added value? Which countries have benefited more of this presence?

EK: The presence of the international community and the European Union is definitely positive. It is even becoming more pragmatic, in order to help with the necessary things for the countries in the region. The dialogue in the last couple of years has been intensifying. Within the European institutions there is an understanding about what is really necessary for those countries in order to help them to get closer to the EU.

I wouldn’t like to single out which countries were helped or assisted more compared to others. I think that the situation must be analyzed in each individual country. The European institutions, especially the Parliament, are always supporting enlargement and gently pushing the Commission to move faster.

For each country the Commission is trying to introduce some – maybe even new – instruments to support the faster integration: the high level accession dialogue with Macedonia, the structured dialogue on the reform of the judiciary with Republika Sprska etc. I know that the Commission is very active in Albania concerning the overcoming of the stalemate that took a very long time, and there are some positive signs from Tirana as well. Regarding BiH, much more attention has been given to the country by Baroness Ashton and Commissioner Füle. The same goes for Serbia.

In conclusion, I think that the activities of the European institutions are helpful for the countries in the region and I am glad that this is the case. I am very much supporting the future inclusion of the whole region in the European Union. Without this we cannot speak about Europe being one and whole.

Although local and international media have depicted last month’s Islamic protest and church attacks in Macedonia as manifestations of inter-ethnic and inter-religious polarity, these events actually derived from internal power struggles between the country’s diverse Muslim parties and interests, Balkanalysis.com can report. However, the inevitable impulse towards mediation and political settlement may make the incorrect depiction a fait accompli in future.

At the same time, new information corroborating seven years of field research indicates that this internal turmoil is allowing rhetorical, financial and logistical opportunities for a small number of people who are truly dangerous, and directed from outside the country. Events and processes scheduled for the next couple years, such as a national census and local elections may act as triggers for further infighting, protests and divisiveness.

What Happened in Brief

In late January 2012, Macedonia received brief but intense international media attention following an unprecedented large-scale Islamic protest in the southwestern lake town of Struga, and attacks against churches, other structures and people. The official cause of the protest, allegedly, was the Vevchani Carnival’s caricature of Islam. (Eye-opening videos of the protest, in which Islamic and Albanian flags were waved amid cries of Allahu Akbar, abound on Youtube). However, the international media coverage of it all was simplistic and lacked proper context- thus improving neither reader understanding nor national and regional security.

First, it should be said that as of February 2012 there is no reason why Macedonia’s different local populations should not be able to co-exist as they always have, and without any outside interference. Unfortunately, it appears that various interests representing different centers of power – some visible, others less so – would like to use the recent incidents for their own varied yet overlapping goals. And, despite that the political leaders have now agreed to work together, these goals do not involve the greater public good.

Odd Timing, a Lack of Spontaneity, and the Media

Until this year, no one had ever seriously criticized the Vevchani Carnival, held every 13-14 January for roughly the last 1,400 years. The statistical chances of two protests from different parties, occurring within nine days of each other would thus seem rather low. Yet this is what happened, when first the Greek government in a note, and then the local Islamist community in force, lashed out at the carnival, on 19 January and 28 January respectively.

The carnival is a major winter cultural event in Macedonia that is regularly attended by international ambassadors and officials as well as by tourists local and foreign. Development in this eternally peaceful Macedonian Orthodox village has been supported by the US, EU and World Bank, and it has a thriving sustainable tourism industry and welcoming atmosphere. Those who showed up at the later Struga protests (Muslims from that town and the villages neighboring Vevchani) have known all their lives that the carnival and the Vevchani locals are entirely harmless; anyone who knows both populations immediately understands this. Yet the protesters have very disingenuously sought to portray things otherwise.

An awareness of what is customary in local reality possibly can explain why the Muslims did not react immediately. When Muslim rioting and protests have occurred in Europe, as after the Paris youth deaths or after the Danish cartoon controversy, it has usually been fairly spontaneous. The recent protest in Macedonia was anything but- it was well-organized, supported by local officials, and took place a full two weeks after the carnival. It was another example of the truism that in Macedonia, nothing happens by accident.

What did transpire in the interim, however, was an indignant protest statement on 19 January from the Greek foreign ministry regarding the same carnival, which had featured a ceremonial funeral float for the country- a gag targeting Greece’s current financial problems, and not symbolic of any real ill-will against the country. And when examined more closely, it seems clear that the skit was actually designed for internal consumption, as it included a mock Orthodox death notice that listed among the supposed bereaved, Macedonian public figures who have over the years been identified with a “pro-Greek” position.

The rationale behind the official Greek reaction can be understood in two ways. First, it offered an easy opportunity to temporarily distract Greek citizens from worsening internal political and economic problems. Second, Greek diplomacy is currently concerned that the negative (albeit merely symbolic) ruling of the International Court of Justice in December 2011 will result in increasing international pressure to resolve the name issue. Therefore, the Greek MFA is seeking to take advantage of any trifling matter that can be depicted as a sign of ‘provocation’ from the Macedonian side. Athens thus seems to think it can stall for time or endlessly defer the process through pointing out alleged cases of Macedonian ‘provocations.’

It is also possible that diplomats in Athens were unnecessarily angered because they are unfamiliar with the event, and thus took it much more seriously than they should have. For example, burning all the masks at the end of the carnival is a traditional ritual, not a singular provocation against anyone or anything.

It is very interesting to note that there was no initial uproar from Muslims after the carnival, and the usual news wraps-ups devoting most of their attention to the Greek sketch. It was only on 28 January that Muslims in the Struga area took to the street to protest. In a telephone interview for Skopje’s Sitel TV conducted a few days after the protest, Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko evaded the question when asked why the Muslims did not seem to have a problem with Vevchani until after the Greeks did. However, the interviewer did not push the issue and this vital question has still not been answered.

A question that still remains, therefore, is whether the Muslims acted completely independently, or played off of the Greek involvement with a ‘copycat’ – but much more serious – protest, or if the two sides could even have been coordinating activities due to a common interest in obstructing the country’s progress. We have absolutely no opinion or information regarding this possibility, and only mention it because it is one of the hypothetical possibilities being weighed now by investigators. However, it does seem plausible that without the Greek protest over Vevchani (an example of the more aggressive Greek policy since the Hague ruling), the Muslims would not have gotten the idea to protest. It is thus possible that this whole incident was entirely avoidable and in a way accidental.

Macedonian officials were further concerned by very damaging and inaccurate news articles, such as an Associated Press piece of 30 January and another of 31 January that soon had around 160 Google News citations, including several US newspapers and even TV networks. Like a similar Reuters report on the same day, these articles depicted the incident as an inter-ethnic one, mentioning the 2001 conflict in the same breath as recent events. The articles take for granted a direct causal connection between the carnival and the protest (although as we have seen, it was not spontaneous) and also make erroneous claims regarding the demographic breakdown and population figures for Muslims in the country.

These articles also provide a distorted selection of quotes from local Muslim leaders and politicians, ignoring those characterized by rough language, and instead transmitting the more politically-correct comments out of the vast totality of commentary made for local media during the crisis period. The second piece provocatively states that Muslims “accuse the [Christian] majority of stoking hatred,” ominously adding that “ethnic tension has been simmering in this small Balkan country since the end of an armed rebellion in 2001.”

These implications portray the whole issue in a completely incorrect light and exaggerate the supposed demise of inter-ethnic relations. It is unclear whether this sensationalism can be attributed to bad writing or to an uninformed editor. But it cannot be due to an uninformed author, as at least the AP work was written by longtime local correspondent Konstantin Testorides, who is presumably better informed about local realities. (Mr Testorides did not reply to an email request for clarification from Balkanalysis.com).

Motive: Political and Economic Control of Struga

Understanding the recent events in Macedonia depends on an understanding of the unique structure of local power- something that the international media has ignored completely. The public figure most associated with supporting the Islamic protest is Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko, who gave permission for it to be held and who has been very vocal in this and in several previous cases of supporting Islamist projects. Although Reuters quoted Merko as saying “we should avoid further incidents and not be influenced by politics,” the Struga mayor has from the beginning sought to manipulate the incidents to increase his political prestige.

This representative of the ethnic Albanian governing coalition member, DUI, has been elected twice, in 2005 and 2009, but it is believed that he will not be the party’s candidate in the 2013 election. This may be partly because he angered party leader Ali Ahmeti by publicly threatening to run with rival ethnic Albanian parties in the 2009 race. Since leading the NLA paramilitary force in 2001, Ahmeti has kept an ironclad grip on party power. For party members, it is better to remain on his good side.

Although a lot can happen between now and the elections, informed sources believe that DUI’s next mayoral candidate will be Artim Labunisti, a doctor and descendent of an established, ‘old’ Struga family. They expect that he could even have crossover appeal with Macedonian voters, something that would be highly unusual for an Albanian party’s candidate.

A local from the Macedonian Muslim village of Labunista praised this idea, telling Balkanalysis.com that the doctor’s grandfather, Murat Labunisti, “was highly respected in our village, and had studied in France.” (In fact, the name of the village’s elementary school has been changed from ‘Josip Broz Tito’ to ‘Murat Labunisti’). Other sources indicate that this candidate was discussed favorably in an internal DUI meeting approximately three months ago.

In the purely politico-economic sense, Struga today is somewhat reminiscent of Atlantic City in the 1920s. Being the mayor of a large municipality such as this puts an individual and party in a position to hand out jobs, favors, contracts and tenders- and, of course, a chance to profit from this interaction. Controlling this machinery not only means controlling cash; it also means the ability to continue deferring non-financial personal debts accrued to a varied group of ‘creditors.’ If one is the mayor of such a place, it is thus best to stay so for as long as possible.

Presuming that Merko will not run with DUI, he could conceivably reach out to another Albanian party, such as the New Democracy of Imer Selmani, or run as an independent. However, running against a strongly supported local candidate would jack up the price of votes from local businessmen, and significant collateral would have to be brought to the table in order to buy them. At very least we can say that the political situation in Struga is fluid.

There is more, however. Despite two attempts, the Struga municipal council could not pass the 2012 budget by the end of December; according to law, this means that the Ministry of Finance in Skopje must intervene. To avoid endangering the fate of this 13.5-million euro jackpot, the budget was illegally passed on January 5. The decision was backed by 14 councilors from DUI and the Macedonian parties SDSM and LDP. Four councilors from the ethnic Albanian DPA voted against it, while nine councilors from the Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE and the (Macedonian Muslim) PEI abstained.

Local representatives of VMRO-DPMNE, which is ironically ruling on the national level in coalition with DUI, announced that they would go to the Constitutional Court over the issue. Legally, if the budget is not adopted by the end of the year, they argued, “the next step would be a decision on temporary financing, which entails the dissolution of the Council,” reported Alfa TV on January 15.

This infighting between political parties, and the tacit issue of control of substantial funds, may not have been directly related to Mayor Merko’s decision to support an Islamic show of force on the city square three weeks later. But it is definitely worth bearing in mind as we consider the bigger picture. It is interesting to note that, while minority Albanian parties relish in playing a kingmaker role on the national level, in ethnically-mixed areas led by the Albanian parties, like Struga, Macedonian parties apparently get to serve a similar function.

More Politics: from Local to National and Back Again

Still another source of local political influence is the above-mentioned PEI (Party for a European Future) of businessman Fiat Canoski, a wealthy Macedonian Muslim who emerged from impoverished origins in the village of Oktisi. Today Canoski’s most visible business is the private FON University, headquartered in Skopje but with branches throughout the country (including in Struga, where it competes with a university linked to Merko). The university’s faculty includes professors from a wide spectrum of political and business life and, like other universities in the country, has thus become an inherent part of Macedonia’s system of dispersed power through patronage.

The PEI was created in May 2006, partly in reaction to years of Albanian chauvinism, but also because Canoski cleverly saw that he could control the swing vote between the Macedonian and Albanian parties. After the post-war decentralization project had annexed the largely Macedonian Muslim-populated villages to Struga, some locals became irritated when the Albanian parties (particularly DUI) went on an aggressive campaign to convince the Macedonian-speaking Muslims that they were ‘really’ Albanian, on account of their shared Islamic faith. Merko and DUI had won the historic race for Struga largely thanks to the Macedonian Muslim vote, and the creation of a rival party run by this crucial population only increased their leverage in economic and political life on the local level.

However, after summer 2006 elections marred by gunfights between rival Albanian parties DUI and DPA, the PEI joined the coalition of the victorious VMRO-DPMNE, which included DPA (even though it had won less of the ethnic Albanian popular vote than the DUI). The PEI remained in coalition after the early elections of 2008, when DPA was replaced by DUI. After Canoski ran unsuccessfully for mayor of Struga in 2009, his party blamed Merko and DUI for falsifying results. A very complex and interesting situation thus emerged in which the Macedonian Muslim population splintered as well between persons employed by DUI/Merko on the local level and PEI devotees. This was worsened by the 2011 parliamentary elections. After secret negotiations in Struga, it was decided that Canoski’s party would no longer be part of the renewed VMNRO-DPMNE and DUI coalition.

According to several sources, the news devastated Canoski, who had already entered into a fateful familial ‘marriage alliance’ between his son and a daughter of Velija Ramkovski, another (equally non-observant) Macedonian Muslim who, near the end of 2010, had been arrested for alleged tax evasion. Ramkovski’s business empire included the influential A1 TV, which had once supported the government, but in recent years sharply turned against it. Ramkovski had also shown political ambitions, running unsuccessfully for parliament at one point, trying to appeal largely to farmers. True to form, he used his television station to advertise his campaign, and some ethnic Albanian media half-jokingly began referring to him as the “Macedonian Berlusconi.”

The cross-connections continue on the national level. The most vocal supporter of the Ramkovski cause since November 2010 has been the opposition Macedonian party SDSM, which gambled on making a ‘media freedom’ issue out of this cause célèbre. However, despite an undeniably sympathetic international diplomatic corps, the SDSM stratagem failed to destabilize the government, as Ramkovski had managed to make enough business and political enemies to preclude such a possibility.

However, the war of attrition did in some way affect ethnic and religious politics. A1’s constant assault on the government helped send a few more MPs to the SDSM in summer 2011 elections; and this trimming of the margins increased DUI’s leverage in the new post-election cabinet.

Thus, in a historic appointment that was lauded by all the foreign ambassadors, Macedonia got its first ethnic Albanian defense minister, Fatmir Besimi from DUI- exactly 10 years after the war started by his party’s founders. Of course, average Albanians were somewhat unimpressed, as the defense ministry is no longer one of the most powerful. Indeed, the army is used most often for supporting NATO missions- despite that Macedonia is still being kept out of NATO due to Greek objections to the country’s name.

Creating a New Ethnicity

A side effect of all these events is that they have accelerated developments and trends within the Muslim parties’ public discourse. In 2011, a luxury residential building that PEI leader Canoski was building in Skopje was ordered to be toppled for allegedly violating its approved design parameters. (Although on 5 January Canoski did announce that he would rebuild it). Then, at an organized event in Skopje on September 28, 2011, Canoski appeared with leaders of a Struga-based NGO, Rumelija, to pronounce the existence of a new ethnicity in Macedonia: the Torbeshi, whose rights his party pledged to champion.

The term ‘Torbeshi’ has generally been used negatively, referring to the Macedonian Muslims’ conversion from Christianity under Ottoman times; the implication is that they were people whose core beliefs could be bought for whatever one put in their bag (torba).

This term has always been controversial and has never been universally accepted by Macedonian Muslims, such as the Gorani, who inhabit northwestern Macedonia and southern Kosovo. The penetration of DUI into Macedonian Muslim villages and the presence of Turkey in municipalities such as Plasnica and Centar Zupa (another legacy of the controversial decentralization) have also fractured unity among Macedonian Muslims, and have led many to identify themselves with these groups.

The manifesto that PEI created for the event, the Torbeshka Deklaracija, strongly resembles in linguistic tone and substance similar manifestos made by all other Balkan ethnic groups in the past 150 years. The book offers new explanation of the word Torbeshi, cleansing it of its negative connotations: rather than being a synonym for opportunism, the word simply referred to people who were known for traveling with a bag.

From the historical view, we find in the text that this new-old ethnicity has medieval origins in the Bogomils – the heretical Christian sect that was most popular in parts of Bulgaria and Bosnia- something that is interesting but that cannot be proven. Other, possibly more controversial claims are that the founder of modern Egypt and Turkish leader Attaturk had Torbeshi roots. At the same time, one can find voluminous histories written by other Macedonian Muslims who passionately claim that they are in fact Macedonians. The situation is opaque, confused, and highly prone to politicization.

The desire to create a new nationality does not rest merely on sentimental attraction, however. The book also calls for the Macedonian Constitution to include the Torbeshi as a constituent people. Arguments that head in this direction, particularly since the ethnic Albanian uprising of 2001, tend to suggest participation in a quota-based system of benefits and entitlements. Most importantly for the present article is that the major element used to give coherence to this new identity – one that is depicted as being separate from the Albanian, Macedonian, Bosnian or Turkish ones – is Islam.

Politics, Ethnicity and Religion: the Creation of a Hybrid Population in Struga

The situation in Struga is not, as has been reported, a simple ‘Christian Macedonian vs. Muslim Albanian’ scenario, a sort of 2001-redux with a stronger religious element. What it actually demonstrates are intra-ethnic and intra-religious tensions- not inter-ethnic or inter-religious ones. In fact, the rivalry, discourse and cooperation of the diverse Muslim interests in Macedonia has increasingly involved manipulating the one thing they have in common, religion.

Essentially, the intermingling between the Albanian DUI and the Macedonian Muslims is creating a unique hybrid population in Macedonia. It is a very unique mix: a party created along fierce Albanian nationalist lines, with a tough paramilitary core and Muslim culture, alongside a traditionally peaceful but extremely conservative rural population characterized by arranged marriages and diaspora labor, and identifying itself strongly with Islam.

Every political party in the world seeks to expand its base and to seize more power. In order for DUI to do this in southwestern Macedonia, it has had to do two things. First, it has had to take on as local leaders and members of its local branches persons who are authoritative and respected in their own villages- meaning that some of the most devout Islamists in the Albanian party are not (or, were not) actually Albanian. Secondly, as the phrase goes, in politics you have to give the people what they want: for a population that identifies itself primarily with Islam, the campaigning and overtures to locals have also been Islam-oriented.

Thus a sort of Islamic arms race has ensued in the last seven years, with local officials from both the Albanian and Macedonian Muslim sides competing to donate money, building permissions, jobs, scholarships and more for persons, structures and activities connected with Islam, while the rhetoric is growing increasingly strong as well. And the muftis are absolutely delighted with this largesse.

The symbiotic relationship is being used by local leaders looking to prolong their grip on power, who have been taking increasingly bold stands. A prominent example was the controversial case of a 2010 mosque project in the depopulated Vlach village of Gorna Belica, above the Muslim villages in the Jablanica range. Although the government said the construction was illegal, Mayor Merko pushed hard for this Wahhabi-initiated project. According to Nova Makedonija on November 9, 2010, he stated that “no one is allowed to touch God’s house.” Before the mosque, the summer houses in the village had been used as impromptu prayer and Islamic teaching centers by Muslim youth groups.

Political Interference, Intelligence Failures, Bad Publicity and the Role of Institutions

Examined within this fuller context, the recent events in and around Struga become more striking. The protest was organized together with Struga mufti Ferhat Polisi, and received the blessings of Mayor Merko – currently of DUI, but with an uncertain future – and involved the participation of Macedonian Muslims (including members of PEI). Ethnic Albanians also participated, and some intelligence sources even place members of the Tirana-based ultranationalist Red and Black Alliance as having been in Struga at the time.

This group, which advocates a Greater (or, ‘Natural’) Albania arose in opposition to Albania’s national census, claiming that the Greek minority was being artificially enhanced. It is led by Kreshnik Spahiu who, according to Balkan Insight, recently resigned after having served for four years as deputy chairman of Albania’s High Council of Justice, because of an investigation into his activism. This group is believed to have strong connections with the Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) nationalist party in Kosovo, which grew out of a similar youth protest movement. The Alliance also has local affiliates in Macedonia, including key supporters within DUI and DPA. Thus Macedonian investigators of the protest are trying to distinguish between the possible participants, and whether they may have had different motives.

It should be noted that due to the sudden politicization of the whole issue – which now involves the participation of the OSCE and the major embassies – a criminal investigation will likely be sacrificed for a political solution that would guarantee ‘stability.’ This is absolutely the worst result but as said above, it is not accidental. It was guaranteed the moment that the local and international media depicted the whole issue as an inter-ethnic incident. It therefore became necessary to give equal hearing to ‘both sides of the story,’ so that people who had advocated for violence were given moral equivalence with people guilty of making a joke.

Regardless of how the issue is politically ‘solved,’ investigators will be obliged to proceed professionally. There are still many unanswered questions, regarding violent attacks against churches and the replacing of a Macedonian flag with an Islamic one in Struga. The lack of answers to these important questions has frustrated many. Some senior officials are concerned that the police suffered an intelligence failure in the two weeks between the carnival and the protest.

Apparently, there had been rumblings in the mosques and a plan was being drawn up, but nothing was done to prepare for it. It was decided that the protest would be held on Saturday (market day in Struga, ensuring maximum turnout from the nearby villages), and announced in the mosques beforehand. And, somewhere in the villages, someone was able to print and bind (not just photocopy) dozens of copies of violent, 12-page propaganda pamphlets specifically referencing the Vevchani Carnival. These revealing texts were not mentioned in the media.

There are different possible reasons for the failure to predict, contain or foil the protest. Internal relocation of intelligence officers knowledgeable about Islamist groups, prioritization issues, and simply other distractions may have been to blame. It should not be forgotten that during the month of January the government was intensively preparing for two much-hyped and high-profile events: the five-day visit of a large British investment delegation headed by Prince Michael of Kent (from 28 January through 1 February), along with a six-city tour of Turkey by Macedonian officials, seeking to drum up investment interest from this major ally (from 29 January-3 February).

These two events most certainly required significant and time-consuming police work on protocol, logistics and security cooperation that would easily have taken precedence over any goings-on in a backwater like Struga, especially if nothing out of the ordinary was expected to happen there. Thus, if there ever was a moment in which someone could secretly gin up trouble for a distracted Macedonian leadership, and embarrass it at the same time, that moment would have certainly been January 2012.

Absolutely the last thing President Ivanov needed during an official British visit was to be taking time to entreat Reis Rexhepi to get his followers to cool down, and it was certainly not ideal timing either for Macedonian officials to have to deal with charges of ‘Islamophobia’ in the world media while trying to build friendships in Muslim Turkey. Indeed, just when the government had expected to be highlighting foreign investment interest before two key allies, world media was instead showing churches in flames and angry Muslim mobs protesting with Arabic flags in the street. Not auspicious.

Despite the temptation to proceed more quickly, senior officials are letting the police investigation run its course. This is due to respect for the legal responsibilities institutions have in such cases, and undoubtedly it is also a nod to the ‘confidence-building’ measures that accompany every similarly politicized case in Macedonia in which the ‘international community’ gets involved. Yet the hands-off approach is also due to the need to oversee what the final outcome will be: the actual information trail may end up telling a more interesting story than could be imagined, in terms of the sources, information and disinformation, and the way the whole system is used to arrive at an intelligence result.

Knowledge Gaps and the Hidden Hand: Tablighi Jamaat in Macedonia

Perhaps we can help speed things up a bit, however. In October of 2011, a meeting was held in Labunista by visiting members of the global Islamist missionary group Tablighi Jamaat, according to secret intelligence obtained by Balkanalysis.com. All of the men were Macedonian Muslims originally from the Struga villages, but living in Switzerland and Austria. One of the topics of discussion was future collaboration between the sect’s Macedonian and Bosnian Muslims (at home and in the West) and the chiefly Albanian tekfiri militant wing, based in Skopje, which is believed to have contacts with Bosniak tekfiri groups in Austria.

Although plenty of ‘famous’ local Islamists have been mentioned in local media, the leader of this wing is known to very few, and the structure itself remains elusive. Senior officials attest that this is largely due to the age bracket of the membership (17-25) and the many operational difficulties that arise due to this serious limiting factor.

Barring a major and chronic security problem in the host country, the US tends to use institutional partnership and delegate non-essential intelligence tasks. The host country is usually eager to participate, but may not have the requisite capabilities. This becomes problematic when a target is too elusive but a report needs to be submitted anyway, since no one likes to admit failure or weakness. Since not even the US invests in cross-checking data in this particular theater of activity, no one is the wiser if the information turns out to be flawed or insufficient.

For two examples, American officials did not know about crucial splits within the tekfiri and Salafi leadership until six weeks ago, and they did not know at all about the attempted creation of a weapons training center by local Muslims in Labunista in summer 2010 (or that the counter-intelligence service was investigating its possible links to Albanian militants) until almost a year later. Both facts are very interesting for several reasons. And while a careful reading of the leaked US cables discussing Islamism in Macedonia indicates knowledge of some of the most prominent Islamic personalities in the country, it does not indicate awareness of those figures who are truly dangerous. For that you have to do your own research rather than delegate it.

The new details regarding the solidification of Tablighi involvement in Macedonia are highly interesting, as it indicates increasing cooperation between young extremists from a multi-ethnic background. Balkanalysis.com, probably alone among world media, has for the past six or seven years focused on the activities of the missionary group in Macedonia. Yet only now can the fuller story be told.

According to senior officials, the movement’s roots in the country date back to 1993. At that time, a (still active) ethnic Albanian from Tetovo, who had been living in Scandinavia in the late 1980s, became involved with the missionary group in Pakistan and developed good connections among Tablighi members, there and in Afghanistan. (It should be remembered that at that time, the “Arab-Afghan” jihadis were being redirected from the former war against the Soviets in Afghanistan to the war against Serbs and Croats in Bosnia). This figure provided the key local connections for Albanian and Macedonian Muslims who had gone to study in the Middle East. It is estimated that 30-50 Macedonian nationals were thus trained in the mujahideen camps in Pakistan due to this connection.

Since the late 1990s, Tablighi members have been showing up in the Struga villages. A Labunista local tells Balkanalysis.com that they made a favorable impression on him at first sight, back in 1999. “They were very nice, and you could see they were real believers and educated,” he said of the white-robed missionaries, who said they were in the village to see local friends who had studied Islamic theology in the Middle East. “They were cool- they didn’t care about anything [political].”

The Tablighi movement started in 1926 in Pakistan as a reaction to Hindu missionary activity, and has its European headquarters in England, from where much of its outreach to the Balkans has come. The group’s plans to build a ‘mega-mosque’ there have caused great controversy. Despite claiming to be entirely apolitical, this broad network of believers has drawn significant attention from various governments, as several individuals connected to high-profile terrorist plots or attempted plots have been known to frequent Tablighi mosques.

There is a vast literature on the movement, so there is no need to go into great detail here. But it is interesting to note a couple of defining features of the movement. Like missionary groups from other religions, it tends to target socially disadvantaged or excluded populations; in Macedonia, this includes not only the long-suffering Macedonian Muslims but impoverished Roma populations, as well as non-Muslims with mental or drug-related problems. The second interesting feature, and the one most relevant to the current investigation, is the group’s apolitical identity, and decentralized, secretive and network-based character. In ‘emerging market’ countries like Macedonia, the movement can keep a low profile, never being associated directly with anything, but often being involved behind the scenes by manipulating the pre-existing internal conflicts and political infighting within Muslim communities for their own ends. It cannot be proven that this is what occurred in Struga in January 2012, but it would fit the profile.

In 2005, the Macedonian counterintelligence service, DBK (now UBK) discovered that Pakistani and British Pakistani missionaries had recently visited the Struga villages, which indicates that the pattern was still going on at that time. Local Muslims told Balkanalysis.com a few months later that a small number of young believers would go for periods of 3-4 months to Pakistan and Afghanistan for spiritual training. From the latest information, it now appears that Macedonian Muslims in the diaspora (chiefly Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Slovenia) have assumed more prominent decision-making roles due to their connections and activities, meaning that direct cooperation with such foreigners is no longer necessary.

An intense but limited period of foreign intelligence activity occurred from 2004-2006 in the Struga villages, first from the French and then Italian intelligence services. Official secret documents obtained by Balkanalysis.com thereafter indicate that diaspora members of these villages were very much engaged with some of the most radical Islamist leaders in Bosnia and Austria, helping to organize their visits in the area. Arab, Albanian and other foreign Islamist leaders were also included in this network.

A bit earlier, in the spring of 2005, Macedonian military intelligence had received a proposal from  a third friendly nation, to insert a trusted person from a Middle Eastern country into the villages. Although it would have been a ‘clean’ operation, with no possible connection to anyone in the country, the plan was ultimately rejected as too risky by an organization not accustomed to managing such missions.

By 2006 and early 2007, the Italians had grown so concerned that they expelled two Macedonian citizens and briefly detained over 30 more on suspicions of radicalism. (Another local Muslim who knew some of these men, however, told us that this must have been a mistake as they were not radical. Since this is a standard reply in similarly tight-knit communities, it is impossible to confirm or deny the claim).

The recent information is so concerning because until now, no one could have expected Macedonian Muslims to be violent: conservative yes, but violent- never. The strategic significance of the recent protests may thus have more dangerous implications than the 2001 inter-ethnic war: for in Struga, Macedonians of different religions were presented as enemies for the first time. We can only hope that this is not a sign of things to come, but with the continuous infighting for votes and influence within Macedonia’s diverse Muslim populations being manifested in increasingly vociferous displays of political Islam, the divisions could worsen over time.

One of the most likely triggers will be the national census: deferred twice in 2011 due to ethnic Albanian objections, it will bring all of the simmering disputes over ethnicity and the internally-debated identity of Muslims to the surface. The next round of elections in Macedonia in 2013 will also bring with them opportunities for new incidents. It seems likely that non-Muslims will continue to be caught in the crossfire of the internal war between Muslim parties, in those areas of the country where the rivalries are strongest.

Brief Chronology

*Note: this timeline is not meant to imply any connection of events. It simply lists the order of recent contemporaneous events that are mentioned in this article or that may have relevance to it, in reverse chronological order.

February 11, 2012: The mayors of Struga and Vevchani hold a five-hour meeting, coming out after it with a joint declaration of future friendship and cooperation

February 1, 2012: Macedonian-language graffiti found on mosque in southern city of Bitola reading ‘death to Shiptarite (Albanians)’- perpetrators unknown, but some media pointed out that the unusual combination of Cyrillic and Latin letters in text might point at a non-native speaker

January 31, 2012: Church of Sveti Gjorgi in the Tetovo-area village of Mala Recica – headquarters of the incumbent ethnic Albanian DUI party – suffers arson attack by unknown persons; local Albanians help to put out fire

January 31, 2012: Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov brings together Orthodox and Muslim chief leaders, his personal good relations with the Reis, Sulejman Rexhepi, result in a strong call for peace and restraint from Rexhepi

January 30 and 31, 2012: The Associated Press and Reuters publish three damaging articles that soon spread to major US newspapers and websites, sensationalizing the events and placing them within an ‘inter-ethnic’ context evocative of the 2001 war

January 30, 2012: The Church of Sveti Nikola in Muslim-majority village of Labunista is hit with a nighttime arson attack; police find no suspects, and some local Muslims suggest that ‘Christians’ were somehow responsible

January 29, 2012: Macedonian government officials leave for a six-day trip to Turkey to highlight investment opportunities for Turkish businessmen in Macedonia

January 28, 2012: A large delegation of British businessmen led by Prince Michael of Kent arrives on a five-day visit, to meet high-level officials and learn about investment opportunities throughout the country

January 28, 2012: A minibus containing Vevchani passengers is stoned by angry Muslims in Struga; a cross on a church in Macedonian Muslim-majority village of Labunista is attacked, as is the village’s medical center, reportedly because people from Vevchani are employed there

January 28, 2012: A large and pre-organized Islamic protest occurs in Struga; Muslim masses chanting Allahu Akbar wave Albanian and Islamic flags, and condemn the Vevchani Carnival for insulting Islam

January 24, 2012: Committee of Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament adopts a draft resolution, following topics raised by a British MEP supportive of Macedonia; resolution proposes implementation of the second phase of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, and references the International Court of Justice’s verdict of 5 December, which was critical of Greece

January 19, 2012: The Greek government lodges an official protest note against the Vevchani Carnival over its satire of Greece’s financial woes

January 15, 2012: Alfa TV from Skopje reports that the Struga VMRO-DPMNE branch will seek Constitutional Court input over the municipal budget, illegally passed 10 days earlier by Mayor Merko’s supporters

January 13-14, 2011: The annual Vevchani Carnival is held in the Macedonian Orthodox village of the same name; local and international media discuss it in a positive light soon after

January 13, 2011: The Macedonian government announces that an important British trade delegation led by Prince Michael of Kent will visit the country in two weeks’ time

January 5, 2012: Struga’s council illegally passes a 13.5-million euro 2012 municipal budget, five days after the deadline, with Mayor Merko’s DUI party getting extra votes from SDSM councilors; VMRO-DPMNE and PEI local councilors abstain from the voting

December 31, 2011: Deadline expires for Struga to pass the 2012 budget. By law, the Ministry of Finance in Skopje must intercede- meaning monetary control would leave the hands of local leaders

December 5, 2011: The International Court of Justice rules on a case brought by Macedonia, upholding Macedonian charges that Greece violated the 1995 Interim Accord by blocking Macedonia’s NATO membership at Bucharest in 2008; although the ruling does not specify punitive measures, the Greek MFA instructs its diplomats that they should follow a more aggressive policy of criticizing alleged Macedonian violations of the Accord, as frequently as possible

November 11, 2011: The Skopje-based British Business Group organizes Macedonian leaders’ investment presentation in London before potential investors, along with a meeting with Prince Michael of Kent, amid plans to arrange a British visit to Macedonia; the event would be followed in mid-December by two unofficial scouting trips to Skopje from an investor representative

November, 2011: DUI leaders reportedly decide that incumbent Struga Mayor Ramiz Merko will not be allowed to run on their ticket in the 2013 local elections; local doctor Artim Labunisti is suggested as a possible candidate

October, 2011: A meeting is held in Labunista by local Muslims visiting from the diaspora, members of the global Islamist missionary group Tablighi Jamaat; one of the discussion topics of discussion is future collaboration with a Skopje-based tekfir militant group

September 28, 2011: At a public event in Skopje hosted by Rumelija, an NGO close to Macedonian Muslim businessman and MP Fiat Canoski, the ‘Torbeshi Declaration’ is announced, voicing support for the creation of a new national ethnic group, the Muslim Torbeshi. Printed estimates are that between 100,00-150,000 citizens could be thus identified, which would make the Torbeshi the second-largest national minority

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A brief analysis of a once top-secret CIA report, written in 1949, provides a glimpse of US understanding of communist Yugoslavia at a pivotal moment in the Cold War- after Tito’s famous break with Stalin the year before.

In the broad sweep of contemporary history, the views expressed therein can be assessed favorably as indicating an accurate judgment of the situation at the time. The report (.PDF), dated June 20, 1949 is titled Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability to Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949. Unfortunately, there are no references to sources, methods or US capabilities that went into crafting the report. However, those seeking in-depth reading on the American views at the time and larger context can read Coleman Armstrong Mehta’s lengthy thesis (.PDF) on CIA assessments from 1948-1950.

The 12-page estimate highlights seven key findings regarding Yugoslav security, economy and political stability. It was published for internal use only and addressed to the intelligence heads of the army, navy and air force, and the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Special Assistance to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, the Director of Security and Intelligence of the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the CIA’s Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. In true Cold War style, there is also a ‘burn after reading’ suggestion.

Security Findings

Tito’s break with Stalin occurred in summer 1948 and was due in part to dissimilar views on the nature of a socialist state, doubts on the transposability of certain Soviet economic models, and not least, the proud Tito’s disinterest in looking to Moscow as the seat of supreme leadership.

In this light, after the break and chill in relations (which would not thaw until Stalin’s death), there were concerns about how the Soviet strongman might act towards Yugoslavia. The most important short-term conclusion of this report was that the Soviets, and satellite states, were not expected by the CIA to engage in any direct military action against Yugoslavia during 1949, but that “border incidents against Yugoslavia will probably increase.”

The CIA also expected “a more hostile, but probably ineffective propaganda campaign” against the Yugoslavs, and added by stating that “no large-scale guerrilla warfare” would be likely to occur in 1949. In conclusion, the CIA expected that Tito’s regime “would meet no insurmountable obstacle during 1949.”

This conclusion is reached following an examination of the perceived three courses of action Stalin could follow, should he wish to topple the new Yugoslav regime. These were: use of satellite states in direct war; a Soviet invasion; or support for “organized guerrilla warfare,” which would constitute a “war of attrition.” The third was considered the most serious possibility, though still not likely.

In this context, it is striking to note that the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s occurred with wars that began with (or featured aspects of) guerrilla fighting, particularly in the case of Kosovo. It was only the uncharted waters of the new, post-Cold War environment that made option one (in the modern example, aerial bombardment by NATO) even conceivable.

The possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia by neighboring states was dismissed by the CIA, as the Yugoslav Army was “the second-largest and second-most competent in Eastern Europe,” and could “defeat any combination of bordering satellite armies.” And the assessment also noted that a direct Soviet invasion would not succeed; “prior to any direct attack upon it, the Yugoslav Army would probably have from thirty to sixty days to regroup in the mountainous region south of the Sava and Danube rivers, thus preventing its annihilation by the USSR forces.” It was probably the intention of the authors to imply that Soviet commanders understood this as well, though it is not explicitly stated.

In 1949, the CIA estimated that Stalin would not support guerrilla fighting as it would be taken as a declaration of war by Tito. Quite interestingly, the report suggests that Tito would take “vigorous counter-measures” against any threat to his rule, including sponsoring guerrilla wars in Albania and Bulgaria, which would create “seriously difficulties, and especially for the “insecure Hoxha Government in Albania.”

Tito’s capability to withstand less dramatic, but equally hostile efforts from the Soviets was also considered in the report. The Soviets could hypothetically “infiltrate” small anti-Tito “bands” in neighboring states in order to “disseminate anti-Tito propaganda, enlist recruits, incite local insurrections, perform acts of sabotage, disrupt communications, and prepare the way for assassination of Tito and his aides.”

To this robust list of alleged capabilities, it was posited that arms, supplies and propaganda leaflets could also be dropped in by Soviet aircraft. Much from this menu of sabotage and guerrilla activities listed had in fact been used by Tito’s Partisans successfully against the Nazis.

Perceptions of the Communist Threat: Coloring Views of Macedonian Secessionism

Looking back, probably the most important theme conveyed in the CIA report seems to be that in 1949 the US understood all resistance or possible resistance to Tito in some relationship to Communism- even the ethnic and nationalist threats. This view would color the US perception of these groups for decades, leaving it from the 1960s to experts from ostensibly unrelated fields, like sociologists (something that today would be called ‘interdisciplinary’ input) to identify the ethnic and nationalist character of the opposition to Tito, that would outlive the dictator and re-emerge in dramatic fashion a decade after his death.

Rather, the 1949 report states that the primary danger of minorities in Yugoslavia was that these groups could allegedly be propagandized by the Soviets, “to overthrow the Tito regime in return for promised preferential treatment.” In other words, secessionist nationalist would somehow prefer client-state status under hardcore communism with a nationalist veneer to Tito’s light communism, which also allowed a symbolic amount of nationalism.

The once top-secret report notes that “certain minority groups” in Macedonia, Montenegro and other Yugoslav republics might aspire to overthrow Tito’s regime. The Macedonians are specifically named, though others, such as Albanians, Croats and Serbs, are not. In this light, one of the more intriguing elements of the report is the estimate that “the proclamation of an ‘independent Macedonia’ would have little success in gaining the support of any significant number of Yugoslav Macedonians.”

The CIA concluded, however, that such a proclamation was unlikely to be made, in the immediate future at least. It does not expand on where such a proclamation could be expected to come from, even if it did- from an internal Macedonian group, or from one in Bulgaria or Greece. The report also does not detail why Macedonians would not support the creation of an independent state, which leaves in doubt the reason for why it was seen as unlikely.

The CIA report also comes to a chillingly prescient conclusion: “if seriously threatened at any time in 1949 by the formation of a Macedonian state, Tito could engineer mass deportations of unreliable Macedonians to other areas in Yugoslavia. He could also cut off Yugoslav aid to the Greek guerrillas and might even come to some understanding with the Greek National Government.” The final two of these policies did occur in precise form as predicted, while the first, ‘mass deportations,’ was actually being done by the Greek Right, and accepted by Tito.

Looking at the situation through the lens of the communist threat also reveals why the CIA report dismissed any major support for a Macedonian state, from another point of view: it assessed that the Soviets’ image had been losing credibility in general among the Yugoslav public. It implies that if the nationalist-based secessionist threat was indeed fundamentally inspired by communists, perception damage suffered by the latter would adversely affect enthusiasm for the former. Of course, the historic relationship between national liberation and communist parties in this case is very complex and contentious.

The 1949 report notes that “since the beginning of the year, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have increased in hostility.” Yet despite extensive Cominform propaganda campaigns, the Soviet rhetoric was perceived as appearing more “hollow and ineffective” to the Yugoslav audience. In fact, it was argued that Soviet propaganda, ironically enough, had the effect of “rallying the extensive non-Communist population to Tito’s camp.”

Internal Communist Threats to Tito, and Secret Police Countermeasures

The CIA report estimates that, along with nationalist secessionists, Tito was also confronted with a potential threat from approximately 8,000 enemies within (2 percent of the party’s total membership)- most of whom, once again, exemplified the ‘Communist threat.’ These were comprised of: “old-line” Communists with experience in Russia, sympathetic to the Kremlin; Partisan fighters dissatisfied with their post-war rewards/jobs; and Communists who had fled (Royalist) Yugoslavia as dissident refugees before WWII, and who were repatriated after it, and thus had not participated in the Partisan resistance and lacked any loyalty to Tito.

The report goes on to reveal that such disenchanted elements “are allegedly attempting to organize active opposition to the Tito regime by concentrating on wresting control away from the army.” Tito’s countermeasures were said to include retiring disloyal persons “as a group” and “replacing known unreliables with young stalwarts.”

Intriguingly, the report adds that the UDB secret service played an instrumental role in preserving Tito’s authority, and that it in fact used some of the same tactics that were perceived as potentially being used against the regime. UDB members were “considered loyal and will provide stern counteraction to any campaign to infiltrate Cominform agents extensively, perpetrate widespread acts of sabotage, foment disturbances or insurrections, or organize assassination plots.”

In regards to any Soviet attempts to use proxy guerrilla groups from satellite states, the report also confirmed that “Tito can thwart the potential threat of such groups through his security police.” Throughout the Cold War, the UDB would gain a fearsome reputation for its efficient activities against perceived enemies of the state, both at home and in the extensive Yugoslav diaspora communities around the world.

Economic Issues and Military Assistance Projections

The CIA report, which concludes with a detailed assessment of the Yugoslav economy, also drew conclusions regarding Yugoslav economy and trade, noting that while the Soviets might entertain a strategy to force the collapse of the Yugoslav economy, any such attempt would fail due to “prevailing internal and external conditions.”

The report assessed that in any case the Soviets would not apply economic sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1949, as this would adversely affect their own imports of “strategic metals” from the country. In any case, sanctions would not “impair seriously” Yugoslavia’s general economy even if they were applied. The report noted that in the three years since 1946, Yugoslavia’s economy was rebuilding, and that grain production had approached pre-war levels, as had that of steel, non-ferrous metals, electricity, textiles and timber, with food shortages expected to be alleviated during 1949.

More negatively, however, Tito’s ‘Five-Year Plan’ for industrial expansion was viewed as “unrealistic,” with a lack of capital, Western technical assistance and trained workers hindering it, while gold reserves were low. An appetite for Western loans was noted as something expected to be increasing in the coming period.

Finally, should an emergency situation arise due to Soviet military attack, the report concludes that Western aid might be required. However, any military equipment for Yugoslavia would ideally be better provided by the West, the CIA believed, than “the means for production of such equipment.” It is not clear from this whether the report’s authors were making a case for efficiency, or outlining a long-term goal of preventing a competitive Yugoslav arms manufacture industry.

A Portrait of Tito

The CIA report also discusses Tito as a leader, though indirectly and partially. It is revealing in that its estimation of him was essentially accurate and held true far beyond 1949- thus showing that the aspiring leader would not significantly change his leadership style or chosen overarching Cold War role into the future. This assessment no doubt helped the Americans to predict the limitations of behavior and outlook of what would turn out to be an autocratic rule for decades, until Tito’s death in 1980.

In his life, Tito would become known for craftily playing “both sides,” trying to highlight his country’s advantages of being somewhere between both East and West, which would mature into the non-aligned movement. According to the 1949 report, he is “confident of Western determination to maintain him as a constant irritant to the Kremlin.”

This status, it was argued, meant also that Tito could feel assured of continued economic assistance from the West and steady imports of needed Western industrial goods. However, “following a policy of self-protection and economic self-interest, he will continue to trade with the East in certain strategic items,” it was added.

On 14 December, a one-day business forum organized by the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club, and featuring officials from Macedonia and other countries was held in Skopje. Along with presentations from some of the organizers and visitors, the event allowed an opportunity for businessmen to discuss their offerings together in more detail.

Although Macedonian-Israeli business ties are already developed and date back to the 1990s, the event marked the first formal meeting of its type in Skopje. There are hopes that it will become an annual event, while Macedonian participation in similar events in Israel is also expected.

The event was opened by a speech from Dejan Dejanov, President of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club. Also speaking for the organization was Gjiorgji Jancevski, President of the club’s Supervisory Board. Looking back on the progress made in the past year, he noted that over 50 businesses and individuals have joined the group since last March, when the club was founded. Adding that it and its activities are “based on the traditionally good relations between Macedonia and Israel,” Jancevski concluded that the event showed “that our endeavors have been successful.”

Speaking for the Macedonian government, Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Pesevski pointed out the high number of guests who packed one hall in Skopje’s trade fair, SAEM, calling it “an unexpected and positive surprise.” Characterizing the economic development of Israel as “a model for Macedonia and other countries in the region,” Pesevski pointed out that Macedonia has established “very good relations with MASHAV [the Israeli Agency for International Cooperation and Development], stating that “a MASHAV representative will be permanently present” in Skopje. Until now, the most visible such organizations in Macedonia have been the American USAID followed by various smaller EU bodies, and Turkey’s TIKA.

Indeed, later in the event, MASHAV’s Director for International Projects and Public Private Partnerships, Efraim Ben Matityahu spoke, as did Daniel Werner of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The latter gave an overview of MASHAV products in Macedonia, while Ben Matityahu discussed MASHAV’s general activities and its background.

The roots of the development agency can be traced back to the foresight of David Ben Gurion, “who sought to share Israel’s experience in the developing world.” The director also noted that so far only Israel and South Korea have been recognized for making the transition from the classification of developing to developed country. Further, the cooperation of MASHAV with local companies is meant to “push the private sector to a higher level.”

Of course, despite best intentions, this economic cooperation will not always be easy. During the present period marked by global financial crisis and uncertainty surrounding the future of the euro, Macedonia has thus far been largely spared. However, the effects are expected to be felt during the coming year and the more the country becomes open to foreign trade, the more it will be susceptible in future to fluctuations in global markets.

In this light, Vice Prime-Minister Pesevski noted his government’s awareness of the present economic climate, and stated that it is prepared for challenges stemming from the “disturbing situation in Europe,” adding however that “in such times, opportunities can arise.”

Macedonian businessmen do see plenty of opportunities in working more closely with Israel, which may also have something to share about surviving the crisis. The Israeli Ambassador to Macedonia, David Cohen provided an overview of the Israeli economy, noting that Israel posted 4.7% economic growth in the first quarter of 2011, recovering quickly from the crisis due to the robust involvement of the state. Ambassador Cohen professed his sentiment that “we all work to extend our multilateral trade relations” and that Macedonia and Israel “share a common set of values and interests.”

Israel is well known for its high-tech industry. Learning from the “Israeli success story” here was specified by speakers such as Ognen Orovcanec, President of the Assembly of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club, who specified high-tech as one of the areas for future growth in Macedonian-Israeli cooperation.

In this light, Ambassador Cohen also pointed to the high level of R&D investment in Israel by many multinationals. Despite strong competition from Asian countries, many firms have established themselves in Israel, including Microsoft, IBM, Cisco and Dell. Being first in the world in R& investment, stated Cohen, “has made Israel a center of technology and innovation.” A result of this, he continued, is that many technological breakthroughs have been made by Israeli companies- like VOIP technology, which enables people to speak over the Internet.

Along with Macedonian and Israeli speakers, the business forum also included presentations from the president of the Kosovo Business Alliance, Agim Shahini, Enver Ferizaj of Albania’s KASH, and the vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce of Republika Srpska, Mihajlo Vidica.

These foreign guest presenters stressed business-friendly reforms made by their governments, such as favorable tax regimes, low-cost labor forces, infrastructure upgrades and opportunities in specific sectors such as agriculture. These points were also made in the Macedonian context by Ekaterina Dimitrovska, Executive Director of the Macedonian-Israeli Business Club. Dimitrovska also pointed out Macedonia’s recent track record as an internationally-recognized leading reformer, as well as its impending development of industrial zones around the country.

The major sponsor of the December 14^th business forum was Crimson Capital, a finance corporation headquartered in Prague with offices in Skopje and Pristina. Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, Managing Director Michael Gold discussed the company and its operations, explaining that it lends “to businesses which have a hard time getting money from the banks,” such as promising start-ups, women-owned companies and so on. For Mr Gold, small and developing countries such as Macedonian and Kosovo present unique opportunities for finance. For example, while 3% of these countries’ loan portfolios go to agriculture, “approximately 30% of our loans are dedicated to agriculture”- an area that will become more important as issues of food security grow more acute in the future.

According to Mr Gold, “the best opportunity for Macedonia to cooperate with Israeli companies is in terms of new technology and methods to improve productivity and quality, as well as marketing.” Pointing out that “a lot of companies are good at producing,” the Crimson Capital managing director noted however that “they don’t always know how to sell what they produce… the experience of Israel, which was challenged by a need to find markets, will be valuable for Macedonia.”

There are bound to be some positive surprises in the future, noted Mr Gold, who expressed his confidence, indicating that Macedonian companies have a lot of opportunities ahead. In general, “their capabilities are a lot greater than outsiders know- and greater than even they themselves know!”

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A career diplomat, Robert Kirnag holds a PhD in International Relations from Slovakia’s University of Matej Bel at Banská Bystrica (2008), and an MA in International Relations from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (1993), specializing in the Benelux countries. For the past two years, he has served as Chargé d´Affaires at the Slovak Embassy in Macedonia, before that serving for five years in several director capacities at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, on EU-related issues. In prior diplomatic postings, Dr Kirnag has also served as Slovakia’s Deputy Head of Mission in South Africa, and as Deputy Head of Mission in Sweden.

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Common Understandings

Chris Deliso: Thanks for speaking with us today. Let me begin by asking, how do you assess the general dynamic between Macedonia and Slovakia, and their peoples?

Robert Kirnag: I have seen that Macedonians feel at home in Slovakia in some way, and that Slovaks also understand the Macedonians… there are many links between the two peoples.

CD: Because of the similarities in language?

RK: Yes, because of language, but also because of our common past- the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia being one important event. In fact, some of those great diplomat-missionaries lived in Slovakia longer than in Macedonia. They still are very much respected-

CD: And they are celebrated too in Slovakia?

RK: Yes, the 5^th of July is the national holiday of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia. Also, since the languages are very much related, for most Macedonians it takes only 3-4 months to start speaking Slovak. It is also true for Slovaks who come to Macedonia.

‘Our message to the Macedonians is that reforms pay,’ says Dr Kirnag.

I thus think that we should use the opportunity, the momentum of visa liberalization to stimulate tourism from Macedonia to Slovakia, and vice versa. For the Macedonians, it was a very important achievement to get the visa waived- it was an expression of freedom. And they rightfully deserved it.

I made a comment at that time that we in Slovakia should use this momentum to attract Macedonian tourists; they already know the places [to visit in Slovakia], and perhaps more importantly, they do not discriminate- now they have the opportunity to travel, for them to go to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Germany or France and so on is no different than to choose Slovakia. I would also say that the Slovaks, with our proximity, similar language and culture, are very sympathetic to the Macedonians.

Education Opportunities for Macedonians in Slovakia

For example, I suggested making a promotion to get the students of secondary schools in Macedonia, who at the end of the year typically go on a class trip abroad- so why not to Slovakia?

CD: Yes, indeed-

RK: This can also be combined with the promotion of opportunities to study in Slovakia. Macedonians can now study in Slovakia under the same conditions as Slovak citizens. This privilege is given only to five countries outside of the European Union.

CD: Really. To which?

RK: To those countries which are close to us, like Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia & Herzegovina, which have similar languages, and their citizens can very easily integrate into the society and improve the competitiveness of our universities. We are happy for them to stay in Slovakia and contribute to the growth of our economies. And, when they return back to Macedonia I think that they would be ideal candidates for business development between our two countries.

CD: Do you have any statistics on the number of Macedonian students studying in Slovakia?

RK: Yes. We give them scholarships, last year it was about 10 who received scholarships, a couple of different kinds. We offer this year four full scholarships in different subjects, including one-year preparation in language and preparation for examinations. Then for those students who would like to study in Slovakia free of charge, these conditions are necessary of course- unless they study subjects in English they have to prepare themselves to learn the language. In Slovakia, they are in the EU, and they receive a European diploma recognized everywhere in the EU.

CD: Are these scholarships open to students of all disciplines, or only certain ones?

RK: We encourage them to study at the best state universities, and especially in the technical sciences. Some are then offered to stay at our universities as assistants, or continue their doctoral studies.

CD: When did you start this program?

RK: The program involving the five countries to support the competitiveness of Slovakian universities started two years ago. In January of last year, the law on universities was changed and Macedonians were given this right to study.

CD: Has this introduction of foreign students on scholarships had any negative effects for Slovak students who might thus miss a place, or not have enough spots available?

RK: Aha, this is not in question- according to European statistics, Slovak students make up the highest percentage of students studying abroad from any EU country. So for us it is pretty normal to go abroad to study.

Furthermore, when we entered the European Union we received the opportunity to work abroad in other member states, so for our young people it’s pretty common after university to spend a year or two abroad. Britain and Ireland are the most important destinations. The [Slovak] people who work there are well aware that they work for less than the local citizens. But they have benefits- they learn the language, get professional experience in a Western environment, save some money, and they return back to Slovakia. They then have bigger chances to find work that corresponds to their qualifications at home.

CD: Right, I see.

RK: So, these two countries, Britain and Ireland, they were not afraid of foreign laborers just after our entry into the EU- on the contrary, they saw an opportunity and it paid off.

Slovakia’s Post-Reforms Investment Gains

CD: So, on another subject, that of economic ties, I wonder if you could mention a little about Slovakian economic promotion in Macedonia- and vice versa. Is there similar potential between the two in this area as well?

RK: Macedonia is a small country with an open economy. Slovakia is also a small country, with 5.4 million inhabitants. The country is still very much dependent on foreign investments, and is very often cited here in Macedonia as an example of transformation and attraction of investment. Macedonia would like to repeat this success story. We need to share our experience, good and bad- perhaps those mistakes we made will be more important for Macedonia, because I am convinced that Macedonians have their right to make new mistakes-

CD: (Laughing)

RK: And not just to repeat ours. Slovakia was in a difficult position in the middle of the 90s and we were able to get out of that situation. Nobody trusted Slovakia at that time; we were excluded from the mainstream of European integration. And we realized that that is not the way to achieve successful development for the people. So, we transformed our banking system, we changed our labor laws, and we introduced reforms in other areas. And our entry into the OECD, though now it is not very often mentioned, was a very important school for us in the process of approximation with the EU then NATO and the EU.

The reforms were quite painful but our message to the Macedonians is that reforms pay. And the sooner and the shorter the period of reforms, the better.

CD: Indeed. But what did they lead to for you, in terms of attracting economic interest? What is the result that a country like Macedonia could look forward to?

RK: Slovakia became a champion in attracting foreign investment in two areas: first, the automotive industry, with the huge investment of Volkswagen in Bratislava, and later the investment of Kia in Žilina, in northern Slovakia. And then came BSA/Peugeot, 50km away. We started producing hybrids, and upgraded the production of sophisticated parts, for example, a new Kia factory that was opened also produces engines for Hyundai in the Czech Republic. So you see many more small companies that give work to people, three times more jobs have been created around the automotive industry alone.

Also, we now produce LCD monitors and computers, with investments made by Sony and Samsung. In fact, last year, for the first time, VW was not the biggest exporter from Slovakia- first place was taken by Samsung, after they opened factories in Slovakia for the EU market. By investing in our country, they have free access to the EU market, a huge market of over 500 million customers. Now, the latest investment was made by AU Optronics-

CD: AU what?

RK: Exactly, that was my reaction- what is this? Then I learned that it is number two in the world in LCD screen production, a huge company. They opened a factory in Slovakia for 2,000 employees, something that is very important for us. We still have unemployment at 13 percent. But the dynamics of our employment could be interesting for Macedonia, where there is still over 30 percent unemployment. In Slovakia, we used to have 20 percent, but we were able to push it back in a couple of years to just 8 percent. Now, because of the global crisis it has gone back up to 13 percent-

CD: But that is not really Slovakia’s fault, after all-

RK: Of course, but still, the crisis is also a great opportunity, it’s not a punishment. It affects all, of course, but those who are clever can use it to invest. It is also an opportunity, in this sense.

CD: So, in the current crisis is there someone who has invested in Slovakia that you see as an example in this light?

RK: Yes, in addition to the ones mentioned, for example, IBM has opened a huge center in Bratislava. So in order to sustain this level of investment we must do two things: first, to sophisticate the investment and then to invest abroad. Slovakian businessmen should start investing abroad- this is the next step.

Economic Promotion and Investment between Macedonia and Slovakia

CD: So, on that note, can you give details about Slovak investments here in Macedonia, or elsewhere in the Balkans? I know the government here is keen on economic promotion and has made an effort in this area in different parts of the world. In your experience here, in the last couple years, have you seen results in this area?

RK: I’m doing my best to convince more Slovak companies to come and see what is available. And we are now organizing a visit by the Macedonian Minister of Economy, Valjon Saracini, to Slovakia. We will give the minister and the Macedonian Investment Agency the chance to present opportunities for investment in Macedonia.

CD: When will this be?

RK: At the end of this month. And there are many opportunities- for one example in September, the Slovak company EMTest got the contract for the electronic system of public transport in Skopje. This involves the coordination of public transport, buses and electronic tickets. This is a contract for 10 years, and they will take 4.9 percent of all the income from the tickets. It adds up to about 5 million euros.

CD: How did this deal come about?

RK: They competed on a public tender and the Slovak company was the winner. This company is from Žilina, not from Bratislava- it’s also very important for us that the companies from the smaller cities in Slovakia get these opportunities.

CD: And how were they made aware of the tender in the first place? Did you inform them of this, or were they working on their own?

RK: We regularly send all the business opportunities to Slovakia, tenders and whatever is of interest from the Macedonia side. We encourage trade, and in both directions. After all, there is no true cooperation if it is not going in both directions.

Also, the trade volume issue between Slovakia and Macedonia is quite interesting. In 2007, the volume was just 25 million euros, with a huge deficit on the Macedonian side. But things have changed, have developed in the past four years; statistics for this year show 44 million euros, in the first half of 2011 alone. So, we will reach trade of up to 90 million euros, probably 100 million by the end of the year. Essentially, therefore, we managed to triple the trade volume in just four years-

CD: And Macedonia’s trade deficit is now?

RK: Well, that’s the interesting thing- this year, for the first time, in the first 6 months Macedonia has registered a trade surplus… we actually are importing more from Macedonia than they are from us.

CD: Wow! In what sectors, particularly?

RK: The structure of trade copies the structure of our industries. So also the statistics differ between Slovakia and Macedonia. We often sit down with our Macedonian friends and compare our statistics and analyze why it is that [they differ]. So, of number one importance is our household machinery, washing machines, refrigerators. Then cars- and note that not all of the sales of Slovak cars are reflected in statistics, as they go through corporate channels in other countries.

So, if you make a calculation, for example, of all the cars registered in Macedonia, you will see that they account for much more than in statistics. For example, all the Porsche Cayennes, all the Audi Q7s, all the [Volkswagen] Touraegs are produced in Bratislava. And there is no other factory producing Kia CEE’D, Pro CEE’D and Sportage models, which are sold here. Also, some small Peugeots and Citroens are from Slovakia.

CD: It seems then that the Slovakian business presence is much bigger than would appear… interesting.

RK: Then, in addition TV sets and LCD monitors are being imported into Macedonia from Slovakia. Products of chemical industry are also being imported. Another trade item that we could not explain, but that is registered in Macedonian statistics, is electricity- shown as the number-one commodity.

CD: Electricity? How is this?

RK: I don’t know. If we are selling electricity, it is pure money. We don’t have an explanation, I cannot imagine it comes from Slovakia, so I imagine a Slovakian company is involved somewhere, and this shows the sophistication of these operations.

CD: Very interesting. Also, it is well known that Macedonians have for a long time had close economic and personal connections with your neighbors in the Czech Republic. Have you benefited in getting more interest for your businesses due to this proximity to the Czech Republic, or common contacts?

RK: Yes, we are very much interdependent- we divided the country, but the economies stayed interconnected. Many Czechs own businesses in Slovakia, and Slovak businessmen are active there too. So there are many Slovak interests which are channeled to Macedonia through the Czech Republic. For example, take tractors-

CD: Tractors!

RK: Yes, tractors- the Zetor tractor is quite famous on the Eastern European market. It’s being imported by a trader in Bitola. The owners of this company are Slovak, even though it is located in the Czech Republic. So, this is an example that illustrates these connections.

CD: So, on the other side of things, what products are being imported from Macedonia into Slovakia?

RK: We import from Macedonia metallurgy products and, more and more, wine and fruits and vegetables. Now, 90 percent of fruits and vegetables in Slovakia are being sold through the supermarket chains. And once you enter in this, it is a huge market. So Macedonians have got this opportunity and should seek to capitalize on it. We can and do import early fruits and vegetables- Macedonia has a one-month advantage on Central Europe, due to the wonderful climate here. And in turn we can invest here in food processing. We can export our machinery for food processing and packaging.

CD: Can these agricultural products be imported without any difficulties, considering Macedonia is not in the EU?

RK: Yes, they have a privileged position since they have signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement and they can, for example, export wine up to a certain limit without duties. But unfortunately for Macedonians – though good for our customers – they mostly do it in tanks, meaning they bring the bulk wine to Slovakia, where our wine companies bottle it and triple the prices.

CD: The same old problem. But do they at least write it as a product of Macedonia? In Yugoslav times they did have that name branding problem, when it would be sold as ‘Yugoslav’ wine or even ‘Slovenian’ wine if it was bottled there.

RK: Yes, Macedonia is always written as the country of origin. But referring to the branding issue, this is the problem of Macedonia. I’m still convinced that Macedonians do not sell their wine abroad- they simply get rid of their wine abroad.

CD: [Laughing] ‘Get rid of it’- I love it.

RK: Indeed, it’s much more convenient if you have someone who will do the marketing and sell it and make a brand for himself, while you just produce wine in bulk, but that is not the way to succeed in Europe. And the rules are changing. The Macedonians must be very clever, and follow the developments in the European Union. But they already have their own brand- Macedonian wine is still very much known and respected in countries in Central Europe, so Macedonians have a good opportunity.

CD: Yes, but also one aspect of the ‘name problem’ with Greece is rights to use the name ‘Macedonia’ in products, like wine-

RK: The Macedonian-Greek problem is a bilateral one, and sometimes it’s used to cover up other things. Or, as a pretense to not do other things. I don’t buy this argument that Macedonians-

CD: You mean, they shouldn’t use it as an excuse-

RK: Well, Macedonians must follow their own interests, and these interests must first be determined. And they should be stubborn in their pursuit of commercial interests, for example, the branding of their wine. Really, the placement of their good wine is not dependent on the issue of the name [with Greece]. Of course, there are sensitive aspects in that. But this is not a way that one can really give to explain why the wine is not being sold in bottles, but in bulk. Come on!

Diplomatic Priorities for Slovakia in the Western Balkans

CD: Turning to Slovakia’s diplomatic role in Macedonia, are there any difficulties or challenges you have to face, or is everything pretty much straightforward here?

RK: Macedonia is part of the priority region for Slovakia. It is a constant priority of Slovak foreign policy, as also expressed within the Visegrád Group, made up of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. This is a very influential group in the EU; the voting rights of these four countries are equal to the voting rights of Germany and France combined.

The Western Balkans has always been a priority region for Slovakian cooperation, and one of my priorities here at the embassy in Skopje is to help provide political support and practical support for Macedonia on its way to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

CD: Why is it important for Slovakia to support Macedonia and the Western Balkans in general to enter the EU?

RK: I recently read an interesting book about Munich in 1938. In it, the author, a historian, said that now the question is not whether Britain would support Czechoslovakia at that time in order to not become a victim of Germany; but whether the Czechs and Slovaks would be willing to fight for Britain once it got into the war.

Following this logic, it is not a question for us of whether we should support Macedonia to become a member state- and we should even aim higher, aim further. I think our question is not whether Macedonia should be a member, but when. We need Macedonia to be our partner, our ally in the European Union- we have similar interests, we are small countries which have a lot in common in our history, mentality and languages. They can be an important future partner in the EU. That is my main motivation for our activities.

CD: What sort of ‘practical support’ are you giving on the diplomatic level?

RK: We are offering practical support for sharing our experience of the reforms Macedonia needs to carry out, and we offer many bilateral projects so that they can learn from our experience with the EU.

In fact, just this month, a group of deputies from the Macedonian Commission for European Affairs visited Slovakia, to learn what will happen in the process of accession; still, however, that is not the goal, the goal is to prepare for the efficient functioning of being a member state in the EU. They always talk about ‘getting a date’- OK, but the negotiations themselves are just an exercise for what will come once you enter the EU.

CD: So in other words, they should be more prepared for the long term-

RK: Yes, the goal is to aim at that, to pursue the interests of Macedonia as part of the European family. And if they aim higher, if they create structures now, it will be better… but if they don’t do it right, that structure will not help them; on the contrary it will drag them down.

CD: I see. So they must be ready for both negotiations and membership.

RK: Yes- in no time, it will become a very intense process. When we in Slovakia negotiated with the EU over membership we thought, ‘okay, this is very tough, but when we enter the EU it will be like heaven, and we will all be living much better and having Western standards.’ But suddenly, we entered the EU- and there was no Mercedes in the garage.

CD: (Laughing) I see.

RK: So also the expectations must be realistic and you must look at your interests and purpose. For five years I was working as Director for European Affairs at our foreign ministry. And I have been telling [the Macedonians] this message because we made mistakes, and the Macedonians can do much better than we did. They ask me whether I think they are prepared for negotiations, and I tell them they are much more prepared than Slovakia was at the time.

Nevertheless, the European Commission is also much more experienced now- so the conditions are still the same, but the Commission is more sophisticated. We had 31 chapters to close, they have 35. There are mistakes that the EU will not repeat, when they set the date of entry, as was an issue with Romania and Bulgaria; and they will be very careful with the official statistics, as they were later disappointed with what Greece did before entering the eurozone. So, we can say that the Commission doesn’t make mistakes- it simply gains experience. And some of this will certainly reflect on the negotiating process for Macedonia.

A Question of Principle: the Kosovo Issue

CD: Very interesting. On another topic, but slightly more complex: Slovakia doesn’t recognize Kosovo, whereas Macedonia and important powers in the EU and US do. So in your daily work here, do you come up against pressure from lobbyists or diplomats pushing Slovakia to recognize Kosovo as part of a general policy on the Western Balkans?

RK: No, for us it’s the question of principle- Slovakia does not recognize unilateral declarations of independence because we simply think it is not in accordance with international law. A minority in a country which has a mother state, in this case Albania, does not have the right of secession. I know the situation is very complicated, and in the recent troubled history of Kosovo, you see there are no saints… mistakes and tragic things happened on both sides.

Our state policy is not against the people of Kosovo. On the contrary we have historical ties with Kosovo. We would like to cooperate and develop relations, economic, cultural, and educational. But please, do not push us on those things that are a matter of principle. For us, if Belgrade and Pristina find a solution, that would be the legal way how to arrange things. That’s why we welcome this dialogue, but it’s a bumpy road, isn’t it?

If this independence would be sanctioned by an international authority, that would be a different story. But look, if one criticizes Slovakia for its principled stance on Kosovo, then how can you explain [our stand on] Georgia? For us, there was no need to change the position we applied in Kosovo to the situation in Georgia [regarding South Ossetia].

But I am a positive-thinking person. I’m always looking at the opportunities. Macedonia could serve as a gateway for the markets of Kosovo and Albania. I’m telling this to Macedonian businessmen, and to ours, though we are aware that many prejudices still exist. So it is not clear to me whether our businessmen are more afraid of the region, or of their own abilities to succeed on the local market. And the explanation is very simple- a lack of information. If you don’t know something about the region, then you don’t go or invest there.

You can have everything perfect on paper, have the advertising, but if the investor feels something is wrong, the reality is perhaps not as important as perception.

Diverging Diplomatic Approaches

CD: Alright, then on that note how do you feel about the role of Slovakia, and how it is perceived here diplomatically?

RK: We look for common activities that can bring us together as small countries, whether they be investments, tourism, or other cooperation. We want to focus on priorities. In any specific case, we go about it by asking the Macedonians, is this a priority for you? We offer them our cooperation but ask that they tell us whether it is a priority for them. From our side, we have certain expertise and resources we are willing to share- if it is welcomed by the other side, we will.

So it is a different approach compared to certain other EU member states, which sometimes come here with recipes ready-made, with ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ proposals and so on. But Slovaks have a perhaps more subtle understanding of the situation, and are thus not perceived as being tutors.

CD: Well, this is the problem as far as I’ve seen it over the years, and you may have a respective advantage in being a small country, not having to be in the ‘power-broker’ position of the EU representative, the US, OSCE or even Britain- you can take a more friendly role. To not have the pressure of coming to deliver a message, a ‘do-this-or-else’ ultimatum-

RK: Well, we do, we do deliver a message, as part of the European Union… but we do it in a friendly way, saying, ‘look we were in this situation, we know how it feels to be in your place. You make your own decisions- we are not pushing, but feel free to look at what we did in a similar situation. If you want to follow our approach, we are ready help.’ That is how we try to present it.

Other Multinational Opportunities: Tourism and Caving

CD:  In terms of tourism cooperation, which I understand you would like to increase, do you have any specific areas in mind? You know how in Western Europe the monastic tourism, for example, became popular in places like Scotland and France after the DaVinci Code was published. Do you have anything similar, say, on the Cyril and Methodius/Byzantine heritage angle that would appeal to Macedonians and Slovaks alike?

RK: Yes, we are very interested in tourism as one area with great potential. Interestingly enough, in Slovakia you cannot sleep in monasteries- here in Macedonia you can. So that is something that would be interesting for our people when coming here. Perhaps one great missed opportunity was the 100-year anniversary of Mother Teresa’s birth- of course if Macedonia had succeeded in getting the Pope to visit, thousands of Slovaks would have come by bus- of course, that would be a big procedure requiring several years of preparation. But in general monastery and historical tourism have strong appeal.

We also see opportunities in ecological and alternative tourism. In Slovakia, we have mountains and forests, but of a different kind, more like in Berovo. We also have spas, a long tradition of spa towns and this could be interesting for Macedonians, as could trips through the old cities and castles of Slovakia. We are known for our castles standing high on the hills.

Another area that might be developed is skiing and snowboarding- we have attractive resorts for these in Slovakia. And, an interesting area for nature tourism is caves. You have around 1000 caves in Slovakia.

CD: And in Macedonia- many caves here too.

RK: Yes indeed. And in fact, did you know, the deepest cave here was discovered by Slovaks, five years ago-

CD: Where is this?

RK: It’s located on [the central mountain massif of] Karadzica, and is now called Slovachka Jama. It is only 40km or so from Skopje. Our speleologists come every year, and every year they go deeper and deeper. So far, this cave has been explored down to 650 meters deep!

CD: And they still didn’t reach the bottom?

RK: No, it us still under investigation, but it will probably never be opened to the public, being 2200m above sea level. But what is interesting that they have discovered is cave lakes, and long streams of water. That could be very important for water supply, and even for the city of Skopje. The mountains seem to be circulating these waters through the channels and caves over long distances. In fact, when specialists made an analysis of the water found in the caves, and in a source somewhere close to [mountain peak] Solunska Glava, they found that it seems to be the same water.

So we would like to be part of this story. Slovakia and another four or five countries are very active here in speleology. I suggested that we issue a joint stamp- why not? The Belgians, French, Italians and Macedonians, these country are active here in caving.

Slovakia’s Projects in Macedonia

CD: Very nice. So, on a broader scale, what kind of projects is Slovakia doing in Macedonia?

RK: We have several different projects going on. One concentrates on developing analytic skills for media and civil society groups, and covers Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, with a budget of 120,000 euros. Slovak experts will train the analysts and journalists and civil society members, and distribute small grants of around 5000 euros; so approximately 40,000 will be distributed to the young journalists and analysts, and they will then work closely under the supervision of Slovak journalists. We did this project in Serbia and it was a success, so probably we can engage those journalist trained there to participate.

Another project we are starting now is the fight against corruption within businesses. So far, no one has been looking at the problem of corruption from this angle. But corruption both within businesses and between them exists, and it is the businesses themselves who are very much interested in fighting it. So together with the Macedonian Confederation of Employers and the Business Alliance of Slovakia, we have started this project, which amounts to another 120,000 euros.

CD: Are you doing any projects specifically for economic development?

RK: Yes, one recent project we did involved support for the business climate of Macedonia. First we published a wish-list from Macedonian businessmen, asking what they would like to see changed. And we talked to the deputy prime minister of economy, and he was very positive. He said that he liked the ideas, but that they should be turned into paragraphs which should be changed in existing Macedonian laws. He provided one member of his team to be part of this working group. The minister of economy also liked the idea. It was an important example of how to follow up.

We also supported small and medium-sized enterprises by helping to establish business centers in Bitola, Kocani, Skopje, Ohrid and Negotino, in cooperation with local governments. These were meant to support both those people who had a business idea and money, and those who had an idea and no money, to help them start their businesses. We provided assistance with everything from registration to identification of financial resources or loans.

CD: Very interesting. How about projects involving politics and reform? Do you have any of these?

RK: Our experts are well known here for involvement in European projects. In the coming years, these projects could become more important to Macedonia from an economic perspective than real trade in certain areas.

Twinning projects or ‘triangular’ projects are done between an established member state, Slovakia as a new member state and Macedonia as a candidate country. Sometimes, Western European countries use us to execute projects on their behalf, for example now we are helping to establish a parliamentary institute here. The whole project is financed through NDI and the Swiss government, which doesn’t have a parliamentary institute, while the American democratic system is very different from our European realities. But nevertheless these two major players recognized the experience of the Czech and Slovak parliaments, as with the EU, which also joined this project. We are sharing and offering our expertise, and I believe we have the ability to get deeper into the public administration and society here than perhaps others could.

CD: Do you have any security sector cooperation, the police, army, etc?

RK: Yes. Two years ago, when Prime Minister Gruevski was in Bratislava, we signed an intergovernmental agreement on the fight against crime. Of course, organized crime is among the top priorities, and there is cooperation going on there. Also there is the cooperation between our two armies, and not only that, but also the Macedonian firefighters have come to Slovakia, this year and last, for training exercises. This was also identified as one of the priority areas between the two ministries of interior.

So there are opportunities in many areas. Specifically now, in the process of accession, the fresh experience and workable experience we have acquired relatively recently is useful for Macedonia and we are willing to share it.

Taking the Initiative

I’m glad to see that the cooperation is broadening and deepening. But it takes two things: identification of priorities, and then initiative. The initiative must come from the Macedonian side. Sometimes I have the feeling that on both sides we are waiting for opportunities that are supposed to come by themselves. But this period of EU accession is limited, as are the resources. You know how the European Union works; it offers money, but this money is just a promise- if you are not able to claim it according to the rules set by the Union, then it will be redistributed, it will be gone; somebody more clever will come and take it. So Macedonia should not wait.

CD: Yes, in my experience and from what I have heard Macedonia is not making the best use of funds set aside for it, and many people and groups who should be eligible for EU funds don’t know the procedures for applying, and so on-

RK: Look, this is a once-off opportunity for Macedonia, but also an exercise, because this money is nothing compared to what they will get when they join the European Union. With the structural funds and cohesion funds, the total resources will become much bigger. But if they don’t learn how to implement this money… off it will go.

One practical example I give to the Macedonians is that in the period 2007-2013, Slovakia has gotten the commitment of about 11 billion euros from the EU. This is approximately the size of the annual budget! So, for seven years you get the opportunity to claim one extra budget. But if you don’t use it all, if you use say only 50 or 80 percent, the rest will be gone.

Part of the message I share with the Macedonians is that small countries must prioritize, must know their potential, must recognize the opportunities and know what they want to achieve. In Slovakia, we realized very quickly that the competitive environment of the European Union means that really, if you hesitate and don’t make priorities, you will lose out.

So again, we decided to make the painful reforms, including in the banking sector to join the eurozone- okay, we are the poorest member of the richest club, but still we are at the table. And we can participate in decision-making, as you can see recently.

CD: Indeed. Dr Kirnag, thank you very much for your time, I really appreciated and enjoyed getting your insights today.

RK: Thank you.

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A minefield of upcoming anniversaries in the coming period will serve to enhance heated local and international rhetoric over the validity of competing ideologies and narratives. If the post-Communist period in the region can be defined as the years of ‘transition,’ the coming period may someday be remembered as the years of regression, a time when retrograde, obscurest and tribal views influenced the balance of power, economy, social and religious life, and ultimately the continuously evolving identity of the region.

Perhaps not incidentally, a conspicuous number of these events involve the deep influence left by the Ottoman Empire, even more important given modern Turkey’s ascent to regional power, and the issue of Macedonia, almost as vexed now as it was during the turbulent times of a century ago. The reappraisal of the Balkans’ mixed legacy represents an ongoing info-war for cultural hegemony that, while not violent, is being waged with grim determination using a variety of means.

The world over, humans have long embraced the practice of associating meaning to rather arbitrary, decimal-system time notations- and to sustain them, have often exerted great energy into organizing events and proclamations having political, economic, media, social and other import. The following is a partial list of such decimal-system anniversaries between 2012-2016, many of which will elicit the stated type of reactions, and become ‘events’ in themselves.

2012

February 28, 2012: 15^th anniversary of the ‘soft’ military coup in Turkey that forced the resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party- the forerunner of today’s ruling AK Party

March 30, 2012: 580^th anniversary of the birth of Mehmet II, Ottoman conqueror of Constantinople

April 5, 2012: 20^th anniversary of the start of the Siege of Sarajevo during the war in Bosnia

August 30, 2012: 90^th anniversary of the final battle in Dumlupınar, ending the Turkish Independence War in 1922 (Victory Day)

October 8, 1912: Centennial of initial hostilities between the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia) declared war on the Ottoman Empire

October 18, 2012: Centennial anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne, and end of the Italo-Turkish War; Italy was awarded the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica (today’s Libya)

October 28, 2012: Centennial anniversary of the Greek liberation of Thessaloniki from the Ottoman Empire

November 8, 2012: 35^th anniversary of the discovery of the royal tomb of Phillip II of Macedon in Vergina, Greece

November 28, 2012: Centennial anniversary of Albania’s declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire (Flag Day)

2013

March 4, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the Battle of Vizani and Greek liberation of Ioannina from the Ottoman Empire

March 11, 2013: 70^th anniversary of the deportation of the Jews of Macedonian to Treblinka by the Bulgarian army in WWII

March 12, 2013: 10^th anniversary of the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić

May 4, 2013: 110^th anniversary of the death of Gotse Delchev, Macedonian-independence revolutionary leader against the Turks

May 29, 2013: 560^th anniversary of Ottoman capture of Constantinople

May 30, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of London, ending the First Balkan War

June 16, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the Second Balkan War (Bulgaria’s declaration of war against erstwhile allies Greece and Serbia)

July 26, 2013: 50^th anniversary of the great earthquake in Skopje, Macedonia

August 2, 2013: 110^th anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising in Krusevo, Macedonia, against the Ottomans

August 10, 2013: Centennial anniversary of the controversial Treaty of Bucharest and official end of the Balkan Wars

September 9, 2013: 20^th anniversary of the Battle of the Medak Pocket in Croatia

October 19, 2013: 10^th anniversary of the death of Alija Izetbegović, first president of the post-Yugoslav Bosnian Federation

October 29, 2013: 90^th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic by Ataturk (Republic Day)

November 9, 2013: 20^th anniversary of the destruction of the Bridge of Mostar during the Croat-Bosniak War

November 10, 2013: 75^th anniversary of the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish national leader

November 17, 2013: 40^th anniversary of the major student protests in Greece against the ruling junta (Polytechneio)

December 1, 2013: 95^th anniversary of the declaration of the union of Transylvania with Romania (the National Day of Romania)

2014

February 7, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the death of pioneering Serbian linguist and author Vuk Stefanović Karadžić

February 15, 2014: 15^th anniversary of the capture of Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish special services in Kenya

February 26, 2014: 10^th anniversary of the death of Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski in an airplane crash near Mostar

March 3, 2014: 90^th anniversary of the constitutional abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey

March 17, 2014: 10^th anniversary of the March riots of Kosovo Albanians against Serbs and internationals in Kosovo

March 24, 2014: 15^th anniversary of the beginning of NATO bombings against Serbia

April 2, 2014: 10-year anniversary of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO

May 21, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the unification of the Ionian islands with Greece

June 28, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, leading to WWI

July 20, 2014: 40^th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus

July 28, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the invasion of Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Army, starting hostilities in WWI

July 29, 2014: Millennial anniversary of the Battle of Kleidion/Belasica, in which Byzantine Emperor Basil II decisively defeated the Bulgarian army of Tsar Samoil

August 2, 2014: Centennial anniversary of the secret Turkish-German treaty that brought the Ottoman Powers into WWI on the side of the Central Powers

August 23, 2014: 150^th anniversary of the birth of Eleftherios Venizelos, future Greek national leader

September 14, 2014: 200^th anniversary of the formation of the famous Greek secret society, the Filiki Etairia

2015

April 24, 2015: Centennial anniversary of the symbolic start of the ‘Armenian Genocide’ in eastern Anatolia, by the Ottoman authorities

April 25, 2015: Centennial anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Gallipoli between Commonwealth and Ottoman troops in WWI (ANZAC Day)

May 6, 2015: 610^th anniversary of the birth of Albanian national hero Georgi Kastrioti Skanderbeg

July 11, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the ‘Srebrenica massacre’ of Bosniak Muslims by Bosnian Serb forces during the war in Bosnian

August 5, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the Battle of Knin, ending the Serbian Republic of Krajina in Croatia (Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian Defenders)

September 6, 2015: 130^th  anniversary of the unification of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria (Unification Day)

September 13, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the signing of the Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia

October 5, 2015: 15^th anniversary of mass Belgrade protests resulting in the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević

October 28, 1915: 75^th anniversary of Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas’ rejection of Mussolini’s capitulation ultimatum during WWII (Ohi Day)

December 9, 2015: 25^th anniversary of election of Slobodan Milošević as Yugoslav president

December 14, 2015: 20^th anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris, ending the war in Bosnia

2016

March 31, 2016: 25^th anniversary of the first multi-party elections in Albania

May 20, 2016: 75^th anniversary of the Battle of Crete in WWII

May 21, 2016: 10^th anniversary of Montenegro’s successful referendum for independence from the state union with Serbia

June 25, 2016: 25^th anniversary of Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence from Yugoslavia

July 10, 2016: 150^th anniversary of the birth of world-famous Serbian scientist Nikola Tesla

September 8, 2016: 25^th anniversary of Macedonia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia

November 8, 2016: 150^th anniversary of the massacre at Arkadi Monastery in Crete, during a revolt against the Turks

November 19, 2016: Centennial anniversary of the WWI Battle of Bitola, in which Serbian troops captured the city from the Central Powers

Editor’s note: With fears of a North African immigrant inundation leading the French and Italian presidents to call for reform in the EU’s Schengen visa system, and newer EU members Romania and Bulgaria preparing to join the Schengen Zone, more scrutiny is falling on the perceived role of Western Balkan countries – most of which now enjoy liberalized non-visa access to Schengen member states – in contributing to illegal immigration.

With a population of only 2 million, Macedonia would seem an unlikely threat to EU stability in this light. However, worries over how to handle a possible “alarming” future illegal migration trend persist, as the following Balkanalysis.com exclusive report reveals.

EU Document Description

A draft document leaked by an official of the EU delegation in Skopje, meant for internal use only and to be completed by Monday May 9^th, examines the impact of visa liberalization on Macedonia.

The draft document, provisionally entitled Local Schengen Cooperation (LSC) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2010-2011 Report, gives an overview of activities carried out since visas were abolished in December 2009, and points out some of the challenges perceived to lie ahead for the EU in this area. (Note that since it is a draft document, some items may be deleted, amended or expanded upon in the final version; direct quotes cited herein may thus not appear in the final version).

The internal document notes that five LSC meetings (four in 2010 and one in 2011) “have been held since the entry into force of the Visa Code.” On December 19, 2009, visas were abolished for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, meaning that any of their citizens having biometric passports could travel in Schengen countries without a visa for up to 90 days per six-month period (though they could not seek employment). Albania and Bosnia were granted similar privileges the next year, while Kosovo alone remains frozen out.

Interestingly, while 16 EU member states have consular offices in Macedonia (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, United Kingdom), “no representational arrangements are known to have been concluded between member states for the purpose of examining applications and issuing visa[s] on behalf of a member state not present in the country.”

Thus, with no “external service providers” for application collections, the European Union Delegation has been tasked with coordinating local Schengen cooperation meetings, the report adds.

Structure of Work, Priority Meetings and Relevance for Intelligence Interpretation

The draft document goes on to describe the structure of LSE meetings in Macedonia. It notes that the meetings, regularly-held at the EUD headquarters and chaired by the EUD’s Head of the Political and JHA issues, Information and Communication section, are “generally well attended.” Given Macedonia’s small size, such meetings are never required outside of the capital, Skopje, it adds.

Another point regarding EU structure and methods to note here is that while “some member states share these minutes with their capitals… some draw up their own reports for their headquarters.”

In this regard, identifying which specific missions tend to fall into which category would be of use for any intelligence analysts trying to interpret the degree of text interventions – and motivation behind such actions, in order to better understand the relationship between the local missions and ministry-level decision-makers, and the motivations of each in depicting local scenarios for policy and sometimes personal goals.

Significantly, the last LSC meeting (held on 3 March 2011) “was partly dedicated to the issue of the high flow of asylum-seekers from the country into Schengen states. Officials from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were invited to present the measures taken by local authorities to reverse this trend.”

This again indicates the EU’s overarching concern with visa-liberalization abuses by locals. In this context, it has to be remembered that in the immediate aftermath of Macedonian visa-free travel, Belgium was inundated by busloads of primarily ethnic Albanians and Roma who had been falsely told that they merely had to demand asylum upon arrival in order to receive lavish social benefits in the EU.

Although Macedonian authorities quickly discovered the lucrative scam behind the operation – which was well-publicized by local media, leading to a sharp decrease in asylum-seekers – the events so alarmed the EU that Belgian officials were dispatched to the wilds of the Lipkovo region – a truly historic, unprecedented event – in order to personally explain to the locals that they could no longer pretend to be in need of asylum, in order to simply escape their rural existence.

EU Local Practices in Dealing with Monitoring Post-Liberalization Developments

Since April 2010, the internal document continues, regular LSC meetings conducted between the 16 member states in Macedonia and the EU Delegation allowed these parties “to discuss and exchange information on implementation of the visa free regime, migratory risks, number of asylum applications of country’s citizen registered, ways of transport, etc.”

Exchanges of monthly statistics on visas issues have been exchanged between EU states- another security loophole in what is already the leakiest ship in this landlocked country.

Further, “monthly statistics on types of visas issued and/or refused in a unified format are exchanged on a monthly basis and compiled by the EUD. It was agreed that MS consulates will exchange information within LSC on selection of external service providers, accreditation of commercial intermediaries and withdrawal of such accreditation, cooperation with transport companies, etc. on ad hoc basis. Information on cases of false or forged documents is exchanged.”

In addition, “valuable information is exchanged within LSC on asylum claims made by the country’s citizens in member states. Different aspects of this issue such as number of procedures launched, return procedures, ways of transportation, places of origin and socio-cultural profile of asylum-seekers have been discussed. Concerned member states informed about their respective asylum procedures including social benefits offered to asylum-seekers and their particular and ad-hoc return procedures during LSC meetings.

EU Future Plans: Profiling Macedonian Citizens, Exchanging Information, and Forestalling “Alarming Trends”

The most significant part of the document is the fourth and final section, titled “Challenges in 2011-2012.”

It begins by noting that following the abolishment of visas, what the EU considers “a high number of the country’s citizens” applied for asylum in EU and Schengen countries: in 2010 alone, some 7,550 Macedonian citizens applied for asylum in EU member states, “thus ranking as the 9^th main country of origin of asylum-seekers.”

However, as was mentioned above, and in fairness to the country, this figure may well be distorted by the initial spike in asylum-seekers drawn in by early scams, and thus not representative of current or future trends.

Regardless, the EU is taking no chances with a country the total population of which would constitute a mere suburb of many large European cities.

The report calls for “further monitoring and exchange of information on the implementation of the visa liberalisation” as being “the main challenges for LSC in 2011-2012.”

This policy is expected to include “exchange of information on some issues (statistics of registered asylum applications on a regular basis, overstays and other breaches of the visa free regime, differences in benefits offered for voluntary return procedures,” as well as “more information on the profile of asylum-seekers.”

These efforts, according to the recommendation presented in the internal document, “should be strengthened in order to improve the capacity to rapidly detect and react to any new alarming trend.”

Final Analysis: Implied Goals, Perceptions, and Possible Oversights in the Security Realm

An objective analysis of this internal EU draft document, in the context of both local diplomatic trends and wider EU policy-making, reveals several things. First, it provides further evidence that the EU, and its member states present in Skopje, have made a dedicated, organized and ongoing effort to deal with issues related to abuse of visa liberalization by Macedonian citizens, and that they will continue to do so.

The document, however, seems to implicitly link, without going into explicit detail, the one-off abuses of liberalization following December 19, 2009 with a long-term possible trend- one that is, in fact, not likely to continue (at least not in the form seen previously).

This has had political ramifications, however: the EU gave Macedonia as a state an embarrassing slap on the wrist, due to the actions of a few, tarnishing its image and slowing its progress towards EU membership. Rectifying this situation became an unwanted political headache, and required time-consuming diplomatic assurances from both the Macedonian foreign minister, Antonio Milososki and Gordana Jankulovska, the interior minister.

However, the document, interestingly enough, makes no mention of terrorism fears or use of the country as a transit zone for radical or criminal elements seeking to enter Europe illegally, nor of the occasional Macedonian complaints of “immigrant-dumping” by Greece.

Nor does it consider the expected new trend – previously predicted by Balkanalysis.com – of a long-term shift in illegal migrant movements into the EU from Turkey-Greece (where the EU’s FRONTEX mission has been making a serious difference) to Turkey-Bulgaria, where border security capacities are weaker. Issues of Bulgarian-Macedonian border susceptibility are not addressed, though admittedly it is possibly not in the purview of the present document to discuss this scenario.

Rather, it seems that in the case of Macedonia, the EU is most concerned with the social issues (abuse of social welfare and medical care, etc.)- issues that have strongly political connotations for the internal debates in fractious and partisan EU countries today.

From the point of view of security, the most interesting detail to emerge from the draft document may well be the admission that “harmonising the list of supporting documents has not been assessed as a priority need in the context of visa free regime with only an insignificant number of non-biometric passport holders. So far, no steps have been taken towards preparing a harmonised list of supporting documents.”

This is interesting because in a country like Macedonia, where the EU and other international actors are constantly pointing out corruption in the public sector and bureaucracy, there are is a plethora of supporting documents out there to regulate.

Control over the dissemination of such documents is thus a weak point. Also, their locally (not universally) recognizable character and basic construction (only passports and personal, state-issued IDs use any degree of technological sophistication) means that the rest can be easily forged by anyone with the requisite skill and determination. This is not even to go into the issue – one that has been highly politicized in the past – of passports said to have been illegally given to non-citizens over the years.

In conclusion, while the EU in Macedonia appears to be trying to find consensus on how to handle visa liberalization-related issues affecting the country, the presently discussed leaked document seems to be marked by an imprecise analysis and several possible oversights.

However, as of Thursday, May 5^th, it was still being circulated to EU embassies and consulates in Skopje with requests for additions, and its final form may thus well reflect a broader range of views and topics than those presented in the draft version.

On April 19, the Delegation of the European Union in Macedonia hosted a public event for business figures and the media to mark the official launch of the EU-funded Business Advisory Services (BAS) Programme, at the EU InfoCentre in Skopje.

Run by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), this technical assistance program will provide funding for the local consulting and advisory sector, for at least 96 local business projects, to be overseen by the EBRD Skopje office.

The BAS Programme, which has operated for over 15 years in 31 countries, including Macedonia, gives local SMEs access to external advisory services on a cost-sharing basis, while also providing “direct assistance at the enterprise level with systemic market development interventions to develop a sustainable local infrastructure of SME support,” according to the organization. The EBRD Shareholders’ Special Fund is now funding a portion of BAS’ projects, whereas these were formerly completely donor-funded.

At the event, participants were provided with a solid overview of the EBRD’s mission and planned continuation of activities with the BAS in Macedonia. The Bank’s projects will have a significant impact for the consulting/business advisory sector in Macedonia, while promoting the potential for economically- and strategically-important business developments in areas such as renewable energy, as will be seen below.

The Proceedings

The morning event began with an opening speech by Dieter Thiel, Head of Operations for the EU Delegation in Macedonia, and was followed by an address by Minister for Economy Fatmir Besimi. Overviews of EBRD activity in the country were also provided by Elena Urumovska, head of the EBRD’s Resident Office in Skopje and BAS National Programme Manager Jovan Gavrilovski, who gave a detailed recap of the BAS’ efforts in the country since 2002.

These totals so far amount to 487 projects with individual projects, involving over 4.3 million euros of donor financing, matched by over 2 million euros from client contributions. The largest share (35 percent) of total BAS consulting projects in Macedonia have been in the sector of environment, while 33 percent have been in the areas of quality management and certification.

Finally, an overview of the BAS Programme and its potential effects for Macedonia were provided by Valeria Della Rosa, the BAS Programme Manager, who came from the Bank’s London headquarters for the occasion.

The BAS Programme- Who Benefits?

An intrinsic goal of the BAS Programme is to stimulate interest and demand for qualified business advisory services, first of all by raising awareness among firms regarding the benefits of having such input; concomitantly, this also ideally leads to an increase in the supply of qualified and experienced local advisory services.

So, who will benefit from the EBRD’s new initiative? Speaking for Balkanalysis.com, BAS Programme Manager Della Rosa stated that in Macedonia “the primary beneficiaries are going to be the local small- and medium-sized businesses, and local consultants.” While EU-funded projects often involve considerable involvement from foreign consultants, for the current initiative in Macedonia “99 percent of consultants engaged with these projects are local.”

Conditions and Supported Consulting Sectors

For BAS projects, local consultants are typically hired for short-term (4-6 months) assignments. The relevant SME is provided with a grant covering up to 75% of advisory costs (with costs capped at 10,000 euros). The grant is only paid, however, following the successful completion of the project, with a mandatory project evaluation one year after, according to the Bank.

The types of advisory services supported consist of specialized areas within five categories: market performance; management effectiveness; cost reduction; quality management and environmental management. The specific opportunities available to local consultants across these categories include analysis, development planning, feasibility studies, restructuring, impact assessments, computerization and ISO certification advisory.

To apply, SMEs must have less than 250 employees, be majority private- and locally-owned, and have little or no experience with having used external consultancy previously. Companies must be willing to pay 25-75% of the net project costs, and must have a debt structure acceptable to the Bank, a demonstrated potential for growth, and a “genuine need” for business advice and ability to absorb and implement it.

Macedonia: Existing Capacity?

One question that comes up with respect to the BAS’ ambitious plans is to what extent Macedonia at present has the domestic consulting capacity required for executing almost 100 to-be-determined projects. However, Programme Manager Della Rosa is not concerned.

“Considerable progress in advisory development has been made since the EBRD started in 2002, and a base has been built,” she noted, pointing to the success of the MCA2000 (Macedonian Consultant’s Association). The larger projects have helped entrepreneurs conform with EU directives, while providing a chance for the local advisory sector to be involved with more work resulting in higher levels of professionalism.

“I’m very optimistic,” Della Rosa stated, noting that Macedonian has been “quite far ahead in some areas, such as energy efficiency and environment in recent years, for example with projects such as the Integrated Project on Pollution Control (IPPC).”

Targeted Industries?

Considering the large number of projects for which the ERBD has planned to devote funds, another question that emerges is whether there is a specific foreseen breakdown of number of projects per industry.

This is not the case, according to the programme manager. “Projects are demand-driven,” she stated. “We don’t target particular industries or businesses, and we don’t exclude any applicants, except for [those outside the EBRD mandate].”

Such industries specifically not funded are the defense industry, gambling, tobacco, banking and financial services. In Macedonia, which is largely agricultural, it is expected that the foods and food-processing industries will be well-represented among applicants, though there is plenty of opportunity for other sectors. Energy and environment projects seem to be of special interest to the EU in the period ahead.

Future Funding: EBRD Development of Green Energy Sector

For investors and European governments today, the alternative energy sector in the Western Balkans stands out, for both geo-strategic and strictly business reasons.

Since 2002, projects related to energy efficiency have comprised only 1 percent of BAS projects in Macedonia, so it is clear that more efforts will be given to this sector in the near future.

Indeed, according to the most recent official EBRD data sheet on Macedonia, the Bank’s overarching strategic plans for the next year in Macedonia include providing long-term funding to local banks under the EU/EBRD Sustainable Energy Credit Line Facility (WeBSECLEF).

According to the Bank, this investment facility has been set up “to provide debt financing for energy efficiency projects and small renewable energy projects implemented by private entities (in industry or in buildings used for commercial services in the Western Balkans.” It is expected to “act as a catalyst to unlock the great potential in the region to reduce energy intensity and promote diverse sources of green energy.”

What’s Next- 2011 and Beyond

The currently planned phase of BAS activity in Macedonia, running through 2013, will include a minimum of 96 projects and involve a budgeted financing of 1.63 million euros, the vast majority of this coming directly from the European Union.

As part of the overall plan, 4 Market Development Activities will be implemented towards developing the needed sustainable local consulting infrastructure. It is expected that the first 60 BAS projects will be achieved during 2011.

Also during this year, at least 2 trainings will be conducted for local consultants or industry sector in specifically the wines sector, energy auditors in the building sector, and the Macedonian Consultants Association (MCA2000), with a view towards accrediting this entity for full membership in the International Council of Management Consulting Institutes (ICMCI). The 2011 plan also includes some promotional and local media visibility efforts.

Fast Facts: EBRD Activity in Macedonia

According to the most recent Bank-published information (cumulative, as of January 2011), the EBRD has completed in Macedonia 68 projects, with a net business volume of 715.9 million euros. The total project value is equivalent to 1.4 billion euros, while gross disbursements equal 458.3 million euros.

The EBRD’s current portfolio in Macedonia amounts to 300.9 million euros, equaling a portfolio share in the private sector of 55 percent. A major recent investment that the Bank is keen to point out is the 5 million euro credit line extended to Ohridska Banka, Macedonia’s fourth-largest bank (since 2007, a subsidiary of the French Societe Generale Group). The credit line is meant to boost Ohridska Banka’s lending portfolio to local SMEs and make it more competitive with the larger banks operating in the country.

The Bank’s report provides an overview of the country’s economy, interestingly pointing out the perceived need for adhering to the “tight fiscal and prudent monetary policies that have delivered stability to the economy throughout the past decade.” It also notes that the 2009 global financial crisis had “very moderate” impact on the Macedonian economy and caused “no delay in the signing or implementation of projects.”

Indeed, it appears that domestic rather than global factors have shaped EBRD activity in Macedonia. A quick look at the EBRD’s in-country project numbers over time indicates a predictable sharp dip during times of uncertainty, such as the 2001 war and again in 2005.

However, since 2006 project totals have consistently risen, with a sharp spike in activity noted from 2008-2010. Provided that outside donors, investors and key governments continue to predict general stability on the domestic and regional level, this trend should continue to increase.

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……………………….

Chris Deliso: Jasen is a nature reserve covering an area of over 300km2, in the mountains of central Macedonia. This is a fairly large and difficult area to manage. Would you like to share your secret for the park’s successful functioning here?

Mihail Malahov: In the period 1958-1960, the territory where today’s Public Enterprise for Managing and Protection of the Multipurpose Area Jasen exists was declared to be set aside as a reserve by the government. The aim of this declaration was the protection of the biological, floral, fauna, hydrologic and geologic natural rarities.

Jasen spreads across 32,000 hectares or 320 km2. The height difference between the lowest (330m above sea level) and highest (2470 meters above sea level) point is above 2100 meters; through it runs the beautiful River Treska, which powers the biggest artificial hydropower accumulation in Macedonia, Lake Kozjak, with 550 million m3 of water and the most spectacular accumulation [point], Matka, which runs into the Matka Canyon. This canyon is by law declared as a monument of nature. Among them is Sveta Petka, a construction which is expected next year to start to be full with water.

The employees in Jasen are people who for generations have been working here, transmitting their love for this area from generation to generation. They are the ones who with jealously guard this area and its natural resources for the future generations, paying attention to the dangers that accompany a new modern era [for the environment].

Without them, without their love for this space, it would simply not be possible to run Jasen. I have the chance and the opportunity to learn from them about how this process of sustainable management should continue, but of course with previous evaluation of the natural values of experts; this means the establishment of special protection zones and, in the end, management that will provide protection of nature and sustainability of management.

Detail map of the area comprising Jasen Nature Reserve (Image: Official Jasen website)

CD: Besides the basic function of your company, preserving the nature as it is and protection of flora and fauna, Jasen is also a high-status hunting ground. How did you manage to build the image of Jasen as a rich and authentic place for sport hunting?

MM: Very simple! We are trying to implement a policy of more services in hunting tourism, but in terms of a minimum of shooting. This means that a hunter in Jasen can come only through hunting tour operators, with whom we have signed agreements which set out our policies for hunting.

In general, the hunter is always accompanied by a hunting guide as a part of our so-called ‘hunting packages;’ precisely defined herein is what can be hunted, when hunting can occur, i.e., in what seasons for which species, and what accommodation the hunter may require.

In many cases, this is previously determined, so that the itinerary during his stay in Jasen may quite possibly include a visit to [other] cultural, historical or tourist attractions in Macedonia. Welcoming the hunter at the airport, providing documents for staying in Jasen, the preparation of documents for input and output of hunting weapons and ammunition, transportation to and through the hunting area, preparation of hunting trophies and certificates for it- all these are, it is not even not necessary to say, carried out by us, these [duties] are our obligation. The percentage of success in hunting in Jasen is 100%.

CD: What kinds of animals can be found in Jasen?

MM: Jasen is famous for Balkan wild goat, wild boar, deer and mouflon, though lately wolf, rabbit and fox are becoming very attractive as well. Since last year in our hunting ground, known as Fazanerija 10, we offer hunting of endemic and migratory birds. Jasen is also known for the beautiful wild pheasant.

However, bears, the Balkan lynx and eagle vultures are strictly protected species from shooting. The terrain where our customers hunt is full of exquisite natural beauty, so very often they reach for their camera rather than for their hunting weapons!

We ourselves, the employees in Jasen, in cooperation with NGOs, are installing a multitude of so-called camera traps, which is giving us insight and new information about the routine behaviour of the animals, their diversity and frequency of movement on certain routes.

CD: While you have primarily been oriented towards VIP hunting, lately there has developed an understanding that Jasen is open for ‘ordinary’ citizens too. People in Macedonia have long had the impression that Jasen hides a big secret- underground cities, secret caves, military tunnels… What is actually the truth behind all this?

MM: It is both the truth, and a lie! For half a century, Jasen has been a mystery. Isn’t it a good enough reason to come to it, and to explore, to discover? I guarantee you great discoveries.

Speleologists from the Slovak Republic were in Jasen and discovered the deepest canyon in Macedonia, with more than 500 meters depth in terms of permanent ice and they have not yet come to the end! And divers from Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands have plummeted deep into Vrelo in Lake Matka- probably the deepest underwater cave in the Balkans and Europe, more than 200 meters deep, and also they did not come to the bottom of it yet.

Lake Kozjak, which meanders through the park, is envisioned as a key draw for tourists. (Photo: Chris Deliso)

Also, in many pits were found skeletons of animals and not only that. Researchers from Slovenia and Poland found large groups of ground squirrels that the world thought had disappeared. Also, do you know that in Jasen live butterflies that simply exist nowhere else in the world? This mystique has probably caused attention also to a French film production, and we are currently negotiating terms for shooting a feature film in the Jasen reserve.

But yes, we organize day tours for ordinary citizens on some of the paths with different levels of difficulty. That depends on the capabilities of the group and, as a reward for successful completion of the hikes, we arrange lunch, a delicious organic meal with homemade wine produced exclusively from our natural ingredients.

For those who want adrenaline-generating experience, we provide a course in paragliding, courses for survival techniques in nature, rock-climbing in the company of experienced climbers and mountain guides, rafting on calm waters and so on. The safety of our visitors is very important to us and therefore each group has a medic present and our experienced guide with them as well.

CD: The main problem for tourism in Macedonia in general, is the lack of a specific vision regarding in which direction to develop tourism. What is your vision for the development of tourism in Jasen?

MM: We know what we have, and that’s what we offer. And it’s not a little! According to the valorization of natural resources, which is ongoing, Jasen is one of the last truly wild and untouched areas in Europe. We know all this, and we have a plan to use it. We intend to build facilities to accommodate guests only where it is allowed according to the degree on protection zone or plan management.

If we do not act like this, tomorrow we will find ourselves in a position of having nothing to show, we will find ourselves in a position of having nothing to offer.

The buffer zone around Jasen, which abounds in mostly unpopulated mountain, has villages and houses within them, with lovely architecture. In agreement with the owners of the houses, those who exchanged their rural life for city life, we decided together to start renovating some houses or parts of the houses.

In these houses, we have plans to accommodate our future guests. And in this area they are many. For example, only in the village of Borova Breznica, one of the many picturesque mountain villages above Lake Kozjak, with over 70 houses and a local road to it, we can provide 100 beds and competent hosts (with little previous education). They would care for each of their guests, and provide a truly rustic bed and breakfast accommodation.

We, the employees from Jasen, according to the guest’s wishes, will provide rides through mountain paths, visit parks offering adrenaline-packed experiences, hunting of wild game in the form of “hunting safaris,” horse riding, resting on rafts on the lake or going down into the deep, ice-cold caverns with a caving guide. And many other things too!

CD: The new road that is being built right now between Makedonski Brod and Skopje comes as a big relief for the people from the Porece region, who can now travel much more easily and quickly to the Macedonian capital. But how it will affect the ecology balance in Jasen?

MM: Not at all! The new road passes right through the zone where the risk of significant destruction of rare species and general disruption of biodiversity is minimal. Certainly this is being taken care of during the time of designing the way through outlets provided under way for feeding and free movement of game and other wildlife, a protected area and a fence along the entire length of the road.

We must not forget that on the other hand, if there is neither communications nor travel directions, the opportunity to reach these beauties is very minimal. Following the regulations in the protection plan through the management area is functioning already in the world. I see no reason why it won’t here as well.

CD: A part of the reserve is also taken up by Lake Kozjak. Does your plan for tourism development in Jasen include the lake too? What activities can be enjoyed on the lake (except for fishing of course), without ruining the ecological balance of the lake and the surrounding area?

MM: Definitely one of the top priorities for tourism development is precisely Lake Kozjak, and not only that but Matka and the new St. Petka as well.

By August this year, in cooperation with the Agency for Youth and Sport, we have planned to promote a new public-lane swimming [area], with a distance of 10 km, on Lake Kozjak. As promoters of the swimming course, hopefully, will be included all the participants of the famous Ohrid swimming marathon, because ours is planned to be held two days later. We hope for the financial assistance of the prime minister of the Republic of Macedonia, and we hope he will accept our offer to be the general patron of the Skopje Swimming Marathon.

The wilderness areas in and around Jasen, such as this crystal-clear river at the village of Belica, have endemic flora and fauna and are largely untouched. (Photo: Chris Deliso)

A tourism development model I see for us is the so-called ‘Scandinavian model.’ However, the northern countries of our continent have developed a specific form of tourist accommodation for guests on the water- platforms holding up houses, restaurants and accommodation.

The construction is cheap, wastewater relatively easy to manage with collection tanks which will sail along with platforms and, from time to time, through a mini mobile water treatment plant on board, will be cleaned.

We will have a minimal cost, the danger of forest fires is minimal, and we have to admit that the attractiveness of water stays for longer periods is also great.

As part of these tourist areas on the water will also be swimming pools and also we’ll have the opportunity to form real beaches. Water sports certainly will be very easy to practice and Skopje citizens will have their sea!

CD: How do you see Jasen in the future?

Tourism planners hope to use traditional-style Porece region homes as 'authentic' guest houses for visitors (Photo: Chris Deliso)

MM: We have a plan to do a real interaction between local government and Jasen as a state enterprise. I believe that the fusion of rural and eco-tourism as the winning combination in the case of Jasen.

I sincerely hope the government support is there for rapid implementation of the project, because the development of tourism is in the interest of all.

………………………..

Note: This interview was co-published in the magazine of the American-Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, Emerging Macedonia.

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Each year on March 11, Macedonia’s small Jewish community, bolstered by guests local and foreign alike, gathers for a solemn commemoration of the Holocaust. On that date in 1943, 7,148 Macedonian Jews – 98 percent of the country’s Jewish population – were deported to the Treblinka death camps by occupying Bulgarian forces. However, this year’s commemoration was somewhat bigger.

Indeed, the series of events held in Skopje, Bitola and Stip (two other former Jewish centers of life), coordinated by the Macedonian and Israeli governments, along with Macedonia’s Holocaust Fund and its small Jewish Community, spanned almost the course of an entire week.

The reason for the unprecedented attention was the opening – at long last – of the much-anticipated Holocaust Memorial Center of the Jews from Macedonia, fittingly located on the site of Skopje’s former Jewish quarter, along the north bank of the River Vardar.

Although the entirety of the $23-million complex, which will also include an adjoining hotel (to provide sustainable revenue for the Center’s future well-being) and perhaps an arts/cultural center, is not yet complete, an impressive three floors of exhibits, multi-media presentations and historical information on Jewish life over the ages were opened just in time for the ceremonial opening.

For all those who have worked long and hard for the initiative to succeed, this achievement is especially satisfying (for a lengthy discussion of the Jewish heritage in Macedonia, including original photos from 2005-2007 of the early phases of construction, see an earlier Balkanalysis.com piece here).

Guests heading to the Holocaust Memorial Center's opening ceremony cross Skopje's historic Stone Bridge (photo: Chris Deliso)

The week’s events started off on the Tuesday (March 8th) with a commemorative session at the Macedonian Academy of Sciences & Arts (MANU), followed that evening by simultaneous exhibitions of historical photographs documenting Macedonian Jewish life at the city museums of Skopje, Bitola and Stip. On the following day at noon, the honorary guard of the Macedonian Army started from Bitola and Stip, conveying the ceremonial urns from these cities to the capital.

On Wednesday evening, several hundred local and foreign guests gathered at the Macedonian Opera and Ballet for an event held under the patronage of President Gjorge Ivanov. It included a commemorative concert by the Macedonian Philharmonic Orchestra, which was preceded by several speeches – including a congratulatory message relayed via video from US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, an event unexpected by most in attendance, which was met by warm applause.

One of the most powerful messages of the night was delivered by World Jewish Congress Research Director Laurence Weinbaum. After conveying the regards of WJC President Ronald Lauder, he commended Macedonia for its principled and determined approach to property restitution for descendents of Jews murdered in the Holocaust and the Jewish Community in general.

In so honoring “the dead and the living,” said Mr Weinbaum, Macedonia has “set an example to which other nations should aspire. There are nations that are larger, richer, better known and more powerful than Macedonia, but none more decent, gracious, good-hearted and noble.” Mr Weinbaum also expressed his appreciation for the Macedonian government’s strong friendship and support for Israel.

Israeli VP Moshe Ya'alon speaking at the ceremony. He is backed by Macedonian Honorary Guard soldiers bearing the ceremonial urns of Macedonian Holocaust victims (photo: Chris Deliso)

In his heartfelt keynote address, President Ivanov noted the many contributions Macedonia’s Jews had made to the country during the past century, including Jewish participation in the struggle for freedom, first from the Ottoman Empire and later from other occupying forces. And, though the modern-day Jewish community in Macedonia essentially dates from Ladino-speaking Sephardic Jews who migrated to the area from Spain during Ottoman times, President Ivanov reminded guests that the expansive archeological site of Stobi (a former Roman city, in the center of the country), holds the remains of one the oldest synagogue in Europe- proof that the Jewish heritage here is much older.

On the following day, Thursday, the major dedication ceremony for the new commemorative center was held under the patronage of Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. The event began with a solemn procession led by the military guard, transporting the urns from the Skopje City Museum, down the pedestrianized Ulica Makedonija, and across the historic Stone Bridge to the site of the new complex- set amidst a veritable construction zone of new buildings, statues and other structures now being developed as part of the Skopje 2014 architectural program.

Here, several hundred seated guests from the diplomatic corps (including leaders of neighboring states Bamir Topi of Albania, and Filip Vujanovic of Montenegro) were flanked by throngs of well-wishers and numerous journalists. Several speakers, beginning with Macedonian Holocaust Fund Director Liljana Misrahi, spoke of the importance the new center will have for perpetuating the legacy of Jewish life in Macedonia, and educating locals and visitors alike about the identity, role and significance of the Jews of Macedonia.

Several times during the week it was noted, as by the Macedonian Jewish Community’s president, Bjanka Subotic that most Jewish survivors of WWII have since died, and with their immediate descendents being but few, the present generations have a duty to carry on their memory. For Misrahi, the new commemorative center will serve as an answer to the rhetorical question of “but mother, who are we?” to come from future generations of Jewish children. The detailed exhibits, histories, photographs and other materials inside the center go a considerable way towards answering these questions.

Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski addresses the guests near the end of the ceremony (photo: Chris Deliso)

Representing the state of Israel, Vice Prime-Minister Moshe Ya’alon gave a strong speech which highlighted the importance of Macedonia’s Holocaust memorial center – one of only four in the world – in the context of current realities of resurgent anti-Semitism in Europe, and even in developed EU countries such as Holland, Denmark and Britain. Reminding the audience that the seeds of the Holocaust were planted in the years preceding the Second World War, when anti-Semitism grew unchecked and was met by “indifference,” Ya’alon also spoke of the need for the West to confront powers that both deny the Holocaust and seek to destroy the state of Israel, specifying President Ahmadinejad of Iran.

Another prominent international speaker, the Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Affairs for the American-Jewish Committee and President of the International Advisory Board of the Holocaust Fund of the Jews from Macedonia, reinforced the severity of what the Macedonian Jews suffered and the importance of what their descendents have now achieved. “The tragedy of the Jews of Macedonia during the Holocaust is a particularly painful one, even when placed amidst the many other horrific accounts of deportation and murder,” he stated.

For many, the most moving part of the ceremony was the final recitation of the Jewish prayers Kaddish and El Malei Rachamim. Recited under clear blue skies, the ethereal, elegiac sound of the prayers emanating from the former Jewish quarter felt both appropriate and unreal, since the sounds emanating from the city’s “old town” today are primarily the cacophony of mosques and occasional clang of a church bell.

Even though things will never be as they once were in a country where little more than 200 Jews survive, at least for a moment one could feel something of what the culturally richer Skopje of old must have been like. Plagued as it still is by inter-ethnic and inter-religious mistrust, Macedonia today would be a significantly better place had its Jewish population survived to enhance the culture and diversity of daily life. This painful point was one that none of the speakers mentioned directly, though it is certainly obvious when countenanced from the point of view of current-day events here.

A recitation of elegiac Hebrew prayers near the end of the dedication ceremony was partially accompanied by many in the audience (photo: Chris Deliso)

Following the ceremony, guests were invited to take a complementary tour of the new Holocaust Memorial Center. It became immediately clear that, despite the absence of much news about progress over the past few years, planners had indeed been very active in developing what is certainly the most modern museum in the country, and one of the most engrossing and unique in the region.

Upon entering, guests are treated to old photos of some of the Macedonian Jews who died in the Holocaust (this reporter was moved to see one elderly man point to one of these photos, sighing and telling his friend, ‘ah, here’s my father’). A huge chandelier of sorts, made up of 7,148 delicate strands (one for each of the victims) hangs from the center of the facility, from the third floor through the open center, interspersed with a Macedonian phrase calling for remembrance.

Curious visitors get a first glimpse at the Holocaust Memorial Center's fascinating displays (photo: Chris Deliso)

Further on, visitors can learn through maps, photos and other displays historical, social and cultural details of the Jews of Macedonia and the Balkans. These carefully prepared exhibits are remarkable, and not only because (unlike with many museums in the region) the English translations are excellent. Moving onwards through the center, one not only goes backwards in time but also gains an appreciation and understanding of a once vital, and now all but lost part of the Macedonian population. The quality and tasteful presentation of the whole entity will surely serve as an example for similar cultural centers in Macedonia and beyond.

In the buzz of all these new happenings, the main annual event – the March 11th commemoration of the Holocaust at Butel Cemetery in Skopje – was unfortunately omitted from most media coverage. This melancholy annual gathering allows the survivors – each year, fewer and fewer – and their descendants, well-wishers and foreign diplomats – to gather and ensure that their suffering is never forgotten.

A luminous series of fine strands with lettering urging viewers to remember the victims of the Holocaust is the eye-catching centerpiece of the new structure, visible from above and below (photo: Chris Deliso)

However, with the major steps that the Jewish Community has achieved over a long period of hard work and long cooperation with the state of Israel, international Jewish organizations and other supporters, they have now finally achieved something remarkable, and something that will put this small Balkan country on ‘the map’ of international Jewish sights- as it well deserves.

In the form of the Holocaust Memorial Center, a symbol of the legacy of Macedonia’s Jews will endure far into the future, a testimony which would certainly have made their ancestors proud.

………………………………..

Readers who enjoyed this article may also like the present author’s 2006 essay “Letter from Macedonia,” on the history and modern-day experience of the Jewish community in the country, with unique, first-hand testimony from community members.

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