Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Nuclear stockpile security

Musharraf Exit May Affect U.S. Plans

Xenia Dormandy — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 00:00:48 -0500

Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, was interviewed for National Public Radio's All Things Considered on the impact of Musharraf's resignation for U.S. foreign policy.

'Appropriate Effective' Nuclear Security and Accounting — What is It?

Matthew Bunn — Fri, 18 Jul 2008 13:49:25 -0500

Project on Managing the Atom's Matthew Bunn discusses United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 — a major new tool for combating nuclear terrorism and proliferation that is little used.

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 20:12:31 -0500

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay

William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 19:31:18 -0500

Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.

100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld

Michael Bronner — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 17:08:26 -0500

This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.

Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA

Graham Allison and Matthew Bunn — Fri, 13 Jun 2008 15:47:29 -0500

The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.

Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?

Hui Zhang — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 15:16:37 -0500

Hui Zhang argues that an effective universal Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would make an important contribution to nuclear disarmament, the nonproliferation regime, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. However, such a FMCT must have a credible verification regime. Dr. Zhang suggests that it should be technically feasible to establish an effectively verifiable FMCT at a reasonable cost, while protecting national security secrets.

The Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism — And Next Steps To Reduce The Danger

Matthew Bunn — Wed, 02 Apr 2008 12:20:43 -0500

Dr. Bunn’s testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate urges a global campaign to ensure that every nuclear weapon and every cache of potential nuclear bomb material worldwide is secured against the kinds of threats terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. Bunn highlights the good and bad news about the risk of nuclear terrorism, and assesses the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack. Bunn then proposes several steps to reduce the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack

The Transfer of Power in Russia

Graham Allison — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 13:37:28 -0500

March 14, 2008

Though the outcome of the presidential election in Russia was a foregone conclusion, many questions remain about when and how which powers will be transferred from whom to whom. Also included below are speculations from Russian colleagues about what the new administration and cabinet may look like.

Expanding Nuclear Energy, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Matthew Bunn — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 16:28:03 -0500

March 13, 2008

Matthew Bunn presented "Expanding Nuclear Energy, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism" to the Energy & Security Search Seminar on March 13, 2008.

New Iran IAEA Report: Reading Between the Lines

Graham Allison — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:08:14 -0600

February 28, 2008

With the International Atomic Energy Agency scheduled to release its much-anticipated report on Iran within the next few days, Graham Allison offers his insight and analysis — as well as questions that remain unanswered.

A Nuclear Site Is Breached

Micah Zenko — Thu, 20 Dec 2007 09:39:44 -0600

"...nuclear terrorism is a global issue, extending far beyond the familiar policy talking points of U.S. cooperation with Russia over its nuclear stockpiles, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the face of threats from Islamic extremists, and concerns that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities it could provide a bomb to sympathetic terrorist organizations....the essential ingredients required for making a nuclear weapon exist in more than 40 countries, in facilities with differing levels of security. Unfortunately, there are still no binding global standards on how to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material."

Matthew Bunn Wins 2007 Hans Bethe Award

Matthew Bunn — Mon, 03 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0600

Matthew Bunn was awarded the Hans Bethe Award for science in service of a more secure world from the Federation of American Scientists, on December 3, 2007 in Washington D.C.

Global Fissile Materials Report 2007

Mon, 01 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Over the past six decades, our understanding of the nuclear danger has expanded from the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals created by the superpowers in the Cold War to encompass the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to additional states and now also to terrorist groups. To reduce this danger, it is essential to secure and to sharply reduce all stocks of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, the key materials in nuclear weapons, and to limit any further production.

The mission of the IPFM is to advance the technical basis for cooperative international policy initiatives to achieve these goals.

Disposition of Excess Highly Enriched Uranium

Matthew Bunn and Anatoli Diakov — Mon, 01 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0500

This chapter describes the progress of the Russian and U.S. HEU disposition programs and how they could be expanded and accelerated. It also provides a brief update on the progress of the international programs to clean out and dispose of civilian HEU. The quantities of HEU involved are much smaller than those in the weapons programs but civilian sites are typically much less secure than military ones. Cleaning them out may therefore contribute more to reducing the overall danger of nuclear theft.

Disposition of Excess Plutonium

Matthew Bunn and Anatoli Diakov — Mon, 01 Oct 2007 00:00:00 -0500

This chapter describes disposition options and assesses the Russian and U.S. programs. The discussion is also relevant to the problem of disposing of the world's growing stocks of separated civil plutonium —especially in the United Kingdom, which currently has no disposition plan.

Bombs We Can Stop

Matthew Bunn — Sun, 30 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0500

"William Langewiesche has the reputation of being one of America's best investigative reporters. Unfortunately, he has written a very bad book on nuclear proliferation." Matthew Bunn reviews The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, by William Langewiesche.

Securing the Bomb 2007

Matthew Bunn — Wed, 26 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Managing the Atom Senior Research Associate Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2007 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.

Nuclear Terrorism FAQ

Wed, 26 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0500

The Nuclear Threat Initiative and project on Managing the Atom answer 21 of the most frequently asked questions about nuclear terrorism.

Thwarting Terrorists: More to Be Done

Matthew Bunn — Wed, 26 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0500

"...much progress has been made toward upgrading security for nuclear stockpiles. The bad news is that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries, and terrorists are actively trying to get a nuclear bomb or the materials to make one."

The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City

Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Dr. William J. Perry and Dr. Michael M. May — Sat, 01 Sep 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Failure to develop a comprehensive contingency plan, such as the one proposed here, and inform the American public, where appropriate, about its particulars will only serve to amplify the devastating impact of any nuclear attack on a U.S. city

Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats

Matthew Bunn and Tom Bielefeld — Thu, 12 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Urgent actions are needed to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11. Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the materials to make them. There are scores of sites where the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist, in dozens of countries worldwide. There are thousands of sites worldwide where radiological materials exist. Many of these sites are not sufficiently secured to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and the scope and pace of the U.S. and world response. While the gap has narrowed significantly in recent years, much more needs to be done. This paper describes the nuclear and radiological terrorism threats, analyzes the actions taken so far to address these threats, and recommends further actions going forward.

The Lobster Summit

Graham Allison — Thu, 05 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0500

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. Bush's decision to award President Vladimir Putin the unique distinction of a weekend in Kennebunkport with two American presidents flummoxed supporters and critics alike. Over the past year, no international leader has been more critical of the president than his Russian guest.

Fast Action Needed to Avert Nuclear Terror Strike on U.S.

Graham Allison — Mon, 02 Jul 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Before 9/11, most Americans found the idea that international terrorists could mount an attack on their homeland and kill thousands of innocent citizens not merely unlikely but inconceivable. After nearly six years without a second attack on U.S. soil, some skeptics suggest that 9/11 was a 100-year flood. The view that terrorists are preparing even more deadly assaults seems as far-fetched to them as the possibility of terrorists crashing passenger jets into the World Trade Center did before that fateful Tuesday morning in 2001. And yet the danger of a nuclear attack by terrorists is not only very real but disturbingly likely.

Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks

Sheena Chestnut — Sat, 30 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Policymakers and scholars agree that North Korea’s nuclear program heightens the risk of nuclear transfer to the global black market. Althuogh the North Koreans engage in illicit activity primarily to acquire hard currency, broader economic and ideological factors may also contribute to a decision to export nuclear materials. North Korea also risks losing control over its smuggling networks as it relies more and more on nonstate criminal actors. The United States, then, must seek to develop and employ new strategies to pursue and dismantle these networks as well as offer economic incentives to the regime. In the case of North Korea, countersmuggling and counterproliferation could go hand in hand.

The Khan Job

Tom Bielefeld and Hassan Abbas — Sat, 30 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Tom Bielefeld and Hassan Abbas review Der Physiker der Mullahs (The Mullah's Physicist), a film by Egmont R. Koch, broadcast on German Public Television (WDR) on February 22, 2007.

No Loose Nukes: Preventing a Terrorist Nuclear Attack on the U.S.

Graham Allison — Thu, 28 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Before 9/11 most Americans found the idea that international terrorists could mount an attack on their homeland and kill thousands of innocent citizens not just unlikely but inconceivable.

After the Bomb

Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Dr. William J. Perry and Dr. Michael M. May — Tue, 12 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0500

June 12, 2007

Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and Michael May call on the United States government to formulate contingency plans that may save thousands of lives and billions of dollars, prevent panic and promote recovery should a nuclear weapon go off in an American city.

Revisiting North Korea's Nuclear Test

Hui Zhang — Fri, 01 Jun 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Hui Zhang re-examines the North Korean explosion on October 9, 2006. His research suggests that the test was likely not a failure if Pyongyang had planned for a yield of 4 kt, as it told Beijing prior to the event.

The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City

Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Dr. William J. Perry and Dr. Michael M. May — Thu, 31 May 2007 00:00:00 -0500

May 31, 2007

The Preventive Defense Project convened a workshop of leading federal government civilian and military officials, scientists, policy experts, and journalists in Washington, D.C. to address "The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City."