Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs - Nuclear weapons

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

Pavel Podvig — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 20:12:31 -0500

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay

William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova — Tue, 08 Jul 2008 19:31:18 -0500

Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.

100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld

Michael Bronner — Mon, 30 Jun 2008 17:08:26 -0500

This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.

Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA

Graham Allison and Matthew Bunn — Fri, 13 Jun 2008 15:47:29 -0500

The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.

Is There a New U.S. Policy for Pakistan?

Xenia Dormandy — Mon, 09 Jun 2008 12:00:20 -0500

"How much will the War on Terror define the new President’s agenda towards Pakistan, as it has President Bush’s? What will this mean for America’s broader policy toward the country, and what are the implications, if any, for India?"

Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters

Richard Clarke — Thu, 29 May 2008 10:11:03 -0500

May 29, 2008

It's not just Bush and Cheney that are to blame. The system is broken. That's the message in this provocative sequel to Against All Enemies. When Richard Clarke apologized for 9-11, he never thought that there would be so many more government failures in so short a time, but climate change, Katrina, the struggle with al Qaeda, the insecurity in cyberspace, and the failure of homeland security all bespeak a larger problem, a systemic failure. Clarke documents the failures and suggests solutions for making government work better in its most important job, protecting us.

U.S. Worry Grows over Pakistan's Tribal Peace Deal

Xenia Dormandy — Tue, 06 May 2008 09:34:47 -0500

May 6, 2008

Jackie Northam of NPR interviews Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, regarding the new Pakistani government's negotiations with militants tied to al Qaeda.

Should and Can the FMCT Be Effectively Verified?

Hui Zhang — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 15:16:37 -0500

Hui Zhang argues that an effective universal Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would make an important contribution to nuclear disarmament, the nonproliferation regime, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. However, such a FMCT must have a credible verification regime. Dr. Zhang suggests that it should be technically feasible to establish an effectively verifiable FMCT at a reasonable cost, while protecting national security secrets.

Next Steps to Strengthen the National Nuclear Security Administration's Efforts To Prevent Nuclear Proliferation

Matthew Bunn — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 12:28:39 -0500

Matthew Bunn testified to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Appropriations, United States Senate about critical issues for U.S. and world security — nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and what more the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) can do to prevent them.

Actions Now for the Day After: Findings of the Preventive Defense Day After Project

Dr. Ashton B. Carter — Tue, 15 Apr 2008 15:56:55 -0500

PDP Co-Director Ashton B. Carter testifies before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

PDP Co-Director Carter testifies before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Tue, 15 Apr 2008 14:17:09 -0500

PDP Co-Director Dr. Ashton B. Carter testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs at its hearing on "Nuclear Terrorism: Confronting the Challenges of the Day After."

India's Key Foreign Policy Issues

Xenia Dormandy — Mon, 07 Apr 2008 12:00:59 -0500

April 7, 2008

In recent years, India's military, diplomatic and economic energies have expanded far beyond Nehru's Non-Aligned position. But what does that mean for India, its region, and the United States?

The Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism — And Next Steps To Reduce The Danger

Matthew Bunn — Wed, 02 Apr 2008 12:20:43 -0500

Dr. Bunn’s testimony to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate urges a global campaign to ensure that every nuclear weapon and every cache of potential nuclear bomb material worldwide is secured against the kinds of threats terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. Bunn highlights the good and bad news about the risk of nuclear terrorism, and assesses the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack. Bunn then proposes several steps to reduce the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack

Review Panel on Future Directions for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

Dr. Ashton B. Carter and The Honorable Robert G. Joseph — Sun, 23 Mar 2008 10:52:37 -0500

PDP Co-Director Ashton B. Carter and the Honorable Robert G. Joseph co-chaired a Review Panel on Future Directions for DTRA Missions and Capabilities to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty Ratification

Matthew Fuhrmann and Xiaojun Li — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 13:48:54 -0500

Matthew Fuhrmann and co-author Xiaojun Li examine when and why states ratify regional nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties.

Expanding Nuclear Energy, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Matthew Bunn — Thu, 13 Mar 2008 16:28:03 -0500

March 13, 2008

Matthew Bunn presented "Expanding Nuclear Energy, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism" to the Energy & Security Search Seminar on March 13, 2008.

Oil for Nukes — Mostly a Bad Idea

Matthew Fuhrmann — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 16:49:05 -0600

"...In 1975, France signed an agreement with Iraq authorizing the export of a research reactor and highly enriched uranium. According to French officials at the time, their aim was to obtain a permanent and secure oil supply from a country that provided 20 percent of its oil.

It worked. But it also had tremendous consequences for international and regional security."

New Iran IAEA Report: Reading Between the Lines

Graham Allison — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 08:08:14 -0600

February 28, 2008

With the International Atomic Energy Agency scheduled to release its much-anticipated report on Iran within the next few days, Graham Allison offers his insight and analysis — as well as questions that remain unanswered.

What Do We Mean by Zero? Strategic Implications of Different Approaches to the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Matthew Bunn — Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:58:08 -0600

February 22, 2008

Matthew Bunn presented "What Do We Mean by Zero? Strategic Implications of Different Approaches to the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization conference on "Nuclear Weapons: The Greatest Peril to Civilization," in New Haven, Conn on February 21-22, 2008.

New Iran IAEA Report: Be Cautious

Joshua Gleis — Fri, 22 Feb 2008 08:48:32 -0600

One should not expect much benefit to come out of the impending IAEA report discussing Iranian nuclear activity, Joshua Gleis writes.

Science and Technology for Sustainable Well-Being

John P. Holdren — Fri, 25 Jan 2008 21:29:19 -0600

"I would urge every scientist and engineer with an interest in the intersection of S&T with sustainable well-being...to 'tithe' 10% of your professional time and effort to working in these and other ways to increase the benefits of S&T for the human condition and to decrease the liabilities. If so much as a substantial fraction of the world's scientists and engineers resolved to do this much, the acceleration of progress toward sustainable well-being for all of Earth's inhabitants would surprise us all."

Toward a Nuclear-Free World

Dr. William J. Perry, George P. Shultz, Henry A. Kissinger and Senator Sam Nunn — Tue, 15 Jan 2008 16:02:36 -0600

January 15, 2008

George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn authored an Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, identifying a series of steps needed to pull the world "back from the nuclear precipice." Belfer Center Director Graham Allison, Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project Ashton P. Carter, and Managing the Atom Senior Research Associate Matthew Bunn attended the conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution that developed these steps, and endorsed the Op-Ed.

Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Matthew Fuhrmann and Bryan Early — Thu, 10 Jan 2008 09:58:46 -0600

The article explains why in September 1991, shortly after the attempted putsch against Gorbachev, George H.W. Bush launched the unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date The article argues that an explanation rooted in prospect theory and a focus on Bush as an individual decision-maker offers the most explanatory power.

A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine

Walter C. Ladwig III — Thu, 03 Jan 2008 13:32:58 -0600

India’s inability to coerce Pakistan into halting its support for insurgents in Kashmir, as well as its experience in past conflicts with Pakistan, led it to develop Cold Start—a new offensive military doctrine that will allow it to mobilize quickly and retaliate in a limited manner. Although India is far from realizing its goal, this break from a traditional defensive strategy deserves scrutiny. A history of misperception and mistrust between India and Pakistan, poor intelligence, and domestic insecurity suggests that limited war could quickly escalate to the nuclear threshold, posing a serious risk to the stability of the subcontinent and the rest of the world.

Correspondence: Do Small Arsenals Deter?

Ward Wilson, Rajesh M. Basrur and Michael D. Cohen — Tue, 01 Jan 2008 13:46:43 -0600

January 1, 2008

Rajesh Basrur and Michael Cohen respond to Ward Wilson's Spring 2007 International Security article, "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima."

Pakistan: What About the Nukes?

Graham Allison — Fri, 28 Dec 2007 14:48:21 -0600

December 28, 2007

The assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto reminds us starkly of an unanswered question most of us would prefer to forget: how secure are Pakistan's nuclear weapons? Could Al Qaeda or another terrorist group acquire a warhead or enough radioactive material to create a dirty bomb?

Exchanging Rhetoric for Reason with Iran

Jason Notte and Martin B. Malin — Wed, 05 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0600

According to Martin B. Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the National Intelligence Estimate's not-so-shocking revelation may give the United States and its European allies greater latitude in their discussions with the Iranian government.

Matthew Bunn Wins 2007 Hans Bethe Award

Matthew Bunn — Mon, 03 Dec 2007 00:00:00 -0600

Matthew Bunn was awarded the Hans Bethe Award for science in service of a more secure world from the Federation of American Scientists, on December 3, 2007 in Washington D.C.

Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks

Matthew Bunn — Thu, 15 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0600

Matthew Bunn presented "Constraining Iran's Nuclear Program: Assessing Options and Risks" to staff members at Oak Ridge National Laboratory on November 15, 2007. He argues, it is time to begin thinking seriously about what the least dangerous options involving some centrifuges in Iran might be, and explores the risks and advantages of an option involving 1-4 cascades with international ownership and a 24/7 international staff for all centrifuge activities.

Pakistan's Political Unrest Prompts Questions About Nuclear Arsenal

Matthew Bunn — Tue, 13 Nov 2007 00:00:00 -0600

Matthew Bunn was a guest on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer discussing Pakistan's nuclear security.

Bunn said, in part: "I think there is a real, immediate danger, not because Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles are not well-guarded -- I think they are -- but there are huge threats in Pakistan. It is, after all, al-Qaida's world headquarters, and there are nuclear and military insiders with Islamic extremist sympathies and, in some cases, with a demonstrated record of selling sensitive nuclear technologies around the world, in the case of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network. So while there's a very focused nuclear security system in place, that system has to deal with very big threats."