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<channel>
	<title>Biometric Update</title>
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	<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com</link>
	<description>Biometrics News, Companies and Explainers</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:29:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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<site xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">66434804</site>	<item>
		<title>Is Utah’s SEDI the future of digital identity in the United States?</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/is-utahs-sedi-the-future-of-digital-identity-in-the-united-states</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/is-utahs-sedi-the-future-of-digital-identity-in-the-united-states#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joel R. McConvey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:29:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil / National ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital ID infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mDL (mobile driver's license)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Utah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Utah State-Endorsed Digital Identity (SEDI)]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363916</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="1600" height="900" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id.jpeg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" fetchpriority="high" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id.jpeg 1600w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id-300x169.jpeg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id-1024x576.jpeg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id-150x84.jpeg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id-768x432.jpeg 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/02133648/utah-digital-id-1536x864.jpeg 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px" />
		Utah’s State Endorsed Digital Identity (<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/utah-pushes-sedi-privacy-framework-as-alternative-to-digital-id-tracking">SEDI</a>) has drawn attention for its novel approach, which some believe marks a paradigm shift in public sector digital infrastructure. This week, a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers is gathering in Park City, Utah to explore how the program plots a course for digital credentials beyond mobile driver’s licenses.

New concerns about AI fraud are driving the push for secure digital credentials, with 21 states already allowing residents to digitally store cryptographically protected credentials in digital wallets. Utah plans initial SEDI pilot releases in early 2027, with broader deployment expected through 2027 and 2028.

A report from the Tennessee Journal <a href="https://pro.stateaffairs.com/tn/politics/lawmakers-gather-in-utah-to-build-a-multistate-digital-id-model-bill">quotes</a> Utah Rep. Paul Cutler, who says states will use the third annual <a href="https://sedi.utah.gov/summit/">SEDI Summit</a> to collaborate on developing technical standards for privacy compliance.

“The vision is that going forward we need not just a mobile driver’s license, but a platform that allows all sorts of types of digital credentials, such as your professional license,” Cutler says. A future SEDI model could allow holders to qualify for state benefits, guard against fraud and identity theft, streamline benefit applications, and preserve privacy when proving age.

The three-day summit brings together lawmakers from Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Carolina and Vermont, as well as officials from California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Wyoming, and federal officials.

Notable industry <a href="https://www.sedisummit.com/speakers">attendees</a> include the <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/fido-alliance">FIDO Alliance</a>’s Andrew Shikiar, Jeremy Grant of the Better Identity Coalition, Kay Chopard of the Kantara Initiative, several representatives from NIST, biometrics and identity providers <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/socure">Socure</a>, <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/vouched">Vouched</a>, <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/spruceid">Spruce ID</a> and <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/dock">Dock Labs</a>.
<h2>Minnesota among states set to introduce SEDI bills</h2>
Utah is <a href="https://sedi.utah.gov/bring-sedi-to-your-state/">actively promoting</a> SEDI as a model for other states to adopt, and Cutler expects lawmakers in several states to introduce SEDI legislation next year. Among them is Minnesota Rep. Kristin Bahner, who is eager to introduce more protections against fraud in the wake of multiple <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020s_Minnesota_fraud_scandals">fraud scandals</a> in the state.

The ACLU has also praised SEDI's recognition that identity is inherent to the individual rather than something granted by the state.

The framework is designed to support privacy-preserving verification, including selective disclosure and offline credential checks, without requiring routine validation against a central government database. As a post on the Digital Government Network <a href="https://digitalgov.network/utah-sedi-framework/">explains</a>, this approach makes selective disclosure part of the conceptual, regulatory and technical architecture, rather than relying on call-home validation loops.

“Because SEDI asserts that human identity exists independent of government recognition, the state no longer creates the identity; it merely provides cryptographic signatures endorsing factual claims maintained in official ledgers,” the post says.

“This philosophical inversion ensures that citizens are the autonomous roots of trust in any digital interaction, positioning the government as a trusted notary rather than an omniscient gatekeeper.”
<h2>Model imposes legal duty to limit use of data for stated purpose</h2>
Of note to identity providers is the statutory “Duty of Loyalty” Utah has <a href="https://sedi.utah.gov/digital-identity-bill-of-rights/">imposed</a> on relying parties. “In conventional models, the terms of identity verification are often dictated by proprietary service contracts heavily skewed in favor of data brokers,” says DGN. “SEDI’s Duty of Loyalty legally prohibits relying parties from profiling, tracking, or exploiting the data-minimized assertions they receive.”

In theory, such restrictions could undermine business models built around the secondary use of identity data. It remains to be seen what they mean for verifiers.

The ACLU has <a href="https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/utah-digital-id-law">praised</a> the law's privacy protections, while warning that it may not adequately restrict unnecessary identity checks by private businesses and that the Duty of Loyalty's effectiveness will depend on enforcement.

SEDI’s architects are also aware of the importance of interoperability in designing an effective digital identity system. The legislation “explicitly creates a multi-state consortium model” that relies on open, royalty-free standards and localized public key infrastructure rather than proprietary vendor ecosystems, so that other jurisdictions can cryptographically verify Utah-endorsed credentials without backend integration or shared databases.

The breadth of participation suggests growing interest in Utah's SEDI model. The summit's outcomes should offer a clearer indication of whether that interest will translate into legislation and implementation in other states.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363916</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>EUDI Wallets on track for uneven launch and hesitant relying parties</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/eudi-wallets-on-track-for-uneven-launch-and-hesitant-relying-parties</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/eudi-wallets-on-track-for-uneven-launch-and-hesitant-relying-parties#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Burt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:54:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil / National ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Features and Interviews]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digidentity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital wallets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU Digital Identity Wallet]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FIDO Alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Signicat]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363908</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="1520" height="990" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone.jpg 1520w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone-300x195.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone-1024x667.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone-150x98.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/12105942/eudi-wallet-phone-768x500.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1520px) 100vw, 1520px" />
		The rollout might have gone more smoothly if it had been phased in, as <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/signicat">Signicat</a> VP Digital Identity &amp; Regulation Jon Ølnes suggests. But with just weeks to go before the deadline for the availability of European Union Digital Identity Wallets, several key questions remain to be answered, and cross-border consistency is a work in progress.

<em>Biometric Update</em>’s online video presentation, “<a href="https://youtu.be/-rl0uX6SVQQ?si=EcVfDYGheHDjktr_">From issuance to acceptance: is Europe ready for the EUDI Wallet?</a>” brought together the perspectives of a wallet issuer, an orchestration provider and an industry body producing standards and specifications.

A lot of work remains to inspire public trust and regular use, however, according to <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/fido-alliance">FIDO Alliance</a> Director of Ecosystem Development Diego Zavala.

A version of the EUDI Wallet that supported only PID authentication, mobile driver’s licenses and age verification could be ready now, Ølnes says. Instead, some EU member states will likely be ready at launch, while others launch with limited functionality, or after the appointed date.

“There’s not going to be a regulator handing out fines on day one,” <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/digidentity">Digidentity</a> Managing Director Fred Slikker points out. “That’s not a realistic proposition.”

So while the wallet introduction deadline is unlikely to be moved, relying parties seem prepared to wait “until we get to a more mature state within the ecosystem,” Slikker says.

The key question for Zavala is “how do we ensure trust is there?”

Differences in national EUDI Wallet capabilities are one thing, but no national wallet is yet <a href="https://eidas.ec.europa.eu/efda/wallet/lists-of-trusted-entities/wallet-providers">listed as certified on the European Commission's eIDAS Dashboard</a>, raising questions about how relying parties will establish trust in the meantime. Ølnes says it could be until late in 2027 before all of the formal requirements for certification have been fulfilled.

There are some built-in limitations, as well, such as usefulness outside of the EU. A company that has customers in the EU but is not registered in a member state cannot sign up as a relying party.

The wallets also promise clear advantages across the EU. It will be easier for people to share information with a government agency or bank. The ability to create a qualified electronic signature (QES) within the wallet from a government-issued PID will empower a lot more people to use QESs.

The highly engaged live audience contributed a large number of informed questions that influenced the course of the conversation and indicate the seriousness with which the digital identity community is treating the EUDI Wallet launch.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363908</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>CDPI joins Digital Public Goods Alliance to support DPI initiatives</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/cdpi-joins-digital-public-goods-alliance-to-support-dpi-initiatives</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/cdpi-joins-digital-public-goods-alliance-to-support-dpi-initiatives#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lu-Hai Liang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:46:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ID for All]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trade Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Centre for Digital Public Infrastructure (CDPI)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital Public Goods Alliance DPGA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital public infrastructure]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363905</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="2048" height="1534" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-scaled.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-scaled.jpg 2048w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-300x225.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-1024x767.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-150x112.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-768x575.jpg 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/19172426/digital-inclusion-1536x1150.jpg 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" />
		The Centre for Digital Public Infrastructure (CDPI) has joined the Digital Public Goods Alliance (DPGA) as the two organizations enter a partnership focused on helping governments develop digital public infrastructure (DPI).

The membership builds on an existing relationship between the two. CDPI already co-stewards the DPGA's Digital Public Goods for DPI Collection, launched in October with Co-Develop, bringing together 18 digital public goods assessed against DPI-specific criteria.

“CDPI brings such strength to our community through its vendor-neutral support to governments and co-stewardships of the DPGs for DPI Collection, ensuring that digital public goods deliver real, lasting impact for people around the world,” <a href="https://www.digitalpublicgoods.net/blog/cdpi-joins-the-digital-public-goods-alliance">says</a> Liv Marte Nordhaug, CEO, DPGA Secretariat.

The partnership will support efforts to help governments adopt open, interoperable and reusable digital systems, according to the organizations. The announcement was made at the DPGA Annual Members Meeting in Paris. Earlier this year, DPGA <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202602/dpga-report-examines-how-digital-public-goods-strengthen-identity-infrastructure">released a report</a> exploring how DPGs are reshaping national identity systems and DPI.

Planned activities include vendor-neutral technical advisory services and hands-on bootcamps where government engineering teams build working DPI use cases in approximately one week.

The collaboration also includes work on resources such as the DPI-AI Framework, which aims to help governments incorporate AI into public services while maintaining interoperability and openness. In an <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/new-framework-argues-government-ai-depends-on-strong-dpi">interview with <em>Biometric Update</em></a>, Daniel Abadie, CDPI's chief growth officer, has argued for strong DPI foundations to scaffold the implementation of AI within government systems.

CDPI is a non-profit that provides technical and architectural advice to governments on a pro bono basis. It has worked with more than 25 countries across Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean on DPI projects.

“Joining the DPGA feels like a natural progression,” comments Abadie, chief growth officer, CDPI. “We already share an ecosystem and the same goals on impact, so becoming a member is really about deepening a relationship that’s already there. We’re looking forward to growing it with the community.”

The DPGA welcomed four new members at the Paris meeting: CDPI, Kenya, Kazakhstan and the Inria Foundation, bringing membership to 60 organizations.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363905</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>UK biometrics commissioner warns facial recognition oversight plans lack detail</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-biometrics-commissioner-warns-facial-recognition-oversight-plans-lack-detail</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-biometrics-commissioner-warns-facial-recognition-oversight-plans-lack-detail#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joel R. McConvey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:59:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facial Recognition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Law Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[live facial recognition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[video surveillance]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363887</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="1024" height="683" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/03114134/essex-police-live-FRT.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/03114134/essex-police-live-FRT.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/03114134/essex-police-live-FRT-300x200.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/03114134/essex-police-live-FRT-150x100.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/03114134/essex-police-live-FRT-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" />
		UK Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner Professor William Webster has published a statement on the government's response to its <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-unveils-plan-for-police-facial-recognition-guardrails-and-oversight">consultation</a> on facial recognition, biometrics and related technologies in law enforcement.

The government response to the facial recognition consultation, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commissioners-statement-on-facial-recognition-consultation-response">Webster says</a>, “marks an important step towards primary legislation that will provide a clear legal basis for their use, protect the public and build confidence in how these technologies are deployed.”

But there is much at stake in getting it right – namely, fundamental rights such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to privacy. Safeguards are necessary, and Webster says the proposed framework “offers the possibility of providing these safeguards whilst at the same time allowing the police to make the best lawful use of emerging biometric surveillance technology.”

Webster says more detail is needed on measures of necessity and proportionality, and on oversight powers covering audits, inspections and compliance. Commitments outlined in the response “must now translate into effective governance arrangements.”
<h2>National standards can provide foundation</h2>
Webster lauds the pledge to publish new statutory codes of practice for law enforcement and the <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/ada-lovelace-institute-wants-uk-to-make-retail-facial-recognition-code-mandatory">commercial sector</a>, and welcomes the framework's extension across public services: “this is an important step as it recognizes that law enforcement and public safety extend across the public and commercial sectors and is not just the remit of the police.” He believes allocating oversight power to a single body will help tidy up a cluttered regulatory landscape.

He hopes to see the government keep pace with technological development, and to adopt an adaptable model that can accommodate new technologies as they emerge and evolve – especially given how common live facial recognition and video analytics capabilities are becoming in surveillance camera networks, body cams and drones.

Webster calls for consistent compliance with national standards for live facial recognition deployments. These, Webster says, can build on existing standards for video surveillance camera systems promoted by the Home Secretary’s existing <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b91a240f0b62826a046c0/Surveillance_Camera_Code_of_Practice_WEB.pdf">Surveillance Camera Code of Practice</a>, and on the work undertaken by the Office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the principles established in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
<h2>Resources necessary to ensure oversight is effective</h2>
Webster concludes his statement with a series of questions that he believes need to be answered before the Police Reform Bill gets laid before Parliament. “What governance, accountability and oversight mechanisms will be committed to in primary legislation and what will be contained in the proposed new statutory code of practice? What will the measures for necessity and <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-plan-to-use-lfr-for-immigration-control-tests-limit-of-proportionality">proportionality</a> look like?”

“Who will determine the efficacy and acceptability of individual technological applications? What will the commitment to meaningful oversight look like in practice?”

“How will national technological and operational standards emerge? How will compliance in the commercial sector be enforced?”

And, crucially, “will the new oversight body be appropriately resourced?”

The government needs to be clearer on the new oversight body’s powers, and whether its “resources and specialist expertise will match its responsibilities.”

“This legislation represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put in place legally binding rules and safeguards that will allow for the proportionate and appropriate use of biometric surveillance technologies in society,” Webster writes. “There is an urgent need for this legislation as technologies like facial recognition are diffusing into society rapidly.”

According to a <a href="https://www.stir.ac.uk/news/2026/november-2026-news/biometrics-commissioner-and-stirling-professor-calls-for-more-detail-on-plans-to-regulate-facial-recognition-use/">post</a> from the University of Stirling – where Webster has stepped back from his academic position for a two-year stint as commissioner – at least 13 police forces in England and Wales, as well as <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-plan-to-use-lfr-for-immigration-control-tests-limit-of-proportionality">Immigration Enforcement</a>, have or use live facial recognition (LFR).  Police Scotland <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/police-scotland-demonstrates-live-facial-recognition-as-calls-for-legislation-grow">hosted a live facial recognition demonstratio</a>n as it considers introducing the technology.
<h2><strong>Facial recognition adds to UK's wider surveillance debate
</strong></h2>
In a <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/can-police-facial-recognition-regulation-bring-meaningful-reform-to-biometric-surveillance">recent piece</a> for <em>Biometric Update</em>, former UK Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner Fraser Sampson analyzes the complexities of “regulating biometric innovation without demonizing the technology.” Firm boundaries between applications, he says, are getting harder to draw. “In the UK, where those lines are already blurred, the government is promising reform of police FRT but singling out one element misses a critical point: biometric surveillance is systemic.” CCTV cameras already hoover up nearly incomprehensible amounts of biometric data – and this, too, must be addressed in the discussion about live FRT.

“Plans for reform must reflect the realities of our technology dependent lives, or we’ll be back to the same biometric drawing board we’ve been staring at for a decade.”]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363887</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>DHS faces widening vendor lock-in risks across biometric and identity systems</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/dhs-faces-widening-vendor-lock-in-risks-across-biometric-and-identity-systems</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/dhs-faces-widening-vendor-lock-in-risks-across-biometric-and-identity-systems#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anthony Kimery]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 19:07:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometric matching]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DHS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government purchasing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identity management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OBIM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vendor lock-in]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="1536" height="1024" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="DHS" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2.jpg 1536w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2-300x200.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2-150x100.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/26135657/DHS-2-768x512.jpg 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px" />
		U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy’s admission that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) cannot simply replace the contractor controlling its telecommunications network exposes a problem that extends well beyond the nation’s air traffic control system.

Federal procurement records show that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed comparable dependencies across biometric identification, immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and identity management, sometimes leaving the government without the technical rights needed to maintain or replace critical systems independently.

“I want to get away from L3Harris and get a new one, but they own the network,” Duffy said during a November 15 <a href="https://podcasts.whipscribe.com/meet-the-press/nov-15-sean-duffy-scott-colom-and-mike-pence">appearance</a> on NBC’s <em>Meet the Press</em>. “I can’t cancel the network that they own, and I operate on.”

Duffy was discussing the November 13 telecommunications failure that triggered a nationwide grounding of commercial aviation in the U.S.

The precise cause remained under investigation, but the FAA episode illustrates a problem also documented at DHS: government agencies can become so dependent on contractors' infrastructure and proprietary technology that replacing them is no longer a straightforward procurement decision.

Across DHS, the dependencies take different forms. The department acknowledges that it lacks the source code and technical rights needed to independently maintain parts of its national fingerprint-matching infrastructure.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has cited unacceptable operational risks associated with replacing its principal investigative software, while Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is examining a contractor transition involving a Border Patrol technical operations center housed in an incumbent-owned facility.

The consequences are not confined to hypothetical system failures. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation found that DHS officials were reluctant to terminate underperforming telecommunications providers because transitioning to alternatives could be equally disruptive.

Together, the records show how earlier technology decisions can limit later competition, raise switching costs, and complicate the government’s ability to modernize systems that support identification, investigations, and border security.
<h2>Proprietary control of DHS biometric matching</h2>
One of the clearest examples involves the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), which maintains the biometric identification infrastructure DHS and its law enforcement partners use.

In September, <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-biometric-overhaul-remains-tied-to-thales-as-hart-deadline-passes">DHS awarded Thales DIS USA an $11.2 million sole-source contract</a> to maintain fingerprint-matching technology associated with its legacy Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/homeland-advanced-recognition-technology-hart">HART</a>) modernization program.

The department’s October <a href="https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/ssj-fy26-0190-thales-ent-dot-fingerprint-soft-dot-lic-dot-ruim-26-00071-redacted-08-oct-2026-dot-pdf">justification</a> acknowledges that it lacks the proprietary source code, technical documentation, interfaces, or intellectual property rights needed for another company to maintain or modify the technology.

Fourteen companies responded to DHS market research, but the department concluded that none could independently support the installed Thales environment.

The dependency is especially consequential because HART was intended to replace IDENT, which began operating in 1994, with a more modern and interoperable biometric identity infrastructure.

A July 2025 GAO <a href="https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-107795/index.html">assessment</a> identified the legacy biometric system among critical aging federal technologies, reporting annual operating costs of $156 million and modernization costs estimated at $630 million. GAO also identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities that could not be remedied without modernization.

The report did not attribute those vulnerabilities to Thales technology. Nevertheless, the findings expose overlapping concerns. DHS must modernize aging biometric infrastructure while retaining proprietary components that competing contractors cannot independently maintain.

GAO has also repeatedly questioned HART’s cost estimates and schedules. Although DHS implemented several recommendations during fiscal 2026, public records reviewed for this analysis do not show that it achieved its planned September 2026 modernization milestone or eliminated the Thales dependency.
<h2>ICE’s dependence on Palantir expands</h2>
A similar problem is emerging around ICE’s investigative architecture, where replacing established software could require extensive reconstruction of integrations, workflows, and security authorizations.

An April 2025 procurement <a href="https://iptp-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2025.04.17_ICE_Limited_Sources_Justification_for_70CTD022FR0000170.pdf">justification</a> described the difficulty of replacing <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/tag/palantir">Palantir</a> technology used to process information from multiple government and external sources. ICE cited migration requirements, alternative software development, personnel training, and the time necessary to authorize a replacement system.

A subsequent justification for ICE’s Investigative Case Management system similarly emphasized established integrations and operational continuity.

The reliance is becoming more consequential.

In February 2026, DHS established a departmentwide, single-award blanket purchase <a href="https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/lsj-fy25-00257-palantir-final-redacted-for-posting-5-dot-2026-dot-pdf">agreement</a> with Palantir, potentially worth $1 billion over five years, covering software licenses, maintenance, hosting, and implementation services.

The agreement permits other DHS components to obtain Palantir technology through the same contracting vehicle.

The department’s justification drew on ICE market research evaluating 42 vendors, raising questions about how requirements from ICE’s investigative environment influenced a purchasing vehicle available across DHS.

Contract records identify an approximately $86.3 million ICE order in May, another worth $45.8 million in June, and a $32.1 million September software-as-a-service order by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

The agreement creates a mechanism to expand reliance on the company’s proprietary software.

ICE retains ownership of its underlying government data and has included migration requirements in its procurements.

Whether those protections are sufficient to reproduce customized applications, data relationships, and investigative workflows on a competing platform remains unresolved.
<h2>Contractor-owned infrastructure at the border</h2>
Another form of dependence appears in CBP’s Border Patrol Technical Operations Center, which supports surveillance, network monitoring, cybersecurity operations, and technical services.

An October 2026 <a href="https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/78582c152ff64750b292c4a67973f4d6/view"><em>Request for Information</em></a> and accompanying industry questions establish that the existing operations facility is contractor-owned.

CBP indicated that it would provide government-controlled transition materials to a successor, subject to proprietary, contractual, operational, and security restrictions.

The incumbent, EvoTech LLC, has supported Border Patrol surveillance systems through an arrangement originating under a Federal Aviation Administration contract.

CBP also awarded EvoTech a contract valued at approximately $23 million for continued support of the operations center, while separately examining future contracting arrangements.

The procurement raises questions about who controls the technical configurations, monitoring tools, operating procedures, and historical records necessary for another contractor to assume responsibility without disrupting border surveillance operations.
<h2>The documented costs of staying with incumbents</h2>
A more direct account of the operational consequences appears in GAO’s August 2026 telecommunications <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107919">investigation</a>.

The watchdog examined the federal government’s transition from legacy telecommunications contracts to the General Services Administration’s Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions program.

DHS headquarters officials described problems with providers unable to process orders and complete installations efficiently.

They also told investigators that agencies were reluctant to terminate poorly performing contractors because alternative providers might perform no better.

DHS officials described the result as effectively paralyzing transitions at large, geographically dispersed agencies.

GAO found that DHS’s monthly legacy telecommunications charges rose from about $5.86 million in February 2025 to $16.85 million in March, attributing the increase to higher prices for legacy technology during the delayed transition.

GAO also found that the government had not adequately assessed whether completed transitions caused service disruptions or whether agencies’ contingency measures worked.
<h2>Modernization can uncover dependencies accumulated over decades</h2>
An October 15 DHS procurement <a href="https://sam.gov/opp/7a97dbfdd83f440e993ee459c530402c/view">justification</a> reveals another problem involving the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the department’s information-sharing platform for government and security partners.

DHS extended a modernization contract with BridgePhase LLC for three months after technical and migration difficulties complicated project completion.

According to the justification, HSIN contains customized SharePoint communities developed over 15 to 20 years, some of which evolved into applications whose original developers are no longer available.

Reproducing those functions required additional engineering, requirements reconstruction, and validation.

The extension also allows BridgePhase to transfer architectural designs, configurations, and outstanding technical issues to a competitively selected successor responsible for operations and maintenance.

The justification does not establish that BridgePhase caused the original knowledge gaps. Rather, it illustrates how years of customization can create institutional dependencies that persist even when an agency competitively replaces a contractor.

ICE is confronting a related issue in its immigration records architecture.

An October procurement <a href="https://govtribe.com/file/government-file/justification-for-exception-to-fair-opportunity-rimu-a-file-mod-redacted-dot-pdf">justification</a> cites incumbent <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/ice-contract-reveals-network-infrastructure-behind-hsi-surveillance-operations">Procentrix’s</a> detailed knowledge of existing data structures and security configurations as grounds for retaining it to integrate ICE’s PLAnet litigation system with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ STACKS digital Alien File repository.

Significantly, ICE requires delivery of source code, interface specifications, data schemas, security documentation, and transition materials intended to reduce future dependence on the incumbent.

That requirement suggests the agency recognizes the danger of keeping critical integration knowledge exclusively with a contractor.
<h2>When continuity becomes dependence</h2>
The problem extends to the equipment used to collect biometric information.

The Coast Guard has standardized proprietary JavelinXL devices and associated Ares software supplied by <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/incadence-strategic-solutions">InCadence Strategic Solutions</a>, a Parsons subsidiary, for its Biometrics at Sea System.

A sole-source <a href="https://www.highergov.com/contract-opportunity/notice-of-intent-to-sole-source-incadence-strate-s-8f7ff/">procurement justification</a> identifies InCadence as the exclusive source capable of supplying and servicing the devices and supporting software.

A subsequent DHS acquisition <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/advance-acquisition-planning-forecast-contract-opportunities">forecast</a> identifies another follow-on requirement for system sustainment and replacement devices.

The operational benefits of standardizing specialized biometric equipment are apparent. But such decisions can also restrict future competition and increase dependence on manufacturers controlling proprietary interfaces and maintenance capabilities.

DHS has taken some steps intended to reduce these risks, including seeking multiple suppliers for biometric capture devices and requiring technical documentation in certain ICE contracts.

Whether those safeguards extend consistently across its larger identity, investigative, and surveillance infrastructure remains uncertain.

DHS has also <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/dhs-2-7b-software-deal-highlights-barriers-to-competition-vendor-lock-in">moved to consolidate</a> software purchases through arrangements favoring established distributors and existing technology providers.

The emerging concern is not simply that some vendors receive contracts without competition. It is whether successive decisions have left DHS unable to independently maintain, migrate, or replace essential technology without the assistance of the companies already operating it.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363862</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Liberian Parliament rejects $52M national digital ID contract proposal</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/liberian-parliament-rejects-52m-national-digital-id-contract-proposal</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/liberian-parliament-rejects-52m-national-digital-id-contract-proposal#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lu-Hai Liang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:53:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ID for All]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Austrian State Printing House (OSD)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data sovereignty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government purchasing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identity infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liberia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[procurement]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363853</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="1536" height="1024" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration.png" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration.png 1536w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration-300x200.png 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration-1024x683.png 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration-150x100.png 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/21122004/liberia-national-id-biometric-registration-768x512.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px" />
		Liberian lawmakers have sent a <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202605/liberia-restructures-national-id-deal-with-osd-plans-issuance-restart">proposed $52 million contract</a> with Austrian company OeSD International to build a national biometric identification system back to the president for renegotiation, following a committee finding that the agreement violated the country's procurement rules.

The House rejected the agreement following a joint committee review that identified procurement violations, potential financial losses and concerns over control of biometric data, <em><a href="https://liberianinvestigator.com/house-rejects-oesd-id-deal-liberia/">The Liberian Investigator</a> </em>reports.

The debate so far has centered around whether qualified Liberian companies were given a fair opportunity to compete for the project, which aims to establish a nationwide biometric identity and civil registration system under a build-operate-transfer arrangement. OeSD International is the specialized global arm of the <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/osterreichische-staatsdruckerei-gmbh">Austrian State Printing Company</a>.

Minutes of a June meeting obtained by <em>The Liberian Investigator</em> indicate that World Bank officials believed Liberia could register its population using its existing identification system at significantly lower cost while retaining government ownership.

The House Joint Committee on Investment and Concessions and Ways, Means, Finance and Budget identified more than 40 alleged deficiencies, concluding that the agreement violated Liberia's procurement regulations. It said the deal would undermine the National Identification Registry's statutory authority, compromise biometric data sovereignty and expose the government to financial losses.

According to the committee, Liberia's Public Procurement and Concessions Commission had directed the government to conduct open international competitive bidding, but the instruction was not followed.
<h2>NIR’s role and economic model</h2>
In a <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202605/liberia-restructures-national-id-deal-with-osd-plans-issuance-restart">May interview with <em>Biometric Update</em></a>, NIR Executive Director Andrew Peters said President Joseph Boakai had opted for a concession model under which OeSD would finance nationwide biometric enrollment and ID issuance, recover its investment over time and eventually transfer the system to the government. Peters said the decision followed a review of the original procurement arrangement.

In response to the revenue-sharing proposal, critics <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/revenue-sharing-data-sovereignty-concerns-arise-from-liberia-id-card-concession">have questioned</a> the economic model of the biometric ID infrastructure concession and why a foreign company should have the bigger share of proceeds from infrastructure that is supposed to serve a sovereign purpose.

Figures from OeSD’s financial report, as cited in local media, project revenue of about $107 million over the 10-year period the concession is expected to last. From this, about $69.5 million will go to the company, and $37.4 million to the Liberian government.

The joint House committee also requested additional documentation from government agencies and the concessionaire.
<h2>Local firms challenge foreign concession</h2>
Liberian technology companies PSI Liberia and M Tosh Prints Media Inc. have publicly questioned their exclusion from the process. The companies recently staged a demonstration at the Capitol Building that doubled as a showcase.

The companies displayed biometric enrollment kits, identity management software, secure credential production systems and document verification technologies. Representatives said the display was intended to demonstrate local technical capabilities amid suggestions that Liberian firms lacked the capacity to deliver such a system.

According to PSI Liberia representative Varney Fahnbulleh, the companies presented 150 biometric enrolment kits and highlighted previous work involving government identity systems, biometric data management and digital credential programmes in Liberia and neighboring countries.

Fahnbulleh argued that excluding domestic firms could limit technology transfer, weaken local industry development and reduce opportunities for Liberian companies to participate in a strategically important national infrastructure project, as reported by a <a href="https://www.liberianobserver.com/business/local-tech-firm-questions-exclusion-from-us-52m-nat-l-id-concession/article_91ded3b0-7328-464f-9ea4-4db840116ef1.html">local publication</a>.

He also raised questions about whether the concession process complied with regulations, including provisions governing sole-source concessions and participation by Liberian businesses.

The<a href="https://www.litcon.org.lr/"> Liberia Information Technology Consortium</a> (LITCON), representing local technology firms, has questioned the selection of a foreign concessionaire and called for greater transparency over procurement and opportunities for domestic companies.
<h2>Lawmakers unconvinced</h2>
Lawmakers examined evaluation reports, termination provisions and evidence supporting the project's value proposition before making their decision. The committee also requested technical presentations and details of comparable projects delivered by OeSD in other countries.

National Investment Commission Chairman Morley Kamara told lawmakers that OeSD's experience in identity technology, security printing and data protection contributed to its selection. He also stated that citizen data would remain in Liberia under the proposed arrangement and that knowledge transfer would occur over the course of the ten-year concession.

Adding another perspective to the debate, Liberian digital identity specialist Ismail Turay, who is based in France, has argued that OeSD's international track record deserves serious consideration.

However, he argued that the government should require transparency from both OeSD and the National Identification Registry, including detailed cost breakdowns, performance commitments and safeguards covering biometric data protection and national data sovereignty.

He also said local companies should be given an opportunity to demonstrate their technical capabilities and participate meaningfully in implementation, training and long-term support, as reported by <a href="https://gnnliberia.com/amp/osd-cites-experience-in-liberia-national-id-debate/">Global News Network Liberia</a>.

With the concession blocked, Liberia’s government now returns to weighing the benefits of international expertise against the goal of developing domestic digital identity capabilities.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363853</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Incode extends fraud protection to AI agents with biometric liveness</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/incode-extends-fraud-protection-to-ai-agents-with-biometric-liveness</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/incode-extends-fraud-protection-to-ai-agents-with-biometric-liveness#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chris Burt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:17:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liveness Detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI fraud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometric liveness detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identity verification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incode]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363844</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="2048" height="1365" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-scaled.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-scaled.jpg 2048w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-300x200.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-150x100.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-768x512.jpg 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/03103310/ai-agents-digital-id-ai-1536x1024.jpg 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" />
		AI agents are showing up to banks, commercial websites and online service portals on behalf of both legitimate customers and fraudsters, and often with equally valid credentials. To help businesses sort agents acting on behalf of legitimate users from agentic fraud attempts, <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/companies/incode-technologies">Incode</a> has introduced biometric Know Your Agent functionality to its popular digital identity platform.

Some of the largest businesses in the U.S. have decided in recent months to block every agent they can identify, but Incode points out in its announcement that every blocked AI agent that isn’t an actual fraud attempt represents a customer turned away.

Incode’s Know Your Agent detects agents within the client’s online traffic, including those that do not self-identify, and prompts the user to complete a face biometrics check with liveness detection against a government credential. The user sets the instructions for the agent, including time limits, and every action the agent carries out is checked against the mandate provided by the authorizing user, Incode says. If either check fails, the agent is blocked.

The company’s core platform tells businesses whether prospective users are real, who they claim to be and whether their track record indicates fraud or legitimate use. The Know Your Agent functionality adds identification of the person responsible for the actions taken.

Incode's Deepsight technology provides liveness and deepfake detection, while <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/incode-launches-govfacematch-for-dmv-based-identity-verification">GovFaceMatch</a>, launched in August, compares a live facial image against official state DMV records. Incode says it delivers 1,000 times fewer false acceptances than Social Security Number checks.

“An agent with no human behind it is a stranger with your customer’s password,” says Ricardo Amper, founder and CEO of Incode, in the announcement. “Put one verified person behind every agent, and a business can open the door instead of locking it. That is the foundation the agentic economy needs, and we’re proud to deliver it today.”

Amper told <em>Biometric Update</em> in an email interview in August that most fraud committed by AI agents is <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202608/online-channels-without-verification-face-open-season-from-agentic-fraud-incode-ceo">not meeting any digital defense</a>. Liveness checks are infrequently applied, and even when they are, not all liveness detection is equal. With Incode’s <a href="https://www.incode.com/agentic-fraud-report/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Agentic Fraud Report</a> forecasting four major developments in agentic fraud over the next year and a half, businesses that are prepared to differentiate good bots from bad ones give themselves a significant competitive advantage.

Incode says its technology works across payment rails and AI agent providers, and can be trusted by all of them as an independent third party.

The company already counts more than 800 organizations, including 9 of the top 10 banks and 8 of the top 9 telcos in the U.S., plus 4 of the top 5 global marketplaces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363844</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>UK Companies House reaches 90% digital ID compliance after first year</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-companies-house-reaches-90-digital-id-compliance-after-first-year</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/uk-companies-house-reaches-90-digital-id-compliance-after-first-year#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joel R. McConvey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:10:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Companies House]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital identity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identity verification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK digital ID]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363892</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="2048" height="1329" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-scaled.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-scaled.jpg 2048w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-300x195.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-1024x664.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-150x97.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-768x498.jpg 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/14131236/companies-house-1536x997.jpg 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" />
		One year after <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202511/mandatory-identity-verification-for-uk-companies-goes-live">mandatory identity verification began at Companies House</a>, around 90 percent of active UK companies have complied with the requirements, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/identity-verification-is-making-the-uks-company-register-more-trustworthy">according to</a> the government agency.

The requirement began on November 18, 2025, with a 12-month transition for existing company directors and people with significant control (PSCs). New directors and PSCs, along with members of limited liability partnerships, are also covered by the rules.

So far, more than 12 million appointments have been verified, and the registry has been tidied up with over 75,000 personal data corrections and 14,000 Person with Significant Control (PSC) address inaccuracies identified and amended.

The verified appointments represent company roles rather than unique individuals, with some people holding multiple directorships or other positions.

Companies House chief executive Andy King says “<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202511/2025-digital-identity-verification-market-report-and-buyers-guide">identity verification</a> is helping to create a more trusted business environment for everyone by improving the quality and integrity of information on the register. This helps ensure that legitimate businesses can start, grow and operate with confidence.”

Corporate leaders say <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202606/uk-companies-house-claims-early-success-in-idv-process-corporate-records-cleanup">mandatory identity verification</a> helps maintain transparency and accountability, ultimately benefiting both businesses and public trust in corporate governance. Companies House estimates that having all identities verified on the register is worth 210 to 400 million pounds ($276-$527 million) of additional annual value for enhanced corporate transparency alone.

Individuals can verify identity with Companies House through <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202610/uk-adds-open-banking-to-gov-uk-one-login-identity-verification">GOV.UK One Login</a>, or through an Authorised Corporate Service Provider (ACSP). A perceptions survey shows that 86 percent of customers find the identity verification process straightforward.
<h2>Enforcement comes with fines, public notice of noncompliance</h2>
By the end of March 2027, Companies House expects all companies to have met their identity verification obligations or entered a compliance or enforcement process. Targeted enforcement has already begun.

Companies House starts with reminders and opportunities, then escalates to enforcement action that can include financial penalties, prosecutions, and referrals to the Insolvency Service. Companies House also plans to add public register notices for identity verification requirements that remain unmet after the legal deadline.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363892</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>New York plans digital identity overhaul with biometrics and fraud controls</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/new-york-plans-digital-identity-overhaul-with-biometrics-and-fraud-controls</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/new-york-plans-digital-identity-overhaul-with-biometrics-and-fraud-controls#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anthony Kimery]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:27:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital ID infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital identity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IAL3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New York]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST Special Publication 800-63]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NY.gov ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RFI]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363814</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="2048" height="1298" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-scaled.jpg" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-scaled.jpg 2048w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-300x190.jpg 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-1024x649.jpg 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-150x95.jpg 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-768x487.jpg 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/15111831/selfie-login-authentication-IDV-1536x974.jpg 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" />
		New York is laying the groundwork for a major overhaul of its statewide digital identity infrastructure, with a new procurement planning initiative arriving just two months after the state adopted security standards that explicitly address biometric verification, biometric sample retention, and automated fraud detection.

What has been presented publicly as an effort to improve access to government services also represents an early step toward determining how identity verification, authentication, and account management will operate across state agencies, and which commercial technologies may eventually support those functions.

The New York State Office of Information Technology Services (ITS) issued a <a href="https://app.govly.com/public/opportunities/17378808">Request for Information</a> (RFI) on November 16 seeking industry guidance for its NY.gov ID Transformation Program.

The request covers enterprise and customer identity and access management, identity proofing, fraud prevention, authentication, account recovery, and integration with existing government applications.

Responses are due December 30. The request is for planning purposes and does not commit New York to purchasing a particular technology, selecting a vendor, or awarding a contract.

The RFI also excludes mandatory digital wallets, physical identity credentials and immediate migration of all existing applications.

The initiative follows the September 8 revision of New York’s <a href="https://its.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2026/09/nys-s20-001-digital-identity-standard_0.pdf">Digital Identity Standard</a>, which establishes statewide requirements based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s <a href="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/"><em>SP 800-63-4</em></a><em> Digital Identity Guidelines</em>.

Read together, the documents provide an early picture of the technical and policy framework within which New York intends to modernize the identity infrastructure supporting government services.

The September standard sets separate requirements for identity proofing, authentication, and federation, allowing agencies to determine the assurance level appropriate for services and transactions.

At Identity Assurance Level 2 (<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202408/what-are-nist-ial2-and-ial3-identity-verification-standards">IAL2</a>), the standard recognizes multiple approaches to confirming that an applicant is the legitimate holder of identity evidence. These can include nonbiometric methods, digital credentials or automated biometric comparison, depending on the proofing process.

The biometric pathway permits automated facial image verification or comparison of another biometric modality against a live applicant sample.

For higher-risk transactions requiring Identity Assurance Level 3 (<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202408/what-are-nist-ial2-and-ial3-identity-verification-standards">IAL3</a>), the requirements become more consequential.

Under Section 4.2.1, credential service providers must collect and retain a biometric sample during identity proofing to support account recovery, nonrepudiation, and verification of the participant’s presence.

IAL3 also requires attended, on-site identity proofing, either with an agent physically present or through a provider-controlled kiosk or device.

The standard also permits periodic biometric re-enrollment, depending on the modality and the account's persistence.

This requirement does not require all NY.gov ID users to undergo biometric enrollment. The standard assigns different assurance requirements according to risk, and the transformation program has not identified which services will require the highest level.

Nevertheless, it establishes a technical framework that explicitly contemplates biometric capture and retention for higher-assurance government identity services.

The standard also addresses presentation attack detection, including defenses against attempts to deceive biometric systems using photographs, manipulated video, or other fraudulent representations.

The standard also identifies AI-generated deepfakes and forged media as advanced threats, referring agencies to NIST's digital identity guidelines for mitigation guidance.

The new framework extends beyond confirming that a person matches an identity document. Section 4.3 requires fraud mitigation measures for digital account creation and transactions even when formal identity proofing is not performed.

The standard identifies device fingerprinting, behavioral analysis, transaction velocity limits, and third-party risk scoring as risk-based controls against synthetic identity fraud and unauthorized access.

New York’s modernization effort places substantial emphasis on identity federation.

The September standard defines the relationships among credential service providers, identity providers, and relying parties, including government applications that depend on those identity services to authenticate users.

It sets requirements for federation assurance, cryptographic protections, trust agreements, and handling identity attributes exchanged between systems.

The framework also accommodates subscriber-controlled digital wallets and cryptographically verifiable attribute bundles, although the RFI expressly excludes mandatory digital wallets.

These provisions create potential opportunities for vendors offering identity orchestration, authentication platforms, credential management, federation services, biometric identity proofing, and fraud detection.

The RFI specifically seeks information on phishing-resistant and passwordless authentication, adaptive and step-up authentication, delegated access, application integration, and migration continuity.

NY.gov ID currently provides access to government functions including unemployment benefits, tax services, motor vehicle records, and public assistance programs. Any replacement must account for existing accounts, agency integrations, identity assurance requirements, and users who cannot complete conventional online verification.

The state has outlined a phased approach that begins with discovery and target-state planning, followed by potential procurement, implementation, pilots, phased migration, legacy retirement, and ongoing operations.

The state has not announced a procurement value, implementation timetable, vendor selection, or final architecture.

The September standard requires credential service providers to maintain records of identity proofing, validated attributes, bound authenticators, and subscriber consent agreements, including those involving biometrics.

It also requires notification and redress procedures when accounts are suspended or terminated, and requires personal information to be deleted in accordance with applicable retention policies. How those requirements translate into the redesigned NY.gov ID system will depend on decisions made after the state's market consultation.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">363814</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Swiss campaign seeks constitutional safeguards as digital identity rollout advances</title>
		<link>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/swiss-campaign-seeks-constitutional-safeguards-as-digital-identity-rollout-advances</link>
					<comments>https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/swiss-campaign-seeks-constitutional-safeguards-as-digital-identity-rollout-advances#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lu-Hai Liang]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 14:15:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Biometrics News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil / National ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government Services]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[digital wallets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[e-ID]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Procivis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Swisscom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Switzerland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SWIYU]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.biometricupdate.com/?p=363833</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[
		<img width="2048" height="1184" src="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-scaled.png" class="attachment-post-thumbnail size-post-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="" decoding="async" loading="lazy" srcset="https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-scaled.png 2048w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-300x173.png 300w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-1024x592.png 1024w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-150x87.png 150w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-768x444.png 768w, https://d1sr9z1pdl3mb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/18091233/digital-id-verification-1536x888.png 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px" />
		The “<a href="https://www.wirbestimmen.ch/de/digital-ja-aber-frei-de">Digital Yes, But Free</a>” initiative, launched November 17, seeks to amend the Swiss Constitution to guarantee that government-issued digital identity credentials remain voluntary. Organizers have until May 17, 2028 to collect the 100,000 signatures required to trigger a national vote.

Switzerland’s work on its new federal e-ID program and related digital infrastructure, including the government-backed digital identity Swiyu wallet, is ongoing as the petition’s organizers stress they’re not opposed to digitalization.

Rather, it seeks to ensure that people who choose not to use a digital identity can continue to access services and prove their identity through alternative means. A key focus is ensuring citizens do not face disadvantages if they fail to adopt an e-ID.

The initiative would require public and private service providers to offer an equivalent, non-discriminatory digital means of access that does not depend on the government e-ID. Preventing situations in which a digital identity becomes a de facto requirement for everyday economic or social activities.

Campaigners are also seeking limits on the role of government-operated digital wallets. This would mean tools such as Swiyu would be restricted to identity and credential management functions — and that they couldn’t be extended into platforms for payments, behavioral monitoring or broader forms of digital control.

Advocates of digital credentials point to easier access to services and streamlined administrative processes, but implementations of DPI and digital identity in places like<a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202611/papua-new-guineas-voluntary-digital-id-is-becoming-harder-to-avoid"> Papua New Guinea</a> and <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/malaysia-and-mydigital-id-when-optional-starts-to-look-unavoidable">Malaysia</a> raise concerns that identity systems are de facto essential for wider government or commercial services — even when official documents emphasize inclusiveness.

However, the initiative's supporters are seeking protections that already exist, at least in part, under current legislation. During the campaign leading up to Switzerland's 2025 e-ID referendum, the federal government repeatedly stated that the e-ID would be voluntary. The law approved by voters does not require citizens to obtain or use a digital identity credential.

The initiative amplifies those assurances from ordinary legislation into the Constitution, making future changes more difficult and requiring broader democratic approval. The campaign follows a closely contested national vote <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202509/swiss-endorse-digital-id-plan-in-narrow-referendum-approval">in September 2025</a>, when Swiss voters approved the new e-ID framework with 50.39 percent support. The result reversed a 2021 referendum in which voters rejected an earlier model that would have relied on private-sector providers.

Implementation of the new e-ID has since faced delays. Swiss authorities announced earlier this year that the planned rollout would be postponed, citing security concerns and the need to address emerging challenges associated with AI. In a November 17 <a href="https://swiyu.admin.ch/de/20261117-unterschriftensammlung-zur-volksinitiative">statement</a>, Swiss authorities said the constitutional initiative would not affect the e-ID rollout timetable. The supporting trust infrastructure is expected to become operational in the first half of 2027, but the government has not confirmed a launch date for the e-ID itself.

Preparations for the <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202606/switzerlands-swiyu-eid-rollout-faces-further-delays">swiyu</a> ecosystem are continuing as organizations develop the infrastructure needed to accept digital credentials. Swisscom is developing a <a href="https://www.lfdecentralizedtrust.org/case-studies/the-other-side-of-the-counter-how-swisscom-makes-digital-identity-verification-enterprise-ready">Credential Validator service</a> to help organizations accept Swiss and EU digital credentials without managing trust infrastructure themselves. The service is currently being tested in Swiss and European wallet sandbox environments.

Meanwhile, industry group DIDAS is calling for greater focus on verifier adoption and ecosystem growth. At the same time, FINMA has updated its digital onboarding rules to accommodate the forthcoming Swiss e-ID, introducing new requirements such as liveness detection and expanded options for remote identity verification. The developments reflect efforts to build both the technical infrastructure and the market conditions needed for widespread digital credential adoption.

For now, Switzerland's e-ID remains legally voluntary. But the "Digital Yes, But Free" initiative raises the debate as to whether the principle should be enshrined in the constitution as the country's digital identity ecosystem takes shape.
<h2>Digital identity adoption raises questions of choice</h2>
While Switzerland considers the everyday scope of digital identity, the commercial infrastructure supporting digital credentials moves apace across Europe. Switzerland is neither an EU nor EEA member and therefore is not legally required to implement an EUDI Wallet or follow the EU's deadline.

Instead, it is building its e-ID ecosystem under Swiss legislation and governance. The two ecosystems are however becoming technically aligned. Swiyu uses similar open standards and verifiable credential technologies, and Swiss organizations are participating in European pilots and interoperability testing.

For example Swiss digital identity provider Procivis, whose technology has been added to France's <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202609/procivis-expands-eudi-footprint-as-europes-wallet-deadline-approaches">EUDIW Unfold Playground</a>, allows participants to issue and verify digital credentials using the company's platform. Procivis already participates in Germany's testing ecosystem, has integrated with Switzerland's swiyu beta environment and says its technology conforms to EU interoperability standards.

The goal is to help organizations verify credentials issued across different countries and technology platforms as the European digital identity ecosystem matures.

The constitutional debate highlights the tension inherent in the growth of commercial and public-sector digital identity services and efforts to preserve meaningful alternatives for individuals who choose not to adopt digital credentials.]]></description>
		
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