Investmoolah

[High Investment Risk!] Country’s Defence Dependence on One Main Foreign Country

2026-10-21T22:30:27.045+08:00

Reports this week suggest Ukraine’s military satellite links were throttled with US involvement, though who ordered it is disputed.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk ordered the military version of Starlink slowed, leaving some Ukrainian attack and interceptor drones practically unusable. The Telegraph, citing four sources, reported that Musk proposed the cap and Trump approved it, clearing the way for the Defense Department to slow Starshield. The cap began on Oct. 14, after the administration urged Ukraine to stop striking Russian oil infrastructure, and Zelensky said he read it as a message from the American government. Musk says limits are decided by the US military and ultimately the president, while Trump and the White House deny involvement and some US officials say Musk acted alone. Whoever decided, a slowdown impedes Ukraine’s intelligence gathering, interceptor drones and long-range strikes.

As a result, Ukraine is now on the back foot, with a greater risk of losing territory.

Dependence on One Major Foreign Defence Provider

The episode shows the core risk of depending on one foreign provider for defence: infrastructure is leverage. Whoever controls a network can throttle it and affect other countries, whether through government policy, a commercial decision or one person’s discretion. The recipient rarely chooses the timing, and can be left unsure of the cause. Ukrainian officials were still trying to establish whether the restrictions were political or corporate, and a state cannot plan its war plans around a decision it cannot attribute.

Dependence also narrows policy options. A country that needs a supplier or another country’s goodwill will weigh that goodwill in every decision, including military ones. Alliances do not remove the problem, because they shift with leaders, elections and domestic politics, and supply guarantees seldom survive a falling-out. Lock-in compounds it: once drones, targeting and logistics are built around one system, switching is slow and costly.

Splitting military suppliers from multiple countriese addresses these weaknesses. Redundancy means that if one source is cut, delayed or degraded, others keep the capability running. Competing vendors give a buyer room to negotiate on price, terms and technology transfer. No single capital can use a supply line as a pressure point. Sanctions, export controls and factory disruptions tend to hit one supplier at a time, not all of them at once. Several countries already work this way. Poland has bought from both the US and South Korea. Singapore buys its main defence heavily from the USA, but its ancillary and small arms fields American, German, French and Israeli systems across different domains.

While Ukraine had some diversification, it remained too heavily concentrated on US technology and equipment, and now faces the risk of a worse outcome in the war.

A reminder for us as well, not to concentrate our holdings in one or two companies *also a reminder of me to avoid adding to my US REITs too, despite their high yield :)

How it Affects Investment

Heavy reliance on one foreign country for defence is a huge risk factor in the current climate. Investors should demand a premium for any country whose defence depends on a single supplier, especially the USA; its current head of state is unpredictable, which means procurement can be delayed or curtailed, leaving a country without sufficient defence infrastructure to protect itself. Investors should be aware of this risk, and weigh it more heavily.

The country risk of investing in a country which has too much dependence on USA is now serious and damning for investors. We should demand a higher risk premieum for such countries.

Portfolio Update Oct 2026: Singapore REITs at 7% Yield and above: My $120,000 Annual Dividend Plan

2026-10-20T13:03:23.696+08:00

Utilising the sell down in shares, I have reallocated capital; Alibaba (partially), KORE and Goodwill were sold off to buy more NTT DC REIT, Yangzijiang Financial and United Hampshire US REIT. A new REIT, CapitaLand Ascendas REIT, has also been added, as I find the 7% yield a decent risk-reward ratio.

Expected Annual Dividend

Fears of high interest rates/rate hikes have sold down REIT prices, which means very high yields. This has enabled me to accumulate these REITs at prices offering a very high dividend yield; in my view, one of the best investment opportunities in Singapore to build wealth now.

My annual dividend is now expected to be $120,000 per year.

Impending French Default: Singapore Interest Rates To Soar and Affect Properties Too

2026-10-11T11:47:50.782+08:00

France carries one of the eurozone’s heaviest debt burdens, well above 100% of GDP. A default remains a tail risk, but the damage would extend beyond the French Treasury. It could spread through the banking system and eventually reach Singapore.

French banks hold substantial amounts of French government bonds (OATs), which are treated as safe, liquid assets and used to meet regulatory requirements and provide collateral. A default would force banks to recognise losses on these holdings. Given the relatively thin equity buffers banks maintain against their total assets, even a modest haircut across a large sovereign bond portfolio could erode a significant portion of their capital.

Basel capital ratios would come under pressure. Eurozone sovereign debt denominated in domestic currency has generally received a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach, meaning banks have historically needed to hold little regulatory capital against such exposures. Losses would reduce Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital, while changes in credit ratings and risk assessments could increase risk-weighted assets. Defaulted bonds could also lose their eligibility as high-quality liquid assets, putting pressure on the Liquidity Coverage Ratio.

This could trigger a sovereign-bank doom loop. Weakened banks would require recapitalisation, but the government expected to provide support would itself be in default. Depositors might withdraw funds, wholesale funding could dry up, lending would contract and the resulting economic slowdown would further reduce tax revenues.

Why France Cannot Print Money like the USA

France cannot simply print money to escape the crisis. Although its debt is denominated in euros, France does not control the issuance of the currency; monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB). Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits the ECB from directly financing governments. Unlike the US, UK and Japan, France cannot independently rely on its central bank to create the currency in which its sovereign debt is issued. Its options would be politically difficult fiscal consolidation, debt restructuring or default, alongside any conditional support available through European institutions.

France is therefore a more lIkely candidate to collapse than USA

Global banking stocks could sell off sharply, with French lenders such as BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole among the first affected. Contagion could then spread through derivatives exposures, repo markets and US dollar funding channels, putting pressure on American and Asian lenders as volatility rises.

Trickel flow of a Property Sell Down Here

Singapore would not be immune. As an open financial centre that relies heavily on global capital flows and deep US dollar funding markets, it could face higher funding costs and wider risk premiums. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducts monetary policy primarily through the exchange rate rather than a conventional policy interest rate, while SORA is determined by conditions in the Singapore dollar overnight interbank market. A severe global funding shock could put upward pressure on some Singapore dollar funding rates, including SORA, depending on liquidity conditions and market expectations. Any sustained increase would feed into the compounded rates used for home loans, SME financing and other property-linked debt.

Property would be one of the most immediate areas of concern for households. Many floating-rate home loans in Singapore are pegged to SORA, so a sustained increase could raise monthly instalments as loan rates reset. Owners who stretched their finances to upgrade to a condominium, recent buyers who paid elevated prices and investors with limited cash buffers would be particularly exposed. If borrowing costs rise while household purchasing power weakens, property transactions could slow and prices could come under pressure. Tighter lending conditions and forced sales by overleveraged owners would amplify the downside. Developers with unsold inventory could also face a double squeeze from higher financing costs and weaker demand. At the same time, higher discount rates would put pressure on property valuations, including those of property funds and REITs.

Singapore's banks would face indirect risks even if their direct exposure to French sovereign debt were limited. DBS, OCBC and UOB could experience mark-to-market losses on bond portfolios as global yields rise, potentially affecting CET1 capital depending on how the holdings are classified and accounted for. Lower asset prices could also weigh on wealth management fees, while weaker collateral values and rising loan delinquencies could increase credit provisions and reduce retained earnings. Higher SORA might initially support net interest margins, but any benefit could be offset by higher credit costs and weaker loan demand. Singapore's banks enter such a scenario with relatively strong capital positions, although a prolonged global shock would test their resilience.

The sequence could be a banking crisis first, a fiscal crisis next and, eventually, a property market shock for Singapore. For households with floating-rate mortgages, the consequences could be felt in every monthly instalment.

NTT DC REIT Aligns Fees With Unitholders; Singapore Companies Haven’t

2026-10-09T13:46:07.717+08:00

NTT DC REIT has made one of the more unitholder-friendly proposals in Singapore’s REIT market. Its manager wants to replace the current performance fee of 3.5% of NPI with one linked to year-on-year DPU growth. The change is subject to unitholder approval and would take effect from FY2026/27.

The hurdle is clear. No fee is payable at DPU growth of 3.0% or below; growth above 3.0% earns 0.1% p.a. of deposited property, and growth of 5.0% or more earns 0.2%. The manager will also waive its FY2026/27 fee if DPU falls short of the 7.80 US cents IPO forecast, and fee units will be issued at NAV when the market price is at or below it, limiting dilution. No DPU growth, no performance fee.

Sharp Contrast to Singapore REIT Managers

Singapore REIT managers like capitaland and Keppel rarely put unitholders interest at a high priority, Hence they are unlikely to follow. Sponsor-backed REITs carry a structural conflict; the sponsor sells, and the REIT its subsidiary buys. Critics argue these REIT managers like to encash proprties at high valautions to their child REIT, while asset growth lifts fees even when per-unit returns lag. A DPU hurdle removes that cushion.

CapitaLand and Keppel, with sponsor-linked pipelines, hence are unlikely to volunteer one, as they want to keep profits for themselves and have little interest to the Singapore investing community holding their REITs. Their current performance fee is tied to asset size and net property income growth and not to the overall dividend. This structure requires the child REIT to constantly acquire without care to the valuation bought from their sponsor.

Taking NTT DC REIT new payment structure, for the past 5 years, both capitaland and Keppel will receive no performance fee with Capitaland only successfully taking one year of fee. Below is how their track record would compare against NTT's REIT structure.

CICT: 10.40, 10.58, 10.75, 10.88, 11.58 cents. Annual growth is +1.7%, +1.6%, +1.2%, +6.4%;
Keppel REIT: 5.82, 5.92, 5.80, 5.60, 5.23 cents. Annual growth is +1.7%, −2.0%, −3.4%, −6.6%;

Japanese REIT managers has started to take care of the investing community while Singapore REIT managers are unlikely to follow suit.

Yangzijiang Financial 1H2026 Results: Deep Discount, Debt-Free, High Dividend Yield

2026-09-29T15:32:11.301+08:00

YZJFH remains one of the most mispriced balance sheets on the SGX. The stock trades at 19.4 Singapore cents. NAV sits at 53.21 cents per share as at 30 June 2026.

That's just 0.36x book. A 63.5% discount to stated net asset value. For a debt-free Singapore-listed company, that gap is too wide to ignore.

Start with the cash. YZJFH held S$575.4 million in cash and cash equivalents at end of 1H2026. Total liabilities were only S$118.4 million.

93% of those liabilities is deferred tax. Not money owed to a bank. Note 21 of the financial period confirms the company has zero borrowings, this period and last.

Strip out the debt book, equity investment entirely. Cash alone covers roughly 85% of the current S$676 million market cap. That's a rare margin of safety.

Now the debt investments book. This is where sceptics will push back. Gross debt investments stand at S$1,323.2 million.

Against that, YZJFH has provisioned S$520.3 million. A 39.3% blended coverage rate. Break it down further and the picture gets clearer. Performing loans (S$466.6 million) carry a 6.2% loss rate. Underperforming (S$189.4 million) sits at 27.6%. The non-performing book (S$667.2 million) is provisioned at 65.8%. That's aggressive provisioning. The 53.21-cent NAV isn't inflated by optimistic bad-debt assumptions. It has already absorbed the worst case. There is a possibility of higher profits baked in if YZJFH recovers more capital than it has provisioned for.

On dividends: YZJFH's stated policy since 2022 is to pay out at least 40% of earnings. Annualising 1H2026's S$38.3 million profit gives roughly S$80 million for the year. At a 40% payout, that's about S$32 million. Spread across 3.4 billion shares, that's 1 Singapore cents per share. At today's price, that's a prospective yield of 5% for a debt free company

For NAV bargain hunters, this is a rare combination. A cash-heavy, debt-free balance sheet. Conservatively provisioned against its worst assets. Trading at a third of book, with a credible path back to a dividend.

YZJFH: 20 Cents Now, 40 Cents Within Reach- The NAV Math Says Maybe

2026-09-28T00:54:26.385+08:00

I am now seeing a clear valuation anomaly at Yangzijiang Financial Holding (YZJFH). My reference point is the S$0.53 NAV per share reported as at 30 June 2026 (slide 10) link: 1H Financial reports, against a prevailing share price of S$0.20, which implies the stock trades at 0.40x book (slide 2), or roughly a 62% discount to intrinsic value. In my view, this gap is unjustified given the quality of the underlying asset base, and I see room for the stock to re-rate meaningfully from here. The company too has started an aggresive share buyback of its shares given the selling pressure, this signals a massive undervaluation.

The NAV isn't a paper number built on hard-to-value assets. YZJFH holds total AUM of S$1.82 billion (slide 5), of which S$575.4 million is cash and cash equivalents (slide 10), cash that can't be disputed or written down. On liabilities, the picture is equally clean: YZJFH carries zero bank borrowings, and 93% of its S$118.4 million total liabilities is deferred tax, not debt owed to a bank (slide 10). A balance sheet this liquid and this lightly geared gives me confidence in the NAV.

On the debt side, YZJFH has already taken its lumps, and in my assessment, conservatively so. Of the S$1,323.2 million gross debt investment book, S$667.2 million is classified non-performing; against that, YZJFH has set aside S$439.2 million in provisions, which means an expected credit loss rate of 65.8% on the bad debt (slide 8). Across the whole debt book, the provision rate is 39.3% (slide 7). These aren't light-touch numbers; they reflect the worst-case book being written down hard already, so the S$0.53 NAV isn't hiding a debt time bomb, it has already absorbed one.

The trend, in my view, is now turning in the company's favour. 1H2026 saw a S$16.6 million reversal of credit loss allowances as recoveries progressed (slide 6), and the gross debt balance has fallen for four straight periods, from S$2,639 million in FY2022 to S$1,323.2 million now (slide 6). Net assets grew 6.0% half-on-half to S$1,851.9 million (slide 10), and YZJFH has already deployed 70% of its planned RMB1.0 billion into high-yield opportunities (slide 3), on top of applying for a Capital Markets Services license with MAS to build out fund management. None of that progress is reflected in the share price.

S$0.40 as a reasonable base-case target, not an aggressive one: investing now would double an investor's capital from current levels, and the stock would still be trading below its S$0.53 NAV, which means there is a margin of safety even at that higher price. In my view, this is the disconnect the market is missing: a cash-rich, lightly-geared, conservatively-provisioned balance sheet, growing its NAV and expanding into new revenue lines, still priced at 40% of book.

Key takeaway: at 20 cents against a 53-cent NAV, with a credible path to 40 cents that still sits below book value, I rate YZJFH's share price one of the more mispriced value opportunities on the SGX.

Why taking the ETS saves you more money than taking a Plane

2026-09-26T23:41:49.550+08:00

Most Singaporeans default to flying to KL. It's the obvious choice — 75 minutes in the air beats a four-hour-plus train ride, so why would anyone think twice? I did. And the moment I actually put ETS and flight prices side by side, the "obvious choice" stopped looking so obvious.

Economy ETS Seat: RM110 vs a Scoot seat

An ETS ticket runs about RM110 one-way. At today's exchange rate (roughly RM3.18 to S$1), that converts to S$34.60.

A Scoot flight on the same route is currently pricing around S$83 one-way for a standard economy seat, before baggage or seat selection are added on.

That's a gap of about S$48.40 — the train comes in 58% cheaper.

Business ETS Seat: RM165 vs an SIA seat

Same story at the top end. ETS Business Class — extra legroom, wider seats, priority boarding — costs RM165, or S$51.90.

A Singapore Airlines economy seat on the same route runs about S$220.

That's S$168.10 saved, or 76% cheaper — and worth noting, that's the ETS's premium class against SIA's standard one. There's no equivalent luxury tier on the rail side; RM165 is about as good as the train gets, and it's still cheaper than a basic plane seat. (SIA fares can also climb well past S$220 depending on season — so on some dates, the gap is bigger than this.)

The Opportunity Cost of Time

Granted on a whole the journey time via ETS is slower in the city, but I think this is justified, Let's compare the time difference

✈️ Flying:

Journey Time to Changi Airport (MRT via Tanah Merah): 40m
Arrive ahead of check-in: 1h 30m
Flight time (SIN–KUL): 1h 15m
Immigration + baggage at KLIA: ~30m
KLIA to KL city centre by car: 1h 00m
Total: 4h 55m

🚆 Train (Location → Woodlands Checkpoint → ETS):

To Woodlands Checkpoint: ~1hr 15 m
Immigration clearance + crossing, both nodes: 20m
Walk CIQ to JB Sentral and Boarding: ~20m
ETS, JB Sentral to KL Sentral: 4h 20m
KL Sentral to KL city centre by car: 15m
Total: 6h 30m

Yes, I do lose roughly 2.5 hours in travel time — but for a saving of $48.40 to $168.10, that's an easy trade to make. And once the RTS Link opens, crossing into Johor Bahru gets quicker and far more reliable, even if it won't dramatically shrink that time gap on its own. Time cost aside, this isn't a marginal win — it's a genuine financial hack, and it's the train, not the flight, that has it.

The ETS has now increased it's frequency of train service enabling us to choose more timeslots for travel

Earning 9% yield as a Singapore Dividend Investor is Possible

2026-09-25T13:32:41.618+08:00

Singapore's REIT sector remains one of the highest-yielding developed markets globally. Two counters currently sit near or above the 9% mark - United Hampshire US REIT and NTT DC REIT. Both payouts are backed by contracted rental income, not payout engineering.

United Hampshire US REIT (SGX: ODBU) — 9.3% Dividend Yield

Business: owns a diversified portfolio of grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail properties, plus modern, climate-controlled self-storage facilities, across the US East Coast The company's objectives are to provide unitholders with regular and stable distributions and to achieve long-term growth in distribution per unit and net asset value per unit while maintaining an appropriate capital structure
Grocery and necessity occupancy at 97.7%; WALE extended to 8.0 years- long income visibility
Distributable income grew 10% year-on-year in Q1 2026
Gearing at 41.1%; no refinancing required until 2028 - buffer against near-term rate volatility
Dividend per share rose from $0.0406 in 2024 to $0.0439 in 2025, with the trailing 12-month yield sitting at 9.3% now on share price of 47 US cents
Growth driver: onboarding rent from a new shopping mall extension, plus built-in rental escalations, support further DPU growth

NTT DC REIT (SGX: NTDU) — 8.7% Forward Yield at 92 US Cents

Business: a diversified portfolio of stabilised, income-producing data centre real estate, sponsored by NTT Global Data Centers - the third-largest data centre provider globally excluding China, with six carrier-neutral, Tier III-equivalent assets across California, Northern Virginia, Vienna and Singapore market reseach data)
Annualising the second-half run-rate gives a DPU of 7.81 US cents - the basis for a high-8% forward yield at current prices
Portfolio occupancy by IT load at 95.1%, with committed occupancy at 98.5%.Gearing well under the 50% MAS ceiling - headroom for accretive, debt-funded acquisition

Both REITs keep gearing comfortably under MAS's 50% leverage ceiling, and both show positive rental reversions alongside multi-year lease profiles - income growth funding the distribution, not capital erosion. The yield gap against "risk-free" benchmarks is stark: Singapore's 10-year government bond yields around 2.3%, while even the US 30-year Treasury, near 5.3%, still falls short of both counters. Add to this that Singapore levies no dividend tax on REIT distributions, and the quoted yield is the yield received.

There are other REITs at attractive price points such as Sasseur and Elite UK REIT. I am surprised why many investors have avoided the Singapore's REIT space

US$40 Trillion Debt: No Default, But Singapore Could Still Greatly Suffer From Its Actions

2026-09-23T23:04:06.544+08:00

Talk of a US debt default on its US$40 trillion debt misunderstands a basic structural fact: the United States borrows in its own currency. Unlike Greece, Argentina, or any nation that owes money in a currency it doesn't control, Washington issues Treasury bonds denominated in dollars, and the Federal Reserve can create dollars at will. This means outright default, in the sense of failing to pay bondholders, is a political choice, not a mathematical necessity. Congress could theoretically refuse to raise the debt ceiling, but the underlying capacity to pay is never actually in doubt: the government can always meet its obligations in nominal terms.

The real risk isn't non-payment; it's the value of the payment. When a government finances mounting debt by expanding the money supply, whether through outright printing or Fed purchases of Treasury debt, it dilutes the purchasing power of every dollar in circulation. That dilution shows up as inflation and, eventually, currency depreciation against other reserve currencies. Bondholders still get paid the face value they were promised. But that face value now buys less.

Singapore's Large Losses when USA Does this

This is where Singapore, in particular, absorbs the cost. A meaningful share of Singapore's foreign reserves and sovereign wealth holdings, through MAS and GIC, sit in US dollar assets, partly to anchor currency stability and partly because Treasuries remain the world's deepest, most liquid safe asset. When the dollar depreciates against the Singapore dollar, every one of those holdings is worth less in SGD terms the moment it's converted or marked to market, even though the nominal USD principal hasn't changed.

Singapore lent real purchasing power and gets back diminished purchasing power: a quiet erosion of national savings that never appears as a headline default, but functions as one in substance. Because MAS also manages SGD appreciation as a policy tool against imported inflation, a weakening dollar compounds the squeeze, hitting reserve values and complicating monetary policy at the same time. Singapore will greatly suffer

This is why economists describe debt monetization as an "inflation tax": one that falls disproportionately on foreign dollar holders rather than domestic voters, making it politically easier to inflate than to default. For a small, trade-dependent, reserve-heavy economy like Singapore, that tax is paid whether or not it ever signed up for it.

Singapore's Dividend Advantage: Why Income Investors Should Look To Singapore's Stock Market

2026-09-03T17:16:55.990+08:00

Singapore's stock market has built a reputation as one of the highest-yielding equity markets in the world, and the numbers back it up. The Straits Times Index (STI) currently offers a dividend yield of around 4% to 4.5%, well ahead of Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index near 3%, and more than double the S&P 500's sub-2% yield. Beyond the blue-chip index, Singapore's deep and mature REIT sector pushes that advantage further, with several counters offering distribution yields of 6% to 9%, a scale rarely matched by developed-market equities.

Three REITs illustrate this well: NTT DC REIT, United Hampshire US REIT, and Lendlease Global Commercial REIT.

NTT DC REIT (SGX: NTDU)

A data centre REIT, exposed to the AI boom, NTT DC REIT has a current forward yield of about 8 to 8.5%/ The REIT owns six data centres across California, Virginia, Vienna, and Singapore, anchored by NTT's global tenant base. First-half FY2025/26 results beat IPO forecasts, with net property income and distributable income ahead of projections by 1.7% and 3.3% respectively. Occupancy stood at 95.1%, positive rental reversions came in at 5.1%, and a weighted average lease expiry of 4.4 years gives income visibility through the decade. Gearing of just 32.5%, an interest coverage ratio of 4.1 times, and 70% of debt fixed or hedged, all support the durability of the payout.

United Hampshire US REIT (SGX: ODBU)

It owns grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail properties, plus self-storage assets, across the US East Coast. Grocery and necessity occupancy reached 97.7%, WALE extended to 8.0 years, and distributable income grew 10% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026. Gearing stands at 41.1%, with no refinancing required until 2028, a meaningful buffer against near-term rate volatility. With a forward yield of 8.5% at 49 US cents, the REIT looks bound to have increasing DPU with the onboard rent-generating from its new built shopping mall extension and the rental escalations built into contracts

Lendlease Global Commercial REIT (SGX: JYEU)

An almost 100% Singapore concentrated REIT, Lendlease offers a trailing yield of around 6.5% to 7%, with FY2026 forecasts pointing toward roughly 7.4%. Its portfolio spans Jem, 313@Somerset, and the newly fully-owned PLQ Mall in Singapore, plus the Sky Complex office towers in Milan. Portfolio occupancy improved to 95.3% as of March 2026, retail occupancy held at 99.7%, and retail rental reversion came in positive at 12.2% for the third quarter of FY2026. Gearing of 38.7% remains comfortably within regulatory limits.

What ties these three together is sustainability, not just headline yield. Each maintains gearing well inside the Monetary Authority of Singapore's 50% leverage ceiling for REITs, positive rental reversions, and multi-year lease profiles — the hallmarks of distributions funded by growing operating income rather than capital erosion.

The yield gap against "risk-free" benchmarks is striking. Singapore's own 10-year government bond currently yields around 2.3%, while even the US 30-year Treasury, near a near-two-decade high of roughly 5.3%, still falls short of what these REITs pay out. That leaves a spread of several hundred basis points for investors willing to take on equity market risk in exchange for income growing well above global benchmark rates.

For income-focused investors in any part of the world, Singapore's REIT sector remains one of the most compelling dividend stories in global markets today. What's more Singapore does not levy a dividend tax

Lendlease REIT: 6.3% Yield, Falling Debt, the Best and Most Undervalued Singapore Mall REIT

2026-08-04T17:26:07.911+08:00

Trading at around S$0.585, Lendlease Global Commercial REIT (SGX: JYEU) looks, on the numbers, like one of the more underappreciated names in the Singapore retail S-REIT space. A market-beating yield, a shrinking debt load, and accelerating rental growth don't usually coexist with a unit price sitting near the bottom of its 52-week range — yet that's the setup here.

A Yield That Holds Up Well Against Retail S-REIT Peers

Lendlease REIT's ("L-REIT") showed a Distribution Per Unit (DPU) of 1.85 Singapore cents, up 3.1% year-on-year. Annualised against its share price, that works out to a yield of roughly 6.3%. With both 1H and 2H financial results proving that the REIT is likely to be consistenly announing 1.85 Sg cents.

For context, here's how that stacks up against the broader retail-REIT peer set:

Lendlease REIT: 6.3%

Suntec REIT: 5.5%

Frasers Centrepoint Trust (FCT): ~5.3–5.8%

CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust (CICT): ~5.1%

Against CICT and FCT — the two largest, most liquid domestic retail landlords, and the most directly comparable names — LREIT's yield premium of 100+ basis points is a meaningful gap, and it comes at a time when its balance sheet metrics are improving rather than deteriorating.

So the more like-for-like comparison — Singapore-anchored, domestically focused retail landlords — still favours LREIT on yield.

Leverage Trending Down, Competitive Within the Peer Set

Gearing stood at 38.9% but the amount of Perpetuals in L-REIT's balance Sheet has reduced

Stacked against the wider retail-REIT peer set:

FCT: gearing of 40.3–40.4% as at end-FY2026 (though FCT has separately flagged a pro forma reduction to ~36.5% following the proposed divestment of White Sands mall)
CICT: gearing in the 38.6–39.2% range
Suntec REIT: 41.5%

LREIT's leverage is now clearly below FCT's and Suntec's reported figure and broadly in line with CICT's.

Retail Rental Reversions Are Growing

Operationally, the retail portfolio is doing the heavy lifting. Positive rental reversion for L-REIT units has come in at double digits.

Cutting the Expensive Perpetual Securities Down by 40%

One of the more overlooked parts of the story is what management has done to the REIT's perpetual securities — a historically expensive layer of hybrid capital that sits above senior debt in the cost stack.

LREIT previously carried S$400 million in perpetual securities across two S$200 million tranches. Through two refinancing rounds:

April 2025: S$200 million of perpetuals refinanced, replaced with S$120 million of new (lower-coupon) issuance plus additional lower-cost loans, bringing the balance down to ~S$320 million.
April 2026: A further S$120 million in new perpetual securities was issued at 4.28% p.a. to partially refinance the remaining S$200 million tranche that matured in June 2026, with the balance addressed through existing debt capacity.

Net result: perpetual securities outstanding have fallen from S$400 million to roughly S$240 million — a 40% reduction. Since perpetual distributions are typically more expensive than senior debt and rank ahead of unitholder distributions, shrinking this layer directly frees up more income for unitholders.

As a result, ICR is now 2.1 times, a large improvement.

Bottom Line: Best Singapore Focused Shopping Mall REITs

Lendlease REIT's latest results show a REIT genuinely repairing its balance sheet while its underlying retail portfolio accelerates. With a higher yield than CICT and FCT which are Singapore malls focused, L-REIT is indeed an undervalued gem and income investors could consider buying L-REIT for its dividend up to 65 Singapore cents and holding it to 68 Singapore cents

How You Can Save More Money than Other Singaporeans Using the ETS from Singapore to KL

2026-08-02T12:37:51.941+08:00

Economy ETS Seat: RM110 vs a Scoot seat

An ETS ticket runs about RM110 one-way. At today's exchange rate (roughly RM3.18 to S$1), that converts to S$34.60.

A Scoot flight on the same route is currently pricing around S$83 one-way for a standard economy seat, before baggage or seat selection are added on.

That's a gap of about S$48.40 — the train comes in 58% cheaper.

Business ETS Seat: RM165 vs an SIA seat

Same story at the top end. ETS Business Class — extra legroom, wider seats, priority boarding — costs RM165, or S$51.90.

A Singapore Airlines economy seat on the same route runs about S$220.

The Opportunity Cost of Time

Granted on a whole the journey time via ETS is slower in the city, but I think this is justified, Let's compare the time difference

✈️ Flying:

Journey Time to Changi Airport (MRT via Tanah Merah): 40m
Arrive ahead of check-in: 1h 30m
Flight time (SIN–KUL): 1h 15m
Immigration + baggage at KLIA: ~20m
KLIA to KL city centre by car: 1h 00m
Total: 4h 45m

🚆 Train (Location → Woodlands Checkpoint → ETS):

To Woodlands Checkpoint: ~1hr 15 m
Immigration clearance + crossing, both nodes: 20m
Walk CIQ to JB Sentral and Boarding: ~20m
ETS, JB Sentral to KL Sentral: 4h 20m
KL Sentral to KL city centre by car: 15m
Total: 6h 30m

The Great Stock Market Contradiction: Why BYD's Bigger Numbers Buy a Smaller Price Tag

2026-07-29T21:31:10.689+08:00

If the stock market were a simple scoreboard — most revenue wins, most profit wins, most units sold wins — BYD would be beating Tesla on every count. And yet Tesla is worth roughly ten times more. This isn't a myth or an internet exaggeration. It's real, it's current, and it's one of the clearest illustrations of how disconnected a stock's price can be from a company's underlying business.

The Fact-Check

For full-year 2025:

Revenue: BYD generated about $116 billion (803.96 billion yuan), versus Tesla's $94.8 billion. BYD wins by roughly 23%.
Net profit: BYD earned about $4.7 billion, versus Tesla's $3.8 billion GAAP net income. BYD wins here too, even though BYD's own profit fell 19% year-over-year due to a brutal domestic price war in China.
Vehicles sold: BYD delivered 4.6 million vehicles (EVs and plug-in hybrids combined) — nearly triple Tesla's 1.64 million. Even narrowing it to pure battery-electric vehicles only, BYD's 2.26 million still outsold Tesla's 1.64 million.

Despite sweeping all three categories, BYD's market capitalization sits at roughly $110–125 billion. Tesla's sits at approximately $1.2 trillion. Tesla is worth somewhere between 10 and 11 times as much as a company that outsold it, out-earned it, and out-revenued it.

Why the Market Doesn't Care About the Scoreboard

The resolution to this apparent contradiction is that a stock price isn't a report card on the past year — it's a bet on the future. Markets assign value based on expected future cash flows, discounted by how confident investors are in getting them, not on which company had the better trailing twelve months.

Look at the valuation multiples this produces. Tesla trades at roughly 12–13 times sales and over 300 times earnings. BYD trades at roughly 1 times sales and about 24 times earnings. Investors aren't pricing Tesla as a car company; they're pricing it as a bet on autonomous robotaxis, Full Self-Driving (FSD) software subscriptions, humanoid robots (Optimus), and grid-scale energy storage — businesses that barely register in Tesla's current revenue but loom large in its imagined future. BYD, meanwhile, is priced closer to what it visibly is today: a high-volume, thin-margin manufacturer competing in an increasingly brutal price war.

There are other forces at work too. BYD's shares are split across Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and thinly-traded U.S. ADRs, which fragments and discounts its valuation relative to a single, highly liquid U.S.-listed mega-cap like Tesla. Geopolitical risk, less transparent Chinese corporate governance, and a smaller base of Western institutional ownership all add a "discount" that has nothing to do with BYD's factories or balance sheet.

Yet BYD is Technologically Superior to Tesla

On Full Self-Driving (FSD), the assessment indicates that BYD's position is more defensible than Tesla's branding may suggest. BYD's "God's Eye" autonomous driving system is available across three tiers, with the top two incorporating LiDAR sensors—hardware that Tesla has deliberately excluded in favor of a camera-only approach. Reports indicate that the entry-level God’s Eye system averages more than 1,000 km between human interventions, is offered as standard on vehicles priced below $10,000, and, notably, BYD accepts liability for accidents occurring while the system is engaged.

In contrast, Tesla has marketed its system as "Full Self-Driving" but has not assumed liability for accidents involving the technology. Furthermore, a U.S. jury assigned Tesla partial responsibility in a fatal incident involving its Autopilot system. This highlights a meaningful distinction between Tesla's branding, which projects a high degree of confidence in its autonomous driving capabilities, and the legal responsibility it is willing to undertake.

The Real Lesson

This is really the same mechanism explored in questions about dividend yield and stock prices: value isn't just today's numbers divided by today's price — it's tomorrow's expected numbers, discounted by how much risk or uncertainty investors attach to them. A stock market can look "irrational" comparing two companies side by side on last year's results, while still being entirely rational once you account for what each company is being trusted, or not trusted, to become.

However, for Tesla's case, this may not hold true and it is very much an over valued stock due to marketing hype and a cult following which borders on unwise and cult like behaviour of a group of investors. Earnings have stagnated as well and the promised land of exponential earnings a false dawn.

An AI Blueprint to Closing NTT DC REIT's NAV Gap

2026-07-29T10:34:06.268+08:00

NTT DC REIT trades at 0.85 times net asset value — a discount that, notably, is not shared broadly across its Singapore-listed peers. That distinction matters. A sector-wide re-rating would point to macro forces: rate expectations, capital flows, sentiment toward the asset class as a whole. A REIT-specific discount points somewhere narrower — the market is pricing something particular to this portfolio.

Three features of the book explain most of it. First, concentration: the top two tenants account for 44% of base rent and the top ten for 75.4%, with a single tenant — an investment-grade multinational corporate — representing 31.5% on its own. That tenant's lease is unusually strong: seven years, with rental escalations and onerous penalty even on early exit. But headline screens used by many analysts and index providers weight concentration by share of income, not by lease enforceability or counterparty credit quality — so a genuinely well-protected exposure still reads, on paper, as a single-name risk. Second, geography: 63.9% of the portfolio sits in one country/sector. Third, and easy to overlook, is the balance sheet itself. At 31% gearing against a 50% regulatory ceiling, and an interest coverage ratio of 4.2 times against a 1.5 times floor, NTT DC REIT is carrying meaningfully more debt capacity than it is using. Unused capacity, left unused long enough, tends to read to the market not as prudence but as inertia.

There's a fourth, quieter issue: strip out the largest tenant and the remaining portfolio's weighted lease life falls to roughly 2.9 years, well short of the 4.2-year blended average. That's near-term rollover risk arriving independently of the concentration story, and it adds earnings uncertainty the market has to price somewhere.

With all the facts in hand, I ran the scenario through an AI model set to its 'Extra' effort setting — reportedly the second-highest reasoning level available. Here's the output it generated:

Closing the Gap: The Capital Allocation Playbook

None of these four issues is fixed by inaction, and none is fixed by picking just one lever.

Run the unit buyback toward the full 10% mandate permitted under its renewed unit buyback, funded from debt or cash rather than equity. At 0.85x NAV, every dollar spent buys back roughly $1.18 of underlying value — a rare, close-to-certain return. With a high daily turnover near 1% of market cap, there is no liquidity or float constraint forcing restraint; the mandate ceiling, not market depth, is the real limit.

In parallel, continue acquiring — not for size, but for diversification. Future deals should be screened for what actually narrows the top-ten and geographic numbers, since the largest tenant's contractual strength already limits the urgency of diluting that specific exposure through growth. Debt headroom supports this: roughly 30% of the current asset base can still be added before the leverage ceiling binds, with even more room on the ICR side. Fund this growth with debt, not fresh units — issuing equity at a discount to NAV gives away the very value the buyback is trying to capture.

Address the rollover risk in the rest of the portfolio directly, through proactive re-leasing and targeted capital expenditure, rather than letting it compete unaddressed against the other two priorities for the same debt capacity.

Finally, communicate the plan via an SGX announcement. If part of the discount reflects unused balance sheet capacity rather than the underlying risk itself, visibly deploying that capacity — and explaining why — will do more for the rating than either lever pulled quietly on its own

Expect a partial, not full, re-rating from the buyback alone. If the discount narrows only modestly once the mandate is used, that confirms the market's real concern is concentration and geographic mix — meaning the acquisition program, not the buyback, holds the key to closing what remains.

Why Singapore's IPOs Keep Going Underwater and the Stock Market Flounders: The Tools Are There, But the Bureaucracy Just Doesn't Have the Will

2026-07-25T13:38:07.888+08:00

Two SGX listings landed with a thud in the past two months. JustCo closed its first trading day almost 18% below its offer price. Foundation Healthcare, backed by Temasek's SeaTown, had to settle for the floor of its price range despite becoming the largest healthcare IPO since 2012. Read in isolation, both look like evidence that Singaporeans just aren't excited about Singapore stocks.

Read differently, they're evidence of something narrower and more fixable: Singapore doesn't have a returns problem. It has an awareness problem.

The Numbers Nobody's Advertising

The Straits Times Index rose 23% in 2025. In my own writing last month, I ran the actual math comparing a S$1,000,000 unleveraged basket of ten SGX REITs against the same S$1,000,000 used as a 25% deposit on a 75%-geared, rented-out condo. The REIT basket returned a blended 6.68% a year in cash — tax-free, no mortgage, no stamp duty, instant liquidity. The leveraged property, even under generous interest-only assumptions, nets closer to 5.2% after financing and tax, and that's before roughly S$200,000 in stamp duty and legal fees paid just to enter the trade. Over ten years, the gap compounds to hundreds of thousands of dollars in the REIT basket's favour, on identical starting capital.

That's not a marginal result, and it isn't a secret either. MAS has been quietly building the institutional case for Singapore equities for over a year — S$6.5 billion allocated to asset managers under the Equity Market Development Programme, new rules requiring family offices under the Global Investor Programme to deploy meaningful capital into SGX names, board lot sizes cut from 100 to 10 units specifically to make it easier for small investors to buy in. All real, all sensible, and all invisible to the average Singaporean scrolling their phone.

Why the Message Never Reaches Singaporeans

Property has an entire content industry built around selling it: short-form videos, "your tenant pays your mortgage" calculators, agents with six-figure follower counts making the leverage story feel intuitive and inevitable. Nothing on the stock side competes with that, because nothing is designed to. Retail investors don't lack access — brokerage accounts are a five-minute sign-up. They lack a version of the property pitch that's been made for stocks, in the same format, with the same repetition, using real numbers.

That's a solvable gap, and MAS and the Ministry of Finance are two of the few institutions with both the credibility and the reach to close it. A short-form social campaign that simply states, plainly, what a diversified SGX REIT basket returned this year against what a leveraged rental unit actually nets after stamp duty and tax would do more for retail participation than another tax incentive aimed at fund managers — because it fixes the actual bottleneck, which is awareness, not capital supply.

The Catch

Here's the trade-off. A campaign that credibly shows stocks beating leveraged property is also a campaign that talks down the primary asset class of Singapore's most established wealth — households and family offices still holding much of their balance sheet in real estate, with real influence over how economic policy gets discussed and shaped. It also unsettles a newer cohort: professionals who leveraged into a second or third unit specifically to rent to expatriates, and who've built both a balance sheet and an identity around that bet. Hearing, on an official channel, that the math was against them the whole time isn't just an inconvenient fact — it's a status challenge from a source they didn't expect it from.

There's a subtler tension too. CPF and HDB upgrading have spent decades reinforcing housing as a retirement asset for the median household, not just the wealthy. A regulator pushing consumers toward equities and a housing system that depends on property values holding up aren't fully pulling in the same direction, even before anyone's politics enters the picture. One ministry's social media campaign may anger one or two other ministries' political office holders.

So the billions keep flowing quietly to institutions, and the board lots keep shrinking to lower the entry barrier — real progress, but all on the supply side. The blunt, retail-facing version of the pitch — REIT yield next to rental yield, tax-free against taxed, no stamp duty against six figures of it — still hasn't been made. It is up to MAS and MOF to have the (iron) will to speak up. As for Singaporeans, they lose a voice which raises their awareness in helping to build for their financial future.

Japan Foods Holding: Squeezed Dry by Sky-High Rents

2026-07-24T12:59:51.841+08:00

Japan Foods Holding Ltd (JPFH) is a familiar name to anyone who has eaten at Ajisen Ramen or its sister brands in a Singapore heartland mall. It's a homegrown F&B success story that has been around for close to three decades. But familiarity and fondness aside, the numbers tell a story that investors should read closely before buying in — and the company's own annual report gives away why.

Boxed in by its own positioning

JPFH's restaurants sit squarely in the low-to-low-middle price segment, with menu items typically priced between $10 and $20. That positioning has been the brand's strength for years — affordable, familiar Japanese comfort food for the everyday consumer. But it is also becoming its biggest vulnerability.

In its FY2026 annual report, the company points to a structural shift in the competitive landscape: an influx of well-capitalised Chinese F&B brands entering Singapore has pushed up both rental and manpower costs across the board. These new entrants aren't just competing for customers — they're competing for the same shop units and drawing from the same limited pool of local and foreign service staff. Backed by deep domestic networks, they are, in the company's own words, willing to spend aggressively to win a foothold in Singapore as a springboard into the wider region.

For a premium or mid-to-premium operator, rising costs can often be passed on to customers who are less price-sensitive. JPFH doesn't have that luxury. Its entire brand promise rests on being the affordable, everyday option — and a $10–$20 price band leaves very little room to raise prices without eroding the value that keeps customers coming back. In short, JPFH is absorbing rising costs from a fight it didn't start, in the one segment where it has the least pricing power to fight back.

The financial results reflect this squeeze. As the chart below shows, JPFH swung from modest profitability in FY2022 and FY2023 into consecutive years of losses from FY2024 onward — with the bottom line deteriorating to a net loss of S$7.9 million in FY2025, before narrowing slightly to a S$6.7 million loss in FY2026.

Its two consecutive years of losses after two years of modest profits lines up with the timeline of increased competitive pressure described in the company's own commentary.

Management's own playbook: survive, don't scale up

Perhaps the most telling signal for investors isn't in the numbers — it's in management's stated strategy. In its latest AGM, rather than moving upmarket to escape the cost pressure, management has been explicit that JPFH will not enter the premium mall restaurant segment. The strategy is to stay in its current lane and manage through the China competition via store rationalisation — trimming the underperforming parts of the network. JPFH expects more local F&B brands to close down due to the competition from China.

That's a defensible survival strategy, but it's important for investors to understand what it does and doesn't achieve. Store rationalisation reduces the drag from loss-making outlets, but it doesn't address the underlying cost inflation hitting every remaining store. My expectation is that even after closing more outlets, the realistic outcome is only a return to breakeven — not a return to the healthier profit margins JPFH posted back in FY2022–FY2023. For a company that once used store expansion as a growth story, the current chapter is essentially about shrinking to survive, as a homegrown brand absorbing the cost of a much more capital-intensive wave of competition.

That is a meaningfully different investment case than "turnaround story." Breakeven is a floor, not a growth trajectory — and it assumes the competitive and cost pressures don't intensify further.

The cost structure means there's no easy lever to pull

The clearest illustration of why JPFH is structurally stuck comes from its own cost disclosure. In response to a shareholder query, the company broke down its FY2026 expense base as follows:

JPFH Cost Breakdown FY2026

Rental and employee compensation together account for roughly 73.5% of these key cost items — and both are precisely the two cost lines that management says are being driven up by the influx of new, cash-rich competitors. Food ingredient cost, by contrast, is only around 18.3% of the base. Hence for many causal chains in Singapore, store and labour is the cost that kills.

This matters because it defines the limits of what operational discipline can achieve. Even if JPFH runs an exceptionally tight kitchen and squeezes every dollar out of its food sourcing (which the CEO claims he does, and does it far better than the China chains), ingredient cost is simply too small a slice of the pie to meaningfully move overall margins. The real cost drivers — rent and labour — are largely outside the company's control, dictated by a property and labour market that competitors are willing to bid up aggressively to win. Staying in the low-end segment means JPFH is committed to a pricing ceiling it cannot easily raise, while its two biggest cost lines are the ones most exposed to external competitive pressure. That combination is difficult to fix through internal efficiency measures alone.

I do not expect any meaningful upside in the share price. At 10–11 Singapore cents, the company is a "Hold" for me, with no expectations of increasing the stake.

Portfolio Update July 2026: Increasing My Highest Conviction Holdings

2026-07-21T21:32:20.806+08:00

Over the past month, I made two large additions to my dividend portfolio by increasing my holdings in NTT DC REIT and Daiwa House Logistics Trust and a smal addition in Asian Pay TV Trust.

These purchases have increased my projected annual dividend income to $100,591.61, while improving the overall quality of my income portfolio.

Buying More of What I Understand

As my portfolio grows larger, I have become more selective with where I deploy fresh capital.

Rather than constantly searching for the next high-yield stock avaliable in SGX, I rather increase my exposure to businesses that I have already spent considerable time researching and have high conviction in. Sometimes the best investment idea is not finding something new, but simply buying more of what you understand well.

NTT DC REIT continues to fit that description. The long-term demand for data centres remains supported by structural trends such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing and digitalisation. Together with healthy rental reversions, a quality sponsor and a visible acquisition pipeline, I believe it remains one of the strongest REITs listed on SGX today.

Why Daiwa House Logistics Trust

Demand for modern warehouses is increasingly supported by supply chain optimisation, third-party logistics providers, manufacturing inventory and changes to Japan's transportation industry. Coupled with positive rental reversions over the past few years, I believe the trust offers attractive long-term income potential while providing diversification away from my other REIT holdings.

Recycling capital

I exited my entire position in Riverstone Holdings. While it remains a good company, I felt my capital could be better deployed to the above 02 REITs, my trust in how this would further strengthen my recurring dividend income.

Looking ahead

Looking back over the past year, my portfolio has gradually shifted from accumulating many different dividend stocks to concentrating capital into my highest-conviction ideas. It is definite that 2027 will be a year where I experience a $100,000 annual dividend inflow.

Dividend (Year to Date)

USD $13,060

HKD $22,599.18 (Alibaba Dividend during this update)

SGD $15,317.38 (NTT DC REIT Dividend during this update)

Why BYD's Profit and Share price Slide Isn't Over: Supplier Rules from CCP

2026-07-01T21:01:18.208+08:00

BYD just posted its fourth straight quarter of falling profits. Share prices fell. However, this decline will continue and normalise only at the end of this year, 2026.

The regulation behind the debt spike

For years, BYD ran one of the auto industry's most aggressive supplier-financing models. It paid vendors an average of 275 days in 2023 and roughly 127 days in 2024, often using its in-house "Dilian" promissory-note platform rather than cash — effectively turning unpaid suppliers into a source of free working capital.

That changed in 2025. Beijing's SME Payment Regulation, effective June 1, 2025, legally caps payment terms at 60 days, and bans forcing smaller suppliers to accept non-cash IOUs as a delay tactic. BYD, along with 16 other major automakers, publicly pledged to comply. By Q3 2025, BYD's payment cycle had collapsed to roughly 57 days.

That's good news for suppliers and for industry health — but it eliminated a multi-hundred-billion-yuan interest-free credit line BYD had been quietly running. The company had to replace it with real, interest-bearing debt.

The Hidden Financing Advantage

Total debt rose from 40.5 billion yuan at the end of FY2024 to 124.2 billion yuan at the end of FY2025 — a 207% jump — and kept climbing to 144.4 billion yuan by the end of Q1 2026, a five-year peak.
Short-term borrowings alone surged 72% quarter-on-quarter to 66.3 billion yuan in Q1 2026, which BYD attributed to higher financing needs across the group.
Long-term borrowings climbed to roughly 61.2 billion yuan by Q3 2025, up more than 640% from the start of that year.

The consequence shows up directly in the income statement. BYD's financial expenses hit 2.1 billion yuan in Q1 2026, up 210% year-on-year — implying a base of roughly 680 million yuan in Q1 2025. That's interest cost that didn't exist a year ago, now eating directly into the bottom line at the same time gross margins are under price-war pressure.

It's likely on a full year basis of 2026, BYD's financial expenses will adversely hit its profits.

The profit trend

Q1 2026 net profit attributable to shareholders fell 55.4% year-on-year to about 4.08 billion yuan, down from 9.15 billion yuan — the lowest quarterly profit since 2023 and the steepest quarterly decline since 2020. Basic EPS fell 56.9% to 0.448 yuan. This extends a streak: Q3 2025 profit fell 32.6%, and full-year 2025 net profit fell 19% to 32.62 billion yuan — BYD's first annual profit decline since 2021. Revenue has now declined for multiple consecutive quarters as the domestic price war and the phase-out of NEV purchase-tax exemptions weigh on volumes.

Price target: 20x forward earnings on the 1Q decline rate

Applying the Q1 2026 vs. Q1 2025 net profit decline (-55.4%) directly to full-year 2025 net profit (32.62 billion yuan) as a proxy for full-year 2026 earnings:

Projected FY2026 net profit: 32.62B × (1 – 0.554) ≈ 14.55 billion yuan
Shares outstanding: ~9.12 billion (post the July 2025 bonus share issue)
Projected forward EPS in HKD: 1.85 HKD per share
Price target at 20x forward P/E (do note many automobile makers price earnings are 9-12 times, so 20 is a very optimistic projection)

The target price is HKD$37

Against current prices of HK$72.45 (H-shares) as of July 1, 2026, this implies a further 50–60% downside.

One of the Highest-Yielding Singapore REIT Isn't in Any Index and it is Causing Singapore Investors to Lose Out

2026-06-29T14:46:21.760+08:00

If you build your Singapore REIT portfolio around the FTSE ST All-Share REIT Index — the benchmark most income investors use, and one that even REITs like Starhill Global REIT measure themselves against — there's a good chance you've never seriously looked at United Hampshire US REIT (SGX: ODBU). That's the problem.

UHREIT currently trades with a dividend yield in the 8% to 9% range, well above the broader S-REIT sector average of roughly 6–7%. For a market where investors chase every extra point of yield, that should put it on every income watchlist. Instead, it sits largely off the radar — and the index is a big reason why.

UHREIT is Singapore-listed, but its entire property portfolio sits in the United States. Its tenants are grocery-anchored and necessity-based retail: strip malls and centres anchored by supermarkets and pharmacies, leased to tenants considered resilient to e-commerce — restaurants, home improvement chains, fitness centres, warehouse clubs. This has kept its income relatively stable even as its unit price has lagged, ironically property revenue has been increasing year on year because of built in annual rental escalations and long WALE.

So Why Isn't It in the Index?

Here's the part that should give investors pause: it's not earnings, tenant quality, or balance sheet stress keeping UHREIT out. It's trading liquidity.

FTSE Russell's index methodology screens for free float and trading liquidity, not just market cap, to ensure constituents can be bought and sold at scale without distorting the price. UHREIT's smaller free float and thin daily turnover don't clear that bar. And low turnover is self-reinforcing: less liquidity means less index eligibility, which means less visibility, which means even less turnover.

This is a structural quirk, not a quality signal. But because so many Singapore income investors use index membership as a shortcut for "is this REIT worth considering," or just buy the REIT ETF, UHREIT ends up invisible to the very crowd hunting for higher yield. In plain sight, Singapore investors are missing out on a 8.4% dividend yielder!

The Cost of the Blind Spot

REIT ETFs that track the index never buy a single unit of UHREIT, no matter how attractive the yield gets, simply because the rules exclude it. Investors who use "is it in the benchmark" as a screen filter it out before ever checking the lease structure or payout coverage. REITs that benchmark themselves against the index never have to stack up against UHREIT's payout, because it isn't part of the comparison set. The result: capital flows toward index members partly because they're index members — not purely because they're the best income vehicles on the exchange. Singapore investors and fund manager lose out on the extra yield and opportunity to outperform Singapore REIT index any time or date of the year.

The Takeaway

If your approach to REIT investing starts and ends with "what's in the index," you may be filtering out some of the highest-yielding options on a technicality that has nothing to do with income quality.

That doesn't mean buy blind, though. Worth noting: UHREIT's illiquidity isn't a case of a thin order book or wide spreads — there's decent volume sitting on both the bid and ask at most price levels. The "low liquidity" here is really low daily turnover, not a shallow market, which is a more benign form of illiquidity. Still, size positions sensibly and do your own homework on debt maturities, occupancy, and currency risk first. But if you've never considered UHREIT simply because "it's not in the REIT index," that's a gap worth closing — the index is a tool, not a verdict.

Singapore's Property Myth: Why REITs Beat Renting out a Property on Pure Math

2026-06-24T15:59:20.175+08:00

If you read, watched (or been bombarded) by short form videos by property agents, you would have heard a Singapore gospel: property is the only "real" way to build wealth here. Buy a second condo, rent it out, let the tenant pay down your mortgage, and watch your net worth compound.

It is also, on a pure mathematical basis, usually the worse trade — once you strip away the emotion and run the actual numbers on yield, leverage cost, tax, and stamp duty. This article walks through exactly why, using a real worked example: a S$1,000,000 portfolio split across ten SGX-listed REITs, compared against the same S$1,000,000 used as a 25% down payment on an Outside Central Region (OCR) condominium that is then leveraged at 75% and rented out.

Comparing an Unlevered Yield to a Levered One — And Still Winning

Here's the asymmetry missed. When people say "property investing is great because of leverage," they're comparing a 75%-geared property to an unlevered REIT portfolio.

But once you actually run the numbers on (i) Singapore's current gross rental yields (roughly 3.0%–3.8% for private condos in 2026, according to URA-linked data), the cost of financing, the operating drag, and the tax treatment, leverage on a 3.5% gross-yield asset vs (ii) an unlevered REIT portfolio, the maths show REITs win

Setting Up the Comparison

To keep this an apples-to-apples test of capital efficiency, both scenarios start with the same amount of investor cash: S$1,000,000.

Scenario A — REIT Portfolio (Unleveraged) S$1,000,000 deployed directly into a diversified basket of 10 SGX-listed REITs, held with zero leverage, income simply collected as distributions.

Scenario B — OCR Residential Property (75% Leveraged, Rented Out) S$1,000,000 used as the 25% equity portion of a property purchase, with the remaining 75% financed by a mortgage at 2% per annum interest (a realistic low-rate assumption), located Outside the Central Region, rented out at prevailing market rates, and taxed at 15% net of allowable expenses under Singapore's personal income tax treatment of rental income.

The REIT Portfolio: Building the 10-REIT Basket

The portfolio below allocates 60% of capital to four REITs — Keppel DC REIT, AIMS APAC REIT, Lendlease Global Commercial REIT, and NTT DC REIT — split evenly at 15% each, and the remaining 40% across six REITs — Suntec REIT, Daiwa House Logistics Trust, Alpha Industrial REIT (formerly Sabana Industrial REIT), Sasseur REIT, CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust (CICT), and CapitaLand Ascott Trust — split evenly at roughly 6.67% each.

Yields below are approximate trailing/forward distribution yields as of mid-2026, sourced from REIT distribution announcements and market data. REIT yields move with unit prices, so treat these as a realistic snapshot rather than a permanent figure.

	REIT	SGX Ticker (approx.)	Sector	Weight	Distribution Yield	Capital Allocated	Annual Income
1	Suntec REIT	T82U	Office / Retail / Convention	6.67%	5.0%	S$66,700	S$3,335
2	Daiwa House Logistics Trust	DHLU	Logistics (Japan/Vietnam)	6.67%	8.0%	S$66,700	S$5,336
3	Alpha Industrial REIT (fmr. Sabana)	M1GU	Industrial	6.67%	7.5%	S$66,700	S$5,003
4	Sasseur REIT	CRPU	Retail Outlet Malls (China)	6.67%	9.1%	S$66,700	S$6,070
5	CapitaLand Integrated Commercial Trust	C38U	Retail / Office	6.67%	4.8%	S$66,700	S$3,202
6	CapitaLand Ascott Trust	HMN	Hospitality / Serviced Residences	6.67%	6.9%	S$66,700	S$4,602
7	Keppel DC REIT	AJBU	Data Centres	15.0%	4.5%	S$150,000	S$6,750
8	AIMS APAC REIT	O5RU	Industrial / Logistics	15.0%	6.9%	S$150,000	S$10,350
9	Lendlease Global Commercial REIT	JYEU	Retail / Office	15.0%	6.8%	S$150,000	S$10,200
10	NTT DC REIT	NTDU	Data Centres	15.0%	8.0%	S$150,000	S$12,000
Total				100%	6.68% (blended)	S$1,000,000	S$66,830

Result: S$66,830 in annual cash distributions on S$1,000,000 of capital — with zero leverage, zero loan to service, and zero personal income tax.

Under Singapore's one-tier corporate tax framework, distributions from SGX-listed REITs paid to individual investors are not subject to further personal income tax, and there is no dividend withholding tax on Singapore-sourced REIT distributions. The 6.68% you see in the table above is, what you get.

In fact, I have not included my trump card, United Hampshire US REIT in the calculation, a REIT gem which gives 8.5% yield on the back of essential tenant providers who have signed long lease terms with them.

Transaction costs to build this portfolio are trivial — brokerage and clearing fees on S$1,000,000 typically run under S$1,000 in total, a one-time cost of well under 0.1%.

The Property Side: Same Capital, 75% Leverage, Rented Out

Now the property scenario. With S$1,000,000 as a 25% equity stake, the maximum property price under 75% leverage is:

Property Price = S$1,000,000 ÷ 0.25 = S$4,000,000 Loan Amount (75% LTV) = S$3,000,000

At 75% leverage, S$4,000,000 of purchasing power pushes past typical mass-market OCR pricing and into the upper end of the OCR segment, or larger/multiple units — new-launch OCR condos transact broadly in the S$1,200–S$1,800 psf range, so this quantum buys a large landed-equivalent or premium-sized condo, or could be split across more than one OCR property. We'll keep it as a single S$4 million asset for clarity.

Gross rental yields for OCR private condos in 2026 sit around 3.0%–3.8%. We'll use 3.5% as a fair midpoint.ready absorbs and nets them off before declaring the distribution yield: Gross Annual Rent = S$4,000,000 × 3.5% = S$140,000 (≈ S$11,667/month)

Step 2: Strip Out Operating Costs

This is where the buy-to-rent thesis starts leaking. A rented-out private property in Singapore carries real, recurring costs that a REIT unitholder never sees because the REIT manager already absorbs and nets them off before declaring the distribution yield:

Expense	Basis	Annual Cost
Maintenance & sinking fund	Flat estimate	S$4,000
Property agent commission	1 month's rent/year	S$11,667
Insurance & incidental repairs	~2% of gross rent	S$2,800
Total Operating Expenses		S$18,467

Net Property Income (before financing and tax) = S$140,000 − S$18,467 = S$121,533

That's already a drop from a 3.5% gross yield to roughly a 3.04% net yield on property value — before the mortgage and taxes.

Step 3: Service the 75% Leverage

The loan of S$3,000,000 at 2% per annum interest costs:

Annual Mortgage Interest = S$3,000,000 × 2% = S$60,000

Taxable Rental Income = S$121,533 − S$60,000 = S$61,533

Step 4: Singapore Income Tax at 15% Net of Expenses

Income Tax = S$61,533 × 15% = S$9,230

Step 5: What's Actually Left

Net Cash Income = S$61,533 − S$9,230 = S$52,303

On the S$1,000,000 of cash equity the investor put in, that's a net cash yield of:

S$52,303 ÷ S$1,000,000 = 5.23% per annum

The above ignores the upfront cost of entry — and a larger property price means a steeper stamp duty bill in dollar terms, even though the percentage is similar. A second residential property purchase in Singapore attracts Buyer's Stamp Duty (BSD) of roughly S$179,600 on a S$4 million purchase, plus legal and valuation fees of around S$20,000 — about S$199,600 total, paid out of the same S$1,000,000 before a single dollar of rent is collected.

Run that forward over 10 years, holding both income streams flat for comparability: the REIT portfolio generates S$668,300 in cumulative cash distributions. The leveraged property generates S$523,000 in cumulative net rental cash flow — and that's before deducting the roughly S$199,600 paid out in stamp duty and legal fees just to get in the door. Net of that entry cost, the property nets closer to S$323,400 over a decade, versus the REIT portfolio's S$668,300 — a gap of roughly S$344,900 on the same starting capital.

Why the Gap Is This Wide

1. REITs are already leveraged at the entity level — you don't need to add personal debt on top. S-REITs typically run gearing of 25%–40% at the trust level, financing portfolio acquisitions with low-cost institutional debt, and what reaches you as a unitholder is the yield after that leverage has already been applied and the associated risk absorbed by a regulated, MAS-supervised structure. Layering a second, personal 75% mortgage on top of a single residential property doesn't replicate this — it just adds risk concentrated in one asset, one tenant, and one location, with a much thinner equity buffer than the trust-level gearing used inside a REIT.

2. REIT distributions are tax-exempt for individuals; rental income is not. Singapore's one-tier tax system means REIT distributions reach you net, in full. Rental income is assessable income, taxed after allowable deductions — and importantly, a private landlord cannot deduct principal repayment, only interest, while still having to fund principal out of after-tax cash flow if the loan amortizes (this example used interest-only financing to be generous to the property side; an amortizing loan would compress the net cash position further).

3. Stamp duty is a one-way, often six-figure tax on entry that REITs simply don't have. BSD and (where applicable) ABSD apply to the full purchase price of a leveraged property — meaning the tax is calculated on S$4,000,000, not on the S$1,000,000 of actual equity at risk. At higher leverage, the same equity buys a larger property and therefore a larger stamp duty bill in absolute dollar terms, even as the percentage stays roughly flat. There is no equivalent levy on buying REIT units on the SGX.

What This Comparison Doesn't Capture

Capital appreciation is excluded from both scenarios' income figures. Singapore property has historically appreciated, and REIT unit prices also rise and fall with interest rates, sentiment, and asset values — neither is a "yield-only" asset in total-return terms.
Vacancy risk isn't modelled for the property scenario (a vacant month with no tenant is a real, recurring risk for a single-tenant asset that a 200-property REIT portfolio largely diversifies away, and at 75% leverage a vacant month still requires the full S$5,000 monthly interest bill to be paid out of pocket).
Amortizing vs interest-only loans: this example used interest-only financing, which is generous to the property scenario. Most residential mortgages in Singapore amortize, meaning actual monthly cash outflow is higher than the interest-only figure used here.
Interest rate risk is amplified at higher leverage. A rise from 2% to, say, 4% on a S$3,000,000 loan adds S$60,000 a year in interest — more than wiping out the entire net cash income calculated above. The same rate move on the unlevered REIT portfolio has no direct effect on the investor's principal (though it can affect REIT unit prices and underlying borrowing costs at the trust level).
REIT capital values can fall, sometimes sharply, when interest rates rise — DPU and unit price are not guaranteed, and concentrated single-country or single-sector REITs (China retail exposure via Sasseur, for instance) carry currency and regulatory risks of their own.
Selling a property carries Seller's Stamp Duty if sold within the holding period, agent fees, and illiquidity that a REIT portfolio does not have.

The Takeaway

The Singapore property narrative persists because it conflates two separate things: property as a forced savings and leverage vehicle (which works, slowly, mostly through price appreciation over decades) and property as a yield-generating rental investment (which, on the math, lands around 5%–5.5% net cash yield even at aggressive 75% leverage, once financing cost and tax are stripped out — and that's before accounting for six-figure stamp duty at entry, and before the much larger downside if rates rise or the tenant leaves).

A diversified, unleveraged REIT portfolio sidesteps almost every friction point in that equation: no stamp duty, no personal mortgage, no income tax on the distribution, instant liquidity, and exposure spread across ten different property types, tenant bases, and geographies instead of concentrated in one unit with one tenant. The 6.68% net cash yield generated above isn't a forecast or a sales pitch.

For an investor whose goal is the highest sustainable cash income per dollar of capital deployed, the math in Singapore currently points one way and it is not properties.

This article is for educational and illustrative purposes only and does not constitute financial, tax, or investment advice. REIT distribution yields move with unit prices and are not guaranteed; past distributions are not indicative of future payouts. Property rental yields, financing rates, and tax treatment vary by individual circumstance — consult a licensed financial adviser or tax professional before making investment decisions. Figures are approximate, based on publicly available data as of mid-2026, and are intended to illustrate a methodology rather than predict future returns.

Portfolio Update June 2026: Accumulating NTT DC, Daiwa Logistics REIT for Dividend Growth

2026-06-23T14:26:06.017+08:00

I have made several purchases recently to strengthen my dividend income stream, along with one new position that is more of a vanity project than a pure investment.

Have sold my Frencken Position at $3.53-$3.54

NTT DC REIT – Major Accumulation

Data centre capacity remains in high demand globally. Among the listed data centre REITs available to me, I evaluated NTT DC REIT, Keppel DC REIT and Digital Core REIT.

My view is that Keppel DC REIT has the strongest portfolio, particularly given its significant exposure to Singapore, which is one of the tightest data center markets in the world. However, the market already recognizes this quality and has priced it accordingly, resulting in a rich valuation.

NTT DC REIT, in my opinion, offers the second-best portfolio mix while still trading at a comfortable dividend yield and a discount to book value. This provides a more attractive balance between quality, income and valuation. In particular, I like its exposure to Singapore as well as selected overseas markets where data centre demand remains robust.

As a result, I have made a substantial purchase of NTT DC REIT at a forward yield of approximately 7.8%. This position should materially enhance my dividend income beginning in 2027.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust

I have recently added to my income portfolio as part of a selective expansion into higher-yield industrial real estate with geographical diversification.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust is a Japan-focused logistics REIT with exposure to modern warehouse and distribution assets across key logistics hubs in Japan. Its properties are strategically positioned near major transport corridors and consumption hubs. Tenants typically include e-commerce distributors, and warehouse users such as Suntory and Mitsubishi Express, providing long lease structures and stable cash flow visibility.

Vanity Project – Japan Foods Holding

I have also continued accumulating shares in Japan Foods Holding, to the extent that I should now rank among the company's top 20 shareholders.

From a pure investment perspective, this is not my strongest idea. The company is currently loss-making and remains in the midst of a rationalization and turnaround process. However, I enjoy being a shareholder of a business whose products and outlets I regularly patronise, which is why I consider this a vanity project.

Should management successfully restore profitability, there is potential for dividends to resume from 2027 onwards. While the investment carries execution risk, I am prepared to be patient and see how the turnaround unfolds.

Dividend (Year to Date)

USD $13,060

HKD $9,068.61

SGD $9,068.20

Why I Am Investing in Two Singapore Listed REITs Delivering More Than 8% Dividend Yield

2026-06-20T21:14:10.150+08:00

UI Boustead REIT and Daiwa House Logistics Trust offer distribution yields above 8%, meaningfully higher than most Singapore blue-chip REITs such as Keppel REIT and CapitaLand Ascendas REIT, as well as traditional fixed income instruments. This places them at a clear income premium while still being backed by real asset cash flows.

Beyond yield, both trusts are anchored in logistics and industrial properties supported by long-term structural drivers including e-commerce growth, advanced manufacturing, and global supply chain reconfiguration. These are demand themes that continue to underpin occupancy and rental resilience across cycles.

UI Boustead REIT has a diversified portfolio of industrial, business park, and logistics assets primarily located in Singapore (about 70%+), with the remainder in Japan. Its tenant base is anchored by multinational corporations across engineering, life sciences, aerospace, and technology sectors, including names such as Rolls-Royce, Jabil, GSK, and Razer. This creates relatively stable occupancy supported by mission-critical industrial usage.

Daiwa House Logistics Trust (DHLT) focuses on modern logistics facilities, with the majority of assets located in Japan and a smaller portion in Vietnam. Its properties are strategically positioned near major transport corridors and consumption hubs. Tenants typically include e-commerce distributors, and warehouse users such as Suntory and Mitsubishi Express, providing long lease structures and stable cash flow visibility.

Geographically, the two REITs complement each other well: UI Boustead provides exposure to Singapore’s high-spec industrial and business park office for HQs, while DHLT offers pure-play exposure to Japan’s logistics market, which benefits from Japan's e-commerce, food and beverage products and automation tailwinds.

Investment View

For income investors, the core attraction is the exceptionally high and sustainable cash yield. With both REITs offering 8%+ distributions, investors are effectively locking in a materially higher income stream compared to most blue-chip REITs, government bonds, and fixed deposits. Importantly, this yield is backed by real assets, long lease tenures, and institutional-grade tenants rather than speculative growth assumptions. Combined with moderate leverage levels and strong sponsor backing, the pair provides a compelling balance of income stability and geographic diversification in today’s higher-rate environment.

May 2025: New Addition UIBREIT

2026-05-26T17:33:44.913+08:00

Dividend came in from Nanofilm, Frencken and Riverstone. Besides, I have bought UIB REIT. This diversifies my dividend sources and importantly, increases my dividend received.

With discovery of high yielding Singapore stocks and sustainable payout, I am now shifting my annual dividend target (for the better, unlike PAP-style goalpost shifting to smoke citizens.)

The dividend target I have set is $100,000. It is an increase from my previous goal of $60,000 because I have bested it due to NTT DC REIT, United Hampshire gains

Dividend (Year to Date)

USD $13,060

HKD $9,068.61

SGD $8,891.20

UHREIT Growing Dividend Every Year: One of the Highest Yield in Singapore

2026-05-24T13:42:29.227+08:00

United Hampshire US REIT ("UHREIT") reported a strong 1Q 2026, with distributable income rising 10.0% year-on-year to US$6.9 million,

Taking it on an annual basis, once can expect about US$26.6 million in distributable income. The real distributable income should be about US$27 million, factoring reduced interest rates and acquistions.

At US$0.52 price per unit/market cap $313 million, this points to 8.5% dividend yield

Sustainable yield (below 100% payout ratio), high yield and consumer resilient tenants in supermarkets, this is turning out to be a good REIT. Based on my cost price, I am earning 10% annual yield on cost.

Prices have gone up, but I am still not selling because it gives 8.5% yield. There are rental escalations built in, this means dividend may keep growing annually.

A good REIT many fund managers have not started buying due to their investment mandate of requiring the REIT to be in tracking indexes. This is hindering fund managers. But as retailers, we are able to purchase it easily and earn 8.5% dividend yield. Eventually fund managers will be forced to buy the REIT when volume picks up

April 2026 Update: Strengthening My Portfolio’s Dividend Power

2026-04-27T17:29:00.002+08:00

Over the past week, I have trimmed my position in Nanofilm to take partial profits following its recent share price strength. While I remain constructive on its longer-term prospects, the sharp rebound presented an opportunity to lock in gains and rebalance exposure. As per my previous update, I had sold Alibaba shares amid regulatory uncertainty and a muted consumer recovery in China.

Proceeds from these adjustments have been channelled into NTT DC REIT, primarily for its attractive dividend yield of approximately 7–8%. In the current environment, the ability to generate stable and recurring income is a key priority, and the REIT offers a compelling yield spread relative to other income instruments. This provides a strong foundation for portfolio cash flow while reducing overall volatility.

Beyond yield, NTT DC REIT offers direct exposure to the data centre sector, which is underpinned by powerful structural tailwinds such as cloud adoption, artificial intelligence workloads, and ongoing digitalisation. The quality of its assets, coupled with long-term leases signed with large software companies, supports visibility and resilience of its DPU.

As the year progresses, the portfolio is steadily evolving into a more robust income generator. Dividend contributions are increasing meaningfully, and the $60,000 annual dividend target now appears well within reach.

Dividend

There is no change in the total dividend income received.

Current Portfolio Value is $1,220,400

Dividend

USD:$13,060

HKD:$9,068.61

SGD:$6,507.80