The Middle East and Iran

Who Are the Yazidis in Iraq and What Are Their Beliefs?

2014-08-11T19:44:00.000-07:00

The holy Yazidi temple of Lalesh in Iraq.

As I noted in my previous post on ISIS and the Yazidis, the brutal jihadists of ISIS have been slaughtering hundreds of people of the Yazidi faith in Northern Iraq. For many - including myself - this was the first time I had heard of the Yazidis. Who are the Yazidis and what do they believe?

The Yazidi are a Kurdish-speaking ethnoreligious group who practice a syncretic religion that combines Shi'i and Sufi Islam with indigenous regional folk traditions. These traditions include elements shared with the Christian and Mandaean communities of the Near East, as well as with more ancient Gnostic, Marcionite, Zoroastrian and early Mesopotamian religions. They live primarily in the Nineveh Province of northern Iraq, a region once part of ancient Assyria.

To make things easy, I have provided a copy of an article from the BBC here below entitled "Who, What, Why: Who are the Yazidis?" Its a great little summary, certainly better than anything I could do:

"On account of their unusual beliefs, the Yazidis are often unjustly referred to as "devil worshippers", and have traditionally held themselves apart in small communities mainly scattered across northwest Iraq, northwest Syria and southeast Turkey.

Estimating their current numbers is difficult, with figures ranging from 70,000 to 500,000. Feared, vilified and persecuted, there is no doubt the population has dwindled considerably over the course of the past century. Like other minority religions of the region, such as the Druze and the Alawis, it is not possible to convert to Yazidism, only to be born into it.

The ongoing persecution in their heartland of the Mt Sinjar region west of Mosul is based on a misunderstanding of their name. Sunni extremists, such as IS, believe it derives from Yazid ibn Muawiya (647-683), the deeply unpopular second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Modern research, however, has clarified that the name is nothing to do with the loose-living Yazid, or the Persian city of Yazd, but is taken from the modern Persian "ized", which means angel or deity. The name Izidis simply means "worshippers of god", which is how Yazidis describe themselves.

Their own name for themselves is Daasin (plural Dawaaseen), which is taken from the name of an old Nestorian - the Ancient Church of the East - diocese, for many of their beliefs are derived from Christianity. They revere both the Bible and the Koran, but much of their own tradition is oral. Due in part to its secrecy, there have been misunderstandings that the complex Yazidi faith is linked to Zoroastrianism with a light/dark duality and even sun worship. Recent scholarship, however, has shown that although their shrines are often decorated with the sun and that graves point east towards the sunrise, they share many elements with Christianity and Islam.

Children are baptised with consecrated water by a pir (priest). At weddings he breaks bread and gives one half to the bride and the other to the groom. The bride, dressed in red, visits Christian churches. In December, Yazidis fast for three days, before drinking wine with the pir. On 15-20 September there is an annual pilgrimage to the tomb of Sheikh Adi at Lalesh north of Mosul, where they carry out ritual ablutions in the river. They also practise sacrifice of animals and circumcision.

Their supreme being is known as Yasdan. He is considered to be on such an elevated level that he cannot be worshipped directly. He is considered a passive force, the Creator of the world, not the preserver. Seven great spirits emanate from him of which the greatest is the Peacock Angelknown as Malak Taus - active executor of the divine will. The peacock in early Christianity was a symbol of immortality, because its flesh does not appear to decay. Malak Taus is considered God's alter ego, inseparable from Him, and to that extent Yazidism is monotheistic.

Yazidis pray to Malak Taus five times a day. His other name is Shaytan, which is Arabic for devil,and this has led to the Yazidis being mislabelled as "devil-worshippers". The Yazidis believe that souls pass into successive bodily forms (transmigration) and that gradual purification is possible through continual rebirth, making Hell redundant. The worst possible fate for a Yazidi is to be expelled from his community, as this means their soul can never progress. Conversion to another religion is, therefore, out of the question.

In remote areas of southeast Turkey towards the Syrian and Iraqi borders, their once-abandoned villages are starting to come back to life, with new houses being built by the communities themselves. Many Yazidis are returning from exile now that the Turkish government leaves them undisturbed. Despite centuries of persecution the Yazidis have never abandoned their faith, testimony to their remarkable sense of identity and strength of character. If they are driven from Iraq and Syria by IS extremists, the likelihood is that more will settle in southeast Turkey where they are left to live out their beliefs in peace."

I hope readers found this BBC summary helpful. Below are some additional wonderful pictures of the Yazidis I came across. Let us just hope and pray that the international community will protect the peaceful Yazidi people from the medieval savages of ISIS who are seeking to hunt them down.

Yazidi women and children in procession

Yazidis worship the Peacock Angel

The Sheer Horror of ISIS in Iraq As They Slaughter Yazidis

2014-08-11T19:09:00.000-07:00

The lunatic terrorists of ISIS on the march in Iraq

Anyone who has been an observer of the Middle East for many years becomes used to seeing some nasty things and unsavory groups. Sadly, this is not a region where human rights seems to be a priority. Nevertheless, the horrors that we have seen in Iraq the last few days are still beyond belief.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - ISIS - has been wreaking havoc across northern Iraq. IS remember is a group that is too extreme even for al-Qaeda, and IS have become known for perpetrating the worst kinds of atrocities on both civilians and especially upon captured enemy fighters and Shia Muslims and Christians in particular. . The group adheres to an austere - dare I even say medieval view of Islam - and regards those who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels and apostates.

ISIS now controls large swathes of territory across both Northeast Syria as well as much of Northern and Western Iraq. ISIS is now threatening both Baghdad, as well as the autonomous Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. ISIS has even captured Iraq's largest dam - the Mosul Dam - and could if they choose decide to flood much of the countryside - it has been estimated that if ISIS decided to blow the dam up and release the water Mosul would be buried under 65 feet of water and even Baghdad would be under 10-15. Hundreds of thousands would surely die. Below is a map showing the approximate amount of territory ISIS controls:

Territory controlled by ISIS

Currently, ISIS has captured the town of Sinjar in Northern Iraq, which is where much of the population of the Yazidi sect live (to learn more, read this entitled Who are the Yazidis and What are Their Beliefs?). To escape ISIS, tens and thousands of Yazidis fled Sinjar, and thousands are now trapped on a nearby mountain where hundreds have been dying from thirst and starvation. This is not the worst of it though. ISIS has been indiscriminately killing the Yazidis, and recently buried 500 Yazidis in a mass grave - with many of the victims still alive. The sheer horror of this is almost beyond the human imagination to comprehend.

As an American, I was quite happy to see the US finally depart Iraq in 2011 and leave the country to sort out its own affairs. Now, however, I am thrilled that the US has decided to launch airstrikes against ISIS to try to turn the tide against the jihadists, as well as to work with the Kurds to save as many of the trapped Yazidis as possible.

If you want to read the latest on the suffering of the Yazidis, ABC News has an excellent article and overview here. It is gut-wrenching to read, and a testament of man's capacity for sheer evil and brutality.

Major New Doctrine Planned For Israeli Air Force?

2014-08-05T21:52:00.001-07:00

The Israel Air Force (IAF) is in the process of making significant changes in its structure and capabilities to enable it to destroy ten times as many targets from the air as it currently can.

In an extensive interview with the US military and defense news website Defense News, IAF air operations chief Amikam Norkin explained that the IAF would be implementing a new operational doctrine enabling the IAF to fire on many more targets within the same amount of time.

According to the Defense News article, the IAF has been able to greatly improve its so-called “Sensor-to-Shooter” capabilities. In plain English, Sensor-to-Shooter means the ability to take vast quantities of data and information – obtained through a variety of data links and sources – and then take advantage of this data through the use of laser-guided bombs and precision weaponry (Note: there is a nice summary of the components of Sensor-to-Shooter on website of defense contractor Thales). While I would strongly recommend reading the entire Defense News article, (particularly if you’re a military or strategic studies buff), two sentences in the piece jumped out at me:

Under the new concept, Israel will focus on “hurting the enemy where it hurts the most,” Norkin said, referring to leadership, commanders and significant war-fighting assets.“We won’t be able to push the enemy to the point where he can no longer shoot rockets and missiles. Therefore we need to push him to the point where he doesn’t want to shoot his rockets and missiles,” the IAF officer said.

The "Sensor to Shooter" Challenge

What does this mean in practice? One possibility is that the IDF is thinking about a future conflict with Hezbollah.

It is universally acknowledged that Hezbollah now has tens and thousands of missiles, some with enough range to strike anywhere in Israel. Given that the IAF will only be able to take out a small number of these missiles, the IDF believes the most critical thing it can do is strike Hezbollah’s leadership – such as Hassan Nasrallah and his deputies – as well as other top Hezbollah assets.

Although the Defense News article does not mention this, one educated guess here is that the IDF hopes destroying Hezbollah’s leadership and other key assets would throw the Lebanese group into a state of confusion. The aim is to leave an enemy like Hezbollah leaderless, destroy its communication capabilities, and leave its forces on the front lines thrashing around like a chicken without a head. In military jargon, this would be described as degrading the enemy’s “Command and Control” (C2) capabilities. In that context, if the IAF can truly destroy 10-times the number of targets within the same time frame, than Israel’s military leadership may hope it can rapidly end any conflict by quickly eliminating the enemy’s C2 capabilities.

Of course, there is the following question: Does the increase in the IAF’s destructive – even an increase by a factor of ten – allow the IDF to win wars without a major commitment to ground combat? Ground combat is very messy, especially against a guerrilla force ensconced in civilian areas, but aren’t “boots on the ground” still critical to winning the next conflict against Hezbollah or other enemies?? Based on the recent war in Gaza, it looks like the answer is a resounding yes – and that ground forces will still play a central role in the IDF’s military philosophy.

I suspect we’ll be seeing more details on the IAF’s plans in the Israeli press over time.

Assad Is Odious - But the West Still Talks To Him Behind the Scenes

2014-05-24T20:48:00.000-07:00

Two years ago, many were predicting the imminent fall of the Assad regime. As an increasing amount of Syrian territory slipped out of the regime’s control, it seemed like only a matter of time until rebel forces would be in central Damascus. Now, however, the narrative regarding Assad’s survivability has changed dramatically.

If there was any doubt about Assad’s staying power, news out of Damascus should put paid to that notion quickly enough. According to a BBC article, Western intelligence agencies have been visiting Damascus for talks with the Syrians on how to mutually combat the radical Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime. As readers familiar with the events in Syria are no doubt aware, the opposition to Assad has been increasingly co-opted by radical Jihadist al-Qaeda-affiliated groups such as al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), resulting in continued strong support for Assad amongst Syria’s non-Sunni minorities, especially the Alawites who form the backbone of the Assad regime.

Why, however, would western intelligence agencies be interested in talking with the Assad regime? The answer is that large numbers of European Muslims have gone to Syria to fight with the opposition, most of whom have ended up joining al-Nusra or ISIS. I have seen estimates of the number of Europeans fighting in Syria as anywhere between 1,500 – 3,000, including 700 from France alone.

From the perspective of western intelligence agencies, Europeans who travel to Syria to fight Assad could easily end up becoming radicalized there, especially if they have joined the two al-Qaeda groups within the opposition. Naturally, European governments worry about the threat of thousands of their radicalized citizens returning to the Europe and turning the skills they have gained in Syria against their own countries. While European intelligence agencies can track a few tens of returning radicals, once you get into the range of thousands the threat matrix increases exponentially.

Clearly, one excellent source of information about European Muslims fighting with the opposition in Syria would be the Assad regime itself. Brutal but effective, Assad’s security agencies — the dreaded Mukhabarat and the Military Intelligence Directorate — are a prime source of information for information of interest to European intelligence agencies concerned with protecting their own homelands against a possible new nexus of terror. Of course, there is no official confirmation from European intelligence agencies of there coordination with the Assad regime, there is strong evidence that this is gpoing on behind the scenes.

Does this mean that the West is now tilting to Assad? Not so far, and indeed, the western line continues to be that “Assad must go.” However, the very fact that leading western intelligence agencies are now even talking to the Assad regime — much less cooperating with it — shows how messy and confusing the Syrian civil war has become. At the end of the day, however, countries tend to focus on their own national interests — first and foremost of which is protecting their own homelands — and from that perspective it is not altogether surprising that western spies are buddying up with the Assad regime — however odious we may find Assad to be.

Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites and Christians - What are the Demographics of Syria?

2013-09-06T12:11:00.003-07:00

As I've discussed previously in my post entitled Syria: Sunnis Versus Alawites, the situation in Syria can increasingly be seen through the lens of a sectarian conflict between the minority Alawites - who are considered an offshoot of the Shiite branch of Islam - who control the Assad regime, and the majority Sunni population that spearheads the revolt. Of course, that it is a bit simplified, but the general framework is correct.

I recently came across a map of Syria that wonderfully demonstrates the true demographic complexity of that country. If you look at the map, you can see that Syria has 17 different ethnic and religious groups, ranging from Sunnis, Alawites and Christians, to tiny minorities of Armenians, Aramaeans and others (and in an interesting surprise, the country evidently includes some Jews who live near the town of Palmyra). Another point worth highlighting in this picture is that you can see the Alawite population concentrated in a grey green cluster on the Mediterranean coast near the ports of Lakatia and Tartus, which as discussed in an earlier post, is where Assad might as a fallback option look to establish an Alawite mini-state apart from Syria.

Another interesting point to consider is that this shows how the maps of new countries in the Middle East - which were drawn primarily be the colonial powers Britain and France in the first half of the 20th century - had artificial borders which created an almost built in recipe for conflict. As the Sunnis Arabs are clearly the largest demographic group in Syria by far, it was probably not realistic that a small minority Alawite population of only 12% could be expected to rule (by authoritarian means) the country indefinitely without raising the ire of the Sunnis. In that sense, what could be argued here is that Syria is essentially re-balancing among more natural ethnic and religious lines. While some countries have managed to achieve this rebalancing peacefully - think the break-up of Czechoslovakia into the two countries of Slovakia and the Czech Republic - in Syria this rebalancing has tragically turned into a brutal killing field of inter-ethic and religious conflict.

Ronn Torossian on Algemeiner

US Military Forces Around Syria and What They Might Attack

2013-08-31T19:35:00.001-07:00

US Military Forces Near Syria

For the last several days, the news has been filled with updates on if or when American military forces will strike Syria in response to the Assad regime's alleged use of poison gas in an opposition held area near Damascus called Ghouta. While a few days ago it looked like an attack on Syria was imminent, as of Saturday, August 31st, President Obama has decided to hold off on striking Syria until he gets authorization from the US Congress to do so.

I personally think that the US is - again - rushing into a potential conflict in the Middle East without having thought through all of the potential repercussions of doing so. With that said, however, the amount of power the US could use against the Syrian regime if it chooses to do so is massive. On top, we can see the disposition of forces in the region. Note that the US has five cruise missile carrying destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea near Syria, and it is those cruise missiles which would be the primary means of striking the Assad regime's military forces.

The next question is, what exactly would the US and it's allies be trying to attack in Syria? The map below is an excellent overview of the major airbases, military bases, and Army units of Assad's regime, all of which could be targeted.

Syrian military assets the US might attack

Sunni-Shiite Conflict Explodes in Lebanon

2013-08-28T15:53:00.002-07:00

Demographic Map of Lebanon

I have long argued that much of the strife in the Middle East can be seen through the lenses of the longtime Sunni-Shiite split in the region. At this point, I think it's very clear that what are seeing in Syria is a battle between Sunni rebels (unfortunately increasingly dominated by hardline Jihadists) and the Alawite/Shia regime - see background here.

Now, it appears that Lebanon is on the brink of a Sunni-Shiite civil war itself. Tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon have been on the rise since Hassan Nasrallah decided to go all in on support for the Assad regime and sent thousands of his fighters to Syria to support Assad. In the last couple of weeks, unfortunately, tensions between the two sects in Lebanon have exploded.

It started with a car bomb back in July exploding in in the Shiite South Beirut suburbs dominated by Hezbollah which injured 53 people. Things got much worse on August 16 when another car bomb exploded in Hezbollah-dominated territory, this time killing 22 Shiites and injuring hundreds. Responsibility for the blast was claimed in a You Tube video by a Sunni Jihadist group calling itself the Brigade of Aisha.

Not surprisingly, a few days later two bomb blasts ripped through Sunni areas of the city of Tripoli in northern Lebanon, including one at the Taqwa Mosque, many of whose members are hardline Sunnis. Although Hezbollah did not explicitly claim responsibility for the blasts, a branch of Al-Qaida quickly announced that it blamed Hezbollah and vowed vengeance.

As people familiar with Lebanon know, the country endured a horrible civil war between 1975 - 1990, in which over 100,000 people died, a huge number for a country of only four million people. As the map above shows, the country is a complex stew of various ethnic groups, and it has always been balanced on a knife's edge and frequently been the playground of larger conflicts playing out in the Middle East. Lebanon is a beautiful country, but I fear that it is on the edge of being dragged into the nightmare playing out in Syria.

Israel Strikes Syria - Aims to Prevent Transfer pf Game-Changing Missiles to Hezbollah

2013-05-06T20:27:00.002-07:00

Israeli warplanes struck Syria over the weekend near Jamraya

As I discussed in a number of previous blog posts - for example here - I have long seen the situation in Syria as a sectarian civil war between the majority Sunni population and the Alawite minority that forms the backbone of the Assad regime. Israel - wisely enough - has remained aloof from the Syrian civil war.

However, Israel has always made clear that it's one "red line" in the conflict was that it would not tolerate the transfer from Assad to Hezbollah of game changing weapons such as advanced anti-aircraft missiles or longer range ground-to-ground missiles. Next to Iran, Israel sees Hezbollah as it's mortal enemy and fears the Lebanese Shiite organization far more then the Assad regime. Israel already struck Syria once previously, attacking a convoy to Lebanon carrying SS-17 missiles which were likely destined for Hezbollah.

Over the weekend, Israel struck Syria twice in two days, again to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. In the most recent cases, it appears the target of Saturday and Sunday's attack were a shipment of Iranian made Fatah-110 missiles being delivered to Hezbollah through Syria. Analysts say the Fateh-110 could put the Tel Aviv metropolis in range of Hezbollah gunners, 100 km (60 miles) to the north, which would bolster the arsenal of a group that fired some 4,000 shorter-range rockets into Israel during a month-long war in 2006. The second bombing, this past Sunday May 5th, was particularly intense. It appears Israel struck a weapons research facility and warehouse in the Syrian town of Jamraya.

In an article on the NBC news website, diplomatic correspondent Martin Fletcher outlined the four types of weapons systems Israel would not tolerate being transferred to Hezbollah:

Analysts here say there are four weapons systems on Israel’s blacklist, whose transfer through Syria would trigger air attacks: guided ground to ground rockets like the Iranian Fateh 110’s reportedly destroyed in this weekend’s attack; chemical weapons; land to sea missiles like Russian Yakhont missiles that can hit a ship 200 miles at sea at speeds of up to Mach 2; and anti-aircraft rockets like the SAM 17s that would endanger Israel’s control of the skies.

My opinion is that Israel has reached the point where it is no longer to willingly accept the transfer of weaponry from Iran or Syria to Hezbollah; if that is indeed the case, we can expect more Israeli strikes within Syria going forward.

If you want to read the NBC article by Martin Fletcher, here it is. If you are interested to understand more about the interplay between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah, I also would recommend reading a previous series of posts I did on the subject:

Part 1: If Israel Bombs Iran, Will Hezbollah Attack Israel?

Part 2: Possible Israeli responses if it is attacked by Hezbollah

Part 3: An overview of Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles (with several infographics)

Part 4: The Israeli Military Plans to Destroy Hezbollah in the Next War

Part 5: Analysis by the Brookings Institution on How the Next Israeli-Hezbollah War Might Unfold

Israel Planning a 10 Mile Buffer Zone in Syria as the Assad Regime Crumbles

2013-02-05T19:07:00.002-08:00

Israel once had a buffer zone in southern Lebanon as well

As a follow-up from my just published post on the Israeli air strikes in Syria, I just came across a news report - which evidently originated in the UK's Sunday Times - that Israel is planning a buffer zone" of 10 miles in northern Syria if or when the Assad regime finally crumbles. Israel of course has a long northern border with Syria, and the Israelis fear that in the chaos that would surely follow a collapse of the Assad regime they (the Israelis) would be faced with jihadist forces on their northern border.

Israel and Syria have fought three major wars against each other - 1948, 1967 and 1973 - and both Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar have demonstrated implacable hostility towards the Israelis. Nevertheless, from Israel's perspective, the Assad's have kept Israel's northern front quiet for 40 years, and Israel has generally taken the attitude of "the devil you know is better then the devil you don't" in its' attitude towards the Assad regime. However, while there is no doubt that Israel would obtain some benefits from the fall of the Assad regime - the regime is after all a close ally of both Hezbollah and Israel's mortal enemy Iran - the Israelis' fear of what exactly might be on their northern border after Assad falls is also legitimate fear in my opinion.

If you look at what has happened recently in the Middle East recently after authoritarian regimes have fallen, the picture is not exactly comforting. In Iraq, chaos and civil war erupted after Saddam Hussein fell; in Libya, after Ghaddafi was killed, we have seen a great deal of chaos in the country, including of course the jihadist
attack on the US consulate in Benghazi which killed four Americans, including the US Ambassador. And now, in Egypt, well let's just say the situation is not exactly trending towards stability.

Turning again to the possibility of Israel establishing a buffer zone on on the territory of one of its' neighbors is not unprecedented. As the map above demonstrates, Israel kept a buffer zone in southern Lebanon for over 15 years to keep Hezbollah away from its northern border. However, maintaining this buffer zone was a constant struggle for the Israelis against determined Hezbollah guerrillas which some commentators even described as being a "mini Vietnam" for the Israeli Defense Forces. While we are currently just seeing speculation, it does seem quite credible that Israel would now be planning for security contingencies in a post-Assad world.

Israel Strikes Targets in Syria - Why, What and Where Did the Attacks Take Place?

2013-02-05T18:32:00.002-08:00

Israel has acted on its threats to ensure that no advanced weapons are
transferred from the Assad regime to Hezbollah

Last Tuesday, January 29th, Israeli war planes struck a convoy of SS-17 missiles heading towards the Lebanese border. The Israelis had made clear that one of their "red lines" in the Syrian conflict was that it was unacceptable to them for the Assad regime to transfer advanced weaponry and/or chemical weapons to Israel's arch-enemies Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah fought a bitterly contested, 34 day war in 2006, and both sides have since been preparing for what they both see as the inevitable next conflict. Awhile back, I wrote a five part series of posts looking at the military balance between Israel and Hezbollah, and how conflict between them might be played out. Here is Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4 and Part 5 of the Israel Hezbollah series (Note: all posts are fairly sure with a concentration on maps and graphics).

There have been a number of reports in the media of what and where Israel attacked in Syria, such as:

Israel attacked a convoy carrying SS-17 missiles to Lebanon;
Israel attached the SS-17 convoy, and a Syrian military base in the town of Jamraya that was a research center for chemical and biological weapons;
The SS-17 missiles were still at Jamraya, and Israel destroyed both the military base and the weapons in one fell swoop, rather then waiting until the missiles were on the road (here is a good article from Mcclatchy news service on this theory).
Finally, there have even been recent reports that Israel also struck other targets in addition to the Jamraya military base and the SS-17 missiles, including an Iranian run intel post in southern Syria targeted at Israel.

While it is difficult to say exactly what happened - the Israelis are being quite coy about things - it is undoubtedly true that both Israel and the US are deathly afraid that as the Assad regime crumbles, some of its chemical or biological weapons or other advanced weaponry could fall into the hands of either Hezbollah in Lebanon, or potentially even worse, Sunni jihadist rebels in Syria from the al-Nusra front who are aligned with al-Qaeda. In fact, the US itself appears to be so worried that it has given the Israelis the green light for the IDF to strike further targets in Syria if necessary, while the US has also made clear that it is prepared to use maximum force - including special operations troops - to secure any chemical or biological weapons as the chaos in Syria continues.

As always in the Middle East, it is hard to say exactly what happened and what are the motives of the main players, but of one thing I am almost certain - we have not seen the last of Israeli strikes in Syria to prevent the leakage of any advanced weaponry to its enemies.

Tartus - The Capital of the Future Alawite State of "Alawistan"?

2012-12-26T20:27:00.000-08:00

Tartus is located on the Mediterranean in the Alawite heartland

As I noted in my previous post, the Assad regime may see a retreat to the Alawite heartland along the coast of the Mediterranean as a way to stave off ultimate defeat, and perhaps even their own destruction. I have noted that this idea of the formation of an Alawite State in Syria may well be an "end-game" the regime is keeping in its back pocket if it appears they will be defeated in Damascus.

In that regard, I just read a fascinating article in the New York Times on how the city of Tartus in the Alawite heartland is thriving despite the bloody Sunni-Alawite/Shia civil war in the rest of Syria. The Times article noted that there are numerous indications that security forces may indeed be laying the logistical groundwork for the formation of a separate Alawite state in the region. Some of the indicators include the possibility of turning a tiny local airfield into a full airport, as well as the regime's forces tightening security checkpoints around what could be the borders of a separate Alawite state of "Alawistan".

The Times article had an interesting summary of what current regime thinking on creating an Alawite state might be:

Should Damascus fall to the opposition, Tartus could become the heart of an attempt to create a different country. Some expect Mr. Assad and the security elite will try to survive the collapse by establishing a rump Alawite state along the coast, with Tartus as their new capital.

I personally am not sure if the idea of a separate Alawite state is feasible logistically or militarily for the regime and its' Alawite supporters, but do bear in mind that there is precedent for this, as a separate Alawite state called Aleppo actually existed under the French mandate from 1920-1946. At any rate, I think one would have to be willfully blind to ignore the fact that conflict in Syria is largely a sectarian civil war between the Shia Alawites and the Sunni majority.

For those interested, here is the link to the NY Times article referenced above.

Sunni-Shia Battle and Possibility of an Alawite State in Syria

2012-12-09T18:32:00.002-08:00

Could there be an attempt to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria?

As I've noted in some previous posts, Syria's civil war can be best understood through the clear prism of a Sunni-Shia/Alawite battle in Syria. Furthermore, there has also been a lot of discussion about how the endgame for Assad and the Alawites may well be an Alawite state in Syria.

Last week, I read a very interesting article in Time magazine by Tony Karon. The article provided an overview of the current situation in Syria, including whether the Assad regime might be desparate enough to use chemical weapons against the rebels in an act of Desperation. In discussing how the war in Syria might end, Karon discusses how the regime in Syria is actually based on the sectarian control of Syria by the Alawite majority::

A fracturing of Syria could, in the minds of some of the hard men around Assad, offer the prospect of salvaging more than they might if the regime is defeated and replaced by a strong, Sunni-dominated central state. Assad’s regime is not so much a personality-cult dictatorship as it is a system of Alawite minority rule and privilege, and its core remains a cohesive, heavily armed and highly motivated Alawite-dominated army that believes it is fighting for the survival of its community. Even once it recognizes that it can no longer rule the entire country, its sectarian communal logic may militate against making a desperate last stand in Damascus, a predominantly Sunni city.

Given the sectarian nature of the minority Alawite regime in Syria, Karon notes that the Alawite leadership around Assad may well see it in their interests to see Syria completely fracture around them, as this may make it possible for the Alawites to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria around the Alawite heartland in western Syria centered the coastal cities of Tartus and Lakatia. Karon notes the following:

Unlike Gaddafi in Libya, Assad is ruling on behalf of a community, and the key decisions may not be his alone to make. The Alawite strongmen around him don’t want to commit suicide. They want to protect themselves and their families from the violent retribution they fear is inevitable if the regime falls. That may make them more likely to favor a retreat to the Alawite heartland along the coast, where they’ll have a greater base of strength than they do in Damascus. If so, the regime, as we know it, will have fallen, but the civil war would be far from over.

I found Karon's article an excellent read, and it confirms my opinion that one possible endgame - at least in the mind of the Alawite leadership around Assad - is a retreat from Damascus and an attempt to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria. Here is the link to Karon's article.

Israel's Missile Defense Shields - Part 3: ARROW

2012-12-08T20:01:00.001-08:00

In my two previous posts on Israel's missile defense structure, I discussed the Israelis' Iron Dome and David's Sling systems. Today, I will briefly mention the third component of Israel's missile defense shield, the Arrow system. While Iron Dome and David's Sling are designed to deal with short to medium range missiles, the Arrow system is designed to knock long range ballistic missiles out of the sky.

While Iron Dome and David's Sling were largely designed for use against Hamas and Hezbollah, the Arrow is seen as a defense against Iran's ballistic missiles. The Arrow Missile-Killer system is a joint-venture between Boeing of the US and IAI (Israel Aircraft Industries) of Israel. Currently, there are two Arrow batteries deployed, one in Northern Israel and one outside of Tel Aviv. So far, the Arrow has gone through two iterations, but the real "killer app" for the Arrow will be the planned Arrow-3. Currently, there are two Arrow batteries deployed, one in Northern Israel and one outside of Tel Aviv.

The Arrow-3 is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in space outside the Earth's atmosphere in the final phase of their trajectory and destroy them on impact. The Arrow-2 - the version operationally deployed by the Israeli military - is built to destroy hostile missiles at lower altitudes within the atmosphere by exploding near them. Any day now, we can expect that the new Arrow-3 missile will be tested live, and this should give the Israelis a keen sense of where their progress on their overall missile defense infrastructure stands.

Here is an article from the website Defense Daily analyzing the capabilities of the Arrow system, and below a depiction of how the Arrow is designed to work.

Israel's Arrow Missile Defense System Works

Israel's Missile Defense Shields - Part 2: DAVID'S SLING

2012-12-02T19:52:00.000-08:00

David's Sling will join Iron Dome as part of Israel's missile defense structure

As I noted in my previous post, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are developing a multitiered missile defense system. The most well known of the Israeli systems, due to the reason conflict with Hamas, is Israel's Iron Dome. The Israelis, however, are not limited to Iron Dome alone, and are also developing other missile defense technologies.

The latest technology the Israelis have developed is a system called "David's Sling", which has been developed by Israel's Rafael Defense Systems (essentially, Rafael is the Lockheed Martin or Raytheon of Israel's defense industry) with assistance from US contractor Raytheon. The main issues with the Iron Dome system are twofold:

Iron Dome is designed to destroy only short-range missiles, up to approximately 75kms from what I've read. David's Sling, by contrast, can intercept missiles which can fly up to 300kms, making it - in theory - an ideal solution for handling Hesbollah's growing arsenal of missiles that it can fire at Israel.
Second, Iron Dome is expensive, as each missile costs between $50,000 - $1000,000. David's Sling should be substantially cheaper.

The Israelis just successfully tested David's Sling in southern Israel on November 25th. David's Sling uses a so-called "stunner" technology, and is scheduled for full deployment by 2014, and assuming its' development continues to progress, it will make a formidable addition to the IDF's missile defense arsenal.

Here is an article with more technical details on the successful test of David's Sling.

Israel's Missile Defense Shields - Part 1: IRON DOME

2012-11-25T18:41:00.002-08:00

How Does Israel's Iron Dome Work?

Although the recent hostilities between Israel and Hamas are now over, one thing that came out of the conflict was clear: Israel's Iron Dome Missile Defense Shield is indeed a game changer. According to analysts I have read, Iron Dome intercepted somewhere between 85%-90% of the missiles Hamas launched at Israel.

As Iron Dome and Israel's other missile defense systems are gradually built out, both Israel's nation-state (Iran) and non-state enemies (Hezbollah and Hamas) will find that the missiles they fire at the Israeli civilian population will become less and less effective. Of course, some will still get through as Iron Dome has not achieved a 100% success rate yet, but certainly the damage will be far less then if the Israelis did not have Iron Dome.

I read a fascinating article by a Mr. Avika Hamilton recently on the Real Clear World website that looked more closely at Iron Dome. The article makes a number a number of really interesting points about the system, but what I found most interesting was the way the article compared Iron Dome to an advanced computer software project - and even mentions the iPhone:

Iron Dome is fundamentally a highly advanced computer system with a very rapid upgrade cycle. So far Iron Dome is matching pace with the iPhone for major software and hardware upgrades, and consequent performance increases.

This will not only continue but will actually accelerate in accordance with Moore's Law and Ray Kurzweil's Law of Accelerating Returns which state that the performance of computer systems increases exponentially with time.

With each upgrade the interception rate will improve and the range of missiles it can intercept may also improve further. It is therefore that we can expect Iron Dome to reach a 95 percent or higher interception rate in the next year or two, and to continue to improve as the speed and processing power of the computers that make up its brain and eyes (radar) advance.

For anyone who has ever worked in software design, this all rings true. For example, when one buys an advanced Cisco router, the "special sauce" is not in the hardware, it is in the software, and it is really the software upgrades that continue to drive the product's performance improvements as new feature sets are added. And so it is with Iron Dome as well.

For those interested, below is another overview of how Iron Dome works and here is the article referenced above

Israel's Iron Dome destroyed 84% of missiles fired from Gaza that were due to hit civilian populated areas.

Overview of the Range of Hamas' Missiles Into Israel

2012-11-19T12:07:00.002-08:00

Map of where Hamas' rockets can hit Israel

As anyone who follows the news in even the most perfunctory way knows by now, the past week has seen a major escalation in the long simmering conflict between Israel and Hamas. Hamas are the rulers of the Gaza strip, and unlike Fatah of the PLO which rules the West Bank, Hamas has never accepted the idea of a peace treaty with Israel and remains committed to Israel's destruction in their Charter.

One reason Hamas has been so aggressive towards Israel in their current flare-up is that the Hamas arsenal of missiles and rockets is considerably more advanced then it was four years ago, which was the last time Israel and Hamas came to blows. In Operation "Cast Lead", which is what Israel called the last battle against Hamas, Hamas' rockets were quite primitive and had a range of only a few kms. In the current battle - which Israel has called "Pillar of Defense" - Hamas has a much more robust missile arsenal. Consider the maps to the right and below. Here is the range of Hamas' missiles which allows them to strike deep into Israel:

Quassam - 17kms
Grad - 20 kms
Upgraded Grad - 40 kms
Iranian Fajir-5 Missile - 75 kms

These dramatically improved ranges have allowed Hamas to target even Tel Aviv with their rocket attacks, and I believe that Hamas feels - and they are correct to a large extent - that this is a game changer for them.

Range of Hamas' Missiles into Israel is up to 75 kms - this puts even Tel Aviv within reach

Could an Israeli Attack on Iran be Launched From Azerbaijan?

2012-11-05T18:41:00.002-08:00

Would Israeli Planes Strike Iran From Azerbaijani Territory?

In a post a few months ago, I noted that there have long been close ties between Israel and the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, and that the Azeris had actually allowed Israel to establish secret airbases in the country. There has long been tension between largely secular Azerbaijan and the Islamic government in Tehran, not least of which is because Iran has a significant Azeri minority of 16% itself, and the Iranians are worried that their Azeri population might have sympathies with Azerbaijan to the North, essentially a "fifth column" that could be used against the Islamic regime..

The Israeli-Azerbaijan relationship - tacit as it is - makes a lot of sense for both parties. From the perspective of the Azeris, having the support of a powerful friend like Israel who provides it with weapons and support is excellent protection in a rough neighborhood. For Israel, Azerbaijan shares a long border with Iran and is an ideal listening and intelligence gathering post.

There was now an article that just came out on the Global Post speculating to what extent the Azeris may allow the Israeli military to attack Iran from its' territory. According to the article:

But the idea of serious cooperation with Israel places these criss-crossing tensions on another, far more serious level. Such a tacit alliance, if it indeed exists, poses a significant threat to Iran's clerical regime. Azerbaijan provides a valuable intelligence listening post for Israeli agents along the Islamic Republic's northern border.

Here is the full Global Post article on the Israel-Azerbaijan relationship.

Iran and Azerbaijan Share a Long Border

When Looking at Syria's Demographics and the Sunni-Shia Split, We Should Also Remember the Syrian Kurds as Well

2012-11-02T22:16:00.000-07:00

The Kurdish population of Syria is concentrated in the North

As I have noted in previous posts here and here, Syria's demographics are quite complicated, and the battle between the rebels and the Assad regime is a de-facto civil war between the Sunni Arab majority and the Shiite/Alawite minority which is the backbone of Assad's power. I have, however, left out one critical ethnic group within Syria, the Kurds.

The Syrian Kurds are Sunnis, just like the majority Arab population. The Kurds, however, are a totally distinct ethnic group, and constitute approximately 10% of the Syrian population. Like their Kurdish brethren in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, Syria's Kurds have long felt persecuted by the government in Damascus. Interestingly enough, the Assad regime has largely pulled out of Kurdish regions in Syria's north, leaving the country's two million Kurds with a degree of independence that was previously unimaginable. Why Assad did made this decision has been debated. Suggestions have run the gamut from his army simply being overstretched to his desire to tweak Turkey who worries about its' own restive Kurdish population seeing a largely independent Kurdish enclave right across their border in northern Syria.

The reality though is that for now, the Syrian Kurds are able to control their own destiny. As with Iraq's Kurds after the Gulf War, Syria's Kurds have moved quickly to expand their authority in Kurdish areas, and as this Washing Post article notes, have been just as quick to fight the largely Sunni Arab rebels as the Assad regime itself. The major issue dividing the Kurds and the Sunni rebels are what kind of government would come after Assad. The main Syrian opposition - the Free Syrian Army or FSA - is split between those who would look to some kind of democratic political system and others who demand an Islamic government based on Sharia, or Islamic Law.

The Kurds, by contrast, are not interested in any kind of Islamist political structure, and many Kurds are therefore leery of what a post-Assad, Sunni Arab dominated political system might look like. Furthermore, the Kurds in general are quite leery about being subject to Arab domination of any sort, especially now that they have tasted freedom. With two million people and an independent Kurdish fighting force, the Kurds are not eager to exchange the dictatorial rule of Assad with an Islamist government, and the Kurd-Sunni Arab fault line is yet one more demographic fault line within Syria.

Is There an Internal Split Within the Alawite Community in Syria?

2012-10-18T19:09:00.000-07:00

Map of where the different Syrian sects live

As I noted in a post from a few months ago, the ethnic demography of Syria is complex and varied. Sunnis constitute the majority of the population, but the ruling regime is largely constituted of a small sect called Alawites, who come from the Shia side of the Sunni-Shia divide. If you want to learn more, here is a previous post on "who are the Alawites". The President Bashar al_Assad is an Alawite, and the pillars of his regime - the security forces and the top echelons of the military - are largely Alawite controlled.

Given the Alawites concern about Sunni fundamentalism and their place in a country dominated by a Sunni-led government, most of the Alawite community have been strong supporters of Assad. In a recent article in the Washington Post, however, the issue of whether some part of the Alawite community may be splintering away from the Assad regime. The reasons raised are twofold:

1) There was a recent shootout between heads of top Alawite clans in the city of Quardaha in the middle of the Alawite heartland of western Syria, which is in red above. Most experts, however, believe this was not a political dispute, but rather an economic one involving control of smuggling routes for cigarettes and other goods.

2) The second hypothesis is that the Alawites believe Assad is using them to maintain his power. As Alawites constitute the backbone of the security forces and militia, the Alawite death toll has been rising substantially. According to the Post article, complaints that Alawite fears are being exploited by the regime to protect Assad and his family are growing steadily louder as the death toll mounts.

The reality, however, is that the Alawite community's fear for their safety in a post-Assad Sunni dominated country means that most Alawites will - however reluctantly - stick with the regime until the bitter end.

This is the Post article referenced above.

Hezbollah Continues to Support Assad's Alawite Regime Despite Risks

2012-10-14T17:56:00.001-07:00

Hezbollah's Nasrallah standing by Assad regime in Syria

Despite Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah's frequent rhetoric around "resistance" and "freedom" in the middle east, when it comes to Hezbollah's own position Nasrallah is taking what might be called a very "real politic" approach. Hezbollah - the powerful Shiite group in Lebanon who are an Iranian client - has remained steadfast allies of Bashar al-Assad's Syrian regime, despite the fact that the Syrian conflict is largely perceived within the region as a revolt by the Syrian majority against a thuggish regime.

Hezbollah is clinging tightly to Assad to date, however, because Syria is one of Hezbollah's two main allies in the region, along with Iran. One of Syria's great values to Hezbollah is that it is the main conduit for Iranian arms to reach Hezbollah in Lebanon. Indeed, as I noted awhile back in a previous post, there is strong evidence that Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon have been in Syria actively working with the largely Alawite military commanders to suppress the largely Sunni rebels. An article from the end of July in the English language version of France's Le Monde paper noted the following:

"Nasrallah also stated that military strategy was more important than anything else for the party insofar as its relations with Syria go. It is no longer a question of defending “the oppressed” as it has been maintaining in its political charters and by siding with the Egyptians, Libyans, Bahrainis and Yemenis since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Holding on to its weapons, upholding the "axis of resistance" -- Iran, Syria, Hezbollah – against Israel has become top priority."

This analysis is clearly spot on, and there is no doubt that Nasrallah is losing much of the admiration he previously enjoyed in the broader Arab world. It appears that Nasrallah and Hezbollah are, for now, giving greater priority to their overall strategic position then to liberation rhetoric, and as a result they will be increasingly seen as simply another sectarian component in the region. Here is the article from Le Monde.

Why is Russia Such a Strong Supporter of the Assad Regime in Syria?

2012-10-12T21:31:00.000-07:00

Russian sailors at the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria

With the recent forced landing in Ankara by the Turkish Air Force of a Syrian civilian air liner that was suspected of also carrying Russian weapons for the Assad regime, the issue of Russia’s support for Syria has been thrown into stark relief. I have a number of theories for why the Russians are such ardent supporters of the Assad regime:

1) The central principle the Russians oppose any outside intervention in Syria is sovereignty, which could be defined as the authority of each state to determine affairs on its own territory without interference from the outside world. The Russians believe that each state's control over its own internal affairs is the only thing standing in the way of domination by strong states over weaker ones. Of course, Russia’s support for absolute sovereign authority does not extend to states in the former CIS such as Georgia. In Georgia, the Russians have recognized the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and S. Ossetia, thereby essentially dismantling the sovereign state of Georgia. Russia’s ultimate fear, of course, is that the principle of “humanitarian intervention” which they see the West espousing could some day be used as a justification for intervening in Russia in some fashion as well.

2) The Russians see the West pursuing its’ own geopolitical interests in Syria, in the context of the ongoing “cold war” war between President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its’ allies Iran, and Hezbollah, and its opposition of Turkey, the US, the European Union, and rich Persian Gulf states. Of course, underlying this conflict is the Sunni-Shiite battle in the region, a clash which we have long argued is fundamental to understanding the Middle East.

3) Finally, we must consider pure geopolitics here. Russia has a large naval base in the Syrian port city of Tartus, which is Russia’s only port in the Mediterranean. While there is now doubt Russia’s military power has declined precipitously since the Soviet Union fell apart, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian establishment are determined to reclaim Russia’s staus as a force in world affairs, and certainly they are loathe to lose their Tartus stronghold.

Tartus, Syria - location of Russia's only Mediterranean naval base

If Israel bombed Iran, the view from Tel Aviv

2012-09-28T19:28:00.001-07:00

As I noted, the Washington Post has a very interesting three part series imagining the aftermath of an Israeli attack, as viewed from Washington, DC, Tehran and Tel Aviv. Do read my prior posts on the View from Washington and the View from Tehran.

Below is the Post article on the view from Tel Aviv, written through the eyes of a mother with three children:

"If Israel bombed Iran, what would life in Tel Aviv be like?"

For months, Israel has threatened to strike Iran’s nuclear sites. The United States has urged restraint. If such an operation were launched, how might Tel Aviv react?

“Our pilots,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proclaims on the Channel 2 TV news, “carried out their difficult and dangerous task for the sake of the state of Israel. They have struck several Iranian nuclear facilities and have returned safely.”

For months, Israeli officials had been debating whether a strike would be worth the risk. I’m relieved they have finally acted, but I worry: What if the reactors and other nuclear facilities, which are scattered throughout Iran, some buried deep underground, aren’t entirely destroyed?

Outside my house in Tel Aviv, the early-morning stillness has been pierced by the sound of explosions; sirens lag behind the shrieks of incoming missiles. Military vehicles, loudspeakers mounted on their roofs, roll through the streets, announcing passwords that call up reserve soldiers — Israeli men and women who’ve completed their mandatory military service — joined by some volunteers. The soldiers hurry out of their homes, buttoning their uniforms and scattering to bases and missions across the country. The massacres of Jews and the piles of ash left by the Nazis are part of our collective memory. So we take responsibility for our own defense — of a land that is both a haven and a self-imposed ghetto for the Jewish people.

My husband, a volunteer beyond the age of his mandatory reserve duty, is called up to defend the home front. In the past, the Israel Defense Forces’ preference for male over female reservists bothered me, but this time I am happy to stay home.
After the Holocaust, we said “Never again,” and we meant it. The world must understand that when the Jewish people are threatened, it is the first sign of a threat to international order and world peace.

I bring my mother, who lives nearby, over to the house so she won’t be alone. Her 72-year-old face is lined from age and decades of worry and war. “They will never leave us alone,” she mutters. “Your father was in Iran for two years when he fled Iraq on his way to Israel. It was different then; the Iranians loved us. Why did everything change?”

Together, with my three children, we go to our safe room. Almost every house in Israel has a room like this: a bomb shelter with thick, concrete walls, stocked with food and water, a radio, TV, and Internet, sometimes in the basement, but often a spare room used as a bedroom.
Analysts on the news repeat what we instinctively fear — that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is probably hovering over a map of Israel in his headquarters, pointing at targets to hit. A TV announcer reports missiles falling on Tel Aviv, launched from the Gaza Strip by Hamas militants. The Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic Jihad has hit civilian targets in the south in the Negev Desert. And Hezbollah, another Iran proxy, aims missiles from Lebanon toward the port city of Haifa in the north.

The mood and events remind me of 1973, but I was a child back then and didn’t really grasp the gravity of the early days of the Yom Kippur War. In all of Israel’s many wars, the people have put aside the arguments that divided them politically and united to fight those who wished to destroy the Jewish state. Nothing is left from the disputes between politicians and former generals from the security forces; once the decision has been made, there is no argument about whether it was a good or bad move.

Netanyahu, with Defense Minister Ehud Barak by his side, says he ordered this mission to protect the state of Israel. He echoes comments he’d made earlier, saying that because the United States hadn’t set a “red line” for Iran’s uranium enrichment and larger nuclear program, Israel had to act.

And despite the fact that Meir Dagan, a former chief of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, and Gabi Ashkenazi, a former chief of staff of the IDF, opposed such a strike, today they say Netanyahu and Barak made the right decision. Once again, when Israel is thrust into conflict, past political division melts into survival-minded solidarity.

I try to think positively. After all, when Israel has destroyed nuclear reactors in the past — Iraq’s in 1981 and, according to foreign sources, Syria’s in 2007 — missiles have been launched at us in retaliation, and history has proved that we did the right thing. Of course, there is a world of difference between the single Iraqi reactor and the Iranian nuclear facilities dispersed throughout the country — and between the secular dictators Saddam Hussein and Bashar al-Assad and the mullahs who govern the Islamic republic of Iran.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have an apocalyptic religious vision: They are doing everything they can to hasten the arrival of the Mahdi, the Islamic messianic figure who will come to save the Muslim world just before Judgment Day. On that day, it is believed that the world’s natural order will reverse — the oceans will dry up, and the sun will rise in the west and set in the east.

A nuclear Iran is not just Israel’s problem. The Sunni gulf monarchs have been trying to convince the Obama administration since 2009 that a nuclear Shiite Iran would be a mortal threat to their governments. And of course, equipped with weapons of mass destruction, Iran would be able to ramp up its funding for and training of Islamic terrorists, presenting a grave danger to the region’s political stability — and its massive oil and natural gas reserves — and to the world at large.

Syrian President Assad sees this new conflict as an opportunity to deflect attention from his country’s civil war. Following Jordan’s and Egypt’s lead, he moves what is left of his troops close to the Israeli border. Israeli Arabs prepare to flee, knowing that the missiles will not distinguish between Muslims and Jews.

The media loop reports that some Israeli infrastructure and military facilities have been destroyed by missile attacks. Bodies are buried under the rubble, but there are no estimates of the number of dead and injured. Israel continues to strike back at Iran, targeting its proxies. I wonder: Will Israel use its ultimate weapons in response?

Israel has clearly hindered Iran’s nuclear program, though the severity of the damage is uncertain. But Israelis know that, like the phoenix, Iran will try to rise again and rebuild its nuclear program. It will emerge more determined and vengeful than before. It will no longer be satisfied to have its proxies attack Israel; it will launch an all-out war, targeting the arrogant Sunni gulf states and the West in addition to the Jewish state.

Anat Berko, a visiting professor at George Washington University and a research fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel, is the author of “The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers.”

What if Israel Attacked Iran? The view from Tehran

2012-09-28T19:19:00.000-07:00

In the previous post, I outlined the Washington Post article detailing an imaginary scenario on how President Obama and his team might react to an Israeli attack on Iran. The second article from the Post below describes a scenario on how Iran might respond. What struck me here is that in this imaginary scenario, the Iranians do not respond directly by launching missiles at Israel - probably because they do not wish for the US to enter the fray in an engagement which would surely destroy large chunks of their nuclear program.

Without further ado, here is the Post article:

"What if Israel bombed Iran? The view from Tehran."

For months, Israel has threatened to strike Iran’s nuclear sites. The United States has urged restraint. If such an operation were launched, how might Tehran react?

Hamid has been awake since midnight, when Israeli bombs struck the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in nearby Amirabad. The boom reverberated throughout the city nearby, sending plumes of smoke into the night. Sirens punctuated the hours till the gray-pink dawn. With the Internet down, Hamid crouches before Radio Tehran, which reports that key nuclear sites at Arak, Natanz and Isfahan have also been hit.

He is surprised that the Israeli planes skipped Fordow, the site built under a fortified mountain near Qom. The war games that he and his colleagues conducted last summer at Shahid Beheshti University, where he teaches political science, placed the Fordow facility at the top of the expected strike list. Recently a military commander called Israel’s threats “hollow” and another said Iran would “welcome” an attack. He thinks about these men now, wondering whether they feel pleased or, like him, dead sick with terror.

Hamid walks to the supermarket on the corner. A crowd of people, some of them his neighbors, presses against the windows and bangs on the door, shouting for the owner to open. Shopping has been tense ever since sanctions turned chicken into a luxury good, but today everyone is frantic. When the owner admits them, anxious shoppers sweep cookies off the shelves. A young woman screams that her baby is allergic to milk: “Where is the formula?” Hamid backs away from the shop.

He flicks on the television at home; the state channel shows emergency workers in white hazmat suits carrying stretchers out of the dusty rubble outside Isfahan. All 1,000 workers at the plant have been killed, and winds are sweeping toxic smoke toward the nearby city. The supreme leader’s war council must be sitting on a woolen rug at Khamenei’s guarded house, appraising the damage to the nuclear sites and calibrating its response. The ticker at bottom of the TV screen says the price of crude oil has jumped to $130 a barrel.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki condemns the attacks and warns that his country’s airspace is off limits to “further aggression.” Iraq and Iran have grown friendlier since the end of the U.S. war, and Maliki might be willing to look the other way should some Iraqi pipelines mysteriously explode, diverting millions of barrels from the market. Hamid knows that the clerics want to avoid a regional war, but they can destabilize the world economy without going to such lengths. He thinks of the relief that Bashar al-Assad must be feeling in Syria, his regime bought precious days by Iran’s misfortune.

In the morning rush hour, cars whiz past billboards of smiling clerics on the expressway; everyone’s moving fast save for those in the two-block-long line at the nearest gas station. Hamid’s political-theory class starts at 10 a.m., but he has left early to see if he can get online at work; he must e-mail his daughter in Los Angeles to say he’s safe.

The authorities have shut down the cellphone network, worried that Israel’s agents will report back via the phone lines and that the Iranian opposition will scramble to exploit the chaos. The radio reports that the Islamic Association of Students has gathered outside the Swiss Embassy, which looks after U.S. interests in Iran, chanting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel,” pelting rocks and tossing gasoline bombs over the concrete walls. These are the Basij front line, Hamid knows, the militiamen organized by the government.

He parks his Kia in the staff lot, wondering which former student he can reach to find out how officials are reacting. Most of Hamid’s students go on to key posts in the diplomatic corps and the Revolutionary Guard; he has supervised at least 20 theses gaming out precisely what might happen in this scenario, watched as his students defended their conclusions with glistening eyes, their fervor evident. Not all of them had itched for war with Israel, he reminds himself. Maybe just half.

After his class, in which rattled students argued that Iran should move to weaponize its nuclear program immediately, Hamid watches the supreme leader address the country, transfixed by the elderly mullah’s forceful calm. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has never captured even a glint of his predecessor Ruhollah Khomeini’s legendary fire. Today, however, his oratory is masterful. He vows that Iran will not be defeated, that the great nation will retaliate and bring the Zionist enemy to its knees.

The speech is over, and the broadcast cuts to images of Tehran’s snow-capped Alborz Mountains and the Caspian Sea, set to “Vatanam,” a patriotic song of his youth. Hamid’s eyes fill with tears. He is a secular aristocrat by birth, the grandson of a shah’s cabinet minister, trained in Weber and Rousseau, but he is not above being moved by nationalism. Today it is not propaganda; it is genuine solidarity.

On the way home, he passes Pars Hospital and sees swarms of people pushed back by navy-clad riot police. He leans out the car’s window to ask a flower vendor what’s happening. “They’ve been coming since morning; they want masks and oxygen tanks.”

The radio reports that Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah rockets are striking cities in Israel; already there are 10 dead in the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona. Hamid wonders why these strikes are Iran’s only military response. The Israeli attacks must have been only moderately damaging, he suspects; the commanders must know that the most advanced nuclear facilities have been spared. Their retaliation will be oblique and stealthy, designed to inflict economic damage by taking oil off the market. The Revolutionary Guard’s cyber-army will hack into the computer systems of countries controlling oil delivery throughout the Persian Gulf. The Saudis and the Qataris will be livid, but what can they do? Syria, emboldened by Iraq’s response, denounces the attacks.

At a big highway intersection, Hamid sees masses of young people assembled, some in black chadors, others with oversize sunglasses pushed back on their headscarves. They are singing “Ey Iran,” the country’s popular anthem, and holding hands, men and women alike. No one tells them not to. “O enemy, if you are of stone, I am of steel,” they sing, their voices rising over the traffic.

Later that afternoon, Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari of the Revolutionary Guard, a squat man with winged eyebrows, addresses the nation while sitting before a faded world map. He tells Iranians not to panic, that they are in no danger of radiation, and he exhorts them to defend the motherland as they did during the “Holy Defense” against Iraq three decades ago. He says that the Guard is planning to line the Iranian side of the Persian Gulf with mines and that enemies’ oil tankers will seek to cross at their peril.

As an amber dusk settles, Hamid drives to the Alborz foothills, to the home of a top Khamenei adviser whose brother directs the university where Hamid teaches. After stopping at a checkpoint, he continues on to the two-story villa. Inside, the men sit on the floor, leaning back against tulip-patterned cushions. They are all there: Jafari; the war council; Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba. As Hamid suspected, the Natanz centrifuges are only partially damaged and can be repaired within a year, barring further strikes. This is why Tehran has not yet lashed out, has held back from igniting Saudi Arabia’s eastern oil fields and attacking U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan through its proxies.

The Americans have sent messages through the Turks and the Swiss asking for direct talks to end the hostilities. The men drink tea and talk heatedly, concluding that they must accede. Iran must resurrect the nuclear program at all costs; that is what matters most. They will threaten to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, to pummel Israel with rockets, to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but they will contain themselves, determined to salvage the program that is their salvation. Their expressions are serious, but Hamid notices a lightness in their postures; the country, they know, is united in wrath behind them.

Azadeh Moaveni, a journalist based in Britain, is the author of “Lipstick Jihad” and “Honeymoon in Tehran: Two Years of Love and Danger in Iran.”

What If Israel Attacked Iran? The View from Washington, DC

2012-09-28T19:07:00.001-07:00

The Washington Post was recently out with a fascinating three part series imagining how different people in the cities of Washington, DC, Tehran and Tel Aviv might feel after an Israeli attack on Iran. These are imaginary scenarios of cost, but I believe that they represent realistic possibilities of the aftermath of an Israeli bombing attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

Two things jumped out at me from this first essay, on the view from Washington. First, how completely taken by surprise the US itself is by an Israeli attack on Iran; and second, how keen President Obama is to let the Iranians indirectly know that the US had nothing to do with the Israeli attack. I think the articles speak for themselves, so below is the first one from the Post on the view from Washington

"What if Israel bombed Iran? The view from Washington."

For months, Israel has threatened to strike Iran’s nuclear sites. The United States has urged restraint. If such an operation were launched, how might Washington react?

President Obama is enjoying a quiet dinner with Michelle, Sasha and Malia at the White House residence on a Thursday evening in October when he gets the call.

Two dozen Israeli fighter jets have just entered Jordanian airspace, apparently en route to Iran, chief of staff Jack Lew tells him. They will enter Iranian airspace, via Iraq, in approximately 85 minutes.

“Damn it,” Obama says under his breath. “Bibi told me he was going to hold off.”

Within 45 minutes, the president’s national security brain trust has convened in the Situation Room. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta informs the group that attempts to reach Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have so far failed but that Israeli military commanders are briefing the Pentagon on Israel’s targets.

Panetta lays out the United States’ options: either persuade Netanyahu to call it off, or shoot down the planes.

“Shooting down the planes is not an option!” Vice President Biden explodes. “Tell Bibi the president of the United States wants to talk to him now!”

Within minutes, Netanyahu’s voice is heard on the speakerphone, and he immediately preempts any attempts to call off the mission.

“I couldn’t wait any longer, Mr. President,” he says firmly. “I am responsible for the security of the Jewish nation.”

As Netanyahu explains the operation, Obama eyes the large electronic map of the Middle East on the Situation Room wall. The coordinates of the Israeli planes show that they’re nearing Iran.

“Mr. President,” Netanyahu says. “I hope we can count on your full support.”
Obama’s face masks his scorn. He pauses for several moments before responding. “You know I respect Israel’s right to defend itself,” he says, “but I need to do what’s in the interests of the United States.”

Panetta orders the head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. James Mattis, to activate Operation Gulf Shield, putting America’s military forces throughout the Middle East on their highest defensive posture, bracing for Iranian retaliation.
Obama surveys the room. “What do we tell the Iranians?” he asks. “They’re going to assume we’re behind this.”

The battle lines are quickly drawn. Susan Rice — the ambassador to the United Nations and a close Obama confidante, who is in the running to replace Hillary Rodham Clinton as secretary of state — is the first to chime in, via secure video teleconference: “We need to be clear that the Israelis acted without our knowledge. We need to urge Iran to exercise restraint while we restrain Israel.”

“With respect,” CIA Director David H. Petraeus says, “if we send them that message, they’ll think they can retaliate without us responding. The Iranians need to believe that if they respond, the United States will enter this war — and swiftly and decisively end it.”

“I agree with David,” Clinton says. “The Iranians need to know there is no daylight they can exploit between us and the Israelis.”

Within hours, Twitter is alight with reports of explosions in various parts of Iran. All seemingly can be traced to one source: the Iranian opposition group Mujaheddin-e Khalq. Mainstream media outlets say they cannot corroborate the story, and Iranian state media is silent.

A few hours later, while Washington sleeps, the Saudi-owned satellite channel Al Arabiya confirms reports of massive explosions in Iran.

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz alludes to an Israeli military operation in Iran but, citing national security restrictions, does not offer details. It appears that one plane has gone missing, but Israeli officials refuse to comment.

By the time Washington awakens, oil futures are up 20 percent to $110 a barrel.

At 6:30 a.m., Obama meets in the Oval Office with senior campaign adviser David Axelrod and former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, who have flown in from Chicago.

Axelrod suggests that the White House’s message should be that Iran brought this upon itself.

“What the hell do I say,” Obama asks them, “when the press ask me whether I knew about this operation in advance?”

“Don’t answer yet,” Emanuel says. He scribbles a few sentences on a notepad, rips the paper out and hands it to Obama.

“If we need to,” Emanuel says, “we can leak the news that we weren’t given a heads up. But we shouldn’t disown it right away if there’s potential it was a successful operation.”

Obama shakes his head. “Voters don’t care about whether the attack was successful. They care about $5 gasoline.”

By 8 a.m., the White House has issued the terse statement Emanuel drafted, saying: “The United States is monitoring events in Iran closely. Israel has a right to defend itself, and America’s commitment to Israeli security is unwavering.”

Having long rehearsed this scenario, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney is ready with a sharp, gaffe-free response.

While campaigning in Palm Beach, Fla., that morning, Romney pledges his “ironclad support” for Israel and attacks “Obama’s policies of appeasement that left Prime Minister Netanyahu no choice but to take exceptional measures.”

Romney adviser Dan Senor rips into the president on CNN: “Our strongest ally in the world, Israel, is facing an existential threat, and Obama is still leading from behind.”

Another Romney adviser, former U.N. ambassador John Bolton, echoes this theme on Fox News. “Instead of doing his job as commander in chief, Barack Obama outsourced our national security to Israel,” he says. “The American public owes a debt of gratitude to Prime Minister Netanyahu, and we should be prepared to finish the job.”

By late morning, more details of the attack trickle out in the media. The strike reportedly caused extensive damage to Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz, Arak and Isfahan, as well as to the country’s radar and command-and-control centers. But it’s unclear just how much damage has been done, and there’s no word on casualties.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) begins circulating a draft resolution on Capitol Hill expressing the Senate’s “unconditional support” for Israel. By noon, 99 senators — with Rand Paul the lone dissenter — have signed on.

J Street, a liberal Jewish advocacy group, issues a statement expressing “concern” that Israel acted preemptively.

China and Russia condemn Israel, urging restraint and calling for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates — which in WikiLeaked State Department cables from 2010 appeared to support a military attack on Iran’s facilities — condemn Israel’s action but stop short of expressing solidarity with Tehran.

Unable to reach Obama again, Netanyahu tells Biden that it has been a “clean, successful operation,” with minimal Iranian casualties. “Frankly, we should have done this a long time ago,” he says.

But the first batch of satellite photos suggests that the Fordow nuclear plant outside Qom, buried under 300 feet of specially designed concrete, may have survived the raid. Unless Israel or the United States mounts a follow-up attack, Iran may be able to continue enriching uranium fairly quickly.

Iranian state television shows footage of the casualties, including women and children (though an opposition Web site later reveals that these images were actually of recent earthquake victims in northwestern Iran). Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vows revenge. “The blood of our women and children is on the hands of the Great Satan and its puppet master!” he says. “The Zionist entity has written its death certificate!”

When the stock market closes, oil prices are up nearly 40 percent, the largest 24-hour increase in history. CNN interviews Americans at gas stations in swing states such as Florida and Ohio; most blame Iran, not Israel or Obama, for the price jumps.

By Friday evening, leaks have emerged from within the U.S. government and military saying that the United States had no prior knowledge of Israel’s actions.
Obama manages to break away from his national security team to join his family for a quick dinner. Sasha and Malia are talking about their schoolwork.
“I don’t like physics,” Malia says. “It’s too complicated.”

“I know just how you feel, honey,” Obama says. “I’ve got a few problems like that, too.”

Karim Sadjadpour is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Blake Hounshell is managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine.

2012-09-10T13:05:00.000-07:00

Hillary and Netanyahu discuss US "red lines" on Iran

As I noted in a previous post, it was starting to look increasingly likely that Israel might bomb Iran before the US November elections. Now comes word that Israel and the US are discussing what "red lines" Iran would have to cross to have the US bomb Iran instead of Israel.

As is clear, the US would have a much better chance of setting back Iran's nuclear program, as the US is able to bring substantially more military assets to the effort. According to an article in Reuters, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is negotiating with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the US "red lines". So far, Clinton is not willing to give public "red lines" as for what it would take for the US to bomb Iran themselves.

Here is the Reuters article.