New York Public Personnel Law

Appellate Division decision address initiating disciplinary action involving law enforcement personnel pursuant to a negotiated collective bargaining agreement and a competing statute vesting such disciplinary authority in the appointing authority

2026-05-15T09:00:00.000-04:00

A Supreme Court (1) granted the City of Albany's [Petitioner] application to permanently stay a pending arbitration, and (2) declared the City of Albany's Local Law F of 2022 valid.

The Albany Police Supervisors Association, Josiah Jones and others [collectively referred to as "PSA"] had moved to dismiss the City's petition/complaint, contending that Local Law F was invalid due to certain alleged conflicts with the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreements [CBAs], the existing city code and the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law §§ 75, 76, 200 et seq.) and for "impermissible vagueness and other reasons".

In addition, the Albany Police Benevolent Association, including Michael Delano, and other unit members [collectively referred to as "PBA"] answered and cross-petitioned to dismiss the City's petition/complaint, declare Local Law F invalid, and compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503. PBA also contended that Local Law F conflicted with Civil Service Laws §§75 and 76 and violated New York State's Municipal Home Rule Law §23 because it was enacted without a referendum.

Supreme Court (1) granted the City's petition/complaint, finding Local Law F valid; (2) granted the petition to stay arbitration; (3) denied the PSA respondents' motion to dismiss; and (4) dismissed the PBA respondents' cross-petition., noting In brief, Supreme Court found that Petitioner's "uninterrupted history of local laws vesting authority over police discipline with city officials qualified it for the 'grandfather[ ]' provisions of Civil Service Law § 76 (4), rendered police discipline a prohibited subject of collective bargaining and vitiated the CBA provisions governing arbitration of police discipline".

The Appellate Division, noting that Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the PSA respondents' alternative claim that Local Law F was void for vagueness and lacked due process procedures, indicating that the PSA respondents and PBA respondents appealed the Supreme Court decision, modified that ruling, addressing a number of issues concerning processing "police disciplinary charges" in an apparent contravention of the Taylor Law, which generally commits public employee discipline to a forum and procedures established by statute or determined through collective bargaining.

Considering the number and variety of issues presented in this appeal to the Appellate Division, the Court said "To put it simply, some municipalities have the right to bargain about police discipline, and some do not, and the difference depends upon whether there is applicable legislation specifically committing police discipline to the discretion of local officials in force".

The Appellate Division then noting that Court of Appeals has resolved the "tension between the strong and sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and a competing policy — here, the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of police forces", pointed out that strong local authority over police discipline prevails when an extant general, special or local law specifically commits police discipline to local officials' discretion" and that "[t]his rule has been applied to municipalities that claimed local control even after signing labor agreements that addressed police discipline".

Further, courts examine the legislative enactment for "plain and clear" evidence that a municipality deliberately ceded the right of local control over police discipline in favor of collective bargaining. In contrast, it was noted that "after a municipality with local control over police discipline enacts a local law clearly delegating police discipline to collective bargaining or the Civil Service Law, the Taylor Law prevails and the municipality may not through later legislation reclaim that authority for local police leaders".

The parties disputed whether Petitioner had a local law "in force" under which a local police official may initiate disciplinary action or had Petitioner relinquished such authority in favor of negotiating disciplinary procedures through collective bargaining pursuant to Article 14 of the State's Civil Service Laws.

Faced with the variety and complexity of the arguments and issues raised by the parties, the Appellate Division said it must examine the origin of Petitioner's disciplinary authority and relevant changes to its laws after the Legislature adopted Civil Service Law procedures to discipline police officers and created the right of public employees, including police officers, to collectively bargain over disciplinary procedures.

Accordingly, NYPPL has elected to set out the Appellate Division's decision in full below rather than attempt to summarize the many and varied issues considered by the Appellate Division raised or argued by the parties addressed in its rulings.

Matter of City of Albany, N.Y. (Albany Police Benevolent Assn.)

2026 NY Slip Op 03038

May 14, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Corcoran, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of the Arbitration between City of Albany, New York, Respondent, and Albany Police Benevolent Association et al., Appellants. (And Another Related Proceeding.)

Decided and Entered:May 14, 2026

CV-24-2055

Calendar Date: March 23, 2026

Before: Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Fisher, Powers And Corcoran, JJ.

Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Christopher M. Silva of counsel), for Albany Police Benevolent Association and others, appellants.

The Law Offices of John K. Grant, PC, Newburgh (John K. Grant of counsel), for Albany Police Supervisors Association and others, appellants.

Robert Magee, Corporation Counsel, Albany (Linda Keller of counsel), for respondent.

Corcoran, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Christina Ryba, J.), entered November 24, 2024 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7503 and action for declaratory judgment, among other things, (1) granted petitioner's application to permanently stay arbitration, and (2) declared Local Law F of 2022 valid.

In 2022, the Albany Common Council enacted Local Law No. 7-2022 (F-2022) (hereinafter Local Law F), which established a Department of Public Safety, empowered the mayor to appoint the department's Commissioner, and designated the Commissioner as "arbiter of any disciplinary determination that is appealed from within the Albany Police Department." In 2023, disciplinary charges were brought against respondents Leonard Gaspary, Joshua Sears and John Polec, all officers of the Albany Police Department, alleging misconduct in how they worked and accounted for extra-duty shifts for the city housing authority, and against respondent Lieutenant Devin Anderson alleging unprofessional conduct. The Albany police chief served them with notices of alleged violations of rules and general orders and proposed termination of the three officers and less severe sanctions against Anderson. The disciplinary notice offered each officer/lieutenant review via either arbitration under "the Labor Agreement" or a hearing under Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 as contemplated by the parties' respective collective bargaining agreements (hereinafter CBAs). The officers and lieutenant denied the disciplinary charges and the parties unsuccessfully sought to settle the dispute. Ultimately, the officers and lieutenant demanded arbitration with the Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter PERB), citing applicable CBAs between the city and relevant labor unions. In response, petitioner referred the disciplinary proceedings to the Commissioner of Public Safety, bypassing the agreed-upon contractual process for disciplinary determinations.

Claiming that proceedings before the Commissioner of Public Safety, rather than PERB, were mandated by Local Law F, petitioner then commenced this hybrid CPLR article 75 proceeding to stay arbitration and declaratory judgment action to declare Local Law F valid. Respondents Albany Police Supervisors Association, Josiah Jones and Anderson (hereinafter collectively referred to as the PSA respondents) moved to dismiss the petition/complaint, contending that Local Law F was invalid due to conflict with the parties' CBAs, the existing city code and the Taylor Law (see Civil Service Law §§ 75, 76, 200 et seq.), impermissible vagueness and other reasons. Respondents Albany Police Benevolent Association, Michael Delano, Gaspary, Polec and Sears (hereinafter collectively referred to as the PBA respondents) answered and cross-petitioned to dismiss the petition/complaint, declare Local Law F invalid, and compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503. They also contended that Local Law F conflicted with Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 and violated Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 because it was enacted without a referendum. Supreme Court (1) granted the petition/complaint, finding Local Law F valid; (2) granted the petition to stay arbitration; (3) denied the PSA respondents' motion to dismiss; and (4) dismissed the PBA respondents' cross-petition. In brief, Supreme Court found that petitioner's uninterrupted history of local laws vesting authority over police discipline with city officials qualified it for the "grandfather[ ]" provisions of Civil Service Law § 76 (4), rendered police discipline a prohibited subject of collective bargaining and vitiated the CBA provisions governing arbitration of police discipline. Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the PSA respondents' alternative claim that Local Law F was void for vagueness and lacked due process procedures. The PSA respondents and PBA respondents appeal, and we modify.

The first issue on appeal is whether the parties must submit the pending police disciplinary charges to a mayoral appointee for determination under Local Law F of 2022, in apparent contravention of the Taylor Law, which generally commits public employee discipline to a forum and procedures established by statute or determined through collective bargaining (see Civil Service Law §§ 74, 75, 200 et seq.). "To put it simply, some municipalities have the right to bargain about police discipline, and some do not, and the difference depends upon whether there is applicable legislation specifically committing police discipline to the discretion of local officials in force" (Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 41 NY3d 156, 163 [2023] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted]). In a series of cases, the Court of Appeals has explained when police discipline determinations must be made by local officials and when they are subject to collective bargaining (see id.; Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d 109 [2017]; Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Serv. Empl. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d 1066 [2012]; Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d 563 [2006]; see also New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 3471 v City of Geneva, N.Y., 75 Misc 3d 677 [Sup Ct, Ontario County 2022], affd 221 AD3d 1456 [4th Dept 2023], lv dismissed 42 NY3d 961 [2024]; City of Syracuse v Syracuse Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 68 Misc 3d 412 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County 2020], affd 198 AD3d 1322 [4th Dept 2021]), lv granted 38 NY3d 904 [2022]). In general, Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 govern police disciplinary procedures, but Civil Service Law § 76 (4) " 'grandfather[s]' " a locality's preexisting law, enacted before 1958, that vests police discipline in local officials, such that nothing in Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 " 'shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local' laws or charters" (Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 114, quoting Civil Service Law § 76 [4]; accord Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 573). Only when the municipality's legislation clearly applies Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 to police discipline may it be the proper subject of collective bargaining (see Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 573). Conversely, absent valid legislation specifically committing police discipline to local officials, the Taylor Law applies (see Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 115).

The Court of Appeals has resolved the "tension between the strong and sweeping policy of the State to support collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and a competing policy — here, the policy favoring strong disciplinary authority for those in charge of police forces" (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 571 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) — by holding that strong local authority over police discipline prevails when an extant general, special or local law specifically commits police discipline to local officials' discretion (see Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 41 NY3d at 163; Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 571). When such legislation remains " 'in force,' " the municipality may not bargain about police discipline (Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 41 NY3d at 163-164, quoting Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 572). This rule has been applied to municipalities that claimed local control even after signing labor agreements that addressed police discipline (see Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 115-116; Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d at 1069). Courts examine the legislative enactment for "plain and clear" evidence that a municipality deliberately ceded the right of local control over police discipline in favor of collective bargaining (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 573 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see City of Syracuse v Syracuse Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 68 Misc 3d at 423). In contrast, after a municipality with local control over police discipline enacts a local law clearly delegating police discipline to collective bargaining or the Civil Service Law, the Taylor Law prevails and the municipality may not through later legislation reclaim that authority for local police leaders (see Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 41 NY3d at 165). The parties dispute whether petitioner has a local law "in force" under which a local police official may mete out discipline or whether petitioner relinquished that authority in favor of collective bargaining through a series of changes to its local laws. We therefore examine the origin of petitioner's disciplinary authority and relevant changes to its laws after the Legislature adopted Civil Service Law procedures to discipline officers and created the right of public employees, including police officers, to bargain over discipline.

The parties agree that Albany was, and still is, a city of the second class. "In 1906, the [L]egislature enacted the Second Class Cities Law, which provided a standard charter for all cities of the second class" (Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 113). The statute prescribed procedures for police discipline, including that " 'the commissioner of public safety shall have cognizance, jurisdiction, supervision and control of the government, administration, disposition and discipline of the police department' " (id. [brackets omitted],quoting Second Class Cities Law § 131). The Legislature authorized the commissioner to make and enforce reasonable rules for the discipline of police officers and for the hearing, trial and determination of charges (see id.). The statute empowered the commissioner to punish any officer found guilty of charges following " 'due trial before said commissioner' " after affording the officer with reasonable notice of specific written charges (id. at 113-114, quoting Second Class Cities Law § 133; see also Second Class Cities Law §§ 135, 137). The statute also directed the commissioner to "make all appointments, promotions and changes of status of the officers and members of the police . . . department[ ] in accordance with the provisions of the civil service law of the state, except as otherwise provided herein" (Second Class Cities Law § 135). Thus, the Second Class Cities Law applied the Civil Service Law to police appointments, promotions and changes of status except disciplinary proceedings and trials.

In 1910, petitioner incorporated the foregoing provisions of the Second Class Cities Law into its municipal code. Throughout later changes to its local laws, petitioner consistently retained the essential structure under which the Civil Service Law applied to police officer appointments, promotions and changes of status except discipline. For instance, in 1936, petitioner ostensibly superseded the Second Class Cities Law when it enacted Local Law Nos. 1 and 2, which abolished the department of public safety, established in its place a department of police, and transferred the powers of the former public safety commissioner to the newly created police commissioner. Like the original Second Class Cities Law and the previous city code, Local Law No. 2 of 1936 empowered the police commissioner to conduct "due trial" of disciplinary charges and directed that appointments, promotions and changes of status shall be made in accordance with the Civil Service Law "except as otherwise provided herein."FN1

In 1958, the Legislature enacted Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, which generally govern discipline and removal of public employees, including police officers. According to Civil Service Law § 76 (4), nothing contained in §§ 75 or 76 "shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local law or charter provision relating to the removal or suspension of officers." In 1967, the Legislature enacted the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, commonly known as the Taylor Law (see L 1967, ch 392, adding Civil Service Law § 200 et seq.), creating PERB and authorizing it to establish procedures for collective bargaining and prevention of improper practices, among other things. Significantly, Local Law No. 1 of 1936 remained in force in 1958, thereby qualifying it for the "grandfather" protection afforded by Civil Service Law § 76 (4).

Petitioner's law governing police discipline remained essentially unchanged between 1936 and 1969, when petitioner enacted Local Law No. 1 of 1969, its first legislation relating to police discipline following the state's enactment of Civil Service Law §§ 75, 76, 200 et seq. Through Local Law No. 1 of 1969, petitioner created a department of public safety led by a commissioner empowered, like his predecessor, to preside over discipline of police officers. This local law also superseded prior iterations that conflicted with it, transferred police discipline powers from the obsolete police commissioner to the revived public safety commissioner, and retained the same directive that nondisciplinary "changes of status" shall be executed in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Between 1969 and 2001, petitioner adopted local laws alternating between a department of public safety, led by a commissioner, and a department of police, led by a chief. These enactments superseded prior inconsistent versions and transferred powers from commissioner to chief and back again. Notably, each local law, including Local Law No. 1 of 1969, Local Law No. 2 of 1986 and Local Law No. 1 of 2001 committed to the commissioner or chief of police the exclusive authority to control police discipline, including by presiding over trials of disciplinary charges; these powers remained vested in the chief of police through another local law enacted in 2013. The same local laws consistently directed that nondisciplinary changes of status, like appointments and promotions, shall follow Civil Service Law provisions. Finally, in 2022, the Common Council enacted Local Law F, which established a Department of Public Safety and created the position of Commissioner of Public Safety, who would serve as the "designated arbiter of any disciplinary determination that is appealed from within the Albany Police Department." This local law did not otherwise alter the structure of the police department or chief. Instead, it left intact the existing power of the police chief to preside over disciplinary trials pursuant to Code of the City of Albany § 42-6 (B) and created a new Commissioner of Public Safety to review determinations "appealed from within" the department.

Unlike RochesterandSyracuse, Albany never enacted legislation that plainly and clearly relinquished local control over police discipline in favor of Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 procedures or collective bargaining. Rather, as in Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Matter of Town of Wallkill and Matter of City of Schenectady, Albany's local laws consistently reserved police disciplinary powers for local officials; the city's shifting authority between a police chief and a commissioner is "irrelevant for the purpose of our decision in this case" because these alterations never disturbed municipal disciplinary authority (Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 115 n 1).FN2 Nothing in Albany's local laws resembles the explicit, dispositive legislative prerogative manifested in Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, where that city enacted a local law in 1985 that specified that "the Civil Service Law" would thereafter govern police discipline (Matter of Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. v City of Rochester, 41 NY3d at 164 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]) or in City of Syracuse, where the 1960 city charter was amended to specifically commit police discipline to the ambit of the Civil Service Law (see City of Syracuse v Syracuse Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 68 Misc 3d at 425; see also New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 3471 v City of Geneva, N.Y., 75 Misc 3d at 690-692). As in PBA, Wallkill and Schenectady, Albany retained local control over police discipline through local laws that continued to vest disciplinary authority in local officials and never clearly committed that subject to the province of the Civil Service Law or collective bargaining. Simply put, petitioner's local laws "state the policy favoring management authority over police disciplinary matters in clear terms" (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 576).

Nor are we persuaded that petitioner waived local control by assigning a disciplinary role to an official who does not direct the day-to-day operation of the police department. Although the state policy favoring local control over police discipline was rooted in a desire to maintain control over the "quasi-military nature of a police force" (id.), other local officials, including town boards, may be vested with disciplinary authority, even where another executive official manages the department's daily operations, without offending public policy (see Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d at 1069; Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 NY3d at 574). Accordingly, the mere fact that Local Law F assigns a disciplinary review function to a mayoral appointee outside the police department's immediate chain of command does not constitute surrender of local control.

Next, we reject respondents' contention that Albany's bargaining history and course of conduct estop petitioner from arguing that police discipline constitutes a prohibited subject of bargaining. The parties seemingly agree that petitioner and police unions entered into CBAs that addressed police discipline even though petitioner now claims it was a prohibited topic of bargaining, as evidenced by their current contract under which officers could elect arbitration under their CBA or the Civil Service Law. Additionally, the police department's general orders acknowledge applicable CBAs and Civil Service Law provisions. However, a municipality's course of dealing, including entering into CBAs with police unions, does not judicially estop it from arguing it retains local control over police discipline under an extant "grandfathered" local law (see Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 117; Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Serv. Empl. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d at 1069). Because petitioner retained local control over police discipline via local law, it could only commit discipline to collective bargaining by a legislative enactment, not by a series of contracts or department practices. To support their course-of-dealing argument, the PBA respondents cite our decisions sustaining police disciplinary determinations under Civil Service Law § 75 or after arbitration (see Matter of De Paulo [City of Albany], 72 AD2d 662 [3d Dept 1979], affd 49 NY2d 994 [1980]; Matter of Auburn Police Local 195, Council 82, Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL-CIO v Helsby, 62 AD2d 12 [3d Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 1034 [1979]; Matter of Marsh v Hanley, 50 AD2d 687 [3d Dept 1975]). However, those decisions preceded Schenectady and Wallkill, where the Court of Appeals held that a municipality's past practice shall not abrogate an "in force" law committing police discipline to local officials (see Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 117; Matter of Town of Wallkill v Civil Serv. Empl. Assn., Inc. [Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town of Wallkill Police Dept. Unit, Orange County Local 836], 19 NY3d at 1069). Thus, those cases are inapposite because the municipal employers there did not assert the same prohibition on collective bargaining.

Accordingly, we find that Supreme Court properly determined that police discipline is a prohibited subject of collective bargaining between these parties. In light of that conclusion, we next consider whether Supreme Court properly granted petitioner's application to permanently stay arbitration. To determine the parties' competing claims about the propriety of arbitration, we apply the two-step analysis set forth in Matter of County of Chautauqua v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807 (8 NY3d 513 [2007]). We must first determine whether any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition bars arbitration of the grievance (see id. at 519). "If there is a prohibition, our inquiry ends and an arbitrator cannot act" (id. [citations omitted]). "[A] court must stay arbitration where it can conclude, upon examining the parties' contract and the implicated statute on their face, that the granting of any relief would violate public policy" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, Supreme Court properly concluded that arbitration is barred by a preexisting local law that specifically committed police disciplinary authority to local officials. Notably, the only issue raised by the parties on the question of arbitrability relates to whether discipline was a prohibited or permissible subject of bargaining. Since a prohibition exists, our inquiry ends because granting any relief under the CBA would violate public policy.

We next address respondents' alternative procedural arguments that Local Law F is invalid, beginning with the PBA respondents' contention that enactment of Local Law F required a referendum. A referendum is required only where a local law abolished, transferred or curtailed the power of an elective officer (see Hoehmann v Town of Clarkstown, 40 NY3d 1, 6 [2023]; see also Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 [2] [f]). Local Law F did not curtail the mayor's power of appointment; rather, it created a department of public safety headed by a commissioner appointed by the mayor. As such, Local Law F operates consistently with the mayor's charter-based appointment authority, rather than in abrogation of it (see Mayor of City of N.Y. v Council of City of N.Y., 9 NY3d 23, 33 [2007]; New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 3471 v City of Geneva, N.Y., 75 Misc 3d at 685-686).

Finally, we address the PSA respondents' argument that the city code, as amended by Local Law F, is void because it is vague, ambiguous and internally inconsistent.FN3 This argument is not foreclosed by our determination that discipline is a prohibited subject of bargaining. "[C]ivil as well as penal statutes can be tested for vagueness under the due process clause" (Matter of Kaur v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 15 NY3d 235, 256 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], cert denied 562 US 1108 [2010]; see e.g. Ahmed v Inc. Vil. of Scarsdale, 244 AD3d 913, 917 [2d Dept 2025]; Matter of Morrissey v Apostol, 75 AD3d 993, 996 [3d Dept 2010]). "Courts use a two-part test to determine whether a statute or regulation is unconstitutionally vague. First, to ensure that no person is punished for conduct not reasonably understood to be prohibited, the court must determine whether the statute in question is sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the person's contemplated conduct is forbidden. Second, the court must determine whether the enactment provides officials with clear standards for enforcement so as to avoid resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application" (Matter of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Fin. Servs., 39 NY3d 56, 64 [2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Town of Copake v New York State Off. of Renewable Energy Siting, 216 AD3d 93, 106 [3d Dept 2023], appeal dismissed 41 NY3d 990 [2024]; Matter of Carpinelli v City of Kingston, 175 AD2d 509, 510 [3d Dept 1991]). Petitioner did not specifically address this argument in its brief nor cite any evidence that Local Law F has been materially amended or augmented by another enactment, such that we analyze only the city code as amended by this new local law.

Local Law F designates the Commissioner of Public Safety as "arbiter of any disciplinary determination that is appealed from within the Albany Police Department" and empowers him or her to "hold hearings, and issue final binding discipline in such matters." However, the existing city code still empowers the chief of police to discipline officers in the first instance for enumerated misconduct after giving notice of the specific charges in writing and upon due trial in the "manner prescribed by law and the rules and regulations of the [d]epartment" (Code of the City of Albany § 42-6 [B]). Though Local Law F contemplates that the Commissioner of Public Safety shall have other powers and duties as prescribed by local law or ordinance, the record is bereft of any evidence of subsequent legislation clarifying the Commissioner's powers or duties or defining when and how the commissioner conducts hearings or issues final decisions (compare Matter of Town of Tonawanda Police Club, Inc. v Town of Tonawanda, 194 AD3d 1462, 1463 [4th Dept 2021]). Because the police chief's authority to conduct disciplinary trials was unchanged by Local Law F, the text suggests that the Commissioner of Public Safety performs appellate review of the police chief's decisions. The parties previously resolved police discipline disputes through methods with clearly defined rights, responsibilities and procedures. However, unlike the parties' CBAs or Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76, Local Law F does not define any procedures, deadlines, standards for review, criteria for determining whether or how a hearing will be conducted, or other explicit standards to prevent ad hoc, subjective application. The ambiguous impact of Local Law F on the existing structure is exemplified by petitioner's initial invitation to resolve the dispute by arbitration under the CBA or by a hearing under Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 before petitioner referred the pending disciplinary charges directly to the Commissioner for a "pre-hearing conference." Under these circumstances, we grant that part of the cross-petition by the PSA respondents that seeks to declare Local Law F void for vagueness. To be clear, invalidation of Local Law F on this basis does not render police discipline a negotiable subject; rather, the parties remain governed by the local law "in force," which continues to commit police discipline to local officials (see Carver v County of Nassau, 135 AD3d 888, 889 [2d Dept 2016], lv dismissed & denied 27 NY3d 1032 [2016]), but petitioner must articulate procedures which afford the officers due process (see Matter of Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v Nassau County,137 AD3d 1145, 1147 [2d Dept 2016]). For the reasons explained above, petitioner was authorized to devise a procedure for appellate review by the newly created Commissioner of Public Safety utilizing procedures that withstand due process scrutiny. However, Local Law F, in its present form, lacks sufficient particulars to guarantee objective, predictable administration of the disciplinary appeals process.

Accordingly, we agree with Supreme Court that petitioner demonstrated its uninterrupted retention of local control over police discipline through a "grandfathered" local law "in force," such that police discipline constitutes a prohibited subject of collective bargaining until and unless petitioner plainly commits it to bargaining by another enactment. Supreme Court therefore properly granted a permanent stay of arbitration of the pending disciplinary charges under CPLR 7503 (b). However, because we find that Local Law F is impermissibly ambiguous, it was error to deny the PSA respondents' motion to dismiss, which we treat as a request for a declaration in its favor, on the limited basis that Local Law F is void for vagueness.

Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Fisher and Powers, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as found Local Law F of 2022 valid and denied that part of the motion of respondents Albany Police Supervisors Association, Josiah Jones and Devin Anderson seeking a declaration that Local Law F of 2022 is unconstitutionally vague; it is declared that Local Law F of 2022 is void for vagueness; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1

We reject respondents' proposed statutory construction that disciplinary terminations constitute "changes of status." Each time the drafters composed an enactment, they defined certain procedures for "appointments, promotions and changes of status" while simultaneously prescribing different procedures for "discipline" in the same law. Respondents thus overlook basic tenets of statutory construction (seeMatter of Perlbinder Holdings, LLC v Srinivasan, 27 NY3d 1, 9 [2016], citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 238; see also General Construction Law § 95).

Footnote 2

This conclusion comports with Civil Service Law § 76 (4), which expressly provides that nothing in Civil Service Law §§ 75 or 76 shall be construed to repeal or modify local laws relating to police discipline. Civil Service Law § 76 (4) thus reflects a legislative judgment that the general policy favoring collective bargaining does not displace a local law that commits police discipline to local officials (see Matter of City of Schenectady v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 30 NY3d at 114).

Footnote 3

Because no questions of fact are presented by the controversy, we treat this motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action as a motion for a declaration in respondents' favor (see 306 Wall St. Owners, LLC v City of Kingston, 241 AD3d 1692, 1694 [3d Dept 2025]; Grand S. Point, LLC v Bassett, 230 AD3d 49, 58-59 [3d Dept 2024], appeal dismissed 42 NY3d 1025 [2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 907 [2025]).

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment found judicially insufficient to support employee's hostile or abusive work environment complaint

2026-05-14T09:00:00.000-04:00

The New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] adopted the recommended order of an Administrative Law Judge to dismiss Petitioner's familial status discrimination and retaliation complaint. Petitioner appealed DHR's dismissal of Petitioner's complaint.

The Appellate Division, however, unanimously confirmed DHR's determination, opining that DHR's determination that Petitioner did not experience a hostile work environment was supported by substantial evidence.

Noting that the record contained evidence that Petitioner's supervisor made negative comments about Petitioner's prioritization of childcare responsibilities over work, the Appellate Division said that isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment do not support a finding of a hostile or abusive work environment under the pre-2019 standard, citing Ferrer v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 AD3d 431 and other New York State court decisions.

Concluding that DHR's dismissal of Petitioner's retaliation claim was rational and noting that Petitioner's employer did not take any adverse employment action against Petitioner following his submitting a discrimination complaint to the Bronx Borough President's Office, the Appellate Division also observed that "... in the nine months after [Plaintiff] filed his discrimination complaint, he received better evaluations than he had previously and received two raises".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a decision issued by the Department's Chief Privacy Officer alleged to be arbitrary and capricious

2026-05-13T09:00:00.000-04:00

New York State's Commissioner of Education Dr. Betty A. Rosa dismissed the Petitioner's appeal challenging a decision by the Chief Privacy Officer of the New York State Education Department explaining that she lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter.

Citing a number of earlier rulings by New York State Commissioners of Education, Commissioner Rosa explained that "[it] is well settled that Education Law §310 does not authorize an appeal to the Commissioner from actions taken by employees or officers of the New York State Department of Education.

Dr. Rosa noted that such actions may be challenged in a proceeding brought in a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Article 78 of New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rules. Accordingly, Commissioner Rosa opined that she lacked jurisdiction to consider the Petitioner’s request for a declaratory judgment that NYSED’s Chief Privacy Officer’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

The Commissioner also observed that the Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief with respect to Chief Privacy Officer decision was likewise outside the scope of an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310, citing Appeal of M.C. and T.H., 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,550; Appeal of M.E., 62 id., Decision No. 18,245; Appeal of He, 57 id., Decision No. 17,299.

Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Employee's terminated after being found guilty of "time theft" and "time fraud"

2026-05-12T09:00:00.000-04:00

Supreme Court denied the Plaintiff's petition to seeking to annul a determination of the New York City Department of Education [DOE] terminating Plaintiff's employment with DOE and granted DOE's cross-motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's petition. Supreme Court granted DOE's motion and dismissed Plaintiff's petition filed pursuant to CPLR Article 78. Plaintiff appealed.

Citing Matter of Royal Realty Co. v New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal, 161 AD2d 404, the Appellate Division's decision noted that DOE terminated Plaintiff following an investigation by DOE's Office of Special Investigations that substantiated allegations that Plaintiff had committed "time theft and time fraud" over a period of nearly two years. The Appellate Division opined that DOE's determination was "rationally based on the record" and was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Appellate Division, citing Matter of 333 E. 49th Partnership, LP v New York State Division of Housing & Community Renewal, 165 AD3d 93, leave to appeal denied, 33 NY3d 908, pointed out that Plaintiff's submissions, including affidavits from her former colleagues and New York Post newspaper articles about the investigation, were not properly before the Court and a Court's review is limited to consideration of evidence and arguments raised by a party before the employer's administrative determination was rendered.

As to the penalty imposed on Plaintiff by DOE, termination, the Appellate Division found that "Plaintiff's contention that the penalty of termination shocks the conscience" was unpreserved, as it was not raised in the Plaintiff petition.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Appellate Division finds Petitioner failed to demonstrate that circumstances existed that would give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, disability, or sex

2026-05-11T09:00:00.000-04:00

Petitioner, a former firefighter, filed an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights [SDHR] charging his former employer [Respondent] with employment discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and sex. After a hearing, an administrative law judge [ALJ] made certain findings and a recommendation that the administrative complaint be dismissed. The Commissioner of the SDHR adopted the ALJ's findings and recommendation and dismissed the administrative complaint. Petitioner commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to Executive Law §298 and CPLR Article 78 to review the SDHR's determination. Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division.

Observing that judicial review of SDHR's] determination made after a hearing is limited to consideration of whether substantial evidence supports the agency determination", explained that "Courts may not weigh the evidence or reject [the SDHR's] determination where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists" and found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the SDHR's determination that the Petitioner failed to establish, prima facie, that he was discriminated against on the basis of age, disability, and sex.

In the words of the Appellate Division, Petitioner "failed to demonstrate that similarly situated people who did not share his age, disability, or sex were treated more favorably than he was treated". Further, opined the Appellate Division, Petitioner also failed to demonstrate "that circumstances existed that would give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of age, disability, or sex", noting that although the Petitioner was served with three notices of disciplinary charges ... the record contains substantial evidence that the charges were based wholly upon [Petitioner's] misconduct rather than discriminatory animus.

Addressing Petitioner's claim that he was subjected to a hostile work environment, Appellate Division said "A hostile work environment exists where the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment". Citing La Marca-Pagano v Dr. Steven Phillips, P.C., 129 AD3d 918, the Appellate Division observed that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the SDHR's determination that the Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case with respect to his claim that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

Turning to Petitioner's claim of "retaliation" the court said that a retaliation claim is analyzed under "a burden-shifting framework" and the employee bears the burden to establish a prima facie retaliation claim. Then the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination "by clearly setting forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision".

If the employer meets its burden, then the burden shifts back to the employee "to prove that the legitimate reasons proffered by [the employer] were merely a pretext for discrimination".

Although SDHR found that Petitioner established a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that he received a notice of disciplinary charges just five days after filing an unlawful discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], SDHR's had determination that Petitioner's employer had rebutted Petitioner's prima facie case of retaliation with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, or nonretaliatory reason for its challenged actions with substantial evidence.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected posts from the Internet during the week ending May 8, 2026

2026-05-10T08:20:58.342-04:00

2026 AI Risk and Readiness Report Most organizations are making decisions about AI security without a full picture of how it’s being used across their environment. Based on new data from over 1,200 cybersecurity professionals, this report highlights where those visibility gaps commonly exist and what they mean for managing data and risk. DOWNLOAD

The H.R. 1 Mandate: Modernizing Medicaid and SNAP H.R. 1 adds substantial administrative obligations to Medicaid and food assistance programs. Learn why automation is essential to handle growing workloads and complexity. DOWNLOAD

How Public-Private Partnerships Help Governments Keep Promises Tight budgets meet rising expectations — partnerships offer a path forward. READ NOW

Local Data Protections in Automated Enforcement Explore how cities protect data privacy while using automated enforcement systems responsibly. READ NOW

Earning Utility Customer Trust as Payments Evolve Trust has become the foundation upon which everything else rests: customer engagement, digital adoption, operational efficiency, and even long-term capital investments. This guide looks at where that trust breaks down and how utilities can strengthen it. DOWNLOAD

Why Identity Is Now Core HHS Infrastructure For HHS agencies, identity verification is no longer a support function. This paper explains how modern identity platforms give agencies a consistent, risk-based way to verify new applicants and returning beneficiaries. DOWNLOAD

Integrating AI, Security and Advanced Network Tech in Government This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

Payment of back salary upon reinstated from a disciplinary suspension without pay

2026-05-08T09:00:00.000-04:00

Supreme Court granted a petition brought pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking to vacate or annul the determination of the Employer discharging Plaintiff from his employment and directed that the Employer conduct a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75(1)(c). Employer appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, which had denied that portion of Plaintiff's petition seeking a judgment that Petitioner be immediately awarded "full back pay."

The Appellate Division explained that although Plaintiff may ultimately be found to be entitled to backpay starting 30 days after his suspension without pay, the amount of such backpay, if any, and the application of any offsets to any amount awarded in consideration of other employment or from unemployment benefits, "is a matter that should be addressed in the first instance at the hearing 0rdered by the court".

It should be noted that in 1985 §§76 and 77 of the New York State Civil Service Law*, which apply to certain employees in the classified service of a public employer, were amended by Chapter 851, Laws of 1985. §§76 and 77 currently provide that an employee reinstated pursuant to either of these subdivisions is to receive the salary to which he or she would have otherwise been entitled, less the amount of any unemployment insurance benefit that he or she may have received during such period. The amendment did not include the clause providing for a "reduction" in the amount to be paid for any such compensation the individual earned in other employment or occupation during during such period of the employee's suspension without pay.

* See https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/search?q=back+pay.

Click HERE to access the instant Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Commissioner of Education directs the respondent school districts to allow all students to access the school districts' facilities that most closely align with their gender identity

2026-05-07T08:00:00.000-04:00

Petitioners in this administrative appeal to New York State's Commissioner of Education, Dr. Betty A. Rosa, the parents of transgender students attending the Respondent New York State public school districts, contended that:

[1] Certain resolutions adopted by the two Respondent school districts were "arbitrary and capricious because [of their reliance] upon an erroneous interpretation of federal law"; and

[2] Certain resolutions adopted by the two Respondent school districts "prohibiting transgender and gender nonconforming students from using facilities that align with their gender identity are contrary to State law, including [New York State's] Dignity for All Students Act".

The Petitioners sought annulment of the Respondents' resolutions and that the Commissioner direct the Respondent school districts to permit their transgender children "to access school facilities, including bathrooms and locker rooms, that align with their gender identity".

Commissioner Rosa sustained the Petitioners' appeals.

In consideration of the scope of Commissioner Rosa's decision, rather than attempt to summarize the Commissioner's comprehensive ruling, NYPPL has elected to recommend that the reader click on Decision No. 18,726 | Office of Counsel to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

Appellate Division affirms Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's motions seeking a writ of mandamus and the recusal of the presiding justice in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding

2026-05-06T09:00:00.000-04:00

Supreme Court granted

[1] the City of New York's cross-motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition seeking to compel the City's Department of Investigation [DOI] to investigate alleged criminal activity targeting Plaintiff while she was employed by the New York City Public Advocate's Office; and

[2] the City's motion dismissing Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78 action; but

[3] rejected the Plaintiff's efforts seeking the designated Justice's voluntary "recusal" in the Article 78 matter. Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Plaintiff lack of success in obtaining a writ of mandamus in Supreme Court, explaining that a writ of mandamus may be sought "to enforce the performance of a ministerial duty", but a writ of mandamus cannot be used "to compel an act in respect to which a public officer may exercise judgment or discretion".

Observing that DOI's decision not to investigate the matter was neither arbitrary and nor capricious, the Appellate Division directed the Public Advocate's Office to have [Plaintiff] report the alleged criminal conduct to the police.

Addressing Plaintiff's efforts seeking the "self-recusal" of the assigned Justice in the CPLR Article 78 action, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court providently rejected Plaintiff's efforts concerning the recusal of the assigned Justice as the assigned Justice was not a party to and had not been an attorney or counsel "in this proceeding".

Nor, said the Appellate Division, did Plaintiff contend that the assigned Justice "had 'an interest' in the proceeding or was related to the parties" and in the absence "of any statutorily mandated disqualification and any legitimate suggestions of bias or impartiality" which Plaintiff could have demonstrated, the assigned Justice's decision "not to recuse" was appropriate as a matter of personal conscience.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

OATH Administrative Law Judge recommends the Appointing Authority suspend the employee for 30-day without pay rather than terminate the employee found guilty of misconduct

2026-05-05T09:00:00.000-04:00

New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearing [OATH] Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Michael D. Turilli recommended that a 30-day suspension without pay be imposed as the disciplinary penalty on the Respondent, an Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”) motor vehicle operator, rather that terminating the employee from the position as proposed by the appointing authority.

OCME alleged that Respondent acted negligently by entering a decedent’s home unaccompanied by the police officer who waited outside and brought OCME into disrepute when the New York Post reported that he was criminally charged with stealing a handbag from the decedent.

The ALJ granted Respondent’s motion to preclude footage from the officer’s body worn camera after finding that such footage was sealed by New York State's Criminal Procedural Law as official records relating to Respondent’s arrest and prosecution, but permitted the introduction of surveillance video because recordings made in a private building in the regular course of business are not official records.

Relying on the recordings, OCME employee testimony, and documentary evidence, the ALJ found that Respondent inefficiently, negligently, or carelessly performed his duties by entering decedent’s apartment without police supervision in violation of an unambiguous agency directive and OCME’s common practice.

However, the ALJ found that OCME failed to prove Respondent brought the agency into disrepute, finding that while the New York Post article may have brought OCME negative attention, it focused on the theft of the bag, a criminal charge of which Respondent was acquitted, and which was neither alleged nor proven at Petitioner's OATH trial.

Accordingly, the ALJ found that the 30-day suspension, rather than termination from the position, was the appropriate penalty to impose on Respondent under the circumstances.

Click HERE to access Judge Turilli findings and recommended penalty.

Recent New York State audits of municipalities posted on the Internet

2026-05-04T09:00:00.000-04:00

On May 1, 2026 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced that the following local government audits were issued.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the audit report.

Town of Alexander – Town Clerk/Tax Collector (Genesee County) The former clerk did not properly record, deposit, report or remit collections, and did not process transactions in a timely manner. The former clerk was arrested in July 2024 and arraigned on charges of grand larceny, falsifying business records, forgery and corrupting the government. In January 2025, the former clerk pleaded guilty to petit larceny, resigned from the position and made restitution to the town. Auditors also found that annual collections recorded decreased by approximately $17,000 (43%) from 2018, the year prior to the former clerk taking office, to 2022.

Town of Davenport – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Delaware County) The board did not conduct, or provide for, an annual audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024, as required by law. The supervisor filed the 2024 annual financial report with DiNapoli’s office 152 days past the statutory deadline. The supervisor also did not properly maintain financial information for liabilities and fund equity in the balance sheet reports, hindering the board’s ability to monitor the town’s financial operations throughout the year.

Town of Sodus – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Wayne County) The board did not conduct, or provide for, an annual audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024, as required by law. The supervisor also failed to prepare or file annual financial reports for fiscal years 2021 through 2024. Lastly, the supervisor did not perform monthly bank reconciliations, provide the board with financial reports or ensure that seven highway department employees were paid the correct overtime wages.

Howard Public Library – Board Oversight (Steuben County) The board did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations. As a result, the board lacked the necessary financial information to manage the library’s financial condition and could not ensure its financial activities were adequately accounted for, recorded and reported. Consequently, the library had an increased risk of budgetary issues and services impact as well as increased risk of theft, waste and abuse of resources.

Cuylerville Volunteer Fire Department Inc. – Financial Oversight (Livingston County) Department officials and membership did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations because they did not adopt a code of ethics, detailed bylaws or financial policies or enforce the limited financial provisions in the bylaws. They also did not adequately segregate financial duties, implement compensating controls or provide guidance related to recording and reporting financial transactions to the treasurer.

Town of Knox – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Albany County) The board did not conduct, or provide for, an annual audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024, as required by law. The supervisor also did not prepare or file annual financial reports for fiscal years 2021 through 2024. In addition, the supervisor did not provide the board with complete, accurate and reliable monthly financial reports.

###

Selected items from Blogs posted during the week ending May 2, 2026

2026-05-02T09:05:00.000-04:00

The Tech Helping Teams Get Work Done Explore how public sector leaders are adopting AI, automation, and safety technologies to solve today’s workforce challenges. This new research highlights what’s working, what workers want, and where public agencies are seeing real ROI across operations, training, and service delivery. DOWNLOAD

Inside the 2026 ISAC Annual Summit: Cybersecurity Priorities for the Decade Ahead Three days. Nine tracks. Real solutions for modern cybersecurity challenges. Learn More and Register Now

What’s Next for Your PeopleSoft Environment? See how organizations are planning the future of their PeopleSoft environments in Washington, DC on May 12. Reserve your spot

AI Fraud: Can Your Agency's Defenses Keep Up? This thought leadership paper covers common misconceptions about AI in identity verification and the technology components agencies need to combat to prevent AI-driven fraud. Read more to learn how your agency can enhance its approach to identity verification. DOWNLOAD

AI Is Reshaping Criminal Justice. The Real Question Is How We Govern It AI can improve efficiency and fairness — but only with strong oversight and accountability. READ NOW

From Buzz to Benefit: Making AI Mission-Relevant Public sector leaders are under pressure to turn AI from a promising concept into measurable impact, but many initiatives stall at the pilot stage. This paper explores how agencies can move beyond experimentation by aligning AI investments with mission-driven priorities and address common barriers like cost and governance. DOWNLOAD

Local Data Protections in Automated Enforcement Explore how cities protect data privacy while using automated enforcement systems responsibly. READ NOW

The 2026 State of Digital Government Report Government teams aren’t short on data, they’re short on clarity. This report breaks down how leading agencies are turning fragmented insights into faster services, higher participation, and measurable outcomes. Backed by benchmarks from nearly 1,300 public sector professionals, it outlines what’s working right now and where gaps are quietly costing time, trust, and resources. DOWNLOAD

Navigating H.R. 1 SNAP Challenges It’s no secret that stricter work and income requirements may increase your administrative burden. Download Checklist

Securing the Reset: How Idaho Strengthened Security and Governance This case study explores how transitioning to a FedRAMP-authorized environment enabled greater accountability, streamlined operations and enhanced protection of sensitive data, while reducing the burden of legacy systems. DOWNLOAD

Balancing Security, Staffing, and System Demands Join IT leaders in Washington, DC on May 12 to learn how agencies are balancing security demands with limited resources. Learn More

Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York's Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law is not a firefighter's exclusive remedy for an injury suffered while traveling to a reported boat fire aboard a ship owned by the Fire District

2026-05-01T09:00:00.000-04:00

A former volunteer firefighter [Firefighter] with the Fire District [District] appealed the grant of the District's motion for summary judgment by a United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Firefighter had suffered injury to his foot while traveling aboard a ship owned by the District to the reported site of a boat fire on the Hudson River when Firefighter extended his leg to fend off a collision with another vessel.

Having previously obtained compensation under New York State’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, Firefighter filed the instant claim in response to the District’s petition in the United States District Court seeking to limit its liability to the value of the vessel pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. §30523, and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims.

Firefighter's claim alleged (i) negligence and unseaworthiness pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104; (ii) unseaworthiness under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); and (iii) negligence under general maritime law.

A Federal District Court had granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Firefighter was not eligible to bring claims pursuant to the Jones Act or Sieracki, and that Firefighter's exclusive remedy were those provided by New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, and that Firefighter was prohibited to bring a general maritime law claim. Firefighter appealed the District Court’s ruling, with the exception of the District's Court's denial of the Firefighter's Jones Act claim.

The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred in granting the District's motion for summary judgment after finding that Firefighter was not entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness extended to a Sieracki seaman and in ruling that New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law barred Firefighter's federal negligence claim under general maritime law.

In the words of the Second Circuit, "Although only a small part of [Firefighter's] employment took place on the navigable waters, and he therefore was not a seaman under the Jones Act, on the occasions when he was engaged in a firefighting mission on the waters aboard the [District's ship] his work was distinctly maritime. This case is unlike the cases of injuries to land workers, whose presence on a ship was only for transportation to their land-based jobs". "If [Firefighter's] job, when joining a firefighting mission on [the District's vessel] was to do waterborne firefighting and rescue, that job was no less maritime while he was doing it than it would have been if he had been permanent crew to a firefighting vessel. [Firefighter] asserts that he was in the bow preparing to secure the vessel and that when he extended his foot, his purpose was to avoid a collision, both tasks being seaman’s jobs carrying seaman’s risks. Neither the Fire District nor the [District Court] has advanced a persuasive reason for granting summary judgment dismissing [Firefighter's] claims."

The Second Circuit said it concluded that the reasons giving effect to the State’s exclusive remedy provision so as to deprive Firefighter of whatever maritime remedies he can prove would “work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, [and] interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”

While the Second Circuit said it disavowed any automatic conclusion that “wherever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing and significant,” the Circuit Court said it read the Supreme Court precedents "as protecting the applicability of maritime remedies, as against conflicting state law, when, federal maritime tort policy engages sufficiently with the facts, so that displacement of the federal remedy because of a state’s exclusivity provision would impair uniformity of the federal maritime law".

The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the matter to the District Court for further consideration, stating that "We leave it to the proceedings in the district court on remand to determine whether this evidence should be believed and whether [Firefighter] was doing seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards".

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's ruling posted on the Internet.

The intra-military immunity doctrine bars certain lawsuits if the alleged injuries arise out of or are experienced the course of an activity with the State

2026-04-30T08:12:12.145-04:00

Plaintiff in this CPLR Article 78 challenging his discharge from the New York Guard [NYG]* and New York Division of Military Affairs' [DMNA] alleged failure to respond to his FOIL request. Plaintiff sought, among other things, records related to the charges he had attempted to file.

Plaintiff had served as a noncommissioned officer with the NYG. During his service, he was counseled over a series of months regarding various disciplinary incidents, most relevant here allegations that Plaintiff had made unauthorized inquiries into the number and identities of NYG service members who had been awarded State Guard Association of the United States [SGAUS] honors.

After Plaintiff attempted to initiate court martial proceedings by purporting to file formal charges with the New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs [DMNA] against several officers involved in disciplinary incident in which he had been involved, he was honorably discharged from the NYG.

DMNA cross-moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Article 78 petition on the grounds that Plaintiff's "challenge to his discharge was nonjusticiable and ... that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his FOIL claims". Supreme Court granted DNMA's cross-motion and dismissed the proceeding explaining that Plaintiff's challenge to his discharge was barred by the intra-military immunity doctrine and Plaintiff's FOIL challenge was moot. Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Addressing the doctrine of intra-military immunity, which applies to both the federal armed forces and a state organized militia, the Appellate Division noted that the doctrine "bars a lawsuit if 'the injuries [for which a plaintiff seeks to recover] arise out of or are in the course of activity incident' involving the plaintiff's military service". However, opined the court, civilian judicial review of internal personnel matters of the military "are subject always to the civilian control" and that of the legislative and the executive branches of State government.

Finding that Plaintiff's challenge was nonjusticiable under the intra-military immunity doctrine, the Appellate Division held Plaintiff's "unsupported assertion that his discharge was retaliatory does not necessitate a contrary conclusion" and, contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, the status of SGAUS as a nonmilitary organization is of no moment inasmuch as Plaintiff's misconduct underlying his honorable discharge stems from his actions related to his service with the NYG.

The Appellate Division then held that Supreme Court properly dismissed Plaintiff FOIL claims as moot, inasmuch as the record reflects that he received responses to his requests.

Addressing Plaintiff's claim that the disclosures were inadequate, the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by first pursuing an administrative appeal.

* Akin to the New York National Guard, the New York Guard is authorized by Article VIII of New York State's Military Law and maintained at the Governor's discretion (See Military Law §165 [1]). The New York Guard is made up of unpaid volunteers and "augments and supports the New York National Guard," but they "are not federal military reservists as are members of New York State's Army National Guard, the State's Air National Guard" and the State's "Naval Militia".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Courts do not choose between differing professional opinions as that is the function of the administrative authority as long as it acts reasonably and responsibly

2026-04-29T09:00:00.000-04:00

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 filed by a candidate for appointment as a police officer [Plaintiff] seeking judicial review of the determination of the Suffolk County Department of Civil Service [Department], affirming its earlier determination, that the Plaintiff was not qualified for employment as a police officer, Supreme Court dismiss the Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court ruling, with costs.

Plaintiff had sought employment as a police officer with the Suffolk County Police Department. Candidates for such employment are required to undergo a background investigation and pass a psychological evaluation, among other things. Petitioner was not recommended for the position and the Civil Service Department notified Plaintiff that he had not been found qualified for the appointment.

Plaintiff appealed the Department's determination, submitting an independent evaluation by a psychologist who disagreed with the conclusion of the Department's evaluator. Ultimately the Department concluded that there was no significant evidence to support reversing its disqualification of Plaintiff and affirmed its prior determination that the Petitioner was not qualified for employment as a police officer.

Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeing judicial review of the Department's determination. Suffolk County, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f), moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's petition. In an order and judgment, Supreme Court, in effect, granted the County's motion, denied the Plaintiff's petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division found that Supreme Court had properly granted the County's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, explaining that "An appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates, and this discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied". The court also observed that "So long as the administrative determination is not irrational or arbitrary and capricious, this Court will not disturb it".

Further, opined the Appellate Division, "If a determination is rational it must be sustained even if the court concludes that another result would also have been rational" and noted that in an Article 78 proceeding, "the reviewing court may not weigh the evidence, choose between conflicting proof, or substitute its assessment of the evidence or witness credibility for that of the administrative factfinder".

Determining that the Supreme Court had properly concluded that the Department's decision disqualifying the Petitioner appoint to the position of police office was neither irrational nor arbitrary and capricious, the Appellate Division stated that "In determining whether a candidate is medically qualified to serve as a police officer, the appointing agency is 'entitled to rely upon the findings of its own medical personnel, even if those findings are contrary to those of professionals retained by the candidate'".

In the words of the Appellate Division, "It is not for the courts to choose between the diverse professional opinions. That is the function of the proper department heads and as long as they act reasonably and responsibly, the courts will not interfere".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

A writ of prohibition is available to challenge an official or an agency proceeding, or when it is about to proceed, beyond its alleged lawful jurisdiction

2026-04-28T09:00:00.000-04:00

An employee [Employee] filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] alleging that a member [Respondent] of the New York State Assembly discriminated against her on the basis of gender and sexually harassed her during her employment.

DHR found probable cause to proceed to investigate Employee's complaint and then amended the Employee's discrimination complaint by adding the New York State Assembly [NYSA] as a Respondent in the DHR in its investigation of the complaint submitted by Employee.

NYSA, contending that DHR did not give NYSA "constitutional due process notice of the charges against it because there are no specific allegations of wrongdoing on its part", initiated the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a Writ of Prohibition* barring DHR from proceeding with the Employee's discrimination claim to the extent it named the NYSA in the DHR proceeding as a Respondent. Supreme Court denied NYSA's application for the Writ of Prohibition and NYSA appealed.

Citing Matter of Town of Huntington v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 82 NY2d 783, and other New York State court decisions, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that "The extraordinary writ of prohibition is available to address 'whether [a] body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction' ".

The Appellate Division also opined that "Prohibition will not lie where the party has access to another adequate legal remedy" and that "[E]rrors of law, which of course may be verbalized, but incorrectly, as excesses of jurisdiction or power, are not to be confused with a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ", quoting the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d 59.

Addressing NYSA's argument that DHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and thus NYSA was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies, the Appellate Division said it rejected that contention because the "[remedy] for asserted error of law in the exercise of [DHR's] jurisdiction or authority lies first in administrative review and following exhaustion of that remedy in subsequent judicial review pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law", concluded that NYSA "will suffer no irreparable harm . . . by waiting to challenge [DHR's] findings, if necessary, on the merits after [DHR] investigates [the Employee's] complaint".

* A writ of prohibition is one of number of the ancient “common law” writs and is typically issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the ground that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction." Other ancients writs include a writ of mandamus, granted by a court to compel an official to perform "acts that officials are duty-bound to perform;" the writ of injunction, a judicial order preventing a public official from performing an act; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of “quo warranto” [by what authority do you act]. New York State's Civil Practice Law and Rules [C{LR] set out the modern equivalents of such surviving ancient writs.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Employee served with disciplinary charges after failing to comply with supervisor's directives

2026-04-27T13:09:14.921-04:00

New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH] Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Kevin F. Casey recommended a 24-day suspension without pay after finding that a housekeeping aide employed by the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation disobeyed orders to remove his gloves on two occasions and failed to wear his uniform shirt on four occasions

Click HERE to access Judge Casey's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Workers’ Comp 202 – Best Practices to Access Benefits for Workers

2026-04-27T09:00:00.000-04:00

The New York State Office of the Advocate for Injured Workers continues its webinar series for workers and their advocates, and there is still time to register!

Workers’ Comp 202 is a deeper dive into best practices workers can use to access their workers’ compensation benefits. This presentation will cover:

understanding labor market attachment,
details on benefit periods and how benefit rates are calculated,
the importance of items such as the degree of disability and the Carrier Continue Payments (CCP) order,
how advocates can help workers and comply with privacy provisions,
The Board’s New York Medical Treatment Guidelines, and more!

The sessions are free and there will be time for questions.

Register here

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

12:00 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.

Wednesday, May 27, 2026

12:00 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.

Wednesday, June 24, 2026

12:00 p.m. – 1:30 p.m.

For more information visit the Advocate for Injured Workers section of the New York State Workers Compensation Board’s website for additional resources or call the Advocate for Injured Workers at (877) 632-4996 or email advinjwkr@wcb.ny.gov.

Having difficulties registering?

If you are having trouble registering for or attending any of these webinars, check out these Webinar FAQs.

Selected Webinars scheduled for the week ending May 1, 2026

2026-04-27T08:30:18.672-04:00

MONDAY, APRIL 27 | 10:00 AM PT, 1:00 PM ET - High-Impact AI: Powering Public Innovation with Advanced Workstations Learn how edge AI and high-performance workstations help public agencies process data faster, reduce latency and drive innovation. REGISTER

TUESDAY, APRIL 28 | 11:00 AM PT, 2:00 PM ET - Modernizing Critical Physical Infrastructure for Today's Public-Sector Demands Learn how to identify risks in aging power, rack and cooling systems and modernize physical infrastructure to improve resiliency, support cybersecurity and enable reliable service delivery. REGISTER

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29 | 11:00 AM PT, 2:00 PM ET - AI Readiness for Public Capital Programs Join this webinar to learn how to evaluate AI, ask the right vendor questions, and protect funding, data, and accountability from the start. REGISTER

THURSDAY, APRIL 30 | 10:00 AM PT, 1:00 PM ET Protecting Public Innovation: Security for Advanced Computing Workflows Explore strategies to secure high-performance computing environments while enabling innovative solutions. REGISTER

Selected items from Blogs posted during the week ending April 24, 2026

2026-04-25T09:00:00.000-04:00

Webinar: AI Relief, Not Revolution Explore why AI adoption stalls and how to create a more coordinated approach. Save Your Seat

City & State published an op-ed by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Items addressed: layoffs, entry level jobs and long-term business growth. Download

The 2026 Cyber Threat Trends Report Cyber incidents aren't slowing down; they're getting faster, more coordinated, and harder to detect. Drawing on over 500,000 hours of real-world investigations, this report breaks down how attackers are getting in, what they target first, and why recovery is becoming the real battleground. DOWNLOAD

Planning What’s Next for PeopleSoft Explore how organizations are evolving PeopleSoft to meet growing security and compliance demands in Atlanta on April 29. Join the Conversation

Your voice shapes the future of public finance Take a few minutes to help us capture what government finance teams are really facing in 2026. Share Your Perspective

What are finance teams ac ross government dealing with? Weigh in on the challenges and priorities defining public sector finance this year. Take the Survey

Modernizing Outdated Identity Tools in the Public Sector Many public sector organizations are trying to secure complex, modern IT environments with identity systems that were designed decades ago. This guide outlines a practical path to modern identity architecture. DOWNLOAD

The 2026 Cyber Threat Trends Report Cyber incidents aren't slowing down; they're getting faster, more coordinated, and harder to detect. Drawing on over 500,000 hours of real-world investigations, this report breaks down how attackers are getting in, what they target first, and why recovery is becoming the real battleground. DOWNLOAD

Integrating AI, Security and Advanced Network Tech in Government This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

Benchmarking AI and Digital Performance Across Government Explore the data, benchmarks, and trends shaping modern public service delivery and what they mean for your agency. Download the Report.

AI-Powered Agencies are delivering 2.5x Higher Engagement Gain insights for improving service delivery and trust with digital benchmarks from thousands of governments. Get the Benchmarks.

Safer, Smarter AI Adoption Starts Here Help your team build shared AI fluency without adding complexity or risk. Get Details

AI in Government: What's Delivering Value; How Agencies Can Get Started Watch this webinar to hear real-world examples of how public-sector teams are applying agentic AI to streamline workflows, establish clear governance, and scale with accountability. WATCH NOW

Collaboration Tools that Protect the Public Conversation Explore how secure, integrated collaboration tools help communities respond faster to public safety incidents. WATCH NOW

Creating the Modern Government Workplace Learn how to design modern government workplaces, from meeting space planning to collaboration tools and IT support. WATCH NOW

Flexible Tech Strategies for Uncertain Terrain Get fresh insights and actionable advice into the shifting government landscape and making the most of your technology investments. WATCH NOW

Building Resilient Government Services for Rural Communities Learn how rural agencies are scaling services, reducing risk, and improving access with automation, data sharing, and cross-agency collaboration. WATCH NOW

Moving Beyond Training: Needed, a Unified Approach Cyber Risk Explore how a unified cybersecurity approach helps agencies understand where risk is building and respond sooner. WATCH NOW

The employer's failing to seek vacation or modification of an arbitration award within the statutorily prescribed 90 days period requires that the arbitration award be confirmed

2026-04-24T09:00:00.000-04:00

Supreme Court denied, in part, an employee organization's petition to confirm an arbitration award. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's ruling on the law, without costs, vacated the modification and confirmed the arbitration award in its entirety.

The Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court should have confirmed "the entirety of the arbitration award", explaining that CPLR §7510-a(a) addresses public sector employee arbitrations and provides that "[t]he court shall confirm an award in a public sector arbitration proceeding upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to the party, unless an application to vacate or modify the award ... is made within ninety days after the delivery of the award to the party seeking to modify or vacate".

In this instance the employer did not seek to vacate or modify the award within the statutorily prescribed 90 days.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court should have confirmed the arbitration award as the employee organization had preserved its claim by explicitly addressing the 90-day limitations period in its petition.

The Appellate Division also noted that the fact that an employee organization is not itself an employee of the employer but rather the representative of the public sector employees in the relevant collective bargaining unit does not change the application of CPLR §7510-a.

In addition, the Appellate Division observed that the legislative history of CPLR §7510-a "does not set forth any rationale for excluding unions from the definition of employees", citing the Assembly Memorandum in Support of the Bill, [Bill Jacket, Chapter 679 of the Laws of 2023].

The Court then directed its Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

When may a municipality be said to have assumed a special duty of care with respect to a plaintiff

2026-04-23T09:00:00.000-04:00

Appellate Division observed that this appeal presented it with an opportunity to provide "additional clarity" concerning when a municipality may be said to have assumed a special duty of care with respect to a plaintiff thereby subjecting the municipality to liability in negligence for breaching that special duty, and, relatedly, when the municipality may rely on the governmental function immunity defense.

For the reasons set out in the decision of the Appellate Division in the instant matter, the Appellate Division held that a municipality may be said to have assumed a special duty of care with respect to a protected party, or the parent of a protected party, when responding to a request to enforce the "stay away" provisions of a court order such as the one at issue in this case.

The Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court erred when it granted the government defendants' separate motions to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

Individual found guilty of stealing $90,000 in Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) funds

2026-04-22T09:00:00.021-04:00

On April 20, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, Albany County District Attorney Lee C. Kindlon and New York State Police Superintendent Steven G. James announced that a resident of Woodstock, New York was sentenced to five years’ probation for his role in stealing $90,000 in Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) funds to which he was not entitled.

“As technology advances so do fraudsters, and this case shows that collaboration works in holding defendants accountable when they attempt to use deception to steal taxpayer dollars,” Kindlon said. “Kudos to the Comptroller’s Office, New York State Police and our Financial Crimes Unit in uncovering this attempt to defraud the state.”

“This sentencing significantly demonstrates the effectiveness of the measures taken to safeguard the application process for rental assistance. The State Police will continue to work to impede the use of false information to prevent individuals from fraudulently obtaining funds they are not entitled to. I commend the New York State Comptroller’s Office, our State Police members, and Albany County District Attorney’s Office for their combined effort in this sentencing,” James said.

To perpetrate their scheme, the defendants filed a phony application with the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) to fraudulently obtain funding through the ERAP.

The ERAP program was created during the COVID-19 pandemic to help medium and low-income households at risk of eviction. Landlords or tenants could apply to OTDA for funds to cover unpaid back rent and future rent payments. If the tenant met the criteria, the payments would be made directly to the landlord.

The New York State Police received a complaint that a brother and his sister received ERAP funds that they were not entitled to. Based on the complaint, a joint investigation was launched by DiNapoli’s office and the State Police.

###

Since taking office in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. New Yorkers can report allegations of fraud involving taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at 1-888-672-4555, or by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Investigations, 8th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236 or by emailing a complaint to investigations@osc.ny.gov .

Court orders terminated probationary employee's reinstatement after employer unable to show the dismissal was made in good faith

2026-04-21T09:00:00.023-04:00

Plaintiff initiated an CPLR Article 78 preceding challenged the Nassau County Sheriff's Department's [Department] decision terminating his employment during Plaintiff's probationary employment as a correction officer. Plaintiff had alleged, among other things, that he was terminated in bad faith after he complained about being assigned excessive overtime hours.

Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition, in effect annulling the Department's decision to terminate Plaintiff during his probationary period. The Department appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Citing Matter of Lane v City of New York, 92 AD3d 786, Appellate Division noted that the employment of a probationary employee may be terminated without a hearing and without a statement of reasons in the absence of a demonstration that the termination was in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible or an illegal purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law*. However, said the Appellate Division, "The petitioner bears the burden of presenting competent proof of the alleged bad faith, the violation of statutory or decisional law, or the constitutionally impermissible or illegal purpose", citing Matter of Capece v Schultz, 117 AD3d 1045 and Matter of Young v City of New York, 221 AD3d 721.

The Appellate Division held that the Plaintiff had "met his burden of demonstrating that the determination to terminate his probationary employment was made in bad faith" by establishing that his termination of probationary employment followed a complaint he made regarding being assigned excessive overtime hours and the purported failure of the Sheriff's to comply with Rule 20 of the Sheriff's Department Rules and Regulations, which requires equal distribution of overtime, noting that the Department "failed to establish, or even adequately allege, that the termination of the [Plaintiff's] probationary employment was made in good faith".

Accordingly, the Appellate Division opined that Supreme Court "properly granted the [Plaintiff's] petition and, in effect, annulled the [Department's] determination".

* In York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, the Court of Appeals set out the basic rule concerning the dismissal of probationary employees as follows: “After completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith.”

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State Comptroller issues local government and school audits and budget reviews

2026-04-20T09:00:00.002-04:00

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government and school audits and budget reviews were issued on April 17, 2026

Click on text highlighted in color to access audits issued

Audits

South Hornell Fire Protection Company, Inc. – Disbursements (Steuben County) The board did not ensure disbursements were supported, appropriate or authorized. Weak bylaws, policies and procedures, including debit card safeguards, meant limited oversight. Because the recording secretary generally did not record membership’s authorization of disbursements during monthly meetings in the meeting minutes, 300 disbursements totaling $297,853 lacked documented authorization. Auditors also found 63 disbursements totaling $126,012 that lacked sufficient support to determine appropriateness.

Town of Plattekill – Information Technology (IT) (Ulster County) The board and supervisor did not adequately manage user accounts or implement key IT controls. For example, unused accounts assigned to some former employees remained active for at least seven years. Officials did not adopt a breach notification policy, as required by law, and did not adopt an IT contingency plan for unexpected disruptions or disasters. Officials also did not enter into a written contract with the town’s IT service provider or require employees to take IT security awareness training. Other sensitive IT control weaknesses were communicated confidentially to officials.

Eagle Mills Fire District No.1 – Records and Reports (Rensselaer County) The board did not monitor financial activity or ensure required records and reports were maintained. The treasurer did not record annual budgets for fiscal years 2024 and 2025 into the central accounting system, necessary for generating statements of operations with budget-to-actual comparisons. The board also failed to have the required annual independent audit of the district’s books since fiscal year 2018. Lastly, the treasurer has not prepared or filed the fiscal year end 2019 through 2024 annual financial reports with DiNapoli’s office, as required by law.

Cicero Volunteer Fire Department – Financial Activities (Onondaga County) Officials did not ensure financial activity was properly recorded, reported or that funds were safeguarded. Auditors identified significant errors and unrecorded transactions. For example, the treasurer recorded $216,088 that was received for a building lease payment twice, which overstated the department’s cash and revenue. The treasurer also did not prepare accurate bank reconciliations, issue customer receipts for collections, and did not deposit collections in a timely manner. The treasurer also did not prepare and submit the annual report for foreign fire insurance tax proceeds to the board and membership and to DiNapoli’s office, as required by law.

Roosevelt Children’s Academy Charter School – Information Technology (Nassau County) Auditors found that school officials did not implement sufficient controls to protect IT systems and data from unauthorized access, use or loss. Procedures for managing and monitoring user accounts were not established, resulting in 51 unnecessary accounts remaining active. Officials also did not monitor employee internet use. Auditors reviewed internet histories of 14 school employee computers and determined that nine employees used the computers to access websites for personal use, including a user who conducted personal business activities. Lastly, the director of technology was unable to provide the documentation related to the monitoring of the IT vendor’s compliance with the consulting agreement.

Arkport Hose Company No. 1, Inc. – Treasurer (Steuben County) The executive committee lacked reliable information to manage the company’s financial activity because the treasurer did not properly deposit, record or report company funds. The treasurer did not deposit revenues totaling $5,191 in a company bank account within three days of receipt, as required by company bylaws. The treasurer also did not maintain adequate supporting documentation for 95 transactions totaling $55,100, accurately record 48 transactions totaling $21,528, or obtain approval for 37 disbursements totaling $15,951. In addition, the treasurer did not prepare bank reconciliations or provide adequate monthly or annual reports to the board and membership. Lastly, the treasurer did not file the annual form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service, putting the company’s not-for-profit status at risk.

Town of Clermont – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Columbia County) Although the board conducted an audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024, the board did not maintain any supporting documentation to show the extent of the work performed or the results of the audit. The supervisor did not prepare and file the 2022 through 2024 annual financial reports with DiNapoli’s office, as required by law. Furthermore, the supervisor provided the board with incomplete monthly financial reports and did not ensure board-approved hourly rates were used to pay the highway department employees.

Budget Reviews

South Country Central School District – Budget Review (Suffolk County) Following the district’s Oct. 22, 2025 disclosure that an unplanned deficit occurred during the 2024-25 fiscal year, stakeholders requested DiNapoli’s office provide an independent review of the district’s finances. The district is on track to incur a 2025-26 fiscal year budget deficit of approximately $8.7 million due to inaccurate estimates in the adopted budget even after accounting for the cost-savings measures, including spending freezes and personnel layoffs. In addition, the district has no available surplus fund balance to mitigate this budgetary deficit. The district reported an unassigned general fund balance deficit of $1.8 million as of June 30, 2025. If current operating trends continue, auditors project the district will have a fiscal year-end deficit of approximately $10.5 million. Finally, district officials indicated the district will need to borrow $6 million to balance the 2026-27 budget. While deficit financing can provide immediate relief, any such borrowing would most likely increase the overall deficit and create future funding gaps due to the district’s reliance on debt to pay for operating expenses.

Wyandanch Union Free School District – Budget Review (Suffolk County) State law as of 2020 authorizes the district to issue serial bonds in an amount not to exceed $4.5 million to liquidate the accumulated deficit in the district’s general fund as of June 30, 2019. Municipalities and school districts that have been authorized to issue obligations to fund operating deficits are required by law to submit their budget to the State Comptroller each year. Auditors determined that the significant revenue and expenditure projections in the district’s proposed budget are reasonable and that the district’s proposed budget complies with the tax levy limit. The budget review did not include any recommendations.

Village of Suffern – Budget Review (Rockland County) State law authorizes the village to issue debt not to exceed $5 million to liquidate the accumulated deficits in the village’s general, water, sewer and capital projects funds as of May 31, 2015. Auditors determined that the significant revenue and expenditure projections in the tentative budget are reasonable, and that the village’s tentative budget complies with the tax levy limit.

###

New York Public Personnel Law

Appellate Division decision address initiating disciplinary action involving law enforcement personnel pursuant to a negotiated collective bargaining agreement and a competing statute vesting such disciplinary authority in the appointing authority

Matter of City of Albany, N.Y. (Albany Police Benevolent Assn.)

Footnotes

Isolated remarks or occasional episodes of harassment found judicially insufficient to support employee's hostile or abusive work environment complaint

New York State's Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a decision issued by the Department's Chief Privacy Officer alleged to be arbitrary and capricious

Employee's terminated after being found guilty of "time theft" and "time fraud"

Appellate Division finds Petitioner failed to demonstrate that circumstances existed that would give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, disability, or sex

Selected posts from the Internet during the week ending May 8, 2026

Payment of back salary upon reinstated from a disciplinary suspension without pay

New York State's Commissioner of Education directs the respondent school districts to allow all students to access the school districts' facilities that most closely align with their gender identity

Appellate Division affirms Supreme Court's denial of Plaintiff's motions seeking a writ of mandamus and the recusal of the presiding justice in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding

OATH Administrative Law Judge recommends the Appointing Authority suspend the employee for 30-day without pay rather than terminate the employee found guilty of misconduct

Recent New York State audits of municipalities posted on the Internet

Selected items from Blogs posted during the week ending May 2, 2026

Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York's Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law is not a firefighter's exclusive remedy for an injury suffered while traveling to a reported boat fire aboard a ship owned by the Fire District

The intra-military immunity doctrine bars certain lawsuits if the alleged injuries arise out of or are experienced the course of an activity with the State

Courts do not choose between differing professional opinions as that is the function of the administrative authority as long as it acts reasonably and responsibly

A writ of prohibition is available to challenge an official or an agency proceeding, or when it is about to proceed, beyond its alleged lawful jurisdiction

Employee served with disciplinary charges after failing to comply with supervisor's directives

New York State's Workers’ Comp 202 – Best Practices to Access Benefits for Workers

Having difficulties registering?

If you are having trouble registering for or attending any of these webinars, check out these Webinar FAQs.

Selected Webinars scheduled for the week ending May 1, 2026

Selected items from Blogs posted during the week ending April 24, 2026

City & State published an op-ed by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Items addressed: layoffs, entry level jobs and long-term business growth. Download

Planning What’s Next for PeopleSoft Explore how organizations are evolving PeopleSoft to meet growing security and compliance demands in Atlanta on April 29. Join the Conversation

Your voice shapes the future of public finance Take a few minutes to help us capture what government finance teams are really facing in 2026. Share Your Perspective

What are finance teams across government dealing with? Weigh in on the challenges and priorities defining public sector finance this year. Take the Survey

Modernizing Outdated Identity Tools in the Public Sector Many public sector organizations are trying to secure complex, modern IT environments with identity systems that were designed decades ago. This guide outlines a practical path to modern identity architecture. DOWNLOAD

Integrating AI, Security and Advanced Network Tech in Government This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

Benchmarking AI and Digital Performance Across Government Explore the data, benchmarks, and trends shaping modern public service delivery and what they mean for your agency. Download the Report.

AI-Powered Agencies are delivering 2.5x Higher Engagement Gain insights for improving service delivery and trust with digital benchmarks from thousands of governments. Get the Benchmarks.

Safer, Smarter AI Adoption Starts Here Help your team build shared AI fluency without adding complexity or risk. Get Details

AI in Government: What's Delivering Value; How Agencies Can Get Started Watch this webinar to hear real-world examples of how public-sector teams are applying agentic AI to streamline workflows, establish clear governance, and scale with accountability. WATCH NOW

Collaboration Tools that Protect the Public Conversation Explore how secure, integrated collaboration tools help communities respond faster to public safety incidents. WATCH NOW

Creating the Modern Government Workplace Learn how to design modern government workplaces, from meeting space planning to collaboration tools and IT support. WATCH NOW

Flexible Tech Strategies for Uncertain Terrain Get fresh insights and actionable advice into the shifting government landscape and making the most of your technology investments. WATCH NOW

Building Resilient Government Services for Rural Communities Learn how rural agencies are scaling services, reducing risk, and improving access with automation, data sharing, and cross-agency collaboration. WATCH NOW

Moving Beyond Training: Needed, a Unified Approach Cyber Risk Explore how a unified cybersecurity approach helps agencies understand where risk is building and respond sooner. WATCH NOW

The employer's failing to seek vacation or modification of an arbitration award within the statutorily prescribed 90 days period requires that the arbitration award be confirmed

When may a municipality be said to have assumed a special duty of care with respect to a plaintiff

Individual found guilty of stealing $90,000 in Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) funds

Court orders terminated probationary employee's reinstatement after employer unable to show the dismissal was made in good faith

New York State Comptroller issues local government and school audits and budget reviews

Click on text highlighted in color to access audits issued

Audits

What are finance teams ac ross government dealing with? Weigh in on the challenges and priorities defining public sector finance this year. Take the Survey