New York Public Personnel Law

Selected Internet blog posts for the week ending July 3, 2026

2026-07-04T09:00:00.000-04:00

8 Data Optimization Strategies Every Government Security Team Needs Cybersecurity teams in government aren’t short on data — they’re drowning in it. The real challenge is knowing what to keep, what to ignore and how to turn raw telemetry into actionable insight without overwhelming staff or budgets. This paper breaks down eight practical strategies to help agencies prioritize high-value data, reduce alert fatigue and close dangerous visibility gaps across complex environments. DOWNLOAD

AI Is Reshaping Criminal Justice. The Real Question Is How We Govern It AI can improve efficiency and fairness — but only with strong oversight and accountability. READ NOW

What Real-Time Permitting Visibility Looks Like Discover how Stockton uses KPIs and dashboards to drive accountability and efficiency. Listen now

How Branded Communications Can Improve Government Billing Learn how consistently branded communications can increase constituent trust, improve engagement and support stronger government billing. DOWNLOAD

Cable Is Delivering Affordable Connectivity for America The American cable industry has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in broadband infrastructure, improving speed, capacity, and consumer value nationwide. Learn more.

Affordable Connectivity Delivers Greater Opportunity for All Families rely on broadband connectivity for schoolwork, remote work, telehealth, and much more. America's cable industry is delivering budget-friendly solutions to stay connected. Learn more.

Making AI Work for Government This paper explains a "four pillars" approach to civic automation and why it results in more effective and responsible solutions for government. DOWNLOAD

Think Like a Fraudster, Adapt Like an Expert This handbook explains key varieties of identity fraud and the fundamentals of effective identity verification. Most importantly, it gives government leaders insights into the fraudster's mindset so they can create strategies to proactively prevent fraud and adapt to evolving tactics. DOWNLOAD

Keeping Public Services Accessible During Emergencies Power outages, severe weather, and equipment failures don't stop the need for public services. Learn how agencies can prepare for unexpected disruptions while maintaining reliable communications with staff and the communities they serve. DOWNLOAD

From Buzz to Benefit: Making AI Mission-Relevant This paper explores how agencies can move beyond experimentation by aligning AI investments with mission-driven priorities and address common barriers like cost and governance. DOWNLOAD

Integrating AI, Security and Advanced Network Tech in Government This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

New Mobile Competition Delivers More for Consumers Cable providers offer competitive broadband and mobile options, giving households more ways to combine services and reduce monthly bills. Learn more.

No More Dead Zones: How Satellite Connectivity and 5G Coverage Beyond the Urban Boundary Is Reshaping Government Operations Join us for a conversation on how satellite-enabled connectivity is changing the way state and local agencies think about resilience, mobility and network design. REGISTER

Why Government Needs Enterprisewide Collaboration This paper explores how enterprisewide collaboration helps agencies break down silos, streamline operations and deliver a more consistent experience for both employees and residents. DOWNLOAD

Better User Experiences, Better Government: Designing the Modern Workplace In this thought leadership paper, explore how the Texas Teachers Retirement System redesigned its workplace to create a more seamless employee experience, improve collaboration and reduce IT complexity. DOWNLOAD

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli releases audit reports for the New York State local governments and school districts listed below

2026-07-03T09:00:00.000-04:00

On June 2, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government and school audits were issued and have been posted on the Internet.

Click the text highlighted in COLOR to access the audit.

Village of Unadilla – Disbursements (Otsego County) Village officials did not ensure that disbursements were accurate, properly approved, supported and for appropriate village purposes. Auditors identified one or more deficiencies within 249 disbursements or 76% of the disbursements totaling $70,600 reviewed.

Gorham Fire District – Procurement (Ontario County) District officials did not always use a competitive process to procure goods and services in an economical manner or in accordance with statutory requirements set forth in state law and the district’s procurement policy adopted on June 9, 2025. Of the 77 purchases totaling $446,884 auditors reviewed, district officials did not use competitive methods for 68 purchases totaling $403,377.

Town of Whitestown – Inventories (Oneida County) The superintendent did not properly safeguard and account for diesel fuel, gasoline and motor oil inventories. As a result, fuel and motor oil purchases totaling $172,588 or 85% of the total purchases made from Jan. 1, 2024 through Oct. 31, 2025, could not be accounted for because usage records were either not maintained or were incomplete and unreliable.

Town of Paris – Water and Sewer User Charges (Oneida County) Town officials did not properly manage billing, collection and enforcement activities associated with water and sewer user charges and the town board did not authorize the water rates. The board also did not provide adequate oversight and guidance to the town’s water and sewer clerk, increasing the risk of errors or irregularities that could occur without detection.

Town of Denmark – Claims Auditing (Lewis County) The board did not properly audit and approve all claims before payment. While the board approved a list of claims for payment each month, it did not conduct a thorough audit of individual claims to determine whether they contained adequate supporting documentation, represented actual and necessary expenditures and were for valid town purposes.

Uniondale Union Free School District – Audit Follow-Up (Nassau County) The purpose of the review was to assess the Uniondale Union Free School District’s progress in implementing our recommendations in a prior audit Uniondale Union Free School District – Information Technology (2023M-61), released in October 2023. The audit determined that district officials did not adequately manage nonstudent network user accounts and permissions. Of the five audit recommendations, the district’s director of technology and library media services, technology supervisor, and officials partially implemented three recommendations and did not implement two recommendations. Auditors also reviewed progress in implementing the recommendations related to the sensitive IT control weaknesses that were reported to officials confidentially and communicated those results confidentially to district officials.

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Second Circuit affirms its school immunization ruling after reconsidering its ruling "in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522"

2026-07-02T11:00:00.000-04:00

In 2019, New York State repealed the religious beliefs exemption to its school immunization law resulting in the law applying to all students attending public, private, or parochial schools, except those who qualify for the law’s medical exemption.

As summarized by the Second Circuit, "Amish parents, Amish community schools, and a representative of Amish schools in New York—sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that the law violates the Free Exercise Clause and their parental free-exercise rights under Wisconsin v. Yoder. The district court dismissed the complaint."

The Second Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision and remanded "for reconsideration in light of Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522" (2025).

The Second Circuit, "having reconsidered the case with the benefit of supplemental briefing", again AFFIRMED.

Click HERE to access the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected decisions by New York City's Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearings Administrative Law Judges following administrative disciplinary hearings

2026-07-02T09:00:00.000-04:00

Alleged use of excessive, unnecessary, or retaliatory force

OATH Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Seon Jeong Lee recommended termination of employment of a New York City correction officer [CO] found guilty of using excessive, unnecessary, or retaliatory force on a detainee being transported by bus.

The ALJ found that the CO, while escorting a rear-cuffed detainee onto a bus, pushed the detainee into a small holding pen, causing her to hit the metal grate on the bus window, resulting in serious facial injury.

The ALJ rejected the CO’s argument that the force was justified and was the minimum amount necessary to defend himself from the detainee, who had kicked him in the groin and attempted to kick him again.

The ALJ instead found that the force used by the CO was retaliatory and excessive and not proportional to the threat, as the detainee was restrained and unable to brace herself as she fell forward. Given the CO's disciplinary history, which included five prior instances of misconduct for use of excessive force, the Administrative Law Judge found termination of CO’s employment was the appropriate penalty under the circumstances.

Click HERE to access Judge Lee's findings and recommendations posted on the Internet.

Alleged falsifying time records, failure to follow time and leave policies, insubordination, and discourtesy

Administrative Law Judge Orlando Rodriguez recommended a 60-day suspension of the deputy director [DD] of the New York Fire Department's [FDNY] Emergency Medical Services Computer Aided Dispatch Program, who was charged and found guilty of falsifying time records, failure to follow time and leave policies, insubordination, and discourtesy.

The ALJ found that FDNY proved some of the charges related to time and leave violations, falsifying time records, and discourtesy and insubordination charges.

However, the ALJ found that FDNY failed to prove charges alleging misuse of sick leave, certain time and leave violations condoned by DD’s supervisor, and certain specifications related to a relocation dispute.

Although NYFD sought the termination of DD's employment, the ALJ found the penalty excessive, given DD’s lengthy service, including during September 11, Superstorm Sandy, and the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to her unblemished disciplinary record, specialized expertise, and demonstrated remorse.

Considering these mitigating factors and DD’s potential for continued productive public service, the ALJ recommended that NYFD should afforded DD with an opportunity to correct her behavior and recommended a 60-day suspension without pay be imposed on the DD as the penalty for the misconduct for which Judge Rodriguez found DD guilty.

Click HERE to access Judge Rodriguez' findings and recommendations posted on the Internet.

Recent notices posted by the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings

2026-07-01T09:00:00.000-04:00

Contract Dispute Resolution Board Panelists sought

OATH is accepting applications from qualified persons to serve on Contract Dispute Resolution Board (CDRB) panels.

CDRB panels hear the final appeal in a three-step dispute resolution process contained in City contracts for construction, goods and services. Each CDRB panel consists of an OATH Administrative Law Judge, as chair, a representative of the Mayor’s Office of Contract Services, and a third member selected from a pre-qualified roster of individuals, established and administered by OATH, who has appropriate expertise and is unaffiliated and not employed by the City.

Those interested in being added to the roster of pre-qualified individuals are encouraged to apply.

Applicants should have a background and experience in government contracting, construction, engineering or related law. The application form, as well as more information on the panelist role, can be found here.

Completed applications should be sent via e-mail to the OATH Trials Division Law Clerks, LawClerks@oath.nyc.gov.

The New York State Department of Civil Service has published Advisory Memorandum 26-01, Fiscal Year '26-'27 Payroll Certification Schedule.

2026-06-30T10:00:00.000-04:00

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the payroll certification schedule.

AM 26-01 - Fiscal Year '26-'27 Payroll Certification Schedule.

A version in PDF format at is available by clicking the URL shown below:

AM 26-01 - Fiscal Year ‘26-’27 Payroll Certification Schedule PDF.

To view previous Advisory Memoranda issued by the New York State Department of Civil Service, visit: https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/Manuals/SPMM/

Members of the New York State Employees' Retirement System in Tier 6 to pay lower employee contributions for retirement

2026-06-30T09:00:00.000-04:00

Effective October 1, 2026, Tier 6 member employee contribution rates are as follows:

Earnings	Current Contribution Rate	New Contribution Rate
$45,000 or less	3.00%	3.00%
$45,000.01 to $55,000	3.50%	3.00%
$55,000.01 to $75,000	4.50%	3.00%
$75,000.01 to $100,000	5.75%	4.00%
$100,000.01 to $125,000	6.00%	5.25%
$125,000.01 to $250,000	6.00%	5.75%

The Tier 6 member's contribution rate is determined by the member's annual earnings as the new law reduced the member's "employee's required contribution rates". This means most Tier 6 members will pay less from their earnings towards their employee's retirement contributions.

Increased Overtime Limits for Tier 5 and 6 Members

For members of Tiers 5 and 6, the law limits the amount of overtime pay included in the calculation of the member's final average earnings (FAE), which is used to determine the member's NYSLRS pension. Overtime pay above the limit is not factored into the members pension. However, the law increased the annual overtime limits, allowing more overtime pay to be included in the calculation of your pension benefit.

Effective January 1, 2027:

For ERS Tier 5 and 6 members, the overtime limit for 2027 is $30,000 and increases by 3% each calendar year thereafter. Currently, the limit for 2026 is $24,070.60 for Tier 5 and $21,589 for Tier 6.
For PFRS Tier 5 and 6 members, the annual overtime limit is 25% of your pensionable, non-overtime earnings. Currently, the annual limit is 15%.

New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli also reported that the new laws continue to improve Tier 6 Benefits.

For more information, including additional laws affecting NYSLRS benefits, click the following URL 2026 Laws page.

2026-06-29T09:00:00.000-04:00

New York State Comptroller issues state and municipal audits

On June 25, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced that the State Government Accountability audits listed below and certain local government audits were released.

Click the text highlighted in color to access the text of the audit

Department of Health – Medicaid Program: Claims Processing Activity April 1, 2025 Through September 30, 2025 (2025-S-11) During the 6-month period ended September 30, 2025, the Department of Health’s (DOH) claims processing system, eMedNY, processed almost 331 million claims, resulting in payments to providers of nearly $55 billion. Auditors identified over $12.1 million in improper Medicaid payments. As a result of the audit, nearly $3.4 million of the improper payments was recovered. The audit also identified 14 Medicaid providers who were charged with or found guilty of crimes that violated laws or regulations governing certain health care programs. In response to the findings, DOH removed 12 providers from the Medicaid program; one of the remaining two providers was referred to the New York State Education Department’s Office of Professions, and the other provider was referred to DOH’s Office of Professional Medical Conduct.

Metropolitan Transportation Authority – Long Island Rail Road: Mitigation for Extreme Weather Conditions and Flooding (Follow-Up) (2025-F-30) In April 2009, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)-established Blue-Ribbon Commission on Sustainability released its Final Report, which predicted that, without an adequate investment in adaptation measures, climate change would have even greater adverse impacts on the MTA’s vital infrastructure, operations, and revenue streams in the future. The report recommended that the MTA have a climate change adaptation master plan in place by 2015. A prior audit, issued in March 2024, found the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) did not perform a systemwide assessment of its transportation facilities to identify weather-related risks and that LIRR departments either were not in compliance with or did not provide documentation to support compliance with storm operating plans. MTA-LIRR officials made some progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit report. Of the initial report’s 12 audit recommendations, five were implemented, four were partially implemented, and three were not implemented.

Empire State Development: Real Property Portfolio (Follow-Up) (2025-F-33) Empire State Development (ESD) invests in infrastructure and innovation, provides early-stage support for new ventures, and strengthens the State’s innovation-based economy through partnerships with universities. A prior audit, issued in August 2024, found ESD did not comply with requirements to publish a report detailing its real property portfolio; as of June 2023, ESD reported it owned 130 properties—of those, 71 (55%) were vacant; and ESD disposed of 10 properties at below-market value between April 2019 and May 2023. While each of the 10 disposals was completed in compliance with requirements, the below-market transfers for seven properties did not include sufficient information about the anticipated economic benefits of the projects compared to the value received and the fair market value of the properties. ESD made significant progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit report, implementing two recommendations and partially implementing one.

Department of Civil Service – New York State Health Insurance Program: CVS Caremark Payments Made Under the Incorrect Plan (2025-S-19) The Department of Civil Service contracts with CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C. (CVS Caremark) to administer the prescription drug program for the Empire Plan, the primary health benefits plan for the New York State Health Insurance Program. This program includes the Empire Plan Medicare Rx drug plan for retired members who have Medicare and their dependents, and a Commercial Plan for non-Medicare-qualified members and their dependents. Claims paid under the Medicare Rx Plan are eligible for drug manufacturer discounts and federal subsidies that are not available for claims paid under the Commercial Plan. Accordingly, ensuring that claims are properly paid under the Medicare Rx Plan allows for significant cost avoidance for the State. The audit identified $19.3 million in claims for 338 Medicare-qualified members and their dependents that were incorrectly paid under the Commercial Plan instead of the Medicare Rx Plan.

Department of Health – Medicaid Program: Oversight of Clinical Trials (2024-S-22) Clinical trials are research studies that evaluate the safety and effectiveness of medical care. New York’s Medicaid program generally does not cover investigational items or services that are the subject of the clinical trial, nor does it cover services provided solely for data collection, but does cover the routine costs of items or services that are necessary for clinical trial participants and are typically covered outside of the trial under the state plan or waiver. In addition to verifying a member’s Medicaid status, a coverage determination must be based on an attestation of the appropriateness of the clinical trial by both the principal investigator and the health care provider responsible for the trial. The audit found that the Department of Health did not always receive an attestation form before members participated in a clinical trial, as required. Additionally, it identified a limited number of improper Medicaid payments for services that were the responsibility of the clinical trial sponsor, investigational services not covered by the member’s managed care organization, or services that lacked supporting prior authorization.

Village of Whitehall – Records and Reports (Washington County) The clerk treasurer did not maintain complete and accurate accounting records, provide the board of trustees with monthly financial reports, or file the fiscal year 2024-25 annual financial report (AFR) with DiNapoli’s office, as required by state law.

Town of Lewis – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Lewis County) Only two board members audited the supervisor’s fiscal year 2024 financial records and reports, not the entire board as required. Furthermore, the board members did not maintain supporting documentation for the audit work performed or identify cash receipts and payroll issues. In addition, the supervisor did not prepare and file the 2022 through 2024 AFRs with the State Comptroller’s office, as required by state law.

Town of Union – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Broome County) The board did not provide for a timely annual audit of the town’s financial records for fiscal year 2024. The town comptroller did not prepare and file the 2024 AFR with DiNapoli’s office, as required by state law. The town comptroller also did not provide the board with complete, accurate and reliable monthly financial reports.

Town of Schuyler Falls – Host Fee Payments (Clinton County) The town did not receive accurate landfill host fee payments. As a result, the town did not have access to funds that could have been used for its operations or to potentially reduce the financial burden on town taxpayers. Officials contacted the corporation to discuss the accuracy of the host fee payments previously made to the town. The corporation subsequently agreed to pay the town the outstanding host fees and interest totaling $370,651, consisting of $329,588 for the outstanding host fees and $41,063 for interest.

Theresa Fire District – Audit Follow-Up (Jefferson County) The review examined Theresa Fire District’s progress in implementing recommendations in a prior audit, Theresa Fire District – Board Oversight and Financial Management (2021M-60), released in June 2021. The audit determined the board did not provide adequate oversight to ensure that financial activities were properly recorded and reported and did not properly manage fund balance. Of the audit’s 13 recommendations, district officials fully implemented one recommendation, partially implemented five, and did not implement seven. Until all recommendations are implemented, the board cannot ensure district assets are fully safeguarded.

Fine Fire District – Audit Follow-Up (St. Lawerence County) The review looked at Fine Fire District’s progress in implementing recommendations in a prior audit, Fine Fire District – Board Oversight (2023M-81), released in October 2023. The audit determined the board did not adequately monitor financial activities or maintain appropriate records and reports. Of the audit’s 21 recommendations, the board did not implement 20, and one recommendation was no longer applicable. The commissioners did not provide reasonable explanations for why the board did not implement the recommendations. Additionally, the commissioners demonstrated an unwillingness to exercise the board’s oversight responsibilities by taking no action in the more than two years since the prior audit was issued.

Town of Tompkins Fire District – Audit Follow-Up (Delaware County) The purpose of the review was to assess the Town of Tompkins Fire District’s progress in implementing recommendations in a prior audit, Town of Tompkins Fire District – Board Oversight (2023M-33), released in June 2023. The audit determined that the board did not provide adequate oversight of the district’s financial activities. Of the 12 audit recommendations, district officials fully implemented two recommendations, partially implemented two recommendations, did not implement seven recommendations and one is not applicable.

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Selected Internet blog posts for the week ending June 26, 2026

2026-06-27T09:00:00.000-04:00

The Next Benefits Cliff Isn’t Fraud. It’s Overload. Rising federal verification mandates are overwhelming state agency infrastructure. Here’s why legacy systems are failing and how consent-based and automated tools can close the gap. READ NOW

Redefining Government Efficiency This report examines how the concept of government efficiency is evolving and offers examples of what these trends look like in practice. DOWNLOAD

New York Health Policy Monitor (June 23, 2026) The New York State Legislature advances measures extending state university hospital procurement flexibilities, while state regulators propose reduced nurse aide training standards.

Future-Proof Your Workforce With Cross-Skilling As emerging technologies reshape government operations, agencies are turning to cross-skilling to build a more adaptable workforce and close critical talent gaps. READ

Deferred Maintenance and Its Impact on Communities This eBook examines the problem of deferred maintenance for America's infrastructure, considers ways to identify deferred maintenance issues early and explores options for addressing them quickly. DOWNLOAD

AI and the Future of Digital Permitting Artificial intelligence can optimize many phases of permitting and inspections while preserving and enhancing human judgement that serves constituents. This paper explores how AI-driven permitting systems can improve resident experience and reduce staff workloads. DOWNLOAD

Protect Public Funds From Emerging Fraud Threats Expense fraud is becoming harder for finance teams to catch. AI-generated fraud tactics are creating new oversight gaps across state and local agencies. This eBook explores how organizations can identify emerging fraud tactics earlier, strengthen policy enforcement, and use automation and analytics to flag suspicious activity. DOWNLOAD

How AI Is Changing Network Requirements This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

A practical path to scaling AI across government Public sector leaders are under pressure to turn AI from a promising concept into measurable impact, but many initiatives stall at the pilot stage. This paper explores how agencies can move beyond experimentation by aligning AI investments with mission-driven priorities and address common barriers like cost and governance. DOWNLOAD

Think Like a Fraudster, Adapt Like an Expert This handbook gives government leaders insights into the fraudster's mindset so they can create strategies to proactively prevent fraud and adapt to evolving tactics. DOWNLOAD

Integrating AI, Security and Advanced Network Tech in Government This guide explores how next-generation networking, AI-powered operations and modern security frameworks work together to create a more resilient, scalable foundation for government. DOWNLOAD

In responding to a Freedom of Information Law request, if the custodian of the information has the ability to retrieve the record or data with reasonable effort, it is required to do so

2026-06-26T09:00:00.000-04:00

Plaintiff' in this action submitted five requests pursuant to New York State's Freedom of Information Law* [FOIL] to Respondent [State College] seeking several categories of documents including email correspondence between certain employees over specified date ranges and, or, containing references to Plaintiff.

The State College's records access officer [RAO] produced one category of responsive records but, for all remaining categories except Category 2 of FOIL request No. 3 and Category 2 of FOIL request No. 4, the RAO advised Plaintiff that review, redaction and production of responsive records would take several months and would be released on a rolling basis. Plaintiff contended that the extended time frames for those requests were unreasonable and pursued administrative appeals.

The FOIL Appeals Unit [FAU] of Respondent State University of New York [SUNY] rejected Plaintiff's claim that the extensions Respondents granted themselves to produce responsive records were unreasonable and thus were constructive denials of the requests. The FAU also sustained the RAO's two actual denials, contending the relevant requests were "very broad and without subject matter limitation, [and] therefore responsive records could not be located with reasonable effort."

Plaintiff next commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to, among other things, compel production of the requested categories of documents and recover counsel fees. Respondents moved, pre-answer, to dismiss the petition, which Plaintiff opposed.

Supreme Court granted the Respondents' motion, dismissed the petition and denied Plaintiff's request for counsel fees. Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

As an initial matter, the Appellate Division addressed Plaintiff's challenges to the reasonableness of Respondents' various extensions of time and held them either moot by Respondents' disclosure of the requested documents or not properly before the Court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

As to the two actual denials, Plaintiff argued, and Respondents concede, that the petition was improperly dismissed on the ground that the relevant categories of documents were not reasonably described. The Appellate Division said it agreed Plaintiff with respect to these two categories of sought consisting of emails exchanged between two identified College employees over specified date ranges, satisfied Plaintiff's "initial burden under Public Officers Law §89(3) (a) to reasonably describe the records sought so that [Respondents] can locate them", citing Matter of Wagner v New York City Dept. of Educ., 45 NY3d 93, and other New York State Court decisions.

With respect Respondents' administrative denials based on the related, but separate, consideration as to whether it would be unduly burdensome for Respondents to comply with Plaintiff's request, the Appellate Division noted that "When an agency has the ability to retrieve or extract a record or data maintained in a computer storage system with reasonable effort, it shall be required to do so", citing Public Officers Law §89[3][a]).

The Appellate Division then observed that what constitutes reasonable effort is necessarily "a case-specific determination", noting that the motion papers are insufficient to resolve that issue and Respondents must be accorded an opportunity to answer the petition with evidence satisfying their burden "to demonstrate that [they] cannot retrieve the requested documents with reasonable effort".

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that the part of the Plaintiff's petition challenging nondisclosure of Category 2 of FOIL request No. 3, and Category 2 of FOIL request No. 4, must be reinstated and because that part of the petition remains undetermined, Supreme Court's denial of counsel fees is premature. The Appellate Division then ruled that "the judgment is modified, without costs, by reversing so much thereof denied to that extent; and, as so modified", affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling.

* Public Officers Law Article 6

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State Comptroller DiNapoli and New York State Attorney General James announced the takedown of a $9 Million fraud scheme in New York City

2026-06-25T09:05:00.000-04:00

On June 24, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and New York Attorney General Letitia James announced the indictment and arrest of Maksim Grinberg, 53, of New York City for an alleged years-long fraud scheme that stole over $9 million from Medicaid. Grinberg and his eight companies, which operate under the name EyePic, were charged with 15 crimes for operating eye care clinics throughout New York City that falsely charged Medicaid for eye surgeries that never happened."
An investigation by the Office of the New York State Comptroller (OSC) and the Office of the Attorney General’s (OAG) Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MFCU) found that Grinberg used credentials from ophthalmologists that were previously affiliated with his businesses to submit false claims for eye surgery procedures, fraudulently collecting millions of dollars in payments from managed care organizations funded by New York’s Medicaid program. Grinberg allegedly spent the stolen funds on expensive purchases such as a mansion in New Jersey, jewelry, international travel, and luxury cars including an Audi, a Bentley, a Porsche, and a Lamborghini.
Despite being caught once before, Grinberg allegedly brazenly tried to cheat the healthcare system again out of millions of dollars meant for those in need," said State Comptroller DiNapoli. “Rooting out Medicaid fraud is a top priority of mine, and I will continue my partnership with Attorney General James to eliminate any such attempts. My thanks to Attorney General James for her partnership to hold Grinberg accountable.”
“Scammers who steal from Medicaid are corrupting our health care system and taking funds meant to support our state’s most vulnerable residents,” said Attorney General James. “Our investigation shut down a shameless scheme that stole millions of dollars from taxpayers and took advantage of doctors without their knowledge. We will not tolerate Medicaid fraud in New York, and I am grateful to Comptroller DiNapoli for his partnership.”

While Grinberg is not a medical professional of any kind, he allegedly set up eye care clinics in Manhattan and Brooklyn in the names of doctors to bill Medicaid for fake procedures. From January 1, 2024, to July 31, 2025, Grinberg submitted thousands of claims falsely stating that four doctors performed surgeries to remove scars on patients’ eyelid linings due to infection. However, the businesses Grinberg ran were merely optical shops for fitting eyeglasses and the surgeries he billed for never occurred. Grinberg allegedly instructed his staff to use the doctors’ credentials to bill three managed care organizations operated by New York’s Medicaid program, Fidelis Care New York (Fidelis), Healthfirst PHSP (Healthfirst), and Molina Healthcare of New York (Molina). The false claims for these fake surgeries allowed him to steal more than $9 million from Medicaid.

Grinberg allegedly used the stolen Medicaid funds to pay restitution owed from a 2017 bank fraud conviction prosecuted by the Brooklyn District Attorney and to fund his lavish lifestyle. His expenses allegedly included gambling, expensive jewelry, fine dining, caviar, high-end fashion, international and domestic travel, and private school tuition for family members. Grinberg also spent the stolen funds on rent for a penthouse apartment in Battery Park City, mortgage payments for a six-bedroom mansion with a swimming pool and three-car garage in New Jersey, and luxury cars, including an Audi, a Bentley, a Porsche, and a Lamborghini.

Grinberg’s businesses under his EyePic brand that were indicted include:

Family Eye Care Ophthalmology, P.C.; 9th Street Vision Care, Inc., and Parkslope Eye Care, Inc., which all operated out of the same address at 334 9th^thStreet in Brooklyn
Flatbush Eye Care, Inc. at 1054 Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn
Graham Eye Care, LLC at 102 Graham Avenue in Brooklyn
Harlem Eye Care, Inc. at 2249 2nd Avenue in Manhattan
MGBK Management, LLC at 326 9th Street in Brooklyn

Grinberg was arraigned before Judge Danny Chun of Kings County Supreme Court. Grinberg and his businesses are charged with 15 crimes, including Grand Larceny in the First Degree, Health Care Fraud in the First Degree, Scheme to Defraud in the First Degree, and Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree. If convicted on the top count, Grinberg faces a maximum sentence of eight and a third to 25 years in prison.

Nota Bene: These charges are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

The MFCU’s investigation was led by Detectives Mohammad Rahman and Gregory Nealon who were assisted by Detectives Aleksandr Lipkin, Daryl Sims, and Senior Detective Larry Williams, under the supervision of Detective Supervisor James Briscoe and Deputy Chief Ronald Lynch. The audit investigation was conducted by Senior Auditor Investigator Michael Di Mascio with the assistance of Auditor Investigator Andrea Lombeyda and Principal Auditor Investigator Kizzy-Ann Waldropt, under the supervision of Regional Chief Auditor Jonathan Romano. Data Analysis was performed by Senior Research Analyst Elise Roche, under the supervision of Chief Auditor Dejan Budimir.

The case is being prosecuted by Special Assistant Attorneys General Yuri Zanow and Michael Hendrick, under the supervision of New York City Regional Director Twan Bounds. Investigative support was provided by Legal Support Analysts Bethany Beru, Tara Shukla, and Julia Guercio, under the supervision of Supervising Legal Assistant Alexandra Schmit.

MFCU is led by Deputy Attorney General Amy Held and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Thomas O’Hanlon. MFCU is part of the Division for Criminal Justice, which is led by Chief Deputy Attorney General José Maldonado and overseen by First Deputy Attorney General Jennifer Levy.

New York MFCU’s total funding for federal fiscal year (FY) 2026 is $70,793,651. Of that total, 75 percent, or $53,095,240, is awarded under a grant from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The remaining 25 percent, totaling $17,698,411 for FY 2026, is funded by New York State. New York MFCU has recovered $627,812,108 for the Medicaid program through its criminal and civil investigations and prosecutions from federal fiscal years 2019 through 2025.

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Since taking office in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. New Yorkers can report allegations of fraud involving taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at 1-888-672-4555, by emailing a complaint to investigations@osc.ny.gov or by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Investigations, 8th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236.

Disabled police officer placed on restricted duty because of a disability claimed unlawful discrimination as a result of his loss of opportunities to earn overtime pay

2026-06-25T09:00:00.000-04:00

Plaintiff, a former New York Police Department [NYPD] detective, alleged he suffered unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the City of New York's Human Rights Law [HRL] as the result of his being placed on restricted duty because of his disability.

Plaintiff contended that he was deprived of opportunities to receive overtime pay at a rate equal to his similarly situated colleagues who did not have a disability. The Appellate Division said that "Supreme Court properly found that [Plaintiff] failed to state a cause of action for discrimination under the City's HRL, citing Harrington v City of New York, 157 AD3d 582.

Further, the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff "provided no support for his allegation that the NYPD had a policy that prevented him from receiving overtime opportunities because of his disability".

In the words of the Appellate Division, "it cannot be inferred from the overtime hours given to [Plaintiff's] colleagues that [NYPD] discriminated against [Plaintiff] based on his disability

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Attorney and law firm sanctioned for submitting a brief prepared with artificial intelligence having fictional case cites and other misrepresentations

2026-06-24T09:00:00.000-04:00

The Appellate Division imposed sanctions on an attorney and on the attorney's law firm for submitting a brief prepared with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence [GenAI] to the court containing citations to nonexistent cases, fictitious purported Court of Appeals quotations wholly contrary to actual law, and misrepresentations about what certain true cases actually held or decided.

Considering all of the circumstances presented, the Appellate Division deem it appropriate to impose a monetary sanction, in the sum of $8,000, on the attorney involved.

With respect to the law firm, the Appellate Division credited the firm's statements that the attorney's actions were contrary to the law firm's policy and that the law firm had no reason to believe that the attorney was using GenAI in a manner that exceeded the scope of technology approved for such use by the law firm.

However, as Appellate Division found that the law firm's name had appeared on a brief containing significant misrepresentations, and, in consideration of the deterrent purpose of sanctions, the Appellate Division deemed it appropriate to impose a monetary sanction on the law firm in the amount of $2,500.

As neither of the Defendant's attorneys requested the imposition of costs, and as neither of the Defendants had submitted billing statements, the Appellate Division declined to award costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a).

The Appellate Division also opined that as the issue before it was limited to whether the conduct of the attorney and the law firm warrant sanctions, "Whether disciplinary action is also warranted may be a matter for the Attorney Grievance Committee".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Court of Appeals affirmed an Appellate Division's decision rejecting plaintiff's "implied repeal" of law argument, noting that "implied repeal of law is disfavored"

2026-06-23T09:00:00.000-04:00

In the Matter of Robert J. Miller, et al., the New York State Court of Appeals, noting that members of the judiciary in New York State have been subject to a mandatory retirement age since the adoption of New York State's first State Constitution in 1777, pointed out that Article VI, §25(b) of the current New York State's Constitution mandates retirement of the relevant judges and justices at 70 years old, with an opportunity for certain judges and justices to serve until age 76.

The Petitioners in this action, former and sitting justices of the New York State Courts, argued that the current version of this mandate was implicitly repealed by the Equal Rights Amendment [ERA] of 2024, which amended Article I, §11 to add age to the classes protected from unlawful discrimination in the exercise of civil rights.

Petitioners further argued "that as a result of this alleged implicit repeal, Judiciary Law §§23 and 115, which together implement the constitutional mandatory retirement age cap and certification system set forth in Article VI, §25(b), are now unconstitutional".

The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that it has "long held that implied repeal is disfavored", citing People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY 473 and Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 19.

In the words of the Court of Appeals, the "text, purpose, and history of these constitutional provisions establish that they operate independently: [Article] VI, §25 (b)'s retirement mandate addresses a different constitutional matter than the ERA, and the two provisions are not antagonistic and may be harmonized".

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division and dismissed the Plaintiffs' petition.

The Court of Appeals decision is set out below.

Matter of Miller v State of New York

2026 NY Slip Op 03907

June 18, 2026

Court of Appeals

Per Curiam

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

No. 64

John Leventhal, for appellants.

Ester Murdukhayeva, for respondent State of New York.

If/When/How: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice et al., Marcy Syms Equality Initiative at NYU School of Law's Birnbaum Women's Leadership Center, The Legal Aid Society,

New York Civil Liberties Union, amici curiae.

Per Curiam

Members of the judiciary in New York State have been subject to a mandatory retirement age since the adoption of our first State Constitution in 1777. In the current Constitution, article VI, § 25 (b) mandates retirement at 70 years old, with an opportunity for certain judges and justices to serve until age 76. Petitioners, former and sitting justices of the New York State Courts, contend that this provision was implicitly repealed by the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") of 2024, which amended article I, § 11 to add, inter alia, age to the classes protected from discrimination in the exercise of civil rights. Petitioners argue that as a result of this alleged implicit repeal, Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115, which together implement the constitutional mandatory retirement age cap and certification system set forth in article VI, § 25 (b), are now unconstitutional. However, we have long held that implied repeal is disfavored (see People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY 473, 496 [1892]; see also Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]). The text, purpose, and history of these constitutional provisions establish that they operate independently: article VI, § 25 (b)'s retirement mandate addresses a different constitutional matter than the ERA, and the two provisions are not antagonistic and may be harmonized. Therefore, we affirm the Appellate Division order affirming dismissal of the underlying petition.

I.

The Relevant State Constitutional Provisions

This appeal concerns the interplay between two state constitutional provisions: article VI, § 25 (b)—the mandatory judicial retirement and certification provision—and article I, § 11—the Equal Protection and Civil Rights Clauses—as amended by the ERA. The parties and amici dispute the proper interpretation of these provisions, but we need not address all their myriad arguments because we are able to dispose of this appeal by holding that the two provisions do not conflict.

A.

Article VI, Section 25 (b) Mandates Judicial Retirement

The New York State Constitution provides for the election or appointment of judges and justices for a set term (see NY Const, art VI, §§ 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16). For over two centuries, from its adoption in 1777, the Constitution has imposed a mandatory retirement age for judges (see NY Const § XXIV [1777]). Initially, that age was set at 60 and then increased to 70 by amendment in 1869 (see NY Const, art VI, § 13 [1869]). In 1961, the Constitution was further amended to permit administrative certification for certain former judges and justices who reached 70 years of age to serve up to age 76 (see NY Const, art VI, § 25 [1961]).FN1 The text of the retirement and certification requirements has remained unchanged since then.

The provision states in relevant part,

"Each judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of claims, judge of the county court, judge of the surrogate's court, judge of the family court, judge of a court for the city of New York . . . and judge of the district court shall retire on the last day of December in the year in which [they] reach[ ] the age of seventy. Each such former judge of the court of appeals and justice of the supreme court may thereafter perform the duties of a justice of the supreme court . . . [if] certificated in the manner provided by law that the services of such judge or justice are necessary to expedite the business of the court and that [they are] mentally and physically able and competent to perform the full duties of such office. Any such certification shall be valid for a term of two years and may be extended as provided by law for additional terms of two years. A retired judge or justice shall serve no longer than until the last day of December in the year in which [they] reach[ ] the age of seventy-six . . . ." (NY Const, art VI, § 25 [b]).

This provision reflects the will of New York's voters that judges and justices shall retire upon reaching a specified age. The voters have reaffirmed that constitutional design—last amended in 1961—that judges and justices shall not serve past the age of 70; in 2013, the voters rejected, by a wide margin, a proposed constitutional amendment to raise the retirement age for certain judges and justices to age 80 (see Proposed Constitutional Amendment, Historical Notes, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, NY Const Art VI, § 25; 2013 NY Senate Bill S886A, 2013 NY Assembly Bill A4395). Significantly, no ballot measure has ever sought to eliminate the age requirement.

B.

Article I, Section 11

As initially approved by the voters in 1938, article I, § 11 provided,

"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in [their] civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state" (former NY Const, art I, § 11).

The Equal Protection Clause in the first sentence requires that the State and its subdivisions treat all persons equally under the law (see People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638, 650-51 [1990]). The second sentence sets forth the Civil Rights Clause, which prohibits discrimination by state and private actors as to civil rights (id. at 651).

As amended by the voters in 2024, article I, § 11 of the State Constitution now states:

"a. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, disability, creed, religion, or sex, including sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes, and reproductive health care and autonomy, be subjected to any discrimination in their civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state, pursuant to law.

b. Nothing in this section shall invalidate or prevent the adoption of any law, regulation, program, or practice that is designed to prevent or dismantle discrimination on the basis of a characteristic listed in this section, nor shall any characteristic listed in this section be interpreted to interfere with, limit, or deny the civil rights of any person based upon any other characteristic identified in this section" (emphasis added).

According to the Senate and Assembly sponsors, the ERA was intended "to ensure that [the] State Constitution extends to all New Yorkers, particularly those who have faced severe and pervasive injustice, the right to be free from discrimination" (Assembly Mem in Support of 2023 NY Assembly Bill A1283 [Assembly Mem]; Senate Mem in Support of 2023 NY Senate Bill S108A [Senate Mem] [same]). The ERA was designed to achieve this aim "by expanding the list of classes affirmatively protected by the New York Constitution in recognition of the need for comprehensive, enforceable, and intersectional equality under the law" and "guarantee[ing] the validity of efforts to prevent or dismantle structural forms of inequality or discrimination against protected classes" (Assembly Mem; Senate Mem [same]). The Legislature noted that the ERA was necessary because article I, § 11 "was last amended to address this topic in 1938 . . . , prior to the civil rights movement, the movement for gender justice, the LGBTQ movement, the disability rights movement, and the many developments in anti-discrimination law," and that "New York's Constitution must reflect our broad conception of justice, equal rights and the duty to protect all people in the state against discrimination" (Assembly Mem; Senate Mem [same]).

II.

Procedural History

Petitioners are, respectively, a retired Appellate Division Justice who reached the maximum constitutional certification age of 76 at the end of December 2025, and two currently certified Supreme Court Justices. Petitioners filed this hybrid article 78 and declaratory judgment proceeding against the State and the Office of Court Administration (OCA),FN2 challenging article VI, § 25 (b), and its legislative codification in Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115.FN3 Supreme Court denied petitioners' request for preliminary relief, granted the State's cross-motion, and dismissed the petition.

The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that article I, § 11, as amended by the ERA, did not implicitly repeal article VI, § 25 (b)'s pre-existing mandatory age requirement (247 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2026]). In reaching that holding, the Court considered that "the ERA contains no reference to article VI, the eligibility of persons to serve as judges or justices, or the judicial retirement age" (id. at 503). That Court rejected petitioners' assertion that the principle that a "subsequent general statute will repeal a prior special law" applies here, noting that "the ERA addresses a different subject matter from the provision petitioners seek to have declared nullified" and that "petitioners cannot show that the [L]egislature or the voters intended for the ERA to repeal article VI, § 25 (b)" (id.). After holding that petitioners' "cause of action asserting an implicit repeal necessarily fails," the Court concluded that "[i]t follows that petitioners cannot demonstrate . . . that Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115, which implement article VI, § 25 (b) faithfully, are unconstitutional" (id. at 504). The Appellate Division "decline[d] to reach the issues of whether the ERA made the Civil Rights Clause of article I, § 11 self-executing, or whether strict scrutiny applies to age-based statutory classifications, as these issues are academic in light of our determination" (id.).FN4 Petitioners now appeal to our Court as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1)].FN5

III.

Constitutional Repeal

We proceed from first principles. "[A]n amended Constitution must be read as a whole and as if every part had been adopted at the same time and as one law, and effect must be given to every part of it, each clause explained and qualified by every other part" (People ex rel. Killeen v Angle, 109 NY 564, 575 [1888] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Thus, every attempt should be made to harmonize the State Constitution's various sections (see id.; People ex rel. McClelland v Roberts, 148 NY 360, 367 [1896]; Matter of Smith v Board of Supervisors of St. Lawrence County, 148 NY 187, 193 [1896]; People ex rel. Balcom v Mosher, 163 NY 32, 36 [1900]; McMahon v Michaelian, 38 AD2d 60, 62 [2d Dept 1971], affd 30 NY2d 507 [1972]). Generally, an amendment to the State Constitution repeals only the particular provision actually changed, as "the very purpose and effect of an amendment is to amend the relevant portion of the Constitution, effectively repealing and voiding any prior version of the particular section so amended" (Matter of Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v County of Nassau, 22 NY3d 606, 625 [2014] [citations omitted]). That said, "[a] constitutional provision can [also] be implicitly abrogated by the adoption of another and later one which is antagonistic to it, although the original provision may in terms remain unaltered" (Carter, 135 NY at 496). Significantly, however, "[a] repeal by implication is not favored . . . in regard to any provision of our organic law" (id. at 496; see also Alweis, 69 NY2d at 204 [implicit repeal is "distinctly not favored in the law"]). Even where two constitutional provisions are in tension, a new amendment will not implicitly repeal a preexisting provision unless "the fact of its opposition to [the] former provision and the intent to displace it by the amendment adopted, [is] so plainly shown by the provisions themselves that there can be no rational doubt in regard to it" (People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY at 496-497). Moreover, a more general provision "will not repeal a more specific one" unless it can be "clearly shown" that such result was intended (Cimo v State, 306 NY 143, 149 [1953]; see also People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 NY2d 192, 200 [1979] [collecting authorities]). The question is fundamentally one of the voters' intention, for only "[t]he power that made can unmake" (People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY at 496).

The ERA does not expressly repeal article VI, § 25 (b). Importantly, the ERA makes no mention of article VI, § 25 (b). Indeed, the ERA amends a different provision of the Constitution, article I, § 11, which was drafted to address wholly different, broader concerns. The plain texts of these two provisions provide no support for express repeal (Matter of Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 22 NY3d at 623-625).

Lacking textual support for an express repeal argument, petitioners contend that the ERA implicitly repealed article VI, § 25 (b) because the ERA prohibits all discrimination—including employment discrimination—based on age. Thus, the argument goes, the two constitutional provisions irreconcilably conflict. Furthermore, petitioners maintain that article VI, § 25 (b)'s judicial retirement and certification requirements must give way to the more recently enacted ERA's broad anti-discrimination mandate. The arguments are unpersuasive.

Petitioners' first line of argument runs afoul of our rule disfavoring implied repeal. Article VI, § 25 (b) and article I, § 11 are not "in such conflict that it is impossible to give some effect to both" (Alweis, 69 NY2d at 204; People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY at 496). At the time of the ERA's enactment, article VI, § 25 (b) explicitly set a 70-year-old retirement age for judges and justices with the possibility of serving until they reached 76 (NY Const, art I, § 11 [a]; NY Const, art VI, § 25 [b]). The State Constitution has always limited the scope of judicial service in this way, reflecting the intent of the voters for over two hundred years to impose this restriction on judicial tenure. Judges and justices are elected and appointed to set terms with the understanding the voters have expressed their desire in the strongest terms—by constitutional proscription—that judicial service ends when a judge reaches the age chosen by the voters, as set forth in article VI, § 25 (b), regardless of whether more time remains on the judge's term.

Petitioners nevertheless maintain that because the ERA prohibits all age discrimination it thus must repeal the judicial retirement mandate. There is no evidence that the Legislature and the voters would have sought to accomplish such a dramatic change to the mandatory retirement provision merely by inference, and we see no indication that they intended to do so by adopting the ERA. Given the longstanding constitutional age limitation on judicial service, the most natural and direct way to change course after two hundred years would be to amend outright article VI, § 25 (b). Or, we would expect that if the ERA were intended to eliminate the age limitation, the ERA would unambiguously declare its repeal of article VI, § 25 (b). Instead, according to petitioners, we are to presume that the drafters and the voters obfuscated their intent to eliminate the specific, longstanding age limitation found in our State Constitution by merely including "age" within the ERA's list of protected classifications. We assume that the drafters were aware of the established interpretive principle that repeal by implication is disfavored and that only a clear statement of repeal eliminates any doubt as to the voters' intent. Indeed, repeals of constitutional provisions historically have been accomplished through explicit language, language that is missing from the ERA and article VI, § 25 (see e.g. NY Const, art I, §§ 7 [b], [e], 10, 13, 15; NY Const, art V, § 5; NY Const, art VI, § 36-a).

Petitioners' other argument that the ERA repeals article VI, § 25 (b) because it is the most recent articulation of the will of the voters fares no better. This argument ignores the basic canon of construction that specific provisions control over general provisions unless the opposite intent is "clearly shown" (Cimo, 306 NY at 149). Article I, § 11 addresses rights generally, and is not limited to judges or judicial service; it mandates equal treatment of all persons by state actors and prohibits public and private discrimination based on a list of protected classifications. In contrast, article VI, § 25 (b) provides specific age-related employment eligibility requirements for a discrete group of judges and justices. This specific provision thus controls over article I, § 11, as amended by the ERA, which sets forth a broad equality provision applicable to all New Yorkers (id.).

The legislative history supports our conclusion that the ERA does not and was never intended to repeal article VI, § 25 (b). There is no reference in that history to any implicit repeal. In fact, an opinion letter from the Attorney General stated that "if adopted, the proposed amendment will have no effect upon other provisions of the Constitution" (Letter from Attorney General, July 6, 2022, RE: Senate No. 51002 [emphasis added]). Nothing else in the legislative history contradicts that statement, and, thus, we assume that the drafters proceeded with the understanding that the ERA did not affect constitutional provisions beyond article I, § 11. If that were not convincing enough, legislative efforts following enactment of the ERA provide further support for our conclusion that the ERA did not implicitly repeal the judicial retirement mandate. In 2025, less than three months after the voters approved the ERA, legislation was proposed amending article VI, § 25 (b) to increase the retirement age to 76 (see 2025 NY Assembly Bills A3756, A3757; 2025 NY Senate Bill S7455). Certainly there would be no reason for further amendment—especially so soon after the ERA vote—if the ERA repealed the judicial retirement mandate. Moreover, if petitioners were correct that the ERA prohibits all age discrimination, then the proposed 2025 amendment—which modified but did not eliminate the retirement mandate—would itself violate the ERA's prohibition on age discrimination. Petitioners' interpretation is thus contrary to our constitutional text and design, doctrines of constitutional interpretation, and the actions of the drafters and the voters. What the voters made in 1777, as reaffirmed in 1869 and 1961 in article VI, § 25 (b), was not unmade in 2025 in the ERA (People ex rel. Carter, 135 NY at 496).

IV.

Conclusion

The voters have spoken clearly since 1777 that judges may serve until they reach the constitutional age of retirement. That age limit has never been eliminated. For more than two centuries, the voters only modified the age limit, first during the Reconstruction era by raising the age to 70, and again in 1961, when the voters approved a certification process for certain judges and justices to serve to age 76. That limit has been fixed since then, with no ballot initiative to eliminate it and a failed effort in 2013 to raise the age to 80. The retirement age is part of New York's constitutional design. The State's voters, Legislature, members of the bench, and judicial candidates have understood that judicial service is limited in this specific way. Article I, § 11, as amended by the ERA, did not repeal article VI, § 25 (b). The retirement mandate stands.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Troutman, J. (concurring):

Although I concur with the outcome reached by the majority, I do so recognizing that New York's recently enacted Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) created enforceable rights with which we must contend. This case has broad implications for our State's constitutional jurisprudence in the wake of New Yorkers' historic passage of the ERA. That was a monumental achievement, which created new constitutional rights that were previously not in existence. The majority does the ERA disservice by not pronouncing the enforceability of those rights and by concluding blithely that the ERA's protection of age as a suspect classification does not conflict with a previously existing provision in our Constitution mandating that certain judges and justices retire at age 70. Consequently, I write this concurrence to address gaps in the majority's reasoning and to address how the majority's per curiam opinion may adversely impact the protections contained in the ERA, which were voted into existence by the citizens of this State.

I.

When New York's Constitution was initially enacted in 1777, it contained a provision mandating judicial retirement at age 60, which was increased to age 70 in 1869. As one delegate opined,

"[T]he judicial office should be established on the principle of good behavior, 'during what may be expected to be the period of judicial usefulness in respect to age and faculties. By fixing the age at seventy years as the period of judicial life, we avoid some of the difficulties which have been felt, and others which have been imagined, as resulting from the prolongation of the term of office beyond the powers of mind and body necessary for the performance of its duties. Establishing that as the term of judicial life, we then give to the incumbent the security, and to the public the advantage of the continuance in office of a judge during that period" (2 Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York at 252-253 [1906]).

Around the time the Constitution was amended in 1869, the average life expectancy was estimated to be only around 41 years of age for men and 43 years of age for women (see Haines and Roger C. Avery, The American Life Table of 1830-1860: An Evaluation, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 11, No. 1 at 87 [Summer, 1980]). As a result, it made sense when a delegate pronounced "that, as a rule, he did not think it for the public interest to select for judges men who were more than forty or forty-five years of age" (2 Lincoln at 254).

When the mandatory retirement age was enacted, 70 was considered to be such an extreme age that allowing judges to serve until age 70 was considered the equivalent of giving them lifetime tenure: "The majority of the judiciary committee had agreed on a life tenure, or, rather, on a tenure during good behavior, and ending, in any event, when the judge should become seventy years of age" (id. at 251). A mandatory retirement age of 70 would not ensure that judges back in 1869 did not have lifetime tenure on the bench. That was ensured instead by setting a term of office for judges and justices (see id. at 255-258; NY Const art VI, § 13 [1869]), not by forcing judges and justices to retire at what would be a highly unusual age for them to attain at that time.

Today, however, average life expectancy at birth is 79 years (Jiaquan Xu, et al., Mortality in the United States, 2024, NCHS Data Brief, No. 548 [Jan. 2026], available at https://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc/174641 [accessed June 16, 2026])—nearly four decades longer than in 1869. A man who today reaches 70 years of age can expect to live on average 14 more years (see U.S. Department of Social Security, Period Life Table, 2022, as used in the 2025 Trustees Report, available at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html [accessed June 5, 2026]). A woman that age can expect to live an additional 16 years on average (see id.).

Nevertheless, New York's Constitution, article VI, § 25 (b), still mandates retirement for certain judges and justices the year they turn 70:

"Each judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of claims, judge of the county court, judge of the surrogate's court, judge of the family court, judge of a court for the city of New York established pursuant to section fifteen of this article and judge of the district court shall retire on the last day of December in the year in which he or she reaches the age of seventy" (emphasis added).

Article VI, § 25 (b), now also provides that, even if a judge or justice is certified to continue on the bench until after the age of 70, they "shall serve no longer than until the last day of December in the year in which he or she reaches the age of seventy-six . . . ."

Notably, in the 1980s, this Court rejected challenges to article VI, § 25 (b), brought by litigants claiming it violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Court held that age is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection, and the mandatory judicial retirement age survives rational basis review (see Diamond v Cuomo, 70 NY2d 338 [1987]; Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 250-252 [1984]). But a major change occurred since then that has validly called into question whether article VI, § 25 (b), is still viable under our State's Constitution.

II.

One week after the Supreme Court decided Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Org. (597 US 215 [2022])—"tak[ing] away" "a woman's right to decide for herself whether to bear a child" (id. at 359, 403 [Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., dissenting]—Governor Kathy Hochul called a special session of the legislature and declared that "New York State will take an unprecedented step toward enshrining the fundamental right to abortion access into our State Constitution" (see https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-extraordinary-session-new-york-state-legislature-enshrine-equal [accessed June 16, 2026]). The legislature responded by passing a concurrent resolution proposing the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which was duly enacted in 2024.

The ERA amended the Civil Rights Clause of article I, § 11, of New York's Constitution and added a second subdivision to that section. The changes made to the Civil Rights Clause included adding a number of new protected classes, so that the clause now protects against discrimination in civil rights based on "race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, disability, creed, religion, or sex, including sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes, and reproductive healthcare and autonomy" (NY Const, art I, § 11 [a]). In addition, the phrase "pursuant to law" was added to the end of the clause (see id.). Finally, the new subdivision (b) provides,

"Nothing in this section shall invalidate or prevent the adoption of any law, regulation, program, or practice that is designed to prevent or dismantle discrimination on the basis of a characteristic listed in this section, nor shall any characteristic listed in this section be interpreted to interfere with, limit, or deny the civil rights of any person based upon any other characteristic identified in this section" (id. § 11 [b]).

III.

Petitioners are three New York Supreme Court Justices who were subject to the mandatory retirement or certification process mandated under article VI, § 25 (b). They commenced this action alleging that the ERA nullified the constitutional mandatory retirement age of 70 for certain judges and justices. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, rejecting the argument that the ERA repealed the mandatory retirement age by implication. The court held that "[p]etitioners have not adequately demonstrated that Section 25 (b) was repealed by the ERA simply because it contains an age-based restriction, nor have they demonstrated that there was a legislative intent to repeal Section 25 (b) or any judicial retirement provisions with the ERA" (2025 NY Slip Op 34484 [U], at 6 [Sup Ct, New York Cty, 2025]). Petitioners appealed.

The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed (247 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2026]). The Court concluded that "article VI, § 25 (b) of the State Constitution has not been repealed and that Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115 are not unconstitutional" (id. at 502). The Appellate Division further held that the plain language of the ERA does not support the argument that article VI, § 25 (b), has been implicitly repealed, inasmuch as the "ERA contains no reference to article VI, the eligibility of persons to serve as judges or justices, or the judicial retirement age" (id. at 502).

IV.

The majority of our Court today, affirming the Appellate Division, agrees with the Attorney General's contention that there is no basis in text, legislative history, or elsewhere supporting a holding that the ERA expressly or implicitly repealed the mandatory retirement age set forth in article VI, § 25 (b). I agree with the outcome reached by the majority, but I write separately because the majority's reasoning is incomplete.

It is well settled that "an amended Constitution must be read as a whole and as if every part had been adopted at the same time and as one law, and effect must be given to every part of it, each clause explained and qualified by every other part" (People ex rel. Killeen v Angle, 109 NY 564, 575 [1888] [quotation marks omitted]). For this reason, the lack of express language in an amendment repealing an earlier provision "gives rise to a presumption that repeal was not intended" (Cimo v State, 306 NY 143, 148-49 [1953]).

This presumption is not conclusive, however. What it means is that, in interpreting the Constitution, "all its provisions relating directly or indirectly to the same subject must be read together and any amendment in conflict with prior provisions must control, as it is the latest expression of the people" (People ex rel. Williams Eng'g & Contr. Co. v Metz, 193 NY 148, 157 [1908]).

What does it mean for an amendment to be in conflict with a prior provision? As Chief Judge Nelson explained it, a conflict occurs where there is a "repugnancy or contradiction" between the prior law and a latter law (Bowen v Lease, 5 Hill 221, 226 [Sup Ct 1843]). "If the two are repugnant, of course the last act governs, upon the principle that it is presumed to express the last intention of the makers" (id. at 226 n a). When determining if such a repugnancy exists between two provisions,

"[t]he real intention will always prevail over the literal sense of the terms. The context, the occasion, and the object of the law are to be considered, and a [law] will not be held repealed by implication if a reasonable construction will enable it to stand consistently with the alleged repealing [law]" (Davis v Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 165 NY 159, 167 [1900]).

I accept these basic premises, but I disagree with the majority that we can simply look at the provisions at issue in this case the way we would look at a conflict between two statutes or between a statute and our Constitution, even though generally the analyses are the same. This case is different because it involves a conflict between two provisions of our Constitution. In that situation, the test for finding implicit repeal of an earlier provision by a latter provision is more demanding: "A repeal by implication is not favored even in regard to a statute, still less can it be favored in regard to any provision of our organic law. It is, however, a question of intention in both cases" (People ex rel. Carter v Rice, 135 NY 473, 496 [1892] [emphasis added]). This heavy burden is what results in the failure of petitioners' claims.

The ERA provides that all discrimination "pursuant to law" against people "in their civil rights" because of "age" is prohibited. Based solely on the text of the ERA, the age restriction in article VI, § 25 (b), discriminates "pursuant to law" against people "in their civil rights" because of their age. Consequently, as a purely textual matter, the age restriction in article VI, § 25 (b), is prohibited under the ERA, meaning that it is repugnant to the ERA's dictate that "[n]o person" be subject to "any discrimination in their civil rights" "because of . . . age."

Under our precedent, however, we cannot simply look to the text of these conflicting constitutional provisions to determine if one is implicitly repealed by the other. As mentioned, when considering the issue of implicit repeal, "[t]he real intention will always prevail over the literal sense of the terms," which means that "the context, the occasion, and the object of the law are to be considered" (Davis, 165 NY at 167). For reasons discussed in more depth later in this opinion (see infra at 21-23), I agree with the majority that petitioners have failed to establish clearly that article VI, § 25 (b), violates the ERA's protection against discrimination "pursuant to law" on the basis of age and that, as a result, petitioners' challenge to the sections of the Judiciary Law implementing article VI, § 25 (b), also fail. Nevertheless, I write this concurrence to address issues that I believe the majority should have confronted head-on.

V.

To begin with, the majority has unfortunately failed to address the Attorney General's argument that, even after being amended by the ERA, the Civil Rights Clause still prohibits discrimination by state and private actors "only as to civil rights which are elsewhere declared by Constitution, statute, or common law" (People v Kern, 75 NY2d 638, 651 [1990] [emphasis added]). The majority's reason for ignoring this issue is unpersuasive. Like the Appellate Division, the majority has "decline[d] to reach the issues of whether the ERA made the Civil Rights Clause of article I, § 11 self-executing," because those issues are "academic in light of our determination" (majority op at 7-8, quoting 247 AD3d at 504 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see id. at 8 n 4).

That is incorrect. We hold today that petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden of proving that the ERA, which amended the Civil Right Clause, is clearly antagonistic to the mandatory retirement provision in article VI, § 25 (b). In order to make that determination, this Court needed to decide what the words of the Civil Rights Clause mean after being amended by the ERA. If the words mean what the Attorney General contends, and do not create enforceable civil rights, then it is unnecessary for us to analyze whether the newly amended Civil Rights Clause is antagonistic to article VI, § 25 (b). It is only because the language of the post-ERA Civil Rights Clause creates enforceable civil rights that we must determine whether those rights conflict with article VI, § 25 (b). Otherwise, it would be our holding today that is academic. But our holding is not academic precisely because the ERA has ingrained anti-discrimination protections into the Civil Rights Clause that are enforceable against the government.

The majority basically says as much by recognizing that,

"[a]ccording to the Senate and Assembly sponsors, the ERA was intended 'to ensure that [the] State Constitution extends to all New Yorkers, particularly those who have faced severe and pervasive injustice, the right to be free from discrimination.' The ERA was designed to achieve this aim 'by expanding the list of classes affirmatively protected by the New York Constitution in recognition of the need for comprehensive, enforceable, and intersectional equality under the law' and 'guarantee[ing] the validity of efforts to prevent or dismantle structural forms of inequality or discrimination against protected classes' " (majority op at 5-6 [citations omitted and emphasis added]).

I therefore feel compelled to write this concurrence explaining how the ERA amended the Civil Rights Clause so that it now contains enforceable—i.e., self-executing—rights protecting against discrimination by the State on the basis of the suspect classifications listed therein.

The Attorney General's contrary position would undermine the entire purpose of the ERA, which is "to promote equality of opportunity" for the protected classes of people listed therein "both by banning [such] discrimination and by affording enforceable legal rights to [such] people" (Senate Introducer's Mem in Support of 2023 NY Senate Bill S108-A, at 3 [emphasis added]). To understand why this is so, it helps to understand the history of the Civil Rights Clause.

Article I, § 11, the first antidiscrimination provision enshrined in our State's Constitution, was a product of the 1938 Constitutional Convention (see Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, The New York State Constitution 84 [2d ed 2012]). It consisted originally of two sentences, and it remained substantially in its original form until the adoption of the ERA:

"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed, or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state."

The section's first major test came in Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp. (299 NY 512 [1949]), a case involving racial discrimination in housing. This Court stated that the first sentence in article I, § 11, is an Equal Protection Clause no broader than its federal counterpart in the Fourteenth Amendment (see id. at 530). The Court based this interpretation on the plain language of the provision and the explicit statements of H.E. Lewis while he was serving as Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee at the 1938 Convention (see id.). Specifically, quoting Lewis, this Court explained that "the first sentence of section 11 'in effect embodies in our Constitution the provisions of the Federal Constitution which are already binding upon our State and its agencies' " (id., quoting 2 Rev Record of N.Y. State Constitutional Convention, 1938 [2 Conv] 1065).

This Court further ruled in Dorsey that the second sentence of article I, § 11, is a Civil Rights Clause, which "protects only against 'discrimination in . . . civil rights,' " stating that "[o]bviou[sly] such rights are those elsewhere declared" (299 NY at 531). In reaching that conclusion, this Court again relied upon the remarks Lewis made at the 1938 convention "to the effect that the provision in question was not self-executing and that it was implicit that it required legislative implementation to be effective" (id., citing 2 Conv 1144). Indeed, the convention rejected language for article I, § 11, that would have required the legislature to "enact the appropriate laws to make effective the principles hereby declared" (2 Conv 1142) after Lewis argued that it is "implicit in the Constitution" that a provision "such as this, in order to be effective, must be carried out in some form by legislative enactment" (id. at 1144; see id. at 1069 ["In the employment field, we hope that the constitutional provision now before us will be implemented by proper legislation" (Sen. Robert F. Wagner)]).

Interestingly, "in civil rights" does not appear to have been included in the original proposed language for article I, § 11. Lewis had subsequently proposed those words "to limit [section 11's] scope" and "relieve [it] of criticism, some of which has been justly hurled against it" (3 Conv 2626). Lewis explained the new limitation: "The words civil rights are defined as those rights which appertain to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community, and the civil rights are the rights which are found in the Constitution, in the Civil Rights Law and in the statutes" (id.). Immediately thereafter, the convention unanimously approved article I, § 11 (see id. at 2626-2628). The Court in Dorsey recognized this limitation and concluded that racial discrimination in housing was not barred by the Civil Rights Clause because the opportunity to acquire real property was not a recognized civil right, inasmuch as bills to create such a right failed to pass the legislature in 1947 and 1948 (see 299 NY at 548-549).

Four decades later, in People v Kern (75 NY2d 638 [1990]), this Court rejected the need for enabling legislation in a different context. The defendant in that case, who was charged in a racially motivated homicide, asserted a right to use his peremptory challenges to exclude persons of a particular race from serving on the jury (see id. 642-643). This Court ultimately concluded that the practice is prohibited by the Civil Rights Clause and the Equal Protection Clause (see id. at 643). Although the defendant argued that the Civil Rights Clause did not apply because "no statute prohibits the exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges" (id. at 651), this Court refused to interpret the Civil Rights Clause "so narrowly" that it "prohibit[s] private discrimination only where such discrimination was already expressly prohibited by statute" (id.). There need only be "a 'civil right' 'elsewhere declared' " (id.), and jury service is a civil right long recognized in the Constitution and by statute (see id. at 651-652). As a result, this Court held that the Civil Rights Clause prohibits racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges (see id. 653).

With the passage of the ERA, we no longer must search outside of the confines of the Civil Rights Clause to determine which rights are protected under it. The clear intent behind the ERA was to create new rights and to make the Civil Rights Clause self-executing against the government.

Although from a textual standpoint the ERA appears to leave equal protection as it existed before, the Sponsor's Memorandum in Support demonstrates that the ERA addressed equal protection concerns by amending the Civil Rights Clause. "Our modern vision of equality demands comprehensive equal protection," it says in the justification section (Senate Introducer's Mem in Support of 2023 NY Senate Bill S108-A, at 1). Furthermore, although the ERA has retained the "in civil rights" language, the Sponsor's Memorandum indicates that the language was no longer meant to have the limiting effect on civil rights that it did before. Because "the right to abortion is central to a pregnant person's equality," the ERA "clarifies that any action that discriminates against a person based on their pregnancy, pregnancy outcome, reproductive healthcare, or reproductive autonomy is sex-based discrimination in their civil rights that would be explicitly prohibited by the State Constitution" (id. at 3 ["This amendment is intended to promote equality of opportunity for people with disabilities both by banning disability discrimination and by affording enforceable legal rights to people with disabilities" (emphasis added)]).

The Sponsor's Memorandum for the ERA further explains that Dorsey declared the Civil Rights Clause to not be self-executing, but it interpreted that to mean "it requires specific executing legislation in order to establish a cause of action between private actors . . . or in actions for damages" (id. at 2). "However," the sponsor continued, "even in the absence of specific executing legislation, the section operates to prohibit the application of laws and governmental action that discriminate on the basis of an enumerated protected category" (id. [emphasis added]). In other words, "discrimination in civil rights" now means discrimination, period.

This is further borne out by the language added to the Civil Rights Clause by the ERA prohibiting discrimination "pursuant to law." Those words have fundamentally shifted the inquiry under the Civil Rights Clause. As the Sponsor's Memorandum to the ERA discusses, "pursuant to law" was added for the purpose of "clarifying" that the Civil Rights Clause applies to any government action "with force of law, including action by the executive or legislative branch, local governments, or any subdivision thereof" (id. at 2). Gone is the time when the Civil Rights Clause depends on the existence of rights "elsewhere declared." The Clause now declares rights.

Indeed, the ERA would be ineffective if we failed to recognize this shift in understanding of the Civil Rights Clause. Otherwise, if a future legislature were to make abortion a crime, the State could argue that the application of the Civil Rights Clause depends on the existence of a right elsewhere declared, and abortion rights are declared nowhere, particularly if there is a statute making it a crime. That hypothetical argument would be consistent with our case law prior to passage of the ERA, but it is certainly not consistent with the Civil Rights Clause post-ERA. As a result, the only way to interpret the ERA as having effectively enshrined abortion rights in the Constitution is to say that by listing "pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes, and reproductive healthcare and autonomy" as protected classes or categories, the ERA created new civil rights.

It would make little sense to limit those new, self-executing, rights to abortion and reproductive rights, because the language of the newly amended clause is so much broader than that. Given that other suspect classifications—including race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, disability, creed, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression—are listed in parallel with pregnancy and reproductive rights, with no category of rights given precedence over another, we should hold that our prior precedent interpreting the Civil Rights Clause is no longer relevant to any of those rights. The Civil Rights Clause, as amended by the ERA, now grants people the self-executing right not to be discriminated against, "pursuant to law," on the basis of the categories set forth therein. The people of this State voted for those rights when they ratified the ERA. They were told how protective it would be of abortion and reproductive rights, and nothing in the text or history of the ERA indicates that any of the other rights created therein would receive lesser protection—including the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age.

VI.

I also write to express my disagreement with the majority shrugging off the mandatory retirement provisions in article VI, § 25 (b), as a mere "age-related employment eligibility requirements for a discrete group of judges and justices" (majority op at 12). Imagine if, instead of an age restriction, article VI, § 25 (b), required judges to resign if they became pregnant or changed their sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression. In that scenario, I would hope that we would readily conclude that the ERA conflicts with that earlier provision of our Constitution, and we would not tolerate that discriminatory provision on the ground that it is a mere "employment eligibility requirement[]" (id.). Consequently, calling the mandatory retirement age in article VI, § 25 (b), an "employment eligibility requirement[]" does nothing to address the fundamental concern here, which is whether that provision is so repugnant to the ERA that we must deem it to have been implicitly repealed (id.).

VII.

Determining whether an amendment to a constitution implicitly repeals older provisions in that same document is not as simple as the majority makes it seem. We should not, as the majority does, base heavily our determination on the fact that "article VI, § 25 (b) provides specific age-related employment eligibility requirements for a discrete group of judges and justices," whereas "article I, § 11, as amended by the ERA, . . . sets forth a broad equality provision applicable to all New Yorkers" (majority op at 12).

Our decision in People ex rel. Carter v Rice, cited numerous times by the majority, makes this clear. In that case, this Court decided "the question as to the validity of the apportionment act of 1892" under New York's Constitution (135 NY 473, 482-83 [1892]). As is relevant, one of the reasons why it was claimed that the act violated our State's Constitution was that the apportionment of senate districts was "not based upon an equal number of inhabitants, excluding 'persons of color not taxed,' " as required under article III, § 4, of the State Constitution of 1874 (id. at 494). Prior to 1874, the Constitution's reference to " 'persons of color not taxed . . . ' refer[red] to the colored persons not taxed, as provided for in the preceding article, limiting their right to vote, and providing for their exemption from direct taxation, unless owners of real estate" (id.). As this Court explained, "The framers of the [pre-1874] constitution evidently thought that persons of color who were not entitled to vote [because they did not own sufficient taxable property] ought not to be counted in making up the number of inhabitants upon which to base the alteration of senate and assembly districts" (id.). By the time of the people's adoption of the 1874 Constitution, however, the Civil War had "commenced and came to an end" and "the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the federal constitution were ratified" (id.). So, the draft of New York's new Constitution submitted to the people in 1874 "omitted the condition for the exercise of the elective franchise by the colored person, so that his right to vote was from that time placed upon the same foundation as that of the white inhabitant" (id. at 495). The condition was also omitted from article III, § 5, governing the apportionment of Assembly districts (see id.). Unfortunately, "[i]n some way not affecting this question[,] the amendment to section 4 of the same article, striking out the exclusion as to senate districts regarding persons of color not taxed, was not submitted to the people, and . . . remain[ed] as it was" (id.). Despite the fact that the exclusion of the "persons of color not taxed" language was in section 5, this Court held that the inclusion of that language in section 4 was implicitly repealed by the exclusion of that language from section 5 and an amended provision regarding the right to vote. In so holding, this Court explained,

"A repeal by implication is not favored even in regard to a statute, still less can it be favored in regard to any provision of our organic law. It is, however, a question of intention in both cases. The power that made can unmake.

A constitutional provision can be impliedly abrogated by the adoption of another and later one which is antagonistic to it, although the original provision may in terms remain unaltered. The later will of the people constitutionally made known must in such case take the place of the other provision, even though it may still in form remain in the organic law as a part thereof. It can only be said that in the case of the constitutional amendment, the fact of its opposition to a former provision and the intent to displace it by the amendment adopted must be so plainly shown by the provisions themselves that there can be no rational doubt in regard to it. I think these conditions are entirely filled by the proof showing the adoption of the amendments to section 1 of article 2, and to section 5 of article 3. I have no manner of doubt that the people intended by the adoption of these amendments to effectually blot out all distinctions of a political nature between white and colored persons, and I think these amendments taken in connection with the sections as they stood before amendment clearly show that such intention has been effectually accomplished so far as the Constitution is concerned.

In other words, the question of whether an amendment to the Constitution repeals by implication an existing provision is a question of whether the newer provision "is antagonistic to" the older provision. Although comparing the specificity of an amendment to an older provision can sometimes aid in answering that question, it can only do so when it is in service of determining whether there is an antagonism between the two provisions. Certainly, a broad prohibition on certain discriminatory behavior by the government must, by implication, repeal older provisions of the Constitution engaging in that same discriminatory behavior regarding a specific issue.

In fact, we have numerous examples in the U.S. Constitution of amendments of different levels of abstraction (i.e., both specific and broad provisions) implicitly repealing older provisions of varying levels of abstraction. Section two of the Fourteenth implicitly overrode article I, § 2, clause 3 (Three Fifths Compromise), without the latter being explicitly repealed. Article I, § 3, clauses 1-2 of the U.S. Constitution proclaim that state legislatures "shall" select members of the Senate, while the Seventeenth Amendment provides for the election of senators by the people, overriding by implication their selection by state legislatures. The Nineteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote. This implicitly overrode that part of section two of the Fourteenth Amendment allowing for the reduction of representation in the House of Representatives to those states who deny males, but not females, 21 years of age the right to vote.

Admittedly, some amendments in the U.S. Constitution are written in levels of abstraction similar to the provisions that they have implicitly repealed. But that is not true for all implicit repeals in our federal Constitution. Like the ERA, some amendments that have implicitly repealed existing provisions of the U.S. Constitution are conceptually far broader than the provisions they have implicitly repealed. For example, the U.S. Constitution still states, in a clause entitled "Fugitive Slaves," that "[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due" (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3). Plainly, the Fugitive Slaves Clause is narrower in scope than the far broader provision that has implicitly repealed it: the Thirteenth Amendment.

As Professor Michael L. Smith explains in his article "Constitutional Interpretation and Zombie Provisions,"

"The Constitution does not contain the word 'slavery,' but these provisions reflect the existence of slavery in founding-era America and the compromises reached by the framers of the Constitution to allow the institution of slavery to persist. Though the Thirteenth Amendment was later enacted to prohibit slavery (with a significant exception for those being punished for crimes), and though the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments set forth rights to equal protection and prohibitions on barring people from voting based on race, those amendments did not strike out or remove slavery-related provisions from the text of the Constitution itself. They remain, perpetually, as zombie provisions—their text overshadowing the gradual, troubled efforts of implementing the ideals of freedom, equality, and suffrage set forth in the text of the Reconstruction Amendments" (40 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 603 [2024]).

The Fugitive Slaves Clause is no longer effective because the 13th Amendment outlaws slavery. That is true despite the prohibition against slavery in the 13th Amendment governing a far broader scope of behavior than the Fugitive Slaves Clause. As a general rule, a broad provision prohibiting all discrimination based on a suspect classification should repeal implicitly earlier provisions endorsing that discrimination in specific contexts.

This comparison of the 13th Amendment and the Fugitive Slaves Clause demonstrates that it is not merely the similarity in the breadth of two constitutional provisions that leads to implicit repeal. It is the repugnancy of the older provision to the amendment that causes an implicit repeal. Or, put another way, it is the antagonism of the amendment to an already existing provision that results in the provision's implicit repeal.

This of course might lead one to believe that we should hold that the ERA has implicitly repealed the mandatory retirement age in VI, § 25 (b). The problem is that unlike many other suspect classifications—such as race, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and pregnancy status—the reality of our mortality creates a compelling governmental interest in ensuring that at some point in the process of natural human decline there comes an age where we can reasonably say that judges should not continue to serve in that capacity.

Engaging in the legal fiction, as our precedent requires, of imagining that the two provisions were enacted at the same time, the mandatory retirement age appears eminently sound if we view the provision from the vantage point of the delegates in 1869. A man born in New York that year who lived long enough to turn 41 in 1910 would on average die by the time he was between 67 and 68 years of age, not even age 70 (see James W. Glover, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Life Tables 1890, 1901, 1920, and 1901-1910, at 162, available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life1890-1910.pdf [last accessed June 2, 2026]). It is hard to say that from the framers' point of view a 70-year-old age limit for judges would be repulsive to the ERA.

I posit that it is not the fact of a mandatory retirement age that is repulsive to the ERA. What concerns some about the retirement age is that it has not kept up with the times. Unlike race, sex, etc.—where laws discriminating against people on those bases are wholly contrary to our ideas of equality—age restrictions are judged by the degree of their discrimination. There are certainly age restrictions that people who voted for the ERA would support: e.g., voting age, driving age, or drinking age. When a legally mandated age restriction is discriminatory, it is so because of the degree of the restriction (set at either too high or too low of an age), it is not because there should never be age restrictions.

This leaves us at an impasse. We cannot rewrite this section of the Constitution to eliminate any age restriction, because we cannot say that, even today, there is no mandatory retirement age for judges that would pass heightened scrutiny. We also cannot insert into the Constitution a retirement age that we believe is appropriate. It is the exclusive job of the people and their representatives to decide what the proper mandatory retirement age should be. Thus, for petitioners, there is no remedy that can be had without this Court performing a role that goes beyond its constitutionally delegated function. For that reason, there is no remedy available to petitioners from this Court, inasmuch as petitioners have not presented sufficient proof that the ERA is antagonistic to article VI, § 25 (b), so as to overcome the presumption against implied repeal. I agree with the majority's reasoning to that effect (see majority op at 8-13). As a result, the remedy for petitioners' complaint is solely in the hands of the people of this State and their representatives. Only the people can amend the Constitution. If there is to be a change to the mandatory retirement age for certain judges and justices, it must be made by the people as a whole, not by the judges of this Court.

That said, I write this concurrence to expound on the majority's reasoning today in deciding this difficult case. We should not simply pay lip service to legal doctrines that are more complex than the majority lets on. Doing so fails to take seriously the rights created by the ERA. This case was an opportunity for the Court to state definitively that the ERA amended the Civil Rights Clause to create rights that can be enforced without the need to resort to some other source. That would have allowed the people of this State to remain confident in the protections against discrimination that they voted into our Constitution. Instead, the majority chooses to delay the promise of the ERA and to roll out its protections slowly "with all deliberate speed" (Brown II, 349 US 294 [1955]). In the meantime, litigants, most of whom never make it to this Court, may be subject to interpretations by lower courts that are demonstrably wrong, inasmuch as those lower courts may not recognize the self-executing nature of the Civil Rights Clause, as amended by the ERA. That is unfortunate.

Order affirmed, without costs. Per Curiam Opinion. Judges Rivera, Garcia, Cannataro and Halligan concur. Judge Troutman concurs in result in an opinion. Chief Judge Wilson and Judge Singas took no part.

Decided June 18, 2026

Footnotes

Footnote 1

The mandatory retirement age provision was moved to article VI, § 12 in 1894, to article VI, § 19 in 1925, and lastly in 1961, to where it is currently found in article VI, § 25 (b).

Footnote 2

OCA administratively enforces the judicial retirement and certification requirements. OCA appeared in this case only to oppose petitioners' request for preliminary injunctive relief and has taken no position on the merits of petitioners' claims.

Footnote 3

Judiciary Law § 23 states, "No person shall hold the office of judge, justice or surrogate of any court, whether of record or not of record, except a justice of the peace of a town or police justice of a village, longer than until and including the last day of December next after [they] shall be seventy years of age, except that a judge or justice in office or elected or appointed to office at the effective date of this section, as to whom no provision limiting [their] right to hold office to the close of the year following his attaining the age of seventy years was applicable prior to the effective date of this section, may continue in office during the term for which [they] w[ere] elected or appointed." Judiciary Law § 115 sets forth a certification system for retired Justices of the Supreme Court. The statute provides that any Supreme Court justice, retired pursuant to article 6, § 25 (b) of the State Constitution, must satisfy an administrative board certification process in which they demonstrate their mental and physical capacity in order to continue serving on the bench. The certification is valid for only three renewable terms of two years. A certified judge or justice may serve in office no longer than the last calendar day in which they reach the age of seventy-six. Our holding on this appeal renders academic petitioners' Judiciary Law claims.

Footnote 4

Because we reach the same conclusion, we have no occasion, unlike the concurrence, to address petitioners' remaining issues (see concurring op at 2, 9-10, 13-16, 21-23).

Footnote 5

Even though members of this Court may be affected by the outcome of this matter, we are required to hear and dispose of this appeal under the Rule of Necessity, "inasmuch as this [C]ourt has exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution to hear this appeal (art VI, § 3, subd b, par [1]) and no other judicial body exists to which this appeal could be referred for disposition" (seeMaresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242, 247 n 1 [1984]).

Workers’ Comp 202 – a webinar addressing best practices to access benefits for workers, scheduled by the New York State Office of the Advocate for Injured Workers

2026-06-22T09:00:00.000-04:00

The New York State Workers Compensation Board has announced that it will continue its Internet webinar series on June 24, 2026 for workers and their advocates, and there is still time to register!

This presentation will cover:

understanding labor market attachment,
details on benefit periods and how benefit rates are calculated,
the importance of items such as the degree of disability and the Carrier Continue Payments (CCP) order,
how advocates can help workers and comply with privacy provisions,
The Board’s New York Medical Treatment Guidelines, and more!

The session, to be held Wednesday, June 24, 2026 12:00 p.m. – 1:30 p.m., is free and there will be time for your questions.

Register here

More information visit the Advocate for Injured Workers section of the Board’s website for additional resources.

You can also call the Advocate for Injured Workers at (877) 632-4996 or email advinjwkr@wcb.ny.gov.

Having trouble? If you are having trouble registering for or attending this webinar, check out these Webinar FAQs.

Selected Internet blog posts for the week ending June 19, 2026

2026-06-20T09:00:00.000-04:00

The 2026 State of Online Payments This sixth annual report delivers essential insights into how, when, and why Americans are paying their bills digitally. DOWNLOAD

Capital Planning in the Public Sector: Constraints, Community and Countermeasures This guide examines how state and local governments approach capital planning when budgets are constrained and infrastructure needs continue to grow. DOWNLOAD

Making AI Work for Government Too much of AI's potential is scattered among narrow tools. A better and more sustainable approach builds AI into workflows and applications across a technology stack -- putting AI wherever people need it. This paper explains the "four pillars" approach to civic automation and why it results in more effective and responsible solutions for government. DOWNLOAD

4 Essential Steps for Building Scalable Transportation Infrastructure Transportation agencies must meet rising data demands, strengthen cyber resilience and prepare for AI—all with aging infrastructure and constrained budgets. This paper outlines four practical steps to build a scalable foundation, from standardizing infrastructure and unifying data to stabilizing costs and enabling advanced analytics. DOWNLOAD

What it Takes to Build Resilient Government Websites This paper shows state and local governments how to build more resilient websites with modern WebOps, clear governance, stronger content practices and a focus on accessibility—so critical information stays secure, accurate and available when residents need it. DOWNLOAD

Think Like a Fraudster, Adapt Like an Expert Identity fraud is a growing threat to government services. This handbook explains major fraud types, core principles of identity verification and the fraudster mindset, giving leaders practical guidance to prevent fraud and stay ahead of evolving tactics. DOWNLOAD

Why Identity Is Now Core HHS Infrastructure For HHS agencies, identity verification is no longer a support function. This paper explains how modern identity platforms give agencies a consistent, risk-based way to verify new applicants and returning beneficiaries. DOWNLOAD

Building the Foundation for AI Growth As AI adoption grows across government, many agencies are discovering that existing IT infrastructure was not designed to support the power, capacity, and performance demands of AI workloads. This paper explores best practices for building infrastructure that can support AI at scale. DOWNLOAD

Application submitted to New York State's Commissioner of Education seeking to reopen an appeal earlier decided by the Commissioner rejected

2026-06-18T09:00:00.000-04:00

Petitioner sought to have the New York State Commissioner of Education reopen Decision Commissioner No. 18,682, which dismissed Petitioner's appeal from a determination of a Board of Education involving the Petitioner's application seeking an appointment to a position with the school district. Commissioner Betty A. Rosa ruled that Petitioner's application must be denied.

Pointing out §276.8 of the Commissioner’s regulations governs reopening a prior decision of the Commissioner and provides that applications to reopen are addressed solely by the Commissioner and are reopened at the discretion of the Commissioner, Dr. Rosa explained that an application to reopen a Decision of the Commissioner require a showing that:

(1) The original decision was rendered under a misapprehension as to the facts; and, or

(2) There is new and material evidence that was not available at the time the original decision was made.

In addition, Commissioner Rosa said that an application to reopen may not:

1. Advance previously undeveloped factual assertions and arguments;

2. Advance new legal arguments, or

3. Merely seek to reargue issues presented in the prior appeal.

Explaining that Petitioner had not met the standard for reopening the appeal as the underlying appeal was dismissed as premature since, "at the time it was commenced [Petitioner] remained an eligible candidate for an open position" with school district nor has Petitioner presented evidence that this conclusion rested upon a “misapprehension of fact” nor produced “new and material evidence” that would support a different outcome.

Dr. Rosa opined that it appears that Petitioner seeks to challenge school district's subsequent selection of a different candidate for the appointment to the position in question. Any challenge to this “discrete act,” however, “would have to be the subject of a new appeal under Education Law §310”.

Accordingly, the Commissioner concluded that Petitioner had not established grounds to reopen the appeal in accordance with the standard set forth in 8 NYCRR 276.8.

Click HERE to access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State's Department of Labor reports its proposed Repealing Outdated and Obsolete Regulations in the New York State Register dated June 17, 2026

2026-06-17T15:00:00.000-04:00

The New York State Department of Labor has proposed repealing its rules listed below, which it describes as being "Outdated and Obsolete Regulations":

I.D. No. LAB-24-26-00009-P

PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE State Administrative Procedure Act, NOTICE is hereby given of the following proposed rule:

Proposed Action: This is a consensus rule making to repeal Parts 12, 36, 38, 50, 82, 175, 176, 185, 187, ch. II, subchapter A, ch. IV, subchapter C, ch. IX, subchapter B, chs. XIII and XIV; amend ch. IX of Title 12 NYCRR. Statutory authority: Labor Law, section 21(11) Subject: EXPRESS NY - Repealing outdated and obsolete regulations.

Purpose: This rulemaking would repeal outdated and obsolete regulations, thereby streamlining compliance for regulated parties.

Text of proposed rule:

Parts 12, 36, 38, and 50 of Subchapter A of Chapter I of Title 12 of the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) are repealed.

Part 82 of Subchapter C of Chapter I of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Subchapter A of Chapter II of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Parts 175 and 176 of Subchapter D of Chapter II of Title 12 of the NYCRR are repealed.

Parts 185 and 187 of Subchapter E of Chapter II of Title 12 of the NYCRR are repealed.

Subchapter C of Chapter IV of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Subchapter B of Chapter IX of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Chapter XIII of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Chapter XIV of Title 12 of the NYCRR is repealed.

Chapter IX of Title 12 of the NYCRR is amended to read as follows:

Chapter IX. [Manpower Services Division] Apprenticeship and Training

Text of proposed rule and any required statements and analyses may be obtained from: Andrew Schutts, Department of Labor, 1200 Washington Ave., Building 12, Suite 509, (518) 485-2191, email: regulations@labor.ny.gov

Data, views or arguments may be submitted to: Same as above.

Public comment will be received until: 60 days after publication of this notice.

This rule was not under consideration at the time this agency submitted its Regulatory Agenda for publication in the Register.

Consensus Rule Making Determination

The Department of Labor has determined that no person is likely to object to this rulemaking. The basis for this determination is that this rulemaking repeals regulations that are obsolete and that the Department of Labor does not and cannot use. This means that the only effect of this rulemaking would be to reorganize the Department of Labor’s regulations, which would benefit regulated parties, the public, and the Department of Labor.

Job Impact Statement A Job Impact Statement is not required because the Department of Labor has determined that this rulemaking would not have a substantial adverse impact on jobs and employment opportunities.

This rulemaking repeals outdated and obsolete regulations that the Department of Labor does not and cannot use. Because the Department of Labor does not and cannot use the regulations being repealed, this rulemaking would have no adverse impact on jobs and employment opportunities.

Police Department declined to give a retiring police office his badge and, or, "a good guy letter" affirming his right to carry a firearm upon his retirement

2026-06-17T09:00:00.000-04:00

A New York State Supreme Court Judge denied Plaintiff's CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a court order annulling a New York City Police Department [NYPD] decision not to issue Plaintiff, a NYPD retiring police officer, his badge and, or, a "good guy letter" affirming his right to carry a firearm upon his retirement from NYPD. The Court, however, granted NYPD's cross-motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's petition as untimely and dismissed the Article 78 proceeding.

Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling, but the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's decision. Plaintiff subsequently applied for a retiree handgun license, which NYPD denied because Plaintiff did not have a "good guy letter".

Citing Matter of Baloy v Kelly, 92 AD3d 521 and other New York State court decisions, the Appellate Division noted that NYPD's written denial of Plaintiff's application was a "final and binding" determination and the four-month statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, upon Plaintiff's receipt of the denial. In addition, the Appellate Division's decision notes that the possibility of Plaintiff obtaining administrative relief had been exhausted when Plaintiff retired "without a change in his [modified] duty status".

The Appellate Division then pointed out that although Plaintiff had sent NYPD a written request for reconsideration of NYPD's determination, to NYPD which had not respond, that communication did not extend the statute of limitations nor did the letter "give rise to a proceeding for mandamus to compel NYPD 'to perform its duty'" (see CPLR 217 [1]).

Noting that Plaintiff did not assert any clear legal right to a good guy letter, which NYPD declined to issue in its exercise of its discretion, the Appellate Division held Petitioner "cannot circumvent the statute of limitations by demanding that [NYPD] change its determination and seeking mandamus to compel [it so do] when that demand is refused".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Appellate Division sustains a Supreme Court's dismissal of a matter involving New York States Open Meeting Law as untimely

2026-06-16T09:00:00.000-04:00

Plaintiffs in this action sought a judgment in a New York State Supreme Court declaring that a New York State Incorporated Village, its Mayor and other Village Officials[Village] and other non-Village defendants violated New York State's Open Meetings Law*. The Supreme Court held Plaintiffs' action was "time barred' and granted separate motions submitted by [1] the Village's and [2] the defendant New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, [New Cingular] seeking summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. Supreme Court then denied the Plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's decision and ordered Plaintiffs' pay costs to the Village and to New Cingular.

Plaintiffs, residents of the Village, challenge the Village's adoption of Village Resolution 20-27 authorizing the Village's mayor to negotiate a lease with the defendant New Cingular to permit the installation of a wireless facility on Village-owned land. Ultimately the lease was adopted by the Village's Board and three resolutions were adopted at public meeting. The meeting minutes were later approved and published.

Plaintiffs brought an Article 78 action contending that the Board held secret evening meetings, during which competing proposals were discussed and that the lease was effectively approved during these meetings prior to the public vote. Defendants maintain that the cause of action based on alleged violations of the Open Meetings Law was time-barred.

Although Defendants acknowledged that representatives of the Village and New Cingular met privately, the Defendants argued that this was not in violation of the Open Meetings Law as no quorum of the Board was present at such meetings and the Board took no official action during any nonpublic meeting. Supreme Court granted the Defendants' separate motions, concluding, among other things, that the cause of action alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law was time-barred and denied the Plaintiffs' cross-motion. The Plaintiffs appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower Court's decision, explaining that:

1. "In enacting the Open Meetings Law, the Legislature sought to ensure that public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of and able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy";

2. A "[m]eeting" is defined as 'the official convening of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business', citing Public Officers Law §102[1]";

3. A "'Public body' means any entity, for which a quorum is required to conduct public business";

4. An "[e]xecutive session is 'that portion of a meeting not open to the general public";

5. 'The statute does not apply only to formal or regular meetings, but to any gathering or meeting of a quorum of a public body for the purpose of transacting public business"; and

6. "An aggrieved person has standing to commence a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 or an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief".

Addressing the issue of the timeliness of Plaintiff's Article 78, the Appellate Division observed although typically a proceeding against a body or officer pursuant to CPLR Article 78 must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding. The Open Meetings Law, however, provides "[t]he statute of limitations in an article seventy-eight proceeding with respect to an action taken at executive session shall commence to run from the date the minutes of such executive session have been made available to the public" and the defendant who seeks dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations "bears the initial burden of proving, prima facie, that the time in which to commence an action has expired".

If the defendant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations or whether the statute of limitations has been tolled.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "... the defendants established, prima facie, that the cause of action alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law was untimely". As an initial matter, although Plaintiffs brought their legal challenge as an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the substance of the action is a challenge to the actions of a municipal body, alleging failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Open Meetings Law. As Plaintiff's "legal challenge could have been brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, the four-month statute of limitations applies".

The Appellate Division said that "Defendants met their initial burden and demonstrated that the action was not commenced within the four-month limitations period under CPLR 217(1) and demonstrated that the municipal determination at issue became final and binding no later than December 2020 and that no meetings attended by a quorum of the Board occurred prior to this date. Therefore, this action was not timely commenced".

As Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact and failed to provide evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact or to support their contention that the alleged secret meetings constitute executive sessions and, as a result, the four-month limitations period has not yet begun to run ... relying "on hearsay allegations suggesting that such unauthorized meetings took place", Plaintiffs rely on "mere conjecture that any such meeting was attended by a quorum of the Board" and "failed to identify any specific executive session at which any official actions were taken or during which the lease was actually approved".

As Plaintiffs failed to establish that minutes of such executive session were created but not made available to the public, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly determined that the cause of action alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law is time-barred under CPLR 217(1)".

* See New York State Public Officers Law Article 7.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Seeking court approval to proceed with the proposed litigation as a class action

2026-06-15T09:00:00.000-04:00

In this action seeking to recover damages for alleged violations of Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107, Plaintiffs appeal a Supreme Court order that denied the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification filed pursuant to CPLR Article 9. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court' denial of Plaintiffs' motion.

The Plaintiffs, New York City Police Captains of Asian descent, had not receive "discretionary promotions to the rank of Deputy Inspector" during the period September 27, 2018 through the present date. Plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Police Department [NYPD] denied them and the members of the putative class discretionary promotions beyond the rank of Captain due to their race in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law.

The Appellate Division explained that the proponent of a motion for class certification bears the burden of meeting the requirements of §901 of CPLR Article 9, which set out the five prerequisites for obtaining class certification:

1. Numerosity;

2. Commonality;

3. Typicality;

4. Adequacy of representation; and

5. Superiority.

Although the Appellate Division opined that these requirements "are to be liberally construed in keeping with the goals of CPLR Article 9", its decision, citing Yonkers Contr. Co. v Romano Enters. of N.Y., 304 AD2d 657, noted that "A class action certification must be founded upon an evidentiary basis", and observed that "Whether the facts presented on a motion for class certification satisfy the statutory criteria is within the sound discretion of the trial court"*.

Further, the Appellate Division's decision notes that it "is vested with the same discretionary power and may exercise that power, even when there has been no abuse of discretion as a matter of law by the nisi prius court" and, citing Pludeman v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 74 AD3d 420, opined that "Conclusory assertions are insufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria."

In the words of the Appellate Division "... even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs demonstrated that "there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members", Plaintiffs' conclusory assertions that the class action "seeks widespread, systematic reform" were insufficient to establish that "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy".

The Appellate Division then observed that "the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the [Plaintiffs'] motion pursuant to CPLR article 9 for class certification".

* Also sometimes referred to as the nisi prius court.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected Internet blog posts for the week ending June 12, 2026

2026-06-13T09:00:00.000-04:00

2026 AI Risk and Readiness Report Most organizations are making decisions about AI security without a full picture of how it’s being used across their environment. Based on new data from over 1,200 cybersecurity professionals, this report highlights where those visibility gaps commonly exist and what they mean for managing data and risk. DOWNLOAD

Making Sense of AI in Public Services AI is reshaping public service delivery, but not every AI tool is built for the same purpose. This guide helps public sector leaders evaluate generative AI, chatbots, and agentic AI to identify the right fit for citizen-facing services. DOWNLOAD

Delivering Early Wins With 39 gubernatorial elections set for fall 2026, navigating change is a crucial skill for state CIOs. This paper explores how CIOs can deliver fast and visible wins that align with policy priorities of incoming administrations. It offers advice for using existing technology platforms and partners to show quick progress while building a foundation for longer-term modernization. DOWNLOAD

Deferred Maintenance and Its Impact on Communities This eBook examines the problem of deferred maintenance for America's infrastructure, considers ways to identify deferred maintenance issues early and explores options for addressing them quickly. DOWNLOAD

Earning Constituent Trust as Payments Evolve A practical guide for local governments to build trust in digital payments by improving security, accessibility, and user experience. DOWNLOAD

Redefining Government Efficiency State and local efficiency initiatives are going beyond cost control. While savings clearly matter, a growing number of these efforts also seek to connect spending to outcomes, increase institutional capacity, and improve the responsiveness and usability of resident services. This report examines how the concept of government efficiency is evolving and offers examples of what these trends look like in practice. DOWNLOAD

From AI Data Centers to AI Factories: Building the Foundation for AI Growth As AI adoption grows across government, many agencies are discovering that existing IT infrastructure was not designed to support the power, capacity, and performance demands of AI workloads. This paper explores best practices for building infrastructure that can support AI at scale. DOWNLOAD

Making Sense of AI in Public Services A practical guide for public sector leaders choosing between generative AI tools, chatbots, and agentic AI. DOWNLOAD

Cable Is Expanding Choice Across Broadband and Mobile Cable providers now compete across broadband and mobile, giving households more ways to combine services and reduce monthly bills. Learn more

Audits of the New York State Municipal and School entities listed below released by the New York State Comptroller

2026-06-12T09:00:00.000-04:00

On June 9, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli posted audits of the local government and school entities listed below on the Internet.

Click on the text highlighted in COLOR to access the audit.

Glen Cove City School District – Information Technology (Nassau County) District officials did not adequately manage network user accounts. As of May 2025, 296 of the district’s 1,104 enabled nonstudent network user accounts were not needed and should have been disabled. Six unneeded network user accounts also had administrative permissions. Unneeded user accounts are additional entry points into the network and, if compromised by an attacker, could be used to inappropriately access the network, make unauthorized changes to records or deny legitimate access to the network and records.

Levittown Union Free School District – Information Technology (Nassau County) District officials did not adequately manage nonstudent network accounts and permissions. As a result, the district had an increased risk of unauthorized access to its network and systems, which could lead to the loss of data and network resources.

Middlesex Hose Company, Inc. – Fundraising (Yates County) Company officials did not ensure that fundraising collections were properly recorded, reported and safeguarded. As a result, the executive committee did not have reliable information to oversee fundraising activities, and the company had an increased risk that fundraising collections could be lost or stolen without detection.

Wrights Corners Fire Company, Inc. – Treasurer’s Records and Reports (Niagara County) The treasurer did not maintain complete financial records or record transactions in a timely manner. The treasurer also did not record financial activity with sufficient detail, including the source of deposits and purpose of disbursements, or prepare and submit accurate financial reports, bank reconciliations and budget status reports to the executive board monthly. More than $1.1 million in checks were recorded in the accounting records, on average, 59 days after receipt.

Eldred Central School District – Building Access (Orange County/Sullivan County) District officials did not properly manage and monitor building access accounts and devices. Specifically, the district had active but unneeded accounts with assigned access badges in the system. As a result, there was an increased risk of unauthorized access to school buildings, potentially compromising the security and safety of students, teachers, staff and visitors.

Village of Wappingers Falls – Audit Follow-Up (Dutchess County) The purpose of the review was to assess the village’s progress in implementing recommendations from the prior audit, Village of Wappingers Falls – Board Oversight, released in December 2023. That audit determined village officials did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations and capital projects. Auditors found that the board did not make progress implementing recommendations related to oversight of financial operations and banking transactions or monitoring capital projects. Of the report’s 13 recommendations, village officials implemented one recommendation, partially implemented one recommendation and did not implement 11 recommendations.

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New York State court judges fall within the broad definition of public servant

2026-06-11T09:00:00.000-04:00

A Grand Jury in a New York State County issued a report pursuant to New York State's Criminal Procedures Law [CPL] §190.85(1)(a) recommending the removal of a City Court Judge [CCJ] from the bench for misconduct or non-feasance in public office.

The County Court accepted the Grand Jury's report and ordered it sealed pending the determination of the CCJ's appeal of the County Court's decision to the Appellate Division pursuant to CPL §190.90, in which the CCJ contended that the New York Commission on Judicial Conduct (CJC) has exclusive jurisdiction to review and make determinations regarding the conduct of members of the judiciary.

The Appellate Division rejected the CCJ's jurisdication argument, explaining that the statutory framework provided by the CPL permits a grand jury to issue a report to the county court concerning "misconduct, non-feasance or neglect in public office by a public servant as the basis for a recommendation of removal or disciplinary action". Citing CPL §190.85 [1] [a], the Appellate Division noted that New York State Court Judges fall within the broad definition of a" public servant".

The Appellate Division also rejected the CCJ's contention that the report should remain sealed after the Appellate Division's determination is handed down.

The Appellate Division opined that "the provisions of the Judiciary Law related to the confidentiality of CJC proceedings apply only to matters before the CJC" and not to matters such as those in the instant appeal from a decision by a County Court where the report and the order must be sealed by the lower court pending the determination of the CCJ's appeal by the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division, in light of its affirmance of the County Court order accepting the Grand Jury's report, concluded that the order and the report in issue must be made public.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

New York State's Comptroller releases municipal audit

2026-06-10T09:00:00.000-04:00

On June 10, 2026, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced that the following local government audits were issued.

Click on the TEXT highlighted in color to access the audit posted on the Internet.

Rushville Hose Company, Inc. – Financial Oversight (Ontario County) The board and membership did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations, enforce the financial provisions in the company’s bylaws, or adopt detailed, written bylaws to provide guidance to the treasurer for recording and reporting financial transactions. The board did not ensure that the treasurer’s financial duties were adequately segregated and did not monitor the treasurer’s work to provide compensating controls. As a result, unsupported and unapproved disbursements were made, and the company had an increased risk that errors and irregularities could go undetected and uncorrected, which could result in theft, waste and abuse of company resources.

Town of Middlesex – Board Oversight – Code Enforcement Revenues (Yates County) The board did not ensure that all code enforcement revenues were accurately billed, collected, deposited, recorded and reported. The board also did not develop written policies and procedures to provide guidance for the code enforcement function, and the former code enforcement officer did not bill for or collect all code enforcement revenues due to the town.

Machias Fire District – Financial Operations (Cattaraugus County) The board and treasurer did not properly manage the district’s financial operations. As a result, the board and treasurer hindered their ability to make informed financial decisions, assess the district’s financial standing and properly plan for the future. This mismanagement diminished transparency and accountability and increased the risk of financial errors, loss, waste and fraud.

Town of Butternuts – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Otsego County) The board conducted an audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024 through an audit committee, not by the entire board as required. The audit committee did not maintain supporting documentation to show the extent of the work performed or the results of the audit and identify that certain records maintained by the supervisor were not complete, accurate and reliable. The supervisor also did not prepare and file the 2020 through 2024 annual financial reports with DiNapoli’s office, as required by state law. The supervisor did not provide the board with complete, accurate and reliable monthly financial reports.

Tioga Fire District – Audit Follow-Up (Tioga County) The purpose of the review was to assess the district’s progress in implementing recommendations in the prior audit Tioga Fire District – Board Oversight (2022M-170), released in January 2023. The audit determined that the board did not always provide adequate oversight of district financial activities and did not complete mandatory fiscal oversight training. District officials did not implement any of the audit’s seven recommendations.

Eaton No.1 Fire District – Audit Follow-Up (Madison County) The purpose the review was to assess the district’s progress in implementing recommendations in the prior audit Eaton No.1 Fire District – Board Oversight (2024M-4), released in May 2024. The audit determined that district officials did not adequately monitor financial activities or maintain appropriate records and reports. Of the audit report’s 13 recommendations, officials fully implemented two recommendations, partially implemented eight and did not implement three.

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