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U.S.-NATO ABM Missile System “Covers” a Large Part of Russian Territory

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Sun, 11 Dec 2011 01:31:00 +0000

U.S.-NATO ABM Missile System “Covers” a Large Part of Russian Territory

It is inadmissible for Russia NATO’s missile defence to cover the part of its territory, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said after a session of the Russia-NATO Council on Thursday.

At the same time, Lavrov said that a new radar, which would be deployed in Turkey within missile defence, would control the most part of the Russian territory.

“If this radar was necessary to monitor the south and an area to the south of the territory of NATO members, such radar exists – it functions and watches the area from where the threat comes from, according to American and NATO colleagues,” the minister noted.

He stressed, “When a radar is deployed in Turkey, it will double the existing radar and watch a considerable part of Russian territory.”

Turkey and the United States signed a memorandum on the deployment of a radar in Turkey within missile defence in September. The radar will be deployed in Kurecik, south-east of Turkey. Kurecik in Malatya province lies 435 miles west of the Iranian border.

In September, Pentagon spokesman Colonel Dave Lapan said the U.S. hoped to have the radar deployed there by the end of the year.

NATO members agreed to an anti-missile system over Europe…at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal last year…

Under the NATO plans, a limited system of US anti-missile interceptors and radars already planned for Europe – to include interceptors in Romania and Poland as well as the radar in Turkey – would be linked to an expanded European-owned missile defences. That would create a broad system that protected every NATO country against medium-range missile attack.

INTEL: Global Military Space : MilsatMagazine

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 08:55:00 +0000

INTEL: Global Military Space : MilsatMagazine:

INTEL: Global Military Space
by Futron

One of the most widely appreciated analysis firms with a 20-year track record is Futron. The Company provides premier Decision Management Solutions and products to a variety of complex technology industries. Futron offers architectures and solutions that transform data into valuable intelligence for informed decisions, to substantially improve judgments in business, program, and project management and engineering. We thank Futron for allowing us to reprint one of the most critical segments of their recently published 2009 Space Competitiveness Index (SCI) — Global Military Space. Again, this is but one single index within their exhaustive report.

This year’s report greatly expands upon their landmark and inaugural 2008 study and examines, in greater depth, 10 nations currently leading in space and space-related activity: Brazil, Canada, China, Europe (considered as a single entity), India, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index evaluates these nations across 50 individual metrics that represent the underlying economic determinants of space competitiveness in three major dimensions: government, human capital, and industry.

GLOBAL MILITARY SPACE
Militaries and intelligence forces fully realize the value of space capability and consequently, invest significant resources in developing and utilizing space-based assets. The clearest validation of its importance is the sheer number of military or dual-use satellites — 232 out of a total 903 satellites at the end of 2008. Investment in military space also drives innovation, research and development of new space technology. As a case in point, the procurement by the U.S. military of so-called communications on the move (COTM) products and services has resulted in technological innovation that is now migrating into civilian and commercial applications. Protecting these technologies via export controls has evolved into a controversial tug-of-war between the need to project technological advantage and the need for continued R&D and the generation of product sales. Just as the debate of U.S. export controls heats up, Israel, a leading exporter of defense and space products, has introduced new export regime.

For many countries, spending on military space outpaces investment in civilian and commercial activities; in other segments such as launch, PNT and Earth observation, platforms are dual-use in nature. Since military space spending continues to constitute a significant portion of space investment, organizational resources, and governmental focus, the purpose of the Global Military Space Competitiveness Index is to understand and quantify the relative position of military activities of leading space powers.

Military programs and assets provide distinct force-multiplying capabilities to armed forces, and, consequently, military organizations worldwide have steadily increased reliance on space assets for communications, surveillance, and tracking. This increased usage can create asymmetric threats whereby a weaker power or near-peer could exploit the space dependence of its stronger adversary as a force equalizer.

Given the importance of military space, understanding the relative positioning of a country’s military space program — from strategy and doctrine to spending, technology, and assets — is a critcal component to understanding a country’s relative space competitiveness overall.

The interaction between the military space sector and its civilian and commercial counterparts is multifaceted and varies from country to country. In addition to its pure national security benefits, military space can also facilitate development of the commercial and civil space sectors both directly and indirectly.

Military space investment can also yield advantages in other areas of national space competitiveness, including advanced technology development and the creation of spin-off industries such as GPS and imagery services. Increasingly, militaries and intelligence forces seek partnerships and collaboration — both domestically across government agencies as well as via international joint assets, interoperability, and sharing information outputs. This trend in military doctrine supports the broader belief that space must be recognized as and treated as a shared resource, e.g., a global commons. The growing issue of space debris, as highlighted by the first-ever collision of satellites in early 2009, now poses a strategic military threat. As a result, governments will seek to identify a solution that spans military, civilian and commercials users. Related, is the need for enhanced space situational awareness. When combined with tighter militaries could offset costs and optimize military space capability through increased reliance on international relationships and more partnering with friends and allies.

Military space has recently received renewed attention. The prospect of anti-satellite weapons has moved to the forefront since China (in early 2007) and the United States (in early 2008) deployed missile technology to destroy satellites. These activities, considered alongside the unprecedented use of space to support war fighting by the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, have caused officials the world over to take notice. Meanwhile, countries in all regions continue to fund and develop systems to boost their own ability to compete in the global military space segment. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative assessments, this section of Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index provides a focused analysis of the comparative positions of the 10 leading space participant nations in the global military space segment. The analysis identifies the current key trends underlying military space competitiveness as follows:

The U.S. leadership in military space remains significant based on a significant head start, large budgets, organizational capacity, asset base and capability
U.S. military space leadership position will likely be reduced as near-peer challengers Russia and China continue to commit increased resources for military space
The U.S. could offset the gains of near-peer rivals by developing and deepening military relationships with friendly governments and allies, particularly with Europe, Japan and India
Passage of Japan’s new space law, when combined with North Korean ballistic activity will result in increase focused on military space
Europe has codified a coordinated military defense regime, which in the near-term could result in increased collaboration through and with NATO
India has procured new military space assets from Israel and, continues to institutionalize military space doctrine and command structure
Israel has emerged as the leading provider of Indian military space technology (and indeed a variety of military technology exports)
To reduce vulnerability from anti-satellite weapons, blinding, and orbital debris, there will be near term development and procurement of technologies related to space situational awareness, “hardening” technology, and directed energy weapons
Other “winning” military space technologies include COTM, Earth observation for intelligence and counter-terrorism, and the integration such as sensor networks and unmanned vehicles on the ground, air and sea
Political and economic limits reinforce military reliance on the commercial and private sector for a broadening array of military space services, and within U.S. and European spheres a large proportion of military space technology is derived from the private sector

Futron seeks to use this focused segment analysis as a baseline for ongoing discussions regarding the relative competitive positions of national military space actors.

About The Global Military Space Segment Index
Futron’s Military Space Index currently employs three drivers to compare military space power among the 10 leading space participant countries. In subsequent versions of its Space Competitiveness Index, Futron will add additional metrics as more data becomes available or unclassified. We welcome feedback and suggestions on specific additional indicators.
Together, the three metrics listed next provide a high-level perspective into how national military space actors use their resources to maximize competitiveness. These three metrics are:

Military Budget: The amount of money allocated for military space activity within a country’s national budget (adjusted for PPP), which offers a relative ranking based on a quantitative measure of the resources made available for military space activity. Military Budget is weighted at 40 percent of the model findings
Military Doctrine and Structure: A qualitative indicator measuring consistent policy, strategy, planning, thought, and applicable organizational hierarchy for the development, operation, and application of military space. Military Doctrine and Structure accounts for 20 percent of the model outputs
Military Capability: The number of operational military satellites in orbit, plus military satellites planned for launch in the next year. This figure provides a quantitative indicator of a country’s military space capability. Military Capability is valued at 40 percent of the model.1

Futron selected these three metrics as they provide both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of the issues necessary to create a competitive program in this sector. When the decision is made to implement military space activity, the first critical step is to allocate funds. Thus, the budget metric seeks to quantitatively rank the estimated military space spending that is imperative for creating competitiveness in this sector. Funding priorities change based on the maturity of the country’s military space organization and asset base.

The second metric in the segment examines the existence of military space doctrine and structure—the policy, strategy, and hierarchy which defines how each country conducts its military space activities. Assessments of military space doctrine and structure, while qualitative, allow an evaluation of the extent to which military space budget and capability are used towards defined military space goals.

Space capability, the final metric, includes factors such as organizational development, ground assets, in-orbit assets, applied technologies, and processes such as command and control. Collectively these assets bridge the entire use of space by the military, from the satellite operator to the spacecraft to the ultimate user. For the purpose of this study, assets are limited to the number of space-borne assets that a country has in orbit; future reviews may include ground assets as well.

While Futron extensively researched the space military segment for our 2009 Space Competitiveness Index, an overarching assessment of this sector requires further examination and a more thorough reflection of competing schools of thought on military space power theory. Themes or questions that remain to be discussed or examined in future focused military space segment analysis include the following:

What are the limits of space-based force multiplication? A recent, public assessment on the limitations of space assets by the Israeli Air Force during the recent Gaza offensive highlighted both the importance and the limits of space capability.
What is the asymmetric strategic threat of militaries that highly leverage space assets? Our assessment does not directly assess such asymmetric implications
Futron’s military space analysis includes the assets of quasi-civilian organizations involved in national security operations, intelligence, counter-terrorism, secure communications, and paramilitary operations
Where sufficient information on dual-use assets—those that combine military-civilian or commercial-military space capabilities—was available, Futron incorporated these dual-use into its focused segment analysis, scaling their capabilities accordingly
Although “competitiveness” still applies in the military world, the outcomes of this analysis could be compared to “superiority” or “effectiveness” when discussing the disposition of different nations

While Futron is confident in the underlying facts and analysis of our findings, we view our framework as basis for additional assessments and study.

Segment Findings
Using the metrics of military space budget, capability, and doctrine and structure as a baseline, the two figures on Page 30 compare the 10 countries analyzed in Futron’s 2009 Space Competitiveness Index in their respective military space segments, highlighting both the current leadership position of the United States as well as the relative positions of its near-peers. While the U.S. retains military space preeminence, near-peers such as China and Russia continue to gain ground.

Military Space Budgets
Military space budgets are estimated from unclassified official sources and select non-official sources, or based upon overall national space spending or overall military budget trends. A clear distinction between military space and civil space spending is often blurred in the case of dual-use programs and applications. The ranked comparison, therefore, represents a best-estimate examination of military space funding in each of the 10 countries.

Futron estimates that the top 10 space powers spend more than PPP-adjusted US$71B annually on space, with the U.S. spending nearly US$50B. The percent of military spending allocated for space ranges from below 1 percent for Brazil, India, and Japan up to nearly 100 percent in the case of the Israel space budget. Our estimate for the U.S. is around 60 percent. These figures, of course, are estimates due to the classified nature of some spending, the complexity of dual-use assets, and spending on multinational alliances such as NATO and NORAD.

Europe represents a special case for the military space budget metric, as there is a collective European budget as well as individual country budgets. The total European military space budget metric examined all relevant budgets, whether national or collective, and assigned a ranking that balanced aggregate European military space spending against the need to compare Europe — as a militarily collaborative and politically integrated supranational region — equitably against other individual nations that feature a centralized military space budget. It is also important to note that Europe, under the auspices of the European Defense Agency, for the first time in 2008 publicly allocated money for European space initiatives. The rankings for this metric follow below.

Military Space Doctrine And Structure
The military space doctrine ranks countries according to whether they have a developed doctrine, strategy, or policy that is used to coordinate a country’s military space activity. Some military space actors, such as the U.S., Europe, and China, have rather clear-cut doctrines and policies, while others have less formalized coordination mechanism within the government that are sometimes not codified or are not publicly available. Secondary doctrines, such as overall military doctrines — or a nuclear doctrine with space linkages, as in the case of India — can also assist in prioritizing and coordinating the military space activities of a given country.

This metric also examines a country’s organizational structure for military space — to the extent that one exists — and compares whether that structure indicates a greater or lesser competitive position. For countries that have well-developed military space units, two models of organization are prevalent. The first model is dispersal of units and activities throughout different parts of the government, typical of the various commands, units, and offices within the U.S. The second model is centralizing all military space activities within a single unit, typical of Russia’s independent space forces.

In evaluating the competitiveness of a country in space, it is challenging to assess which model provides a government with the most effective organization. Questions of efficiency, bureaucratic politics and processes, successful adoption of lessons learned, and implementation of programs all play a role in this determination. As these gradations are beyond the scope of this inaugural edition of Futron’s Space Competitiveness Index, this ranking considers the centralized Russian-style model to provide an organizational framework for military space activities that is the competitive equal or nearequal to the more dispersed U.S.-style model.

During 2008, several countries enhanced their military capability — and ranking — by developing new military strategies and/or doctrines as well as making organizational changes.

Japan passed a new law that enables military space activity, and quickly crafted a strategic report highlighting military space objectives. Canada reconstituted its military space organization and began updating its military strategy. Finally, Europe made some operations improvement is the way the continent defines, invests and procures military space assets. Not surprisingly, these activities positively impact each country’s rankings.

In terms of doctrinal innovation, the United States military is the furthest along in two pioneering advancements: the use of hosted payloads; and operationally responsive space (ORS). The concept of hosted payloads disaggregates the traditional satellite value-chain and manufacturing process by placing military payloads on commercial and civilian platforms. By focusing on the payload only, military planners are able to orbit assets more quickly and cheaply.

Time is condensed because the military payload are simply added to satellites currently in the planning or production phase — and presumably already have a scheduled launch slot. Ideally, using standardized interfaces, these payloads could be incorporated into “whichever” satellite is available. Cost is reduced because the secondary military payload shares a satellite bus, launch and some operational costs with the primary payload operator. The U.S. military has already piloted this concept and is discussions with several commercial and civilian entities to embed additional hosted payloads.

The ORS concept, which is driven forward by an independent office within the U.S. military, focuses on rapidly providing assured space power and assets to military commanders in a timely period. The end state of the ORS concept is capability to address emerging, urgent, and/or unanticipated via rapid augmentation, reconstitution and exploitation of assets. The ORS doctrine would use small satellites, gap fillers, standardized components, open architectures, etc., to quickly field space assets. The ORS doctrine differs from traditional processes for requirements setting, procurement, cost, and capability.

Europe has a unique doctrine and organization situation due to the complexity of European institutions and their overlapping relationships with a collection of countries. Within this institutional framework, European companies tend toward highly collaborative and supranational relationships, as well as individual country membership in NATO and the European Defense Agency (EDA). Futron includes these factors in our analysis of organizational structure, both has fundamental benefits as well as complications. The benefit of shared assets reduces costs and augments soft and hard power, but at the same time, decision-making is fragment as there no centralized military space command for Europe.

Against this analytic backdrop, Figure 5 above reveals the rankings in the military space doctrine and organizational structure metric.

Military Space Capability
The number of operational satellites serving military applications is a quantitative metric that counts those satellites believed to be currently active and serving a primary military function. Dual-use satellites and the unclear status of certain satellites posed minor challenges in counting.

For example, China does not clearly delineate its satellite functions in terms of military, civilian, or commercial use as other countries do, so the count of active Chinese military satellites may overlap with the count of Chinese satellites for other user types. The model of a commercial satellite being used by the military — not uncommon in the U.S. experience — is often reversed in the case of China: some Chinese satellites that are officially for military or classified are, in fact, employed for civilian or commercial purposes. Similarly, European military space assets feature a high degree of operational overlap among national, European-level, and NATO-level authorities.

It is important to note that several countries do not officially have military space assets, including Canada and Japan. For the purpose of the military space capability metric, European assets are aggregated into a unified capability, even though in actuality, specific resources are national, regional, or NATO assets, or some combination of the three. Despite such counting challenges, Futron was able to make comparisons among countries that it believes reflect space competitiveness in the metric of military on-orbit assets with high fidelity. The results are as follows.

Military Space Summaries By Country
The following section provides in brief information on military space for each country in the Space Competitiveness Index.

BRAZIL
Officially headed by the Comando-Geral de Tecnologia Aerospacial, or CTA (Brazilian General Command for Aerospace Technology), there is little apparent official articulation of military space doctrine — although arguments by policymakers in favor of space spending have featured the military advantages of independent space access. In practice Brazil’s military space activity is very limited, focusing on international security issues such as border control and contraband. Toward that end, the military uses dual-use Earth observation products to monitor its large border and the Amazon, e.g., use of the two-satellite CBERS constellation, a joint China and Brazil program. The military’s communications requirements are met via the dual-use Brasilsat B-2 satellite.

CANADA
After several years of drift, the Canadian government has reinvigorated its military space strategy, policy, and planning — and plan significant future developments. The previous policy effort, now more than 10 years old, responded to military requirements associated with the first Gulf War. Essential to the current plans are the reconstitution of theDirectorate of Space Development (D Space D) in 2008.

The Canadian military see space as both force multiplying, as well as central to the country’s integration with NATO and its special relationship with the United States, which include integrated participationin NORAD. D Space D will coordinate a number of on-going programs such as the Joint Space Support Program (JSSP), the Sapphire Program, the Near Earth Orbit Surveillance Satellite (NEOSsat), the Military Maritime Messaging Satellite (M3MSat), and Project Polar Epsilon (RADARSAT-2). The government also understands the national defense implications — and benefits — of the RADARSAT Constellation Mission. The Canadian military space policy has two primary objectives: exploit space as a medium to enhance military capability, domestically as well as in partnership, and project international leadership through an integrated capabilities-based policy of responsive space. While formalized, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy is leading an effort to finalize a new military space policy. D Space D has some 25 officers and contractors representing each of the branches of the Canadian armed forces.

CHINA
Over the last several decades, China has consistently and effectively invested in developing military space capability through a robust program focused on developing technological capability and expanding regional coverage. While many Chinese programs are dual-use, China has built a sophistical organizational infrastructure supported by an research and development facilities, a robust industrial base, and has publicized its technical prowess in areas of launch vehicles, sensor capability, command and control know-how, anti-satellite technology, and a variety of other essential — and advanced — military space technologies. Supported by a strong organization and doctrine — most of which remains secret — the Chinese military is likely to continue with its high level of investment in space platforms and capabilities. While the force multiplication of these assets impact regional power — and gain ground with leaders of military space capability — in the near-term will lag the United States and Russian in terms of overall space capability.

EUROPE
While European military space capabilities lag their U.S. allies, there is growing realization in the significance of space assets, and importantly, a commitment to minimize the gap through increased investment, coordination and planning. Following an agreement between the European Commission (EC), the European Space Agency (ESA) and theEuropean Defence Agency (EDA), and supported by national initiatives, European militaries are keen to improve the broadest range of space capabilities — from communications and Earth observation to positioning, navigation and timing. In late 2008, the EDA sponsored a joint workshop with participants from 20 countries coordinate development of space technologies ensure non-dependence of strategic space technology, and position itself as a major space power and credible international partner. The EDA has several ongoing planning processes for military communications satellites, emerging satellite technology trends, industry trends, and a utilization study. Additional areas of EDA interest in include: multi-spectral imaging systems (MUSIS), space situation awareness, and data relay system.

On the communications front, coordination between NATO allies is driving consolidation of satellite communications systems. Currently, NATO, France, Germany (planned), Italy, and the U.K. maintain dedicated military communications satellites. The need for further coordination, coordination, has been supported by experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, where shortages in communications capacity, problems of interoperability and high cost of independent systems are pushing continued integration of allied communications platforms. Similar to the U.S., Europe is also increasing its dependence on commercial providers, with the U.K. having developed a public private partnerships with Paradigm, a subsidiary of EADS) to own and operating the SkyNet 5 communications satellites.

Funding — rather than technology, organization, or market structure — is the limiting factor to Europe’s
military space capability, and the current financial crisis magnifies the issue and threatens announced increases in investment. Estimates for European military space spending range from €500M to €1B (US$705M to US$1.4B) annually — significantly less than the U.S.; the largest budgets includes France, Italy and Germany which is investing in reconnaissance satellites. To meet their strategic needs, based on recent comments from the French Defense Minister, Europe will need to double its spending in the near term.

As a way of stretching money further, a number of European countries are pooling their assets. The U.K.’s SkyNet 5, France’s Syracuse 3, and Italy’s Sicral satellites will jointly provide NATO’s new communications satellites and NATO has inked a long-term lease of about a third of Syracuse 3A’s nine transponders of super-high frequency (SHF) transmissions under a contract with France, Britain, and Italy. France and Italy are also looking at a largely military dual use geosynchronous satellite called Athena-Fidus. It would be capable of very high rates of data transmission and could augment or even replace some of the Syracuse and Sicral satellites.

In a development that parallels the U.S. organization of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the EDA is preparing the establishment of a Procurement Cell to coordinate the EU Member States’ orders of commercial satellite communications services. The European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell will be a three-year pilot project (2010 - 2012) to gain practical experience with centralizing commercial SATCOM procurement at the EU level. The cell’s activities could reach a business volume of at least €30M (US$42M) per year.

A central booking office would initially be hosted at EDA’s premises. It would manage the technical and financial aspects of the requests and orders placed by the Member States with the capacity and service offers by satellite operators and telecom companies. After the end of the pilot period, the SATCOM Procurement Cell activities are intended to be transferred to an appropriate entity for permanent operations for the EU Member States. The U.K. uses an outsourced model with Paradigm, and this business model may spread to other countries such as France, and Germany. It is estimated that only 20 percent of European military communications capacity is procured commercially.

INDIA
Military space in India is tied to a large revamp of the country’s armed forces that includes significant new investment and organizational change. As India procures new air, ground and sea platforms, satellite communications requirements will dramatically increase, which in turn could drive equipment markets for COTM. Increased interest in and purchase of UAVs are core the country’s planned projection of power and capability along its frontier. Purchase of commercial space segment by the military, however, for two critical reasons: India’s commercial satellite communications market is closed, so international commercial providers have not focused on the market; and second, India’s military requirements in the near term are likely to remain in region.

During 2008, India announced plans to create an Integrated Space Cell, a nodal agency within the Government of India that coordinates space-based military and civilian systems. A key factor in the creation of the Cell was China’s anti-satellite test. The Cell, formed in June 2008, is under the command of the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters, and is responsible for coordinating activities of ISRO and the Indian Armed Forces. On the EO front, India has targeted enhanced military capability — a process that is distinctly tied to the country’s growing military relationship with Israel. India has both launched military satellites for Israel, TECSAR, and launched a similar Israeli-built, Indian-operated, RISAT-1 payload in early 2009.< br />
ISRAEL
Israel’s military space activity focuses mainly of the Shavit small launch vehicle and the Ofek reconnaissance satellite series. In the past two years, Israel has begun to transition both its launch and satellite development programs toward partnership with India. The future of Israeli military space investment is highly contingent and as of early 2009, the question was in effect tabled by Israeli decision-makers pending the outcome of the Israeli elections.

JAPAN
Japan’s New Basic Space Law (August 2008) overturned a 40-year prohibition on any military space activity. The Basic Law for Space Activities, which formally allowed Japan to use space for national security purposes and is the result of a series of meetings conducted from September through December by a Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD) committee chaired by Seigo Kitamura, Japan’s senior vice minister of defense, according to Takashi Sekine, director of MoD’s International Public Affairs Office. The law also required the formulation of a report, the Basic Guidelines for the Development and Use of Outer Space, which was published in January 2009. While short on detail, the report is a first step in identifying systems and technologies that Japan will seek to develop as part of its emerging military space strategy. The document identifies a number of space capabilities including:

More and higher-resolution imaging satellites to complement the nation’s existing fleet of fourInformation Gathering Satellites (IGS)
A dedicated military communications satellite
A missile warning satellite — or a missile warning payload hosted aboard another satellite — to support the nation’s Aegis ballistic missile defense system
Small, low-cost satellites and rockets that can be launched on short-notice, perhaps from aircraft
A signals intelligence satellite
An independent navigation and positioning capability
Satellite protection and space situational awareness capabilities

As these changes cascade, the new space law will have a dramatic impact of Japanese military space activity. Driven in part by activity in North Korea, the government’s new policy allows for the use of space in national self-defense. This change in policy comes on the heels of broader changes in the Japanese military mission that place new information and communications demands on the military.

As Japan’s forces evolve in the near term, there will invariably be increased demand for advanced communications, which may drive military purchase of commercial capacity for overseas missions. Also in response to policy changes, there have been a number of inter-governmental discussions about dual-use assets and programs. The full impact of this new military space doctrine will take several years to understand, but over the next several years, the Japanese military will place increasing importance on and resources in military space activities.

RUSSIA
Russia maintains a long-standing history and organization of military space activities, included an integrated command and control hierarchy with the military establishment. TheRussian Space Force, a centralized military command structure overseeing some 40,000 personnel, supports the country’s long-standing military space doctrine. Central to Russia’s space doctrine is a Kosmos series of military surveillance and communications satellites. Overall, however, military doctrine lacks transparency and there is discourse surrounding Russian military doctrine.

The Russian military — like the U.S. military — is highly dependent on space-based communications services. Russia employs a satellite-based early warning detection system. Russia’s GLONASS system is central to military space strategy, providing positioning, navigation, and timing services. Russia also operates the Strela LEO constellation and the Raduga GEO network. Overall, the Russian military has approximately 38 active satellites providing communications, PNT, and reconnaissance services.

SOUTH KOREA
Futron research was not able to locate any publicly available reports that articulated South Korean military space doctrine or official military space policy. That said, the South Korean military is likely to become a major implementer of COTM technology, particularly in response to recent North Korean missile activity. South Korea does operate a dual-use communications satellite, Koreasat 5 (Mugungwha 5), launched in 2006. The payload reported carries 12 military relay terminals and 24 commercial terminals, with military coverage from the Malacca Strait to the central Pacific Ocean areas.

UNITED STATES
The U.S. has a developed, transparent, and evolving military space doctrine, aligned with a complex operational structure. There is an ongoing discourse surrounding unclassified portions of military space doctrine and related subjects — such as Space Power Theory — although significant portions of the strategy remain classified. U.S. military doctrine is somewhat integrated into the country’s larger national space strategy. In general terms there is emphasis on retaining a national lead in space situational awareness, military reconnaissance, and responsive space in order to combat anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and asymmetric threats. The focus is on development of state-of-the-art technologies to maintain comparative national advantage in space. In addition, the U.S. military space doctrine is the one that overtly aims at “leading” the world.

Without going into detail of the complexity of the U.S. military space organization, several important happenings occurred during 2008 and early 2009. First is the establishment of the ORS Office, which as discussed, represents a potential paradigm shift that could cascade throughout the entire military space organizational. Second is the cancellation of two large military programs — BASIC, which was focused on high-end observation satellites, and the termination of the US$26B transformational satellite program, TSAT; the military, instead, will purchase two more advanced extremely high frequency satellites as alternatives. Looking forward, these decisions will facilitate the continued and increased reliance on commercial vendors for imaging and communications solutions, as well as expand plans for hosted payloads and ORS activity. The U.S. is also a leader in the use of COTM as well as the use of commercial satellite capacity, and it is estimated that some 80 percent of U.S. communications activity is procured commercially.

Future Global Military Segment Study Goals
The purpose of the Global Military Index is to distill the debate about military space and the balance of space-based capabilities in both war and peace. In the future, Futron plans to enhance its focused analysis of the global military space segment in the following ways:

Expand capability metric to include ground and application technologies, as well as new technology development and the quality of the assets
Improved information on worldwide military space budget trends, with a focus on distinguishing between the often non-exclusive relationship between military and civil government activity
Identify a group of leading experts to provide additional qualitative insight and analysis to support the data
Identify appropriate metrics to measure the value of human resources with respect to military space capacity through skills, training, and career progression
Identify ways to quantify asymmetric military space vulnerability
Review information regarding defense spending on space R&D efforts

Thanks from Futron...
Futron Corporation would like to thank those people and organization who supported (and
continue to support) our ongoing efforts to characterize global space competitiveness, including those providing information on background and confidentially. Futron would like expressly thank a few external contributors in particular:

Canada-based AppSpace Solutions, for providing insight into Canada’s space sector. The mission of AppSpace Solutions is to assist space industry leaders and organizations in making informed decisions about spacecraft applications. The company is led by Wayne A. Ellis, BSc, MSc, CD, who has more than 20 years of Canadian military experience, primarily in space systems education and applications. He has designed, developed and delivered space-related educational content for audiences from grade school children to senior government officials, and has provided space expertise to multiple levels of the Canadian military.

Dr. Young-Keun Chang, for reviewing the sections on North and South Korea. Dr. Chang is a professor in the Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering and a director of the Space System Research Lab at Korea Aerospace University, South Korea. He is also a Program Director of National Space R&D of Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF), a government-funded institute. Dr. Chang was previously a principal researcher responsible for the development of KOMPSAT-1 in Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). His current projects include development of nano- and micro-satellites, including Hannuri-2 and Hannuri-3, and training future aerospace engineers at Korea Aerospace University.

Dr. Raz Tamir and Dr. Meidad Parientes for providing insight into the Israeli space sector. Both Dr. Tamir and Dr. Parientes work on the AMOS satellite program and are founding members of the Israeli Nanosatellite Association (INSA). Additional support came from Mr. Tal Inbar of the Fischer Institute of Space Studies as well as from Mr. Daniel Rockberger, a mechanical engineer and graduate of the International Space University.

Futron would also like to thank others that provided confidential feedback to our 2009 edition, and we look forward to comments and suggests from our readers to enhance the Space Competitiveness Index in the future.

Tech_Journal: IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 08:53:00 +0000

IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

In distinction to this and showing that peace and not war is the proper way to go, please see:

Did war with Iran get mainstreamed after all? - By Stephen M. Walt | Stephen M. Walt

The 'silent war' with Iran

Posted By Stephen M. Walt Wednesday, December 7, 2011 - 6:24 PM

Back in August 2010, I wrote a post warning about the possibility that war with Iran was being "mainstreamed." My concern was the likelihood that incessant talk of war would gradually accustom people to the idea and harden perceptions to the point that eventually even former skeptics would be convinced that war was inevitable and that we might as well get it over with. As I put it back then:

If you talk about going to war often enough and for long enough, people get used to the idea and some will even begin to think if it is bound to happen sooner or later, than "'twere better to be done quickly." In an inside-the-Beltway culture where being "tough" is especially prized, it is easy for those who oppose "decisive" action to get worn down and marginalized. If war with Iran comes to be seen as a "default" condition, then it will be increasingly difficult for cooler heads (including President Obama himself) to say no.

I now wonder if my concerns were understated, and the danger a bit more subtle. It appears that we have gone beyond just talking about military action to actually engaging in it, albeit at a low level. In addition to waging cyberwar via Stuxnet, the United States and/or Israel appear to be engaged in covert efforts to blow up Iranian facilities and murder Iranian scientists. Earlier this week, the CIA lost a reconnaissance drone over Iranian territory (whether Iran shot it down or not is disputed). And just as I'd feared, this situation has led smart and normally sober people like Andrew Sullivan and Roger Cohen to endorse this shadowy campaign, on the grounds that it is preferable to all-out war.

I certainly agree that what the United States is doing is better than launching an all-out attack, but I question this approach on three grounds. First, as I've already argued elsewhere, our preoccupation with Iran vastly overstates its capabilities and the actual threat it poses to U.S. interests. Iran is a minor military power at present, and it has no meaningful power projection capabilities. It has been pursuing some sort of nuclear capability for decades without getting there, which makes one wonder whether Iran intends to ever cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Even if it did, it could not use a bomb against us or against Israel without triggering its own destruction, and there is no sign that Iran's leadership is suicidal. Quite the contrary, in fact: the clerics seem more concerned with staying alive and staying in power than anything else. Iran's "revolutionary" ideology is old and tired and inspires no one. The "Arab Spring" has underscored Iran's irrelevance as a political force, Iran's Syrian ally is under siege and may yet fall, and the ongoing U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will remove a key source of Iranian-Iraqi solidarity and encourage Arab-Persian differences to reemerge once again. Iran is a problem but a relatively minor one, and it is a sign of our collective strategic myopia that U.S. leaders either cannot figure this out or cannot say so openly.

Second, waging a covert, low-level war is not without risks, including the risk of undesirable escalation. No matter how carefully we try to control the level of force, there's always the danger that matters spiral out of control. Iran can't do much to us militarily, but it can cause trouble in limited ways and it could certainly take steps that would jack up oil prices and possibly derail the fragile global economic recovery. Moreover, if some U.S. operation misfired and a couple of hundred Iranians died, wouldn't the revolutionary government feel compelled to respond? If U.S. or Israeli operatives are captured on Iranian soil, will pressure mount on us to do more? (Just imagine what all the GOP candidates would start saying!) Such developments may not be likely, of course, but it would be foolhardy to ignore such possibilities entirely. Nor should we ignore the possibility that others will learn from this sort of "unconventional" campaign and one day use similar tactics against U.S. allies or the United States itself.

Third, a semi-secret war of this kind raises the inevitable risk of "blowback." The late Chalmers Johnson defined blowback as the unintended consequences of U.S. action abroad, and especially those actions of which the public is largely unaware. When we conduct semi-secret, not-quite wars in other countries, the targets sometime try to hit us back. When they do, many people back home will see their actions as unjustified aggression, and as evidence that our enemies are irrevocably hostile and unremittingly evil.

A case in point is the alleged Iranian plot to get Mexican drug lords to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. Americans immediately concluded that this scheme was a sign of dastardly Iranian perfidy, when it might just as easily have been a harebrained Iranian riposte to what we were already doing. This is not to say that Iran was justified in trying to blow up a building in our nation's capital, but by what logic is peace-loving America justified in doing something similar over in Iran? In short: If the American people don't quite know what their government is up to, they cannot understand or interpret what other states are doing either. We may have good reasons not to like what others are doing, but the bigger danger is that we simply won't understand it, and won't understand our own role in helping bring such actions about.

Lastly, ratcheting up military pressure -- even if done covertly and at a relatively low level -- can only reaffirm deeply rooted Iranian suspicions of the United States and prolong U.S.-Iranian animosity. (The same is true in reverse, of course). I'm under no illusions about the depths of this animosity and the degree of skill, imagination, and patience it would take to unravel it, but doing more of the same is not going to make it any easier. Yes, many Iranians loathe the regime and would like it to go, but that doesn't mean they welcome U.S. or Israeli attacks on Iranian soil. And that is especially true of attacks on the nuclear program, which Iranians of many political persuasions view as an important symbol of national pride.

In short, the "silent campaign" against Iran is not without its own risks and costs. It is preferable to all-out attack, but a silent war and an all-out war are not the only options. The third option is a sustained and patient effort to reengage with Iran, in order to convince Iranian leaders that they are better off not going nuclear and that both sides will be better off if we can gradually work out some of our differences. Such an approach does not require the United States to sacrifice any core interests, nor would it preclude continuing to press Iran on its human rights record and on other matters that trouble us. And maybe it won't work. But as Trita Parsi shows in his new book A Single Roll of the Dice, that alternative approach has never really been tried.

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 06:53:00 +0000

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States:

Satelite Capabilities Of Emerging Space-Competant States

Gerald M. Steinberg

The military role of space satellites has increased continuously over the past three decades. In the early 1960s, the first reconnaissance satellites were launched by the United States, and the Soviet Union followed within a few years. In addition, military communications, navigation, meteorology and other satellites were developed during this period. By the 1980s, systems such as the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS), as well as reconnaissance satellites (Keyhole, KH-11, Lacrosse, etc.) were of major importance in the military balance.
Most of this activity has been undertaken by the major powers; the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), and China. France and the European Space Agency have also devoted considerable resources in this area, such as in the development of the Helios reconnaissance satellite. (The British military space program has been relatively limited, compared to the other major powers.) Until the 1980s, these were the only states with the capability to develop satellites and launch them into orbit. Although commercial launch services allowed many other states to develop civilian satellites, mainly for communications and scientific research, these satellites had little military utility.
However, in recent years, the number of states with indigenous launch capabilities has grown. In addition to the major space powers (US, Russia, China, and the European Space Agency), Japan, India, and Israel have placed satellites into orbit. (In 1967, Australia used a modified US Redstone booster to launch a small satellite, but cannot be said to have an ongoing launch capability. Iraq was also reported to be seeking an independent military space capability, and on December 5, 1989, launched a three-stage Al-Abid missile, but no satellite was placed in orbit.1) Canada, Italy, Britain, Norway, and other advanced industrial states have designed, produced and operated advanced satellite systems that were launched commercially. In addition, Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan and South Africa have developed some independent capability to produce (but not launch) satellites, including imaging and communications systems.
The rate at which different states develop the ability to operate in space has been the subject of many studies and much debate. This debate focuses on two central issues; 1)the military uses of satellite systems and concerns regarding the impact on international stability and potential for an arms race in space, and 2)the degree to which states that are not major space powers or advanced industrialized economies will have access to space capabilities for commercial, technological, and national security purposes.2
Technically, as is frequently noted, there is no clear difference between civil and military satellite systems. Orbital imagers and communications satellites are prime examples of dual-use technologies. As a recent US Congressional Research Service report notes, "The distinction between military and civilian launches is arbitrary to a certain extent, since any satellite can be used for either sector. For example, communication satellites can carry either military or civilian traffic, and navigation satellites are used by both the military and civilian communities."3
The potential military impact of dual-use systems is most salient with respect to imaging and reconnaissance satellites. For many years, the French SPOT (Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre) has provided a limited surveillance and imaging capability for states and non-governmental organizations that lack an indigenous capability. Additional systems operated by governments and firms from Russia, the United States, Japan, and potentially, other states, will provide more options and higher resolution in the next few years.
As a result, the importance of military space systems and dual-use satellites in regional conflicts and "emerging space competent states" (second or third tier space nations)4 is likely to increase. As will be discussed in this paper, these capabilities can alter the military balance and stability in a number of regions and conflict systems. However, as will also be demonstrated, the commercial space and imaging platforms of the major (or first tier) space powers are likely to have a far greater impact. The high resolution commercial satellites being developed in the US, Russia, France and Japan, and the competition between them, will be a source of instability in both regional and global conflict systems.5
With respect to the issue of access to space capabilities and technology, as will be seen in this study, in many areas, the number of "emerging space competent states" is growing, despite significant technical and economic obstacles. With the notable exception of India and Israel, the ability of most states to develop a high level of autonomy, including indigenous launchers, has been limited by the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and similar measures. Space launcher and missile development programs (which are closely linked and provide another important example of dual-use technology) in Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan and other states have been severely curtailed as a result of these restrictions and the difficulties and costs inherent in obtaining the necessary technology.
However, this trend has been offset to a high degree by an increase in the availability of commercial launch services. In addition to the US and the ESA, Russia and China offer a range of services, and competition between these commercial launchers is intense. Through these services, "emerging space competent states" can contract for the launch of indigenously designed, produced, and operated commercial and research satellites. Thus, access to advanced space capability for many states has actually increased.
I. The Capabilities of Emerging Space-Competant States
For a number of regional powers, the capacity to launch satellites into earth orbit is closely linked to ballistic missile development efforts. Technically, once a state develops an intercontinental or intermediate range ballistic missile (ICBM or IRBM), this can also be used to place a small payload into low earth orbit. (It should be noted that the first satellite launchers used by the major powers were also developed initially as ballistic missiles.) In this way, the economic cost of developing a satellite launcher is largely absorbed by missile development programs, and the space launcher is a low-cost bonus.
While economic, military and strategic considerations provide the primary motivations for the development of indigenous ballistic missiles, space launchers and satellites, national prestige and pride also play an important role. The public visibility of technological achievements in this area is used by governments to gain additional financing for these projects.
However, the technical complexity and high cost of developing these technologies have limited the number of non-OECD states that have succeeded in developing an indigenous space launcher capability to India and Israel. Other states, such as Brazil and perhaps Pakistan, have initiated programs designed to reach this objective, but the high costs and limits placed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as unilateral export controls imposed by the US have slowed or blocked these efforts. This situation is unlikely to change in the next five years.
A. India
India has the most active and advanced space program among the emerging space powers. The Indian Space Research Office (ISRO), based in Bangalore, declares that all of its programs are "intended for peaceful purposes", with specific emphasis on satellite communications and survey of earth resources. Research and development activities related to satellites and launch vehicles are "designed to contribute towards achieving the above goals."6
The Indian space efforts can be traced to a research and development program that began in the early 1950s. In 1975, India built the Aryabhata research satellite which was launched by a Soviet launcher, followed by Bhaskara 1 in 1979, and Bhaskara 2 in 1981. On July 18, 1980 an Indian launcher (the SLV-3) placed a 35 kilogram satellite (Rohini 1) in low earth orbit. As Smith notes, by this achievement, India became the first developing country to launch its own satellite on its own launch vehicle.7 This was followed by the launch of the Rohini 2 on May 31, 1981 (which was in a very low orbit and decayed after 9 days), the Rohini 3 on April 17, 1983 (a 41.5kg. experimental research satellite), the RS-I (Rohini Satellite) and RS-D-I (Rohini Satellite for Development).
In this area, as in other technology-intensive sectors, the Indian government placed a high priority on developing an indigenous capability and overcoming external factors that were deemed to be obstacles to national economic and military development.8 Officially, the 1993 budget of the Indian space program was very small, but this may not include booster development and other costs that are included in the military or other budgets. According to unofficial estimates, between 1980 and 1990, the Indian government allocated $1 billion for space research, including the development of satellites for telecommunications, meteorology, and imaging.9
In contrast to the situation in most other countries, the Indian space launcher did not grow directly out of a ballistic missile development effort. Indeed, the order seems to be reversed, with the missile application following the successful testing of a space booster. Missile development began in earnest in the early 1980s, and in 1983, the Chairman of ISRO indicated that the space program would lead to an IRBM capability.10 Indeed, the Integrated Guided Missile Program led to the development of the Prithvi tactical SSM, with a range of 250km. (first tested in February 1988). The major Indian effort is the Agni IRBM, with a range of 2500km. and a payload estimated at from 1 to 2.5 tons. However, its guidance system, first stage rocket engine and other components were imported.11 The first tests of the Agni took place in 1989, and production is not expected to begin until the late 1990s.
The Indian SLV family has three basic variations; 1) the ASLV (Augmented SLV), which is designed to place a 150kg. payload into a 500km. orbit; 2) the 4 stage Polar SLV, designed for an orbit of 900km.; and 3) a geostationary launcher (GSLV) with a declared payload of 1900kg. The first and third stages of the PSLV use solid propellant, and the second and fourth stages are liquid propellant engines. The GSLV has four additional liquid strap-on motors, and the third and fourth stages are replaced by one cryogenic stage12. Three launch sites are also being built; Sriharikota (the main launch site), Trivadrum, and Balasore.13 The launch vehicle development program has been plagued by a number of failures. An SLV tested failed in 1979, and the first ASLV tests failed in March 1987 and July 1988, but in 1992, succeeded in placing the SROSS-C scientific research satellite into orbit (although here too, the fourth stage of the launcher did not perform optimally and the satellite's orbit was lower than planned). The first flight of the PSLV in September 1993 also failed and an IRS-E satellite was lost, but in October 1994, this system was used successfully to place an IRS-P2 imaging satellite into polar orbit.
In the effort to upgrade its booster capability, India sought to purchase cryogenic engines and technology from Russia in the early 1990s. According to reports, 80% of the "know how" was transferred, but then American pressure on Russia to adhere to the requirements of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) led Moscow to renegotiate this contract.14
In the area of satellite development, India has active communications and reconnaissance satellite development programs. The first Indian communications satellite, APPLE, was launched in June 1991 by the Ariane launcher. The major Indian effort in this area is concentrated in the INSAT series. INSAT 1A failed to operate properly, but INSAT 1B, built by Ford Aerospace and launched from the U.S. Challenger Space Shuttle in August 1983 was successful (it decayed in 1991). Additional satellites in this series include INSAT 1C (launched by Ariane in 1988), INSAT 1D (launched by a U.S. Delta rocket in 1992).
INSAT 2A was built indigenously by the Indian Space Research Organization (using some imported technology) and launched in July 1992 by an Ariane-4 launcher. In addition to communications technology, this multipurpose satellite also contained a meteorological imaging system. INSAT 2B was launched in July 1993.15 In mid-1995, the upgraded GSLV launcher is scheduled to place a 2,500kg. communications spacecraft into geosynchronous orbit.16 In addition, there are reports that India has contracted for the launch of the Gramsat communications satellite aboard a Russian booster.17
India has also given high priority to the development of imaging satellites. In 1987, a Soviet launcher placed the Indian-built IRS-1A satellite into orbit. This payload includes an monochrome imager with a resolution of 36 meters, and a 73 meter multispectral system.18 The IRS-1B was launched in 1991, and in October 1994, the IRS-P2 earth observation spacecraft was placed in polar orbit. This satellite is equipped with a linear imaging scanner based on an advanced CCD array, providing a resolution of 40m. in 4 spectral bands.19
According to a document of the Indian Space Agency, "Several advanced Indian remote sensing spacecraft are planned as part of a continuing PSLV launch series. These will include Indian multispectral linear arrays with resolutions as high as 10 meters, making them somewhat comparable with current SPOT class spacecraft."20 The IRS-1C, scheduled to be launched by Russia, is expected to have similar characteristics.21 It should be noted that the Indian Space Agency has signed an agreement with EOSAT (a private US firm) to market space images.
According to the Indian government, the imaging satellites are designed for civilian purposes, such as estimating agricultural yields, mapping water resources and for flood monitoring. However, as noted, imaging satellites are dual use systems with military potential. The military focus of the Indian surveillance satellites is apparently Chinese and Pakistani military facilities, including the Kahuta nuclear weapons production complex and the Kanachi naval base.22 India has used aerial reconnaissance for this mission, including the MIG-25 Foxbat B, equipped with five camera ports and with a photographic range of 100km. Manned overflights involve significant risks of interception by aircraft or missiles, while satellites involve no such risks.
B. Israel
Israel, like India, has an advanced scientific infrastructure, and this has led to continuing space-related activity. The Israeli Space Agency (ISA) was founded in 1983, and much of the activity focused on basic research and development, in conjunction with the American and European civil space programs. The ISA's formal budget is very small ($6 million in 1993) but this does not include development and operational costs for the Ofeq and Amos satellites. Israel reportedly spent $1 billion through 1993 on the Ofeq satellite program. Other unverified reports claim that the Defense Ministry allocates $20 million a year for Ofeq, although this seems to be an underestimate.23 (Gross estimates place the cost of development and launch of a first-generation imaging satellite at $400 million.24) Nevertheless, high costs and budgetary limitations delayed the planned launch of Ofeq-3 for as much as two years.
Like other strategic technologies and weapons, the Israeli government provides little official information regarding space launchers and satellites. However, using available information and drawing logical inferences, the outlines of the Israeli program can be discerned. The Shavit (Comet) launchers are apparently based on what is commonly referred to as the Jericho ballistic missile. According to speculation, the Jericho is part of Israel's assured second-strike nuclear deterrent. The Jericho I reportedly carries a payload of 500kg. to a 500km. range, and the more advanced Jericho-2 (in some sources, Jericho-2B or Jericho 3) is estimated to have a range of 1450 to 2800km. and a payload of 1000kg.25 The first two solid rocket engines of the Shavit are manufactured by TAAS (formerly Israel Military Industries), and the third stage motor was designed and produced by Rafael (the Arms Development Research Authority). Israeli Aircraft Industries is the prime contractor.
IAI has sought to recover some of the costs of launcher development through commercial booster services, but with little success. Moshe Keret, IAI's president, blames "political issues" for these obstacles, but claims that these have eased with the Middle East peace process. "Now we have a new opportunity to approach the market, so we will renew our booster marketing efforts."26 However, US missile technology control requirements and the claim that the Israeli launcher is subsidized by the government and military, may continue to block these efforts.27
IAI has announced plans to produce the "Next" launcher, which will be able to place a 300kg. payload into polar orbit. Israel is reportedly planning to enter this launcher in the second phase of NASA's ultralight satellite booster competition. IAI has attempted to create links with US firms (Space Vector and Atlantic Research) to market the Shavit. In this partnership, IAI will provide the first and second rocket motor cases, Rafael will supply the 3rd stage, Atlantic Research will load them with propellant, and Space Vector will integrate and launch the vehicle.28 The NEXT launcher is also being considered for the ELLIPSAT communications satellite system. This 14 satellite system is designed to provide communications for the northern hemisphere. IAI reportedly purchased 10% of the stock in the lead firm, Mobile Communications Holding Inc.29
Early warning and real-time reconnaissance have always been of major importance to Israel defense planners in offsetting the threat to national survival posed by the massive conventional forces of the neighboring Arab states. Israeli defense industries developed a number of mini-RPVs for use as overhead reconnaissance platforms, and these were used extensively during the 1982 Lebanon war.
As part of strategic cooperation with the United States, Israel received sporadic access to American satellite information, (including images of the Entebbe airport used in planning the rescue operation in 1976), but this is not consistent or sufficient.30 Former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur noted that immediately prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the US withheld critical intelligence information regarding Arab plans to attack. Similarly, Meir Amit, who served as head of the Israeli Mossad, has referred to the 'crumbs' of satellite intelligence that Israel has received, noting that this "is very inconvenient and very difficult".31
Israel security concerns extend to the nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities being developed by Iran and Iraq. The events prior to the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the failures of US intelligence with respect to the Iraqi missile and nuclear weapons program, and the inability of the United States to locate and destroy the Iraqi Scud missile launchers during the war increased Israeli focus on obtaining an indigenous capability.32 The Jerusalem Post quoted an Israeli Defense Ministry official as saying that, "For years we have been begging the Americans for more detailed pictures from their satellites and often got refusals - even when Iraqi Scud missiles were falling on Tel Aviv. ...The Americans have also done their best to deny us all help in building our own reconnaissance satellite."33 After the war, Defense Minister Arens explicitly and publicly declared Israel's intention of launching an indigenous reconnaissance satellite.34
In 1988, Israel launched the Ofeq (Horizon) 1 test satellite, using the Shavit (Comet) launcher. The launch site is on the Mediterranean Coast near Palmachim. To avoid flying over other countries, a highly unusual flight path was used which headed northwest over the Mediterranean, placing the satellite into a retrograde orbit at an inclination of 143 .35 The 156kg. satellite was reported to be a test vehicle designed to lead to the development of an orbital reconnaissance capability, and it reentered Earth's atmosphere in January 1989. Ofeq's orbit limited the satellite's view to areas 37 north and south of the equator. Ofeq 2 was similar in weight and technical characteristics to Ofeq 1. It was launched in April 1990 and had an orbital lifetime of 3 months.36 Both were spin stabilized.
The Ofeq 3, launched April 5 1995, weighed 225kg. at launch, including a 36kg. payload. Its higher perigee (369km.) and orbital maneuvering capability allows for a longer lifetime (one to 3 years). (According to reports in the Israeli press, this version of the Shavit launcher included a small new IAI rocket engine with 674lb. of thrust.37) Its orbit will take it over sites in the Middle East, including Iraq, on most passes during the first months of operation. This version of Ofeq has small thrusters for three-axis stabilization and attitude control with an accuracy of 0.1 degree.38
Officially, the head of the Israeli Space Agency described Ofeq 3 as "a very sophisticated platform on which many things can be placed".39 In particular, Ofeq 3 is reported to be a first-generation imaging satellite, including ultraviolet and visible imaging sensors. Reports that this system could "read license plates in Baghdad" are clearly exaggerated, and for an operational system, Israel will need a number of reconnaissance satellites capable of monitoring various targets. In addition, a data analysis unit to interpret images will require a very large budget. The head of the ISA has noted that Ofeq technology would not replace Israel's request for access to US satellites, particularly in the context of a peace agreement with Syria. In addition, the requirement for an early warning satellite for detecting missile launches would require a geostationary orbit, which is far beyond Israel's current capability.40
A number of Israeli firms have been developing technology for orbital surveillance, including El-Op (camera to photograph 100km. strips to a resolution of 16 meters), Elisra and Tadiran (communications systems), Rafael (thrusters), Elta (antennas), the Dimona nuclear center (vacuum chambers), IAI/Melam (solar cells), IAI/Tamam (gyros and magnometer).41 It is not clear which of this technology is incorporated in Ofeq 3.
In addition to military reconnaissance, IAI and the ISA are also investing in commercial space ventures, (although there are reports that Israel has rejected requests from other states to purchase Ofeq satellites.42) Aby Har-Even, the head of the ISA, has stated that future commercial versions of Ofeq could include sensors, cameras, and communications equipment.43 According to unconfirmed reports, IAI is developing the EROS (Earth Resources Orbiting Satellite) with 2-3 meter resolution capability, and has reportedly signed a contract with Core Software Technology to market these images.44
In the area of communications satellites, Israel is developing the Amos 1, equipped with 7 Ku-band transponders. IAI has signed a contract with Ariane to place this satellite in geosynchronous orbit in December 1995. Amos is a civil commercial satellite developed by IAI at a reported cost of $150 million.45 IAI is reported to be interested in selling future Amos satellites and providing operating services to Asian, Eastern European, and Middle Eastern countries.46 The operating services will be supplied through Satellite Communications Corp. Ltd.47
The Israel Institute of Technology (Technion) is also active in space research and development. Technion students developed the 52kg. Gerwin 1-Techsat (at a cost of $4 million), which was launched in March on a converted Russian SS-25 (Start I) booster, but this launch failed.48 In 1990, the Technion signed an agreement with the USSR for cooperation in scientific engineering and research on x- ray astronomy, planetary exploration, instrumentation, solar-terrestrial physics, earth remote sensing and ecological monitoring.49 The Israel Space Agency signed a government-to-government agreement with Russia in 1993, and the ISA's TAUVEX (Tel-Aviv Ultraviolet Explorer) is expected to be launched on Russia's Spectrum-x/Gamma satellite.
C. Brazil
The Organizing Group of the National Commission for Space Activities (GOCNAE) was created in 1961, in order "to provide Brazil with the infrastructure necessary for the exploration of outer space".50 In 1981 the Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) was created by the federal government to achieve self-sufficiency in space programs. This program is coordinated by the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE) and involves both civilian and military bodies (Ministry of Aeronautics, Secretary of Science and Technology). Goals included the production of launch vehicles, and satellites. Before being transferred to civilian authority in 1969, Brazil's space program was part of the Navy, and in the 1980s, according to Karp, its higher echelon was still composed largely of military officers, "suggesting that military applications have not been overlooked".51
In the early 1960s the SONDA sounding rocket series program began at Avibras (a private company that produces most of Brazil's missiles and rockets), which led to the development of Sonda I (2 stage, solid propellant, 75km. range), Sonda II and Sonda III (2-stage solid propelled, 500km. range and 50-160kg. payload). The Sonda 4 rocket was intended to test the major propulsion components of a future space launch vehicle (VLS) and was designed to achieve a range of 600 kilometers with a payload of 500kg.52 The VLS is a four stage rocket designed to place 200kg. in an orbit of 250-1000km. The VLS-R2 reportedly completed a successful test flight.53 In 1989, a one-third size development version of the VLS was tested. The Air Force "Barreira do Inferno" (Hell's Barrier) has been used for Sonda testing, and work has begun on a new launch site for low and geostationary orbit satellites, the Alcantara Launch Centre (CLA), in the State of Maranhao.
However, in the past five years, the pace of development in this area has slowed significantly, and in the 1980's, VLS appropriations dropped from $600m to $170m. In 1989, the Avibras SS-300 ballistic missile project was suspended due to lack of funding, and Avibras declared bankruptcy in 1990 after Iraq refused to pay for artillery ordered during Iran/Iraq War. The National Space Research Institute (INPE) opposed the investment in the VLS and favored less expensive foreign launches. In addition, the Chief of the VLS development, Jayme Boscov, claims that the program was harmed by a US-led technology boycott (the MTCR regime).54
With respect to satellite development, Brazil is most active in the area of space communications. In 1974, Brazil began leasing Intelsat transponders for domestic communications, the second country to do so. The first satellite in the Brasilsat system, SBTS (Sistema Vrasiliero de Telecommunicacoes por Satellite) was launched by Ariane in February 1985 and the second satellite was launched in March 1986. This series of satellites and ground stations was built by Spar Aerospace of Canada and Hughes Aircraft Co. for Embratel, the state-owned telecommunications company.55 These created the basis for developing educational, agricultural and medical TV programming nationwide. Over the years, Brazilian firms have produced the ground stations for this system, and the second generation of Brasilsat is manufactured by Embratel.56 Brasilsat 1 was launched by Ariane on February 8, 1985, and Brasilsat 2 on March 28, 1986. Nine years later, on March 28, 1995, Brasilsat B2, built by EMBRATEL, was successfully orbited by Arianespace.
The Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciales is active in the design and manufacture of additional satellites. The SCD-1 (Satelite de Coleta de Dados) is a small 115kg. satellite designed to provide weather and climate data, and is used to monitor degradation of the Amazon rain forest. It was placed into orbit in 1993 by an American air-launched Pegasus booster. The INPE is also reportedly in the process of developing three additional satellites in this series to collect environmental data and remote sensing data.57
The Brazilian space agency has also discussed cooperation with other states, including China58 and Russia. In July 1988, Brazil and China signed an agreement (CBERS- China Brazil Earth imaging satellites) for the development of two earth imaging satellites. According to Alves, "The CBERS is aimed at the development of a complete remote sensing system by developing countries which would be both compatible to and competitive with other systems produced and operational during the present decade"59. The first satellite was originally to have been launched in 1993, with a replacement going up in 1995. The status of this project is unknown at this time. In March 1995, a Russian delegation visited Brazil and discussed specific cooperation programs and objectives.60
D. Indonesia
Due to its island geography, Indonesia has sought to develop an extensive satellite communications system, and was the first developing state to operate its own communications satellite (PALAPA A, 1976). The PALAPA B series (with 24 transponders per satellite), manufactured in the United States, and launched by a US launcher, began operation in 1983. The latest satellite, PALAPA B4, was launched in May 1992, and provides communications links for Indonesia, N.Guinea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. In the longer term, Indonesia has broader ambitions of becoming a major Asia-Pacific power in the area of technology, including space technology. However, independent launch and satellite development capabilities seem to be many years away.
E. South Africa
Prior to the regime change and election of Nelson Mandella, South Africa had an ambitious space development plan. The indigenous ballistic missile development program provided the basis for the production of an independent satellite launch capability.
Most of the South African effort in the 1980s and early 1990s was concentrated on the development of imaging satellites. Denel Aerospace has designed Greensat, which was initially planned as a military intelligence platform, but following the change in government, became a commercial venture, with an emphasis on environmental monitoring and land management.
As Gupta and other analysts have noted, this platform is clearly a dual use system capable of providing high-resolution military intelligence. According to published reports, the Greensat is to have a 1.8 meter GSD high resolution camera. Current plans call for the launch of GS-01 in late 1995, and a system of 3 satellites ("Greensense") is planned for late 1997 or 1998. (Prospective customers will negotiate for privileged use over certain regions.) The Greensense system will include a SAR (synthetic aperture radar) with the ability to provide images at night through cloud cover or other atmospheric disturbances. According to Gupta, this SAR system will be able to "resolve small structures that act as good electrical conductors or corner reflectors such as vehicles, aircraft, and buildings."61
However, in the wake of the changes in government in South Africa, and the broader political changes in the region, the future of this satellite and system is in doubt. The Mandella government has cut military and defense-oriented spending significantly, and government subsidies for Greensat are likely to be halted. The viability of a purely commercial imaging satellite, operated from South Africa, is questionable.
F. South Korea
South Korea currently operates a small space research program, but like other states, is interested in developing communications and imaging satellites. KITSAT-A is a 50kg. platform that includes a small communications relay and two charge coupled device imagers. It was built by the South Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, in collaboration with the University of Surrey (which designed the platform), and launched by an ESA Ariane launcher in 1992.62
KITSAT-B was placed into polar orbit in September 1993 aboard an Ariane launcher. It is based on the same platform as the KITSAT-1 satellite, and its payload includes an earth imaging and communications systems.63 As South Korea develops its indigenous military technology capability further, it is likely to also expand its space related activities. In the next decade, South Korea can also be expected to develop a local space launch system.
G. Pakistan
The Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), along with the Space Research Council (SRC) are responsible for this nation's space activities and development plans. In the past five years, SUPARCO has overseen the production and testing of sounding rockets, with an average of 3 or 4 launches per year and carrying high altitude and ionosphere research payloads. The 2-stage Shahpar launcher has a payload of 55 kilograms and reaches an altitude of 450 kilometers.64 In 1986, Pakistan contracted for the purchase of missile technology and a launch facility with an American firm (ISC Technologies), at a reported cost of $200-$300m. According to press reports, after 10% of the obligations were paid, Pakistan began to doubt if ISC could provide the assistance that had been anticipated, and apparently no useful technologies were transferred.65
SUPARCO is also active in sponsoring satellite development. The BADR-1 experimental digital communications satellite was launched by a Chinese Long March 2E in July 1990. It weighed 52 kilogram and had an orbital lifetime of 6 months. As in the case of Korea, the design for this micro-satellite was apparently based on the University of Surrey platform.66
As in the case of India and other states, Pakistan is also seeking to develop and operate remote sensing spacecraft. Officially, Pakistan claims to seek this capability in order to obtain data for precise mapping, flood control, pollution, and the location and development of mineral deposits and other natural resources. Despite a small budget ($7.5 million annually), Pakistan developed the BADR-B satellite, which employs a gravity gradient stabilization system, and carries a charge coupled device camera to test image transmission.67
II. Implications of Dual-Use Satellites For Regional Stability
As noted, many space-based and satellite systems are inherently dual-use technologies, with both civilian and military applications. Civil communications satellites can also be applied to military communications, and the information provided by navigation and meteorological satellites can be used by the military for planning maneuvers.68
Remote-imaging, earth observation and surveillance satellites are potentially the most important of these dual-use space systems. Dedicated reconnaissance systems had a major impact on the US-Soviet balance and played an important role throughout the Cold War. They can be used for defensive purposes, to provide early warning and information regarding attacks, as well as offensively through target location and related information. The US used satellite imaging intensively for monitoring events and deployments in the Soviet Union, as well as in regional conflicts. In the 1991 Gulf War, the use of space-based communications and reconnaissance systems were of prime importance to the US-led military effort.69 Similarly, the Soviet Union and, later, China70, developed extensive military reconnaissance capabilities and France is the process of deploying a similar system (Helios).
The intelligence provided by such satellites can be used both as a stabilizing and destabilizing factor. If intelligence strengthens early warning and crisis prevention or resolution, as well as anti-terrorist operations, it has a stabilizing effect. However, if used by an aggressor for target location, damage assessment in the context of attacks, or determination of order of battle, it can be very destabilizing .
The military potential of such satellites also depends on optical resolution, spectrum, orbital features, sun-angle, return time, etc. Of these, resolution is the major factor. In a broad sense, and for military reconnaissance purposes, satellite imaging capabilities can be divided into three categories, according to resolution.
-1)High resolution systems (four meters or less);
-2)Mid-level resolution (ten meters to four meters)
-3)Low-resolution (30 meters to ten meters)71
In general, systems with a GSD of four meters or less are defined as high-resolution imagers and have the greatest utility for intelligence purposes, although the area covered is also minimized.72 Characteristics of weapons systems, damage assessment, and even order of battle, require a resolution of 1 meter or less.73 In this category, the US and Russian military reconnaissance systems have the only currently available systems. The capabilities of the "emerging space competent states", like the commercial systems currently in operation, have significantly less sensitive optics.
Systems with resolutions of from 5 to 10 meters can also provide useful information. The SPOT system is the primary operational example in this category, and constituted the first dual-use imaging satellite.74 (As Krepon notes, while SPOT officials claim that the first-generation satellite "is not suitable for tactical purposes", their marketing efforts "clearly suggest some military applications".75) The first SPOT was launched in 1986, and included a panchromatic imager with a ground resolution of 10 meters, and a multispectral camera with 20 meter resolution. The latest in the series, SPOT 3, was launched in September 1993.
Images obtained from SPOT have been used for many national security-related purposes. For example, SPOT images were used to pressure the German government to end German industrial involvement in the construction of a chemical warfare plant in Rabta, Libya,76 and provided images of the CSS2 missiles Saudi Arabia purchased from China.77 There are indications that Iraq and Iran used SPOT images during their eight-year war.78 SPOT has also been used to obtain information regarding the Dimona nuclear reactor complex in Israel, sites in Iran and Iraq, and in the areas of Serbia and Bosnia.79 In a study involving the use of SPOT for observing military deployments in the Golan Heights, Jasani was able to identify anti-aircraft positions, barracks, perimeter fence locations, aircraft shelters, and other objects.80 SPOT also played an important role in revealing details of the situation at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor complex, and the distribution of these images demonstrated that inaccuracy of the official Soviet statements.81 (SPOT and LANDSAT images were embargoed during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, indicating that these images contained militarily useful information.82)
The Russian Soyuzkarta sells images from the Cosmos KFA-1000 and MK-4 and MFK-6 cameras, with resolutions of approximately 5 meters.83 (Russia also operates the KVR-1000 system, which has the potential of providing images 2 meters or less, but as Gupta notes, this system is also in use by the Russian intelligence community, many of the operating characteristics are unknown, and orders images take several weeks or months before they are filled). In 1978, the US government approved the licensing of commercial LANDSAT systems up to 10 meters resolution, but as of 1995, no such satellites had been built.84 (In 1998, this limit was removed as well.)
The military utility of systems with resolutions of between 30 meters and 15 meters is limited. This category includes LANDSAT (30 meters resolution), the European ERS (SAR 30m resolution), the Japanese JERS-1 (SAR-18m resolution) and the Russian ALMAZ, which uses synthetic aperture radar with a resolution of 15 meters. In addition, the ALMAZ 1, launched in 1991, carries an infrared radiometer with a resolution of 30m.85
Images at these resolutions are useful for detection of large area targets, such as space launching facilities, railroad yards, and coastal features. In 1985, Japanese defense analysts used LANDSAT images to identify improvements to a Soviet air based and to conclude that these improvements would allow the TU-22M Backfire bomber to be flown from this site.86 In addition, Norwegian academics sought to use LANDSAT images, with resolutions of 80 and 30 meters, to detect evidence of the Soviet naval build-up on the Kola Peninsula, with some apparent success.87 (LANDSAT images were also used to identify the oil wells that were ignited by Iraqi forces during their retreat from Kuwait in February 1991.88)
Thus, high-resolution satellite imaging systems with significant military impact still limited to the dedicated satellites of the primary space powers. However, the expected addition of a number of commercial high-resolution satellite imaging systems is likely to change this situation. Wider availability of satellite reconnaissance and space-based imaging, and increased resolution of commercial systems will increase their military impact. Satellite imaging is likely to contribute to instability in a number of regions.
High-resolution commercial imaging satellites, with resolutions under 5 meters, are currently being developed in the US, France, Russia, and Japan, as well as in Israel, and South Africa (as noted above).89 As Gupta notes, "States and political groups that do not have the advanced space systems for acquiring 'spy' satellite imagery will soon have the chance to buy the technological capability they lack."90
For example in 1992, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) submitted an application to purchase an imaging satellite from Litton/Itek. The Israeli government objected, arguing that after denying Israel assistance in obtaining reconnaissance technology, the US seemed to be prepared to supply the Arab countries with binoculars that will "enable them to see every military movement here."91 This was inconsistent with American pledges to guarantee the security of Israel and insure its technological superiority in order to offset the massive Arab quantitative advantage in weapons.92 Although the application was blocked by the US State department, it was endorsed by the space industry and its supporters in the US government.93
More recently, the proposed EYEGLASS project has aroused a great deal of controversy and debate. The EYEGLASS consortium was established in 1994, after the US government reviewed its policy and approved the sale of high-resolution satellite services. The satellite, which is scheduled for launching in 1997, will have a resolution of 1 meter, with potential coverage extending to an area of 14,400 kilometers.94
In late 1994, a Saudi company known as EIRAD acquired a major interest in the EYEGLASS venture, in return for exclusive rights to coverage in the Middle East. In response, the Israeli government expressed concern that this would give the Arabs, including Iraq, access to highly accurate intelligence information and threaten Israeli security and vital interests. In March 1995, the US government decided to study the matter in greater detail and to freeze the project during that period.95 In addition, Litton/Itek, one of American partners in EYEGLASS (since renamed OrbView) dropped out of the consortium, and its future is in some doubt.
A number of additional commercial ventures are planning to offer high-resolution satellite imaging. Earthwatch Inc. has announced plans to orbit a 3 meter system in 1996.96 In 1993, the WorldView Imaging Corporation received a license from the US Department of Commerce for the development of 3 meter resolution commercial imaging satellites, and two are currently under construction.97 Lockheed is developing the Space Imaging Satellite, with a planned GSD of 1 meter, and Alos, being produced by Japan, will have a 2.5 meter resolution.
Implications and Conclusions
While a detailed investigation of the impact of dual-use and dedicated military space systems in emerging space competent states is beyond the scope of this paper, some broad implications can be discerned. In the first place, the major and second-tier space powers - the US, Russia, France/Europe, China, and Japan will continue to be the dominant technological forces in the development and operation of these technologies and capabilities. Indian and Israeli launchers will develop slowly and remain limited with respect to payload and altitude. Due to the high costs and restrictions on technology transfer, other states with objectives aimed at developing space launchers, such as Brazil and Pakistan, are likely to remain earthbound for many years.
However, as noted, this will not limit access to space resources or operational capabilities. The availability of numerous and growing commercial launch services and the competition between them has increased the ability of many states to develop and operate satellite systems for various purposes. This group includes Brazil, Pakistan, South Korea, Indonesia, South Africa. In the next few years, this list is likely to grow.
As demonstrated in this paper, the impact on international security of the dual-use and dedicated military efforts of this group of emerging space competent states is very limited and likely to remain so. To the degree that an "arms race" or a military competition in space can be said to exist,98 it continues to be based on the activities of the first- and second-tier states.
The greatest short term impact of dedicated military space systems and dual-use technologies is in the use of high-resolution dual-use imaging satellites. As De Santis has noted, "given the persistence of territorial disputes and ethnic and religious tensions, ... the use of commercial observation satellites in other parts of the world may be more likely to foster than lessen conflicts in the 3rd world."99 This characterization is particularly true in the Middle East and South Asia regions.
However, as has been demonstrated in this paper, the impact of emerging space-competent states is small compared to first-tier commercial systems such as EYEGLASS (OrbView), improved SPOT, etc. The high costs of producing even limited systems with a few low-power and short-lived satellites will limit the independent capabilities of India, Israel, Brazil, etc. Thus, the impact of the commercial imaging satellite systems on global regional stability over the next decade is likely to be far greater than the systems developed by "emerging space-competent states".
In the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a number of proposals have been presented to limit the military impact of dedicated and dual-use space systems, in general, and of imaging satellites in particular. Some of these proposals are based on "greater transparency and predictability", and other forms of CSBMs in space.100 With respect to imaging satellites, proposals have been presented to create an international regime governing the use of these systems and the distribution of images.101
Strategically, however, space-related military technology and activities are linked directly to other forms of military deployments, both conventional and non-conventional. There is no technical or political basis for separating space technology from other areas or environments for the purposes of arms control and international limitations. This has always been the case for the major space powers (the US and USSR), and is also valid for the emerging space competent states.
The author would like to thank Yehuda Aspler for assisting in the research and writing of this paper.
References:
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Potter, Harlan W. Jencks eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, (Oxford:  Westview Press, 1993).  Gerald Steinberg, "Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining", (New-York: Praeger, 1983).  Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, Report by the Secretary-General,  (New-York: United Nations, 1993).  K. Subrahmanyam, "A View from the Developing World", in Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard  S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds., Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, (London:  Macmillan Press, 1990).  Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development?", World Politics, Vol.  38, January 1986.   Mary Umberger, "Commercial Observation Satellite Capabilities", in Commercial Observation Satellites and  International Security, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds.,  (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).  Peter D. Zimmerman, "Evidence of Spying", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1989, pp. 24-5.  Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf War,", in  John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements, (London: Vertic, 1992), pp. 230-240.  "Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957- 1993", Congressional Research Service Report to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of  Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, (Washington: US Government Printing  Office, 1994).  Endonotes:  1 "Space Activities of the United States, Soviet Union and Other Launching Countries/Organizations: 1957- 1993", Congressional Research Service Report to Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of  Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, (Washington: US Government Printing  Office, 1994). p.135  (Hereafter referred to as CRS).  2 Pericles Gaspaini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, (New- York: United Nations, 1992); Pericles Gasparini Alves, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: A Guide  to the Discussions in the Conference on Disarmament", (New-York: United Nations, 1991); Bhupendra Jasani  ed., Outer Space: A Source of Conflict or Co-operation?, (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1991); N.  Jasentuliyana, "Ensuring Equal Access to the Benefits of Space Technologies for all Countries", Space Policy,  February 1994.  3 CRS, p.93.  4 In general, the first tier consists of the two major space powers, the US and Russia, which are the only states  that are able to produce the full range of launchers and satellite systems.  The second tier of states includes  those with some, but not all of the capabilities for designing, operating, and launching satellites.  This group  includes China, France (and the ESA), and Japan.  The third tier consists of states with some independent  capabilities, including India and Israel, with considerable indigenous programs, and Brazil, Pakistan, South  Korea and other states with somewhat lesser local capabilities.  The problem of categorization is discussed by  Pericles Gaspaini Alves (Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security,(New- York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 9-10) and by Edmundo Fujita, in CSBMs and Outer Space Activities, edited  by Pericles Gasparini Alves, UNIDIR, forthcoming, pp. 77-8.  5 Satellite systems can also serve to support regional conflict resolution.  During the confrontation between  the US and Soviet Union, satellite monitoring provided the "National Technical Means" (NTM) for verifying  arms control agreements.  Similarly, such overhead reconnaissance and NTM could also monitor regional  limitation agreements, and can be useful in the context of confidence building measures. (See Gerald  Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining, (New-York: Praeger, 1983);  Bhupendra Jasani, "Commercial Observation Satellites and Verification", in Michael Krepon, Peter D.  Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, Mary Umberger eds., Commercial Observation Satellites and International  Security, (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p.142).   6 Report: 1980-81, Dept. of Space, Government of India, p.8.  7 Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Detection or Drift in Defense Policy?, (New York: Oxford Univ.  Press, 1994), p.201.  8 Raju G. C. Thomas, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Defense or Development ?", World Politics, Vol.  38, January 1986, p.339.  9 Ibid. (Thomas).  10 Smith, p.201; Amit Gupta, "Fire in the Sky", Defense and Diplomacy, January 1995.  11 Ibid. (Smith).  12 Pericles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security,  p.26.  13 Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter", Orbis, Fall 1991.  14 CRS, p.158.  15 CRS, p.158-9; Aviation Week and Space Technology (AW&ST) July 27, 1992; TRW Space Log, 1992,  p.11.    16 AW&ST Oct. 24, 1994.  17 CRS, p.158-9.  18 The resolution of a given imaging system is a function of a number of factors, and can vary according to  altitude, angle, weather conditions, sun-angle, contrast, etc.  In general, the use of this term is based on a  standard ground sample distance (GSD) covered by a single pixel.  See Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For  Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore  Laboratory, University of California, September 28, 1994, p.2.  19 AW&ST October 24, 94; TRW Space Log 1991, p.21.  20 AW&ST October 24,1994; Jeffrey Richelson, "Implications for Nations Without Space-Based  Intelligence-Collection Capabilities", in Michael Krepon et al., p. 68.  21 CRS, p.158.  22 Krepon, p.69.  23 CRS p.162; Ha'aretz (Israel) February 5, 1993.  24 Michael Krepon, "The New Hierarchy in Space", in Michael Krepon et al., p.27; Alves estimates the total at  $300m (1992 US$) for a "standard earth observation satellite" with a maximum resolution of ten meters.    25 Maariv April 6, 1995; The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.160; John Simpson,  Philip Acton, and Simon Crowe, "The Israeli Satellite launch", Space Policy, May 1989.  26 AW&ST, October 17, 1994.  27 Israel has agreed to accept the MTCR guidelines, but is not a formal member of the MTCR.  28 AW&ST Oct. 17, 1994.  29 Ha'aretz August 15, 1994.  30 Jeffrey Richelson, in Krepon, et al., p.67, citing  B. Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd Country Contra Aid",  Washington Post, May 19, 1984; Woodward, "Probes of Iran Deals Extend to Roles of CIA Director",  Washington Post, November 28, 1986.  31 Jane's Defense Weekly, October 1, 1988 (cited by Richelson in Krepon, et al, p.67).  32 John Kifner, "Israel Launches Space Program and a Satellite", New York Times, September 20, 1988,  (cited by Mary Umberger, "Commercial Observation Satellite Capabilities", in Krepon et al., p.13).  33 Michael Rotem, Jerusalem Post, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious threat'", November 19, 1992, p.1.  34 Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant.  35 CRS, p.161; Additional thrust is needed to achieve the extra 1200 mph of velocity needed to escape into  orbit from a westward launch, this restricted the size of the payload to 156kg. (John Simpson et al., Space  Policy, May 1989).  36 CRS, p.161.  37 AW&ST October 17, 1994.  38 IAI Press Release, "OFEQ-3" Technical Data, April 4, 1995.  39 Sharone Parnes, "Israeli Officials Decline to Discuss Role of Latest Ofeq", Space News, April 10-16,  1995.  40 Ibid.  41 Ha'aretz, Nov. 10 1993.  42 Ha'aretz, April 13, 1995, citing Foreign Report.  43 Sharone Parnes, "Israeli Officials Decline to Discuss Role of Latest Ofeq".  44 Steve Rodan, "Space Wars", Jerusalem Post Magazine, March 10, 1995. US officials reportedly agreed to  link image distribution policies to the limitation adopted by the US government for US licensed images;  Ha'aretz, May 7, 1995.  45 AW&ST October 17, 1994.  46 AW&ST February 21, 1994; AW&ST October 17, 1994.  47 CRS, p.162.  48 The START treaty required the decommissioning of Russian SS-25 missiles, and these are being  transformed into commercial space launch vehicles called Start-1 (CRS p.5).  49 CRS, p.162.  50 Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, p.13.  51 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World", International Security, Winter 84/85,    p.183.  52 The Non-Proliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1995, p.159.  53 Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, p.14.  54 IPRI 1990 Yearbook, Ch. 9, Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", p.377.  55 asani, "Review of National Programmes", in Bhupendra Jasani ed., Outer Space: A Source of Conflict or  Co- operation?, (Tokyo: UN University Press, 1991), p.97.  56 Ibid.  57 TRW Space Log, 1993, pp. 3-4.  58 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.22.  59 Pericles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security.  p.16.  60 Andrei Kurguzov, 3/4 TASS 29: APRIL 3 1994 ITAR-TASS.  61 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, p.12.  62 TRW Space Log, 1992, p.17.  63 TRW Space Log, 1993, p.19.  64 AW&ST Aug. 10, 1992.  65 SIPRI 1991 Yearbook, Ch. 9, Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", p.331.  66 Ibid.  67 AW&ST Aug. 10, 1992.  68 See Civil Space Systems: Implications for National Security, Stephen E. Doyle, editor, UNIDIR  (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994), pp. 81-107.  69 Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf War",  in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements (London: Vertic, 1992), pp. 230-240; see all remarks by Jeffrey Harris, director of  the United States National Reconnaissance Office, at the Space Foundation's 11th Annual Space Symposium,  Boulder, Colorado April 6 1995.  70 Through 1993, China had 33 successful launches, orbiting 36 satellites.  Most missions were not  announced and some were recovered on Earth after a few days, suggesting that they returned film images  presumably for military reconnaissance purposes (CRS p.137).  71 For weather information and other large-area features, such as smoke from bombing campaigns, or for  tracking large troop movements in the desert, even lower-resolution imaging systems have some military  utility.  See Vipin Gupta, "METEOSAT Imagery and the Second Gulf War" in John H. Poole and Richard  Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and Environmental Agreements, pp. 219- 229.  72 For a detailed analysis of the intelligence implications of different resolutions and other technical  characteristics, see Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.  73 Umberger in Krepon, p.10.  74 Other civil space systems, including both US and Soviet manned space flights, produced images that may  have been applied to military purposes.  However, these were generally not systematic and were not available  for purchase, as in the case of SPOT or LANDSAT.  75 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.22.  76 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.21.  77 Richelson in Krepon et al., p.55.  78 Krepon in Krepon et al., p.23.  79 Peter D. Zimmerman, "Evidence of Spying", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1989, pp. 24-5.  80 B. Jasani, "The Value of Civilian Satellite Imagery", Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1993.  81 See Krepon in Krepon et al., p.20.  82 Peter Zimmerman, "The Use of Civil remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-1991 Gulf  War,", in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of Arms Control and  Environmental Agreements, pp. 230-240.  83 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead,  p.3.  84 Ibid., p.4.  85 TRW Space Log, 1991, p.5.  86 See Richelson in Krepon, p.55.  87 Peter Zimmerman, "Remote Sensing Satellites, Superpower Relations, and Public Diplomacy", in Michael  Krepon et al., p.35.  88 Peter Zimmerman, in John H. Poole and Richard Guthrie, eds., Verification Report 1992: Yearbook of  Arms Control and Environmental Agreements, pp. 230-240.  89 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.  90 Ibid., p.2.  91 AWST June 21, p. 80; Ha'aretz, February 5, 1993; Michael Rotem, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious  threat', Jerusalem Post, November 19 1992, p.1.  92 See Dore Gold, US Policy Towards Israel's Qualitative Edge, (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 1992).  93 AWST June 21, p. 80; Ha'aretz, February 5, 1993; Michael Rotem, "Spy satellite for Arab Emirates 'serious  threat', Jerusalem Post, November 19 1992, p.1.  94 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, pp. 14-16.  95 Steve Rodan, "Space Wars".  96 Sharone Parnes, "Israelis Regroup after loss of Satellite on Russian Launcher", Space News, April 3-9,  1995, p.38.  97 Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead, p.4, 13-14.  98 Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space, p.78.  99 Hugh De Santis, "Commercial Observation Satellites, Alliance Relations, and the Developing World", in  Michael Krepon et al., p.83.  100 See Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, Chapter II.  101 See Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images For Sale: The Opportunities and Risks Ahead.

Tracking Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Legal Context | Secrecy News

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 00:39:00 +0000

Tracking Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Legal Context | Secrecy News:

Tracking Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Legal Context

December 5th, 2011 by Steven Aftergood

A new report from the Congressional Research Service explores ongoing legal debates over the tracking of private cell phones and vehicles by law enforcement agencies.

“It is undeniable that… advances in technology threaten to diminish privacy,” the CRS report says. “Law enforcement’s use of cell phones and GPS devices to track an individual’s movements brings into sharp relief the challenge of reconciling technology, privacy, and law.”

The 22 page CRS report provides a survey of relevant Fourth Amendment law, federal electronic surveillance statutes and case law, pending GPS-vehicle tracking cases, and electronic surveillance legislation that is before Congress.

“The primary debate surrounding cell phone and GPS tracking is not whether they are permitted by statute but rather what legal standard should apply: probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or something less,” the report says.

A copy of the CRS report was obtained by Secrecy News. See “Governmental Tracking of Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Confluence of Privacy, Technology, and Law,” December 1, 2011.

Twitter / @MedvedevRussiaE: The missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad is now operational

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Fri, 02 Dec 2011 23:31:00 +0000

Twitter / @MedvedevRussiaE: The missile attack early w ...:

The missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad is now operational - http://pic.twitter.com/kGddJRHO

@MedvedevRussiaEDmitry Medvedev

The missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad is now operational -pic.twitter.com/kGddJRHO

29 Nov via web

Retweeted by ira15091972 and 100+ others

IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Wed, 30 Nov 2011 19:10:00 +0000

IAEA Releases New Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program » FAS Strategic Security Blog

Stuxnet Worm Used Against Iran Was Tested in Israel - NYTimes.com

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Sun, 27 Nov 2011 19:06:00 +0000

Stuxnet Worm Used Against Iran Was Tested in Israel - NYTimes.com

Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay

By WILLIAM J. BROAD, JOHN MARKOFF and DAVID E. SANGER

Published: January 15, 2011

This article is by William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger.

The Dimona complex in the Negev desert is famous as the heavily guarded heart of Israel’s never-acknowledged nuclear arms program, where neat rows of factories make atomic fuel for the arsenal.

Over the past two years, according to intelligence and military experts familiar with its operations, Dimona has taken on a new, equally secret role — as a critical testing ground in a joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb of its own.

Behind Dimona’s barbed wire, the experts say, Israel has spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to Iran’s at Natanz, where Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say Dimona tested the effectiveness of theStuxnet computer worm, a destructive program that appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy, Tehran’s ability to make its first nuclear arms.

“To check out the worm, you have to know the machines,” said an American expert on nuclear intelligence. “The reason the worm has been effective is that the Israelis tried it out.”

Though American and Israeli officials refuse to talk publicly about what goes on at Dimona, the operations there, as well as related efforts in the United States, are among the newest and strongest clues suggesting that the virus was designed as an American-Israeli project to sabotage the Iranian program.

In recent days, the retiring chief of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, Meir Dagan, and Secretary of StateHillary Rodham Clinton separately announced that they believed Iran’s efforts had been set back by several years. Mrs. Clinton cited American-led sanctions, which have hurt Iran’s ability to buy components and do business around the world.

The gruff Mr. Dagan, whose organization has been accused by Iran of being behind the deaths of several Iranian scientists, told the Israeli Knesset in recent days that Iran had run into technological difficulties that could delay a bomb until 2015. That represented a sharp reversal from Israel’s long-held argument that Iran was on the cusp of success.

The biggest single factor in putting time on the nuclear clock appears to be Stuxnet, the most sophisticated cyberweapon ever deployed.

In interviews over the past three months in the United States and Europe, experts who have picked apart the computer worm describe it as far more complex — and ingenious — than anything they had imagined when it began circulating around the world, unexplained, in mid-2009.

Many mysteries remain, chief among them, exactly who constructed a computer worm that appears to have several authors on several continents. But the digital trail is littered with intriguing bits of evidence.

In early 2008 the German company Siemens cooperated with one of the United States’ premier national laboratories, in Idaho, to identify the vulnerabilities of computer controllers that the company sells to operate industrial machinery around the world — and that American intelligence agencies have identified as key equipment in Iran’s enrichment facilities.

Siemens says that program was part of routine efforts to secure its products against cyberattacks. Nonetheless, it gave the Idaho National Laboratory — which is part of the Energy Department, responsible for America’s nuclear arms — the chance to identify well-hidden holes in the Siemens systems that were exploited the next year by Stuxnet.

The worm itself now appears to have included two major components. One was designed to send Iran’s nuclear centrifuges spinning wildly out of control. Another seems right out of the movies: The computer program also secretly recorded what normal operations at the nuclear plant looked like, then played those readings back to plant operators, like a pre-recorded security tape in a bank heist, so that it would appear that everything was operating normally while the centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.

The attacks were not fully successful: Some parts of Iran’s operations ground to a halt, while others survived, according to the reports of international nuclear inspectors. Nor is it clear the attacks are over: Some experts who have examined the code believe it contains the seeds for yet more versions and assaults.

“It’s like a playbook,” said Ralph Langner, an independent computer security expert in Hamburg, Germany, who was among the first to decode Stuxnet. “Anyone who looks at it carefully can build something like it.” Mr. Langner is among the experts who expressed fear that the attack had legitimized a new form of industrial warfare, one to which the United States is also highly vulnerable.

Officially, neither American nor Israeli officials will even utter the name of the malicious computer program, much less describe any role in designing it.

But Israeli officials grin widely when asked about its effects. Mr. Obama’s chief strategist for combating weapons of mass destruction, Gary Samore, sidestepped a Stuxnet question at a recent conference about Iran, but added with a smile: “I’m glad to hear they are having troubles with their centrifuge machines, and the U.S. and its allies are doing everything we can to make it more complicated.”

In recent days, American officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity have said in interviews that they believe Iran’s setbacks have been underreported. That may explain why Mrs. Clinton provided her public assessment while traveling in the Middle East last week.

By the accounts of a number of computer scientists, nuclear enrichment experts and former officials, the covert race to create Stuxnet was a joint project between the Americans and the Israelis, with some help, knowing or unknowing, from the Germans and the British.

The project’s political origins can be found in the last months of the Bush administration. In January 2009, The New York Times reported that Mr. Bush authorized a covert program to undermine the electrical and computer systems around Natanz, Iran’s major enrichment center. President Obama, first briefed on the program even before taking office, sped it up, according to officials familiar with the administration’s Iran strategy. So did the Israelis, other officials said. Israel has long been seeking a way to cripple Iran’s capability without triggering the opprobrium, or the war, that might follow an overt military strike of the kind they conducted against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.

Two years ago, when Israel still thought its only solution was a military one and approached Mr. Bush for the bunker-busting bombs and other equipment it believed it would need for an air attack, its officials told the White House that such a strike would set back Iran’s programs by roughly three years. Its request was turned down.

Now, Mr. Dagan’s statement suggests that Israel believes it has gained at least that much time, without mounting an attack. So does the Obama administration.

For years, Washington’s approach to Tehran’s program has been one of attempting “to put time on the clock,” a senior administration official said, even while refusing to discuss Stuxnet. “And now, we have a bit more.”

Finding Weaknesses

Paranoia helped, as it turns out.

Years before the worm hit Iran, Washington had become deeply worried about the vulnerability of the millions of computers that run everything in the United States from bank transactions to the power grid.

Computers known as controllers run all kinds of industrial machinery. By early 2008, theDepartment of Homeland Security had teamed up with the Idaho National Laboratory to study a widely used Siemens controller known as P.C.S.-7, for Process Control System 7. Its complex software, called Step 7, can run whole symphonies of industrial instruments, sensors and machines.

The vulnerability of the controller to cyberattack was an open secret. In July 2008, the Idaho lab and Siemens teamed up on a PowerPoint presentation on the controller’s vulnerabilities that was made to a conference in Chicago at Navy Pier, a top tourist attraction.

“Goal is for attacker to gain control,” the July paper said in describing the many kinds of maneuvers that could exploit system holes. The paper was 62 pages long, including pictures of the controllers as they were examined and tested in Idaho.

In a statement on Friday, the Idaho National Laboratory confirmed that it formed a partnership with Siemens but said it was one of many with manufacturers to identify cybervulnerabilities. It argued that the report did not detail specific flaws that attackers could exploit. But it also said it could not comment on the laboratory’s classified missions, leaving unanswered the question of whether it passed what it learned about the Siemens systems to other parts of the nation’s intelligence apparatus.

The presentation at the Chicago conference, which recently disappeared from a Siemens Web site, never discussed specific places where the machines were used.

But Washington knew. The controllers were critical to operations at Natanz, a sprawling enrichment site in the desert. “If you look for the weak links in the system,” said one former American official, “this one jumps out.”

Controllers, and the electrical regulators they run, became a focus of sanctions efforts. The trove of State Department cables made public by WikiLeaks describes urgent efforts in April 2009 to stop a shipment of Siemens controllers, contained in 111 boxes at the port of Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. They were headed for Iran, one cable said, and were meant to control “uranium enrichment cascades” — the term for groups of spinning centrifuges.

Subsequent cables showed that the United Arab Emirates blocked the transfer of the Siemens computers across the Strait of Hormuz to Bandar Abbas, a major Iranian port.

Only months later, in June, Stuxnet began to pop up around the globe. The Symantec Corporation, a maker of computer security software and services based in Silicon Valley, snared it in a global malware collection system. The worm hit primarily inside Iran, Symantec reported, but also in time appeared in India, Indonesia and other countries.

But unlike most malware, it seemed to be doing little harm. It did not slow computer networks or wreak general havoc.

That deepened the mystery.

A ‘Dual Warhead’

No one was more intrigued than Mr. Langner, a former psychologist who runs a small computer security company in a suburb of Hamburg. Eager to design protective software for his clients, he had his five employees focus on picking apart the code and running it on the series of Siemens controllers neatly stacked in racks, their lights blinking.

He quickly discovered that the worm only kicked into gear when it detected the presence of a specific configuration of controllers, running a set of processes that appear to exist only in a centrifuge plant. “The attackers took great care to make sure that only their designated targets were hit,” he said. “It was a marksman’s job.”

For example, one small section of the code appears designed to send commands to 984 machines linked together.

Curiously, when international inspectors visited Natanz in late 2009, they found that the Iranians had taken out of service a total of exactly 984 machines that had been running the previous summer.

But as Mr. Langner kept peeling back the layers, he found more — what he calls the “dual warhead.” One part of the program is designed to lie dormant for long periods, then speed up the machines so that the spinning rotors in the centrifuges wobble and then destroy themselves. Another part, called a “man in the middle” in the computer world, sends out those false sensor signals to make the system believe everything is running smoothly. That prevents a safety system from kicking in, which would shut down the plant before it could self-destruct.

“Code analysis makes it clear that Stuxnet is not about sending a message or proving a concept,” Mr. Langner later wrote. “It is about destroying its targets with utmost determination in military style.”

This was not the work of hackers, he quickly concluded. It had to be the work of someone who knew his way around the specific quirks of the Siemens controllers and had an intimate understanding of exactly how the Iranians had designed their enrichment operations.

In fact, the Americans and the Israelis had a pretty good idea.

Testing the Worm

Perhaps the most secretive part of the Stuxnet story centers on how the theory of cyberdestruction was tested on enrichment machines to make sure the malicious software did its intended job.

The account starts in the Netherlands. In the 1970s, the Dutch designed a tall, thin machine for enriching uranium. As is well known, A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist working for the Dutch, stole the design and in 1976 fled to Pakistan.

The resulting machine, known as the P-1, for Pakistan’s first-generation centrifuge, helped the country get the bomb. And when Dr. Khan later founded an atomic black market, he illegally sold P-1’s to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

The P-1 is more than six feet tall. Inside, a rotor of aluminum spins uranium gas to blinding speeds, slowly concentrating the rare part of the uranium that can fuel reactors and bombs.

How and when Israel obtained this kind of first-generation centrifuge remains unclear, whether from Europe, or the Khan network, or by other means. But nuclear experts agree that Dimona came to hold row upon row of spinning centrifuges.

“They’ve long been an important part of the complex,” said Avner Cohen, author of “The Worst-Kept Secret” (2010), a book about the Israeli bomb program, and a senior fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He added that Israeli intelligence had asked retired senior Dimona personnel to help on the Iranian issue, and that some apparently came from the enrichment program.

“I have no specific knowledge,” Dr. Cohen said of Israel and the Stuxnet worm. “But I see a strong Israeli signature and think that the centrifuge knowledge was critical.”

Another clue involves the United States. It obtained a cache of P-1’s after Libya gave up its nuclear program in late 2003, and the machines were sent to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, another arm of the Energy Department.

By early 2004, a variety of federal and private nuclear experts assembled by the Central Intelligence Agency were calling for the United States to build a secret plant where scientists could set up the P-1’s and study their vulnerabilities. “The notion of a test bed was really pushed,” a participant at the C.I.A. meeting recalled.

The resulting plant, nuclear experts said last week, may also have played a role in Stuxnet testing.

But the United States and its allies ran into the same problem the Iranians have grappled with: the P-1 is a balky, badly designed machine. When the Tennessee laboratory shipped some of its P-1’s to England, in hopes of working with the British on a program of general P-1 testing, they stumbled, according to nuclear experts.

“They failed hopelessly,” one recalled, saying that the machines proved too crude and temperamental to spin properly.

Dr. Cohen said his sources told him that Israel succeeded — with great difficulty — in mastering the centrifuge technology. And the American expert in nuclear intelligence, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the Israelis used machines of the P-1 style to test the effectiveness of Stuxnet.

The expert added that Israel worked in collaboration with the United States in targeting Iran, but that Washington was eager for “plausible deniability.”

In November, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, broke the country’s silence about the worm’s impact on its enrichment program, saying a cyberattack had caused “minor problems with some of our centrifuges.” Fortunately, he added, “our experts discovered it.”

The most detailed portrait of the damage comes from the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington. Last month, it issued a lengthy Stuxnet report that said Iran’s P-1 machines at Natanz suffered a series of failures in mid- to late 2009 that culminated in technicians taking 984 machines out of action.

The report called the failures “a major problem” and identified Stuxnet as the likely culprit.

Stuxnet is not the only blow to Iran. Sanctions have hurt its effort to build more advanced (and less temperamental) centrifuges. And last January, and again in November, two scientists who were believed to be central to the nuclear program were killed in Tehran.

The man widely believed to be responsible for much of Iran’s program, Mohsen Fakrizadeh, a college professor, has been hidden away by the Iranians, who know he is high on the target list.

Publicly, Israeli officials make no explicit ties between Stuxnet and Iran’s problems. But in recent weeks, they have given revised and surprisingly upbeat assessments of Tehran’s nuclear status.

“A number of technological challenges and difficulties” have beset Iran’s program, Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, told Israeli public radio late last month.

The troubles, he added, “have postponed the timetable.”

This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:

Correction: January 17, 2011

An earlier version of this story misspelled, at one point, the name of the German company whose computer controller systems were exploited by the Stuxnet computer worm. It is Siemens, not Seimens.

A version of this article appeared in print on January 16, 2011, on page A1 of the New York edition.

Hypersonic weapon: New US bomb kills long before you hear it — RT

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Sun, 27 Nov 2011 05:44:00 +0000

Hypersonic weapon: New US bomb kills long before you hear it — RT:

Hypersonic weapon: New US bomb kills long before you hear it

Published: 18 November, 2011, 19:46
Edited: 19 November, 2011, 13:00

Like the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, the Pentagon's Falcon HTV-2 hypersonic plane is part of the Prompt Global Strike program (AFP Photo / Handout / Darpa)

TAGS:Arms, Military, USA, War

The US Army has tested a hypersonic missile, which travels six times faster than the speed of sound. It is part of a larger plan to have the capability to strike any place on the planet within an hour.

The missile, called the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW), was launched from Hawaii on Thursday, the Pentagon reported. A rocket delivered it to suborbital altitude, after which the glider went for its target on the Marshall Islands, some 3,700 kilometers away.

It hit less than 30 minutes later, which means its speed was at least 7,400 kilometer per hour, or about Mach 6. An aircraft must be able to fly faster than Mach 5, to qualify as hypersonic.

A Mach number is used to describe the speed of an object or a fluid in comparison to the speed of sound in that medium. Mach 1 means the object travels at the same speed as sound. However the speed of sound may vary depending on such conditions as temperature and composition, so the speed expressed in Mach number is also variable. The now-retired Concorde supersonic passenger planes used to fly at a cruising speed of about Mach 2.

The test was aimed at gathering data on "aerodynamics, navigation, guidance and control, and thermal protection technologies," the Pentagon said.

The AHW is one of several projects of the Prompt Global Strike program. It is aimed at developing several weapons which can be launched from American territory and reach their destinations within an hour.

On August 11 the US Air Force tested another hypersonic glider called the HTV-2. It is faster than the AHW, with speeds reaching 27,000 kilometer per hour. But unlike the Army’s vehicle, it does not work well – the test was aborted due to a technical failure.

The Soviet Union developed ramjet engines capable of hypersonic locomotion and even tested one design, which successfully reached Mach 5.7. The work was stalled by the collapse of the USSR, and no weapon using this technology was ever produced.

_____________________

See: Traditional Catholic Prayers: Pray for an alliance between Russia and the United States

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Wed, 16 Nov 2011 19:14:00 +0000

Link in title to FAS PDF: "The Concept of Space Combat"

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started. http://bit.ly/9b1VUO - notice that in this, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq didn't do any of the things that the West pretended he did, he was their boy after all. They knew that ahead of time. Also note that if he had taken advantage of DEFENSIVE space platform technology, HE WOULD HAVE WON THE WAR. I am sure that he was led to believe that the Americans weren't going to go as far as they did. The Amerikanski knife in the back of Iraq is just like Judas Iscariot betraying Jesus Christ. The betrayal had several elements and players in the part of Judas, Saddam and Oil and transnational drug dealing and Bush's Zapata Oil Company and the engineered attack on Kuwait and then of course 911. The innocent Iraqis and Afghanis and others are the ones who suffered and still are suffering. Concerning DEFENSIVE space platform technology, I hope those who haven't been conquered yet by unlawful invaders are paying attention.

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear and other and Space Weapons

The Concept of Space Combat

Whereas those who have the capability to control the air, control the land and sea beneath it, so in the future it is likely that those who have the capability to control space will likewise control the earth’s surface.

• Gen Thomas D. White

Chief of Staff, USAF, 1957

Imagine a different set of events leading to the 1991 Gulf War. First, imagine that Saddam Hussein was able to procure a reliable source of space-derived data.1 Or that his contract with Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (INPE) for a military reconnaissance satellite had been successful.2 Or, barring that, he might have contracted with France’s Matra Defence Space for the development and launch of a military reconnaissance version of their satellite pour l’observation de la terre (SPOT).3 Such capabilities would have allowed Saddam to monitor the deployment and beddown of all coalition forces. He could have targeted ports and airfields as forces arrived in-theater. He could have attacked Patriot batteries before they were operational. Even if he did not attack during the buildup, he would have never missed the “left hook,” which was key to the coalition strategy.

Along with the acquisition of ballistic missile technology and the development of nuclear and chemical weapons, imagine he had more aggressively pursued development of his indigenous space launch capability to launch militarily significant satellites.4 A space launch capability provides the foundation for conducting physical attacks on many military satellites, either through direct ascent or co-orbital antisatellites (ASAT). A preemptive space denial campaign could have negated US and allied capability to maintain their knowledge of the theater.5

With a space launch capability, Iraq could have had space-based weapons which could attack Persian Gulf neighbors or any member of the coalition, including the United States. Any simple reentry vehicle could have had profound psychological effects on the US population, as buzz bombs and V-2s did on the population of London in World War II. The US has never been attacked from the air and, certainly, never from space. Fortress America could have been vulnerable. At this writing, Iraq is rebuilding its ballistic missile research program at new laboratories and rebuilt research and development centers.6 Finally, imagine that the invasion of Kuwait didn’t stop at the Saudi Arabian border but pushed further south to Riyadh and beyond. Mobile Scuds could have been deployed south and used against airfields and ports, in effect strategically cutting off Saudi Arabia from the rest of the world. Without the “land carrier” of the Saudi Arabian peninsula, the strategic buildup of air and ground forces could not have occurred. In spite of the availability of aircraft carriers off the Saudi Arabian peninsula and air bases in Egypt and Turkey, and even intercontinental bombers based in the US, an air campaign would have been next to impossible to execute. Some other form of combat power “in the theater” would have been useful—perhaps precisionguided munitions based in space.

Any combination of these three scenarios would have, at least, reduced US strategic options and increased casualties. Any of these scenarios by itself would have significantly altered the outcome of the confrontation.

Today, the US has little or no way to deny space to its opponents. It has no active means of protecting its space order of battle.7 If forces are not deployed in an area of interest, a capability to strike from space might provide some strategic and tactical regional options.8

Definition and Relevance

Space combat can provide those options. Space combat employs space in the execution of missions. Space combat forces would provide commanders additional tools and methods for engaging an enemy. The missions of space denial, space strike, and space protection comprise space combat.9 Space combat is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force into, through, within, or from space.

This definition includes actions taken against space systems that are

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

100

not in space.10 Space denial is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force against enemy space systems to deny the enemy’s use of the space medium.11 Space strike is the hostile application of destructive or disruptive force from space against natural-body-based (earth, moon, and asteroid) targets.12 Space protection is the active, defensive application of destructive or disruptive force to defend friendly space systems.13 This essay examines the importance and usefulness of space combat and proposes a preliminary theory of space combat. It asserts that a theory of space combat is required to understand and effectively employ US space capabilities against existing and future space threats resulting from the proliferation of spacefaring technologies.

Space Combat Employment

Why is space combat useful? What operational utility does it bring to military operations? Space denial makes the high ground of space unavailable to an adversary. The most important current space missions are the force multipliers: surveillance and reconnaissance, warning, navigation, environmental monitoring (weather), and communications. The significance of these missions was not lost on the military forces of the world during Desert Storm.14 If an adversary possessed or had access to force multiplying space systems, friendly operations could be put at risk. Friendly forces could be under constant observation. Sensors of all varieties based in space could track force deployment and supply movement. This information could be decisive in an information dominance sense. Space denial allows friendly forces to operate without being observed. Other force enhancing space systems can benefit our adversaries. Enemy munitions could be precisely guided by Global Positioning System (GPS)-like signals. Satellite communications enhance theater operations when a communication infrastructure does not exist. Weather information from environmental monitoring satellites supports campaign planning and execution. A space denial capability removes the benefits such force enhancement systems provide.

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

101

Space denial also prevents the passage of enemy military platforms through space. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) are current candidates. These vehicles usually have an exoatmospheric phase where they are vulnerable to space denial weapons which could be ground- or space-based. Expendable space launch vehicles (SLV) are another type of platform to be denied. Closing space lines of communication prevents the deployment of new space platforms and the reconstitution of existing space systems. Reusable, recoverable space vehicles which take off vertically, like the space shuttle or the experimental single-stage-to-orbit Delta Clipper, or horizontally, like a US National Aerospace Plane or German Sanger, might also be likely targets if they are carrying force enhancing satellites or weapons deliverable from the vehicle.

Space strike brings a new set of war-fighting tools to terrestrial fights. Just as space-deployed systems provide space combat support capabilities to a surface fight, they can also provide offensive firepower. Space strike systems can provide an increased capability for prompt, intense, lethal or nonlethal, parallel attack against terrestrial (land, sea, and air) targets with minimum risk to allied personnel and minimum collateral damage. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory clearly sees a requirement for the future USAF to block large-scale attacks by large quantities of compact, ultra-precision munitions launched in inconvenient locations with only hours notice.15 One can postulate that future force postures will continue to move away from large, fixed overseas bases and the accompanying logistics support. Future US forces will be more expeditionary and will have to respond upon short notice. A premium will be placed on early show of force in an attempt to diffuse crises.16 Space strike forces could do that.

These capabilities could be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as across the spectrum of conflict. They could be used to deter, defend, and defeat. Space strike could be applied singularly as a show of force or independent flexible deterrent option, or integrated into joint, coalition, or combined operations.

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Space protection provides security to space systems beyond traditional passive defense mechanisms. Space systems based either in space or on the ground could be defended by space systems in space or on the ground. Space protection systems (counter-ASAT) could defeat antisatellites engaging our satellite or launch systems. Such systems are the P-51 escort fighters of the future, providing defensive firepower for our space force multipliers and space strike systems (the B-17s of the past).

The Significance of Space Combat

Why is the subject of space combat important? First, residual military space capabilities exist in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These capabilities could again threaten the US and allies or proliferate to other nations. The US may need to counter these capabilities. Second, space technologies are proliferating and third world countries are developing military space capabilities (combat and combat support). These countries could threaten the US and, again, the US may need counters.

Third, space combat concepts have existed since the time of sputnik and are part of US military doctrine and thought. But these ideas have not gone much past the conceptual and, in some cases, the experimental stage. Finally, in spite of past US attempts to acquire elements of space combat, like antisatellites and space-based ICBM interceptors, no US operational space combat capability exists today.

The Emerging Space Threat

Many nations learned a great deal from the Gulf War. They noted not only the significance of precision-guided munitions, but also the importance of space-based force enhancement. Access to space systems may make the difference between victory and defeat in future wars.

These nations are attempting to acquire space-derived data through their own military systems or through international commercial systems. In addition to learning the importance of access to

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space-derived data, they learned the importance of denying enemies access to space-derived data. Space combat support systems have become high-value targets.

The threat of observation can be most disarming for commanders, especially if their strategy is maneuver-oriented. An Air Force Space Command National Security Industries Association study stated that imaging systems have direct military utility in:

$ Technology verification of an enemy’s capabilities;

$ Analysis of terrain features for combat planning;

$ Surveillance of forces and their movements;

$ Targeting of hostile forces; and

$ Assessment of battle damage.17

Commanders can take some actions to minimize observations, but it will be impossible to totally avoid detection. Multiple sources of space data exist. Data can come from military, civil, or commercial satellites owned by the using country or owned by another country. Some nations have “intelligence-sharing agreements” or commercial arrangements with spacefaring nations. Other aspiring nations are pursuing indigenous capabilities.18 Space launch by itself is not a threat per se, but it is required for an indigenous space combat capability. A space launch capability enables the other space combat and force enhancement missions. Space launch technologies also enable ballistic missile development. Third tier states attempting to procure ballistic missile or space launch capabilities are Libya, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Taiwan, South Africa, and South Korea.19 A space launch capability is an incremental step toward a counterspace capability. If an enemy can launch a satellite, it can certainly launch an elementary antisatellite. A simple ASAT would consist of a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile. A more sophisticated one could employ a conventional or kinetic kill warhead which requires more accurate tracking, targeting, and guidance.

The only country, other than the US and FSU, to start the development of an ASAT capability was China, which conducted a

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co-orbital ASAT program up to the early 1980s. Except for Russia, no other country is openly pursuing a space strike or space protection capability. But with the proliferation of advanced space technologies, other countries may soon have this capability.

Current US Military Thought

about Space Combat

Current space combat thought is important to future resource allocation and to research and development decisions. Also, it will influence the employment of space weapons. Current US military thought is found both in official doctrine and in professional journals and other military writings. Official US military doctrine is beginning to address the integration of space operations into joint operations. Doctrine tends to focus on force enhancement and space support, though space combat missions are beginning to get more attention. Professional journals and other military writings have the same force enhancement slant, but more articles about space combat are beginning to appear.

Surface Service Thoughts on Space Combat

The three surface services (Navy, Marines, and Army) generally see military space operations in a force enhancement function. The US Navy is primarily interested in exploiting space for its force multiplier and information domination capabilities.20 However, the Navy has acknowledged the importance of space control as a contributor to battlespace dominance.21 Like the Navy, Marine Corps space thought is focused on the force-multiplying effects of space systems.22 The US Army credits the exploitation of space-based capabilities (along with other technological advances) with increasing “the lethality, range, accuracy and reliability of our weapons systems.”23 Brig Gen Robert Stewart, the Army’s first astronaut, captured the Army’s view on space: “The Army’s role will be what it’s always been: to assure proper support to the combat soldier. He is the element to project force on the battlefield, and everybody else in the Army exists to help him.”24 The Army sees the day when it will

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man “ground-based ASAT firing batteries” in support of USCINCSPACE.25 In spite of its work in strategic defense, the Army plans to exploit space in support of ground forces.

US Air Force Thoughts on Space Combat

In his article, “The Uniqueness of Space Doctrine,” Lt Col Charles Friedenstein said the 1979 version of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 “cracked the door on our use of force in space by stating that it should ‘enhance deterrence by developing the capability to deny or nullify hostile acts in or through aerospace.’”26 This type of space operation was called space defense. In 1982, AFM 1-6, Aerospace Doctrine:

Military Space Doctrine, became the first separate space doctrine. It officially acknowledged for the first time there were some “potential warfighting missions.”27 Space strike and space denial are clear missions. Both AFM 1-1 and variations of AFM 1-6 have evolved the space missions.28 The latest draft of Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 4, Air Force Operational Doctrine: Space Operations, appears to be a small doctrinal step forward. Though AFDD 4 seems to focus on enhancement capabilities and information dominance (e.g., information warfare, information combat, and integrated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition), it does introduce the concepts of integrated application of firepower (including the possibility of space strike), space-based BMD, and integrated air and space control.29

The Case against Space Combat

In spite of the argument for space combat power, the US is not falling all over itself to develop it. Several arguments against space combat exist. The first is the physical challenge of getting into space. The current fleet of SLVs and the space launch infrastructure are not designed to be tactically responsive.30 The existence of the Russian spacelift capability is proof that responsive launch is achievable. The Russian system may be more expensive (which is debatable) and not as technologically sophisticated as the US system, but it is militarily responsive.

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Second is the cost of spacelift. Individual space launches range in cost from tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars. The cost of launch may be the single greatest drag on the development and employment of space combat systems. In spite of this cost, some rudimentary space combat systems could be and have been developed; for example, the air-launched miniature homing vehicle antisatellite. The approach and cost of space launch are recognized problems that multiple recent studies have addressed.31 An associated challenge is that of maneuvering in orbit. Orbit changes can use up large amounts of fuel (which is either not replaceable or replaceable only at great cost). New propulsion technologies may be required for maneuverability. Inexpensive and responsive lift and on-orbit propulsion are required to employ space combat power. This approach assumes they will be available in the foreseeable future. The third challenge is the cost of space combat systems. The cost of development and test of space combat systems can be substantial, but perhaps the highest recurring cost is the cost of spacelift or launch. Thirty-three billion dollars were spent on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and not a single operational system was produced.32 Fourth, political resistance in Congress stifles the development of space combat systems. Congress has been concerned about the possible violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The ABM Treaty prohibits the basing of ABM weapons or detection devices in space. President Ronald Reagan, when he announced SDI, took a “broad interpretation [of the Treaty that] would have permitted virtually unlimited testing and development of spacebased ABM systems or components, provided they employed so-called ‘exotic’ technologies (other than missiles or radars).”33 President George Bush continued support for the broad interpretation in his SDI budget request, which would have funded both an allowable fixed ground-based ABM system and a space-based system using Brilliant Pebble interceptors.34 The Clinton administration has turned around the 10-year-old decision and has embraced the traditional or narrow interpretation of the treaty, which “prohibits the development, testing

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and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based and mobile land-based ABM systems.”35 A fifth challenge to space combat is technical viability. Many respected scientists and engineers doubt that space combat systems can be developed. After 10 years, the SDI did not produce the global protective umbrella originally promised by President Reagan. One final argument against space combat is that the employment of space combat weapons violates the self-imposed space sanctuary policy established by President Dwight Eisenhower. President Eisenhower wanted to preserve space for peaceful purposes. To establish the principle of freedom of space, to protect US satellites from interference, and to avoid an arms race in space, the US pursued the goals of protecting the right to collect data from space, which was particularly important during the early days of the cold war. This policy was at odds with the desire to develop space combat capabilities. When space combat threats developed, such as the Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system and the co-orbital ASAT, we did not respond with countermeasures or systems in kind. But the US deployment of ICBMs, experiments with ASATs since the 1960s, and the SDI program, all hint that the US has abandoned sanctuary doctrine.

Both the US and the FSU pursued space combat power during the cold war. The US abandoned its capabilities, but the FSU is still thought to have some residual capabilities. Evidence indicates that other nations may be pursuing at least the basic technology needed to conduct space combat. The US disarmed itself for political reasons and the political debate about space combat continues. The US military needs to debate and explore the significance of space combat even if the political debate is not encouraging.

Notes

1. This is a concern voiced after the war by the then commander of Air Force Space Command, Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman. He also argued “for an ASAT system to assure that just as US forces achieved control of the air and the battlefield, we can control space as well.” Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., “Space: A New Strategic Frontier,” Airpower Journal 6, no.1 (Spring 1992): 14–23.

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2. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Why Third World Space Systems Matter,” Orbis, Fall 1991, 569–70.

3. France developed a satellite called Helios for joint use by France, Spain, and Belgium.

4. In December of 1989, Iraq launched a vehicle for the announced purpose of launching satellites. Mahnken, 567.

5. This is an inference based on the importance observers are putting on space.

One source said about the Gulf War, “military experts are generally agreed that satellites helped to win the political battle, sustained command and control, shortened the war and saved lives. [Space’s] highly effective, economic and flexible capabilities will be needed even more in the increasingly volatile world of the future.” If space capabilities were, and will be, so useful, then denying the use of space would increase an adversary’s uncertainty on the ground. Sir Peter Anson, BT, and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal, Winter 1991, 53.

6. Iraq rebuilt its Saad research and development center near Mosul and built a new laboratory, Ibn al-Haytham, near Baghdad. Also, the Saudis intercepted a shipment of ammonium perchlorate, the oxidizer of choice for solid rocket boosters, from China. It was bound for Iraq via Lebanon. Thomas Sancton, “No Longer Fenced In,” Time, 23 May 1994, 37–38.

7. With the exception of a few on-orbit spares and a few extra satellites in storage on the ground, which might take months to launch, the US has no means to reconstitute our space order of battle if it came under attack. For an outstanding discussion of this strategic problem, see Maj Jeffrey L. Caton, Rapid Space Force Reconstitution: Mandate for United States Security, Research Report no. AU-ARI-94-4 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1994).

8. For another scenario-based argument for space combat capability, see Lt Col Michael E. Baum, “Defiling the Altar: The Weaponization of Space,” Airpower Journal 8, no.1 (Spring 1994): 52–62. The term space combat is not used in Colonel Baum’s article.

9. These are nonstandard terms. Hopefully, the author’s terms are more complete.

10. This is the author’s definition and is a composite of official and unofficial definitions for the medium of space. It is surprising, but there is no official definition of combat in Joint Pub 1-02. There are multiple definitions using the word combat without defining it. Army Regulation 310-25 does not include the definition of combat. The USAF Dictionary and the Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms contain definitions of combat. Col T. N. Dupuy’s book has a very comprehensive definition of military combat. Appendix A has all of these definitions. Joint Pub

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

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23 March 1984; AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, 15 October 1983; Woodford A. Heflin, ed., The United States Air Force Dictionary (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1956); John Quick, Dictionary of Weapons and Military Terms (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973); and Col T. N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987).

11. Space denial is an expanded form of offensive counterspace. Defensive counterspace includes both passive and active defensive operations or designs.

12. Space strike is an expanded form of force application, which includes attacks on other heavenly bodies besides the earth.

13. This definition excludes the active countermeasure of maneuver, but includes the use of electronic warfare to defend space systems.

14. Mary C. FitzGerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, August 1993), 19.

15. Lowell Wood, “The US Air Force in 2020,” SPACECAST 2020 lecture, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 27 October 1993, 8.

16. Deputy for Development Planning, Space and Missile Systems Center, “An Evolving Focus for Military Missions in Space, 1995–2020,” vol. 1, Executive Summary, 50–51.

17. Rich Poturalski et al., Space Combat Panel Final Report: An Advocacy Plan for Future Space Combat Capabilities, National Security Industrial Association (NSIA) Space Study 1992 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: NSIA, February 1993), 15.

18. Mahnken, 565–66.

19. Ibid., 564, 573.

20. The Navy’s vision white paper, . . . From the Sea, states that “our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize exploitation of space and electronic warfare systems to provide commanders with immediate information, while denying and/or managing the data available to our enemies.” The paper focuses on information collection, but is silent on communications and environmental monitoring applications in spite of the fact the Navy depends on space for these functions. Department of the Navy, . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21^st Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 8.

21. The white paper makes a quick reference to using “space-based assets to achieve dominance in space” as a part of battle space dominance, but does not elaborate on how this is to be achieved. . . . From the Sea, 9.

22. The US Marine Corps basic doctrinal manual, FMFM 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989, is silent on space operations. The section on combined arms could be interpreted to include operations in space. A second manual, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, does refer to space operations, but in support of combat operations. It lists space forces as one component of US military

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110 posture for national defense. The focus of these forces is force enhancement. The section on projection forces is silent on space combat options. FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, 21 June 1991, 2-3 and 2-7.

23. FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, 2-3.

24. Quoted in “Space Primer,” Soldier, April 1987, 8.

25. Heike Hasenauer, “Army Takes the Lead in ASAT,” Soldier, August 1989, 13–20.

26. Quoted in Lt Col Charles D. Friedstein, “The Uniqueness of Space Doctrine,” Air University Review 37, no. 1 (November–December 1985): 15.

27. AFM 1-6, Aerospace Doctrine: Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982, 8.

28. First, no space role is suggested or discussed under force application.

Spacelift is listed as force enhancement in an attempt to closer associate it with airlift. Launching satellites doesn’t seem to be in the same category as providing communication and navigation support. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 6–7.

29. Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 4, Air Force Operational Doctrine:

Space Operations (draft), November 1993, 7, 11, 14, 19, 27–28.

30. Caton.

31. In spite of all these studies, only incremental improvements in responsiveness, cost reductions, and increased throw weight have been identified. Real improvements may require revolutionary approaches. See Lt Col John R. London

III, LEO on the Cheap: Methods for Achieving Drastic Reductions in Space Launch

Costs, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June 1993).

32. An argument can be made that SDI was a technologically driven program, not an operationally driven one. Lots of good ideas and science came out of it, but no systems.

33. Dunbar Lockwood, “Administration Backs ‘Narrow’ Interpretation of ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today, September 1993, 22.

34. Pat Towell, “Nunn Assails Bush’s Request for Space-Based Weapons,” Congressional Quarterly, 11 April 1992, 962. See also Pat Towell, “Bush Carries on Fight for SDI, but Space Weapons in Doubt,” Congressional Quarterly, 6 July 1991, 1836–44.

35. Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Clinton Hews to Narrow View on ABM Treaty,” Congressional Quarterly, 17 July 1993, 1894.

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_____________________________________________

Extremely Important Links with more Links contained therein.

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The Nuclear Weapon Archive A Guide to Nuclear Weapons

Federation of American Scientists WMD Resources

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FAS Status of World Nuclear Forces

FAS States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence Threat Assessments FAS Strategic Security Blog

Wall Street Journal: Man 1/3rd Bin Laden's age in his place and Crashed Copter Sparks Concern About Secrets

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Fri, 11 Nov 2011 04:05:00 +0000

Link: Man 1/3rd Bin Laden's age in his place. Makes sense, since Osama "Tim Osman" Bin Laden has been dead since 2001 at Tora Bora.

Crashed Copter Sparks Concern About Secrets

By NATHAN HODGE

Reuters

The destroyed helicopter's tail rotor sits near the compound where U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden.

WASHINGTON—The crash of a helicopter involved in the raid on Osama bin Laden's Pakistani hideout has prompted intense speculation about whether the aircraft was specially modified to fly stealthily—and whether its remains could offer hostile governments clues to sensitive U.S. military technology.

According to U.S. officials, two Black Hawk helicopters carrying Navy SEALs landed in the compound in Abbottabad, while two other helicopters circled overhead. One Black Hawk was disabled during the landing, and had to be destroyed by the commandos.

However, remnants of the helicopter, including a nearly intact piece of its tail, suggested that the aircraft involved in the raid wasn't the typical MH-60 Black Hawk flown by special-operations forces. Aviation experts who scrutinized photos of the scene say the tail had unusual features that suggested the helicopter had been extensively modified to fly quietly, while appearing less visible to radar.

WSJ's Julian Barnes profiles the Navy's Commando forces. The squads, such as the Navy SEALs force that stormed Osama bin Laden's compound, have been been increasingly used in Afghanistan. (Photo by John Moore/Getty Images)

The U.S. military has tried in the past to build a stealth helicopter, but has kept secret if it has indeed succeeded.

The wreckage in Abbottabad appeared to have exotic coatings and distinct surfaces and edges reminiscent of stealth aircraft such as the B-2 bomber and the F-22 fighter, aviation experts say. Equally important, they pointed to an unusual dishpan-shaped cover over the tail rotor, perhaps designed to make the aircraft quieter.

"The odds are fair—based on my knowledge of the subject area—the vast majority of the special MH-60s aircraft were purpose-built to make those aircraft as stealthy as they could possibly be," said Jay Miller, an author who has written extensively about stealth aircraft.

Mr. Miller said the remnants of the aircraft suggested extensive use of nonmetallic composite parts, which reflect less radar energy. Likewise, he said the tail's remains suggested that it was designed to shroud or mask metal parts, which are much more visible to radar.

After the Raid

While President Obama decided not to release photographs of Osama bin Laden's body, other photos taken at the compound were released by Reuters.

View Slideshow

The Compound

Diagram from the U.S. government

View Interactive

Photos inside and out

View Slideshow

Anjum Naveed/Associated Press

U.S. forces found Osama bin Laden at this compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, about 40 miles outside Islamabad.

In addition, experts said the tail rotor's design suggested an effort to reduce the "acoustic signature" of the helicopters—in other words, to make them fly more quietly.

Rex Rivolo, a former Black Hawk aviator and helicopter expert, said the distinctive noise of a helicopter's rotor blades is "the signature that gives you away."

Mr. Rivolo said the military had studied a number of methods for reducing helicopter noise, including pairing helicopters with unmanned aircraft to cancel out noise.

But he was skeptical about how far those efforts had advanced.

"It's really never materialized," he said. " 'Whisper mode' just doesn't exist."

The U.S. Army spent billions developing the Comanche, a stealth-helicopter project canceled in 2004. Two prototypes were developed, but Comanches were never fielded because of their high price.

Stealth features would have been particularly important in the bin Laden mission: The Navy assault team presumably wanted to give those in the compound as little warning as possible.

In addition, the commandos entered Pakistani air space without permission of the Pakistani authorities; the longer it took for the Pakistani military to realize the helicopters were there, the less likely they would interfere in the U.S. mission.

The recovery of the tail by the Pakistanis raised questions about whether some of the unique technology may have fallen into the wrong hands.

Rep. Howard "Buck" McKeon (R., Calif.), the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, told reporters Thursday he was unaware of any efforts to retrieve the tail. He said there wasn't much left of the aircraft after the SEALs blew it up, said a staffer who was present. The Pentagon declined to comment on the downed helicopter.

Black Helicopters What are they doing in Napa? By Harry V. Martin

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Fri, 11 Nov 2011 03:58:00 +0000

From bottom of this article.

"EDITOR'S NOTE: Harry Martin was formerly the editorial director of Military Electronics Countermeasures, Defense Electronics, Microwave Systems News, International Countermeasures Handbook, and publisher of Defense Systems Review and Military Communications."

OK, that settles it, there are Black Helicopters. Now the question is, how did the Air Force lose so many of them to the CIA and the transnational drug runners? Hmmm?!

Black Helicopters

What are they doing in Napa?

By Harry V. Martin

Copyright FreeAmerica and Harry V. Martin, 1995

The United States Air Force has confirmed that those mysterious helicopter flights over Napa County are classified operations. The helicopters are supplying what appears to be a secret base located on Bureau of Land Management property, without the knowledge or permission of the Bureau. The U.S. military has not informed Napa County, nor has it indicated anything on FAA/Military maps.Aerial shots taken this weekend over the 87 acre Bureau land near Oakville Grade show large cement bunkers with large concrete doors, a new road, freshly graded, and some underground facility. The satellite link-ups have geo-synchronized microwave dishes pointing straight up. There are approximately 8 to 10 dishes on the tower, which is not shown on any FAA map.
The aerial shots would indicate that a lot of government money has gone into the building of this secret base in Napa. The structure is virtually near the top of a mountain. The military helicopter overflights are apparently supplying the underground facility.
The cargo helicopters, however, are only part of the traffic. Black helicopters without markings have been making 3 a.m. flights to the facility. There are several black helicopters at Hamilton Air Force Base, but all of them have some identifying marking, particular FBI markings. One helicopter only has a Playboy bunny marked on its tail.
The Air Force will not comment on the helicopters, only stating, "The helicopter traffic over the Napa Hills is a classified operation."
The Sentinel acknowledges the valuable assistance of Mike Jamieson for supplying films of the location.
But what type of military base is in the Napa hills and what is its function? That will be part of a series commencing on September 1, exclusive reports from within the military and intelligence community.

Black Helicopters

By Harry V. Martin

Copyright, Napa Sentinel 1992

A secret installation near the Oakville Grade is being used by the United States Government for three purposes. Increased helicopter traffic is directly linked to this installation.
The installations and helicopter traffic serve the following purposes:
Direct satellite communication.
Continuity of the U.S. Government in case of nuclear attack or other disasters.
Secure communication links with the outside world in the event of a disaster.
The helicopter traffic over the last year has been provisioning an elaborate underground complex designed to hold government officials, scientists and other high echelon personnel in the event of an emergency. The helicopters have been transporting generators, food stock, electronic and communications equipment, and other items to the site.The secret government site is replacing other installations and combining them into one solid underground center. An installation at Benicia is considered too marginal and vulnerable. Its functions have been transferred to Napa. An underground facility in Ukiah, an old railroad tunnel, was not serving the full purpose. The remote area of Napa was selected to combine the functions of the Ukiah and Benicia facilities into a more secure area. Napa is considered to be safe from the nuclear fallout zone of targeted areas in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The facility in the Napa hills is heavily fortified and protected with thick concrete. Its microwave tower is pointed toward Santa Rosa, where AT&T has secure communications links. The microwave dishes are to guarantee government officials with direct access to national communication links. The government has always relied on AT&T for those links.
The satellite dishes make direct communication with geosynchronized satellites at regular time intervals. The communication linkage is by laser, which accounts for the constant reports of light beams and flashes in the area. The operation in Napa County is classified according to the United States Air Force.
The area has been serviced by unmarked helicopters for some time. There have been other helicopter overflights, some as part of the Drug Enforcement Agency sweep and others are National Guard training missions. But the main and constant force has been to supply this secret installation.
The United States Government has similar installations all over the nation. These facilities are all located in remote areas which would not normally be targeted by enemy nations for a nuclear strike. Napa Valley's wine growing areas provide a good cover for such an installation.
Similar helicopter traffic has been reported in other areas of California and the west, which indicates the government is creating new facilities or is preparing for some type of disaster or upheaval.
The helicopters used in Napa are olive drab and also black, all unmarked. The olive drab helicopters originate from Hamilton Air Force Base and operate generally in late afternoon and in the evening. The black helicopters generally operate in the late evening and early morning hours. The olive drab helicopters are providing supplies to the secret installation, but the black helicopters are providing direct laser communication to satellites.
Hamilton Air Force base has confirmed that the helicopters originate from their area and that the mission is classified.
Black Helicopters

What they are doing in Napa

By Harry V. Martin

While KVON radio's news department and the "Johnny-come-lately" Napa Valley Register wallow in whether or not a telephone tower in Sonoma County has anything to do with the increased flight of helicopters in Napa County, the Sentinel has obtained over 200 pages of unclassified and secret documents which outline the purpose of a special communications and government continuity base in the Napa hills.
The documents, which focus on 26 unclassified reports, 1 "for official use" report, and 14 secret reports, relate specifically to continuity of government and emergency telecommunication systems. Participating with the government is this classified nationwide emergency telecommunications Service for National Security Telecommunications ITT, AT&T, COMSAT, MCII and TRT.
Plans went into motion in 1988 and 1989 to ensure secure national and international communications and the continuity of government in case of war or disaster. The plan is being implemented throughout the nation, with similar helicopter traffic and construction of facilities. For national security reasons, much of the work is done in secret.
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Commission reactivated the Commercial Satellite Survivability Task Force to assist the government and recommending secure telecommunications systems that would survive any disaster. The systems are used not only in case of war, but also when disasters such as hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes destroy existing commercial telecommunication facilities.
The government asked the group for international augmentation from an interexchange carrier switch via an international gateway satellite earth station. The foreign end users identified in the report are senior U.S. civilian and military officials overseas. The problem that existed was that foreign satellites do not operate with the same type of equipment used in the United States. Satellite earth stations working together in an international link are owned and operated by different companies and agencies.
When the INTELSAT is used incompatibility is at a minimum, but when CCITT systems are used, there are major incompatibilities to be overcome. The construction of new systems is part of a 12-point plan:
That the Government establish a commercial satellite communications survivability program which will satisfy National Security requirements.
That the Government establish a Commercial Satellite Survivability (CSS) Program Office to coordinate the program within the Government.
That the CSS Program Office, in conjunction with the planning arm of the NCM, should undertake a program to develop emergency control plans and procedures to assure the capability to coordinate the restoration of commercial satellite communications service under emergency conditions.
The development of a capability for communications interoperability at critical earth stations to maintain emergency communications networks.
The development of a capability utilizing the Date Encryption Standard algorithm to protect critical digital communications links if communications protection over commercial satellite systems is required by the Government.
The development of a capability to enhance the survivability of satellite control systems through actions to achieve command link protection.
The development of control interoperability between satellite systems to control the commercial communications satellite assets under emergency conditions.
The development of capabilities which increase physical security of satellite control facilities and communications earth stations.
The CSS Program Office should initiate a study which would assess the susceptibility of existing commercial satellite communications systems to nuclear effects and provide recommendations which would established hardening guidelines for further commercial satellite programs.
Development of a transportable terminal capability to enhance survivability and restoral of critical satellite communications systems.
Enhancement of control survivability through the development of transportable TT&C terminal facilities.
Development of a capability for Ku-band communications interoperability at critical earth stations to maintain emergency communications networks.
Napa is not alone in this area in participation of the program, units exist through Pac Bell's access tandem in Vallejo and also in Benicia and Santa Rosa. These units can patch in or over disrupted communication ground lines. The main continental United States (CONUS) focuses on the west coast traveling to the east coast and back again. CONUS contour maps show a major segment of that critical beam is located on or near Napa.
On Tuesday, the Sentinel published an article outlining the purposes and scope of the local project and its relationship with the helicopter traffic. In summary, the article stated the purpose of a secret installation in Napa served by the helicopters was for:
Direct satellite communications.
Continuity of the U.S. Government in case of nuclear attack or other upheaval.
Secure communication links with the outside world in the event of a disaster.
The helicopter traffic over the last year has been provisioning an elaborate underground complex designed to hold government officials, scientists and other high echelon personnel in the event of an emergency, similar facilities are active all over the United States. The local installation is combining and replacing installations from Benicia to underground railroad tunnels in Ukiah.There is no sinister plot involved. The site was selected because Napa is considered to be safe from the nuclear fallout zone.

Black Helicopters, they do exist, despite local media scorn

Links with FEMA and Wackenhut Corporation

By Harry V. Martin

EDITOR'S NOTE: During the summer months, the Napa Sentinel published a series of articles on black helicopters and a clandestine government base operating in Napa County. Through nationwide radio programs and other contacts, the Sentinel has been able to accumulate substantial information to show that Napa was not exclusive in the helicopter-clandestine base scenario. Such activities have been reported all across the United States. This article concerns those other sightings.

They are black, unmarked and generally fly late at night. This is one type of helicopter traffic reported over Napa this year - regular and steady. Local air commanders have never confirmed the origins of these helicopters.
The local media, despite receiving reports of such activities themselves, have attempted to make a farce out of the numerous reports. The Napa Valley Register attempted to pooh-pooh the reports as from crazed UFO followers and used a PacBell repeating station photograph to "discredit" any clandestine base. KVON radio, which originally confirmed the helicopter flights, just recently qualified their previous reports by stating "if" such helicopters existed. Neither media has made any serious attempt to trace the origins or pattern of the helicopter traffic.
The Napa Sentinel reported the flight patterns, interviewed eyewitnesses, talked to military and intelligence sources, and provided a scenario for the entire phenomenon. Since that period of time, however, reports have surfaced across the country. Black helicopters overhead, unmarked. In a few ground sightings, the occupants of the helicopters have been described as men wearing black uniforms carrying automatic weapons. The helicopters appear almost unreachable.
In the Watsonville area, one such helicopter landed. Law enforcement officials went to investigate but left the scene when encountering armed men in black uniforms. "We had black helicopters come over here every day," states several Massachusetts families. "They were just plain black, with no markings."
A Paris, Texas-based group, "These mystery helicopters are almost always without identifying markings. The aircraft are frequently reported flying at abnormal, unsafe or illegal altitudes. They may shy away if witnesses or law officers try to approach. But there are several accounts of aggressive behavior on the part of the helicopter occupants."
These type of helicopters have also been reported over Loring, Maine, Wurtsmith, Michigan and Malmstrom, Montana, as well as northeastern New Mexico. Military officials in Colorado state that black helicopters seen in their area do not belong to the military. When the FAA was asked to investigate black helicopter traffic over New Mexico, Freedom of Information Act requests show they had no investigation on file. Yet, the FAA did have investigators in the field taking depositions from individuals.
Thomas Adams of Texas has spent a lot more time investigating the black helicopter mystery than the Sentinel has. He has listed hundreds of sightings from all over the country. In fact, the Napa Sentinel is not the only media to be investigating black helicopter traffic. Major TV and print media in Colorado, the Los Angeles Times, KLTV-TV in Tyler Texas, the Kilgore News Hearld in Texas, the Denver Post, the reports go on and on, in Colorado, Texas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, Oklahoma, Kansas, Illinois, South Dakota, Arkansas, Alberta, Wisconsin, Berkeley, California, Missouri, Arizona, Minnesota. Law enforcement officials in various states have also investigated the black helicopter traffic.
The bulk of the helicopter traffic is seen throughout the United States from August through October, with some heavy activity in February, July, November and December. Reports have been received from Monterey and Southern California, as well. Colorado appears to have the heaviest concentration of black helicopter traffic, with Texas being second.
Communities and publications in these areas confirm or suggest the existence of underground facilities serviced by helicopters. "The small amount of published evidence that is available indicates that the great majority of these underground bases are for use by government agencies in the event of nuclear war," states one publication. The agencies associated with these underground facilities include the Pentagon, CIA, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Security Agency (NSA).
In May 1992, revelations came to the surface that a large secret government bunker was located under the rich Greenbriar Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. It had been hidden there for years. Only six members of Congress knew about the living quarters, meeting rooms and banks of computers and communications equipment installed underneath the posh hotel. It contains two giant blast doors, each weighing more than 20 tons, supplied with water, electricity and even a sewage treatment system. It also had an infirmary, shower facilities, a television studio, radio and communications equipment, phone booths and code machines, a dining and kitchen area, a power plant and even a crematorium for disposing of the corpses of those who might die inside the sealed bunker.
FEMA also operates a number of underground bunkers across the country. Such installations are usually surrounded by high fences and patrolled by armed guards. Only a few of the buildings appear above ground. At least 96 underground centers have been secretly funded by the United States Government.
A Chicago-based source with high credentials in such investigations, claims that the black helicopters are not a military operation, but rather are operated by the Wackenhut Corporation and FEMA. Wackenhut is a private company that provides security in prisons, hospitals, government installations and other facilities. It was founded by former FBI agents and has been called the modern "Robocop" organization. FEMA, has broad emergency powers. It was created by President Jimmy Carter and has the ability to virtually take over the country or any region in a disaster. With FEMA and the private Wackenhut army teamed together, neither are regulated by too many outside authorities.
Though the helicopter traffic over Napa eased after the series of media articles and broadcasts, they have reappeared again. In one eye-witnessed incident, at least four of the black helicopters focussed for hours on a site off of the Oakville Grade, northwest of the Fire Station near Dry Creek Road.
While Napa is in its infancy in investigating black helicopters (and some of the local media acting in infantile ways about the subject), the mysterious black helicopters are a well-talked about and well-written about phenomena in many other western states. Stay tuned.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Harry Martin was formerly the editorial director of Military Electronics Countermeasures, Defense Electronics, Microwave Systems News, International Countermeasures Handbook, and publisher of Defense Systems Review and Military Communications.

Secret Stealth Helicopters in Osama bin Laden Raid

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Fri, 04 Nov 2011 19:21:00 +0000

A crashed non-existent extremely stealthy black helicopter. Non existent helicopter and non existent Tim Osman al-CIA-Qaeda leader who was buried at sea to prevent any identification of him since they got him already in 2001 at Tora Bora after 20 years plus work for the CIA and the Bush Oil and Drugs Cartel. Now repeat after me, there are NO black helicopters and al-CIA-Qaeda can leap over the Twin Trade Towers in a single bound. Yeah sure.

Based on the wreckage of one Blackhawk helicopter that was used in Bin Laden raid and destroyed with explosives by the Seals after it landed heavily at Bin Laden's compound and got damaged, many military analysts believe the aircraft involves hitherto unknown modifications to reduce its radar visibility and muffle noise.

According to one former air expert, the distinctive hard-angled shape of this destroyed Blackhawk didn’t look like a traditional Black Hawk but resembled the fuselage of the F-117 Stealth Fighter, which was created to deflect radar.

Because the U.S. didn’t warn Pakistan about the attack for fear of leak, the helicopters had to fly to the compound from their base in Afghanistan without being alerted by Pakistan’s military.

Experts also mentioned that a circular cover over the helicopter’s tail rotor could dampen noise to make people on the ground hardly recognize the helicopter’s arrival. Some people living near the area said they didn’t hear the helicopters until they were almost directly overhead. The rear end bears no resemblance to that of the Black Hawk typically used by the:

U.S. special forces

An image of the UH-60 Black Hawk, a workhorse with U.S. forces including the Army, Navy and Airforce

In order to kill the Osama bin Laden, the military team arrived in two helicopters, that were officially descried as Blackhawks, the Sikorsky-made US military's workhorse helicopter for the past 30 years. The Pentagon now refuses to answer questions related to the Blackhawks used in the Bin Laden raid.

The rotor of the crashed “stealth” helicopter (left) from Sunday's raid and a close up of a standard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter

The aircraft has distinctive features including the smooth and angular outer shell, covered rotor blades and pointed rear end

A writer for website Defense Tech suggested that the aircraft was a modified version of the MH-60 Black Hawk, which was manufactured by Sikorsky and first entered service with the U.S. army in 1979.

SEALs and other special forces have access to the latest military hardware, potentially explaining why they would have used an experimental or secret helicopter type

The helicopter is removed by Pakistan’s soldiers

Experts also speculated that the classified helicopter could be a descendant of the now abandoned RAH-66 Comanche stealth helicopter project

There are NO black helicopters. I repeat there are NO black helicopters.

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Tue, 01 Nov 2011 21:30:00 +0000

Oh, those helicopters.

They don't exist.

I repeat there are NO black helicopters.

Now you say it.

There are NO black helicopters.

There are no Black Helicopters

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 15:28:00 +0000

God is true - evilution is false - there was a world wide flood

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Tue, 25 Oct 2011 03:42:00 +0000

Book Of Genesis, Chapter 6

Giants, nephilim, on the earth with the souls of demons, who were born of fallen angels and women. The giants and man's sin is the cause of the deluge. Noe is commanded to build the ark.

[1] And after that men began to be multiplied upon the earth, and daughters were born to them, [2] The sons of God [the fallen angels] seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, took to themselves wives of all which they chose. [3] And God said: My spirit shall not remain in man for ever, because he is flesh, and his days shall be a hundred and twenty years. [4] Now giants [nephilim] were upon the earth in those days. For after the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown. [5] And God seeing that the wickedness of men was great on the earth, and that all the thought of their heart was bent upon evil at all times, [6] It repented him that he had made man on the earth. And being touched inwardly with sorrow of heart, [7] He said: I will destroy man, whom I have created, from the face of the earth, from man even to beasts, from the creeping thing even to the fowls of the air, for it repenteth me that I have made them. [8] But Noe found grace before the Lord. [9] These are the generations of Noe: Noe was a just and perfect man in his generations, he walked with God. [10] And he begot three sons, Sem, Cham, and Japheth. [11] And the earth was corrupted before God, and was filled with iniquity. [12] And when God had seen that the earth was corrupted (for all flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth,) [13] He said to Noe: The end of all flesh is come before me, the earth is filled with iniquity through them, and I will destroy them with the earth. [14] Make thee an ark of timber planks: thou shalt make little rooms in the ark, and thou shalt pitch it within and without. [15] And thus shalt thou make it: The length of the ark shall be three hundred cubits: the breadth of it fifty cubits, and the height of it thirty cubits.

NASA - Emergency Preparedness Guidelines For Weapons of Mass Destruction

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Sun, 09 Oct 2011 05:36:00 +0000

Link in title above is to html version of original on Bing and the below link here is to PDF:
http://ohp.nasa.gov/policies/pdf/WMDEmergencyPreparednessGuidelines.pdf

If there were ever a WMD attack - actually, anywhere, this would be the most professional and humane and decent response imaginable. Most impressive. This is NASA's plan from shortly after 911. I remember at that time, when it was clear that something had happened to demolish two huge skyscrapers, that when both President and Vice-President of the United States told the people of this country to take very specific measures to guard against WMD attacks, I did just that, medical supplies etc. Quite a number of things. Then quite some time later I was criticized by people who didn't know or care about what they were talking about, that I must be wrong in doing this and it must be a resistance to proper authority. Absurd, it was the "proper authority" who said to take measures.

All emergency preparedness measures are good to have at all times. That much is not affected by the fact that two 757's DID NOT knock down two utterly huge buildings at 99 percent free fall into their own footprints, and a third building over 600 feet tall which wasn't even hit - down in under 7 seconds. I would dearly love to see NASA's super computer technical ability and the rest of their expertise analyse 911 from a perspective of the Physics involved, with the results public for the comments of their peers in the Scientific and Engineering communities. Debate and all challenges would be public - and very revealing to be sure.

To repeat: All emergency preparedness measures are good to have at all times. These below of NASA's are the best.

DRAFT 2002
NASA Occupational Health Program 1 Emergency Preparedness Guidelines For Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction The events of September 11th, 2001 highlighted our need to improve our emergency response plans and enhance our capability to manage an incident of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). NASA Occupational Health Program (OHP) health care facilities must be prepared to immediately put their emergency management plan into action and initiate communications to effectively mobilize human and material resources. The clinic plans must be fully integrated into the Center wide emergency response plan. Emergency plans need to be reviewed regularly because threats/events may change with knowledge and time.

Objectives Many NASA OHP clinics lack plans for responding to WMD events at their Center. The objectives of these Emergency Preparedness Guidelines are as follows: ο Assist individual NASA Centers to improve their current Emergency Response Plans. ο Ensure that Centers' Emergency Response Plans are up to date. ο Ensure Center complete a threat vulnerability analysis. ο Ensure Centers' Emergency Response Plans are compliant with latest JCAHO standards and with "best industry practices". ο Develop emergency medical plans consistent with their resources, capabilities and Center needs. ο Ensure Centers develop communication links with the local health care community. ο Ensure Center integrate their emergency response plans with local and state response plans. ο Assist Centers to understand and access federal assets available during an WMD incidents. Emergency Response Planning The emergency medical response plan must be a component of the overall Center emergency preparedness plan. The Center plan is established usually with key areas such as medical, environmental, safety and security in coordination with the local community emergency planning priorities for potential emergencies identified during the threat vulnerability analysis. The plan must include the following components: ο Describe the activation of the emergency response plan, e.g., how, when and by whom. ο Identify which personnel are responsible for which activities during emergencies. ο Notifying personnel when emergency procedures are initiated. ο Identifying personnel during emergencies. ο Define and integrate the Center's role with that of local emergency response agencies. ο Develop an emergency command structure. ο Detail the processes for notification of external authorities of emergencies.

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 2 ο Management of patient care activities, logistics, security, and communications. ο Detail the evacuation processes for the organization. ο Establish an alternate care site(s) that meet clinical needs. ο Reestablish and/or continue operation following the disaster. ο Provide alternate means of meeting essential building utility needs to provide continuous service. ο Monitor ongoing emergency plan performance in drills and real emergencies. ο Determine how an annual evaluation of the plan's objective, scope, performance, and effectiveness will occur. ο Detail the transfer and tracking of employees, staff and equipment to alternate care sites. ο Establish communication processes with alternate care sites. ο Establish backup internal and external communication systems. ο Identify radioactive, biological, or chemical isolation and decontamination sites. Threat Vulnerability Analysis Each Center must evaluate their existing emergency response plans to determine the extent to which they are prepared to respond to a WMD event. The process begins with a threat vulnerability analysis at each Center. The assessment must consider the following: ο All potential health threats and the direct and indirect effects they could have on the Center. ο Clarification of health threats, e.g., natural health, man-made health and internal versus external threats. ο Consider known risk, geographic location and presence of local high-risk industry when estimating probability. ο Evaluate how well your current emergency response plan deals with various threats, e.g., training level of staff and availability of resources for various health threats. ο Consider the probability of occurrence and the human, property and operational impact on the Center. ο Rate of probability of occurrences of the individual health threats, e.g., high, moderate, or low. ο Rate how well your clinic is prepared to deal with different situations, e.g., good, fair, or poor. Communications The emergency response plan should include measures to ensure that the OHP clinic is capable of reliable communication with their own response personnel, as well as, other personnel on Center involved in responding to emergencies. The communication system should: ο Disseminate accurate information to medical staff, first responders and decision makers.

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 3 ο Include protocols for notifying Emergency Operation Center in the affected area to facilitate communication and coordination in the event of a WMD event. ο Include a sufficient number of radios and radio frequencies to facilitate communication between organizations. ο Maintain a contact list of critical local and state public health, medical, law enforcement, emergency management personnel and Center medical personnel, distribute as appropriate and verify at least quarterly. ο Develop provision to disseminate information about diagnosis and patient/employee management for high-risk terrorism threat agents to local and state health care providers, hospitals, clinics, laboratories and pharmacies. ο Address internal and external communications needs including designating personnel authorized to communicate and receive emergency information between the Center medical personnel, emergency response personnel and community health care providers. ο The procedures for periodic testing of primary and back-up emergency communications should be addressed in the plan. Clinical Requirements The emergency response plan describes the criteria or conditions that trigger the activation of the plan. An individual and alternate should be identified to serve in the leadership/command position for clinic operations and the interface with the Center Incident Command Officer. An alternative site for the clinic operations needs to be identified and prepared in the event the clinic is not available for employee/patient care. The clinic and alternate site must have an emergency power generator and water available. Special consideration should be given to isolation guidelines. The guidelines for isolation precautions, patient placement and transport should be developed. The protocol for cleaning and disinfecting of patient care areas needs should be identified for bacterial agents, viruses and biological toxins. The medical personnel providing clinic coverage during a emergency should be offered immunizations based on the recommendation by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for health care workers. A post exposure immunization plan should be developed to identify and manage health care workers exposed to infectious patients. Staff should be familiar with the local health care community and the resources available in the event of an emergency. A list of important emergency phone numbers must be maintained and updated periodically. Staff should become familiar with relevant lines of communications and the availability of the emergency phone number list. The Center clinics should develop an increased awareness of the ongoing threat of bioterrorism. They should become familiar and develop a working knowledge of the CDC's most likely and dangerous pathogens through ongoing and periodic training. Ongoing education should provide opportunities to accurately asses and quickly

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 4 recognize signs and symptoms of diseases and monitor disease patterns and numbers of cases. Management of incidents should be guided by the SEE principles: S afe: no one gets hurt; E ffective: Everyone works towards stated objectives; E fficient: All resources utilized to maximum benefit. Emergency Preparedness Supplies The final determination of pharmaceuticals and related supplies to be stocked for managing incidents of WMD rests with the Center Medical Director. These decisions should be based on the threat vulnerability assessment and recommendation from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The amount of pharmaceuticals and supplies is based on the Center's population and what is needed to survive 24 hours until relief supplies arrive from the NPSP. Suggested pharmaceuticals include: ο For bacterial agents: o Ciprofloxacin o Doxycycline o Penicillin o Chloramphenicol o Azithromycin o Rifampin o Streptomycin o Gentamicin ο For cyanides: o Cyanide antidote kits containing amyl nitrite, sodium nitrite, and sodium thiosulfate. ο For lewisite: o British anti-lewisite ο For nerve agents: o Atropine o Pralidoxime chloride o Diazepam (or lorazepam) Medical Equipment and Supplies ο Mechanical respiratory ventilators ο IV pumps and poles ο IV supplies o IV fluids-D5W, D5NaCl, D5 lactated ringers o In-dwelling catheters o IV sets ο Suction machines ο Stretchers ο Wheelchairs ο Linens ο Bandages and dressings

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 5 Health Surveillance and Epidemiology Investigation NASA Center emergency response plans should address the need for epidemiological investigations. An individual should be identified in the plan to manage enhanced surveillance and epidemiological investigations during a bioterrorism incident. Surveillance and epidemiologic capability is the foundation for the detection, evaluation and designing of an effective response to WMD events. This capacity will facilitate the initial detection and response in a WMD to monitor the impact of these events and the effectiveness of the responses. The detection of WMD events using biological or certain chemical agents will require linking of data from a variety of sources. An effective response will depend on the timeliness and quality of communications among Center personnel, public health agencies at the local, state, and federal levels, laboratories, poison centers, and other health response partners. Event Notification The Center emergency response plan should identify the individual and alternates responsible for assessing the threat to employee health and consequences of the incident. The plan should address how event-related data will be received and how the assessment information will be distributed and used. Center Alert The emergency response plan should describe the process and means that the employee population at a Center will be notified about a public health emergency. The notification should be coordinated with other response organizations. The notification should advise employees of protective actions and the notification process should be tested on an annual basis. Notification should be provided in other languages at Centers with non- English speaking populations. Employee Education and Emergency Public Information Each Center should provide an education program covering WMD health matters of interest to the population. The educational program could be ongoing to update the employee population with new health related information, emerging trends, and preventative health measures. Patient/Employee Decontamination The emergency plans should have provisions for performing effective decontamination, when necessary after a WMD event. Effective planning and consultation during the threat or incident can limit unnecessary decontamination substantially and ensure needed decontamination actions are timely, sufficient, and effective. Mass Care In the event of a mass causality the OHP clinics would not likely be directly managing the mass casualties but the plan would need to address such a situation. Centers should be aware of the health care facilities responsible for mass care in their community.

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 6 Environmental Issues Though the clinics would not have any direct responsibility for dealing with the environmental consequences of a WMD event, they do have an advisory role to play and the responsibility to monitor the employee's long-term health and safety issues. Mental Health Emergency situations cause a significant amount of stress on responders and victims. The emergency plan must include provisions for identifying and obtaining mental health resources from those affected by an emergency situation. The responsibility for ensuring resources rests with the Center Employee Assistance Manager. Mass Fatalities WMD emergencies can generate a significant number of fatalities that poses special challenges. The OHP clinic should consult with medical examiners or coroners to develop protocols for dealing with a large number of fatalities. National Pharmaceutical Stockpile The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPSP) was created by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The NPSP insures the availability and rapid deployment of the life-saving pharmaceuticals, antidotes, medical supplies and equipment needed to counter the effects of biological agents, nerve agents, and chemical agents. It consists of caches (push packets) of antibiotics, antidotes, antitoxins, life support and airway maintenance supplies and other medical and surgical supplies stored across the country. Upon request by a state, the NPSP program stands ready for immediate deployment to any U.S. location in the event of a terrorist attack directed against a civilian population. State and local authorities are then responsible for the distribution of supplies within the community. NASA clinics must know how to access this resource if needed to meet the needs of the employee population. Laboratory Diagnosis and Support Clinical laboratories play a critical role in the readiness and response of bioterrorism attacks. They define a bioterrorism incident through the identification of a bioterrorism agent. The laboratories are responsible for developing guidelines and protocols for sampling and labeling, packaging, communication of test results and safe disposal of samples. Laboratories are also responsible for transportation of the samples, Chain of Custody (COC) and referrals and contacts of appropriate level laboratories. NASA Center clinics must be knowable about the laboratories they utilize. This includes the level of the laboratory, and their capabilities. Clinics should know the biosafety level of the laboratory. The certification and accreditation requirements of your laboratory should be known. This will require Centers to continually evaluate the laboratories being utilized. The CDC, Association of Public Health Laboratories and the FBI developed the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) to aid with the response to bioterrorism. The goals of the LRN are to quickly and safely identify bioterrorism agents and coordinate inter-

DRAFT 2002 NASA Occupational Health Program 7 organizational activities. The laboratory serves as both a testing and exchange network. The LRN is composed of county, city, state and federal public health laboratories that accept sample from various sources and organizations. The LRN has level A, B, C and D laboratory but primarily level B and C labs.

NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (AKA "Warrantless Wiretapping")

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Sun, 02 Oct 2011 17:43:00 +0000

NSA warrantless surveillance controversy

See link in title for article.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

For the related controversy about data-mining of domestic call records see NSA call database.

National Security Agency

The NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (AKA "Warrantless Wiretapping") concerns surveillance of persons within the United States during the collection of foreign intelligence by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) as part of the war on terror. Under this program, referred to by the Bush administration as the "terrorist surveillance program",^[1] part of the broader President's Surveillance Program, the NSA is authorized by executive order to monitor, without search warrants, phone calls, Internet activity (Web, e-mail, etc.), text messaging, and other communication involving any party believed by the NSA to be outside the U.S., even if the other end of the communication lies within the U.S. Critics, however, claimed that it was in an effort to attempt to silence critics of the Bush Administration and their handling of several hot button issues during its tenure.

Bunker Busters and Israel

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Thu, 29 Sep 2011 22:08:00 +0000

FAS: "Bunker Busters": Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

Global Research: US completing massive 'bunker buster' bomb

Traditional Catholic Prayers: Google Search - Bunker Buster Bombs Israel.

______________________________________________________

FAS: Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) Bunker Buster - Smart Weapons:

Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28)
BLU-113 Penetrator

The Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) is a special weapon developed for penetrating hardened Iraqi command centers located deep underground. The GBU-28 is a 5,000-pound laser-guided conventional munition that uses a 4,400-pound penetrating warhead. The bombs are modified Army artillery tubes, weigh 4,637 pounds, and contain 630 pounds of high explosives. They are fitted with GBU-27 LGB kits, 14.5 inches in diameter and almost 19 feet long. The operator illuminates a target with a laser designator and then the munition guides to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target.

The GBU 28 "Bunker Buster" was put together in record time to support targeting of the Iraqi hardened command bunker by adapting existing materiel. The GBU-28 was not even in the early stages of research when Kuwait was invaded. The USAF asked industry for ideas in the week after combat operations started. Work on the bomb was conducted in research laboratories including the the Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate located at Eglin AFB, Florida and the Watervliet Armory in New York. The bomb was fabricated starting on 1 February, using surplus 8-inch artillery tubes as bomb casings because of their strength and weight. The official go-ahead for the project was issued on 14 February, and explosives for the initial units were hand-loaded by laboratory personnel into a bomb body that was partially buried upright in the ground. The first two units were delivered to the USAF on 16 and 17 February, and the first flight to test the guidance software and fin configuration was conducted on 20 February. These tests were successful and the program proceeded with a contract let on 22 February. A sled test on 26 February proved that the bomb could penetrate over 20 feet of concrete, while an earlier flight test had demonstrated the bomb's ability to penetrate more than 100 feet of earth. The first two operational bombs were delivered to the theater on 27 February.

The Air Force produced a limited quantity of the GBU-28 during Operation Desert Storm to attack multi-layered, hardened underground targets. Only two of these weapons were dropped in Desert Storm, both by F-111Fs. One weapon hit its precise aimpoint, and the onboard aircraft video recorder displayed an outpouring of smoke from an entrance way approximately 6 seconds after impact. After Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force incorporated some modifications, and further tested the munition. The Fy1997 budget request contained $18.4 million to procure 161 GBU-28 hard target penetrator bombs.

For a visual depiction of how the GBU-28 works view the grapic produced by Bob Sherman and USA Today on-line.

Specifications
Mission	Offensive counter air, close air support, interdiction
Targets	Fixed hard
Class	4,000 lb. Penetrator, Blast/Fragmentation
Service	Air Force
Contractor	Lockheed (BLU-113/B), National Forge (BLU-113A/B),
Program status	Production
First capability	1991
Weight (lbs.)	4,414
Length (in.)	153
Diameter (in.)	14.5
Explosive	6471bs. Tritonal
Fuze	FMU-143 Series
Stabilizer	Air Foil Group (Fins)
Guidance method	Laser (man-in-the-loop)
Range	Greater than 5 nautical miles
Development cost	Development cost is not applicable to this munition.
Production cost	$18.2 million
Total cost	$18.2 million
Acquisition unit cost	$145,600
Production unit cost	$145,600
Quantity	125 plus additional production
Platforms	F-15E, F-111F

Sources and Resources

How TTR Helped the Air Force Ready a New Bomb Sandia Lab News, July 26, 1991
GBU-28 CHAPTER VI - THE AIR CAMPAIGN Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

Helicopters

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Fri, 23 Sep 2011 21:45:00 +0000

Bell 222 Helicopter

Bell 430 Helicopter

MD 500 Series Helicopter

The Westland Lynx ZB500 (Fastest helicopter in the world)

The Westland Lynx ZB500

Bell 430 Helicopter

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Mon, 19 Sep 2011 05:43:00 +0000

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

Link in title to FAS PDF: "The Concept of Space Combat"

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

• Gen Thomas D. White

Chief of Staff, USAF, 1957

Definition and Relevance

This definition includes actions taken against space systems that are

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

100

Space Combat Employment

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

101

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

102

The Significance of Space Combat

The Emerging Space Threat

These nations are attempting to acquire space-derived data through their own military systems or through international commercial systems. In addition to learning the importance of access to

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

103

space-derived data, they learned the importance of denying enemies access to space-derived data. Space combat support systems have become high-value targets.

$ Technology verification of an enemy’s capabilities;

$ Analysis of terrain features for combat planning;

$ Surveillance of forces and their movements;

$ Targeting of hostile forces; and

$ Assessment of battle damage.17

The only country, other than the US and FSU, to start the development of an ASAT capability was China, which conducted a

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

104

Current US Military Thought

about Space Combat

Surface Service Thoughts on Space Combat

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

105

man “ground-based ASAT firing batteries” in support of USCINCSPACE.25 In spite of its work in strategic defense, the Army plans to exploit space in support of ground forces.

US Air Force Thoughts on Space Combat

The Case against Space Combat

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

106

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

107

Notes

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

108

2. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Why Third World Space Systems Matter,” Orbis, Fall 1991, 569–70.

3. France developed a satellite called Helios for joint use by France, Spain, and Belgium.

4. In December of 1989, Iraq launched a vehicle for the announced purpose of launching satellites. Mahnken, 567.

5. This is an inference based on the importance observers are putting on space.

9. These are nonstandard terms. Hopefully, the author’s terms are more complete.

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

109

11. Space denial is an expanded form of offensive counterspace. Defensive counterspace includes both passive and active defensive operations or designs.

12. Space strike is an expanded form of force application, which includes attacks on other heavenly bodies besides the earth.

13. This definition excludes the active countermeasure of maneuver, but includes the use of electronic warfare to defend space systems.

14. Mary C. FitzGerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, August 1993), 19.

15. Lowell Wood, “The US Air Force in 2020,” SPACECAST 2020 lecture, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 27 October 1993, 8.

16. Deputy for Development Planning, Space and Missile Systems Center, “An Evolving Focus for Military Missions in Space, 1995–2020,” vol. 1, Executive Summary, 50–51.

18. Mahnken, 565–66.

19. Ibid., 564, 573.

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

23. FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993, 2-3.

24. Quoted in “Space Primer,” Soldier, April 1987, 8.

25. Heike Hasenauer, “Army Takes the Lead in ASAT,” Soldier, August 1989, 13–20.

26. Quoted in Lt Col Charles D. Friedstein, “The Uniqueness of Space Doctrine,” Air University Review 37, no. 1 (November–December 1985): 15.

27. AFM 1-6, Aerospace Doctrine: Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982, 8.

28. First, no space role is suggested or discussed under force application.

29. Air Force Doctrine Directive (AFDD) 4, Air Force Operational Doctrine:

Space Operations (draft), November 1993, 7, 11, 14, 19, 27–28.

30. Caton.

III, LEO on the Cheap: Methods for Achieving Drastic Reductions in Space Launch

Costs, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June 1993).

32. An argument can be made that SDI was a technologically driven program, not an operationally driven one. Lots of good ideas and science came out of it, but no systems.

33. Dunbar Lockwood, “Administration Backs ‘Narrow’ Interpretation of ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today, September 1993, 22.

35. Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Clinton Hews to Narrow View on ABM Treaty,” Congressional Quarterly, 17 July 1993, 1894.

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

111

_____________________________________________

Extremely Important Links with more Links contained therein.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) WMD Links

The Nuclear Weapon Archive A Guide to Nuclear Weapons

Federation of American Scientists WMD Resources

WMD Around the World

FAS Status of World Nuclear Forces

FAS States Possessing, Pursuing or Capable of Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction

FAS Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence Threat Assessments

FAS Strategic Security Blog

U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization Project - a truly fine project

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Thu, 15 Sep 2011 20:13:00 +0000

U.S. Army Chemical demilitarization rotary kiln
http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=U.S.+Army+Chemical+demilitarization+rotary+kiln&view=detail&id=136FCD7FE69F2B41328947A01683EC53DA58CF50&first=0&FORM=IDFRIR

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The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) - Ordnance Viewer

Image Source Page: http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/ordview.aspx?id=20

http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/ordview.aspx?id=20#
The Deactivation Furnace System (DFS) is one of three furnaces required by various munitions for destruction. The DFS provides flexibility and the capacity to incinerate the chopped rockets, explosives, propellants and remaining chemical agents. The DFS is a rotary kiln.

U.S. Army Home Last Modified on Friday, September 04, 2009 Legal Notices
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U.S. Military Officers for 9/11 Truth

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Tue, 13 Sep 2011 19:00:00 +0000

SIGN THE PETITION

Preliminary Website - Subject to Change
Based on their prior statements questioning the official account
of 9/11 and/or supporting a new investigation, the following officers have been invited to sign the petition. Only those
officers listed as having signed the petition have done so.

As Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers in the U.S. military, we took an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same."

Regardless of our current status -- active duty, reserves, retired, or civilian -- that oath remains in force. Therefore it is not just our responsibility as citizens, it is our duty as officers to expose the real perpetrators of 9/11 and bring them to justice, no matter how hard it is, how long it takes, how much we have to suffer, or where it leads us.

We believe the official account of 9/11 as defined in the 9/11 Commission Report is grossly inaccurate and fatally flawed.

It is imperative that we have an accurate understanding of 9/11 so that those responsible can be identified and brought to justice in order that they and similarly-minded people never again commit such heinous crimes.

It is also imperative that we have an accurate understanding of 9/11 so that governmental policies and military actions resulting from 9/11 are based on truth rather than deception.

We join with others, such as Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth, Pilots for 9/11 Truth, Firefighters for 9/11 Truth, Veterans for 9/11 Truth, Medical Professionals for 9/11 Truth, and Lawyers for 9/11 Truth, and millions of individual citizens in demanding a thorough, impartial, open and transparent reinvestigation of the terrorist acts of 9/11.

PETITION:

We, the undersigned current and former Commissioned and Non-commissioned U.S. Military Officers, believe that whereas:

There is incontrovertible publicly available evidence since 9/11/01 that the official account of the events of that day is incomplete and fraught with errors;

The 9/11 Commission Report inadequately answered, and in numerous cases even failed to address, many of the most important questions that were called to its attention;

The blatant disregard of extensive compelling evidence that clearly refutes the official account raises rational suspicion of intentional deception by agents of the U.S. Government;

U.S. Government policies and military actions have been, and continue to be, founded upon assumptions about the events of 9/11 that are likely to be erroneous;

As a result of U.S. military action based on the official account of 9/11, thousands of U.S. servicemen and women and hundreds of thousands of civilians have lost their lives; and

The perpetrators of the heinous crimes against humanity that were committed on 9/11 have still not been brought to justice.

Therefore, we petition the Congress of the United States for a new and independent investigation into the events of 9/11/01 by a duly constituted legal body with the authority to subpoena and require testimony under oath, and with authority to prosecute if criminal activity is discovered, so that the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity can at last be brought to justice.

Signed by the following currently serving and former U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers:

Continue here:

U.S. Military Officers for 9/11 Truth - Section 1

U. S. Military Officers for 9/11 Truth - Section 2...

911 (2)

_________________________________________________|

Also see this link.

Sweet Liberty: Israel's Mossad: Black Ops and False Flags

Firefighters for 9-11 Truth

noreply@blogger.com (صفيّة Safiyah) — Tue, 13 Sep 2011 18:25:00 +0000

Flyer page 1 and 2
No Comments

25 Nov 2008 / Uncategorized, What Can I do

Here is our Flyer.

Please distribute to your local Fire Stations, Police Stations, and everybody else.

Thank you!!

flyer3
Summary of Evidence of Controlled Demolition at the World Trade Center
1 Comment

25 Nov 2008 / Controlled Demolition, Evidence

This work is dedicated to Chief of Department Peter J. Ganci Jr. and his
342 fellow F.D.N.Y. members killed in action while trying to save others.

Summary of Evidence of Controlled Demolition at the World Trade Center
(Expansive citations below)

This article appeared originally at FireFightersFor911Truth.org and is the intellectual property of David R. Wayne & Greg Garrison ©2008 with all use permissions hereby granted provided that all copies include this notice of authorship.

The evidence summarized below proves conclusively that 3 World Trade Center buildings should have been tested for “exotic accelerants.” It also establishes the most probable cause of collapse on 9/11/2001 to be the result of controlled demolitions. It makes no attempt to determine why, or to imply by whom. From a scientific standpoint, it is inadvisable to leap to conclusions because there are always scenarios we may not be prepared to imagine. In science, as in life, an open mind is a good thing.

CLICK HERE FOR SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

Kidnapping and Torture

noreply@blogger.com (ستيف في فيستا) — Mon, 12 Sep 2011 19:39:00 +0000

Saint Romero pray for us

I was a member of AAAS, Engineering Division, long time ago, back in the time when I was working in High Tech. They are basically a benign organization dedicated to Science. At the time I was a member, I ordered from them and still have my copy of 'The Breaking of Bodies and Minds - Torture, Psychiatric Abuse, and the Health Professions - Edited by Eric Stover and Elena O. Nightingale, M.D., Foreword by David A. Hamburg, M.D. - American Association for the Advancement of Science.'

It is a timeless indictment of False Imprisonment and Torture by Medical and any other authority and person and persons for any reason, especially political suppression of peoples.

Where you find political suppression, you will always find religious suppression with it. Archbishop Romero of El Salvador was assassinated for his profession of Jesus Christ and stance against persecution of the faith and oppression of the poor people by neo-fascist United States sponsored (read Heinz [a.k.a. Henry] Kissinger's Operation Condor and related Vatican Ratlines, Granta, ODESSA, Nazi/Neo-Nazi South American CIA insurgencies and murder) paramilitary right-wing groups and the government. Saint Romero did not then align himself with the Marxists, instead, he aligned himself with Jesus Christ and His kingdom as he had always done.

From Wikipedia: Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez (15 August 1917 – 24 March 1980)^[1] was a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador. He became the fourth Archbishop of San Salvador, succeeding Luis Chávez. He was assassinated on 24 March 1980.

In less than three years, more than fifty priests have been attacked, threatened and slandered. Six of them are martyrs, having been assassinated; various others have been tortured, and others expelled from the country. Religious women have also been the object of persecution. The archdiocesan radio station, Catholic educational institutions and Christian religious institutions have been constantly attacked, menaced, threatened with bombs. Various parish convents have been sacked.^[7]

— Oscar Romero

For a prime and always pertinent medical indictment of kidnapping ('desaparecido' - disappearance) and torture go to this source -

Link: AAAS Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program

Title:	The Breaking of Bodies and Minds: Torture, Psychiatric Abuse, and the Health Professions
Price:	$11.95 ($9.50 for AAAS members)
Author(s):	Elena O. Nightingale Eric Stover
Year:	1985
Language(s):	English
Distributor:	AAAS Science and Human Rights Program 1200 New York Avenue, NW Washington DC, 20005 Tel: 202 326 6600 Fax: 202 289 4950 E-mail: shrp@aaas.org Cost of shipping and handling will be added to the invoice. Please indicate if you need rush delivery.

Title: The Breaking of Bodies and Minds: Torture, Psychiatric Abuse, and the Health Professions

Price: $11.95 ($9.50 for AAAS members)

Author(s): Elena O. Nightingale
Eric Stover

Year: 1985

Language(s): English

Distributor: AAAS Science and Human Rights Program
1200 New York Avenue, NW
Washington DC, 20005

Tel: 202 326 6600
Fax: 202 289 4950
E-mail: shrp@aaas.org

Cost of shipping and handling will be added to the invoice. Please indicate if you need rush delivery.

Tech_Journal

U.S.-NATO ABM Missile System “Covers” a Large Part of Russian Territory

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Retweeted by ira15091972 and 100+ others

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By WILLIAM J. BROAD, JOHN MARKOFF and DAVID E. SANGER

Published: January 15, 2011

Hypersonic weapon: New US bomb kills long before you hear it — RT

Hypersonic weapon: New US bomb kills long before you hear it

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

Definition and Relevance

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

Space Combat Employment

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

The Significance of Space Combat

The Emerging Space Threat

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

Current US Military Thought

Surface Service Thoughts on Space Combat

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

US Air Force Thoughts on Space Combat

The Case against Space Combat

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

Notes

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

Wall Street Journal: Man 1/3rd Bin Laden's age in his place and Crashed Copter Sparks Concern About Secrets

By NATHAN HODGE

After the Raid

The Compound

Black Helicopters What are they doing in Napa? By Harry V. Martin

Secret Stealth Helicopters in Osama bin Laden Raid

There are NO black helicopters. I repeat there are NO black helicopters.

There are no Black Helicopters

God is true - evilution is false - there was a world wide flood

NASA - Emergency Preparedness Guidelines For Weapons of Mass Destruction

NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (AKA "Warrantless Wiretapping")

NSA warrantless surveillance controversy

Bunker Busters and Israel

Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28)BLU-113 Penetrator

Specifications

Sources and Resources

Helicopters

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Nuclear (and other Weapons of Mass Destruction) World War III has already started.

Definition and Relevance

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

Space Combat Employment

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

The Significance of Space Combat

The Emerging Space Threat

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

Current US Military Thought

Surface Service Thoughts on Space Combat

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

US Air Force Thoughts on Space Combat

The Case against Space Combat

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

Notes

ESSAYS ON AIR AND SPACE POWER, VOL. II

THE CONCEPT OF SPACE COMBAT

U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization Project - a truly fine project

U.S. Military Officers for 9/11 Truth

Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28)
BLU-113 Penetrator